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THE 


Psychological  Review 


EDITED  By 
J.  MARK  BALDWIN  J.  McKEEN  CATTELL 

AMD 

PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY  COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY 

WITH  THE  CO-OPERATION  OP 

ALFRED  BINET,  ECOLE  DES  HAUTES-ETUDES,  PARIS;  JOHN  DEWEY,  UNIVERSITY  OF 
CHICAGO;    H.  H.  DONALDSON,    UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO;  G.  S.  FULLERTON, 
UNIVERSITY  OF  PENNSYLVANIA;   JOSEPH  JASTROW,  UNIVERSITY  OF  WIS- 
CONSIN;   G.  T.   LADD,  YALE  UNIVERSITY;   HUGO  MUNSTERBERG, 
HARVARD  UNIVERSITY;    M.  ALLEN  STARR,  COLLEGE  OF  PHY- 
SICIANS AND  SURGEONS,  NEW  YORK  ;  CARL  STUMPF,  UNI- 
VERSITY,   BERLIN;    JAMES    SULLY,   UNIVERSITY 
COLLEGE,  LONDON. 


Volume  IV.      1897. 


PUBLISHED  BI-MONTHLY  BY 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY, 

41  N.  QUEEN  ST.,  LANCASTER,  PA. 

66  FIFTH  AVENUE,  NEW  YORK;  AND  LONDON. 
Copyright  1897  by  THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY. 


P7 


PRESS  OF 

THE  NEW  ERA  PRINTING  COMPANY, 
LANCASTER,  PA. 


CONTENTS   OF  VOLUME   IV. 


ALPHABETICAL  INDICES  OF  NAMES  AND  SUBJECTS  WILL  BE  FOUND  AT  THE 
END  OF  THE  VOLUME. 


ARTICLES. 

PAGE. 

The  Knower  in  Psychology:    G.  S.  FULLERTON i 

Studies  in  the  Physiology  and  Psychology  of  the  Telegraphic  Lan- 
guage:   W.L.BRYAN 27 

The  Influence  of  Intellectual  Work  Upon  the  Blood  Pressure  in 

Man:   A.  BINET  and  N.  VASCHIDE 55 

Proceedings  of  the  Fifth  Annual  Meeting  of  the  American  Psy- 
chological Association,  Boston,  December,  1896 107 

Upright  Vision:  J.  H.  HYSLOP 142 

The  Stages  of  Knowledge:    A.  H.  LLOYD 164 

The  Negative  in  Logic :    A.  F.  ORMOND 23 1 

Discrimination  in  Cutaneous  Sensation  (Harvard  Studies)  :    S. 

M.  SOLOMONS 246 

Studies  in  Sensation  and  Judgment  (Harvard  Studies)  :  E.  A. 

SINGER 250 

The  Identification  of  the  Self:  SMITH  BAKER 272 

Some  Memory  Tests  of  Whites  and  Blacks:    G.  R.  STETSON 285 

Experiments  on  Memory  Types :   C.  J.  HAWKINS 289 

The  Propagation  of  Memories :  C.  L.  HERRICK 294 

Notes  on  Reaction  Types :  L.  FARRAND,  J.  McK.  CATTELL  and 

J.  MARK  BALDWIN 297 

Vision  Without  Inversion  of  the  Retinal  Image :    G.  M.  STRAT- 

TON 341,  463 

The  Psychology  of  Sufficient  Reason:    W.  M.  URBAN 361 

Some  Facts  of  Binocular  Vision :  C.  H.  JUDD 374 

Blots  of  Ink  in  Experimental  Psychology:   G.  V.  DEARBORN 390 

The  Imagery  of  One  Early  Made  Blind:    A.  CAMERON 391 

Determinate  Evolution :  J.  MARK  BALDWIN 393 


jv  CONTENTS. 

PAGE. 
Involuntary  Motor  Reaction  to  Pleasant  and  Unpleasant  Stimuli 

(Harvard  Studies)  :  G.  N.  DEARBORN  and  F.  N.  SPIND- 

LER 453 

The  Psychology  of  Social  Organization:  J.  MARK  BALDWIN 482 

Le  Dantec's  Work  on  Biological  Determinism:  A.  BINET 516 

A  New  Factor  in  Weber's  Law :  C.  E.  SEASHORE 522 

Note  on  the  Rapidity  of  Dreams :  R.  S.  WOODWORTH. 524 

The  Reaction  Time  of  Counting  (Princeton  Studies)  :  H.  C. 

WARREN 569 

Some  Experiments  on  the  Double-Point  Threshold  (Princeton 

Studies)  :  G.  A.  TAWNEY  and  C.  W.  HODGE 591 

The  Force  and  Rapidity  of  Reaction  Movements  (Harvard 

Studies)  :    E.  B.  DELABARRE,  R.  R.  LOGAN  and  O.  F. 

REED 615 

After-Sensations  of  Touch :  F.  N.  SPINDLER 632 

DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS. 

Language  and  Image  :    H.M.STANLEY 67 

Upright  Vision :  J.  H.  HYSLOP 71 

The  President's  Address :    G.  T.  LADD 180 

Upright  Vision  and  the  Retinal  Image:    G.  M.  STRATTON 182 

The  Originality  of  ^Esthetic  Feeling :  M.  WILDE 188 

Professor  Ladd  and  the  President's  Address:  G.  S.  FULLERTON..  402 

Visceral  Disease  and  Pain :    E.  A.  PACE 405 

The  Color- Vision  of  Approaching  Sleep:    C.  L.  FRANKLIN 641 

Professor  Wundt's  '  Ueber  naiven  und  kritischen  Realismus ' :  W. 

M.  URBAN 643 

PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE. 

Weber's  History  of  Philosophy :   E.  H.  GRIFFIN 74 

Sterrett's  Power  of  Thought :    R.  B.  JOHNSON 76 

Bussell's  School  of  Plato:  A.  T.  ORMOND 79 

Walker's  Doctrine  of  Personality :  JAMES  SETH 8 1 

Nichols' Number  and  Space :  M.  WASHBURN  82 

Hallock's  Central  Nervous  System:    GUY  TAWNEY 85 

Schopenhauer's  Art  of  Controversy,  Kohn's  Theorie  der  Auf- 

merksamkeit:    J.  G.  HIBBEN 86 

Richet's  Dictionnaire  de  Physiologic :    A.  BINET 87 


CONTENTS.  v 

PACE. 

Binet's  Alterations  of  Personality,   Hart's  Hypnotism :  W.  R. 

NEWBOLD 88 

Metscher's  Leib  u.  Seele,  Michaelis'  Willensfreiheit :  H.  N. 

GARDINER 90 

Mill's  Psychic  Development  of  Young  Animals :  H.  M.  STAN- 
LEY   92 

Vision:  C.  L.  FRANKLIN,  E.  B.  DELABARRE 93 

Feeling  (Dumas' Joie  et  Tristesse,  Storring's  Einfluss  der  Gefiihle 

auf  die  Vorstellungen)  :  A.  BINET,  L.  B.  McWnooo 97 

Pathological:  H.  N.  GARDINER,  J.  H.  LEUBA 101 

Schurman's  Agnosticism  and  Religion:  W.  J 192 

MacTaggart's  Studies  in  the  Hegelian  Dialectic :  F.  C.  S. 

SCHILLER 193 

Hoff ding's  Kierkegaard :  A.  C.  ARMSTRONG,  JR 197 

Wentscher's  Physische  u.  psychische  Kausalitat :  C.  H.  JUDD 198 

Rehmke's  Geschichte  der  Philosophic:  JAMES  SIMMONS,  JR 200 

Jovanovich's  Die  Impersonalien :  S.  F.  MACLENNAN 201 

HaleVy's  IrreVersibilite  des  Phenomenes  psychologiques :  J.  M. 

TROUT 203 

Experimental  (Flournoy's  Types  de  Reaction,  Shield's  Effects  of 

Odors,  etc.,  Drew's  Attention)  :    HELEN  B.  THOMPSON, 

E.  A.  PACE,  E.  C.  SANFORD 205 

Anthropology  and  Criminology  (Robinsohn's  Naturvolker,  Lom- 

broso  and  Ferrero's  Female  Offender)  :  LIVINGSTON  FAR- 
RAND,  FRANZ  BOAS , 211 

Child  Psychology :  H.  T.  LUKENS 213 

Physiology  and  Biology  (Howell's  Text-book  of  Physiology, 
Poulton's  Darwin)  :  J.  McK.  CATTELL,  J.  MARK  BALD- 
WIN    216 

Vision:  C.  L.  FRANKLIN 220 

Pathological  (Du  Fougeray's  Manual  pratique,  Bourneville's  R£- 
cherches  cliniques,  Wernicke's  Grundriss]der  Psychiatric)  : 

F.  PETERSEN,  W.  J 223 

Jodl's  Lehrbuch:  G.  W.  T.  PATRICK 300 

Robertson's  Elements :  J.  McK.  CATTELL 306 

Fraser's  Philosophy  of  Theism  :  FRANCIS  G.  PEABODY 307 

Merz'  History  of  European  Thought:  R.  M.  WENLEY 309 

Lasswitz' Fechner :  G.  A.  TAWNEY 310 

Morgan's  Habit  and  Instinct :  C.  S.  MINOT 312 

Social  Psychology  (Le  Bon's  The  Crowd,  etc.)  :  W.  J.,  J.  H. 

TUFTS 316 


vi  CONTENTS. 

PAGE- 

Neurology  and  Physiology  (Wilson's  The  Cell ;  Starr's  Atlas  of 

Nerve  Cells)  :  E.  G.  CONKLIN,  LIVINGSTON  FARRAND 318 

Vision:  C.  L.  FRANKLIN,  E.  B.  DELABARRE 324 

Experimental:    E.   B.  DELABARRE,   H.   C.  WARREN,  M.  W. 

CALKINS,  H.  GRIPPING,  J.  M.  TROUT 326 

Logical:  J.  B.  HIBBEN,  R.  M.  WENLEY 335 

Stout's  Analytic  Psychology :  H.N.GARDINER 410 

Mach's  Analysis  of  the  Sensations:   E.  C.  SANFORD 419 

Marshall's  Consciousness  and  Biological  Evolution :  H.  M.  STAN- 
LEY   420 

Recent  Philosophy  (Watson's  Christianity  and  Idealism,  Sloane's 
Life  of  McCosh,  Wenley's  Contemporary  Theology)  :  A. 

T.  ORMOND,  G.  S.  PATTON 422 

Pedagogical:  H.  T.  LUKENS 426 

Vision:  C.  L.  FRANKLIN,  G.  A.  TAWNEY 430 

Volition:   H.  N.  GARDINER,  M.  W.  CALKINS 437 

Emotion  (Santayana's  Sense  of  Beauty,  Huymans'  Aesthetische 
Untersuchungen,  Dugas'  Timidite',  Jastrow's  Aesthetics  of 
Color)  :  A.  HODDER,  M.  W.  CALKINS,  J.  M.  TROUT,  J. 

O.  QUANTZ 439 

Pathological:  W.  NOYES,  W.  R.  NEWBOLD 447 

James'  Will  to  Believe:  A.  C.  ARMSTRONG,  JR 527 

Hobhouse's  Theory  of  Knowledge,  Cohn's  Unendlichkeitsprob- 

lem:  G.  S.  F 529 

Adamson's  Logical  Copula,  Crooks'  President's  Address :  J.  G. 

HIBBEN 535 

Pillsbury's  Apperception,  etc.:  J.  E.  LOUGH 536 

Sergi's  Psicologia  per  le  Scuole:    G.  SANTAYANA 538 

Vision :  C.  LADD  FRANKLIN,  E.  W.  SCRIPTURE,  J.  McK.  CAT- 
TELL,  G.  A.  TAWNEY 539 

Sleep  and  Dreams:   H.  C.  WARREN,  E.  A.  PACE 549 

Genetic:  K.  C.  MOORE 555 

Mental  Fatigue:    S.  I.  FRANZ 558 

Cutaneous  Sensation:  G.  M.  STRATTON,  H.  GRIPPING 561 

Ladd's  Philosophy  of  Knowledge:    D.  S.  MILLER 647 

Psychical  Research  and  Pathology  (Sidgwick's  Involuntary 
Whispering,  Morsel li's  Fenomeni  Telepatice,  Parish's  Hal- 
lucinations and  Illusions,  etc.)  :  W.  J.,  J.  G.  HIBBEN 655 

Social  Psychology  (Gidding's  Sociology,  etc.)  :  J.  H.  TUFTS 661 

Vision:  C.  E.  SEASHORE 665 

Pedagogical  (Schiller's  Stundenplan)  :  GUERNSEY  JONES 667 


CONTENTS.  vii 

PACE. 

./Esthetics:  W.  M.  URBAN 669 

Logical:  J.  F.  CRAWFORD 672 

Biological  (Delage's  Structure  du  Protoplasma,  etc.)  :  C.  B. 

DAVENPORT,  J.  McK.  CATTELL 674 

Volition  and  General :  H.  N.  GARDINER,  M.  W.  CALKINS,  J.  G. 

HIBBEN,  W.  G.  SMITH 679 

New  Books 103,  227,  338,  449,  566,  689 

Notes 105,  229,  339,  451,  567,  690 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW.  VOL.  IV.,  PLATE  i. 

Article  of  BRYAN  AND  NOBLE. 


VOL.  IV.     No.  i.  JANUARY,  1897. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW. 


THE  'KNOWER'  IN  PSYCHOLOGY.1 

BY  PROFESSOR  G.  S.  FULLERTON, 

University  of  Pennsylvania. 

Gentlemen:  In  the  presidential  address  which  I  have  the 
honor  to  read  to-day  before  your  Association,  I  have  taken  up 
a  psychological  problem  which  seems  to  me  of  importance  both 
to  psychology  and  to  epistemology,  and  one  which  has  not,  I 
think,  in  the  general  advance  of  the  science  of  psychology,  been 
treated  with  the  same  clearness,  or  had  applied  to  it  the  same 
scientific  method,  that  has  led  to  such  good  results  elsewhere. 
I  allude  to  the  problem  of  the  self  or  '  knower '  as  contrasted 
with  those  problems  arising  in  the  consideration  of  '  things 
known,'  whether  phenomena  or  *  external '  things.  I  am  not 
here  directly  concerned  with  the  question  of  the  so-called  '  em- 
pirical '  self,  that  psychical  complex  which  has  been  analyzed 
and  discussed  much  as  one  analyses  and  discusses  any  other 
mental  content.  It  may,  it  is  true,  be  difficult  to  enumerate  the 
elements  of  which  this  is  composed,  but  the  attitude  of  the 
psychologist  toward  it  is  sufficiently  definite,  and  the  only  mys- 
tery that  the  subject  presents  is  the  mystery  of  incomplete  knowl- 
edge. In  discussing  it  the  psychologist  at  least  means  some- 
thing. He  applies  the  scientific  method,  aiming  at  and  hoping 
for  clear  and  exact  results.  The  self  with  which  I  am  concerned 
is  the  knower,  that  indefinite  something  to  which  attaches,  not 
merely  the  mystery  of  incomplete  knowledge,  but  also,  as  I  can- 
not but  believe,  the  mystery  of  misconception  ;  it  is  that  elusive 

1  President's  address  before  the  American  Psychological  Association,  Bos- 
ton Meeting,  December  30,  1896. 


2  G.    S.    FULLERTON. 

entity  so  generally  cherished  by  philosopher  and  psychologist, 
which  hides  itself  in  clouds  and  darkness,  and  whose  incompre- 
hensible attributes  are  accepted  without  protest  by  a  faith  which 
rests  upon  tradition  and  custom. 

My  statement  that  I  am  concerned  with  the  self  as  knower 
and  not  directly  with  the  empirical  self  commonly  said  to  be 
'  known '  needs  a  word  of  explanation,  and  this  I  may  insert 
here,  though  I  think  my  meaning  will  be  made  sufficiently  clear 
during  the  course  of  my  address.  I  am  interested  in  the  ques- 
tion of  what  knowledge  means  in  psychology,  and  I  discuss  the 
self  as  the  accepted  subject  of  the  act  of  knowing.  Of  course, 
any  light  which  may  be  cast  on  the  nature  of  knowledge  will 
help  to  make  clear  what  is  meant  by  speaking  of  anything  as 
'  known,'  and  will  help  us  to  a  better  comprehension  of  the  '  em- 
pirical '  self  in  so  far  as  it  is  a  something  known.  Moreover, 
since  the  self  as  knower  and  the  self  as  known  have  been  and 
are  generally  very  loosely  distinguished  from  one  another  and 
even  declared  identical,  it  will  be  impossible  for  me  to  confine 
myself  strictly  to  the  self  as  knower.  I  must  take  the  self  as  I 
find  it,  vague,  ambiguous,  inconsistent,  and  must  simply  try  to 
come  to  some  conclusion  about  its  '  knowing'  function. 

So  much  for  my  aim.  I  shall  try  to  remain  so  far  as  possi- 
ble on  psychological  ground  in  my  discussion,  although  the 
matter  is,  as  I  have  said,  also  of  interest  to  the  epistemologist. 
One  approaches  such  a  theme,  in  the  presence  of  this  critical 
audience,  with  a  certain  reverent  hesitation,  and  would  gladly 
pour  out  a  libation,  praying,  as  did  Plotinus,  for  the  gift  of  cor- 
rect discernment. 

In  a  paper  which  I  read  three  years  ago  before  this  Assoica- 
tion  I  tried  to  make  clear  the  nature  of  the  work  done  by  the 
psychologist,  and  to  set  forth  the  assumptions  upon  which  he 
must  proceed  and  the  method  he  must  employ.  I  maintained 
that  he  must  assume  the  existence  of  an  external  physical  world, 
and  the  existence  of  certain  copies  or  representatives  of  it  in- 
timately related  to  particular  bodily  organisms.  These  tran- 
scripts of  the  external  world,  as  I  expressed  it  in  a  later  paper, 
supplemented  by  certain  elements  not  supposed  to  have  their 
prototypes  without  (feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain  etc.,)  are,  for 


THE  '  KNO  WER '   IN  PS  YCHOL  OGY.  3 

the  psychologist,  minds.  He  must  by  applying  the  method  of 
introspection,  observation  and  experiment,  strive  to  obtain  a 
knowledge  of  such  minds  and  reduce  their  phenomena  to  laws. 
He  must  conceive  each  mind  or  consciousness  as  shut  up  to  its 
own  representations  of  things  and  dependent  upon  messages 
conveyed  to  it  from  without.  Ideas  are  to  him,  like  images  in 
a  mirror,  numerically  distinct  from  the  things  which  they  repre- 
sent and  of  which  they  give  information.  I  further  indicated 
that  knowledge  must,  to  the  psychologist,  be  a  mental  state  of 
some  kind,  a  complex  in  consciousness,  and  it  follows  that  it 
must  be  studied  by  the  usual  psychological  method.  I  main- 
tained, finally,  that  psychology  as  natural  science  should  reso- 
lutely confine  itself  to  mental  phenomena,  and  eschew  all  such 
metaphysical  entitles  as  '  substrata,'  '  unit-beings,'  or  '  transcen- 
dental selves.'  I  added  that  whether  one  conceive  of  conscious 
states  as  '  parallel '  to  brain  states,  or  conceive  of  them  as  be- 
longing with  these  latter  to  the  one  series  of  causes,  and  de- 
termining physical  movements,  in  either  case  one  may  study 
them  from  the  natural  science  point  of  view.  They  are  in  any 
case  phenomena  which  may  be  analyzed  and  described,  and 
the  relations  of  which  to  other  phenomena  may  be  determined 
by  accepted  scientific  methods.1 

A  mind  is,  therefore,  to  the  psychologist,  a  little  world  in 
itself,  cut  off  from  others,  and  '  knowing '  them  only  through 
their  representatives  in  it.  It  is,  moreover,  a  very  complex- 
world,  and  the  phenomena  it  presents  are  by  no  means  easy  to 
analyze  and  classify.  Some  things  in  it  seem  to  stand  out 
clearly ;  some  remain  after  our  best  efforts  dim  and  vague. 
It  is  quite  conceivable  that  some  things  supposed  to  live  and 
move  and  have  a  real  being  in  this  world  are  mere  chimaeras, 
having  no  existence  at  all  except  in  the  imagination,  where  they 
lead  a  dubious  existence  rather  as  symbols  of  the  unknown  than 

1  In  the  earlier  of  the  two  papers  alluded  to  I  point  out  the  inconsistency  of 
the  psychologist's  position.  To  cut  off  minds  from  things,  giving  them  mere 
copies  or  representatives,  and  then  to  use  the  method  of  observation  and  experi- 
ment, as  though  the  observer  were  directly  conscious  of  his  own  ideas  and 
at  the  same  time  of  his  own  and  other  men's  bodies,  is,  of  course,  flatly  self- 
contradictory.  The  psychologist  has,  however,  the  right  to  use  a  convenient 
fiction,  and  it  need  not  bring  him  to  grief  as  long  as  he  remains  upon  psycho- 
logical ground. 


4  G.    S.   FULLERTON. 

as  concrete  intelligible  representations.  It  is  not  difficult,  in 
the  obscurity  which  still  covers  much  of  our  mental  life,  to  con- 
found one  thing  with  another,  to  create  a  phantom,  or  to  seek 
diligently  for  the  solution  of  a  problem  which  need  never  have 
been  raised. 

Certain  problems  the  psychologist  may,  as  I  have  said,  set 
aside  at  the  outset.  All  metaphysical  entities  supposed  to  be 
beyond  consciousness,  and  to  'underlie'  phenomena,  he  may 
simply  disregard.  He  is,  to  restate  my  former  description  of 
his  task  in  perhaps  a  broader  way,  concerned  with  the  contents 
of  consciousness,  mental  phenomena  and  their  interrelations, 
and  whatever  else  (if  there  be  anything  else)  sufficiently  re- 
sembles mental  phenomena  to  be  found  in  a  consciousness. 
He  is  also  concerned  with  the  relations  of  mental  phenomena 
to  the  material  world,  a  something  which  can  be  observed  and 
experimented  upon.  His  method  is  scientific  and  has  already 
been  applied  with  satisfactory  results  to  some  of  the  phenomena 
in  consciousness.  It  should  be,  I  think,  his  duty  to  strive  to 
apply  the  same  method  to  everything  in  this  realm.  If  some 
things  in  consciousness  need  to  be  further  studied  from  another 
point  of  view,  and  by  another  method,  he  may  safely  leave  this 
task  to  another  workman.  Still,  even  if  he  remain  on  his  own 
ground,  and  regard  as  the  proper  object  of  his  studies  the  con- 
tents of  consciousness  and  the  physical  conditions  or  accom- 
paniments of  this  or  that  psychical  fact,  it  is  nevertheless  possible 
that  he  may  fall  into  some  such  difficulties  or  perplexities  as  are 
indicated  in  the  preceding  paragraph.  One  need  not  have  a 
very  broad  acquaintance  with  psychological  doctrines  to  see 
that  the  task  of  the  psychologist  is  by  no  means  an  easy  one, 
and  that  warring  opinions  concerning  psychical  phenomena  may 
be  held  with  great  obstinacy  and  strong  conviction. 

Of  course,  when  a  writer  does  not  accept  and  hold  to  the  stand- 
point of  the  psychologist  as  I  have  defined  it,  there  are  still 
other  errors  into  which  he  may  fall.  He  may  wander  into  the 
realm  of  the  metaphysician  and  return  with  a  self  which  is  not 
the  self  of  consciousness,  the  psychologist's  self  at  all.  He 
may  confuse  this  with  the  psychologist's  self,  and  keep  talk- 
ing about  two  things  while  he  supposes  himself  to  be  discussing 


THE  '  KNO  WER '   IN  PS  YC/fOL  OGY.  5 

only  one.  He  may  transport  the  self  into  a  world  in  which 
reasonable  explanations  of  things,  couched  in  intelligible  lan- 
guage, will  be  sought  for  in  vain.  He  may  make  of  '  knowl- 
edge' a  something  not  in  consciousness,  and  yet  not  out  of 
consciousness ;  a  thing  inconsistent,  inscrutable,  and,  I  believe, 
unpsychological.  That  many  writers  have  been,  and  that  many 
are,  guilty  of  these  things  '  et  enormia  alia?  it  needs  little  knowl- 
edge of  the  history  of  speculative  thought  to  reveal.  It  is  be- 
cause I  am  compelled  to  refer  to  the  works  of  such  writers  that 
I  have  promised  only  to  try  to  keep  upon  psychological  grounds. 

But  to  come  to  the  particular  point  which  I  wish  to  discuss 
to-day,  the  psychological  problem  of  the  knower  and  the  known. 
The  plain  man,  who  has  not  gotten  beyond  the  psychology 
of  common  life,  has  always  distinguished  in  some  vague  way 
between  himself  as  knower  or  doer  and  the  objects  which  he 
knows  or  acts  upon.  The  distinction  has  become  crystallized 
in  language  and  appears  to  have  past  current  everywhere  and 
at  all  times.  And  in  the  History  of  Philosophy  we  find  drawn, 
with  more  or  less  clearness,  almost  from  the  beginning,  the  dis- 
tinction between  that  which  knows,  the  mind,  soul  or  reason, 
and  the  thing  known,  which  may  be  either  an  external  thing  or 
a  psychical  state.  I  do  not  propose  to  weary  you  with  an  ex- 
haustive examination  of  the  opinions  of  philosophers,  ancient 
and  modern,  but  a  glance  at  some  of  them  will,  I  think,  prove 
helpful  in  the  discussion  of  our  problem. 

It  is  difficult  to  select  from  such  a  cloud  of  witnesses,  but  I 
may  mention,  in  passing,  among  the  ancients,  Anaxagoras, 
Democritus,  Plato,  Aristotle,  the  Stoics,  the  Epicureans  and  the 
Skeptics,  in  all  of  whom  the  distinction  is  sufficiently  empha- 
sized. Thales  doubtless  distinguished  in  an  unanalytic  way 
between  himself  and  the  object  of  his  knowledge,  but  in  what 
little  we  know  of  his  doctrine  his  ideas  upon  this  subject  do 
not  come  to  the  surface.  Perhaps  the  problem  of  knowledge 
had  not  presented  itself  to  him  as  a  problem.  With  the  growth 
of  reflective  thought  it  comes  more  and  more  into  view,  and  the 
knower  grows,  I  can  hardly  say  more  definite,  but  at  least  more 
definitely  an  object  of  discussion.  This  it  is  with  Plato  and 
Aristotle,  whose  distinction  between  reason  and  the  lower  psych- 


6  G.    S.   FULLERTON. 

ical  functions  has  moreover  a  flavor  of  the  modern  distinction 
between  the  rational  and  the  empirical  self.  In  Plotinus  the 
soul,  or  subject  of  knowledge,  has  definitely  put  on  the  incom- 
prehensible aspect  with  which  later  speculation  so  constantly 
clothed  it.  It  is  not  in  space ;  or,  rather,  it  is  in  space  in  an 
unintelligible  and  inconsistent  way ;  it  is  all  in  the  whole,  and 
yet  all  in  every  part  of  the  body.  It  is  divided  because  it  is  in 
all  parts  of  its  body,  and  undivided  because  it  is  in  its  entirety 
in  every  part.  With  Augustine,  who  set  his  stamp  so  authori- 
tatively upon  the  thinking  of  the  centuries  which  succeeded  his 
own,  it  behaves  no  better,  being  still  all  in  the  whole  and  all  in 
every  part  of  the  body.  It  knows  itself  and  what  is  not  itself. 
Its  properties  are  not  related  to  it  as  material  qualities  are  to 
material  substance ;  they  share  in  its  substantiality,  although  it 
has  them,  and  must  not  be  regarded  as  being  them.  To  make 
this  confusion,  if  possible,  worse,  Cassiodorus  maintains  that 
the  soul,  which  knows  things  spiritual  and  material,  is,  as  a 
whole, 4n  each  of  its  own  parts. 

Into  the  tangles  of  the  Scholastic  Philosophy  I  shall  not  at- 
tempt to  enter.  Suffice  it  to  say  we  find  everywhere  a  knower 
and  a  known,  and  this  knower,  which  knows  both  itself  and 
what  is  not  itself,  and  may  even  know  itself  more  certainly 
than  it  knows  external  objects,  remains  throughout  a  mystery 
and  a  perplexity. 

In  the  Modern  Philosophy  some  of  the  subtleties  of  scholastic 
thought  disappear,  but,  until  we  come  to  Hume,  the  problem  re- 
mains, I  think,  much  what  it  was  before.  With  Bacon,  Hobbes 
and  Descartes  the  mind  is  still  the  knower,  and  an  ill-defined 
and  shadowy  knower.  With  Descartes  it  knows  itself  better 
than  it  knows  external  things.  Spinoza's  position  is  an  odd  and 
very  interesting  one.  The  mind  is  the  idea  of  the  body,  or  that 
mode  in  the  attribute  thought,  which  corresponds  to  the  body, 
a  parallel  mode  in  the  attribute  extension.  The  mind  is  com- 
posed of  ideas,  and  may  be  called  the  knowledge  of  the  body. 
But  there  is  also  such  a  thing  as  the  idea  or  knowledge  of  the 
mind,  and  this  is  related  to  the  mind  just  as  the  mind  is  related 
to  the  body.  Spinoza  finds  it  impossible,  it  is  true,  to  keep  the 
idea  of  the  mind  apart  from  the  mind  itself,  since  they  are  both 


THE   *•  KNOWER'   IN  PSYCHOLOGY.  ^ 

modes  in  the  one  attribute  and  thus  melt  into  one.  His  doctrine 
is  not  consistent,  but  its  purpose  is  clear.  It  appears  to  him 
that  knowledge  demands  a  knower  and  a  known,  and  he  cannot 
conceive  the  knower  as  playing  the  part  of  both.  He  therefore 
explains  the  mind's  knowledge  of  itself  by  splitting  it  into  a 
fictitious  quality,  which  fades  again  into  unity.1  It  is  interest- 
ing to  note  that  to  Spinoza  the  mind  is  composed  of  ideas ; 
it  is  not  a  something  distinct  from  them  and  behind  them.  In 
Locke  there  appears  again  the  ambiguous  double  self,  the  nou- 
menal  and  the  phenomenal.  It  is  the  latter  which  is  directly 
perceived  ;  the  former  remains  *  an  uncertain  supposition  of  we 
know  not  what.'  Berkeley,  the  Idealist,  basing  himself  upon 
Locke's  conclusions,  classifies  the  objects  of  human  knowledge 
as  ideas  of  sense,  ideas  of  memory  and  imagination,  the  passions 
and  operations  of  the  mind,  and  the  self  that  perceives  all  these. 
Those  who  are  familiar  with  the  *  Principles  '  will  remember  that 
even  Berkeley's  clear  and  graceful  sentences  leave  the  reader's 
mind  in  a  hopeless  confusion  regarding  this  last  object  and  the 
nature  of  its  relation  to  its  own  ideas. 

In  his  general  demolition  of  the  noumenal  and  the  tradition, 
Hume  cast  out  everything  except  what  we  may  now  call  the 
empirical  self,  the  self  as  a  complex  of  mental  phenomena.  He 
uses  the  word,  to  be  sure,  as  it  has  since  been  used  by  others, 
to  cover  our  whole  mental  life,  and  as  equivalent  to  the  word 
mind.  He  regards  the  mind  as  "but  a  bundle  or  collection  of 
different  perceptions  which  succeed  each  other  with  inconceiv- 
able rapidity,  and  are  in  a  perpetual  flux  and  movement."  Spi- 
noza had,  as  a  psychologist,  gone  nearly  as  far,  but  his  mediaeval 
realistic  metaphysic,  and  his  desire  to  have  in  all  cases  a  knower 
distinct  from  the  thing  known,  obscured  the  force  of  his  teach- 
ings. Hume  himself,  who  has  written  on  this  as  on  all  subjects 
with  acuteness  and  admirable  lucidity,  occupies  himself  chiefly 
with  destructive  criticism,  and  furnishes  no  answers  to  the  many 
objections  and  inquiries  which  naturally  suggest  themselves,  and 
which  did  suggest  themselves  to  his  successors  in  philosophy. 
He  has,  however,  done  much  in  clearing  the  ground  for  aprofit- 

1  See  my  volume,  '  The  Philosophy  of  Spinoza ;'  Note  on  the  Mind  and  its 
Knowledge.  2d  ed.,  N.  Y.  1894,  pp.  317-324. 


8  G.    S.  FULLERTON. 

able  discussion  of  the  question.  His  writings  performed,  more- 
over, the  signal  service  of  stimulating  to  a  new  course  of  thought 
Immanuel  Kant,  the  Sage  of  Konigsberg. 

We  owe  it  to  Kant,  that  keen,  systematic  and  inconsistent 
thinker,  that  the  terms  phenomenon  and  noumenon  have  become 
household  words.  This  is  no  small  gain.  If  a  man  loosely 
talks  about  the  self  as  knowing  or  doing  something,  and  we 
ask  him  whether  he  refers  to  the  noumenal  or  to  the  phenomenal 
self,  only  to  receive  the  answer  that  he  does  not  know,  we  have 
now  the  right  to  refuse  him  respectful  attention.  He  does  not 
know  what  he  means  to  say  himself,  and  it  is  not  likely  that  his 
words  can  profit  others.  Kant,  in  the  Critique  of  Ptire  Rea- 
son, condemns  the  noumenon  to  outer  darkness,  and  shuts  up 
psychology  to  the  world  of  experience,  the  phenomenal  world. 
He  is  not,  however,  content  with  Hume's  '  bundle '  of  percep- 
tions, but  distinguishes  between  the  multiplicity  of  psychical 
elements  forming  the  content  of  consciousness  and  a  something 
— not  ZL.  noumenon,  but  a  something  in  consciousness — an 
activity,  or  whatever  one  may  choose  to  call  it,  which  makes 
possible  the  combination  of  this  multiplicity  into  the  unity  of  a 
single  consciousness.  On  this  depends  the  consciousness  '  I 
think  '  which  accompanies  all  my  ideas.  The  empirical  self,  as 
a  complex  of  psychical  elements,  is  to  be  distinguished  from 
this  rational  self.  This  doctrine  has  had  and  still  has  so  deep 
an  influence,  that  it  is  especially  worthy  of  note  in  any  historical 
study  of  the  self  as  knower. 

Let  me  now  turn  to  the  treatment  of  this  problem  by  modern 
psychologists.  The  necessary  limits  of  such  a  paper  as  this  of 
course  preclude  anything  like  an  exhaustive  treatment  of  the  sub- 
ject, and  I  must  content  myself  with  an  examination  of  the  doc- 
trines of  but  a  few  writers.  I  shall,  however,  try  to  select  those 
which  seem  to  me  fairly  representative  of  the  thought  of  our  time. 
We  do  not,  I  think,  find  among  them  much  that  is  distinctly 
new,  though  we  find,  as  might  be  expected,  modifications  of 
the  views  to  which  I  have  already  referred. 

Perhaps  I  should  begin  with  the  descendants  of  Kant  (the 
line  of  descent  runs  through  Hegel),  a  rather  numerous  and  ag- 
gressive body,  who  take  their  psychology  seriously,  and  are  apt 


THE  '  KNO  WER '   IN  PSYCHOLOGY.  9 

to  keep  one  eye  on  their  metaphysics  or  theology  while  discuss- 
ing psychological  problems.  As  a  protagonist  of  these  I  may 
take  Professor  T.  H.  Green.  Mr.  Green  repudiated  the  Kantian 
noumenon  and  avowedly  confined  human  knowledge  to  the  field 
of  experience,  but  he  did  not  approve  a  Humian  experience  con- 
sisting of  a  bundle  of  percepts.  He  found  it  necessary  to  as- 
sume in  experience  a  principle  of  synthetic  unity ;  a  principle 
not  to  be  confounded  with  any  of  the  elements  making  up  the 
experience,  nor  subject  to  their  conditions  ;  a  principle  which,  in 
some  fashion,  knits  together  the  manifold  of  sense  into  an  or- 
ganic unity.  "  Thus,"  he  writes,1  "  in  order  that  successive  feel- 
ings maybe  related  objects  of  experience,  even  objects  related  in 
the  way  of  succession,  there  must  be  in  consciousness  an  agent 
which  distinguishes  itself  from  the  feelings,  uniting  them  in  their 
severalty,  making  them  equally  present  in  their  succession. 
And  so  far  from  this  agent  being  reducible  to,  or  derivable  from 
a  succession  of  feelings,  it  is  the  condition  of  there  being  such 
a  succession ;  the  condition  of  the  existence  of  that  relation  be- 
tween feelings,  as  also  of  those  other  relations  which  are  not  in- 
deed relations  between  feelings,  but  which,  if  they  are  matter  of 
experience,  must  have  their  being  in  consciousness.  If  there  is 
such  a  thing  as  a  connected  experience  of  related  objects,  there 
must  be  operative  in  consciousness  a  unifying  principle,  which 
not  only  presents  related  objects  to  itself,  but  at  once  renders 
them  objects  and  unites  them  in  relation  to  each  other  by  this  act 
of  presentation ;  and  which  is  single  throughout  the  experi- 
ence." 

According  to  this  passage,  the  knowing  or  distinguishing 
agent  is  conscious  and  self-conscious,  is  in  consciousness, 
makes  a  consciousness  possible  by  uniting  different  elements, 
and  is  single  throughout  the  experience.  We  find  elsewhere 
that  this  principle  is  not  in  consciousness  but  is  consciousness, 
and  that  everything  that  exists  is  in  it ;  that  it  is  intelligence ; 
that  it  is  a  subject  or  agent  which  desires  in  all  the  desires  of  a 
man  and  thinks  in  all  his  thoughts.  Notwithstanding  that  it  is 
all  this,  it  has,  nevertheless,  no  existence  except  in  the  activity 
which  constitutes  related  phenomena ;  and  it  is,  in  the  words  of 

1  Prolegemena  to  Ethics,  §  32. 


10  G.    S.   FULLERTON. 

the  author1  '  neither  in  time  nor  space,  immaterial  and  immov- 
able, eternally  one  with  itself.' 

The  mere  statement  of  the  attributes  of  Mr.  Green's  spiritual 
principle  would  seem  to  be  sufficient  to  condemn  it.  A  faith 
robust  enough  to  remove  mountains  might  well  shy  at  the  task 
of  believing  that  the  single  subject  or  agent  which  desires  in  all 
the  desires  of  a  man  and  thinks  in  all  his  thoughts,  which  is 
conscious  and  self-conscious,  is  still  only  an  activity  without  ex- 
istence except  as  it  constitutes  the  objects  of  experience,  and 
which,  though  it  does  not  exist  in  time,  is  equally  present  to  all 
stages  of  a  change  in  conscious  experience.  Think  of  it !  the 
activity  which  constituted  my  thought  of  yesterday  did  not  ex- 
ist yesterday,  when  my  thought  did ;  and  the  activity  which 
constitutes  my  thought  of  to-day  does  not  exist  to-day,  while 
my  thought  does !  Both  activities  are  one,  for  the  activity 
which  constitutes  objects  is  '  eternally  one  with  itself.'  What 
can  this  mean?  If  the  phrase  is  to  be  significant  at  all,  must 
it  not  mean  that  the  activity  in  question  is  '  always '  the  same 
activity  ?  and  does  not  '  always '  mean  '  at  all  times  ?'  And 
what,  in  Heaven's  name,  is  an  'immovable'  activity?  More- 
over, is  it  fair  to  a  genuine  activity,  however  abnormal,  to  call 
it  a  principle  or  subject  or  agent? 

But  even  supposing  it  possible  for  an  activity  to  be  all  that 
Mr.  Green  asks  it  to  be,  even  to  be  timelessly  present  at  all 
times,  how  are  we  to  conceive  of  such  a  thing  uniting  the  ele- 
ments of  any  possible  experience?  Shall  we  merely  assume 
that  it  has  a  vague  and  inscrutable  uniting  virtue,  as  opium  was 
once  assumed  to  have  a  dormitive  virtue  ?  Mr.  Green  gives  no 
hint  of  the  method  by  which  this  activity  obtains  its  result.  He 
does  not  seek  light  on  this  point  by  a  direct  reference  to  expe- 
rience, for  he  does'  not  even  obtain  his  activity  by  direct  intro- 
spection ;  he  obtains  it  as  the  result  of  a  labored  process  which 
strives  to  demonstrate  that  it  must  be  assumed  or  experience 
will  be  seen  to  be  impossible. 

I  have  read  Mr.  Green's  book  with  a  great  deal  of  care,  and 
have  tried  to  read  it  sympathetically.  Of  course,  those  who 
sympathize  with  his  doctrine  will  be  inclined  to  think  that,  as 

'§54- 


THE   '  KNO  WER '   IN  PS  YCIIOL  OGY.  II 

regards  the  latter  point,  I  have  met  with  indifferent  success.  I 
must  confess  that  the  book  appears  to  me  to  be  valuable  to  the 
psychologist  chiefly  as  a  warning.  I  have  not  found  Mr. 
Green's  utterances,  in  one  sense  of  the  word,  incomprehensible. 
His  doctrine  is  not  fundamentally  new.  He  has  taken  the 
Kantian  unity  of  apperception,  made  of  it  an  hypostatized  activ- 
ity, tried  to  keep  it  free  of  space  and  time  relations,  and  used  it 
as  an  explanation  of  the  unity  of  experience,  or  as  I  should 
prefer  to  say,  of  consciousness.  He  has  given  us  the  same  in- 
consistent totum  in  toto  thing  that  we  find  in  Plotinus  and  St. 
Augustine.  He  is,  however,  a  Post-Kantian,  and  he  has  in- 
cluded this  thing  in  'experience.' 

It  would,  of  course,  be  unfair  to  judge  of  all  Neo-Kantians 
or  Neo-Hegelians  on  the  basis  of  the  utterances  of  even  so 
prominent  a  member  of  the  school  as  Mr.  Green.  Neverthe- 
less, the  way  of  thinking  which  characterizes  the  school  seems  to 
me  much  the  same  in  all,  and  this  is  a  way  upon  which,  I  be- 
lieve, psychology  as  science  should  be  careful  not  to  enter.  It 
has  led  our  colleague,  Professor  Dewey,  who  can  write  so 
clearly  when  he  forgets  to  what  school  he  belongs,  to  express 
himself  regarding  the  intuition  of  self  as  follows:1  "We  are 
concerned  here  especially  with  what  is  called  self-consciousness, 
or  the  knowledge  of  the  self  as  a  universal  permanent  activity. 
We  must,  however,  very  carefully  avoid  supposing  that  self- 
consciousness  is  a  new  and  particular  kind  of  knowledge.  The 
self  which  is  the  object  of  intuition  is  not  an  object  existing 
ready  made,  and  needing  only  to  have  consciousness  turn  to  it, 
as  towards  other  objects,  to  be  known  like  them  as  a  separate 
object.  The  recognition  of  self  is  only  the  perception  of  what 
is  involved  in  every  act  of  knowledge.  The  self  which  is 
known  is,  as  we  saw  in  our  study  of  apperception  and  reten- 
tion, the  -whole  body  of  knowledge  as  returned  to  and  organized 
into  the  mind  knowing.  The  self  which  is  known  is,  in  short, 
the  ideal  side  of  that  mode  of  intuition  of  which  we  just  spoke  ; 2 
it  is  their  meaning  in  its  unity.  It  is,  also,  a  more  complete 
stage  of  intuition,  for,  while  in  the  final  stage  of  intuition  of 

1  Psychology,  3d  ed.  p.  242. 

*/.  e.,  Intuition  of  the  World  or  Nature. 


12  G.    S.   FULLERTON. 

nature  we  perceive  it  as  a  whole  of  interdependent  relations,  or 
as  self-related,  we  have  yet  to  recognize  that  we  leave  out  of 
account  the  intelligence  from  which  these  relations  proceed. 
In  short,  its  true  existence  is  in  its  relation  to  mind ;  and  in 
self-consciousness  we  advance  to  the  perception  of  mind." 

The  self  as  here  described  is  a  universal,  permanent  activity ; 
it  is  only  what  is  involved  in  every  act  of  knowledge,  and  yet  is 
the  whole  body  of  knowledge ;  as  returned  to  and  organized  into 
the  mind  knowing — in  other  words,  into  the  activity  involved  in 
every  act  of  knowledge.  Moreover,  although  it  is  the  whole 
body  of  knowledge  as  thus  organized  and  returned,  it  is  the 
source  of  the  relations  obtaining  between  the  objects  making  up 
the  world  of  knowledge.  Can  any  one  form  a  clear  notion  of 
such  a  self?  Professor  Dewey  gives  the  reader  little  assistance 
in  making  plain  to  himself  how  the  whole  body  of  knowledge 
can  be  returned  to  and  organized  into  a  universal,  permanent 
activity ;  and  he  leaves  unsolved  the  problem  of  how  an  organ- 
ized whole  consisting  of  things  in  relation  can  itself  be  the  source 
of  relations  which  make  it  what  it  is.  Surely  this  is  not  sense  or 
science.  It  is  not  in  place  in  a  modern  work  on  psychology. 
Taken  literally  the  phrases  quoted  do  not  convey  any  meaning  ; 
and  taken  loosely  and  figuratively  they  express,  I  think,  quite 
as  much  error  as  truth.  The  error  here  is  the  error  of  Green  ; 
but  the  language  of  the  extract  is  more  distinctly  the  phraseology 
of  a  school,  and  further  removed  from  the  plain  diction  of  com- 
mon life  and  science.  This  is,  I  think,  an  aggravating  circum- 
stance. 

Another  of  our  colleagues,  Professor  Baldwin,  has  placed 
himself  beside  Green  and  Dewey,  and,  in  so  far,  has  abandoned 
the  standpoint  of  scientific  psychology.  In  his  volume  on  Feel- 
ing and  Will,  he  does  not  often,  I  think,  stray  far  from  the  path 
of  empirical  psychology,  though  there  is  sometimes  an  indefi- 
niteness  of  expression  which  leaves  me  rather  in  the  dark  as  to 
his  true  meaning.  The  following,  however,  is  unmistakable  i1 
"We  may  well  notice  that  neither  the  manifoldness  nor  the 
unity  of  feeling  could  be  apprehended  as  such  in  the  absence  of 
a  circumscribing  consciousness  which,  through  its  own  unity, 

'N.  Y.,  1894,  p.  79. 


THE  '  KNO  WBR '   IN  PS  YCHOL  OGY.  13 

takes  it  to  be  what  it  is.  Suppose  we  admit  that  at  the  begin- 
nings of  life  the  inner  state  is  simply  an  undifferentiated  con- 
tinuity of  sensation  ;  what  is  it  that  feels  or  knows  the  subsequent 
differentiation  of  parts  of  this  continuity?  It  cannot  be  the 
unity  of  the  continuity  itself,  for  that  is  now  destroyed ;  it  can- 
not be  the  differentiated  sensations  themselves,  for  there  are 
many.  It  can  only  be  a  unitary  subjectivity  additional  to  the 
unity  of  the  sensory  content,  /'.  e. ,  the  form  of  synthetic  activity 
which  reduces  the  many  to  one  in  each  and  all  of  the  stages  of 
mental  growth.  The  relations  of  ideas  as  units  must  be  taken 
up  into  the  unit  idea  of  relation,  to  express  what  modern  psy- 
chology means  by  apperception." 

In  the  same  category  with  the  above  we  must  put  Professors 
Hoffding  and  Murray,  and,  I  fear,  also  John  Stuart  Mill. 
Mill's  chapter  on  the  Psychological  Theory  of  Matter  as  applied 
to  Mind1  regards  consciousness  as  a  'string  of  feelings,'  and 
holds  it  to  be  an  ultimate  and  incomprehensible  fact  that  a 
string  of  feelings  can  be  conscious  of  itself  as  a  string.  In  the 
appendix  to  the  chapter,  printed  in  the  later  editions  of  his 
work,  he  admits  the  existence  of  an  inexplicable  tie  or  law, 
which  is  a  reality,  and  connects  the  feelings  with  each  other. 
The  Neo-Kantian  will  recognize  in  this  the  self  for  which  he 
enters  the  lists,  though  he  may  disapprove  of  Mill's  forms  of 
expression.  I  am  even  tempted  to  include  in  the  list  our  col- 
league, Professor  James — at  least  Professor  James  in  one  of  his 
moods,  for,  although  he  characterizes  the  phrase  '  united  by  a 
spiritual  principle '  as  absurd  and  empty,  yet  in  the  same  paper 
he  maintains 2  that  "union  in  consciousness  must  be  made  by 
something,  must  be  brought  about ;  and  to  have  perceived  this 
truth  is  the  great  merit  of  the  anti-associationist  psychologists." 
As,  however,  he  also  maintains  that  if  there  were  a  '  soul '  it 
might  serve  as  an  explanation  of  this  union,  possibly  it  would 
be  as  just  to  class  him  with  those  who  hold  to  a  noumenal  self. 
Perhaps  it  would  be  best  not  to  class  him  at  all,  as  he  appears 
so  undecided  as  to  what  he  wants.  It  is  clear,  however,  that 
he  wants  something  to  do  the  knowing. 

'Examination  of  Sir  William  Hamilton's  Philosophy. 

2 '  The  Knowing  of  Things  together,'  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW,  March,  1895. 


14  G.    S.    FULLERTON. 

I  do  not  think  that  the  substratum  soul  in  its  bald  and  un- 
compromising aspect,  the  Lockian  '  I  know  not  what,'  the 
Kantian  noumenon  clearly  recognized  to  be  noumenal,  plays  an 
important  part  in  the  psychological  thinking  of  our  time.  Still, 
it  is  possible  to  modify  or  dilute  this  entity  and  hold  to  it  in  a 
certain  indefinite  and  inconsistent  way.  I  think  this  is  done  by 
our  colleague,  Professor  Ladd,  whose  valuable  writings  are 
justly  attracting  no  small  attention  among  our  contemporaries. 

I  find  in  Professor  Ladd's  last  two  books  many  signs  of  a 
development  in  what  I  must  consider  the  right  direction.  He 
is  evidently  gravitating,  although  with  reluctance,  toward  psy- 
chology as  science.  His  utterances  may  be  collected  under 
two  heads  according  as  they  reveal  the  position  in  which  he  has 
heretofore  been  intrenched,  or  as  they  indicate  the  goal  toward 
which  he  is  moving.  Let  us  glance  at  a  few  passages,  begin- 
ning with  some  of  those  which  fall  under  the  former  head. 

We  are  told  by  Professor  Ladd  that  the  final  aim  of  psychol- 
ogy is  '.to  understand  the  nature  and  development,  in  its  rela- 
tions to  other  beings,  of  that  unique  kind  of  being  which  we  call 
the  Soul  or  Mind.'1  Our  author  complains  that  the  larger  num- 
ber of  those  who  cultivate  psychology  as  an  empirical  science 
habitually  regard  consciousness,  and  the  phenomena  of  con- 
sciousness, merely  '  content- wise.'  They  overlook  or  deny  the 
fact  that  all  consciousness  and  every  phenomenon  of  conscious- 
ness, makes  the  demand  to  be  considered  as  a  form  of  function- 
ing, and  not  as  mere  differentiation  of  content.  All  psychic 
energy  is  self-activity ;  it  appears  in  consciousness  as  the  ener- 
gizing, the  conation,  the  striving,  of  the  same  being  which  comes 
to  look  upon  itself  as  attracted  to  discriminate  between  this  sen- 
sation and  that,  or  compelled  to  feel  some  bodily  pain,  or  solic- 
ited to  consider  some  pleasant  thought.  Thus  all  psychic  life 
manifests  itself  to  the  subject  of  that  life  as  being,  in  one  of  its 
fundamental  aspects,  its  own  spontaneous  activity.2  Again : 
knowing  is  distinguished  from  mere  imagining,  remembering 
or  thinking,  in  that  it  involves  belief  in  reality  ;  and  psychological 

1  Philosophy  of  Mind,  N.  Y.,  1895,  p.  64. 

2  Philosophy  of  Mind,  pp.  85-88.      Psychology,  Descriptive  and  Explana- 
tory, N.  Y.,  1895,  p.  215. 


THE   '  KNOWER*   IN  PSYCHOLOGY.  15 

analysis  shows  that  knowledge  is  impossible  without  this  rational, 
metaphysical  belief,  or  metaphysical  faith.1  "  The  psychologi- 
cal analysis  of  any  state  of  so-called  knowledge,"  says  Professor 
Ladd,2  "of  any  of  those  psychoses  properly  described  by  the 
affirmation  *  I  know,'  shows  that  all  knowledge  implicates  reality, 
envisaged,  inferred,  believed  in — we  do  not  now  stop  to  inquire 
into  the  manner  of  implication.  Especially  is  this  true  of  every 
act  of  so  called  s^^-knowledge  ;  for  the  psychologist  is  simply 
ignoring  what  everybody  means  by  the  word,  unless  he  under- 
stands the  reality  of  the  self-knowing  and  the  self-known,  the 
one  self,  to  be  involved  as  an  immediate  datum  of  experience." 
From  the  above  so  much  at  least  is  clear :  Professor  Ladd 
believes  in  a  unique  kind  of  being  called  Soul  or  Mind,  and  re- 
gards all  psychic  life,  every  form  of  consciousness,  as  the  ener- 
gizing or  striving  of  this  being,  holding,  further,  that  all  this  is 
manifested  to  this  being  as  its  own  spontaneous  activity.  More- 
over this  being  knows  itself,  and  knows  itself  as  a  reality.  But 
whether  this  reality  which  knows  itself  and  is  the  subject  of 
all  conscious  states  is  itself  in  consciousness  or  not  remains 
rather  unclear.  The  statement  that  knowledge  '  involves  belief 
in  reality '  would  certainly,  if  words  are  to  be  taken  in  their 
usual  senses,  indicate  that  the  reality  is  not  immediately  given 
in  experience ;  and  the  further  statement  that  knowledge  '  im- 
plicates reality,  envisaged,  inferred,  believed  in,'  is  vagueness 
itself,  and  gives  little  help  in  clearing  up  the  matter.  It  is  to  be 
regretted  that  Professor  Ladd  did  not  stop  at  this  point  to  in- 
quire '  as  to  the  manner  of  the  implication,'  for  he  has  not  made 
it  clear  anywhere  else.  The  latter  part  of  the  last  extract, 
which  makes  the  reality  of  the  self  an  immediate  datum  of  ex- 
perience, should,  perhaps,  settle  the  question ;  for  where  the 
reality  of  a  thing  is,  there  it  seems  reasonable  to  expect  to  find 
the  thing  also.  Yet,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  maintained  that  to 
describe  self-consciousness,  as  a  mere  state  or  mere  activity  of  a 
definite  kind,  is  imperfectly  to  describe  it,  and  that  «  self-knowl- 
edge, although  it  comes  as  the  result  of  a  development,  implies 
a  knowing  being  that  knows  itself,  in  an  actual  indubitable 

1  Philosophy  of  Mind,     p.  100.     Psychology,  p.  513. 

2  Philosophy  of  Mind,  p.  63;  cf.   Psychology,  pp.  511-517. 


1 6  G.    S.    FULLERTON. 

experience,  really  to  be.'1  It  appears,  thus,  that  we  are 
not  to  regard  the  self  as  either  content  of  consciousness  or 
activity ;  so  that  the  empirics  complained  of  above  for  overlook- 
ing the  aspect  of  consciousness  which  makes  it  a  '  form  of 
functioning '  would  still  be  in  the  wrong  even  if  they  included 
this  in  their  treatment  of  it.  They  would  have  accepted,  it 
is  true,  every  aspect  and  element  of  consciousness,  but 
would  have  left  out  the  real  being,  which  knows  itself  in  an 
act  of  metaphysical  faith  really  to  be.  This  speaks  for  some- 
thing very  like  a  noumenon ;  and  one  begins  to  feel  decidedly 
that  one  must  accept  this  as  Professor  Ladd's  doctrine  when  one 
remembers  that  in  the  same  chapter  with  the  sentence  above 
quoted  he  denies  knowledge  of  mere  phenomena  to  be  knowledge 
at  all,  and  maintains  that  the  word  phenomenon  has  abso- 
lutely no  meaning  except  as  implying  some  particular  being  of 
which,  and  some  being  to  which,  the  phenomenon  is.  Profes- 
sor Ladd  prefers,  it  is  true,  the  expression  *  real  existence'  to 
«  noumenon,'  but  that  is  a  mere  detail.  I  conclude,  then,  that 
our  colleague  holds  to  a  noumenal  self  of  some  sort,  which  is 
responsible  for  the  phenomena  of  consciousness ;  and  yet,  turn- 
ing at  this  juncture  to  the  end  of  the  chapter,  I  am  again  thrown 
into  confusion  by  the  author's  summary  of  the  discussion  from 
which  I  have  taken  the  above  sentiments.  I  there2  find  that 
"  the  peculiar,  the  only  intelligible  and  indubitable  reality  which 
belongs  to  Mind  is  its  being  for  itself,  by  actual  functioning  of 
self-consciousness,  of  recognitive  memory,  and  of  thought.  Its 
real  being  is  just  this  '  for-self-being'  (Fiir-sich-seyn) .  Every 
mind,  by  living  processes,  perpetually  constitutes  its  own  being, 
and  knows  itself  as  being  real.  To  be  self-conscious,  to  remem- 
ber that  we  were  self-conscious,  and  to  think  of  the  self  as 
having,  actually  or  possibly,  been  self-conscious — this  is  really 
to  be,  as  minds  are.  And  no  other  being  is  real  mental  being." 
This  extract,  which  the  author  presents  as  the  sum  of  the  whole 
matter,  seems  unequivocally  to  make  of  the  self  nothing  more 
than  an  activity  of  consciousness,  and,  whatever  that  may  be,  a 
self-constitutive  activity.  It  smacks  strongly  of  Neo-Kantism. 

1  Philos.  of  Mind,  p.  127. 

s.  of  Mind,  p.  147;  cf.  Psychol.  p.  638. 


THE   ^KNOWER'   IN  PSYCHOLOGY.  17 

But   what   now   becomes  of   that  object  known,  which  is  not 
merely  an  object  'for  the  knowing  process'?1 

Although  it  is  difficult  to  gain  from  Professor  Ladd's  writ- 
ings any  clear  idea  of  what  the  active  subject  of  mental  phe- 
nomena really  is,  one  may  at  least  guess  from  certain  passages 
what  he  is  anxious  that  it  should  not  be.  "This  active  agent," 
he  remarks, 2  "  actually  here  and  now  active  and  knowing  itself 
as  active,  is  indeed  no  transcendental  being,  up  aloft  in  the 
heavens  of  metaphysics ;  but  then  neither  is  it  submerged  be- 
neath the  slime,  or  covered  with  the  thin  varnish,  of  purely 
empirical  psychology."  It  holds,  as  it  seems,  a  middle  course, 
and  combines  the  properties  of  a  noumenon,  a  Neo-Kantian 
self-constitutive  activity  and  an  empirical  psychosis. 

The  last  mentioned  aspect  of  Professor  Ladd's  self  or  agent, 
and  the  one  which  fixes  the  goal  toward  which,  as  it  seems  to  me, 
he  is  moving,  comes  out  very  clearly  in  his  work  on  Descriptive 
and  Explanatory  Psychology.  We  there  find  that  knowledge 
or  cognition  is  only  studied  by  scientific  psychology  as  a  com- 
plex psychosis  ;3  that  human  mental  life  does  not  begin  with 
knowledge ;  that  it  not  only  grows  in  knowledge,  when  knowl- 
edge is  once  attained,  but  it  grows  into  knowledge  only  when 
certain  conditions  are  fulfilled.4  The  truth  that  all  knowledge 
implies  a  development  has  not,  we  are  told,  been  hitherto  suf- 
ficiently emphasized  by  psychologists,  for  "  at  first  and  for  a  con- 
siderable but  indefinite  time  after  birth  the  child  has  no  such  de- 
velopment of  any  faculty  as  to  make  knowledge  possible.  To 
it  there  is  no  *  Thing '  known  ;  to  it  there  is  no  self  as  an  object 
of  knowledge.  This  is,  however,  far  from  affirming  that  the 
child  has  no  states  of  consciousness  whatever — no  sensations,  no 
mental  images,  no  feelings,  no  conation  and  motor  consciousness. 
Even  a  considerable  development  of  discriminating  consciousness, 
as  the  inseparable  accompaniment  and  indispensable  condition  of 
all  mental  development,  may  take  place  before  the  first  act,  or  pro- 
cess, worthy  to  be  called  knowledge  is  reached."5  It  is  insisted 

1  Philos.  of  Mind ',  p.  too.     Psychol.  p.  513. 

tP/tilos.  of  Mind,  p.  106. 

3 Psychology,  N.  Y.,  1895,  p.  508. 

'P.509- 
6  P.  5:0. 


iS  PROFESSOR    G.    S.   FULLERTON. 

that  "  all  objects  of  knowledge,  psychologically  considered,  are 
alike  to  be  regarded  as  states  of  consciousness  ;  all  states  of  con- 
sciousness are  time  processes  in  the  on-flowing  stream  of  con- 
sciousness. This  is  as  true  of  the  things  perceived  by  the  senses 
as  it  is  of  the  self  known  in  self-consciousness."1  Again:  "In 
the  earlier  stages  of  mental  life  no  psychoses  can  be  discovered 
which  are  worthy  to  be  called  a  knowing  of  self."2  The  gradual 
development  of  the  psychosis  called  a  knowledge  of  self,  Pro- 
fessor Ladd  traces  at  length,  and  concludes  thus:  "  Finally, 
it  is  by  complex  synthesis  of  judgments,  based  on  manifold  ex- 
periences converging  to  one  conception — the  resultant  of  many 
acts  of  memory,  imagination,  reasoning  and  naming — that  the 
knowledge  of  the  Self  as  a  Unitary  Being  is  attained."  Only  at 
this  stage  is  self-consciousness  in  its  highest  sense  possible  ;  but 
in  this  stage  "  in  one  and  the  same  act  the  mind  makes  itself  the 
object  of  its  self-knowledge,  and  believes  in  the  real  being  of 
that  which  it  creates  as  its  own  object."3 

Surely  all  this  is  plain  and  unvarnished  empirical  psychology, 
with  only  a  few  traces  of  the  old-fashioned  rationalistic  doctrine. 
It  is  psychology  as  science.  But  it  is  very  hard  to  fit  it  to  what 
has  preceded.  We  find  here  that  in  the  earlier  stages  of  con- 
sciousness there  is  no  self  as  known.  It,  of  course,  follows  that 
during  these  stages  there  also  exists  no  self  as  knowing,  no 
agent,  no  reality ;  for  is  it  not  true  that  consciousness  regarded 
as  objectively  discriminated,  and  consciousness  regarded  as  dis- 
criminating activity,  are  only  two  sides  of  one  and  the  same 
consciousness  ?4  and  are  not  the  self-knowing  and  the  self-known 
the  one  self?5  and  does  not  the  existence  of  this  one  self  depend 
upon  its  actual  functioning  as  self-consciousness?  "To  be  self- 
conscious,  to  remember  that  we  were  self-conscious,  and  to 
think  of  the  self  as  having,  actually  or  possibly,  been  self-con- 
scious— this  is  really  to  be,  as  minds  are."6  There  are  then 
sufficiently  complex  consciousnesses  containing  sensations, 

'P.  519. 

8  P.  523- 

3  Pp.  531,  532. 

4  Philos  of  Mind,  p.  89;  Psychol.  p.  291. 

6  Philos.  of  Mind,  p.  63  ;  cf.  Psychol.  p.  532. 
6  Philos.  of  Mind,  p.  147;  cf.  Psychol.  p.  638. 


THE  '  KNOWER*   IN  PSYCHOLOGY.  19 

images,  feelings,  motor  impulses,  and  even  a  considerable  de- 
velopment of  discrimination,  which  are  not  the  manifestation  of 
any  reality,  or  the  states  of  any  being.  As  yet  there  is  no  mind 
or  self  of  which  they  may  be  the  manifestation.  Here  are 
activities  without  any  *  thing'  that  is  active.  Here  are  phe- 
nomena without  any  reality  of  which  and  to  which  they  are  the 
phenomena.  We  must  then  abandon  the  position  that  all 
psychic  energy  is  the  activity  of  the  self,  for  the  self  must  be 
begotten  or  beget  itself  before  it  can  act ;  and  we  must  also  re- 
consider the  statement  that  the  word  phenomena  has  no  mean- 
ing except  as  implying  some  particular  being  of  which,  and 
some  being  to  which,  the  phenomenon  is. 

The  two  elements  in  Professor  Ladd's  doctrine  cannot,  I 
think,  by  any  possibility,  be  made  to  harmonize.  It  is  war  to 
the  death ;  and  I  believe  the  careful  reader  of  the  earlier  and 
later  works  of  our  colleague  will  see  that  the  issue  of  the  con- 
flict is  scarcely  a  matter  of  doubt.  Professor  Ladd's  soul  as 
'envisaged  reality'  is  gradually  slipping  away  from  him.  I 
should  not  be  surprised  to  see  him  in  some  later  work  apostro- 
phizing it  after  the  manner  of  Hadrian  : 

"  Animula  vagula,  blandula, 
Hospes  comesque  corporis, 
Quae  nunc  abibis  in  loca?" 

Let  us  hope  that,  when  it  does  take  its  departure,  it  may  find 
some  abode  with  an  atmosphere  less  rarified  than  the  heaven  of 
the  transcendentalists,  and  let  us  also  hope  that  it  may  escape  a 
damp  and  unpleasant  interment  in  so-called  empirical  'slime.' 
I  have  dwelt  at  length  upon  Professor  Ladd's  doctrine  both 
because  of  our  own  interest  in  his  work  and  because  it  has 
seemed  to  me  profitable  to  show  into  what  perplexities  even  a 
learned  and  really  scholarly  man  is  in  danger  of  falling,  when 
he  wanders  from  the  narrow  way  of  scientific  psychological 
method,  and  takes  to  what  Diogenes  Laertius  calls  a  noble  line 
in  Philosophy,  dealing  with  the  incomprehensible.  It  remains 
for  me  to  say  a  word  concerning  those  whom  I  may  call  the 
successors  of  Hume.  I  think  we  will  all  admit  that  Hume 
wrote  rather  crudely  concerning  the  self,  and  that  his  '  bundle ' 
of  perceptions  is  by  no  means  able  to  take  its  place  without 


20  PROFESSOR    G.    S.   FULLERTON. 

modification  in  a  modern  psychological  treatise.  I  do  not  mean, 
therefore,  in  speaking  of  the  successors  of  Hume,  to  indicate 
that  those  referred  to  write  in  the  same  crude  fashion.  I  only 
mean  to  indicate  that  they  have  abandoned  the  traditional  self 
of  the  History  of  Philosophy,  and  have  not  replaced  it  by  an 
hypostatized  unitary  activity  in  consciousness  or  in  '  experience,' 
but  regard  it  as  the  whole  task  of  the  psychologist  to  study  the 
'content'  of  consciousness  in  a  broad  and  reasonable  sense  of 
the  word  content.  In  this  class  I  place  Professor  Wundt,  as  he 
appears  in  his  later  writings  ;*  Professor  Kiilpe,  who  states  and 
maintains  more  unequivocally  than  Wundt,  Wundt's  later  psy- 
chological doctrine ; 2  Professor  Ziehen,  who  almost  succeeds 
in  leaving  out  of  his  clear  little  book  on  Physiological  Psychol- 
ogy, all  non-psychological  reference  ;  and  Professor  Titchener, 
who  holds  that  there  is  no  psychological  evidence  of  a  mind 
which  lies  behind  mental  processes,  and  no  psychological  evi- 
dence of  a  mental  '  activity '  above  or  behind  the  stream  of  con- 
scious processes.3  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  these  men  have 
approached  psychology  from  the  physiological  and  experimental 
side ;  and  one  is  tempted  to  think  that  the  novelty  of  their  task 
and  the  conditions  under  which  they  have  been  compelled  to 
approach  it,  have  somewhat  loosened  for  them  the  bonds  of 
tradition,  and  have  enabled  them  to  place  themselves  more  com- 
pletely on  the  ground  proper  to  psychology  as  science  than  it 
has  been  possible  for  a 'goodly  number  of  their  co-workers  to  do.4 
It  is  unnecessary  for  me  to  say  that  I  regard  their  position  as 
the  right  one,  though  I  should  not  like  to  be  understood  as  ap- 

iGrundziige,  Leipzig,  1893.    Human  and  Animal  Psychology .   London,  1894. 
2Grundriss,  Leipzig,  1893. 

3  Outline  of  PsychoL,  N.  Y.,  1896;  p.  341. 

4  It  is  proper  for  me  to  state  that  none  of  these  writers  have  appeared  to  me 
to  fully  appreciate  the  significance  of  their  own  position  for  the  psychological 
doctrine  of  '  knowledge.'    A  commentator  always  treads  upon  uncertain  ground, 
but  I  am  inclined  to  believe  that  their  scientific  attitude  in  treating  of  the  self 
has  really  been  brought  about  by  the  causes  to  which  I  have  alluded.     They 
have  wished  to  avoid  metaphysics  and  hold  to  clear  psychological  concepts. 
This  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  they  have  seen  the  total  value  of  these 
concepts  either  for  Psychology  or  Epistemology.     I  suppose  all  the  writers  I 
have  mentioned  would  give  a  goodly  share  of  the  credit  for  bringing  before  the 
public  the  doctrine  I  am  discussing  to  Wundt,  although  he  has  not  been  the 
most  happy  in  giving  its  expression. 


THE   '  KNOWER'   IN  PSYCHOLOGY.  21 

proving  all  the  details  of  their  treatment  of  psychological  prob- 
lems. The  study  of  the  content  of  consciousness  and  of  the 
relations  of  mental  phenomena  to  the  physical  world  seem  to 
me  the  proper  task  of  the  psychologist  as  psychologist.  And 
by  the  words  '  content  of  consciousness,'  I  do  not  mean  content 
in  the  Kantian  sense,  a  something  contrasted  with  '  form ;'  I 
mean  all  that  is  to  be  found  in  consciousness,  including  relations, 
changes  and  activities.  But  relations,  changes  and  activities 
should  be  treated  in  a  scientific  and  intelligible  way.  If  I  have 
a  perception  of  three  black  dots  on  a  white  surface,  so  related 
to  one  another  that  lines  joining  them  would  form  an  equilateral 
triangle,  surely  the  relations  of  the  dots  are  as  much  a  part  of 
my  perception  as  the  color  of  the  dots  ;  and,  if  I  see  again 
on  the  following  day  three  similar  dots  similarly  related,  I  am 
surely  not  justified  in  declaring  the  relations  perceived  on  the 
two  occasions,  to  be  identical  in  any  sense  in  which  the  dots  are 
not.  If,  further,  I  describe  the  formation  of  any  psychosis  in 
consciousness  to-day  as  the  manifestation  of  an  activity,  and  the 
formation  of  a  like  psychosis  in  consciousness  to-morrow,  as 
also  the  manifestation  of  an  activity,  surely  the  two  activities 
should  be  as  carefully  distinguished  as  the  psychoses  them- 
selves, and  each  relegated  to  the  particular  time  at  which  it  man- 
ifested itself.  The  word  '  activity '  is  not  a  word  to  conjure 
with  ;  and  when  speech  ceases  to  be  intelligible,  silence  is  golden. 
There  is  nothing  in  the  view  of  the  task  of  the  psychologist  which 
I  am  advocating,  to  make  him  overlook  or  slight  any  phenome- 
non or  aspect  of  consciousness.  He  is  not  compelled  to  regard 
our  mental  life  as  composed  of  unrelated  elements,  or  to  look 
upon  it  as  passive  or  mechanical.  He  need  not  betake  himself 
to  unusual  or  misleading  expressions  such  as  the  '  self-com- 
pounding '  or  *  agglomeration '  of  ideas.  He  has  the  same  right 
others  have  to  take  language  as  he  finds  it,  and  to  do  his  best 
with  it,  striving  only  to  be  clear  and  exact  and  to  avoid  being 
misunderstood.  He  must  recognize  that  when  men  say  '  I  think,' 
4 1  believe,'  '  I  know,'  '  I  feel,'  « I  will,'  '  I  remember,'  '  I  am 
self-conscious,'  these  words  indicate  the  presence  in  conscious- 
ness of  complex  psychoses,  which  it  is  his  duty  to  analyze  to  the 
best  of  his  ability.  His  task  is  not  an  easy  one  ;  and  even  if  he 


22  PROFESSOR    G.    S.   FULLERTON. 

follow  loyally  a  good  method,  confining  himself  resolutely  to  the 
field  that  I  have  indicated,  he  may  for  a  long  time  to  come  ex- 
pect to  find  in  it  much  that  cannot  be  so  brought  into  the  light 
as  to  make  him  confident  that  he  has  completely  analyzed  and 
described  it.  Notwithstanding  all  this,  he  may  take  comfort  in 
the  thought  that  his  method  is  the  true  one.  Even  if  the  goal 
be  far  distant,  it  is  something  to  be  on  the  right  road. 

I  have  no  doubt  that  many  will  object  that  this  simply  aban- 
dons the  psychological  problem  of  the  knower  and  his  knowl- 
edge, and  does  not  solve  it.  They  will  insist :  How  can  there, 
after  all,  be  a  consciousness,  unless  something  unifies  it?  can 
one  psychosis  know  another  ?  or  '  a  string  of  feelings '  know  it- 
self as  a  string  ?  Where  in  all  this  is  the  knowing  ?  I  answer, 
the  psychological  problem  is  indeed  abandoned,  for  it  is  only 
through  a  misconception  that  such  a  psychological  problem 
exists  at  all.  How  the  traditional  knowing  self  came  into  being 
and  became  a  perennial  stone  of  stumbling  to  the  speculative 
mind,  it  is  not,  I  think,  difficult  to  conjecture  ;  and  a  brief  ex- 
position of  what  I  believe  to  be  the  genesis  of  this  self  will  be 
the  best  justification  of  my  statement  that  the  problem  has  no 
right  to  demand  a  solution. 

It  is  generally  accepted  among  psychologists  that,  at  an 
early  stage  of  the  mind's  development,  the  chief  constituent  of 
the  notion  of  the  self,  and  perhaps  the  only  one  that  stands  out 
with  sufficient  clearness  to  occupy  the  attention,  is  the  idea  of 
the  body.  When  the  child  says  '  I  see,'  '  I  hear,'  '  I  feel,'  he  is 
not  thinking  of  the  self  of  the  philosophers,  but  is  recognizing 
the  fact  that,  given  his  body  in  such  and  such  a  relation  to  other 
objects,  he  has  certain  experiences.  His  body  stands  over 
against  other  objects  and  is  distinguished  from  them.  It  sees 
with  its  eyes,  hears  with  its  ears,  feels  with  its  hands.  It  not 
only  sees,  hears,  and  feels  other  objects,  but  also  sees,  hears 
and  feels  itself.  It  perceives  not  merely  that  it  is  acted  upon, 
but  also  that  it  acts  upon  other  things,  bringing  about  changes 
in  them.  It  is  the  constant  factor  in  experience,  while  the  ob- 
jects with  which  it  occupies  itself  succeed  one  another  in  a  more 
or  less  rapid  succession.  Moreover,  it  is  an  interesting  object, 
with  which  are  bound  up  in  a  peculiar  manner  the  pains  and 


THE  •  KNO WER '   IN  PS YCIIOLOG Y.  23 

pleasures  of  the  individual.  No  wonder  it  becomes  the  centre 
of  the  little  world  in  which  it  has  its  being,  a  world  concrete, 
unreflective,  external,  if  I  may  be  permitted  to  use  this  relative 
word  when  the  correlative  can  not  as  yet  be  regarded  as  having 
made  its  way  into  the  light  of  clear  consciousness — at  least  a 
world  objective  and  material  in  the  sense  that  what  comes  later 
to  be  recognized  as  objective  and  material  almost  wholly  con- 
stitutes it.  And  from  the  crude  materialism  of  the  infant  mind 
to  the  crude  animism  of  the  savage  the  step  is  but  a  short  one. 
That  duplicate  of  the  body,  which  in  dreams  walks  abroad,  sees 
and  is  seen,  and  acts  as  the  body  acts,  has  simply  taken  the 
place  of  the  body  as  knower  and  doer,  and  its  knowing  and  do- 
ing obtain  their  significance  in  the  same  experience.  The 
thought  of  the  child  is  duplicated  in  the  new  world  opened  up 
by  the  beginnings  of  reflection. 

Now,  I  believe  that  the  student  of  the  History  of  Philosophy 
who  is  able  to  read  between  the  lines  can  see  in  the  highly  ab- 
stract and  inconsistent  ' totum  in  toto"1  soul  of  Scholasticism, 
and  in  the  '  transcendental  unity  of  apperception '  of  Kant,  a 
something  that  has  grown  by  a  process  of  refinement  from  these 
rude  beginnings.  These  nebulous  entities  do  not  make  their 
appearance  upon  the  stage  unheralded.  We  find  early  in  the 
history  of  thought  a  material  soul  which  knows  things  by  con- 
tact with  the  effluxes  thrown  off  from  material  objects.  It  is  an 
object  among  other  objects,  as  is  the  body,  and  the  nature  of  its 
knowing  is  clearly  analogous  to  that  of  the  body's.  We  have, 
later,  a  soul  in  part  fettered  to  the  body,  and,  as  it  were,  semi- 
material.  We  have,  finally,  a  soul  abstract  and  unmeaning,  a 
shade,  a  survival  from  a  more  concrete  and  unreflective  past. 
It  is  worthy  of  note  that  with  this  development  the  soul  and  its 
method  of  knowing  become  more  and  more  unintelligible.  How 
the  soul  as  noumenon  or  as  super-temporal  activity  can  know 
anything  or  do  anything,  no  man  can  pretend  to  understand. 
The  reason  is  not  far  to  seek.  In  the  successive  transmutations 
through  which  it  has  passed,  almost  all  reference  to  the  primary 
experience  out  of  which  the  notion  of  a  soul  or  self  as  knower 
and  doer  took  its  rise  has  been  lost.  Were  such  reference 
completely  lost,  it  would  go  hard  with  the  hypostatized  abstrac- 


24  PROFESSOR    G.    S.    FULLERTON. 

tions  of  the  Noumenalist  and  the  Neo-Kantian.  As  it  is,  they 
hold  their  own  because  men  really  do  find  in  their  experience 
something  which  seems  to  speak  for  them  in  a  certain  vague 
and  inarticulate  way.  They  can  form  no  conception  of  the 
method  by  which  a  noumenon  or  a  Neo-Kantian  self-activity  can 
account  for  their  experiences,  but  they  prefer  these  to  nothing 
at  all ;  for  must  there  not  be  a  knower?  do  they  not  really  know? 
Their  position  is  one  quite  easy  to  understand.  It  is  not  ex- 
clusively to  the  childhood  of  the  individual  or  of  the  race  that 
we  need  go  to  find  the  body  an  important  element  in  the  self- 
idea.  The  developed  man  has  much  the  same  experience  as 
the  child,  and  instinctively  interprets  it  in  the  same  way, 
although  reflection  has  furnished  him  with  the  means  of  correct- 
ing this  instinctive  interpretation.  Even  the  psychologist  who 
writes  clearly  and  systematically  concerning  the  empirical  self, 
which  he  recognizes  as  nothing  more  than  a  complex  in  con- 
sciousness, may  retain  as  a  troublesome  and  inexplicable  entity 
a  second  self,  the  knowing  self  contrasted  with  the  self  known 
— identical  with  it,  and  yet  distinguished  from  it ;  the  same,  and 
yet  not  the  same.  Here  he  may  revel,  as  those  who  have  pre- 
ceded him  have  reveled,  in  self-contradictions  and  unintelli- 
gible discourse.  He  may  apply  to  the  self  the  unhappy  title  of 
'  subject-object '  and  endeavor  to  separate  a  thing  from  itself, 
positing  a  relation  between  the  two,  when  there  are  not  two  but 
one  to  be  related.  It  requires  but  a  moment  of  unprejudiced 
reflection,  it  seems  to  me,  to  see  that  all  this  is  absurd  and  un- 
meaning. The  only  question  of  real  interest  is :  How  have 
men  come  to  speak  in  this  way  ?  The  answer  I  have  indicated 
above.  When  one  whose  chief  idea  of  the  self  is  the  body1 
speaks  of  perceiving  himself  among  other  objects,  he  has  refer- 
ence to  an  experience  which  he  and  others  constantly  have ; 
and  he  has  used  a  certain  expression  to  call  attention  to  that 
experience.  His  thought  may  not  be  clear  and  analytic.  His 
statement,  if  the  words  be  taken  quite  literally,  is  meaningless. 
Still,  he  means  something  by  it,  and  it  is  the  duty  of  the  psy- 

1  Of  course,  I  have  no  intention  of  taking  here  any  position  regarding  the 
body  as  a  material,  external  thing.  Any  one  who  pleases  may  substitute  for 
the  word  such  expressions  as  '  experience  of  the  body,'  '  relatively  permanent 
organic  feelings,'  etc. 


THE  '  KNO  WER '   IN  PSYCHOLOGY.  25 

chologist  to  show  him  what  he  means.  It  is  not  his  duty  to 
turn  an  inconsistency  of  expression  into  an  inconsistency  of 
thought,  and  find  in  his  words  what,  in  their  proper  interpretation, 
they  do  not  contain.  Our  Noumenalist,  or  our  Neo-Kantian, 
thus  bases  himself  upon  an  experience,  even  though  he  misin- 
terprets it.  He  draws  from  experience  the  impulse  to  carry 
over  into  a  region  in  which  it  has  no  right  to  exist  the  notion  of 
a  bodily  self.  He  refines  it,  he  purifies  it  of  all  that  is  earthly 
and  concrete,  starves  it  to  a  shadow  of  its  former  self,  and  yet 
expects  of  it  its  former  tale  of  bricks — knowing  and  doing. 

This  I  cannot  but  regard  as  delusion ;  as  a  misinterpretation 
of  our  common  experience.  This  path  let  the  psychologist 
avoid.  To  him  knowledge  is  a  psychosis  to  be  analyzed  ;  so  is 
self-knowledge.  The  unity  of  consciousness  he  may  accept  as 
he  finds  it,  striving  to  make  clear  to  himself  what  he  means  by 
*  unity'  in  general,  and  by  the  unity  of  consciousness  in  partic- 
ular. To  attempt  to  explain  the  ultimate  nature  of  conscious- 
ness by  the  assumption  of  hypothetical  entities  not  to  be  found 
in  consciousness,  or  by  ascribing  inconceivable  virtues  to  hypos- 
tatized  activities,  seems  to  me  an  unprofitable  task.1 

My  address  is  already  longer  than  I  intended  to  make  it,  and 
yet  I  feel  with  regret  that  I  have  not  been  able  to  speak  on  some 
of  the  points  upon  which  I  have  touched,  as  clearly  and  fully 
as  I  could  have  wished.  Nevertheless,  I  must  beg  your  indul- 
gence in  allowing  me  to  mention  very  briefly  one  point  more. 
Psychologists  are  men,  and  may  be  assumed  to  share  the  hopes 
and  fears  common  to  men  of  their  degree  of  intelligence.  It  is 
quite  possible  that  some  among  us  have  already  mentally  char- 
acterized my  position  by  applying  to  it  the  damnatory  phrase 

1  In  spite  of  the  fact  that  I  heartily  dislike  seeing  a  discussion  encumbered 
with  foot-notes,  I  must  add  one  more.  I  have  said  at  the  outset  that  I  would 
try  to  confine  myself  to  psychological  ground.  I  have,  hence,  raised  none  of  the 
epistemological  questions  which  are  suggested  by  the  one  question  I  have  been 
discussing.  I  have  not  criticized  from  the  standpoint  of  epistemology  the  psy- 
chological standpoint,  nor  asked  how  one  may  know  that  there  is  an  external 
world.  I  have  not  asked  what  it  means  for  two  men  to  know  the  same  thing,  or 
how  one  consciousness  can  be  known  to  be  outside  of  another.  I  have  simply 
discussed  the  general  problem  of  knowledge  and  of  the  knower  in  psychology, 
and  I  have  stated  the  problem  in  its  simplest  form.  Until  some  satisfactory  so- 
lution is  given  to  the  problem  as  thus  stated,  it  seems  to  me  to  be  futile  to  at- 
tempt the  solution  of  more  intricate  problems  of  the  same  nature. 


26  PROFESSOR    G.    S.    FULLERTON. 

4  psychology  without  a  soul,'  and  have  felt  that  what  I  have  said 
militates  against  the  existence  of  the  soul  after  death.  My  dis- 
cussion has,  however,  left  this  question  just  where  it  was  before. 
It  was  pointed  out  by  Mill  long  ago,  that  if  it  is  possible  for  a 
*  string  of  feelings'  to  have  a  continued  existence  in  this  life, 
there  can  be  no  a  priori  objection  to  its  having  such  an  existence 
in  another.  Even  so  I  would  say,  if  a  consciousness  can  here 
develop  during  a  period  of  years,  and  retain  that  identity  which 
it  is  the  duty  of  the  psychologist  to  analyze  and  describe,  there 
is  nothing  in  a  man's  repudiation  of  noumena  or  supertemporal 
activities  to  prevent  him  from  believing  that  his  conscious  life 
may  continue  indefinitely.  My  reference  to  this  matter  may  be 
a  little  out  of  place,  for  we  are  here  to-day  as  psychologists,  and 
have  before  us  a  definite  and  limited  field  of  labor.  Still,  it  is 
hard  for  men  to  approach  scientific  questions  without  asking 
what  is  their  bearing  upon  theological  or  religious  convictions. 
Perhaps  it  is  right  that  such  questionings  should  arise.  I  have 
added  this  paragraph  in  the  hope  that  what  I  have  said  may  not 
meet  with  a  prejudice  arising  out  of  a  mere  misunderstanding, 
and  be  condemned  through  the  application  of  a  question-begging 
phrase. 


STUDIES  IN  THE  PHYSIOLOGY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY 
OF  THE  TELEGRAPHIC  LANGUAGE. 

BY   PROFESSOR  WILLIAM  LOWE  BRYAN  AND  MR.  NOBLE 

HARTER.i 

Indiana   University. 

In  March,  1893,  Mr.  Harter  began  at  the  Psychological 
Laboratory  of  the  Indiana  University  a  study  of  certain  prob- 
lems connected  with  the  acquisition  of  the  telegraphic  language. 
Eleven  months  were  spent  at  and  away  from  the  University  in 
a  preliminary  study  of  these  problems,  in  the  light  of  his  own 
experience,  and  by  diligent,  personal  cross-examination  of 
thirty-seven  operators,  employed  by  the  Wabash  Railway  Com- 
pany and  by  the  Western  Union  Telegraph  Company.  Of 
these,  seven  were  recognized  as  experts,  twenty-two  as  men 
of  average  experience  and  ability,  while  eight  had  barely 
enough  skill  to  hold  their  places.  Twenty-eight  of  the  number 
had  been  personally  known  to  H.  from  two  to  sixteen  years. 
Throughout  these  and  the  subsequent  investigations,  the  mem 
bers  of  the  telegraphic  fraternity  showed  the  most  cordial  interest 
and  readiness  to  help. 

In  March,  1894,  H.  began  at  the  University  Laboratory,  an 
experimental  study  of  individual  differences  in  telegraphic 
writing.  The  experimental  part  of  this  study  continued  until 
August,  1894,  and  the  study  of  the  results  until  June,  1895.  A 
review  of  certain  phases  of  the  results  was  made  in  January, 
1896.  During  the  winter  of  1895-96  he  was  engaged  with  the 
study  of  the  curve  of  improvement  in  sending  and  receiving. 

II.  THE  PRELIMINARY  STUDY. 

The  first  year's  work  was  in  the  nature  of  an  exploring  ex- 
pedition in  search  of  the  problems  which  would  repay  fuller  in- 

>N.  H.,  a  graduate  student  of  Psychology  at  Indiana  University,  was  for 
many  years  a  railroad  telegrapher,  and  is  an  expert  in  that  branch  of  telegraphy. 
The  experiments  were  made  under  Professor  Bryan's  direction. 

27 


28  WILLIAM  L.  BRYAN  AND  NOBLE  HARTER. 

vestigation.  It  seems  best,  on  the  whole,  to  give  a  somewhat 
gossipy,  through  brief  account  of  this  exploration.  The  method 
of  exploration  consisted  in  cross-examining  the  operators  with 
questions  which,  on  the  one  hand,  seemed  to  have  psychologi- 
cal or  physiological  significance,  and  which,  on  the  other  hand, 
in  the  light  of  H's  personal  experience,  gave  promise  of  an- 
swers.1 

The  student  learns  to  distinguish  most  of  the  letters  of  the 
telegraphic  alphabet  in  a  few  hours  or  days  at  most ;  but  after 
distinguishing  them  clearly  at  one  time,  he  generally  finds  him- 
self confused  by  the  back  stroke,  and  must  re-learn  the  letters 
many  times  before  this  difficulty  is  overcome.  The  back  stroke 
is  the  stroke  of  the  armature  against  the  adjusting  screw  above 
it.  Those  letters  composed  of  simple  dots  or  dashes  are  mas- 
tered first,  then  those  composed  of  dots  and  spaces,  and  lastly 
those  most  complex,  as,  J  ( —  .  —  . ) ,  X  ( .  —  ..)  Q^( .  .  —  . ) . 

As  the  characters  composed  of  four,  five  and  six  dots,  are 
made  more  rapidly  than  the  learner  is  able  to  count,  much 
practice  is  necessary  before  he  can  recognize  surely  the  number 
of  dots  in  such  groups.  When  a  considerable  degree  of  speed 
in  receiving  is  reached,  the  space  between  the  letters  of  a  word 
becomes  so  small  that  one  ceases  to  recognize  it  consciously,  the 
letters  seem  to  blend  together,  and  the  word  is  recognized  as  a 
sound  whole.  Thus,  expert  operators  read  -words  from  their 
instruments ;  and,  as  will  be  seen  later,  these  group  themselves 
into  larger  wholes,  so  that  the  sentence  becomes  the  conscious 
unit,  much  as  in  the  reading  of  printed  matter.  Of  course,  the 
short  and  frequently  recurring  words  are  the  first  ones  to  have 
their  parts  melt  together.  A  learner  is  thus  very  soon  able  to 
distinguish  such  words  as,  'the,'  'is,'  'and,'  etc.,  when 
written  swiftly  on  the  main  line  in  their  proper  connection, 
while  he  cannot  understand  even  a  single  letter  in  other  words. 
This  observation  shows  that  a  given  group  of  sounds,  for  ex- 
ample those  making  the  letter  H,  may  be  apperceived  in  one 
instant  because  occurring  within  a  larger  known  group,  and 
then  not  apperceived  a  moment  later  because  occurring  as  part 
of  an  unknown  group. 

JTo  save  circumlocutions,  technical  words  in  common  use  among  telegraph 
operators  and  whose  meaning  is  plain,  will  be  used  in  this  article. 


STUDIES  IN  THE  TELEGRAPHIC  LANGUAGE.  29 

There  are  distinct  specialties  in  telegraphy,  so  that  while  an 
operator  may  be  competent  in  one  department  he  would  be  a 
failure  in  another  department  requiring  no  greater  speed,  until 
he  had  acquired  the  vocabulary  of  that  department.  Thus,  a 
commercial  operator  would  be  'lost 'in  a  yard  office,  or  the 
train  dispatcher  in  taking  markets.  It  is  the  opinion  of  experi- 
enced operators  that  while  there  are  many  exceptional  cases  of 
quickness  and  slowness  in  learning,1  it  requires  from  two  to  two 
and  a  half  years  to  become  an  expert  operator.  Through  lack 
of  energy  to  practice,  except  when  compelled  by  the  nature  of 
their  work,  few  operators  reach  their  maximum,  while  many 
have  little  more  than  the  skill  actually  required  in  their  daily 
work.  To  gain  expertness,  work  increasing  in  difficulty  must 
be  faithfully  done.  For  a  fuller  discussion  of  this  point  see 
below,  part  IV. 

The  effect  of  sending  a  long  strange  word  swiftly  is  to 
cause  the  receiver  to  make  an  error  or  break — that  is,  to  ask 
for  a  repetition  of  the  word.  Many  operators  are  very  sen- 
sitive on  the  subject  of  breaking,  and  some  do  not  hesitate  to 
supply  the  most  probable  word  and  thus  avoid  what  they 
consider  a  humiliation.  Sometimes  an  obnoxiously  smart  young 
operator  is  allured  through  his  pride  against  breaking,  into  a 
trap,  whose  psychology  is  significant.  The  date  and  address 
of  a  message  are  sent  at  a  rapid  rate,  followed  by  the  period 
which  separates  the  address  from  the  body  of  a  message.  The 
letters  of  the  alphabet  in  order  are  then  plainly  but  rapidly 
sent  to  him.  The  receiver  expects  a  message.  In  the  first  few 
letters  he  recognizes  no  word  group.  He  hopes  to  see  the  con- 
nection a  little  farther  on.  He  is  finally  compelled  to  break. 
It  is  sometimes  possible  to  repeat  this  trick  several  times  with- 
out the  victim  discovering  it.  In  this  case  evidently  the  stren- 
uous effort  of  attention  to  recognize  word  groups  has  prevented 
the  recognition  of  a  most  familiar  group,  namely,  the  alphabet 
in  order. 

Another  interesting  apperceptive  illusion,  to  which  even  ex- 

JA  story  is  told  of  an  Indiana  operator,  who,  after  three  months'  practice, 
was  able  to  receive  Garfield's  Inaugural  Address.  Stories  of  this  sort  must  be 
taken  with  a  grain  of  salt.  The  more  of  telegraphy  you  know,  the  more  salt  it 
takes. 


30  WILLIAM  L.  BRYAN  AND  NOBLE  HARTER. 

pert  operators  are  subject,  arises  in  the  following  way  :  The  ad- 
justment of  the  armature  of  the  sounder  is  controlled  by  set  screws 
so  that  the  down  stroke  and  up  stroke  may  be  differentiated. 
The  down  strokes,  of  course,  correspond  to  the  dots  and  dashes 
of  the  Morse  code.  Whether  a  dot  or  dash  is  intended,  is  de- 
termined by  the  length  of  time  between  the  down  stroke  and 
the  following  back  stroke.  It  is  evidently  essential  that  the 
down  stroke  and  the  back  stroke  should  he  clearly  distinguish- 
able. Making  this  distinction  is  one  of  the  greatest  difficulties 
in  learning  telegraphy.  The  student  may  learn  to  recognize 
several  of  the  simple  dotted  letters  in  a  few  minutes ;  yet  after 
an  hour,  when  <?,  a  single  dot,  is  made,  he  interprets  the  two 
sounds  which  he  hears  as  /,  which  is  two  dots.  Learners  seek  to 
assist  the  ear  by  watching  the  teacher's  hand  or  the  armature  of 
the  sounder.  This  device  must,  of  course,  be  prohibited,  and 
the  learner  required  to  depend  on  the  ear  alone.  Several  in- 
stances have  been  observed  in  which  expert  operators  have 
made  the  same  sort  of  error  when  listening  to  strange  instru- 
ments in  which  the  down  stroke  and  back  stroke  were  not  very 
clearly  different.  In  such  cases  the  experts  were  unable  to 
understand  even  a  single  letter.  By  a  sort  of  inversion  of  at- 
tention the  back  strokes  are  heard  as  down  strokes,  and  vice 
versa. 

The  rate  of  receiving  varies  greatly.  On  train  wires,  about 
twenty  to  twenty-five  words,  of  four  letters  each,  per  minute, 
may  be  taken  as  the  ordinary  rate  of  communication.  Among 
lower  grade  operators  the  ability  to  send  is  greater  than  the 
ability  to  receive,  but  with  experts  the  reverse  is  generally 
true.  The  highest  sending  record,  so  far  as  known,  is  forty- 
nine  words  per  minute.  When  the  type-writer  is  used  the  abil- 
ity of  the  receiver  exceeds  that  of  the  sender.  Words  in  cipher 
cannot  be  received  so  rapidly  or  so  accurately  as  ordinary  lan- 
guage. The  telegraph  companies  recognize  this  fact  by  charg- 
ing very  high  rates  for  combinations  of  letters  forming  other  than 
ordinary  English  words.  Errors  in  the  transmission  of  mes- 
sages are  comparatively  few,  and  it  is  the  common  feeling  of 
telegraphers  that  they  could  testify  more  surely  in  Court  con- 
cerning what  they  have  heard  on  the  line  than  concerning  what 


STUDIES  IN  THE  TELEGRAPHIC  LANGUAGE.  31 

they  have  heard  from  personal  interview,  or  as  to  the  accu- 
of  a  message  which  they  have  copied  from  a  sounder  than 
as  to  one  which  they  have  copied  from  dictation. 

External  disturbances  have  a  very  great  effect  upon  inex- 
perienced operators,  but  affect  the  experienced  operator  very 
little.  It  is  not  uncommon  to  see  an  operator  doing  a  large 
amount  of  important  work  in  a  small  room  where  half  a  dozen 
sets  of  instruments  are  working,  trainmen  running  in  and  out, 
talking  excitedly  and  asking  questions,  engines  moving  by  the 
window  and  trucks  running  noisily  by  on  the  platform.  Yet 
the  operator  works  ahead,  calmly  and  rapidly,  and  even  briefly 
answers  questions  addressed  to  him.  Where  a  number  of 
sounders  work  close  together,  pieces  of  tin,  brass  or  the  like 
may  be  attached  so  as  to  give  each  a  distinguishable  tone. 
Many  men  can  receive  from  an  instrument  adjusted  low  in  the 
presence  of  others  sounding  much  louder.  The  ability  to  do 
this,  however,  is  much  lessened  by  lack  of  practice.  Dis- 
patcher C.  was  a  copyer  for  several  years  in  an  office  where  he 
worked  with  several  instruments  close  together.  After  he  had 
been  promoted  two  years  to  a  dispatcher's  desk,  where  but  one 
instrument  was  used,  he  lost  the  ability  to  do  the  work  he  had 
formerly  done,  being  confused  by  the  working  of  the  other  in- 
struments. 

Subjective  disturbances,  as  fear,  anger,  excitement,  etc., 
have  little  effect  on  expert  men  other  than  to  make  them  more 
fluent  in  the  use  of  the  telegraphic  language.  Operators  are 
keenly  alive  to  the  presence  of  those  with  whom  they  communi- 
cate, so  that  they  do  not  feel  alone,  although  no  one  is  physic- 
ally present.  This  feeling  causes  young  operators  to  suffer 
keenly  from  stage  fright,  especially  when  making  their  debut. 
The  first  work  generally  consists  in  reporting  a  train  to  a  dis- 
patcher. The  debutant  is  very  anxious  to  do  so,  and  practices 
hard  so  as  to  do  it  well,  but  almost  invariably  does  it  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  attract  the  attention  of  all  the  operators  on  the  line. 
It  is  not  unusual  to  see  a  beginner  sweating  profusely  in  a  cold 
room  from  the  exertion  of  taking  an  easy  ten-word  message. 
A  similar  fact  appears  in  the  difficulty  which  the  young  opera- 
tor has  to  keep  up  a  conversation.  He  writes  very  slowly,  and 


32  WILLIAM  L.  BRYAN  AND  NOBLE  HARTER. 

yet  he  cannot  think  of  enough  things  to  say.  The  organizing 
imagination  seems  paralyzed  by  the  presence  of  his  audience. 
In  one  who  is  not  an  expert  the  emotions  of  fear,  of  anger  and 
even  of  joy,  generally  paralyze  invention,  so  that  only  spasmodic 
or  meaningless  sound  groups  can  be  made,  and  every  one  recog- 
nizes that  the  man  is  '  rattled.'  The  ability  to  receive  is  also 
often  so  affected  that  he  is  unable  to  recognize  anything.  This 
is  particularly  true  in  the  case  of  fear. 

The  telegraphic  language  becomes  so  thoroughly  assimilated 
that  thinking  apparently  resolves  itself  into  the  telegraphic  short 
hand  used  in  conversation.  This  telegraphic  short  hand  is  an 
abbreviated  code  in  which  the  vowels  and  many  consonants  are 
thrown  out.  One  thinks  in  telegraphic  terms.  An  odd  expres- 
sion or  an  unusual  message  attracts  the  operator's  attention,  while 
he  is  directly  engaged  with  some  other  work.  Operators  who 
work  at  night  depend  on  their  office  call  to  waken  them.  The 
sensation  is  that  of  hearing  one's  name  repeated  softly  over  and 
over.  When  the  operator  is  worn  out  by  loss  of  sleep  or  phys- 
ical fatigue  he  is,  of  course,  more  difficult  to  awaken.  At  such 
times  the  sender  writes  the  office  call  very  distinctly  and  makes 
unusually  long  spaces.  This  seems  to  add  emphasis  to  the  call. 
The  anger  flutter,  a  whir  made  by  rapid  alternate  strokes  of 
the  first  and  second  finger,  is  also  employed  with  good  effect  to 
awaken  sleeping  telegraphers. 

How  thoroughly  the  telegraphic  language  is  mastered  in 
some  cases  is  illustrated  by  the  fact  that  expert  operators  '  copy 
behind'  three  or  four  words  ;  sometimes  ten  or  twenty  words  ; 
that  is,  the  receiving  operator  allows  the  sender  to  write  a  num- 
ber of  words  before  he  begins  to  copy.  It  is  then  possible  for 
him  to  get  something  of  the  sense  of  the  sentence  in  advance. 
The  operator  is  thus  able,  not  only  to  punctuate  and  capitalize, 
but  also  to  keep  run  of  the  grammatical  structure.  Yet,  while 
he  would  detect  an  error,  or  notice  that  a  word  was  not  appro- 
priate in  the  connection  used,  and  be  able  to  suggest  to  the 
sender  what  the  word  should  be,  the  language  of  the  message 
as  a  whole  may  have  little  or  no  meaning  to  him.  Several  cases 
illustrating  this  fact  have  been  observed.  The  most  notable 
case  was  given  by  Chief  S.  A  message  for  the  superintendent 


STUDIES  IN  THE  TELEGRAPHIC  LANGUAGE.  33 

was  received  by  a  very  skillful  operator.  Any  one  might  have 
seen  from  its  contents  that  it  required  immediate  delivery  and 
action.  Some  word  in  the  message  had  been  so  written  that  it 
was  misread  and  missent  by  the  sending  operator.  The  receiv- 
ing operator  saw  that  this  word  did  not  make  sense,  and  suggested 
to  the  sender  that  it  might  be  another  word  similar  in  appear- 
ance. The  sender  decided  that  this  was  true  and  the  message 
was  corrected  accordingly.  The  receiving  operator  placed  the 
message  upon  the  superintendent's  hook,  where  it  was  found  by 
a  clerk  too  late  for  the  action  required.  The  receiver  could  not 
believe  that  he  had  received  such  a  message  until  his  copy  was 
shown  him.  The  details  described  were  then  recalled.  The 
railway  companies  recognize  this  tendency  to  automatism  by 
requiring  dispatchers  not  to  send  out  train  orders  until  they  have 
been  assured  by  the  operator  to  whom  the  orders  are  sent  that 
he  has  displayed  the  proper  signals. 

The  most  striking  example  of  complete  mastery  of  the  tele- 
graphic language  is  seen  in  the  daily  work  of  a  train  dispatcher 
on  a  trunk  line.  Except  when  there  is  a  very  unusual  amount 
of  traffic,  the  dispatcher  records  the  movements  of  trains  as  re- 
ported on  a  train  sheet,  figures  on  a  special  meeting  point  for 
trains,  sends  out  the  order,  and  as  it  is  repeated  by  one  office, 
copies  it  in  the  order  book,  checks  it  again  as  the  next  office  re- 
peats it,  acknowledges  its  correctness  and  gives  his  official  sanc- 
tion ;  but  while  this  very  important  work  is  being  done,  he  fig- 
ures on  other  meeting  points  in  which  the  weather,  length  of 
side  tracks,  size  and  heaviness  of  trains,  grades  and  probable 
delays  are  items.  By  the  time  the  first  order  is  completed,  he 
has  decided  on  the  next  line  of  action,  and  so  it  goes  on  for  the 
eight  hours  he  is  on  duty. 

When  not  influenced  by  nervous  diseases,  practice  enables 
nearly  all  to  make  groups  of  four,  five  or  six  dots  with  great 
rapidity.  For  the  accuracy  with  which  this  is  done  see  below 
part  IV.  Measurements  made  with  the  chronograph  showed 
this  rate  to  be  as  high  as  twelve  dots  per  second.  Letters 
forming  words  are  written  much  more  rapidly  and  with  greater 
precision  than  letters  taken  at  random.  The  same  is  true  of 
words  in  connected  discourse  as  compared  with  words  in  ran- 
dom order. 


34  WILLIAM  L.  BRYAN  AND  NOBLE  HARTER. 

The  effect  of  emotion  upon  sending  is  to  give  greater  facility 
of  expression  to  expert  men,  while  beginners  are  in  a  greater 
or  less  degree  paralyzed.  The  syllable  <ha'  repeated,  indi- 
cates laughter  and  is  frequently  used  without  any  other  external 
sign  even  when  the  operator's  risibles  are  considerably  excited. 
The  uninitiated  spectator  might  not  suspect  that  the  conversa- 
tion was  humorous.  On  the  other  hand,  the  anger  flutter  de- 
scribed above  is  invariably  accompanied  by  a  strong  facial  ex- 
pression of  passion. 

Tests  were  made  to  ascertain  the  average  rate  of  sending. 
The  best  results  were  obtained  from  two  one-minute  trials  of 
dispatcher  K.  At  the  first  trial  he  wrote  thirty-nine  words  of  a 
hundred  and  eighty-six  letters,  making  four  hundred  and  six- 
teen impacts  upon  the  key.  At  the  second  trial  he  wrote  forty- 
two  words  of  a  hundred  and  ninety- two  letters,  or  four  hundred 
and  twenty-nine  impacts.  This  shows  a  speed  of  seven  and  two- 
tenths  movements  per  second.  If  the  words  in  the  Cincinnati 
contest,  where  the  winner  wrote  forty-nine  words  per  minute, 
averaged  as  many  impacts  per  word  as  in  the  above  cases,  the 
rate  would  be  eight  and  one-tenth  impacts  per  second.  Com- 
parison of  these  results  with  the  maximum  rate  of  voluntary 
movement  as  determined  by  Von  Kries,1  Dressier2  and  Bryan3 
must,  of  course,  take  into  account  the  important  differences  be- 
tween the  conditions  in  the  tests  made. 

Every  operator  develops  a  distinctive  style  of  sending  so 
that  he  can  be  recognized  readily  by  those  who  work  with  him 
constantly.  (See  III.  below.)  Mr.  S.,  a  dispatcher  of  much 
experience,  works  daily  with  forty  or  fifty  men  and  states  that, 
after  hearing  four  or  five  words,  he  can  readily  recognize  the 
sender,  or  be  sure  that  he  is  not  one  of  his  men.  Where  two 
or  more  operators  work  in  the  same  office  they  sometimes 
change  before  the  appointed  time,  or  work  for  each  other  with- 
out permission.  When  a  train  is  reported,  however,  in  such 
cases,  the  dispatcher  often  asks  where  the  other  operator  is. 
Operators  who  feel  secure  in  the  seclusion  of  their  offices  have 

*Du  Bois  Reymond,  Archivf.  Physiologic,  1886.     Suppl.  I. 

2  Am.  Jour.  Psychol.,  IV.,  p.  514. 

3  Am.  Jour.  Psychol.,  V. ,  p.  i. 


STUDIES  IN  THE  TELEGRAPHIC  LANGUAGE.  35 

sometimes  been  detected  in  making  improper  and  impertinent 
remarks  on  the  line,  by  their  style  of  sending.  Two  instances 
were  noted  where  men  were  discharged  for  offenses  detected  in 
this  manner.  Young  operators  have  a  peculiar  way  of 
grouping  the  letters  of  words,  which  gives  the  impression  of 
some  one  walking  unsteadily  as  when  partially  intoxicated. 
Many  dispatchers  claim  that  they  can  generally  recognize  a 
woman  by  her  style  of  sending. 

The  best  time. to  learn  telegraphy  is  doubtless  before  the  age 
of  eighteen.  The  most  expert  operators  have  learned  as  a  rule, 
when  quite  young.  It  is  very  difficult  and  often  impossible  to 
become  even  a  passable  operator,  when  the  start  is  made  after 
thirty.  While  extreme  age  weakens  and  limits  the  power  of 
the  operator,  the  maximum  skill  seems  to  be  retained  up  to  the 
age  of  sixty-five.  This  point,  however,  demands  special  inves- 
tigation. Severe  headaches  and  other  painful  diseases  inter- 
fere with  the  work  of  the  operator.  Mr.  S.,  now  a  train  mas- 
ter, regards  the  use  of  tobacco  as  hurtful  to  operators.  Mr  .W. 
a  Western  Union  Superintendent  thinks  tobacco  invariably  in- 
jurious to  his  men.  Many  operators  do  not  consider  a  moderate 
use  of  tobacco  as  detrimental.  All  agree,  however,  that  intoxi- 
cants make  a  man  not  only  unreliable,  but  dangerous.  To  be 
found  in  a  saloon  means  discharge  on  many  railroads.  The 
work  of  telegraphers  is  much  affected  by  nervous  diseases. 
Writers'  cramp  frequently  disables  the  sending  arm,  and  causes 
the  retirement  of  the  operator,  unless  he  learns  to  send  with  the 
other  arm,  a  difficult  matter  with  most  men  so  afflicted.  Some- 
times rest  and  treatment  relieve  this  difficulty,  at  least  tempor- 
arily. Mr.  Y.  had  suffered  from  a  nervous  affection  which 
made  it  difficult  for  him  to  stop  when  making  four  or  five  suc- 
cessive dots.  He  would  make  ten  or  twelve  dots  in  writing  let- 
ters composed  of  these  groups. 

III.     INDIVIDUAL    DIFFERENCES    IN   TELEGRAPHIC  WRITING. 

The  telegraphic  language  is  singularly  well  adapted  to  the 
experimental  study  of  many  problems  in  physiology,  phychology 
and  even  philology.  Indeed,  if  one  were  required  to  invent  a 
generation-long  experiment  for  the  exact  study  of  certain  phases 


36  WILLIAM  L.  BRYAN  AND  NOBLE  HARTER. 

of  language,  one  could  scarcely  hope  to  find  a  better ;  for,  on 
the  one  hand,  no  other  language  used  by  man  can  be  so  com- 
pletely translated  into  exactly  measurable  symbols ;  while,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  manifold  personal  differences  in  the  opera- 
tors are  shown  by  investigation  to  be  represented  in  those  sym- 
bols. As  illustration  and  proof  of  these  assertions,  the  follow- 
ing study  of  individual  differences  in  telegraphic  writing  is 
offered. 

Apparatus. — The  DuPrez  signal  was  adjusted  to  write  upon 
the  Marey  drum,  being  carried  transversely  by  the  automatic 
carriage  which  Verdin  supplies  with  the  Marey  drum.  The 
Marey  chronograph  in  circuit  with  the  Kroneker  Interrupter 
gave  the  time  control. 

The  experiment. — The  sentence,  "  Ship  364  wagons  via 
Erie  quick,"  was  written  by  each  subject  about  a  dozen  times  in 
succession.  This  sentence  was  chosen  because  it  contains 
almost  every  sort  of  difficulty  which  the  telegraphic  language 
presents.  '  Ship '  is  composed  of  groups  of  three,  four,  two 
and  five  dots.  Each  of  the  figures  3,  6,  4  is  somewhat  difficult, 
especially  the  6,  which  is  composed  of  six  dots.  '  Wagons r 
contains  two  letters  which  have  two  dashes  in  succession. 
'Via'  is  a  simple  word  presenting  no  special  difficulty. 
'  Erie '  is  by  far  the  hardest  word  in  the  sentence.  By  a  little 
change  in  the  time  relations,  one  would  get  oye,  ere,  sic,  eeye. 
Such  words  are  usually  written  with  extra  care  and  with  longer 
spaces.  The  word  '  quick '  has  several  dashes,  of  which  the 
last  one  is  likely  to  be  longer  than  the  others,  since  it  closes 
the  word  and  the  sentence.  The  sentence  as  a  whole  is  as  fol- 
lows:  S  (...),  h  (....),  i  (..)  p  ( ),3  (...  —  .),  6 

( ),  4  (....—  ),w(. ),a(.— ),g( .),o(.  .), 

n  (— .),  s  (...),  v  (...-),  i  (••),  a  (.— ),  E  (.),  r  (.  ..), 
i  (..),  e  (.),  q  (..-.),  u  (..-),  i  (..),  c  (..  .),  k 

(-•-)• 

The  subjects. — By  connecting  the  Du  Prez  signal  with  the 
main  lines  of  the  Western  Union  Telegraph  Company  and  of  the 
Monon  Railroad  Company,  about  sixty  operators  were  tested. 
It  was  found  that  it  would  require  several  years  of  continuous 
work  to  investigate  all  of  these  records  by  the  method  decided 


STUDIES  IN  THE  TELEGRAPHIC  LANGUAGE.  37 

upon.  Accordingly  sixteen  of  the  number  were  selected,  some 
of  them  being  expert,  some  ordinary  and  some  poor  operators. 
Following  is  a  brief  characterization  of  the  men,  grouped  some- 
what in  the  order  of  their  ability  as  telegraphers,  beginning 
with  the  less  expert.  A.  B.  Guthrie,  student  I.  U.,  age  21, 
5  months'  experience  as  student  in  a  telegraph  office ;  C.  G. 
Mallotte,  student  I.  U.,  age  22,  2  years'  experience  as  student 
in  an  office,  3  months  in  charge  of  a  small  office ;  Prof.  G.  E. 
Fellows,  department  of  European  history,  I.  U.,  age  43,  5 
years'  experience  in  charge  of  railroad  office  about  13  years 
ago;  R.  C.  Brooks,  student  I.  U.,  age  21,  3  years'  experi- 
ence in  charge  of  an  office ;  L.  A.  Clark,  agent  Monon,  Craw- 
fordsville,  Ind.,  age  40,  experience  17  years  ;  C.  L.  Buchanan, 
agent  Monon,  Ellettsville,  age  57,  experience  25  years ;  G.  W. 
Dyer,  agent  Monon,  Bainbridge,  Ind.,  age  60,  experience  33 
years;  Geo.  H.  Godfrey,  Manager  W.  U.,  New  Albany,  Ind., 
age  55,  experience  31  years;  Mrs.  Z.  M.  Apple,  Manager  W. 
U.,  French  Lick  Springs,  Ind.,  age  24,  experience  5  years; 
Miss  Nellie  Green,  operator  Monon,  Louisville,  Ky.,  age  24, 
experience  5  years;  A.  B.  Evans,  Manager  W.  U.,  Blooming- 
ton,  Ind.,  age  27,  experience  10  years  ;  Noble  Harter,  graduate 
student  of  Psychology,  Indiana  University,  age  37,  experience 
21  years;  C.  W.  Goodman,  dispatcher,  Monon,  age  32,  ex- 
perience 15  years ;  H.  O.  Chapman,  dispatcher,  Monon,  age 
27,  experience  10  years ;  W.  H.  Fogg,  dispatcher,  Monon,  age 
26,  experience  10  years ;  E.  B.  Cassell,  chief  dispatcher, 
Monon,  age  36,  experience  18  years. 

Measurement  of  Results. — Each  character  in  the  tracings 
obtained  was  measured.  There  are  one  hundred  and  forty-nine 
characters  to  be  measured  if  the  sentence  is  written  without 
error;  but,  as  in  many  cases,  too  many  characters  were  made, 
the  actual  number  to  be  measured  was  considerably  greater. 
Eight  repetitions  of  the  message  by  each  of  the  sixteen  subjects 
were  measured,  so  that  the  total  number  of  measurements  made 
was  about  twenty  thousand,  and  required  several  months.  The 
measurements  were  made  to  the  nearest  half  millimetre.  The 
rate  of  the  drum  was  so  adjusted  that  forty-seven  mm.  corre- 
spond to  one  second  of  time.  Most  of  the  errors  must  then  evi- 


38  WILLIAM  L.  BRYAN  AND  NOBLE  HARTER. 

dently  be  less  than  five  thousandths  of  a  second,  and  an  error  of 
1^  mm.  would  be  about  one  hundredth  of  a  second.  Higher  ac- 
curacy could  have  been  obtained  easily,  and  was  obtained  in  in- 
dividual cases  by  increasing  the  rate  of  the  drum  and  so  lengthen- 
ing the  lines  to  be  measured.  But  upon  careful  consideration, 
the  degrees  of  accuracy  given  was  proved  to  be  sufficient  for 
the  experiment  proposed. 

Methods  of  Treating  Results. — Several  methods  of  treating 
the  results  were  employed  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  out  dif- 
ferent points. 

First  Treatment. — The  theoretical  Morse  alphabet  is  com- 
posed of  the  following  elements  :  A,  the  dot,  one  unit  of  time  ; 
B,  the  dash,  three  units  of  time ;  C,  the  short  space  between  the 
parts  of  a  letter,  one  unit  of  time ;  D,  the  long  space,  in  spaced 
letter,  two  units  of  time  ;  E,  the  space  between  letters,  three  units 
of  time;  F,  the  space  between  words,  six  units  of  time.  This 
is  the  ideal  scheme  which  each  operator  has  tried  to  learn.  Now 
it  is  possible  to  compare  the  actual  writing  of  each  individual 
with  this  ideal  scheme  by  taking  the  actual  length  of  his  dot  as 
a  unit  and  by  then  computing  the  actual  ratios  of  the  other  ele- 
ments to  this  unit.  This  computation  was  made  for  each  indi- 
vidual. The  average  length  of  dot,  dash,  etc.,  being  used. 
The  results  are  given  in  Table  I. 

It  was  found  by  a  study  of  the  individual  results  that  the  sev- 
eral values  of  a  given  character  are  not  accidental  variations 
from  their  average  value,  but  that  there  are  constant  differences 
between  the  times  required  for  the  same  character  in  different 
parts  of  the  sentence  or  even  of  the  same  word.  These  facts, 
which  affect  the  value  of  Table  I.,  will  be  considered  further 
on.  The  table  proves  its  value  in  spite  of  this  or  any  other 
defect,  however,  by  the  fact  that  it  affords  a  means  of  identify- 
ing any  one  of  the  individuals  represented  in  it.  If  a  single 
one  of  the  sentences  written  by  one  of  the  subjects  be  treated 
by  the  method  employed  in  constructing  the  table,  a  comparison 
of  the  several  ratios  obtained  and  their  sum  with  the  values 
given  in  Table  I.,  will  in  every  case  show  a  correspondence  so 
much  more  exact  with  one  of  the  sixteen  than  with  any  of  the 
others,  that  the  identification  will  be  beyond  question. 


STUDIES  IN  THE  TELEGRAPHIC  LANGUAGE.  39 

TABLE  I. 


NAME. 

A 

B 

C 

D 

E 

F 

TOTAL. 

I.OO 

7.OO 

I.OO 

2.OO 

3.00 

6.00 

16.00 

I.OO 

1  -<K 

1.  17 

I.CC 

1.76 

2.09 

9.48 

I.OO 

4.66 

2.  -13 

T.CI 

5.80 

7.44 

24.74 

I.OO 

3.O2 

1.18 

2.41 

2.88 

4.O5 

H.*4 

I.OO 

7.47 

1.24 

3.09 

C.72 

6.76 

20.88 

A.  B.  EVANS  

I.OO 

2.7O 

.80 

1.98 

2.  IO 

2.65 

10.92 

NOBLE  HARTER  

I.OO 

2.83 

-QS 

2.11 

7.08 

6.44 

16.61 

G   W  DYER  

I.OO 

2.85 

I.OQ 

2.  2O 

2.9? 

C.77 

IC.44 

G.  H.  GODFREY  

I.OO 

2.27 

.76 

1-77 

2.  02 

4.15 

11.97 

C.  L   BUCHANAN  

I.OO 

2.64 

I.  O2 

1.86 

2.  CO 

4.68 

I7.7O 

L.  A.  CLARK  

I.OO 

2.38 

•7° 

2.31 

2-95 

4.91 

14.21; 

I.OO 

2.4? 

•94 

1.77 

2-4? 

3.58 

12.19 

NELLIE  GREEN  

I.OO 

2.4.9 

.85 

1.81 

1.  02 

2.87 

IO.94. 

W.  H.  FOGG  

I.OO 

2.98 

1.08 

2.40 

2.71 

I.OO 

17.17 

E.  B.  CASSELL  

I.OO 

2.61 

1.06 

2.27 

7.OI 

4.12 

17.92 

C.  W.  GOODMAN  

I.OO 

2.12 

.87 

2.13 

2.42 

7.14 

11.88 

H.  O.  CHAPMAN  

I.OO 

2.  CO 

•94 

1.97 

2.87 

7.76 

12.71 

In  order  to  obtain  average  values  which  should  represent 
more  homogeneous  values  and  also  to  show  characteristic  indi- 
vidual differences  in  a  single  short  and  easy  word,  the  results 
for  the  word  *  via '  were  treated  in  the  following  way.  As 
above,  each  man's  average  dot  for  the  six  dots  in  the  word  was 
taken  as  the  unit,  and  the  length  of  each  character  was  com- 
puted as  a  per  cent,  of  that  unit.  The  ideal  scale  is  given  for 
comparison,  also,  the  variation  of  this  average  dot  from  the 
typical  dot,  *'.  e.,  the  average  of  all  the  dots  in  the  sentence. 

In  order  to  prove  the  identifying  value  of  this  table,  two 
tests  were  made  :  A  friend  selected  single  records  from  three 
of  the  operators.  Computations  of  these  records  by  the  same 
method  as  that  used  in  making  the  table  gave  results  which 
could  be  unmistakably  identified.  Then,  records  of  three 
others  were  measured  from  the  original  tracings  and  the  results 


WILLIAM  L.  BRYAN  AND  NOBLE  HARTER. 


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NAME. 

MALLOTTI 

GUTHRIE 

BROOKS  . 

FELLOWS 

EVANS 

E  HARTER 

W 
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.  GODFREY 

BUCHANAJ 

CLARK  . 

.  APPLE  . 

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WILLIAM  L.  BRYAN  AND  NOBLE  HARTER. 


computed  as  above.  The  identification  was  equally  sure. 
Table  III.  gives  the  six  sets  of  results  obtained  in  this  way  in 
comparison  with  the  corresponding  results  from  Table  II.  Of 
special  importance  is  the  fact  that  the  individual  results,  num- 
bers four,  five  and  six,  Table  III.,  were  written  much  more 
swiftly  than  the  results  represented  in  Table  II.  by  the  same 
operators ;  for  it  is  thus  shown  that  the  individual  character- 
istics persist  through  different  rates  of  speed.  The  variation  in 
speed  does  not,  however,  leave  the  ratios  between  the  several 
characters  undisturbed.  Examination  of  Table  III.  will  show 
that  greater  speed  is  gained  for  the  most  part  by  shortening 
the  longer  characters.  Fig.  i  in  Plate  I.  shows  the  relations  of 
Table  III.  graphically. 

Third  treatment. — By  a  different  method,  a  single  letter  v 

TABLE  IV. 


OPERATOR. 

A 

• 

C 

A 

C 

A 

• 

C 

B 

E 

TOTAL. 

H.  O.  C. 

(a) 
(b) 

.099 
.098 

•093 
.094 

.105 
.105 

.099 
.098 

.116 
.116 

.092 

.094 

.231 
.230 

.258 
.258 

.165 
.165 

I.  COO 
I.OOO 

G.  H.  G. 

(a) 
(b) 

.101 
.097 

.101 
.097 

.105 
.104 

.105 

.106 

.121 
.119 

.091 
.091 

.118 
.128 

I.OOO 
I.OOO 

G.  E.  F. 

(a) 

(b) 

.063 
.067 

•073 
.067 

•059 
.058 

.076 

.081 

•055 
.058 

.054 
.058 

.236 
.230 

•  384 
.381 

I.OOO 
I.OOO 

A.  B.  G. 

(a) 
(b) 

.067 
.069 

.114 
.118 

.060 
.063 

.109 

.105 

.042 
•043 

.126 
.128 

.265 
.260 

.217 
.24 

I.OOO 
I.OOO 

N.  G. 

(a) 

no 

.in 
.114 

•093 
.089 

.in 

.112 

.102 
.101 

.100 
.IOO 

.105 

.102 

•275 
.274 

.103 
.108 

I.OOO 
I.OOO 

N.  H. 

(a) 

(b) 

.065 
•063 

.089 
.090 

.100 
.IOO 

.089 
.090 

.109 

.110 

.090 

.088 

.248 
.250 

.210 
.209 

I.OOO 
I.OOO 

(a)  The  ratios  of  the  average  length  of  each  element,  to  the  average  length 
of  the  whole  letter  v. 

(b)  One  of  the  eight  percentages  selected  at  random,  the  design  being  to 
demonstrate  its  efficiency  in  identification. 


STUDIES  IN  THE  TELEGRAPHIC  LANGUAGE.  43 

from  the  word  'via'  was  studied.  The  average  length  of  each 
element  was  found,  and  the  ratio  of  this  to  the  average  length 
of  the  whole  letter  was  computed.  Each  of  the  eight  trials  for 
six  of  the  subjects  chosen  at  random  were  thus  treated.  The 
results  are  given  in  Table  IV.,  and  they  show  that  each  of  the  six 
may  be  identified  by  the  characteristics  which  appear  in  the  sin- 
gle letter. 

Variation : — Sixty-nine  dots  are  required  to  write  the  mes- 
sage used.  An  operator  wrote  the  message  eight  times.  It  is 
evident  that  the  sixty-nine  dots  made  in  one  writing  of  the  mes- 
sage will  vary,  and  also  that  each  of  the  sixty-nine  dots  will 
vary  in  the  eight  successive  writings  thereof.  To  save  circum- 
locutions, I  shall  call  the  first  heterotaxic  variation,  and  the  sec- 
ond homotaxic  variation.  These  two  sorts  of  variation  were 
studied  in  a  variety  of  ways,  covering  all  the  material  at  dis- 
posal, and  always  with  the  same  result.  In  order  to  make  a 
sure,  quantitative  comparison  between  the  two  sorts  of  variation, 
it  was  decided  to  study  eight  dots,  beginning  with  the  first  dot 
in  the  word  '  via. '  Since  the  message  was  written  eight  times, 
this  selection  gave  eight  rows  and  eight  columns,  or  sixty-eight 
dots  in  all,  for  each  of  the  sixteen  subjects.  The  homotaxic 
variation  was  computed  as  follows :  The  average,  the  mean 
variation  (~),  and  the  per  cent,  which  the  latter  is  of  the  former 
were  computed  for  each  of  the  eight  columms.  The  average  of 
these  eight  results  is  a  measure  of  the  homotaxic  variation. 
The  heterotaxic  variation  was  found  by  two  methods.  First, 
the  rows  were  treated  in  the  same  manner  as  that  used  in  find- 
ing the  homotaxic  variation  in  the  columns.  Second,  the  aver- 
age of  each  column  was  found,  and  then  the  per  cent,  of  vari- 
ation in  these  averages  was  computed.  The  reason  for  this 
procedure  will  be  given  below.  Table  V.  shows  the  results  ob- 
tained. 

It  is  evident  from  the  foregoing  table  that  the  homotaxic 
variation  is  an  inverse  measure  of  skill.  In  every  day  lan- 
guage, this  simply  means  that  an  operator  can  repeat  the  same 
action  more  exactly  the  more  expert  he  is. 

The  heterotaxic  variation  as  given  in  column  II.  is  a  result- 
ant of  two  factors.  First,  of  course,  the  accidental  variation 


44 


WILLIAM  L.  BRYAN  AND  NOBLE  HARTER. 


TABLE  V. 


OPERATOR. 

AGE. 

YEARS 
EXPERIENCE. 

HOMO- 

TAXIC  I. 

HETERO- 

TAXIClI. 

HETERO- 
TAXIC  III. 

C.  G.  MALLOTTE  .   .    .   . 

22 

2 

.117 

.120 

.086 

A.  B.  GUTHRIE  

21 

5-12 

.112 

.161 

.150 

G.  E.  FELLOWS   .... 

43 

15 

.094 

.097 

•035 

G.  W.  DYER  

60 

33 

.078 

•  154 

.150 

NELLIE  GREEN    .... 

24 

5 

•075 

.156 

.150 

C.  L.  BUCHANAN  .... 

57 

25 

.070 

•  152 

.130 

L.  A.  CLARK    

4° 

17 

.062 

.078 

•053 

NOBLE  HARTER    .... 

37 

21 

.056 

.171 

.170 

R.  C.  BROOKS   

21 

3 

.052 

.135 

.120 

Z.  M.  APPLE  

24 

«; 

.050 

.000 

.072 

A.  B.  EVANS  

27 

10 

.047 

.170 

.170 

C.  W.  GOODMAN  .... 

32 

15 

•045 

.104 

.088 

H.  O.  CHAPMAN  .... 

27 

10 

•045 

.116 

.083 

G.  H.  GODFREY   ,    .    .    , 

55 

3i 

.O4I 

.120 

.106 

W.  H.  FOGG  

26 

IO 

.Ot4 

.IQ2 

.180 

E.  B.  CASSELL  

1.6 

18 

.027 

.OQ2 

.075 

enters  here  as  everywhere.  Second,  the  operator  does  not  in- 
tend to  make  the  same  character  exactly  alike  in  successive 
positions.  This  intentional  differentiation  corresponds  to  in- 
flection in  speech.  A  study  of  Table  II.  or  III.  will  show 
clearly  these  characteristic  differences  between  a  character  in 
one  position  and  the  same  character  in  a  different  position.  By 
computing  the  heterotaxic  variation  by  the  second  method  de- 
scribed, we  partially  eliminate  the  element  of  accidental  varia- 
tion. A  comparison  of  the  variations  given  in  columns  II.  and 
III.  of  Table  V.  shows  that  the  amount  of  accidental  variation 
thus  eliminated  is,  as  might  be  expected,  smaller  in  the  case  of 
the  expert  men.  If  we  take  the  results  in  column  III.,  Table 
V.  as  the  best  attainable  measure  of  variation  due  to  intentional 
inflection,  it  appears  that  this  is  slightly  greater  in  the  more  ex- 
pert men  than  in  the  less  expert.  The  average  heterotaxic 

1  Has  been  out  of  business  about  18  years. 


STUDIES  IN  THE  TELEGRAPHIC  LANGUAGE.  45 

variation  of  the  first  seven,  or  the  less  expert  operators,  as  de- 
termined from  column  III.  of  Table  V.  is  106.  The  corre- 
sponding value  for  the  last  nine,  the  more  expert  men,  is  118. 
The  largest  two  values  in  the  Table  belong  to  two  of  the  more 
expert  men,  and  the  smallest  two  belong  to  two  of  the  less  ex- 
pert men. 

In  conclusion,  therefore,  it  may  be  said  that  the  accidental 
variation  is  a  somewhat  accurate  inverse  measure  of  skill,  while 
the  variation  for  inflection,  is  likely  to  be  larger  rather  than 
smaller  with  increasing  expertness. 

Note  on  the  accuracy  -with  -which  the  longer  groups  of  clicks 
are  made  by  telegraphic  operators.  A  count  of  the  results  show 
in  writing. 

//(....)        5  errors  out  of  possible  128. 

V  (.  .  .  )    IO         "  "       "  "  " 

q  (. .  — .  )     4       "       "     "        "  ** 

3  (. . .  — .)  12      "       "     "        "  " 

4.  (. ..  — )  17       "       «««        "  " 

p  ( )  56      "       "     "        "  " 

6  ( )  91       "       "     "        "  " 

In  order  to  show  the  variations  in  writing  the  figure  6 

( ) ,  and  that  these  variations  are  not  primarily  deter- 
mined by  the  skill  of  the  operator,  the  results  for  the  several 
operators  are  given. 

V.      THE    CURVES    OF    IMPROVEMENT    IN    RECEIVING    AND 

SENDING. 

Throughout  the  year  of  exploration,  operators  were  ques- 
tioned closely  with  regard  to  the  rate  of  improvement  with 
practice  at  various  periods.  Operators  generally  agreed  upon 
certain  main  facts.  Upon  the  basis  of  this  general  inquiry  and 
of  his  own  personal  experience  as  an  operator  and  a  teacher  of 
telegraphy,  H.  drew  the  curves  represented  in  Fig.  II.,  Plate  I. 
as  a  rough  picture  of  the  facts. 

In  further  verification  of  the  main  characteristics  of  these 
curves  over  two  hundred  operators,  ranging  in  skill  from  the 


46 


WILLIAM  L.  BRYAN  AND  NOBLE  HARTER. 


OPERATORS. 

YEARS  EXPERIENCE. 

PRESENT  POSITION. 

Av.  No.  OF  DOTS 
IN  WRITING  6. 

C  G  M 

2 

Student 

5-2 

A  B  G 

5-12 

ii 

6.0 

G  E  F 

5 

College  Professor 

5-6 

G  W  D 

33 

Ry.  Agent 

9.2 

N  G 

5 

Ry.  Operator 

10.2 

C  L  B 

25 

Ry.  Agent 

8.6 

LAC 

17 

"        " 

6.1 

N  H 

21 

Teacher 

7-5 

RGB 

3 

Student 

7-i 

Z  M  A 

5 

W.  U.  Operator 

6.0 

ABE 

10 

ti             it 

7-2 

C  W  G 

15 

Dispatcher 

6.1 

HOC 

10 

" 

7-7 

G  H  G 

31 

Ry.  Agent 

12.2 

W  H  F 

IO 

Dispatcher 

5-0 

R  B  C 

18 

ii 

8.7 

most  expert  to  those  just  beginning,  have  been  questioned  and 
have  given  practically  unanimous  assent,1 

For  the  purpose  of  gaining  not  only  more,  but  more  definite 
information,  requests  were  sent  to  a  number  of  schools  of  teleg- 
raphy. Blanks  were  sent  to  such  schools  with  the  request  that 
the  typical  curves  of  improvement  be  plotted.  In  many  cases, 
of  course,  no  reply  was  received,  and  in  some  cases  the  adver- 
tising impulse  was  the  evident  inspiration  of  curves  which  repre- 
sented their  students  as  becoming  skillful  operators  in  a  few 
months.  The  manager  of  Valentine's  School  of  Telegraphy, 
Jonesville,  Wis.,  wrote  :  "  While  I  recognize  the  fact  that  every 
student  undergoes  the  experience  you  have  outlined  in  your  let- 
ter, I  hesitate  to  furnish  you  this  information  without  first  having 
systematically  obtained  it."  Seven  months  later  he  sent  the 

1  One  skillful  operator  denied  having  experienced  the  period  of  non-advance- 
ment shown  in  the  receiving  curve  before  reaching  the  main-line  rate.  His  as- 
sociates in  the  office  explained  this  exception  as  a  lapse  of  memory  due  to  vanity. 
Their  incredulity  illustrates  the  practical  unanimity  of  opinion. 


STUDIES  IN  THE  TELEGRAPHIC  LANGUAGE.  47 

curves  in  Fig.  III.,  Plate  I.,  which  are  believed  to  be  entirely 
reliable,  as  is  also  Fig.  IV.,  Plate  I.  from  the  Commercial  Col- 
lege of  Kentucky. 

Two  schools  where  telegraphy  is  taught  in  Cincinnati  were 
visited  personally  and  arrangements  made  to  have  the  progress 
of  a  representative  student  in  each  observed  systematically. 
These  results  are  given  in  Figs.  V.  and  VI.,  Plate  I.  Arrange- 
ments were  also  made  to  have  two  reputable  operators,  well 
known  to  H.,  observe  and  test  the  progress  of  one  student  in 
each  of  their  offices,  from  the  time  of  beginning  until  profi- 
ciency was  reached.  These  results  are  given  in  Figs.  VII. 
and  VIII.,  Plate  I. 

Finally  H.  was  able,  during  the  winter  95-96,  to  test  the 
advancement  of  two  learners  from  the  beginning  until  they  were 
both  fair  operators.  Both  were  students  in  the  Western  Union 
Office  at  Brookville,  Indiana.  The  operator,  Mr.  Balsley  gave 
every  assistance  in  his  power  to  make  the  investigation  success- 
ful. Will  J.  Reynolds,  one  of  the  students,  is  eighteen  years 
old  and  is  a  young  man  of  more  than  ordinary  ability.  Edyth 
L.  Balsley,  the  other  student,  is  seventeen  years  old  and  is  a 
very  bright  young  girl.  The  former  began  in  August,  the  lat- 
ter in  September,  1895.  The  tests  were  made  every  Saturday. 
Forty  tests  were  made  with  the  young  man  and  thirty-six  with 
the  young  woman. 

Ordinarily  telegraphic  speed  is  reckoned  in  terms  of  so 
many  words  per  minute.  For  these  tests,  however,  the  letters 
were  counted.  Of  course  sentences  were  used  in  each  test 
which  had  not  been  used  before.  Pains  were  taken  to  keep  the 
tests  of  uniform  difficulty.  On  the  one  hand,  many  short  and 
easy  combinations,  and  on  the  other  hand,  combinations  repre- 
senting unusual  difficulty  from  a  telegraphic  point  of  view  were 
avoided.  Special  pains  were  also  taken  to  see  that  the  amount 
of  practice  from  week  to  week  was  substantially  uniform. 

The  sending  test  was  made  as  follows :  The  learner  was 
directed  to  write  as  fast  as  he  could  do  so,  legibly.  The  obser- 
ver copied  the  words  as  sent  as  a  test  of  legibility.  Some  two- 
minute  period  was  noted  by  the  observer,  unknown  to  learner, 
and  the  number  of  letters  sent  in  that  time  was  afterward 


48  WILLIAM  L.  BRYAN  AND  NOBLE  HARTER, 

counted.  Several  tests  were  taken  and  the  results  averaged. 
The  variation  in  the  several  tests  was  slight1.  The  receiving 
test  was  made  as  follows :  The  observer  would  try  a  rate  of 
sending  which  he  judged  would  correspond  to  the  learner's 
capacity.  The  learner  was  required  to  name  the  letters,  later 
on  the  words,  or,  when  he  had  more  skill,  to  copy  without  nam- 
ing them.  If  he  failed  to  interpret  correctly  at  that  rate,  a 
slower  rate  was  tried.  If  he  succeeded,  a  more  rapid  rate  was 
tried.  A  two-minute  period  was  noted  and  the  letters  were 
counted  as  above. 

The  results  of  this  study  are  shown  in  Figs.  IX.  and  X.2 
Significance  of  the  practice  curves.     Certain  main  facts  ap- 
pear in  all  the  foregoing  curves  : 

1.  The  sending  curve  rises  more  rapidly    and   more    uni- 
formly than  does  the  receiving  curve  from  the  beginning  of 
practice  to  the  learner's  maximum  ability. 

2.  The  receiving  curve  rises  more  slowly  and  irregularly. 
All  the  results  agree  in  showing  a  long,  flat  curve  for  several 
months  before  the  slowest  main-line  rate  is  reached  ;  and  all  the 
evidence  before  us  indicates  another  long    flat   curve  a  little 
above  the  rate  necessary  for  the  transaction  of  ordinary  office 
business,  in  the  case  of  operators  to  whom  that  amount  of  skill 
in  receiving  is  sufficient.     A  study  of  the  quantitative  results 
shown  in  Figs.  IX.  and  X.  shows  that  there  are  many  short  flat 
places  in  the  receiving  curve  followed  by  relatively  rapid  im- 
provement. 

3.  Two  of  the  curves  show  a  fact  which  usually  appears  at  a 
period  of  the  learner's  development  later  than  that  shown  in 
these  curves,  namely,  that  the  receiving  rate  finally  exceeds  the 
sending  rate.     This  is  almost  the  universal  rule.     A  receiving 
operator  with  a  typewriter  can  practically  take  his  ease  in  tak- 
ing the  most  rapid  press  work. 

JThe  M.  V.  ranged  from  .37%  to  2.3%  of  the  averages. 

llt  is  believed  that  the  progress  of  the  learners  was  materially  hastened  by 
their  interest  in  the  tests.  They  were  forewarned  as  to  the  slowness  of  progress 
and  they  gave  special  attention  to  practice.  Both  are  now  (June  1896)  able  to 
transact  ordinary  business  on  the  main  line.  It  may  prove  to  be  worth  while 
for  certain  purposes  to  study  the  curves  of  improvement  with  more  accurate 
methods  and  apparatus,  but  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  method  used  gives  a 
highly  accurate  quantitative  picture  of  these  curves. 


STUDIES  IN  THE  TELEGRAPHIC  LANGUAGE. 


49 


4.  In  considering  the  reasons  for  the  remarkable  differences 
between  the  receiving  and  sending  curves,  the  following  points 
may  be  noticed  :  (a)  The  language  which  comes  to  the  ear  of 
the  learner  seems  to  him  far  more  complex  than  the  language 
which  he  has  to  write.  When  he  wishes  to  write  the  letter  et 
he  must  have  in  mind  only  the  making  of  one  quick  snap  with 
his  hand.  When  he  hears  the  letter  e,  he  hears  two  sounds, 


50  WILLIAM  L.  BRYAN  AND  NOBLE  HARTER. 

the  down  stroke  and  the  back  stroke,  and  must  take  note  of  the 
time  between  them  to  distinguish  the  dot  from  the  dash.  If  we 
take  the  more  difficult  combinations,  as  k  ( —  .  — ) ,  or  j 
( — .  — .),  the  greater  complexity  of  the  sound  picture  with 
its  irregularly  occurring  back  stroke  is  sufficiently  evident, 
(b)  The  opportunity  for  practicing  receiving  at  slow  rates  is 
evidently  far  less  than  for  sending  at  such  rates.  It  is  always 
possible  for  the  learner  to  do  his  slow  best  at  sending,  but  he 
must  depend  upon  others  for  a  chance  to  receive  at  a  rate  within 
his  capacity.  It  is  of  course  true  that  he  hears  all  that  he  him- 
self sends,  but  it  is  a  significant  fact  that  the  hearing  of  his  own 
writing  does  not  improve  his  power  to  receive  in  anything  like 
the  same  degree  that  the  hearing  of  other  operators'  writing 
does.  As  the  curves  show,  young  operators  can,  at  a  certain 
period,  send  with  fair  rapidity  for  a  long  period  during  which 
they  cannot  understand  a  single  sentence  on  the  main  line,  (c) 
A  further  significant  fact  is  that  learners  enjoy  the  practice  of 
sending,  but  feel  practice  in  receiving  to  be  painful  and  fatigu- 
ing drudgery.  For  this  reason  they  naturally  incline  to  prac- 
tice sending  a  great  deal,  but  must  summon  up  all  their  resolu- 
tions to  keep  up  the  necessary  practice  in  receiving,  (d)  A 
fact  which  seems  to  be  highly  significant  is  that  years  of  daily 
practice  in  receiving  at  ordinary  rates  will  not  bring  a  man  to 
his  own  maximum  ability  to  receive.  The  proof  of  this  fact  is 
that  men  whose  receiving  curve  has  been  upon  a  level  for  years 
frequently  rise  to  a  far  higher  rate  when  forced  to  do  so  in  or- 
der to  secure  and  hold  a  position  requiring  the  higher  skill. 
That  daily  practice  in  receiving  will  not  assure  improvement 
is  further  seen  in  the  fact  that  in  many  cases  inferior  operators 
after  being  tolerated  for  years  are  finally  dropped  because  they 
do  not  get  far  enough  above  the  dead  line,  (e)  One  conclusion 
seems  to  stand  out  from  all  these  facts  more  clearly  than  any- 
thing else,  namely,  that  in  learning  to  interpret  the  telegraphic 
language,  it  is  intense  effort  -which  educates.  This  seems  to  be 
true  throughout  the  whole  length  of  the  curve.  Every  step  in 
advance  seems  to  cost  as  much  as  the  former.  Indeed,  each  new 
step  seems  to  cost  more  than  the  former.  Inquiry  at  the  teleg- 
raph schools  and  among  operators  indicates  that  between  sixty 


STUDIES  IN  THE  TELEGRAPHIC  LANGUAGE.  51 

and  seventy-five  per  cent,  of  those  who  begin  the  study  of  teleg- 
raphy become  discouraged  upon  the  plateau  of  the  curve  just 
below  the  main-line  rate.  As  a  rule,  ordinary  operators  will  not 
make  the  painful  effort  necessary  to  become  experts.  Facts  of 
an  analogous  character  will  be  recalled  from  other  fields. 

The  physiological,  psychological  and  pedagogical  implica- 
tions of  this  conclusion  are  manifestly  important.  If  in  our  ed- 
ucational methods  in  the  past,  we  have  often  made  the  pace 
that  kills,  there  is  possibly  the  danger  on  the  other  hand  that  we 
shall  make  school  work  all  play,  and  so  eliminate  the  intense 
effort  which  is  necessary  for  progress.1 

5.  The  sending  curve  conforms  approximately  to  the  well- 
known  typical  practice  curve  with  the  important  difference  from 
the  curves  usually  obtained  in  the  laboratory  that  it  extends  over 
a  much  greater  period  of  time.  This  difference  characterizes 
the  whole  curve.  If  we  represent  the  practice  curve  by  the 
general  equation 


it  is  evident  that  the  function  of  x  contains  a  constant  which 
depends  upon  the  unit  of  time.  So  for  example,  the  curve 
given  in  the  figure  would  present  exactly  the  same  appearance 
if  the  same  results  had  been  obtained  in  forty  successive  hours 
or  forty  successive  years.  Comparison  of  different  practice 
curves  shows  that  this  time  factor  varies  greatly  in  the  develop- 
ment of  different  abilities.  A  comparative  study  of  this  charac- 

1  The  conclusion  here  reached  in  matters  of  learning  telegraphy  recalls  the 
opinion  of  Senator  Stanford  upon  the  training  of  race  horses.  In  a  letter  to 
Horace  Busbey  (Scribner's,  June,  '96),  Senator  Stanford  says: 

"  My  own  idea,  and  I  think  it  is  justified  by  experience,  is  to  commence 
working  the  colt  early,  developing  its  strength  with  its  growth.  If  the  exercise 
Is  judicious,  the  colt  takes  no  harm  from  it.  I  do  not  remember  a  single  in- 
stance where  an  animal  of  mine  was  injured  by  early  work.  When  a  break- 
down has  occurred,  it  has  been  invariably  after  a  let-up.  Let-ups  are  very  dan- 
gerous to  young  fast  animals,  as  their  bodies  grow  during  the  let-up  without  cor- 
responding development  of  strength,  and  they  are  very  liable  to  get  too  much 
work  when  their  exercise  is  renewed.  My  aim  is  to  give  the  greatest  amount  of 
exercise  without  fatigue,  and  never  to  allow  it  to  reach  the  period  of  exhaus- 
tion. This  is  secured  by  short-distance  exercise.  It  is  the  supreme  effort  tha 
develops.  If  colts  are  never  over-worked  they  are  always  willing  to  try  in  the! 
exercise,  having  no  apprehension  that  they  will  be  forced  beyond  their  com- 
fort." 


52  WILLIAM  L.  BRYAN  AND  NOBLE  HARTER. 

teristic  of  various  practice  curves  would  have  evident  theoretical 
and  practical  values. 

6.  The  receiving  curve  presents  many  profound  interests 
and  difficulties.     It  is  a  quantitative  study  of  apperception.     It 
represents  with  a  high  degree  of  accuracy  the  increasing  power 
which  practice  brings  to  interpret  a  language.     The  task  of  the 
mind  is  not  in  every  respect  analogous  to  that  involved  in  lis- 
tening to  foreign  speech,  for  in  the  telegraphic  language,  after 
a  short  time,  every  element  is  recognized  by  the  learner  if  he  is 
given  time,  whereas  in  the  foreign  speech  he  may  frequently 
be  disturbed  by  words  that  are  entirely  unknown.     We  have, 
however,  gained  the  impression,  partly  from  personal  experience 
and  partly  from  conversation  with  teachers  of  language  and 
others  who  have  learned  foreign  languages,  that  the  curve  of 
practice  in  learning  a  language   must  present  at  least  great 
general  similarities  to  the  receiving  curves  here  shown.     All 
agree  that  just  below  the  ability  to  understand  what  is  spoken, 
there  is  a  long  discouraging  plateau  where  many  give  up  in  des- 
pair ;  that  there  is  at  last  a  sudden  ascent  into  the  ability   to 
understand  most  of  what  is  said ;  finally  that  the  perfect  mas- 
tery of  one  at  home  in  the  language,  comes  much  later  and  only 
after  very  persistent  work.     Of  those  who  undertake  the  study 
of  any  foreign  language,  most  stop  on  the  first  plateau  below  a 
working  proficiency ;  and  of  those  who  go  on,  most  stop  on  the 
second  plateau,  below  complete  mastery.1 

7 .  What  is  the  interpretation  of  the  plateaus  in  the  receiving 
curve  ?     For  many  weeks  there  is  an  improvement  which  the 
student  can  feel  sure  of  and  which  is  proved  by  objective  tests. 
Then  follows  a  long  period  when  the  student  can  feel  no  im- 
provement, and  when  objective  tests  show  little  or  none.     At 
the  last  end  of  the  plateau  the  messages  on  the  main  line  are, 
according  to  the  unanimous  testimony  of  all  who  have  experi- 
ence in  the  matter,  a  senseless  clatter  to  the  student — practi- 
cally as  unintelligible  as  the  same  messages  were  months  before. 

1The  President  of  the  Cincinnati  Business  College,  who  prepared  estimate 
VI.,  says  that  the  same  general  characteristics  appear  in  the  learning  of  short- 
hand. A  director  of  primary  work  in  a  western  city,  after  examining  the  re- 
ceiving curve,  expresses  the  opinion  that  it  represents  the  progress  of  a  child  in 
learning  to  read.  This  point  will  be  made  a  subject  of  immediate  investigation. 


STUDIES  IN  THE  TELEGRAPHIC  LANGUAGE.  53 

Suddenly,  within  a  few  days,  the  change  comes,  and  the  sense- 
less clatter  becomes  intelligible  speech. 

In  explanation  of  the  form  of  the  motor  curve,  one  may  sup- 
pose that  it  is  an  asymptotic  approach  to  a  physiological  limit. 
In  the  receiving  curve  there  is  also  something  like  an  asymp- 
totic approach  to  a  limit ;  but  that  limit,  whatever  its  nature, 
suddenly  disappears.  What  it  is  that  occurs  during  the  period 
of  sensible  and  measurable  improvement,  may  be  represented  in 
various  ways  according  to  the  standpoint  from  which  the  mind 
and  mental  growth  are  viewed.  But  in  every  case,  one  has  to 
account  for  the  great  slowing  down  in  the  process  of  improve- 
ment. Stated  otherwise,  the  task  is  to  explain  the  nature  of 
the  changes  in  brain  or  mind  which  must  be  taking  place,  dur- 
ing the  period  represented  by  the  plateau,  and  which  yet  make 
no  determinable  manifestation  of  themselves.  That  changes 
are  taking  place  during  this  period,  which  are  essential  to  the 
acquisition  of  proficiency,  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  no  one  is 
able  to  omit  this  period. 

8.  As  suggested  above,  it  is  probable  that  the  curves  which 
represent  the  acquisition  of  the  telegraphic  language  also  repre- 
sent the  main  characteristics  of  the  curves  for  many  other  ac- 
quisitions. This  should,  however,  by  no  means  be  taken  for 
granted.  We  should  rather  require  of  ourselves  a  thorough 
study  of  the  actual  curves  of  improvement  for  every  ability 
which  makes  measurable  manifestation  of  itself.  The  determi- 
nation and  comparative  study  of  these  curves  would  furnish  one 
thing  which  is  always  a  precious  enlargement  to  any  science — 
an  outlay  of  problems  which  permit  approach  by  systematic  re- 
search and  which  promise  results  of  far-reaching,  theoretical 
and  practical  importance. 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  INTELLECTUAL  WORK  ON 
THE  BLOOD-PRESSURE  IN  MAN.1 

BY  MM.  A.  BINET  AND  N.  VASCHIDE, 
Paris. 

I. 

Physiologists  measure  the  blood-pressure  in  animals  by  ap- 
plying the  monometer  to  an  artery ;  the  height  to  which  the 
column  of  the  monometer  is  raised  by  the  blood  furnishes  the 
measure  of  the  pressure.  A  measure  of  the  pressure  in  man  can 
only  be  made  from  the  exterior,  the  methods  employed  by  Vier- 
ordt,2  Marey,3  Kries,  v.  Basch,  Mosso,4  Bloch,  etc.,  all  consist 
in  suppressing  the  pulse,  or  in  arresting  the  circulation  in  an  or- 
gan that  is  easily  accessible,  e.g.,  the  hand  and  fingers,  and 
in  measuring  the  minimal  pressure  necessary  for  this  suppres- 
sion. 

It  would  evidently  be  of  the  greatest  value  to  combine  these 
pressure-results  with  those  which  are  furnished  by  the  form  of 
the  arterial  pulse,  and  by  changes  of  volume  in  the  limbs,  in 
order  to  determine  precisely  the  influence  of  intellectual  work 
and  of  the  emotions  on  the  circulation.  The  question,  e.g., 
whether  in  any  case  an  active  or  passive  vascular  dilation  oc- 
curs, can  only  be  answered  with  certitude  by  the  monometer. 

We  undertook  this  psychological  study  in  the  belief  that  no 
one,  up  to  this  time,  has  reached  satisfactory  results.  There 
are,  it  is  true,  some  scattered  observations  in  medical  journals, 
on  the  pressure  of  the  blood  during  intellectual  labor,  but  the 
pressure  has  been  generally  taken  with  defective  apparatus. 
The  only  systematic  work  on  the  subject,  at  least  to  our  knowl- 

1  Translated  for  the  REVIEW  from  the  author's  manuscript. 

*  Die  Lehre  von  Arterienpuls.     Braunschweig,  1855. 

3  Travaux  du  laboratoire,  1876;  p.  316, 

*Arch.  ital.   de    Biologic,   1895;  p.  177.     This  work  contains  a  short  his- 
torical sketch,  a  discussion  of  the  researches  of  Basch,  and  the  description  of 
a  new  apparatus. 
54 


INFLUENCE   OF  INTELLECTUAL    WORK.  55 

edge,  is  that  of  Kiesow  ;  we  will  indicate  later  on  what  criti- 
cisms should  be  made  on  his  work.  In  short,  the  problem 
which  we  have  set  before  ourselves  has  no  history. 

Our  first  care  should  be  the  choice  of  a  good  instrument  to 
measure  the  blood-pressure  in  man.  Clinicists  frequently  em- 
ploy the  sphygmometer  of  Bloch,  more  or  less  modified  by 
Verdin  and  Cheron ;  this  instrument  resembles  Cattell's  algom- 
eter.  It  is  a  pressure-dynamometer  which  obstructs  the  pulsa- 
tion of  the  radial  artery ;  the  experimenter  interposes  his  finger 
between  the  artery  of  the  subject  and  the  instrument,  and  re- 
ceives on  his  own  finger  the  pressure  of  the  instrument  in  such 
a  way  that  with  the  finger  he  presses  upon  and  obstructs  the 
artery  of  the  subject,  and  at  the  same  time  perceives  the  pulsa- 
tion of  the  artery ;  the  method  consists  in  gradually  increasing 
the  pressure  of  the  exploring  finger  until  it  no  longer  perceives 
the  beating  of  the  artery  which  it  compresses.  We  did  not 
make  use  of  this  instrument ;  for  after  having  tried  it  for  some 
time,  we  rejected  it  because  it  involved  a  subjective  element  of 
estimation/  We  gave  the  preference  to  Mosso's  sphygmoma- 
nometer  which  has  the  advantage  of  indicating  its  results  by 
tracings. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  give  a  description  of  the  numerous 
parts  which  make  up  the  apparatus ;  this  description  may  be 
found  in  the  work  of  Mosso  and  also  in  the  Ann6e  Psychol- 
ogique.1  We  will  content  ourselves  with  indicating  the  prin- 
ciple. Two  fingers  of  each  hand  are  placed  in  rubber  finger- 
tubes,  and  through  these  tubes  are  exposed  to  the  pressure  of 
water ;  this  pressure  is  varied  by  means  of  a  piston  and  meas- 
ured by  a  mercury  manometer,  which  registers  at  the  same  time 
the  pulsations  of  the  fingers.  If  we  begin  with  o  and  increase 
gradually,  we  find  a  regular  change  in  the  amplitude  of  the 
pulsation ;  this  is  very  small  at  first,  grows  and  reaches  a 
maximum,  decreases  again,  aud  finally  disappears ;  thus  the 
amplitude  does  not  vary  directly  or  inversely  with  the  pres- 
sure ;  there  is  a  most  favorable  degree  of  pressure,  equal  on 
the  average  to  80  mm.  of  mercury,  at  which  the  pulse  attains 
its  maximum  amplitude ;  a  weaker  or  stronger  pressure  have 

lAnnde  Psychologique,  II.,  p.  584. 


56  A.  BINET  AND  N.   VAS CHIDE. 

alike  the  effect  of  diminishing  the  pulse.  The  question  is  how 
to  measure  the  blood-pressure  with  an  instrument  of  this  sort. 

Marey's  opinion  was  that  we  must  take,  as  measure  of  the 
blood-pressure,  the  counter-pressure  necessary  to  obstruct  and 
suppress  the  pulse.  Mosso  maintained,  on  the  contrary,  that  it 
is  the  most  favorable  pressure,  about  80  mm.  of  mercury,  which 
is  equal  to  the  pressure  in  the  arteries.  This  disputed  point  is 
of  little  importance.  What  interests  us  as  psychologists  is  not 
the  absolute  value  of  the  blood-pressure,  but  the  change  which 
it  undergoes  by  reason  of  mental  processes ;  in  relating  our  ex- 
periences we  will  have  to  examine  the  criteria  of  both  Marey 
and  Mosso,  and  to  determine  which  of  the  two  answers  best  to 
the  special  end  which  we  have  in  view. 

Technique.  It  is  necessary  to  give  some  practical  details  as 
to  the  manipulation  of  Mosso's  sphygmomanometer.  Two  very 
different  methods  may  be  employed  together,  since  they  supple- 
ment each  other.  A.  The  first  method  consists  in  registering 
the  pulse  with  variations  of  pressure  from  o  to  100  or  120  mm. 
of  mercury,  either  varying  the  pressure  by  sudden  jumps,  e.  g., 
from  o  to  10,  from  10  to  20,  from  20  to  30,  etc.,  or  by  slow 
changes  of  pressure  which  are  almost  insensible.  The  latter  is 
the  method  recommended  by  Mosso.1  It  is  very  useful  when 
one  wishes  to  compare  the  blood-pressure  to  different  hours  of 
the  day ;  it  is  necessary  then  to  make  the  piston  of  the  appa- 
ratus move  from  the  minimal  to  the  maximal  pressure,  in  order 
to  determine  the  value  of  the  most  favorable  pressure.  The 
differences  of  blood-pressure  at  different  hours  of  the  day  can 
in  this  case  be  expressed  in  figures,  an  expression  which  is  evi- 
dently the  aim  of  all  scientific  research. 

Here  a  parenthesis.  In  measuring  the  pressure  with 
Mosso's  sphygmomanometer,  we  must  not  take  account  of  the 
absolute  amplitude  of  pulsation,  but  of  the  counter-pressure 
necessary  to  give  the  pulsation  its  maximal  amplitude.  This  is 
not  at  all  the  same  thing.  Mosso  gives  an  interesting  example 
which  will  make  this  distinction  clear.2  One  of  his  subjects, 

1  We  found  it  practicable  to  make  the  piston  revolve  automatically  with  a 
weight-motor. 

.  cit.,  p.  180  f . 


INFLUENCE   OF  INTELLECTUAL    WORK.  57 

Dr.  Colombo,  has  his  blood  pressure  taken  in  the  normal  state ; 
iho  most  favorable  point  of  counter-pressure  is  at  80  mm.,  of 
mercury.  Then  the  same  subject  takes  a  hot  bath,  and,  on  com- 
ing out  of  the  bath,  without  dressing,  has  his  pressure  taken 
a^ain.  As  a  result  of  the  bath  the  amplitude  of  pulsation  was 
increased  enormously,  while  the  blood-pressure  was  diminished 
—it  was  then  only  60  mm.,  of  mercury — as  was  demonstrated 
by  the  most  favorable  degree  of  counter-pressure.  Hence,  he 
would  have  made  a  serious  error  if,  on  the  basis  of  the  enlarge- 
ment of  the  pulse,  he  had  inferred  an  increase  of  pressure.  It 
is  absolutely  necessary  to  determine  the  most  favorable  counter- 
pressure  in  order  to  compute  the  pressure.  This  is  the  method 
with  which  it  is  necessary  to  begin. 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  this  method  entails  great  practical 
difficulties;  we  observed  three:  i.,  it  is  slow,  it  requires  a 
manipulation  which  lasts  at  least  i  to  3  minutes ;  2.,  it  produces 
very  clear  sensations  in  the  fingers  of  the  subject  as  the  pres- 
sure is  changed,  and  these  sensations  might  disturb  his  atten- 
tion in  a  manner  prejudicial  to  the  experiment;  3.,  it  causes,  by 
the  changes  of  pressure,  certain  excitations  which  may  produce 
reflex  phenomena,  such  as  vascular  constrictions,  in  the  fingers. 

The  first  of  these  difficulties,  the  most  serious,  shows  itself 
when  we  study  the  changes  of  pressure  produced  by  a  phe- 
nomenon which  lasts  only  a  short  time ;  for  example,  the  result 
of  the  concentration  of  the  attention,  of  a  mental  calculation, 
or  of  a  deep  breadth.  Suppose  we  wish  to  know  whether  a 
mental  calculation  increases  the  blood-pressure  or  not,  the  time 
needed  to  take  all  the  pressures  from  o  to  120  is  at  least  i  to  3 
minutes.  Hence,  it  is  necessary  to  see  that  the  mental  calcula- 
tion lasts  just  so  long,  and  that  is  not  always  easy.  Moreover, 
the  method  can  only  indicate  the  blood-pressure  at  the  moment 
when,  by  trial,  we  reach  the  most  favorable  counter-pressure. 
We  do  not  know  exactly  what  the  pressure  at  the  beginning  of 
the  intellectual  labor  was,  nor  how  it  changed  during  the  prog- 
ress of  the  experiment.  All  this  shows  that  this  method  is  in- 
sufficient. But  such  as  it  is  we  believe  it  to  be  indispensable, 
i.,  to  show  whether  the  average  pressure  has  increased  or  dimin- 
ished, 2.,  to  indicate  in  millimeters  of  mercury  the  value  of  the 
change  of  pressure. 


58  A.  BINET  AND   N.    VASCHIDE. 

In  Kiesow's  article  on  the  effects  of  psychic  excitations, 
studied  by  means  of  Mosso's  Sphygmomanometer,1  the  author 
almost  never  employed  this  method ;  he  indicates  it  only  once. 
He  employed  it  on  a  Privat-Docent  to  study  the  blood-pressure 
after  mental  work,  and  noted  a  deviation  of  pressure  equal  to 
8  mm.2  But  he  does  not  give  the  tracing,  and  the  experiment 
indicates  only  what  occurred  afterwards,  and  not  what  occurred 
during  the  mental  work. 

B.  The  second  method,  much  the  shorter  and  more  con- 
venient, consists  in  registering  the  pulsations  with  a  constant 
pressure  of  the  manometer,  and  then  producing  the  mental  work 
and  other  psychic  phenomena  studied,  without  changing  the 
pressure  of  the  manometer.  Thus  by  the  first  method  we  change 
the  pressure  successively,  in  order  to  register  the  maximal  am- 
plitude of  the  pulsation,  while  by  the  second  we  leave  the  pres- 
sure constant,  and  observe  simply  the  changes  of  amplitude  of 
the  pulsation  which  the  mental  operation  produces.  For  ex- 
ample, we  begin  by  registering  the  pulsation  of  the  fingers  under 
a  pressure  equal  to  50  mm.  of  mercury ;  then  without  touching 
the  piston  again,  we  ask  the  subject  to  make  a  mental  calcula- 
tion and  observe  whether  there  are  any  changes  in  the  pulsation, 
the  pressure  remaining  always  at  50  mm.  as  before  the  calcula- 
tion. 

What  is  the  advantage  of  this  method  ?  It  will  be  seen  at 
once  :  i.  We  seize  the  first  modification  produced  by  the  men- 
tal calculation,  and  all  that  occurs  at  the  beginning,  the  middle, 
or  the  end  of  the  process.  2.  We  do  not  distract  the  attention 
of  the  subject  by  changes  of  pressure  in  the  fingers.  3.  We  do 
not  produce  reflex  vaso-motor  phenomena  by  changes  of  pres- 
sure. 

But  this  method  cannot  inform  us  whether  the  pressure  has 
changed  or  in  which  direction  it  has  changed.  It  shows  us 
merely — when  it  shows  us  anything  at  all — that  the  pulse  has 
changed  in  amplitude.  Now,  it  was  mentioned  above  that  the 
changes  of  amplitude  in  the  pulse  (the  case  of  Dr.  Columbo  is 
an  example  of  this) ,  are  not  a  constant  sign  of  changes  of  pres 

lArck.  ttal.  de  Biologic,  1895,  xxxiii,  p.  198. 
3  Op.  cit. ;  p.  207. 


INFLUENCE   OF  INTELLECTUAL    WORK.  59 

sure ;  hence  it  may  be  that  when  the  pulse  becomes  stronger, 
the  effect  is  due  to  a  relaxation  of  the  arteries,  to  a  diminution 
of  blood,  or  in  any  case  to  some  cause  other  than  an  increase 
of  pressure.  Hence,  before  employing  the  second  method  we 
must  employ  the  first,  which  shows  with  certainty  whether  any 
change  of  pressure  occurs  and  in  which  direction  it  occurs.  The 
first  method  gives  the  principle  fact  and  the  second  the  details. 
The  two  are  complementary. 

There  remains  one  very  important  question :  when  the  sec- 
ond method  is  employed,  what  pressure  should  be  chosen  as  con- 
stant? There  is  a  very  simple  way  of  determining  it,  viz.>  to 
compare  the  two  tracings  of  increasing  pressures  made,  the  one 
in  the  normal  state,  and  the  other  during  the  phenomenon  which 
we  wish  to  study,  such  as  mental  calculation.  The  comparison  of 
these  two  curves  allows  us  to  decide  for  what  counter-pressure 
they  differ  most.  If  the  maximal  difference  is,  e.  g.,  at  the 
counter-pressure  of  120  mm.  of  mercury,  it  is  that  counter-pres- 
sure which  we  must  choose  for  the  method  of  constant  pressure, 
since  it  is  that  which  is  most  favorable  for  the  differentiation  of 
the  two  curves. 

We  must  here  make  a  criticism  of  Kiesow's  work.  This 
distinguished  author  has  not  determined  the  most  favorable  coun- 
ter-pressure, and  in  his  experiments  with  constant  counter-pres- 
sure, he  has  always  chosen  the  most  favorable  counter-pressure, 
that  which  gives  the  maximal  amplitude  of  pulsation.  We  do 
not  find  in  his  work  any  justification  of  his  choice.  This  choice, 
it  must  be  admitted,  is  not  the  most  fortunate,  as  is  shown  by 
numerous  tracings  (  I  to  6)  inserted  in  his  work.  In  these 
tracings  it  is  impossible  to  see  whether  the  mental  calculation 
has  had  any  influence  upon  the  blood-pressure,  since  the  pulse- 
amplitude  shows  no  change.  It  is  possible  that  among  the  in- 
dividuals whom  he  has  studied,  intellectual  labor  produced  no 
effect  upon  the  pressure.  We  cannot  tell.  But  we  believe  it 
more  probable  that  the  negative  result  reached  by  Kiesow  is  due 
to  the  fact  that  he  chooses  as  the  constant  pressure  the  most  favor- 
able pressure  ;  for,  on  the  one  hand,  the  maximal  difference  be- 
tween the  two  curves  for  rest  and  mental  labor  does  not  occur, 
according  to  our  own  experiments,  at  the  most  favorable  coun- 


60  A.  BINBT  AND   N.    VAS CHIDE. 

ter-pressure ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  we  observed  constantly 
among  the  subjects  in  whom  intellectual  labor  produced  an  in- 
crease of  blood-pressure,  that  this  effect  is  not  noticeable  when 
the  most  favorable  pressure  is  taken  as  the  constant  pressure, 
but  is  most  clearly  noticeable  when  the  strongest  counter-pres- 
sure is  used.  These  considerations  lead  us  to  believe  that  Kiesow 
has  committed  a  technical  error,  quite  excusable  indeed  in  an 
author  who  is  not  entirely  familiar  with  the  graphic  method. 

II. 

Our  experiments  were  made  upon  three  subjects,  but  prin- 
cipally upon  a  young  student  of  psychology,  23  years  old,  and 
in  good  health.  We  will  speak  simply  of  the  experiments  made 
upon  him.  Last  year  we  made  on  him  numerous  experiments 
on  the  effect  of  mental  labor  on  arterial  circulation,  and  hence 
he  is  able  to  observe  himself  and  concentrate  his  attention.  His 
pulse,  compared  with  the  others  whom  we  examined,  is  weak, 
but  his  pulsation  is  well  formed  ;  when  he  makes  a  mental  effort 
there  occurs  in  him  almost  always  a  fine  and  quite  radical  vas- 
cular constriction,  with  a  diminution  in  the  size  of  the  pulse- 
curve  ;  then  the  vascular  constriction  disappears  and  the  tracing 
returns  to  its  normal  level ;  this  return  to  the  normal  may 
take  place  before  the  mental  effort  of  calculation  is  completely 
finished,  particularly  if  the  subject  has  been  given  to  solve  a 
very  complicated  problem  which  requires  much  time.  There 
is,  besides,  during  the  calculation  an  acceleration  of  the  heart 
and  of  respiration.  These  experiments  do  not  show  whether 
intellectual  work  increases  the  blood-pressure.  The  vascular 
constriction  of  the  capillaries  which  we  observed  tends  to  relieve 
the  pressure,  as  does  also  the  acceleration  of  the  heart,  but  since 
we  do  not  know  what  the  work  of  the  heart,  what  its  force  was, 
during  this  time,  we  cannot  say  certainly  that  the  pressure  has 
increased. 

The  Sphygmomanometer  relieved  all  doubt.  At  the  begin- 
ning, we  employed  the  first  method  of  experimentation,  which 
consisted  in  taking  the  pulse  under  increasing  pressure  from 
o  to  140  mm.  of  mercury ;  this  test  is  made  at  first  while  the 
subject  is  in  a  state  of  rest  without  excitement  or  preoccupation 


INFLUENCE   OF  INTELLECTUAL    WORK.  6l 

of  any  sort ;  then  the  same  experiment  is  made  while  the  sub- 
ject is  absorbed  in  a  difficult  mental  calculation ;  in  this  way 
two  curves  are  obtained  for  comparison ;  the  difference  of  the 
two  curves  can  be  attributed  to  the  intellectual  labor  unless  some 
chance  circumstance,  as  an  emotion,  a  shiver,  etc.,  prevents  the 
two  experiences  from  being  comparable.  This  double  test  was 
made  on  our  subject  at  five  different  times  so  that  we  obtained 
ten  curves  which  may  be  compared  in  pairs.1  The  change  of 
pressure  from  o  to  140  mm.  was  made  each  time  very  slowly  by 
hand  in  an  almost  insensible  manner,  lasting  almost  always  the 
same  length  of  time  (two  minutes  and  a  half)  ;  the  experimen- 
tor  regulated  the  speed  of  his  movement  by  means  of  a  seconds 
watch.  The  pulsations  of  the  mercury  column  were  not  written 
by  means  of  a  float  on  a  revolving  cylinder  (Mosso's  method), 
but  were  transmitted  by  means  of  air  pressure  to  a  Marey  tam- 
bour ;  a  very  small  escape2  attached  to  the  transmission  tube 
prevented  the  pen  from  becoming  displaced  through  the  influence 
of  the  sinking  back  of  the  column  or  mercury  (produced  by  the 
piston) ,  so  that  the  pen  traced  at  approximately  the  same  level 
the  pulsations  of  the  column  of  mercury,  although  the  latter 
was  at  different  heights,  varying  from  o  to  60  mm.  We  found 
this  arrangement  much  more  advantageous  than  that  of  Mosso, 
which  gives  the  tracings  in  steps ;  by  means  of  ours,  one  may 
perceive  more  easily  the  gradual  changes  of  amplitude. 

The  mental  calculation  was  to  last  for  about  two  or  three 
minutes :  we  did  not  give  the  subject  a  single  calculation,  be- 
cause it  would  have  to  be  very  complex  and  very  difficult  to  last 
so  long,  and  the  subject,  who  had  no  special  talent  for  this  sort 
of  exercise,  would  have  become  confused  and  lost  the  figures ; 
and  in  the  end,  we  should  not  have  been  able  to  get  the  strong 
and  concentrated  attention  which  we  wished  to  study.  It  seemed 
better  to  give  to  the  subject  a  series  of  easy  multiplications ;  as 
soon  as  he  had  finished  one,  he  gave  the  answer  and  was  imme- 
diately given  a  second,  then  a  third.  In  general,  during  the 
two  or  three  minutes  that  the  experiment  lasted,  the  subject 

1 A  much  larger  number  of  experiments  have  been  made  since  these  lines 
were  written. 

aOn  the  regulation  of  graphic  tracings  by  means  of  an  escape,  see  the 
Annie  Psychologique,  II.,  p.  776,  1896. 


A.  BINET  AND  N.   VAS  CHIDE. 


made  three  multiplications,  each  of  two  figures  into  two  figures. 
As  he  was  very  much  interested  in  the  experiments,  he  always 
made  a  vigorous  effort,  as  is  shown  by  the  correctness  of  the 
answers  given.  He  closed  his  eyes,  knit  his  brows,  and  leaned 
his  head  a  little  forward. 

We  measured  exactly  the  amplitude  of  the  pulse  for  the  ten 
experiments :  they  were  made  at  the  same  hour  and  under 
strictly  comparable  conditions.1 

We  subjoin  the  results  in  Table  I. 

TABLE  I. — AMPLITUDE  OF  PULSE  UNDER  DIFFERENT  PRES- 
SURES DURING  A  STATE  OF  REST  AND  DURING 
INTELLECTUAL  WORK. 


8 

Without  Intellectual  Work. 

With  Intellectual  Work. 

V   -M 

bC  3 

u 

bo  j 

3 

03    O 

!-.  J;H 

s  *^ 

CO 

^  t> 

U 

^  *^ 

y*  [^ 

£ 

i 

2 

3 

4 

5 

i 

2 

3 

4 

5 

<<£ 

^ 

2O 

o 

o-5 

i 

o-5 

o-5 

o 

o-5 

0-5 

3° 

o 

i 

i-5 

o-5 

°-S 

0 

i 

o-S 

40 

i 

o-S 

o 

2 

2 

o-5 

I 

i 

i 

0.5 

i 

i 

5° 

i 

o-S 

0-5 

2-5 

3 

o-5 

I 

i 

i-5 

o-5 

i 

i 

60 

i 

1.5 

1.5 

4 

5 

i 

i-5 

1.2 

I-5 

i 

J-5 

1.2 

70 

2 

2 

2 

3 

4 

1.5 

2 

3 

3 

z-5 

2 

2 

80 

2-5 

2 

5 

5 

J 

2 

J-5 

4 

4 

2 

5 

3-5 

90 

2 

2 

3-5 

4 

4 

2 

J-5 

3-5 

3 

2 

3-5 

2 

ICO 

I 

1-3 

2 

2 

o-5 

2 

o 

4 

3 

2 

1.3 

2 

no 

o-S 

I 

o-5 

I-5 

o-5 

I 

o 

2 

J-5 

x»5 

o-5 

T-5 

1  20 

o 

o 

o-5 

o 

o-5 

0-5 

I 

0 

o-5 

o 

o-5 

Explanation  of  Table  /.  The  five  first  vertical  columns  on 
the  left  indicate  the  amplitude  of  the  pulse  during  five  experi- 
ments in  the  normal  state  ;  the  amplitude  is  measured  in  mm  ; 
we  begin  with  an  amplitude  of  20  mm.  of  mercury,  then  30, 
then  40,  and  so  on  up  to  120.  The  five  following  vertical  col- 
umns show  the  amplitude  of  the  pulse  during  a  series  of  mental 
calculations  at  all  pressures  from  20  to  120  mm.  of  mercury. 
Finally,  the  two  last  columns  show  the  average 2  of  the  results 

:The  pressure  varies  with  the  hours  of  the  day.  We  always  made  alter- 
nately the  experiments  of  rest  and  intellectual  work,  in  order  to  keep  them  in 
comparable  conditions. 

2  We  give,  not  the  arithmetical  mean,  but  the  median  value,  as  indicated  by 
Scripture  (PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW,  II.,  1895,  p.  376,  and  Annee  Psychologique, 
I,  1894)- 


INFLUENCE   OF  INTELLECTUAL    WORK.  63 

obtained  from  the  experiments  in  the  normal  state  and  during 
intellectual  work  respectively. 

Let  us  look  for  a  moment  at  the  left  side  of  the  Table  (I) ,  con- 
taining the  results  of  individual  experiments.  We  are  struck 
with  the  irregularity  of  certain  series  of  figures.  The  amplitude 
of  the  pulse  does  not  increase  regularly  up  to  the  most  favorable 
counter-pressure  and  then  regularly  decrease.  In  experiments 
4  and  5  in  the  normal  state,  e.  g.,  the  figures  make  several  quite 
unexpected  jumps.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  subject  is 
not  an  automaton ;  he  has  had  during  the  experiment  vascular 
constrictions  and  changes  of  blood-pressure  which  have  changed 
the  trend  of  the  curve.  Similarly  in  experiment  2,  during  in- 
tellectual labor  the  subject  has  had  suddenly  near  the  end  of  the 
curve  at  a  counter-pressure  of  100,  a  reflex  vascular  constriction 
caused  by  a  rather  strong  emotion  (he  noticed  that  he  had  given 
a  wrong  answer  to  the  problem  set) .  These  experiments  show 
that  we  must  multiply  the  experiments  and  only  preserve  the 
average  results,  in  order  to  eliminate  the  sources  of  error. 

Let  us  now  compare  the  averages  from  the  last  two  columns 
of  Table  I.  The  differences  are  evident.  First,  the  curve  of 
pressures  of  the  state  of  rest  has  a  greater  amplitude  than  that  of 
intellectual  work ;  the  maximum  amplitude  of  pulsations  in  the 
first  curve  is  5  mm.,  that  of  the  second  is  only  3.5  mm.  There 
has  evidently  occurred  in  our  subject  during  all  the  mental  cal- 
culation, a  diminution  of  the  pulse  which  results  from  a  vascu- 
lar constriction  that  is  more  or  less  marked.  The  position  of 
the  maximum  point  in  the  two  curves  is  about  the  same,  at  80 
mm.  of  mercury,  and,  if  this  fact  alone  were  taken  into  consider- 
ation, we  might  conclude  that  the  blood-pressure  was  not  modi- 
fied ;  but  we  must  hasten  to  add  that  when  the  pressure  was  in- 
creased beyond  80  mm.  the  two  curves  acted  very  differently. 
The  pressure  curve  for  the  normal  state  decreased  rapidly ;  at 
100,  it  fell  to  1.3  mm.,  and  at  no  it  was  practically  suppressed ; 
on  the  other  hand,  the  pressure  curve  for  mental  work  withstands 
the  stronger  pressures  more  vigorously,  notably  pressures  from 
100  to  1 20.  In  short,  here  are  two  cases  which  coincide  in  their 
maximum,  but  which  differ  very  much  in  their  resistance  to 
strong  pressure.  We  think  that  this  resistance  must  be  taken 


64  A.  BINET  AND  N.   VAS CHIDE. 

into  consideration ;  when  one  pulse  withstands  a  counter-pres- 
sure of  1 20  and  still  records,  while  another  pulsation  of  the  same 
amplitude  is  checked  by  this  counter-pressure,  we  must  recognize 
that  the  former  pulsation  corresponds  to  a  stronger  arterial  ten- 
sion. We  are  thus  led  to  set  aside  Mosso's  criterion  in  this  par- 
ticular case,  and  to  accept  that  of  Marey. 

The  tracings  which  we  have  obtained,  together  with  our  nu- 
merical results  show  clearly  the  essential  difference  between  the 
two  pressure-curves. 

In  determining  the  complexity  of  this  phenomenon,  be  it  un- 
derstood, it  would  be  difficult  to  take  account  of  it  with  a  clin- 
ical sphygmometer  of  Bloch's  type,  a  method  which  consists  in 
obstructing  the  radial  artery  until  the  finger  inserted  between 
the  syhygmometer  and  the  radial  no  longer  perceives  the  beat- 
ings of  the  latter.  The  experimenter  would  have  to  be  very 
skillful  in  taking  exact  account  of  the  constriction  produced  by 
intellectual  work,  which  decreases  the  amplitude  of  the  pulsa- 
tion, and  to  perceive  that  in  spite  of  this  diminution,  which  ought 
to  give  to  the  exploring  finger  a  new  sensation,  the  pulsation 
has  greater  resistance.1 

III. 

From  what  precedes,  we  conclude  that,  with  our  subject,  a 
pressure  of  from  100  to  120  completely  suppresses  the  pulsation 
of  a  state  of  repose  as  also  that  of  a  state  of  intellectual  labor. 
This  observation  will  help  to  guide  us  in  the  second  series  of 
researches,  where  we  will  employ  a  constant  pressure ;  it  is 
clear  that  to  make  apparent  the  difference  between  the  circula- 
tion in  a  state  of  intellectual  labor  and  that  of  rest,  it  is  this 
counter-pressure  of  from  100  to  120  which  must  be  chosen. 

In  order  to  remove  all  doubts  we  have  made  a  counter-test 
in  the  following  manner :  Seven  times  in  succession  our  sub- 
ject made  a  mental  calculation  having  his  fingers  subjected  to  a 
constant  pressure,  and  each  time  the  pressure  chosen  was  dif- 
ferent ;  the  results  also  were  very  different.  With  a  constant 
pressure  of  40  mm.,  there  was  no  modification  produced  by  the 

1Ferd,  who  made  some  use  of  the  sphygmometer,  noticed  that  when  the  ar- 
tery contracted,  e.  g. ,  under  the  influence  of  cold,  the  apparatus  gave  only 
erroneous  indications  (Patkologie  des  emotions,  p.  14,,  note). 


INFLUENCE   OF  INTELLECTUAL    WORK.  65 

fact  of  mental  work  ;  with  a  pressure  of  60,  the  same  negative 
result ;  with  a  pressure  of  70  mm.  there  was  a  slight  augmenta- 
tion of  pulsation;  at  80  mm.,  there  was  again  a  slight  aug- 
mentation, not  measurable,  but  visible  to  the  eye  ;  at  100  to  120 
the  augmentation  is  very  clear ;  it  varies  from  simple  to  double  ; 
at  140,  all  pulsation  was  suppressed.  This  shows  us  very  well 
that  the  constant  pressure  chosen  ought  to  lie  between  100  and 
1 20.  These  experiments  are  a  confirmation  of  those  made  be- 
fore :  they  show  anew  that  if  we  choose  the  most  favorable 
counter-pressure,  we  may  obtain  results  which  are  as  com- 
pletely negative  as  those  of  Kiesow  are. 

Now  let  us  take  a  counter-pressure  of  no.  We  first  reg- 
ister the  pulse  with  this  pressure  for  about  a  half  minute,  then 
tell  the  subject  to  commence  a  mental  calculation.  While  he  is 
absorbed  in  his  work  we  watch  the  pressure  with  care ;  for 
when  we  give  a  heavy  pressure  with  the  Sphygmomanometer, 
it  tends  to  diminish ;  and  in  order  to  keep  it  equal,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  give  a  stroke  with  the  piston  from  time  to  time.  This 
slight  correction  ought  to  be  made  very  gently,  so  that  the  sub- 
ject does  not  experience  any  new  sensation  in  his  fingers,  and 
does  not  perceive  anything.  Excepting  this  slight  cause  of 
error,  for  which  we  ought  to  watch,  this  method  of  experiment 
is  much  easier  than  the  preceding ;  one  does  not  disturb  the 
person  in  the  experiment,  and,  moreover,  the  change  of  pressure 
in  the  hand  is  seen  in  the  tracing  as  soon  as  it  is  produced.  The 
experiment  carries  with  it  a  kind  of  sensible  evidence ;  as  soon 
as  the  mental  calculation  begins,  there  is  an  increase  in  the 
pulsation. 

This  experiment  was  made  n  times  upon  our  subject, 
always  with  analogous  results.  We  gave  him  multiplications 
of  two  figures  by  two  figures,  and  immediately  he  began  the 
operation  in  his  head.  The  first  three  or  four  pulsations  which 
register  themselves  are  usually  of  the  same  character  as  the 
preceding,  sometimes  they  are  slightly  shortened,  an  effect 
which  is  probably  due  to  the  vascular  constriction  which  is 
habitual  with  this  subject  at  the  beginning  of  intellectual  work. 
Then  the  pulsation  increases,  it  doubles  in  size,  or  becomes 
twice  and  often  three  times  as  great.  This  increase  in  ampli- 


66  A.  BINET  AND  N.    VASCHIDE. 

tude  maintains  itself,  in  general  without  increase  or  diminution, 
and  with  great  regularity  during  the  whole  of  the  mental  cal- 
culation ;  when  the  subject  has  found  the  solution  and  has  given 
it,  there  is  no  sudden  diminution  of  pulsation ;  it  may  retain  its 
amplitude  without  change  for  15  seconds,  sometimes  even 
longer ;  then  the  pulsation  begins  to  diminish  very  gradually ; 
finally  it  recovers  the  same  amplitude  that  it  had  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  mental  calculation.  This  return  to  the  original 
condition  is  a  very  significant  fact  for  us,  since  it  shows  that  the 
change  in  amplitude  of  the  pulsation  is  not  due  to  the  apparatus, 
but  to  the  physiological  condition  of  the  subject.1 

A.  BINET. 

1  This  is  part  of  a  more  general  study  which  I  am  making  on  the  physiolog- 
ical expression  of  thought,  including  also  my  experiments  with  M.  Cour- 
tier on  capillary  circulation  and  respiration.  Some  of  the  results  will  appear  in 
April,  1897,  in  the  third  Ann&e  Psychologique. 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS. 
LANGUAGE  AND  IMAGE. 

With  reference  to  the  understanding  general  concrete  terms,  like 
telephone,  tree,  things,  etc.,  it  would  be  a  very  natural  supposition 
that  it  would  only  be  done  by  imaging.  Indeed,  what  else  is  or  can 
be  the  knowing  the  meaning  of  words  for  sensible  objects  other  than 
a  connecting  word  with  image  ?  and  the  better  the  word  is  understood 
would  there  not  be  the  more  definite  imaging?  The  natural  supposi- 
tion is  that  the  whole  function  of  a  vocal  sign  of  a  sensible  is  to  call 
up  that  sensible  as  individual  or  group  to  the  mind,  i.  e.,  the  produc- 
tion of  an  image,  and  that  if  a  word  signifies  a  thing  or  things  it  can 
only  do  this  through  image. 

However  this  very  natural  idea  that  the  understanding  of  a  sense 
word  must  be  through  sense,  seems  hardly  borne  out  in  practice.  Did 
the  reader  who  understood  the  first  sentence  of  this  paper  have  any 
imaging  when  he  came  to  the  words  '  telephone,  tree,  thing  ? '  And 
does  he  not  understand  this  last  without  image  ?  A  little  reflection 
assures  you  of  no  trace  of  image,  and  yet  you  read  the  sentence  with 
perfect  understanding.  By  far  the  great  majority  of  readers  at  least 
will  find  this  the  result  of  their  introspection.  And  further  it  will  be 
said  that  the  better  the  word  is  understood  the  less  imaging  is  required 
till  at  length  there  seems  to  be  none  at  all.  The  man  who  is  perfectly 
familiar  with  the  telephone,  both  the  word  and  thing,  does  not  need  to 
image  as  does  the  farmer's  boy  on  hearing  the  word.  And  this  ap- 
pears to  be  true  of  both  common  and  proper  names.  Most  men  on 
hearing  the  very  familiar  name  of  a  near  relative  as  in  casually  saying 
*  my  wife,'  '  my  son,'  form  no  image,  but  on  hearing  name  of  some  one 
whom  they  have  seen  but  once  or  twice  the  understanding  of  the  word 
implies  very  definite  image.  Thus  if  some  one  asks,  '  is  your  wife 
here  ? '  and  another,  '  is  Mr.  Penn  here  ? '  (an  acquaintance  seen  but 
once)  you  answer  understandingly  at  once  in  the  first  instance  without 
definitely  imaging,  but  not  so  in  the  later  case.  Hence  we  have  the 
paradox  that  apprehension  of  sense  meanings  is  most  perfect  when 
senseless. 

The  interesting  problem  of  how  we  understand  the  meaning  of  ob- 
67 


68  LANGUAGE  AND   IMAGE. 

ject  names  without  conscious  object-reference  is  certainly  not  solved 
by  Mr.  Stout's  remark  that  '  imageless  apprehension '  merely  is  '  the 
power  to  distinguish  the  apprehended  object  from  other  objects, ' 
though  '  the  constituent  parts  of  the  object  cease  to  be  discernible. ' 
(Analytic  Psychology  I.,  p.  84.  )  But  this  surely  is  not  real  image- 
less  apprehension,  but  only  the  last  stage  in  the  imaging  apprehension, 
that  is,  when  we  need  but  one  distinctive  mark  in  referring  the  word 
to  the  thing.  Here  the  image  is  reduced  to  a  single  element,  but  is  as 
real  an  image  as  ever.  But  it  is  obvious  to  an  ordinary  reflection  that 
in  common  conversation  and  reading  we  are  continually  understanding 
words,  and  yet  not  having,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  even  a  trace  of  image 
of  mere  distinctive  mark  or  generic  aspect. 

But  I  think  the  best  clue  to  the  mental  process  in  understanding 
sense  words  without  apparent  imaging  is  given  by  a  study  of  cognitive 
process  as  a  whole,  by  comparing  the  understanding  meaning  of  a 
word  with  the  understanding  meaning  of  a  thing.  All  knowledge  of 
objects  is  interpretation,  is  a  getting  at  meaning,  and  all  objects  as 
known  are  thus  signs,  and  in  a  large  sense  constitute  a  language.  In 
knowing  what  a  telegraph  instrument  is  when  I  see  it  I  am  aware  of 
its  significance,  as  contrasted  with  a  Hottentot,  to  whom  the  object 
would  have  no  more  meaning  than  the  English  words  designating  it. 
And  the  interpreting  becomes  easier  with  successive  experiences  of  the 
same  things  until  they  are  at  length  known  without  any  interpretation 
being  consciously  applied.  Every  time  I  see  a  chair  I  know  it  to  be 
such,  though  I  do  not  consciously  image  it  in  its  use  as  a  chair.  I 
have  learned  to  know  it  so  easily  and  quickly  that  the  knowing  act  be- 
comes unself-conscious  and  so  unrememberable,  but  continues  as  real 
act,  for  it  is  evident  that  in  the  most  casual  notice  of  a  chair  one  really 
appreciates  it  for  what  it  is.  When  you  go  into  a  drawing  room  you 
will  both  know  the  chairs  and  sit  down  in  them  quite  mechanically, 
though  if  you  see  some  strange  piece  of  furniture,  which  you  have  to 
identify  as  chair,  then  there  is  self-conscious  identifying  interpreting 
process  which  is  rememberable  knowing. 

Now  the  knowing  meaning  of  a  word  and  thing  are  quite  parallel 
activities ;  indeed,  word  is  really  kind  of  thing.  If  a  very  common 
thing  like  chair  becomes  so  well  known  as  to  be  subconsciously 
known,  we  might  expect  the  same  of  its  name.  And  in  fact,  let  the 
reader  reflect  on  his  understanding  of  the  previous  sentences  where 
this  word  chair  occurred,  and  he  will  hardly  find  in  any  case  that  he 
has  been  conscious  of  any  imaging  process  and  yet  he  is  sure  he 
understood  the  meaning.  The  name  chair  has,  through  practice,  be- 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  69 

come  so  familiar  and  the  process  has  been  made  so  quick,  easy,  and 
abbreviated  as  not  to  be  in  the  least  intruded  on  self-consciousness. 
In  general  we  suspect  that  the  objects  which  are  subconsciously  known 
will  have  names  subconsciously  known,  that  the  imaging  interpretation 
is  in  both  cases  carried  on,  though  not  rememberable.  The  law  of 
habit,  that  we  get  to  doing  acts  so  well  we  are  not  aware  of  acting, 
applies  in  both  the  knowing  things  and  names;  and  the  general  results 
of  common  knowing  seems  to  confirm  this.  This  habit  theory  is 
plainly  quite  different  from  Hobbes'  theory  of  habit  and  understand- 
ing. 

Of  course,  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  we  cannot  get  direct  proof  of 
unrememberable  mental  process.  Yet  an  illustration  of  the  effect  of 
habit  upon  knowing  is  seen  in  the  perception  of  distance,  which  we 
have  learned  so  well  in  early  life  by  a  real  judging,  which  later  be- 
comes unself-conscious  process;  and  hence  the  ordinary  theory  of 
space  perception  is  intuitional.  Again,  another  illustration  is  in  read- 
ing as  a  very  rapid  subconscious  spelling,  and  in  thinking  as  unself- 
conscious  mental  pronouncing  of  words.  The  poor  reader  consciously 
spells,  the  better  reader  takes  in  the  spelling  of  the  word  and  cognizes 
it  at  a  glance,  and  is  unconscious  of  any  process,  and  the  very  best 
reader  grasps  by  sentences  and  is  unconscious  of  either  letters  or 
words  as  such.  Similarly  the  poor  thinker  talks  aloud  or  moves  his  lips, 
the  practiced  thinker  only  mentally  pronounces,  and  the  best  thinker 
is  unconscious  of  using  any  words.  Yet  it  is  undoubted  that  thought, 
which  has  once  thoroughly  learned  words  as  its  instrument,  never  after 
becomes  really  wordless.  Thought  by  means  of  words  cannot  get 
beyond  words. 

A  more  direct  evidence  of  subconscious  process  than  these  analo- 
gies is  this :  that  we  sometimes  come  upon  a  very  common  word  whose 
meaning  we  have  to  definitely  search  for,  and  we  rummage  our  collec- 
tion of  images  till  we  find  the  right  one,  and  the  old  faculty  is  reestab- 
lished. By  a  constant  imaging  of  thing  for  word  and  word  for  thing, 
a  perfect  coordination  is  formed  which  is  carried  on  in  an  under-con- 
sciousness — that  is  a  consciousness  of  which  we  are  not  and  do  not 
need  to  be  conscious.  Again,  an  evidence  of  subconscious  imaging 
in  understanding  meaning  is  this :  that  when  we  have  read  understand- 
ingly  several  sentences  of  general  sense  terms  without  being  conscious 
of  imaging,  but  are  then  asked  to  state  the  substance  in  our  own  words, 
we  immediately  begin  to  marshal  the  images  which  we  did  not  directly 
connect  with  the  words,  but  which  we  yet  seemed  in  some  way  to  have 
had. 


70  LANGUAGE  AND  IMAGE. 

Practice,  of  course,  tends  to  abbreviate  the  image,  and  we  become 
satisfied  to  only  partially  realize  meaning  with  a  dim  sense  of  an  in- 
definite realizability,  which  for  practical  purposes  we  do  not  need  to 
carry  out.  There  is  generally  felt  to  be  a  great  potentiality  in  the 
word  which  we  do  not  stop  to  measure.  When  we  are  told  that  it  is 
a  thousand  miles  from  New  York  to  Chicago,  we  may  understand 
well  enough  with  a  minimum  of  realization,  but  which  we  know  at 
the  time  can  be  indefinitely  increased.  A  word  is  a  machine  which 
easily  moves  an  unimagined,  yet  imaginable  mass  of  images  and  ideas, 
and  it  is  the  very  office  of  words  to  give  us  the  practical  manipulation 
of  these  masses  without  recourse  to  any  but  the  most  general  imaging 
reference,  and  that  often  subconscious,  yet  with  a  constant  sense  of 
unrealized  but  realizable  potentiality. 

In  helping  us  to  realize  the  hidden  image  force,  our  main  reliance 
is  in  poetry,  which  may  be  defined  as  the  art  of  using  words  in  such 
a  way  as  to  awaken  image  to  full  life.  Poetry  partly  accomplishes 
this  by  a  special  vocabulary  of  its  own,  and  partly  through  the  dex- 
trous throwing  of  the  word  into  a  new  and  more  striking  position,  as 
by  inversion,  metre  or  rhyme,  or  mentally  by  a  trope,  and  so  leading 
the  mind  to  image. 

Poetry  revivifies  language  by  bringing  out  the  latent  image  or  in- 
serting a  new  one.  Take  Tennyson's  expression,  'The  rainy Hyades 
vext  the  dim  sea.'  Here  each  word  in  itself  may  evoke  no  image, 
but  the  combination  and  the  figurative  use  call  up  a  most  vivid  image, 
and  that  vast  reach  of  the  imaginable  wherein  poetry  chiefly  lies. 
Even  a  bare  connective,  as  '  and,'  has  its  latent  image  evolved  when 
used  emphatically,  as  in  the  line : 

'  With  rocks,  and  stones,  and  trees,' 

where  a  dim  visual  '  more '  is  evoked.  If  the  poet  uses  only  the  com- 
mon words  of  prosaic  life,  as  did  Wordsworth,  he  must  have  great 
skill  to  attain  the  imaginative  effect,  and  the  more  common  the  word 
the  harder  it  is  to  give  it  sensuous  force. 

We  have  thus  far  remarked  only  upon  the  understanding  of  the 
meaning  of  the  concrete  terms,  more  or  less  general,  but  language  is 
plainly  more  than  notation  of  sensibles.  Some  words,  like  '  signify,' 
'  idea,'  for  instance,  are  purely  intellectual  words,  and  any  infusion  of 
image  but  distorts  the  meaning.  And  many  words  also  relate  rather 
to  pain,  pleasure  and  emotion  than  to  the  sensible  in  any  form,  and 
must  thus  be  understood.  In  fact,  the  first  expressive  vocal  utterance 
was  doubtless  a  cry  of  pain,  animals  otherwise  dumb  giving  in  great 
pain  a  squeak,  which  of  itself  conveys  no  sensuous  image.  Primi- 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  71 

tivr  language  is  not  a  name,  but  a  cry.  We  know  immediately 
what  is  meant  upon  hearing  a  cry,  because  it  awakens  in  us  some  of 
the  painfulness  for  which  it  stands.  One  to  whom  pain  was  wholly 
unknown  would  be  as  unable  to  interpret  a  pain  note  as  a  blind  man 
to  interpret  the  words  red,  white  and  blue.  It  is  very  probable  also 
that  what  we  take  to  be  vocal  signals  indicating  food  are,  with  the 
very  lowest  animals,  at  least,  only  signs  of  eating  pleasure,  and  so  do 
not  convey  real  image  of  object  as  food.  The  eating  act,  as  is  evi- 
dent from  observation  of  very  young  infants,  is  carried  on  at  first  with 
little  or  no  consciousness  of  what  is  eaten.  It  might  even  be  main- 
tained that  animal  language  is  never  properly  denominative,  and  only 
with  the  higher  species  does  it  become  even  indirectly  denominative. 
Mere  emotion  words,  like  joy,  sorrow,  hate,  etc.,  are  also  plainly 
understood  without  sense  image.  Nothing  is  really  imagined,  no  real 
objective  reference  is  really  made,  but  the  words  in  their  isolation  are 
understood  wholly  by  subjective  realization.  In  some  very  slight 
measure  the  understanding  of  all  pain  words  gives  pain  and  all  pleas- 
sure  gives  pleasure,  that  is,  in  revival,  just  as  the  knowing  the  meaning 
of  sense  words  implies  revived  sense — that  is,  image.  In  understand- 
ing meaning  of  the  words  joy,  sorrow,  you  experience  at  least  a  faint 
joy  and  sorrow. 

We  conclude  then  that  language,  as  an  indicator,  can  only  indicate 
by  suggesting  to  our  consciousness  what  is  indicated,  as  object,  thought 
or  feeling,  even  in  most  summary  and  unself-conscious  form  to  which 
it  is  brought  by  practice,  and  from  which  it  may  be  rescued  by  poetic 
art  to  its  primitive  vividness.  HIRAM  M.  STANLEY. 

LAKE  FOREST,  ILLINOIS. 


UPRIGHT  VISION. 

Dr.  Stratton's  paper  in  the  last  number  of  the  PSYCHOLOGICAL 
REVIEW  on  '  Vision  without  Inversion  of  the  Retinal  Image '  calls  for 
some  criticism.  The  first  sentence  in  it  shows  that  he  means  to  dis- 
cuss the  problem  of  upright  vision,  and  in  the  same  paragraph  he  an- 
nounces his  purpose  to  examine  the  projection  and  ocular  movement 
theories  of  this  phenomenon.  But  the  course  of  his  experiments  and 
arguments  shows,  not  only  that  he  had  no  right  to  talk  about  upright 
•vision  in  this  connection,  but  that  he  has  not  even  understood  his  own 
problem.  Nor  does  he  in  reality  discuss  the  two  theories  mentioned, 
much  less  throw  any  light  upon  them. 

His  phrase  '  vision  without  inversion  of  the  retinal  image,'  espec- 


72  UPRIGHT    VISION. 

ially  when  taken  with  the  first  sentence,  where  'upright  vision'  is 
mentioned  as  the  problem,  is  the  main  source  or  evidence  of  his  con- 
fusion, as  it  shows  with  the  later  experiments  that  he  has  not  distin- 
guished between  visual  perception  and  tactual  or  motor  adjustment  to 
visual  perception.  The  problem  in  upright  vision  is  to  determine 
how  we  see  objects  in  a  certain  way  when  the  image  on  the  retina  is 
inverted.  This  problem  remains  the  same  throughout  all  of  Dr. 
Stratton's  experiments.  This  is  noticeable  in  the  very  statements  he 
makes  about  the  effect  of  the  glasses  upon  what  is  seen.  He  concedes 
the  inverse  relation  between  image  and  apparent  object  after  the  glasses 
are  put  on,  but  does  not  see  that  this  is  only  a  reproduction  of  the 
normal  relation,  and  that  in  so  far  as  vision  is  concerned  there  is 
nothing  anomalous  in  the  effect.  But  instead  of  discussing  this  ques- 
tion, or  getting  true  upright  vision  after  inverting  the  normal  image,  he 
goes  on  to  study  the  influence  of  experience  upon  motor  (  not  ocular  ) 
adjustment  to  these  new  conditions  and  the  influence  of  memory 
images  upon  our  notion  of  uprightness.  Very  well.  But  this  is  not 
a  problem  in  upright  vision  at  all.  It  is  merely  a  problem  as  to  the 
influence  of  memory  and  association  upon  muscular  adjustments,  and 
these  not  ocular  movements  at  that.  Dr.  Stratton  has  not  analyzed 
his  problem  in  the  least,  and  his  whole  discussion  will  only  lead  the 
unwary  to  think  that  he  has  shown  the  effect  of  experience,  muscular 
experience  and  adjustment  upon  the  ocular  perception  of  uprightness* 
when  the  very  fact  that  he  concedes  the  inversion  of  the  apparent  ob- 
ject under  the  glasses  proves  that  the  visual  process  is  as  before  and  is 
not  affected  by  the  foreign  factors  of  either  memory  or  touch.  His 
attempt,  whether  implicitly  or  explicitly  avowed,  is  to  show  that  in- 
version of  the  retinal  image  is  not  necessary  to  upright  vision,  but  all 
that  he  actually  shows  is  that  this  inversion  is  not  necessary  to  correct 
tactual  and  muscular  adjustment  and  the  formation  of  new  judgments 
for  motor  movements.  That  is  to  say  he  only  shows  that  we  have  to 
invert  the  memory  images  at  first  by  an  effort  of  will  in  order  to  se- 
cure correct  movements,  and  then  experience  establishes  a  line  of  spon- 
taneous connections  as  prompt  as  the  old  ones.  But  this  is  no  more 
the  problem  of  upright  vision  than  it  is  one  of  upright  audition. 
Hence  to  talk  about  the  projection  and  ocular  movement  theories  in 
this  connection  is  simple  nonsense,  if  I  may  be  allowed  to  use  such 
severe  language,  and  only  betrays  a  misconception  and  misrepresenta- 
tion of  the  problem. 

When  Dr.  Stratton  talks  about  '  vision  without  inversion  of  retinal 
images,'  and  then  discusses  motor  and  tactual  adjustments,   he  ought 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  73 

to  have  seen  either  that  he  was  not  talking  about  vision  at  all,  or  that 
the  phrase  'without  inversion  of  retinal  images'  was  an  equivocal  one 
and  leads  to  complete  confusion.  It  might  mean  'without  inversion  ' 
in  relation  to  the  real  object,  which  after  all  is  not  seen  at  all,  or 
•without  inversion'  in  relation  to  the  apparent  object,  which  is  de- 
scribed by  Dr.  Stratton  himself  as  representing  in  fact  the  inverse  re- 
lation of  normal  vision.  There  is  no  anomaly  in  the  latter  case, 
which  only  shows  that  he  does  not  mean  to  assert  the  absence  of  in- 
version between  retinal  images  and  the  apparent  objects  under  the 
conditions  described.  Here  the  visual  problem  is  not  altered,  but 
taking  the  phrase  in  the  first  sense,  'without  inversion '  in  relation  to 
the  real  object  ( which  is  not  seen  ) ,  the  problem  is  tactual  and 
motor.  If  at  any  time  he  could  show  an  instance  of  a  symmetrical 
and  not  an  inverse  relation  between  retinal  images  and  real  or  appar- 
ent objects,  he  might  reasonably  enough  imply  or  assert  that  upright 
vision  with  inverted  images  is  not  an  organic  but  an  empirical  process. 
Until  he  does  this,  such  experiments  as  he  describes  in  his  paper  are 
irrelevant  to  the  problem.  JAMES  H.  HYSLOP. 

COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE. 

History  of  Philosophy.  ALFRED  WEBER,  Professor  in  the  Univer 
sity  of  Strasburg.  Authorized  translation  by  FRANK  THILLY. 
from  the  fifth  French  Edition.  New  York,  Scribner's,  1896. 
Pp.  xi  +  640.  $2.50. 

One  need  not  hesitate  to  pronounce  this  the  best  history  of  philos- 
ophy for  use  as  a  text-book,  and  for  the  purposes  of  the  general 
reader.  In  translating  it,  Professor  Thilly  has  rendered  a  not  less  valu- 
able service  than  in  his  translation  of  Paulsen's  Introduction  to  Philos- 
ophy. 

Professor  Weber  has  an  admirable  faculty  of  exposition.  He  knows 
how  to  select  out  of  a  mass  of  details  the  points  most  suitable  to  his 
purpose,  and  to  present  them  in  a  lucid,  graphic,  and  interesting  way. 
His  work  is  less  suggestive  and  original  than  that  of  Windelband,  but 
has  the  advantage  over  it  of  a  much  more  simple  and  natural  method. 
He  is  less  detailed  in  his  discussion  of  systems  than  Falckenberg,  but 
the  latter  treats  only  the  modern  period,  while  the  entire  development 
of  philosophy,  from  the  beginning  of  Greek  speculation  to  the  present 
time,  is  brought  within  the  six  hundred  pages  of  this  volume.  The 
sense  of  proportion  is,  in  the  main,  good,  though  Greek  philosophy 
receives  less  than  its  due  share  of  attention,  being  allotted  scarcely 
more  than  one-quarter  of  the  space.  Too  much  can  hardly  be  said 
in  commendation  of  the  literary  skill  which  handles  the  vast  body  of 
materials,  with  which  a  general  history  of  philosophy  has  to  deal,  in 
such  a  way  that  one  without  previous  knowledge  of  the  subject  need 
have  no  difficulty  in  following  the  narrative  with  pleasure. 

It  may  be  questioned  whether  the  two-fold  division,  '  the  Age  of 
Metaphysics'  and  '  the  Age  of  Criticism,' under  which  both  ancient 
and  modern  philosophy  are  treated,  is  best  adapted  to  exhibit  the  re- 
lations of  the  history.  The  movement  of  thought  may  naturally  be 
conceived  as  three-fold :  first  a  period  of  construction  or  interpreta- 
tion, then  a  reaction  of  sceptical  reflection,  and  then  a  restatement,  in 
more  systematic  form  and  from  a  more  comprehensive  point  of  view — 
this  restatement  becoming,  in  turn,  the  subject  of  critical  analysis,  fol- 
lowed by  fresh  attempts  at  construction.  Windelband  recognizes 
these  stadia  in  his  distribution  of  the  philosophy  of  Greece  proper 
74 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  75 

into  the  '  Cosmological,'  'Anthropological '  and  '  Systematic '  periods, 
and  in  his  treatment  of  the  post-Aristotelian,  or  '  Hellenistic-Roman,' 
period  as  one  of  revolt  or  decline,  and  also — largely  because  of  the  re- 
ligious elements  in  Stoicism  and  Neo-Platonism— one  of  positive  con- 
structive activity.  This  is  a  more  discriminating  and  helpful  outlin- 
ing of  the  subject  than  one  which  includes,  in  a  summary  and  hetero- 
geneous way,  the  whole  body  of  thought,  from  Protagoras  to  Proclus, 
under  a  single  rubric.  The  parallelism  between  ancient  and  modern 
thought  is  brought  out  very  clearly  when  we  consider  each  as  follow- 
ing this  law  of  development,  but  the  affinities  and  analogies  between 
the  two  are  obscured  when  after  Descartes,  Spinoza,  and  Leibnitz,  re- 
garded as  constituting  the  'Age  of  Metaphysics,'  we  find  all  other 
philosophers,  from  Locke  to  Spencer,  enumerated  under  the  'Age  of 
Criticism.' 

It  is  hardly  just  to  complain  of  omissions  rendered  necessary  by  the 
plan  of  the  work.  It  is,  however,  of  interest  to  observe  that  some 
aspects  of  the  subject  are  treated  more  fully  than  others.  The  relation 
between  philosophy  and  science  is  accorded  a  good  deal  of  promi- 
nence, the  speculative  bearings  of  the  theory  of  evolution,  in  particular, 
forming  the  subject  of  one  of  the  most  interesting  sections  of  the  book. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  relation  between  philosophy  and  theology  is 
passed  over  lightly.  Little  or  no  mention  is  made  of  the  English 
Deism,  the  German  Illumination,  Hume's  Natural  History  of  Re- 
ligion and  Dialogues,  the  Kantian  theory  of  religion.  The  effects 
within  the  domain  of  dogmatic  and  critical  theology  of  Hegel's  philos- 
ophy of  religion  are  very  imperfectly  indicated.  The  highly  impor- 
tant philosophic  theologian,  Schleiermacher,  is  disposed  of  in  a  single 
sentence.  A  noticeable  omission  is  that  of  the  series  of  English 
writers  upon  ethics  following  Hobbes.  Political  philosophy  receives 
little  attention ;  in  speaking  of  Hobbes,  Spinoza,  and  Locke,  their  ideas 
in  regard  to  the  origin  and  nature  of  the  state  are  not  noted ;  Grotius 
is  not  mentioned,  or  Montesquieu,  or  Rousseau.  The  sketch  of  con- 
temporary philosophy  dismisses  so  influential  a  name  as  that  of  Lotze 
with  a  bare  mention.  These  lacuna,  however,  and  others  that  might 
be  enumerated,  are  not  properly  occasion  of  complaint.  It  should  be 
said  that  the  footnotes  make  up,  to  a  considerable  extent,  for  the 
omissions  of  the  text,  since  they  furnish,  in  the  case  of  all  important 
authors,  sufficiently  full  bibliographical  references.  The  translator 
has  added  much  to  the  bibliography  and  has  contributed  an  index. 

A  feature  of  this  work  which  renders  it  particularly  suitable  as  an 
introduction  to  the  subject  is  the  appreciative  and  positive  temper  in 


76  POWER  OF  THOUGHT, 

which  it  is  written.  A  historian  of  philosophy  who  conceives  it  to  be 
his  function  to  convict  every  great  thinker  of  as  many  errors  and  in- 
consistencies as  possible  is  as  gravely  at  fault  as  the  literary  critic 
who  occupies  himself  only  with  the  faults  of  his  author.  The  dis- 
covery of  truth  and  beauty  to  those  who  are  liable  to  overlook  them 
is  a  far  more  valuable  service  than  the  mere  exposure  of  their  oppo- 
sites.  Every  one  who  has  observed  the  painful  sense  of  disappoint- 
ment which  is  so  often  the  first  result  of  a  study  of  the  great  specula- 
tive systems  will  appreciate  the  wisdom  of  such  a  treatment  of  the 
subject  as  is  indicated  in  remarks  like  this :  "To  the  argument  (page 
594)  drawn  from  the  perpetual  disagreement  of  philosophers,  we 
answer  that  the  historian  of  metaphysics  is  most  impressed  with  the 
open  or  tacit  agreement  existing  between  the  rival  movements  and 
schools.  We  have  discovered  such  agreement  between  Plato  and 
Democritus,  Descartes  and  Bacon,  Leibnitz  and  Schopenhauer,  Her- 
bart  and  Hegel."  Instead  of  emphasizing  weaknesses,  inconsistencies, 
and  disagreements,  Professor  Weber  seeks  to  exhibit  the  points  of 
contact  between  different  systems,  the  elements  of  truth  held  by  them 
in  common.  This  is  the  most  effectual  way  of  securing  the  inex- 
perienced student  against  the  bewilderment  and  sense  of  futility 
which  are  so  apt  to  overcome  him.  It  is  not  a  defect,  but  an  impor- 
tant mei'it,  of  a  work  which  has  in  view  the  needs  of  novices,  that  it 
should  announce  a  definite  philosophic  doctrine.  The  reader  who  has 
patiently  followed  the  long  way  which  European  philosophy  has 
traversed  may  well  be  reminded  at  the  end  that  his  journey  has  not 
been  purposeless.  A  constructive  chapter,  like  that  which  concludes 
this  volume,  is  valuable  and  wholesome,  irrespective  of  the  intrinsic 
merit  of  its  reasonings,  as  an  example  of  the  spirit  in  which  one 
should  study  philosophy,  and  of  the  fruits  one  may  hope  to  gather 
from  it.  E.  GRIFFIN. 

JOHNS  HOPKINS  UNIVERSITY. 

The  Power  of  Thought :    What  It  Is  and  What  It  Does.     By  JOHN 
DOUGLASS  STERRETT.     With  an  introduction  by  J.  MARK  BALD- 
WIN.    New  York,  Scribner's,  1896.     Pp.  xiv  +  320. 
Introductions  by  better  known  men  for  books  written  by  those  who  are 
less  known  are  not  a  priori  commendable.     As  a  general  rule  books 
had  better  speak  for  themselves.     That  there  are  justifiable  exceptions, 
however,  Baldwin's  judgment  shows  in  the  present  case.     For  here 
is  a  book  admirable  in  many  respects,  but  with  a  title  calculated  to 
make  it  caviare  to  the  very  people  who  alone  might  be  expected  to 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  77 

it.  Those  whom  at  first  sight  the  title  would  'catch*  are  again 
the  very  ones  who  would  never  have  the  mental  patience  and  courage 
to  read  the  book  through.  But  if  neither  the  public  nor  the  specially 
interested  read  it,  it  '  falls  between  two  stools.'  The  association  of 
Baldwin's  name  will  draw  the  attention  of  the  latter  class. 

The  book  is,  as  I  have  said,  in  many  respects  admirable;  it  is 
thoughtful,  well-informed  and  independent  in  the  true  sense.  There 
is,  too,  for  the  most  part,  a  certain  naive  charm  about  the  author's  style 
and  his  way  of  putting  things.  But  in  spite  of  this,  there  is  much 
that  is  uncouth  and  barbarous  in  expression  scattered  through  these 
three  hundred  pages — much  that  is  more  forbidding  than  the  techni- 
calities of  the  professional  psychologist.  After  all,  when  one  is  writ- 
ing on  science  it  is  hard  to  avoid  technical  terms.  Those  who  will 
read  Sterrett's  book  would  read  it  with  more  satisfaction  if  there  were 
a  more  precise  and  exacting  terminology.  The  last  issue  of  this  RE- 
VIEW puts  the  pertinent  question  :  "If  one  is  to  traverse  a  desert,  why 
not  ride  a  camel?"  This,  to  the  reviewer's  mind,  is  a  fault  of  the 
book,  causing  the  author,  despite  what  he  says  in  his  preface,  to  be 
often  diffuse  and  at  times  tiresome.  Moreover,  why  wrest  from  tech- 
nical terms  their  customary  meaning?  Why,  to  take  one  instance, 
keep  on  talking  about  physical  sensations  ?  u  A  sensation  is  but  a  physi- 
cal impression  in  the  sensorium,  not  an  idea,  not  knowledge,  not  con- 
sciousness" (p.  37).  For  this  meaning  see  also  pp.  21,  23,  26,  28, 
29,  48,  50,  51,  52,  57,  64,  80,  82,  etc.  Is  it  not  surprising,  then,  in 
the  face  of  all  these  references,  to  find  the  following  language  on 
p.  67  :  "  Here,  then,  is  something  that  touches  its  soul  with  a  sensa- 
tion, or  a  feeling."  Are  sensation  and  feeling,  then,  in  any  sense 
equivalents  ?  If  they  are  we  are  compelled,  in  trying  to  harmonize 
pp.  37  and  67,  to  consider  feeling,  too,  as  physical  and  extra-conscious ! 
But  perhaps  the  author  will  say  that  the  context  shows  that  sensation 
and  feeling  are  not  intended  as  equivalents.  Why,  then,  did  he  not 
write  and  instead  of  or?  We  read  again,  on  p.  191  :  "  And  I  affirm 
that  the  tone  and  stress  of  sensation  is  as  much  set  up  genetically  by 
mind  as  by  the  exterior  potency."  Is  this  not  implying  that  sensation 
is  a  conscious  as  well  as  a  physical  perturbation  ?  Can  one  read  such 
passages  without  a  sense  of  dumb  dismay  at  this  playing  fast  and  loose 
with  terms  which  ought  to  have  something  like  a  definite  meaning? 

Notwithstanding,  many  such  defects  in  execution,  Sterrett's  gen- 
eral purpose  is  praiseworthy.  His  main  thesis  that  mind  or  thought 
is  power  (  his  popular  way  of  expressing  the  psychologist's  '  mental 
dynamogenesis '  ),  is  worked  out  from  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  the 


78  POWER   OF  THOUGHT. 

book,  with  a  concentrated  and  yet  comprehensive  purpose  which  ought 
to  prove  suggestive  to  the  specialists  themselves.  This  note  is  sounded 
in  the  very  first  sentence  of  the  first  chapter.  "To  be  a  free  agent 
man  must  have  the  ability  to  achieve  his  freedom."  And  the  under- 
lying aim  of  all  the  chapters  seems  to  be  to  prove  that  he  has  this 
ability.  No  stone  is  left  unturned  in  the  attempted  proof  of  this.  It 
is  made  plain  to  the  author's  mind  by  a  true  reading  of  the  conscious 
life  of  our  sub-human  brothers ;  it  is  worked  out  again  in  an  ingenious 
bit  of  genetic  psychology,  where  the  beginning  and  organic  develop- 
ment of  the  child's  powers  are  the  object  of  analysis  and  interpreta- 
tion; and  it  finds  its  final  corroboration  in  the  normal  life  of  the  ma- 
ture man. 

The  most  impressive  parts  of  the  book  to  those  who  are  more  phil- 
osophically than  psychologically  inclined  will  be  the  chapters  in 
which  the  analysis  brings  us  to  close  quarters  with  'free  will.'  How- 
ever, familiar  the  reader  may  be  with  the  ins  and  outs  of  this  question, 
he  will  here  find  much  that  is  instructive.  The  more  fundamental 
issues  are  dissected  out  of  the  body  of  the  question  and  stated  with  a 
clearness  hard  to  find  rivaled.  See,  for  example,  Part  I.,  Chap.  IV: 
Mind  and- Brain,  and  Part  IV.,  Chap.  XIX.  and  XX.  In  Chap.  IV. 
are  to  be  found  some  of  what  Baldwin  calls  in  his  introduction, 
'  points  of  view  *  *  *  *  of  the  latest  scientific  investigators.  '  The 
reading  of  it  calls  to  mind  at  once  the  names  of  Romanes,  James,  S. 
Hodgson  and  Baldwin.  (  See  Baldwin  on  '  Consciousness  and  Evo- 
lution '  in  the  May,  '95,  number  of  this  REVIEW.)  What  the  author 
says  about  motives  is  also  worthy  of  special  mention — his  interpreta- 
tion reminding  one  strongly  of  passages  in  Green,  James  and  Bald- 
win. The  conflict  of  motives  is  not  a  conflict  between  separate  ideas, 
each  with  a  distinct  activity  of  its  own,  and  exploding  its  own  gun  to 
compel  submission  from  the  others.  Such  a  conception  is  as  imagi- 
nary as  that  '  chimaera  bombinans  in  vacuo  ' — the  freedom  of  indiffer- 
ence. A  motive  has  no  independent  existence  and  means  nothing  if 
it  is  not  '  a  name  for  a  partial  expression  of  the  nature  of  the  agent. ' 
Very  similar,  too,  to  Baldwin's  and  Hodgson's  is  his  description  of  the 
process  through  which  an  end  passes  into  volition. 

But  in  spite  of  all  this,  which  one  may  cordially  applaud,  there  are 
occasional  lapses  from  philosophic  grace.  For  example,  one  fails  to 
feel  the  force  of  his  method  of  appeal  to  '  facts  at  first  hand '  (  pp. 
258  and  260  ) .  The  writing  here  is  below  the  author's  standard ;  he 
seems  to  be  regarding  facts  as  if  they  were  stones  to  be  picked  up  by 
the  mere  reaching  out  of  a  hand.  What  is  a  fact  ?  Why  did  Sir 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  79 

John  Herschel  say  that  there  were  more  false  facts  than  false  theories 
in  the  world  ?  Would  not  a  little  idealistic  analysis  do  this  kind  of 
realistic  appeal  a  great  deal  of  good  !  Besides,  doesn't  the  author 
know  the  literature  on  the  distinction  between  *  the  sense  of  freedom  ' 
and  '  the  fact  of  freedom  ?  '  Has  he  never  read  Martineau,  Hodgson, 
Chalmers  and  Mill  !  Or,  does  he  ignore  them  ?  Outside  of  this  and 
a  few  other  lapses,  these  chapters  on  freedom  are  suggestive  and  con- 
vincing. 

The  book  as  a  whole  teaches  well  the  lesson  "that  we  know  it" 
(  the  world  )  "not  with,  as  it  were,  a  quasi-detachable  intellect  only, 
but  with  our  whole  living  energy  ;  that  we  know  in  so  far  as  we  act, 
nay,  that  ultimately,  only  as  we  will,  as  we  put  forth  activity,  as  we 
act,  can  we  claim  fully  to  be.  "  (  Introduction  to  Croom  Robertson's 
General  Philosophy.  )  ROGER  BRUCE  JOHNSON. 

UNIVERSITY. 


The  School  of  Plato.  F.  W.  BUSSELL.  New  York,  Macmillan  & 
Co.  1896. 

The  author  of  this  book  shows  unusual  insight  into  the  spiritual 
forces  that  were  at  work  in  that  movement  of  Greek  speculative 
thought,  in  which  Platonism  stands  central.  His  aim  is  to  interpret 
the  movement  from  a  special  point  of  view.  The  title  of  the  book  is 
justified  by  the  discussion  as  a  whole.  The  author  fears  in  his  preface 
that  he  may  be  charged  with  superficiality  and  tiresome  iteration.  He 
is  not  open  to  either  charge,  though,  as  to  the  first,  a  few  more  details 
in  places  would  have  been  acceptable.  He  finds  his  starting  point 
and  criterion  of  interpretation  in  a  study  of  the  philosophical  and  re- 
ligious movements  of  the  Roman  imperial  period,  which  had  their  rise 
in  the  mingling  together  of  the  elements  of  Greek,  Jewish  and  Ori- 
ental culture.  These  movements  profoundly  influenced  and  were  in  a 
sense  absorbed  by  Christianity,  with  which  they  came  in  contact.  In 
the  union  of  intellectual  and  mystical  elements,  in  the  current  of  specu- 
lation, and  in  the  aim  of  the  period  which  was  a  search  for  the  blessed 
life,  the  author  sees  the  true  method  and  end  of  all  philosophy. 

The  central  motive  of  philosophy,  according  to  Dr.  Bussell,  is  in- 
dividualism; the  self-assertion  of  the  free  spirit  of  man  against  the 
universal,  whether  in  the^form  of  nature  or  society.  With  this  idea  in 
mind  the  author  follows  the  stream  of  Greek  speculation  from  its 
source.  His  thesis  is  the  rebellion  of  the  individual  ;  his  uprising 
against  an  environment  that  seeks  to  crush  him,  or,  at  least,  to  rob 
him  of  his  freedom  and  make  him  a  slave  of  the  universal.  The 


8o  THE   SCHOOL    OF  PLATO. 

beginning  of  speculation  is  the  awakening  of  the  individual,  and  the 
stages  of  the  Greek  movement  mark  the  individual  spirit's  struggle 
against  nature  and  society,  and,  in  the  later  theosophic  stages,  against 
an  absolute  which  threatened  to  swallow  up  the  individual  life.  Ac- 
cording to  the  author,  the  supreme  end  of  philosophy  is  practical,  the 
establishment  of  a  modus  vivendi  by  which  happiness  may  be  secured. 
The  theoretical  and  logical  are  subordinate  therefore  to  the  practical 
and  moral. 

The  author  finds  the  highest  organ  of  philosophy  in  Platonism,  in 
which  the  process  of  knowing  is  supplemented  by  mystical  intuition. 
The  processes  of  knowledge  are  inadequate,  and  here  the  author  is 
somewhat  agnostic ;  knowing  breaks  down  or  falls  at  the  threshold, 
and  recourse  must  be  had  to  feeling  in  order  to  attain  the  highest  truth. 
It  is  through  this  union  of  thought  and  feeling  that  Platonism  obtains 
its  grasp  on  the  truths  of  religion  and  the  immortality  of  the  soul.  The 
author  shows,  and  this  is  the  most  interesting  feature  of  the  book,  how 
in  the  later  period  the  final  solution  of  the  problem  of  philosophy  in 
the  ancient  world  was  reached  by  the  reassertion  in  Neo-Platonism  of 
this  Platonic  synthesis  of  thought  and  mystical  intuition. 

Throughout  the  theosophic  period,  and,  in  truth,  since  Aristotle, 
the  pendulum  of  speculation  had  swung  between  the  extremes  of 
an  immanent  naturalism  which  merged  God  in  the  course  of  the 
world  and  a  transcendent  absolution  which  removed  him  beyond  the 
pale  of  conceivability.  Neo-Platonism  finds  its  solution  of  this  prob- 
lem, and  the  final  one  of  ancient  thought,  in  the  doctrine  of  emanation 
which  saves  the  divine  transcendence  and  yet  brings  God  into  relation 
with  man  and  the  world,  through  a  chain  of  mediating  beings. 

Dr.  Bussell  characterizes  the  doctrine  of  emanation  as  an  honest  at- 
tempt to  overpower  the  dualism  in  which  stoic  cosmogony  had  ended, 
but  regards  the  solution  as  unsatisfactory.  What  is  needed  is  not  so 
much  a  theoretic  solution  of  our  difficulties  as  "  a  divine  voice  of  conso- 
lation ;  something  to  assure  the  soul  of  man  of  its  intrinsic  worth,  of 
its  value  in  its  Maker's  eyes  *  *  *  something  to  show  us  that  the  prac- 
tical life  and  the  government  of  material  things  is,  after  all,  the  high- 
est duty  and  happiness  for  us ;  *  *  *  and  above  all  that  God  is  no 
palace-secluded  sovereign,  but  a  general  who  fights  with  us  and  for  us ; 
and  this  semi-dualistic  conception  of  the  efforts,  the  painful  efforts  of 
Deity,  paradoxic  though  it  may  be  called,  is  nevertheless,"  the  author 
concludes,  "  a  certainty  of  experience,  the  supreme  consolation  and  en- 
couragement of  the  highest  thinkers  and  most  devoted  believers.  And 
in  this  lies  the  significance  of  the  Christian  religion." 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  8 1 

The  author  may  be  characterized  as  a  profoundly  Christian  thinker 
who  has  read  and  been  influenced  by  Schopenhauer  and  who  is,  there- 
fore, somewhat  pessimistic,  somewhat  agnostic  and  somewhat  out  of 
sympathy  with  modern  democratic  movements  and  with  what  he  calls 
the  collectivism  of  the  century.  It  might  be  questioned  whether  the 
motive  of  philosophy  is  not  social  as  well  as  individual  and  whether 
the  despair  of  knowledge  need  be  so  profound  as  it  is  in  the  mind  of 
this  author;  but  at  all  events  the  theme  is  treated  with  insight,  the 
style  is  stimulating,  and  the  handling  of  the  materials  is  masterly. 

A.  T.  ORMOND. 
PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY. 

The  Development  of  the  Doctrine  of  Personality  in  Modern  Phi- 
losophy. Part  I.  In.  Diss.  Strassburg.  WM.  H.  WALKER. 
Ann  Arbor,  Mich.,  The  Inland  Press.  Pp.  So. 
This  is  a  careful  and  creditable  study  of  the  subject.  The  author 
holds  that  "the  history  of  the  development  of  the  doctrine  of  personality 
in  modern  philosophy  is  that  of  a  gradual  and  necessary  return  to  the 
consideration  of  the  nature  and  worth  of  personality  from  the  opposite 
pole  of  philosophical  thought."  The  first  chapter  shows  how  philos- 
ophy "  at  the  Renaissance  turned  from  the  inner  world  to  the  outer," 
from  the  world  of  scholastic  abstractions  to  the  world  of  reality. 
Bacon  and  Bruno  u  agree  that  nature  is  the  immediate  end  of  study." 
Yet  indirectly  the  thinkers  of  the  Renaissance  raised  the  question  of 
personality.  "If  truth  is  to  be  sought  for  its  uses,  material  or  re- 
ligious, then  to  whom  is  it  useful,  and  by  virtue  of  what  nature  can 
truth  be  of  use  to  him  ? "  The  second  chapter  traces  the  emergence 
of  the  problem  in  Hobbes,  Descartes,  and  the  Cartesian  school.  Po- 
litical disturbances  precipitated  the  question  of  "the  ultimate  unit  of 
society,  the  legal  person."  While  Hobbes's  mechanical  philosophy 
logically  implied  the  denial  of  personality,  his  political  philosophy 
found  it  indispensable.  "  He  not  only  introduces  the  concept  into 
modern  philosophy,  but  he  also  gives  it  its  characteristic  modern  note. 
Man  is  a  person  because  he  is  accountable  for  his  actions."  The  Carte- 
sian treatment  of  the  problem  is  exclusively  intellectual ;  yet,  failing  to 
recognize  the  centrality  of  personality  for  knowledge,  the  Cartesians 
lose  its  distinctive  character  and  reduce  the  subject  to  the  level  of  the 
object.  The  rationalistic  dissolution  of  personality  in  Spinozism  is 
next  indicated  (Ch.  III.).  The  author  thinks,  however,  that  Spinoza  was 
compelled,  "not  by  the  exigencies  of  his  system,  but  by  the  logic  of  facts, 
to  reproduce  in  the  microcosm  the  scheme  of  the  macrocosm  ;  "  for  "  it 


82  DOCTRINE   OF  PERSONALITY. 

would  be  possible  to  show  that  the  modes  of  the  attribute  of  thought 
are  not,  after  all,  ideas,  but  human  spirits."  The  opposite  or  empiri- 
cal dissolution  of  personality  in  empiricism  is  next  developed  (Ch. 
IV.).  Here  Locke's  distinction  between  personal  identity  and  identity 
of  substance  is  emphasized,  and  the  writer  says,  in  his  enthusiasm,  that 
"  Kant  himself  could  hardly  have  defined  the  transcendental  ego  of  ap- 
perception in  better  terms."  "  Berkeley  rises  to  the  higher  thought  that 
there  is  no  true  unity  save  in  personality."  The  reference  is  to  Strt's, 
but  "already  in  his  commonplace  book  Berkeley  writes:  'Nothing 
properly  but  persons,  i.  e.,  conscious  things,  do  exist.  All  other  things 
are  not  so  much  existencies  as  manners  of  the  existence  of  persons.'" 
Berkely  further  recognized  the  essential  activity  of  personality,  thus 
anticipating  the  new  period  in  the  history  of  the  doctrine  inaugurated 
by  Leibnitz.  "In  most  of  the  earlier  systems  the  chief  emphasis  was 
laid  upon  man  as  a  thinking  being.  That  man  is  also  an  acting  being 
was  added  as  a  subordinate  fact."  In  the  new  period  "  the  standpoint 
was  reversed,  and  man  was  regarded  first  of  all  as  an  active  being. 
Personality  was  removed  from  the  sphere  of  thought  to  that  of  action." 
This  new  standpoint  is  that  of  Kant  in  his  doctrine  of  the  Practical 
Reason,  to  which  the  last  chapter  of  the  thesis  is  devoted,  and  the  re- 
lation of  which  to  his  doctrine  of  the  Pure  Reason  is  admirably  shown. 
Kant  is  also  "  the  precursor  of  a  new  period  in  which  the  discussion  of 
the  personality  of  man  and  the  personality  of  God  go  hand  in  hand." 
To  this  post-Kantian  period,  presumably,  the  second  part  of  the  dis- 
sertation is  devoted.  JAMES  SETH. 
CORNELL  UNIVERSITY. 

Our  Notions  of  Number  and  Space.  HERBERT  NICHOLS,  assisted 
by  WILLIAM  E.  PARSONS.  Boston,  Ginn  &  Co.  1894.  Pp. 
vi  -+•  201. 

Dr.  Nichols  has  based  upon  a  series  of  experiments  performed  at 
Cambridge  certain  views  relating,  as  the  title  of  his  book  shows,  to  the 
origin  of  our  number  and  space  judgments.  His  book  thus  presents  not 
merely  a  statement  and  explanation  of  experimental  results,  but  an  ap- 
parently complete  theory,  comprised  in  no  fewer  than  one  hundred  and 
nine  articles,  on  the  general  subjects  of  space  and  number — a  weighty 
superstructure  to  be  founded  on  psychological  experiment  in  its  pres- 
ent stage  of  development. 

The  experiments  from  which  Dr.  Nichols  derives  his  hypothesis 
were  performed  with  simple  apparatus,  consisting  of  rows  of  pins 
fixed  in  cardboard,  the  number  of  pins  in  each  row  varying  from  two 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  83 

to  five,  and  the  length  of  the  rows  varying  by  half-centimeter  stages 
from  one  to  five  centimeters.  Other  experiments  were  performed 
with  the  same  number  and  distance  categories,  but  with  the  pins  ar- 
ranged in  triangles,  squares  and  circles.  Cardboard  edges  of  corre- 
sponding lengths  were  also  used,  and  solid  cork  triangles,  circles  and 
squares  for  comparison  with  the  pin  experiments.  Four  persons 
served  as  reagents.  The  apparatus  was  applied  by  the  reagent  him- 
self on  the  locality  to  be  investigated,  which  was  either  the  tongue, 
forehead,  forearm  or  abdomen,  and  the  pins  were  ordinarily  '  rocked ' 
back  and  forth  on  the  skin  to  facilitate  judgment.  In  the  pin  experi- 
ments the  reagent  was  asked  to  determine  in  the  same  experiment  both 
the  number  of  pins  and  the  length  of  the  row ;  indeed,  where  the 
pins  were  set  in  triangles,  etc,  '  figure '  judgments  were  also  required ; 
a  method  which  must  have  produced  a  certain  amount  of  attentional 
distraction.  A  general  criticism  which  suggests  itself  on  a  survey  of 
Dr.  Nichols'  tables  concerns  his  use  of  sub-liminal  values.  Many  of 
his  inferences  are  drawn  from  tables  where  the  percentage  of  right 
judgments  seldom  rises  above  forty. 

The  chief  results  of  these  experiments  may  be  briefly  summarized 
as  follows:  (i)  When  two  pins  are  used,  the  accuracy  of  both 
distance  and  number  judgments  increases  with  increasing  distance. 
(2)  When  five  pins  are  used,  on  the  other  hand,  the  closer  together 
they  are  placed,  the  more  accurate  is  the  judgment.  This  result  as 
regards  the  estimation  of  number,  Dr.  Nichols  accounts  for  by  the  fact 
that  reducing  the  distance  really  increases  the  uncertainty,  but  that  in- 
creased uncertainty  means  an  increased  tendency  to  assign  the  higher 
numerical  categories,  and  hence,  where  the  number  of  pins  is  actually 
a  maximum,  increased  correctness  of  number  judgment.  Such  at 
least  is  what  the  present  reviewer  makes  out  of  the  most  difficult  pas- 
sage in  the  book,  whose  style  is  nowhere  very  clear.  (3)  The  num- 
ber judgments  when  the  pins  are  set  in  triangles,  etc.,  are  more 
accurate  than  when  the  same  number  of  pins  are  placed  in  a  straight 
line.  (4)  The  number  judgments  are  more  accurate  when  four  pins 
are  set  in  a  square  than  when  these  are  set  in  an  equilateral  triangle 
of  the  same  base.  (5)  The  distance  between  the  pins  seems  shorter 
when  the  pins  are  set  in  a  triangle  or  circle  than  when  they  are  set  in 
a  square. 

Such  being  the  more  important  inferences  from  the  experimental 
results,  let  us  see  what  the  derived  space  theory  is.  Since  the  author's 
own  summary  of  his  doctrine  occupies  twenty-five  pages,  only  its 
merest  outline  can  be  suggested  here,  but  the  gist  of  it  seems  to  be 


84  NUMBER  AND   SPACE. 

this :  If  a  combination  of  nerve  endings  have  been  on  the  whole 
stimulated  oftener  together  than  separately,  the  resulting  presentation 
will  be  numerical  and  spatial  unity ;  if  oftener  separately  than  together, 
we  shall  have  a  lineal  distance  presentation.  The  length  of  the  dis- 
tance presentation  will  depend  '  upon  the  average  length  of  all  the 
time  series  in  which  the  peripheral  line  has  through  life  been  stimu- 
lated.' The  further  apart  two  points,  the  greater  the  probability  of 
serial  rather  than  simultaneous  stimulation  ;  hence  the  more  accurate 
the  distance  presentation.  If  the  successive  stimulation  is  discontinu- 
ous, the  result  is  a  presentation  of  number.  The  further  apart  two 
points,  the  more  likely  they  are  to  be  stimulated  discontinuous ly,  hence 
the  more  accurate  the  number  presentation.  The  greater  the  number 
of  points  stimulated  within  a  given  distance,  the  less  the  probability 
that  those  points  have  been  previously  stimulated  discontinuously, 
hence  the  less  accurate  the  number  presentation.  At  the  same  time, 
the  more  points  touched  in  a  given  distance,  the  more  clearly  the  '  dis- 
tance tendency'  will  be  recalled,  and  the  more  accurate  the  distance 
judgment.  Three  points  in  a  triangle  would  average  more  discon- 
tinuous stimulation  than  three  in  a  straight  line,  and  four  in  a  square 
than  four  ill  a  straight  line ;  hence  we  find  the  number  judgments  more 
exact  in  the  experiments  with  triangles  and  squares.  The  fact  that 
number  judgments  in  the  case  of  the  square  are  more  accurate  than  in 
the  case  of  the  triangle  is  explained  by  showing  that  the  diagonal  points  of 
the  square  are  further  apart  than  any  two  points  on  the  triangle.  In  dis- 
tance judgments  with  triangles,  squares  and  circles,  the  sides  of  a  tri- 
angle are  under-estimated  because  each  corner  calls  up  not  only  the 
presentation  of  the  distance  between  itself  and  the  opposite  corners, 
but  the  shorter  distance  presentations  between  itself  and  other  points 
on  the  perimeter,  the  average  '  distance  tendency '  being  thus  shortened. 
Similarly,  the  diameter  of  a  circle  is  under-estimated  because  each  end 
recalls  the  shorter  distance  presentations  between  itself  and  other 
points  on  the  circumference.  Obviously  no  such  shortening  influence 
is  exerted  on  the  sides  of  a  square. 

These,  as  briefly  stated  as  possible,  are  Dr.  Nichols's  explanations 
of  his  results.  There  is  no  space  for  detailed  criticism,  but  two  general 
observations  present  themselves.  First,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  author 
reduces  space  to  a  succession  in  time.  He  can  hardly  mean  that  it  is 
nothing  more,  yet  he  seems  to  imply  that  he  is  giving  us  a  complete 
theory  of  space.  In  a  note  (p.  155)  where  he  criticises  Professor 
James's  doctrine  of  'crude  extensity,' he  expressly  says  :  "Our  every 
notion  of  extensity  is  wholly  an  expression  of  time  extension.  *  *  *  I 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  85 

should  say  that  independently  of  time  form  there  could  be  no  feeling  of 
i -\u-nsity,  while,  theoretically,  there  might  be  big  feelings  and  little 
IL clings  in  the  sense  of  more  feeling  and  less  feeling."  It  is  surely 
superfluous  to  remark  that  'time  extensity'  is  not  space  extensity, 
and  that  successive  stimulation  of  different  nerve  endings  could  never 
make  them  spatially  distinct  for  consciousness  unless  each  one  gave  a 
sensation  spatially  distinguishable  from  that  of  every  other  nerve  end- 
IIIL;.  'Crude  extensity,'  or  a  series  of  local  signs  in  the  sense  of 
original  spatial  differences,  one  or  the  other  we  must  have. 

Secondly,  it  is  undoubtedly  true,  as  Professor  James  has  told  us, 
that  no  elements  can  be  analyzed  out  of  a  complex  presentation  unless 
they  have  been  previously  experienced  separately.  But  is  it  not  rather 
dangerous  to  claim  that  two  points  will  not  be  felt  as  two  unless  '  on 
the  whole '  they  have  been  oftener  stimulated  separately  than  together? 
When  one  thinks  of  the  simultaneous  stimulation,  practically  con- 
tinuous through  life,  of  distant  parts  of  the  skin  by  contact  with  cloth- 
ing, one  hesitates  to  say  that  no  points  are  locally  distinguishable  save 
those  which  have  been  stimulated  oftener  separately  than  together.  Is 
it  absolutely  certain  that  the  volar  surfaces  of  the  ends  of  the  forefinger 
and  thumb  average  more  successive  than  simultaneous  stimulations? 
Yet  on  the  assumption  that  the  average  experiences  of  a  peripheral 
nerve-ending  determine  the  result  of  its  present  stimulation  rests  the 
whole  of  Dr.  Nichols's  theory.  MARGARET  WASHBURN. 

WELLS  COLLEGE. 

The  Education  of  the  Central  Nervous  System,  a  Study  of  Foun- 
dations, especially  of  Sensory  and  Motor  Training.  REUBEN 
POST  HALLECK.  New  York  and  London,  The  Macmillan 
Company.  1896.  Pp.  251. 

The  first  four  chapters  of  this  work  contain  a  popular  statement  of 
elementary  facts  in  the  gross  anatomy  of  the  central  nervous  system 
and  in  neural  physiology.  The  work  assumes  that  the  cortical  centers 
are  developed  (  i  )  by  the  exercise  of  the  particular  senses  whose  af- 
ferent fibres  terminate  in  them,  (  2  )  by  practice  in  recalling  sensory 
images.  To  these  ends  an  early  beginning  in  the  systematic  exercise 
of  all  the  senses,  frequent  changes  of  environment,  and  care  on  the 
part  of  the  instructor  to  exercise  the  pupil  in  recalling  sensory  images, 
are  recommended.  The  familiarity  of  great  writers  with  the  sensory 
aspect  of  nature,  as  seen  in  their  poetry,  is  cited  to  prove,  as  it  seems, 
that  mental  superiority  is  based  upon  well  developed  cortical  centers 
corresponding  to  the  special  senses.  In  Chapter  X.,  HOVJ  Shakes- 


86  CENTRAL  NERVOUS   SYSTEM. 

peare's  Senses  'were  Trained,  the  author's  hostility  to  the  study  of 
books  reminds  one  of  Rousseau.  "No  one  was  ever  educated  by  the 
study  of  words  "  (  1 76  ) .  Against  '  those  who  favor  going  to  school 
chiefly  for  the  purpose  of  studying  books,  '  the  education  of  Shakes- 
peare is  held  up.  His  superiority  is  believed  to  be  due  to  the  fact  that 
' '  he  had  magnificent  sensory  training  and  made  the  proper  motor  re- 
sponses thereto"  (180).  Chapter  XI.  emphasizes  the  necessity  of 
suitable  motor  responses  to  sensory  stimuli.  The  last  chapter  gives 
pedagogical  application  to  the  pleasure-pain  theory  of  Marshall.  A 
convenient  index  is  added  to  the  text. 

The  style  is  lucid  and  very  popular,  the  print  clear  and  the  pages 
handsome.  The  author  offers  no  new  facts,  either  anatomical,  phys- 
iological, or  pedagogical.  The  evidence  upon  which  he  rests  his 
theory  is  not  the  experience  of  educators,  but  rather  certain  assumed 
physiological  facts  gleaned  from  the  work  of  others ;  while  the  shad- 
owy evidence  upon  which  some  of  these  '  facts '  rest  is  not  mentioned 
by  the  author.  The  precise  genesis  and  function  of  the  '  association ' 
fibres,  e.  g.,  as  well  as  the  physiological  parallel  of  memory,  etc.,  are 
problems  as  to  whose  solution  physiologists  can  as  yet  only  guess ;  yet 
the  author  cites  certain  assumed  solutions  of  them  and  of  other  psycho- 
physical  problems  as  evidence  for  his  theory.  Is  the  evidence  ade- 
quate ?  We  think  not ;  and  yet  it  may  be  true  that  pedagogical  theory 
pays  too  little  attention  to  sensory  and  motor  training  in  the  early  life 
of  children.  The  important  question  as  to  how  the  senses  and  mem- 
ory are  to  be  rendered  the  trained  servants  of  a  will  which  moves 
toward  intellectual,  ethical  or  other  practical  aims,  is  not  touched  upon 
by  the  author.  GUY  TAWNEY. 

PRINCETON,  N.  J. 

The  Art  of  Controversy,  and  Other  Posthumons  Papers.  ARTHUR 
SCHOPENHAUER.  Selected  and  translated  by  T.  BAILEY  SAUN- 
DERS.,  New  York,  The  Macmillan  Co.,  1896.  Pp.  116.  90 
cents. 

The  volume  is  a  valuable  accession  to  Mr.  Bailey  Saunders'  library 
of  Schopenhauer.  The  excellent  English  translations  of  the  German 
master  have  preserved  the  thought  and  spirit  of  the  original  while  in 
no  wise,  however,  sacrificing  the  demands  of  clear,  idiomatic  English. 
In  the  transfer  from  one  language  to  the  other  there  is  in  all  of  these 
volumes  a  minimum  of  loss  as  regards  the  impression  made  of  the 
author's  mind  and  personality.  The  Art  of  Controversy  is  one  of 
Schopenhauer's  posthumous  papers,  though  a  small  part  of  it  was  pub- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  87 

lished  before  his  death  in  the  chapter  of  the  Parcrga  entitled  Zur 
Logik  und  Dialcktik.  The  opening  chapter  consists  of  a  theoretical 
exposition  of  the  distinction  between  Logic  and  Dialectic,  the  one  a 
guide  in  the  search  for  truth,  the  other  a  weapon  to  wield  in  the  quest 
of  victory.  This  is  followed  by  a  practical  discussion  of  the  ways 
and  means  of  securing  an  advantage  over  an  adversary  in  debate.  This 
chapter  has  the  significant  heading  of  Strategems,  and  has  a  vein  of 
irony  running  through  it  that  gives  added  force  to  its  many  valuable 
hints.  The  other  essays  of  this  volume  are  on  Interest  and  Beauty 
in  Works  of  Art,  Psychological  Observations,  Wisdom  of  Life, 
Genius  and  Virtue.  The  epigrammatic  style,  the  sententious  com- 
ments upon  human  nature,  and  withal  an  underlying  strain  of  humor, 
concealed  and  yet  pervasive,  render  these  essays  both  interesting  and 
suggestive.  JOHN  GRIER  HIBBEN. 

PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY. 

Zur  Theorie  der  Aufmerksamkeit.  HARRY  E.  KOHN.  Halle, 
Niemeyer,  1895.  Pp.  48. 

The  main  contention  of  this  paper  is  that  there  is  no  real  differ- 
ence between  the  two  states  of  attentive  and  inattentive  consciousness. 
The  difference  is  only  one  of  degree,  and  attention  is  regarded  as  the 
intensity  coefficient  of  consciousness.  The  essential  features  of  atten- 
tion are  discovered  in  the  process  of  apperception.  Different  stimuli 
strive  together  to  possess  the  field  of  consciousness,  and  the  victorious 
inhibit  the  force  of  the  others,  their  superior  intensity  being  felt  in 
consciousness  as  attention.  Every  change  in  consciousness  or  conse- 
quent shifting  of  attention  rises  from  the  fusion  of  a  perception-mass 
with  an  apperception  mass,  resulting  from  the  strife  of  contending 
stimuli.  The  writer  indicates  also  as  one  of  the  factors  in  attention, 
the  susceptibility,  both  original  and  acquired  of  the  inner  nature  to 
certain  stimuli  in  preference  to  others,  thus  increasing  or  diminishing 
their  intensity  as  the  case  may  be  and  so  further  modifying  attention. 
His  theory  is  mainly  an  exposition  of  the  Herbartian  doctrine  of  strug- 
gle and  inhibition,  and  partakes  of  a  like  vagueness  and  artificiality. 
The  constructive  portion  of  the  paper  is  followed  by  a  criticism  of  the 
theories  of  Stumpf,  Wundt  and  James.  JOHN  GRIER  HIBBEN. 

PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY. 

Dictionnaire  de  physiologic.    CH.  RICHET.    I.  A-B.    Paris,  Alcan, 

1895.     Pp.  1044. 

Strange  to  say  there  has  not  existed  heretofore  any  special  diction- 
ary for  physiology.  It  is  a  lack  which  M.  Ch.  Richet  has  attempted 


88  DICTIONNAIRE  DE  PHYSIOLOGIE 

to  fill,  with  the  help  of  a  great  number  of  physiologists  of  distinction, 
mainly  French.  The  first  volume  is  now  ready,  and  we  find  that  it 
treats  of  physiology  in  the  largest  sense.  It  includes  all  the  sciences 
commonly  known  as  physics,  bacteriology,  medicine,  chemistry,  ther- 
apeutics and  psychology.  To  psychology  a  considerable  number  of 
interesting  articles  are  devoted.  We  may  cite  Aboulia,  Amnesia, 
Analgesia,  Anaesthesia,  Apperception,  Attention,  Automatism,  etc. 
These  articles  are  signed  by  Marillier,  Janet,  and  Richet.  They  are 
quite  in  their  place  in  a  dictionary  of  physiology,  but  they  would  be 
considered  too  summary  in  a  dictionary  of  psychology.  It  is  difficult 
to  give  a  general  opinion  of  these  different  articles,  for  they  are  of 
very  unequal  value.  Some — as  Algesimeter,  Agraphia,  Audition 
coloree — are  curiously  inadequate ;  while  others — as  Hearing — are 
treatises.  But  my  general  impression  is  that  this  dictionary  is  a  very 
useful  work,  and  that  it  will  be  of  more  service  to  psychologists  than 
the  ordinary  dictionaries  of  medicine,  in  which  psychology  is  alto- 
gether sacrificed.  A.  BINET. 
PARIS. 

Alterations     of    Personality.      ALFRED    BINET.      Translated     by 

HELEN   GREEN   BALDWIN.     With   notes   and   a  preface  by  J. 

Mark  Baldwin.     New  York,  D.  Appleton  &  Co.      1896.     Pp. 

xii  +  356. 
Hypnotism,  Mesmerism  and  the  New  Witchcraft.     ERNEST  HART. 

New  edition,  enlarged.     New  York,  D.  Appleton  &  Co.      1896. 

Pp.  viii  +212. 

The  appearance  of  Mrs.  Baldwin's  excellent  translation  of  M. 
Binet's  monograph,  and  of  a  second  edition  of  Dr.  Hart's  essays,  of- 
fers an  opportunity  of  giving  them  mention  in  the  pages  of  the  PSY- 
CHOLOGICAL REVIEW. 

M.  Binet's  book  is  divided  into  three  parts — '  Successive  Person- 
alities,' '  Coexistent  Personalities,'  and  '  Alterations  of  Personality  in 
Experiments  on  Suggestion.' 

The  first  part  deals  with  Spontaneous  Somnambulism,  the  exposi- 
tion of  which  is  based  chiefly  upon  the  cases  of  F£lida  X.  and  Louis 
V. ;  and  with  Induced  Somnambulism.  The  latter  term  is  used  to 
designate  those  secondary  states  in  which  the  patient  is  vividly  con- 
scious, although  they  are  not  remembered  in  the  primary  state.  Hyp- 
notic states  in  the  narrower  sense  are  scarcely  mentioned.  The  phe- 
nomena of  post-hypnotic  suggestion  are  then  used  to  prove  that  the 
somnambulistic  state  can  survive  the  reappearance  of  the  normal 
consciousness,  thus  constituting  a  secondary  personality. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  89 

The  conception  thus  introduced  is  worked  out  in  detail  in  Parts  II. 
ami  III.  In  Part  II.  it  is  used  to  explain  the  phenomena  of  hysterical 
amnesia,  anaesthesia,  automatic  movement  and  automatic  ideation, 
while  in  Part  III.  the  analogous  phenomena  which  can  be  produced 
1>\  direct  suggestion  are  interpreted  in  the  same  way,  including  in  the 
latter  class  '  spirit'  writing. 

Into  the  details  of  M.  Binet's  reasoning  one  cannot  enter  within  the 
limits  of  a  brief  review.  It  is  dominated  throughout  by  the  notion  of 
a  subconscious  personality  or  self,  and  although  he  does  not  hold  that 
this  subconscious  personality  is  to  be  conceived  as  invariably  analo- 
gous to  the  primary  self,  that  it  exists  in  all  persons,  or  that  it  enjoys 
a  continuous  existence,  he  frequently  writes  as  if  he  held  all  these  doc- 
trines. There  is,  in  fact,  a  certain  lack  of  clearness  in  M.  Binet's 
conceptions,  of  which  his  loose  interchange  of  such  words  as  '  uncon- 
scious'  and  'subconscious,'  'personality'  and  'consciousness,'  is 
merely  the  exponent.  Notwithstanding  such  blemishes,  however,  the 
book  is  an  earnest  attempt  at  synthesis  in  a  new  field,  and  as  the  author 
is  one  of  the  few  who  can  say  of  the  early  researches  in  that  field, 
'  quorum  pars  magnafuij  his  views  are  of  weight. 

Dr.  Hart  writes  in  a  very  different  vein.  Someone  has  said  that 
if  an  Englishman  be  asked  for  an  opinion  upon  a  subject  of  which  he 
is  ignorant  he  may  for  a  while  be  at  a  loss,  but  after  a  half  hour's  re- 
flection will  be  found,  not  only  in  possession  of  an  opinion,  but  ready 
to  knock  down  anyone  who  fails  to  agree  to  it. 

Whether  this  be  true  on  the  whole  or  not,  Dr.  Hart's  mental  atti- 
tude seems  to  be  of  somewhat  the  same  type.  In  1850  he  began  the 
study  of  hypnotism  and  soon  satisfied  himself  that  hypnotic  states 
exist,  that  they  are  of  subjective  origin,  that  will  or  magnetism  has 
nothing  to  do  with  their  production,  and  that  the  subject  is  sug- 
gestible. He  further  concluded  that  hypnotic  sleep  is  due  to  a  reflex 
inhibition  of  the  cerebral  circulation.  At  that  point  his  powers  of  as- 
similation seem  to  have  failed  and  he  has  never  advanced  a  step.  This, 
he  holds,  is  the  sole  and  only  true  faith  of  hypnotism,  which  except 
a  man  hold  faithfully  he  shall  be  damned  scientifically.  All  further 
alleged  discoveries  are  compounds  of  malobservation  and  fraud,  and 
those  who  are  engaged  in  foisting  them  upon  the  world  are  either 
knaves  or  fools,  mainly,  however,  fools.  For  even  Dr.  Hart  can  be 
charitable  in  his  way. 

These  views  are  expounded  in  the  first  two  essays.  The  third 
narrates  the  author's  expose  of  the  mehods  of  Luys  and  de  Rochas. 
It  is  good  as  far  as  it  goes,  and  so  also  is  the  amusing  and  well  writ- 
ten essay  on  'The  Eternal  Gullible.' 


90  ALTERATIONS    OF  PERSONALITY. 

The  book  may  be  of  service  to  the  general  public  in  pruning  away 
some  of  the  absurd  notions  about  hypnotism  which  are  so  common. 
Otherwise  it  is  insignificant.  The  sole  point  of  importance  which  Dr. 
Hart  makes  is  that  fraud  on  the  part  of  the  patient  is  a  source  of 
error  never  absent  and  seldom  provided  for,  but  he  probably  grossly 
exaggerates  the  extent  to  which  this  vitiates  the  results  of  careful  ob- 
servers. Furthermore,  the  intemperance  of  his  language  and  his 
supreme  self-confidence  will  discredit  his  work  in  the  eyes  of  all  who 
value  cool  thinking,  justice  and  courtesy.  W.  R.  NEWBOLD. 

UNIVERSITY  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

Causal-Nexus  zwischen  Leib  und  Seele  und  die  daraus  resultier- 
enden  psychophysischen  Phanomene.  HEINRICH  METSCHER. 
Dortmund,  Ruhfus.  Pp.  179.  (No  date.) 

The  first  part  of  this  work  reviews  historically  and  critically  the 
principal  metaphysical  theories  of  the  relation  of  soul  and  body.  All 
are  found  unsatisfactory,  but  no  new  solution  is  attempted.  Instead, 
the  author,  falling  back  on  the  general  psycho-physical  formula  as 
expressing  the  empirical  facts,  proceeds,  in  the  second  part,  to  discuss 
the  more  characteristic  phenomena  which  exhibit  bodily  and  psychical 
interdependence.  The  historical  data  are  almost  all  at  second  hand ; 
in  the  more  psychological  portions  the  chief  authority  is  Wundt,  cited 
from  the  second  edition.  Wundt  is  also  referred  to  as  one  of  the  lead- 
ing investigators  after  Flourens  of  localization  of  brain-function. 
None  of  the  real  investigators  is  mentioned  except  Flechsig,  whose 
name  occurs  twice,  spelled  with  an  x.  In  the  more  metaphysical  por- 
tions the  arguments  proceed  from  the  assumption  that  soul  and  body 
interact  and  from  the  demand  for  a  theory  to  explain  the  fact.  No 
effort  is  made  to  unravel  the  metaphysical  implications  of  this  assump- 
tion. The  author  does  not  consider  what  light  might  be  thrown  on 
the  problem  by  the  application  of  the  critical  method,  regarding  soul 
and  body  as  terms  derived  from  distinct  points  of  view  in  the  organi- 
zation of  experience,  and  thence  developing  the  principles  on  which 
the  experience  that  yields  these  distinctions  rests.  Nevei'theless,  the 
book  has  sufficient  merits  as  a  popular  exposition.  The  material  is 
well  arranged  and  the  style  clear.  H.  N.  GARDINER. 

SMITH  COLLEGE. 

Die    Willensfreiheit.     PAUL   MICHAELIS.     I.-D.      Leipzig,    1896. 

Pp.  56.  " 

Following  five  pages  of  introduction,  in  which  the  problem  is 
stated,  is  a  sketch  of  its  historical  development,  four  pages  being  de- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  91 

voted  to  the  Bible,  two  and  a-half  to  Greek  Philosophy,  and  so  on 
through  the  Middle  Ages  and  Modern  Philosophy  till  Kant,  Kant  and 
his  successors  being  finally  disposed  of  in  a  little  over  four  pages. 
The  more  independent  second  half  discusses  the  Law  of  Causality,  the 
Will,  Character,  Transcendental  Freedom,  the  Development  of  Moral 
Will,  the  Freedom  of  Moral  Will,  Ethical  Consequences  and  Education 
in  Moral  Freedom,  allowing  on  an  average  about  three  pages  to  each 
topic.  One  is  reminded  of  the  traditional  first  sermon,  into  which  the 
young  theologue  puts  all  of  the  divinity  he  knows.  One's  impression  of 
the  work,  however,  improves  on  acquaintance.  Herr  Michaelis  has 
evidently  not  told  all  that  he  knew ;  and  while  we  must  regret  that  he  did 
not  confine  himself  to  fewer  subjects  and  develop  them  in  a  way  which 
would  have  made  his  work  of  real  value  as  a  contribution  to  the  dis- 
cussion of  the  main  problem,  it  is  fair  to  say  that  he  has  selected  his 
points  with  good  judgment  and  presented  them  so  succinctly  and  clearly 
that  one  gets  from  his  work  as  good  an  idea  of  what  the  controversy 
is  all  about  as  from  many  much  more  pretentious  treatises.  The 
question  discussed  is  the  old  one  of  the  liberum  arbitrum  indiffer- 
entice,  \htpossibilitas  utriusque  partis.  The  author  well  brings  out 
its  ethical  and  religious  bearings.  The  interest  in  the  question,  he 
says,  is  not  as  to  whether,  when  at  the  cross-roads,  we  can  turn  indiffer- 
ently to  the  right  or  to  the  left,  but  whether  Hercules,  at  the  parting 
of  the  ways,  can  of  himself  choose  '  the  narrow  path '  or  must  wait 
for  assistance  from  above,  that  is  from  without.  This  possibility 
Herr  Michaelis  denies.  Our  choices  are  determined.  The  arguments 
are  the  familiar  ones  and  are  perhaps  conclusive.  Few  at  any  rate 
would  contend  to-day  for  a  choice  without  motive  or  deny  that  the  motive 
essential  to  choice  is  determined  by  circumstances  and  character.  A 
modern  defender  of  free-will  would  be  likely  to  say  that  the  question 
is  as  to  the  relation  of  motive,  circumstances  and  character  to  will  and 
choice  and  to  maintain  that  the  former,  so  far  from  being  external  forces 
which  determine  the  will,  are  elements  of  it,  that  choice  is  deter- 
mined, to  be  sure,  but  self-determined,  and  that  self-determination,  as 
opposed  to  the  mere  capacity  of  transmitting  foreign  energy,  consti- 
tutes a  freedom  whose  forms  are  so  various  as  are  the  forms  of  life. 
The  analytic  method  of  Herr  Michaelis  leads  him  to  overlook  the  pos- 
sibility that  self-determination  may  be  a  valid  category  and  hence, 
though  explicitly  recognizing  the  difference,  to  really  think  of  psychi- 
cal causality  after  the  analogy  of  physical.  When,  therefore,  he  him- 
self substitutes  a  conception  of  freedom  for  the  older  conception,  it  is 
not  that  of  self -determination  which  he  gives,  but  '  will  consciously  di- 


92  GENETIC. 

rected  to  the  moral  ideal.'  In  proportion  as  the  dependence  of  the  in- 
dividual is  insisted  on,  the  function  of  society  is  exalted.  By  nature 
the  individual  is  unfree.  Nor  can  he  free  himself.  His  freedom, 
i.  e.,  his  good  moral  disposition,  which  Luther  and  Augustine  believed 
possible  only  through  divine  grace,  must  come  to  him  from  society. 
The  great  function  of  society  is  to  educate  its  citizens  for  moral  free- 
dom, and  to  this  end  belongs,  among  other  things,  the  education  of  the 
criminal  and  a  social-economic  condition  free  from  incitements  to 
envy.  H.  N.  GARDINER. 

SMITH   COLLEGE. 

GENETIC. 

Psychic  Development  of  Young  Animals  and  its  Physical  Corre- 
lation. WESLEY  MILLS.  Parts  I.  to  VI.  From  the  Transac- 
tions of  the  Royal  Society  of  Canada.  Doric  &  Son,  Ottawa, 
1894-5. 

These  papers  by  Professor  Mills  consist  of  a  series  of  diaries  of 
the  earliest  psychic  life  of  dogs,  cats,  rabbits,  guinea-pigs,  pigeons 
and  domestic  fowls,  followed  by  some  comments.  To  determine 
whether  a  reaction  is  conscious  or  reflex,  and  if  conscious,  what  kind 
of  consciousness,  is,  of  course,  more  difficult  with  very  young  ani- 
mals than  with  mature  ones.  Professor  Mills  often  seems  duly  im- 
pressed with  the  difficulties  of  his  task,  as  when  (p.  55)  he  speaks  of 
apparent  anger  in  a  pup  of  17  days  old  as  possibly  merely  a  reflex. 
However,  he  is  inclined  (p.  53)  to  believe  that  a  pup  of  26  days  has 
a  '  sense  of  fun  or  humor.'  Yet  I  think  it  must  require  a  vast  deal 
of  very  thorough  evidence  to  lead  us  to  believe  that  so  young  a  pup 
'  makes  believe '  in  biting  play,  and  thus  distinguishes  between  real  and 
unreal,  and  so  becomes  an  actor  and  makes  a  fiction  which  is  enjoyed  as 
such.  So,  also  the  kitten  20  days  old,  which  hisses  when  called 
'  puss,'  'puss,'  expresses  probably  fear  rather  than  '  surprise,'  as  Pro- 
fessor Mills  interprets. 

Some  suggestive  remarks  are  made  on  the  tail-wagging  and  bark- 
ing of  the  dog  (pp.  54,  224).  But  Professor  Mills  surely  goes  too 
far  in  saying  that  tail-waggings  are  to  the  dog  what  '  words  are  to 
mankind.'  Whether  the  tail  is  primarily  or  only  secondarily  an  in- 
strument of  expression,  and  whether  it  is  purposely  used,  as  the 
voice  seems  to  be,  for  expression,  and  how  far,  these  are  questions 
which  can  only  be  settled  by  very  thorough  observation  upon  the 
dingo  or  wild  dog  and  upon  higher  breeds.  Professor  Mills  notes 
that  growling  precedes  barking  and  that  both  first  occur  in  sleep.  An 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  93 

observation  recorded  (p.  213)  suggests  that  the  bark  and  growl  may 
be  differentiated  from  some  middle  tone ;  but  the  subject  needs  to  be 
studied  with  all  dogs  from  the  dingo  up  to  come  to  any  certain  result. 

Professor  Mills  grants  the  cat  more  docility  and  gratitude  than  is 
often  allowed.  He  is  much  impressed  by  its  relatively  long  period  of 
psychic  immaturity — more  than  twice  that  of  the  dog — and  also  by  its 
superior  persistency,  even  when  very  young.  This  quality,  I  think, 
is  hereditary,  and,  being  implied  in  all  lying-in-wait  and  stalking  in 
the  feral  form,  naturally  appears  very  early  in  the  domesticated  cat. 
Professor  Mill's  observations  of  the  chick  practically  agree  with  Pro- 
fessor Lloyd  Morgan's.  If  there  is  any  thing  new  it  is  with  reference 
to  the  sense  of  support.  That  most  new-born  land  animals — the 
prairie  dog  is  a  notable  exception — evidence  a  strong  reaction  on  being 
brought  to  the  edge  of  a  table  is,  indeed,  a  marked  fact,  but  just  how 
far  it  is  reflex,  and  how  far  a  real  consciousness  as  '  sense  of  support,' 
is  very  difficult  to  make  out.  Professor  Mills  shows  clearly  that 
length  of  infancy  does  not  of  itself  point  to  higher  development. 
Thus,  though  the  rabbit  takes  three  times  as  long  in  coming  to  matu- 
rity as  the  cavy,  yet  both  are  then  '  about  on  the  same  mental  plane.' 

While  Professor  Mills'  observations  are  necessarily  somewhat  iso- 
lated and  meager,  they  appear  unbiased,  and  are  of  interest  and 
value  as  a  step  in  the  right  direction.  Complete  and  exact  observations 
can  only  be  made  by  those  who  can  give  up  their  whole  time  to  mak- 
ing a  full  record,  day  and  night  for  the  whole  period,  and  who  are 
thoroughly  conversant  with  the  species  studied.  A  thorough  method 
would  doubtless  lead  to  the  discovery  of  some  temporary  and  recapitu- 
latory phases  of  great  historical  import  for  mental  embryology. 

HIRAM  M.  STANLEY. 
LAKE  FOREST,  ILL. 


VISION. 

/.  Action  de  la  lumiere  sur  la  retine.  ED  PERGENS.  Annales  de 
la  Soc.  Roy.  des  Sci.  M6d.  et  Nat.  de  Bruxelles.  V.  (3).  Pp. 
33>  1896. 

2.   Zur  Theorie  der  Farbenblindheit.     A.  FICK.    Pfliiger's  Archiv, 


Absorbtion  und  Zersetzung  des  Sekpurpurs  bei  den  Wirbeltiren. 
ELSE  KOTTGEN  und  GEORG  ABELSDORFF.  Ztsch.  fur  Psych. 
und  Phys.  der  Sinnesorgane,  VII.,  161-184. 


94  VISION. 

4.  Vergleichende  Untersuchungen  iiber  Raum,- Licht-  und  Farben- 
sinn  in  Centrum  und  Peripherie  der  Netzhaut.  DR.  GUILLERY. 
Ztsch.  fur  Psych,  und  Phys.  der  Sinnesorgane,  XII.,  243-275. 
That  the  cones  of  the  retina  are  much  shortened  under  the  influ- 
ence of  light  was  first  discovered  by  Van  Genderen-Stort  in  1887. 
Pergens  here  confirms  the  observation,  having  made  use  of  the  latest 
methods  of  staining  and  preservation.  The  animal  experimented  upon 
was  a  fish  (Leuciscus  rutilis),  and  great  pains  were  taken  to  secure 
conditions  absolutely  alike  for  different  individuals  as  regards  every- 
thing except  exposure  to  light.  After  numerous  experiments  it  was 
found  that  the  best  results  were  obtained  by  the  rapid  method  of  Golgi ; 
sometimes  the  retina  was  colored  during  life  by  mixing  methy line  blue 
or  the  Biondi  mixture  with  the  water  in  which  the  fishes  swam.  The 
amount  by  which  the  retina  is  shortened  under  the  influence  of  light 
was  found  to  be  from  170/4  to  220  p;  this  was  almost  wholly  due  to  a 
change  in  the  length  of  the  cones.  There  was  also  found  to  be  a  dim- 
inution in  the  amount  of  chromatine  in  most  of  the  layers  of  the 
retina,  and  especially  in  the  external  granular  layer ;  the  author  con- 
siders that  this  layer  constitutes  a  reserve  of  protoplasm  and  nuclein 
in  direct  relation  with  the  functioning  of  the  rods  and  cones.  The 
forward  movement  of  the  pigment  follows  upon  the  contraction  of  the 
cones,  and  takes  place  very  much  more  slowly  than  that. 

2.  Professor  Fick  here  produces  his  'theory'  of    color-blindness. 
He  represents  normal  color- vision  by  three  curves  indicating  the  ex- 
citability of  the  three  kinds  of  color  substance  in  the  different  portions 
of  the  spctrum,  and  considers  that,   in  the  different  species  of    color 
blindness,  one  or  another  pair  of  these  curves  become  co-incident.  He 
gives  curves  of  different  shape  from  those  usually  chosen,  and  finds 
some  vague   reasons  for  preferring  them ;  he  is  apparently  unaware 
that  Konig's  curves  have  been  so  chosen,  that  they^V  both  in  the  nor- 
mal eye  and   that  which    is   color-blind.       It  is,  since    Konig's    im- 
mensely laborious  measurements,   no  longer  a   theory  that  the  sen- 
sations of  the   color-blind    can  be  represented  by  a  curve  which  is 
the  union  of  two  curves  of  normal  vision — it  is  plain  matter  of  fact ; 
instead  of  being  vague  speculation  it  is  a  deduction  from  observations 
of  the  utmost  refinement,  provided  the  curves  are  those  adopted  by 
Konig — that  is  to  say,  provided  the  fundamental  colors  are  the  same 
as  those  chosen  by  him  with  special  reference  to  their  serving  the  color 
equations  of  both  normal  and  abnormal  vision. 

3.  The  authors  here  describe,  with  more  detail  regarding  methods, 
than  in  the  brief  paper  presented  to  the  Berlin  Academy  of  Sciences, 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  95 

the  examination  which  they  have  made  of  the  visual  purple  of  a  num- 
ber of  different  vertebrates,  namely,  thirteen  mammals,  three  birds, 
eight  amphibians  and  twenty-seven  fishes.  They  find,  as  we  have 
before  noted,  that  there  are  two  distinct  kinds  of  visual  purple,  with 
no  intermediate  stages,  one  which  has  a  faint  purplish  tinge  and  is 
found  in  all  fishes,  and  another  which  is  not  purple  at  all,  but  red, 
and  which  is  found  in  all  other  mammals.  They  also  announce  the 
remarkable  fact  that  in  all  the  lower  animals  the  visual  purple  fades 
out  without  going  through  an  intermediate  stage  of  yellow,  or  that 
man  is  the  only  animal  in  whom  the  visual  yellow  occurs  at  all. 

4.  The  writer  of  this  paper  is  concerned  to  show  that  the  several 
functions  of  the  retina  do  not  all  decrease  with  like  rapidity  in  passing 
from  the  fovea  to  the  periphery,  and  hence  that  it  is  necessary  to  at- 
tribute them  to  different  elements,  either  anatomical  or  chemical.  He 
determines  with  this  intention  the  rate  of  diminution  of  the  space- 
sense,  the  light-sense,  and  the  color-sense. 

By  space-sense  one  ought  to  mean,  in  the  most  elementary  analysis, 
the  feeling  of  the  wkere-ness  of  a  given  sensation  of  brightness-differ- 
ence, just  as  the  sense  of  locality  on  the  skin  is  the  sense  of  the  po- 
sition in  space  of  a  temperature-sensation,  or  some  other  skin-sensa- 
tion ;  it  does  not  exist  as  a  sensation  in  the  abstract,  but  merely  as 
a  quale  of  another  sensation.  But  Dr.  Guillery  maintains  that  the 
simple  perception  of  a  black  point  on  a  white  surface,  without 
reference  to  its  place,  is  an  exercise  of  the  space-sense,  and  he  gives 
a  long  and  very  ineffective  argument  to  support  this  claim.  He  pro- 
ceeds to  determine  the  physiological  point  (the  size  of  the  just  dis- 
cernible retinal  image)  for  different  distances  from  the  fovea,  and 
then  the  size  of  the  image  cast  by  two  points  of  different  bright- 
ness when  they  differ  so  much  as  to  be  just  perceptibly  different 
if  their  image  falls  upon  a  single  cone  of  the  fovea.  He  finds 
that  these  two  functions  diminish  part  passu  in  proceeding  from 
the  fovea  the  ratio  for  corresponding  points  of  the  retina  is — that 
nearly  constant,  which  does  nothing  to  confirm  his  theory  that  they 
are  not  one  and  the  same  function.  The  color-sense  is  naturally  a 
sense  which  diminishes  with  a  different  rapidity  from  either  of  the 
other  two ;  but  here  the  writer's  observations  would  be  of  greater  in- 
terest if  state  of  adaptation  of  the  eye  had  been  attended  to ;  there  is 
no  indication  of  his  knowing  the  importance  of  that  condition.  His 
conclusion,  in  passing,  that  the  sense  for  blue  and  yellow  (and  the 
sense  for  red  and  green)  fade  out  together,  respectively,  is  as  nugatory 
as  all  the  other  proofs  of  this  supposed  fact;  the  most  that  can  be  de- 


96  VISION. 

termined  is  that  a  blue  and  a  yellow,  etc.,  can  be  found  such  that 
they  fade  out  at  approximately  equal  distances,  but  no  effort  is  made 
to  show  that  the  colored  papers  that  happened  to  be  chosen  were  in 
any  sense  of  equal  value  for  sensation  at  the  fovea.  Of  the  '  nor- 
mal' colors  prepared  by  Hegg,  for  instance,  the.  red  and  the  yellow 
would  not  strike  the  plain  man  as  at  all  deserving  of  the  name.  The 
writer  is  quite  unaware  of  the  significance  of  the  recently  discussed 
functions  of  the  visual  purple.  CHRISTINE  LADD  FRANKLIN. 

BALTIMORE. 

Das  Einfachsehen  und  seine  Analogien.  SIGMUND  REICHARD. 
Ztschr.  f.  Psych,  u.  Physiol.  d.  Sinnesorg.  XI.,  286-290.  1896. 
This  article  merely  points  out  that  the  phenomenon  of  single  vis- 
ion with  identical  points  of  the  two  retinae  has  analogies  in  the  phe- 
nomena of  single  hearing  with  corresponding  nerve-endings  in  the  two 
organs  of  Corti,  of  single  smelling  with  two  organs,  and  of  single 
contact-sensation  when  two  points  are  stimulated  which  lie  within 
a  single  *  sensory-circle ;'  and  attempts  briefly  to  devise  a  theory  of  the 
anatomical  development  of  the  retinae  such  as  would  increase  the 
analogy  of  the  visual  with  the  tactile  phenomenon. 

Ueber geometrisch-optische  Tauschungen.  ARMAND  THIERY.  Philos. 
Studien,  XI.,  307-370;  603-620;  XII.,  67-126.  1895. 

This  is  a  thorough  and  important  contribution  to  the  study  of  geo- 
metrical optical  illusions  in  general.  It  discusses  all  the  various  kinds, 
gives  the  results  of  careful  measurements  of  many  of  them  under  va- 
rious conditions,  outlines  and  criticises  the  different  theories  that  have 
been  advanced  to  account  for  them,  and  attempts  to  establish  the  view 
that  all  of  them — whether  illusions  of  direction,  of  size  or  of  curva- 
ture— are  due  to  the  conscious  or  unconscious  influence  of  a  perspec- 
tive interpretation  of  the  figures.  The  following  remarks  by  Prof. 
Wundt  are  appended  to  this  article : 

"  I  recognize  the  great  importance  of  perspective  projection  for 
these  phenomena,  but  cannot  wholly  agree  in  regarding  the  perspec- 
tive idea  as  the  primary  cause  of  the  illusions.  I  believe  rather  that 
as  a  rule  the  perspective  idea  itself  is  to  be  regarded  as  the  effect  of 
other  primary  elements,  especially  of  position  and  movement  of  the 
eyes,  and  it  seems  to  me  that  the  proof  of  this  thesis  is  itself  to  be 
found  to  a  large  degree  in  the  observations  above  recorded.  I  intend 
shortly  to  return  to  this  subject  in  a  special  article  in  these  Studien." 

Further  analysis  of  Thiery's  views  will  be  delayed  until  after  the 
appearance  of  Wundt's  article.  E.  B.  DELABARRE. 

BROWN  UNIVERSITY. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  97 

FEELING. 

Rechcrches  cxperimcntales  sur  la  Joic  et  la  Tristesse.  G.  DUMAS. 
Rev.  philosophique,  June,  July,  August,  1896. 

In  spite  of  the  works  of  Darwin,  Spencer,  Wundt,  Mantegazza, 
and  many  others  on  the  emotions,  we  have,  as  yet,  no  adequate  ex- 
perimental researches  on  the  question.  With  this  lack  in  mind  we 
turn  to  this  work  of  G.  Dumas,  who  proposes  to  study  joy  and  sadness  in 
the  insane,  from  the  physiological  point  of  view,  by  registering  the 
capillary  circulation,  arterial  tension,  heart-beat  and  respiration. 

In  his  three  rather  long  articles  the  author  gives  us  his  results.  To 
understand  them  thoroughly  we  must  recall  two  laws  established  by 
the  physiologist  Marey,  to  which  Dumas  continually  returns  for  the 
interpretation  of  physiological  phenomena :  i .  Vaso-motor  constric- 
tion, i.  e.,  the  contraction  of  the  arteries  under  the  influence  of  the 
excitation  of  a  vaso-motor  nerve  of  constricture,  produces  an  increase 
of  tension  in  the  blood-pressure  and  a  slowing  in  the  heart-beat,  while 
dilatation  of  the  arteries,  under  the  influence  of  the  vaso-motor 
nerves  of  dilatation,  produces  the  opposite  effect.  2.  Increase  of  the 
action  of  the  heart  produces  increase  of  tension ;  and  the  reverse. 

The  author  distinguishes  six  different  affective  types,  i.  Joy  with 
hypertension;  in  general  paralytics,  the  heart-beat  is  accelerated,  res- 
piration likewise,  the  tension  is  feeble,  the  arteries  are  in  a  state  of 
dilatation.  The  author  holds  that  the  joy  is  produced  by  the  dilata- 
tion of  the  arteries ;  this  indeed,  according  to  the  law  of  Marey  ex- 
plains the  rapidity  of  the  heart-beat  and  the  diminution  of  tension. 

2.  Joy  with  hypertension;  in  different  sorts  of  insane  patients  who 
are  very  excitable  :  accelerated  heart-beat  and  respiration,  the  tension 
strong,  the  arteries  constricted  or  dilated.     The  author  holds  that  in 
these  cases  the  cause  of  the  changes  of  circulation  is  central,  in  the 
brain,  which  excites  the  heart,  and  the  heart  increases  the  tension. 
The  constriction  of  the  arteries  is  an  insignificant  phenomenon. 

3.  Sadness  with  hypertension;  heart  and  respiration  are  slowed, 
tension  strong,  with  constriction.     In  this  case  it  is  the  constriction  of 
the  arteries  which  dominates  everything ;  it  produces  the  strong  tension 
and  slows  the  heart. 

4.  Sadness  with  hypotension;  phenomena  as  in  type  three,  ex- 
cept that  the  tension  is  feeble.     Here  we  must  hold  that  the  constric- 
tion of  the  arteries  does  not  increase  the  tension,  since  the  heart  is  too 
feeble. 

5.  Sadness  with   hypotension,    and  acceleration   of  the  heart. 


98  FEELING. 

This  occurs  in  the  active  sadness  of  melancholies :  constriction,  accel- 
eration of  the  heart  with  hypotension.  These  symptoms  seem  para- 
doxical, since  in  spite  of  the  union  of  causes  which  tend  to  increase 
the  tension,  it  remains  feeble.  The  author  supposes  that  the  heart  is 
not  excited,  although  it  appears  to  be  so,  and  that  it  empties  itself  in- 
completely. 

6.  Moral  pain,  hypertension,  acceleration  of  the  heart,  vaso- 
constriction.  These  are  almost  the  same  symptoms  as  those  of  joy 
of  the  second  type,  except  that  the  respiration  is  more  irregular  in  this 
case. 

This  brief  account  will  show  that  M.  Dumas'  story  is  systematic ; 
but  when  we  look  at  these  types  we  see  that  some  of  them  are  arti- 
ficially explained,  as  the  second,  fourth  and  fifth. 

I  may  take  advantage  of  this  occasion  to  point  out  a  physiological 
error  made  by  M.  Dumas  and  all  his  predecessors,  even  Lange  him- 
self, whose  theories  the  author  criticizes.  It  is  well  known  that 
Lange,  employing  a  very  simple  formula,  held  that  sadness  is  con- 
nected with  a  condition  of  arterial  vaso-constriction,  and  joy  with 
dilation.  It  is  likely  that  Lange  was  led  by  theory  on  this  point :  the 
theory  that  in  sadness  the  vessels  ought  to  contract  because,  in  this 
case,  blood  would  be  drawn  from  the  tissues,  the  temperature  would 
be  lowered  with  lack  of  blood,  paling  of  tissues,  etc. ;  and  on  the  con- 
trary, with  vaso-dilation,  in  joy,  the  blood  circulates  more  freely,  the 
temperature  rises,  the  skin  colors  up,  vitality  is  augmented.  But 
these  theoretical  views  do  not  seem  adequate,  and  it  seems  that  the 
most  favorable  condition  to  circulation  is  neither  dilation  nor  contrac- 
tion of  the  arteries,  but  a  state  intermediate  between  these  extremes. 
Yet  I  do  not  now  insist  on  this  point,  expecting  to  return  to  it  on 
another  occasion. 

The  error  which  I  wish  to  point  out  consists  in  attributing  to  vaso- 
constriction  the  loss  of  blood  in  the  hand,  coldness  in  the  extremities, 
and  discoloration  of  the  skin.  They  are  independent  phenomena, 
which  may  exist  with  constriction  or  not.  In  order  to  distinguish,  it 
is  necessary  to  study  the  form  of  the  capillary  pulse.  If  we  take  an 
example  of  true  vaso-constriction,  such  as  is  produced  by  the  sudden 
stroke  of  a  bell  or  by  strong  inspiration,  we  find  that  this  constriction 
shows  itself  clearly  in  the  form  of  the  pulse-curve  ;  the  tracing  de- 
scends, the  curve  takes  on  a  smaller  size,  and  its  decrotism  is  less.  If 
at  the  same  time  we  study  the  arterial  pulse  we  find  that  it  changes 
its  form  in  consequence  of  the  effect  of  the  constriction  of  the  arteries 
upon  the  flow  of  the  blood ;  the  curve  rises,  and  its  decrotism  dimin- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  99 

ishes.  The  effect  is  analogous  to  that  which  follows  pressure  on  the 
artery  under  the  sphygmograph.  These  are  the  signs  of  vaso-con- 
striction,  which  is  above  all  an  active  phenomenon. 

Now,  in  many  circumstances,  for  example  in  the  fatigue  produced 
by  a  day  of  uninterrupted  intellectual  work,  we  find  the  occurrence  of 
coldness,  lowering  of  temperature  and  discoloration  of  the  tissues. 
The  pulse  is  faint  and  difficult  to  take.  If  the  phenomenon  is  very 
accentuated  we  get  only  a  linear  tracing,  with  no  sign  of  pulse ;  the 
respiration  is  slow,  the  heart-beat  less  than  usual.  Does  this  indicate 
vaso-constriction  ?  Is  there  in  this  case  an  active  constriction  of  the 
arteries?  If  so  it  would  seem  very  extraordinary — such  activity  of 
the  vaso-motors  in  the  midst  of  the  general  lowering  of  the  organic 
vitality.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  form  of  the  capillary  pulse,  when 
it  can  be  registered,  gives  quite  a  different  indication.  We  find  a 
feeble  pulse,  lessened  decrotism  very  high  up  on  the  line  of  oblique 
ascension ;  in  a  word,  a  pulse  indicating  weakness,  lack  of  blood  and 
slow  circulation. 

It  is  not  astonishing  that  authors  heretofore  who  have  described  the 
physiological  effects  of  emotion  have  confused  these  two  very  differ- 
ent conditions  of  the  capillary  circulation.  The  confusion  is  almost 
inevitable  if  the  form  of  the  pulse  is  not  registered.  Moreover,  this 
slow  pulse  is  very  difficult  to  register  without  special  tambours  and 
adjustible  membranes  of  the  kind  which  we  use  in  the  laboratory  of 
the  Sorbonne. 

In  conclusion,  I  am  able  to  formulate  the  following  practical 
rule :  When  the  extremities  are  cold,  discolored,  we  can  not  con- 
clude to  vaso-motor  constriction  without  study  of  the  force  of  the 
capillary  pulse,  and  if  it  is  impossible  to  register  this  pulse  we  cannot 
conclude  from  this  impossibility  to  the  presence  of  constriction. 

As  far  as  I  can  judge  from  my  own  experiments,  M.  Dumas  deals 
sometimes  with  slow  circulation,  and  more  rarely  with  true  constric- 
tion. Consequently,  as  he  does  not  take  account  of  this  source  of 
error,  all  the  effective  types  which  he  distinguishes  must  be  revised. 
There  remains  from  this  work  the  general  conclusion,  which  is  very 
interesting,  that  in  joy  there  is  an  acceleration  of  the  heart  action,  and  of 
respiration,  while  in  sadness  these  two  functions  are  made  slower; 
but  that  in  active  sadness,  sharp  suffering,  the  symptoms  are  almost 
the  same  as  in  joy.  This  certainly  does  not  lead  to  a  theory  of  emotion, 
but  it  is  a  useful  contribution  to  the  study  of  the  question. 

A.  BlNET. 
PARIS. 


100  FEELING. 

Zur  Lehre  vom  Einfluss  der  Gefilhle  auf  die  Vorstellungen  und 
ihren   Verlauf.     GUSTAV  STORKING.     Phil.  Studien,  xii.,  Heft 

4,  PP-  475-524- 

Dr.  Storring  devotes  the  greater  portion  of  his  paper  to  a  philo- 
sophical and  introspective  study  of  his  question.  The  first  part  is  given 
to  showing  that  feelings  affect  ideas  through  attention.  Like  Ribot, 
he  believes  that  feelings  determine  the  fixation  of  an  object  in  con- 
sciousness, and  are  the  basis  of  attention.  This  holds  both  in  normal 
and  in  abnormal  mental  life.  The  second  part  of  the  article  treats  of  the 
influence  of  feelings  on  association  and  reproduction ;  an  idea  with  a 
strong  feeling-tone  is  more  suggestive,  and  has,  in  turn,  greater  sug- 
gestibility. Similar  organic  sensations  may  associate  two  ideas  in 
consciousness. 

Storring  describes,  also,  an  experimental  research  into  the  in- 
fluence of  feelings  on  the  voluntary  muscles.  After  mentioning 
F6r6's  similar  work,  he  reviews  the  experiments  of  Miinsterberg,  which 
showed  that  under  the  influence  of  pleasure  {Lust}  outward  move- 
ments were  made  too  large,  inward  ones  too  small,  and,  conversely, 
under  the  influence  of  displeasure  (  Unlusf)  outward  movements  were 
made  too  small,  inward  ones  too  large.  Starring  constructed  an  ap- 
paratus with  which  the  fore-arm  swung  freely  in  a  horizontal  plane, 
the  elbow  resting  in  a  cup.  The  hand  carried  with  it  a  thin  board  on 
which  there  was  an  index  moving  over  a  graduated  scale.  This  scale 
was  arranged  in  an  arc,  with  the  elbow-cup  as  a  center.  Readings  could 
be  taken  from  the  scale,  or  the  apparatus  could  be  made  self-recording. 

The  subject  was  drilled,  with  closed  eyes,  in  first  moving  his  hand 
through  an  arc  of  10  cm.,  it  being  stopped  by  a  peg  at  the  end; 
and  then  in  repeating  the  movement,  as  accurately  as  possible,  the  peg 
having  meanwhile  been  removed.  This  imitation-movement  was 
found  to  have  a  positive  constant  error,  but  comparatively  small. 
When,  however,  a  pleasant  or  displeasing  feeling-tone  was  created  by 
placing  in  the  subject's  mouth  raspberry  juice  or  a  solution  of  salt,  the 
constant  error,  positive  or  negative,  became  quite  large.  Storring 
found,  in  the  case  of  a  pleasant  feeling-tone,  a  positive  constant  error 
for  flection  of  the  arm ;  in  the  case  of  a  displeasing  feeling-tone,  a 
negative  constant  error  for  flection,  and  a  positive  one  for  extension. 
These  results  are  directly  contrary  to  Miinsterberg's.  Storring  seems 
less  interested  in  a  pleasant  feeling-tone  than  in  one  that  is  displeas- 
ing, not  giving  any  results  of  arm-extension  in  the  former  case.  The 
work  appears  to  have  been  carefully  done  throughout ;  but  there  seems 
to  have  been  only  one  person  tested.  LEONARD  B.  McWHOOD. 

COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  IO1 

PATHOLOGICAL. 

/  .<•  Mot  dcs  Mourants:    nouveaux   Faits.    V.  EGGER.     Revue  Phi - 

losophique,  XLII.,  337-368,  October,  1896. 

In  reply  to  Dr.  Sollier's  criticism  of  the  title  under  which  M. 
Egger  introduced  the  discussion  of  this  subject  (see  this  REVIEW,  III., 
236  and  454),  the  latter  explains  that  the  terms  used  were  not  medical 
but  psychological ;  the  '  mourant'  is  one  who  is  such  for  himself,  z.  e., 
who  believes  himself  to  be  dying,  and  as  to  the  '  moi,'  it  does  not,  he 
says,  exist  unless  such  an  one,  "already  prepared  by  previous  reflec- 
tions on  himself  and  in  full  possession  of  his  faculties,  resume  his  past 
either  by  a  rapid  series  of  recollections  or  by  spoken  or  written  for- 
mulas." He  further  explains  that  his  object  in  studying  the  mental 
states  of  the  dying  was  to  confirm  his  theory  of  the  ego — the  ego  is 
'the  total  recollection,'  'the  consciousness  of  the  pastas  such,' etc. 
Hence  his  explanation  of  the  vivid  resurgence  of  memory-images  in 
accident  cases  as  a  special  illustration  of  the  'moi  vif '  analogous  to 
the  expressive  utterances,  of  which  he  gives  many  examples,  in  which 
those  about  to  die  sometimes  appear  to  sum  up  a  whole  life  and  char- 
acter. In  other  words,  the  cause  of  the  reaction  is  held  to  be  logical, 
not  pathological.  M.  Egger,  therefore,  while  accepting  Dr.  Sollier's 
explanation  of  the  beatitude  commonly  felt  at  a  certain  stage  of  the 
crisis,  namely,  that  it  is  the  direct  consequence  of  the  bodily  insensi- 
bility, refuses  to  admit  Dr.  Sollier's  further  hypothesis,  that  the  phan- 
tasmagoria of  memory-images  is  an  indirect  consequence  of  this  same 
bodily  condition.  He  claims,  in  opposition,  anesthesia  without  hyper- 
mnesia,  and,  again,  hypermnesia  without  anaesthesia.  The  last,  how- 
ever, he  does  not  establish,  at  least  for  the  accident  cases,  and  the  cases 
cited  of  conscious  reflection  on  the  past  and  reflective  anticipations  of 
the  impending  future  on  the  part  of  dying  persons  in  full  possession  of 
their  faculties  would  seem  to  belong  to  a  different  class  from  that  of 
the  vivid  panoramic  vision  in  certain  cases  which  Sollier's  hypothesis 
sought  to  account  for.  On  any  theory,  there  must,  of  course,  be  some 
sort  of  an  organized  past  to  recur  to ;  M.  Egger's  theory  requires  it  to 
be  that  of  a  civilized  adult.  Hence  cases  like  that  of  Charles  Darwin, 
who,  when  a  schoolboy  at  Shrewsbury,  experienced,  during  a  fall  of 
some  seven  or  eight  feet,  such  an  extraordinarily  rapid  succession  of 
ideas  as  seemed,  he  says,  to  contradict  the  assertion  of  the  physiolo- 
gists, that  each  thought  requires  an  appreciable  amount  of  time — cases 
like  these  fall  outside  of  the  theory.  Darwin,  to  be  sure,  does  not 
directly  tell  us  that  his  ideas  were  memories.  But  in  one  of  the  new 


1 02  PA  THOL  O  GICAL. 

cases  here  reported  we  find  a  person  three  times  in  his  life  in  mortal 
danger,  and  surveying  with  extreme  rapidity  his  past  in  the  first  ex- 
perience when  less  than  ten  years  old,  and  in  the  first  only.  How 
does  M.  Egger  explain  this  ?  He  explains  it  by  reference  to  a  '  moi 
pr£coce'  and  distinguishes  between  the  '  moi  encombrant'  of  school- 
boys and  '  what  the  psychologist  calls  a  mot.'  There  is  no  doubt  a 
place  for  the  distinction ;  only  in  this  connection,  while  it  suggests  the 
sort  of  self  reacting,  does  it  succeed  in  removing  the  form  of  the  re- 
action itself,  the  hypermnesia,  from  the  need  of  a  mechanical  explana- 
tion or  in  disconnecting  it  from  cases  like  that  of  Darwin  above,  and 
its  suggested  pathological  associates?  We  think  not. 

H.  N.  GARDINER. 
SMITH  COLLEGE. 

Periodische  Depressionszustande  und  ihre  Pathogenesis  auf  dem 
Boden  der  harnsauren  Diathese.  C.  LANGE.  Tr.  into  Ger- 
man from  second  edition  by  HANS  KURELLA.  Leopold  Voss, 
Hamburg  and  Leipzig,  Publisher.  1896.  Pp.  52,  including 
Appendix. 

This  paper  was  first  read  before  the  Medical  Association  of  Copen- 
hagen, in  1886.  The  second  edition  (1895)  has  an  appendix  of  13 
pages. 

The  author  singles  out  of  the  classes  of  diseases  known  as  Neuras- 
thenia and  Melancholia  a  very  frequent  affection  which  he  calls 
'periodic  depression.'  Although  in  some  respects  like  the  first  stage 
of  Melancholia,  with  which  it  is  erroneously  identified,  it  differentiates 
itself  from  it  in  that  (i)  the  patients  have  neither  fixed  ideas  nor 
hallucinations ;  they  never  ascribe  their  suffering  to  external  agents ; 
(2)  the  periodicity  is  a  constant  feature,  while  in  Melancholia  it  is 
rare ;  (3)  not  one  of  the  many  hundred  cases  studied  by  the  author 
went  further  than  the  supposed  first  stage. 

The  most  characteristic  feature  of  the  disease  in  an  alternation  of 
periods  of  depression  with  periods  of  usual  moral  tone.  The  period- 
icity varies  greatly.  Generally,  the  shorter  the  depression  periods  the 
more  regular  is  their  reappearance ;  in  some  cases  the  movements  of 
the  disease  are  so  regular  that  the  day  of  their  coming  can  be  safely 
predicted.  In  more  than  half  the  cases  that  came  to  his  notice  it  is 
between  the  ages  of  25  and  35  that  the  disease  made  its  appearance. 
It  does  not  show  any  preference  for  any  particular  class  of  people,  but 
"it  is  almost  powerless  with  individuals  without  hereditary  taint."  In 
almost  every  case  the  author  discovered  a  bad  heredity. 


NEW  BOOKS.  103 

The  symptoms  are  those  of  nervous  depression :  dullness,  sleepi- 
ness (not  incompatible  with  disturbed  sleep),  apathy,  inertia.  The 
patient  can  hardly  set  to  work,  but  when  he  has  once  begun  he  may 
experience  almost  as  much  difficulty  in  stopping.  Yet  there  is  no  ap- 
pearance of  reduced  efficiency.  He  is  joyless,  affectionless ;  the  ex- 
pression sometimes  used  by  him,  '  geistige  (Steifheit  oder  Versteine- 
rung,'  mental  rigor,  describes  well  his  condition.  Sometimes  anguish 
is  added  to  the  ordinary  blank  depression.  The  physiological  symp- 
toms have  less  significance.  There  is  a  general  expression  of  fatigue 
and  of  sorrow.  The  patient  looses  flesh,  and  this  loss  is  made  more 
apparent  by  the  flaccidity  of  the  muscles.  The  digestive  organs  are 
somewhat  sluggish.  Menstruation  seems  neither  to  influence  the  di- 
sease nor  to  be  influenced  by  it. 

Concerning  the  pathogeny  of  periodic  depression,  the  author  found 
in  every  case,  as  well  during  as  between  the  depression  periods,  a 
strongly  marked  tendency  to  the  formation  of  an  abnormal  quantity  of 
uric  acid  sediment.  According  to  the  theory  he  adopts,  the  uric  acid 
acts  directly  on  the  elements  of  the  nervous  system  to  which  it  is  car- 
ried by  the  blood. 

In  the  appendix,  Lange  answers  some  criticism  questioning  the 
sufficiency  of  the  non-quantitative  method  with  which  he  established 
the  pathogeny  of  the  disease.  He  also  points  to  some  signs  indicating 
that  at  last,  '  out  of  the  chaos  of  Neurasthenia,  Periodic  depression  is 
coming  to  light.' 

The  least  satisfactory  part  of  this  specification  of  a  new  type  of 
nervous  disease,  supported  by  observations  on  about  2,000  cases,  is  the 
one  concerning  the  symptomatic  importance  of  the  presence  of  an  ex- 
cess of  uric  acid  in  the  urine  of  the  patients  and  its  supposed  relation 
to  the  disease.  J.  H.  LEUBA. 

WORCESTER,  MASS. 


NEW  BOOKS. 

Abhandlungen  zur    Geschichte  der  Metaphysik,    Psychologic  und 

Religions  philosophic    in     Deutschland    seit    Leibnitz.       L. 

STRUMPELL.     Hefte,  I. -IV.     Leipzig,  Deichert.     1896. 
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B.  SAUNDERS.     London,  Sonnenschein ;  New  York,  Macmillan. 

1896.     Pp.  vi-fn6.     $.90. 


104  NEW  BOOKS. 

Genius  and  Degeneration.  W.  HIRSCH.  From  the  second  German 
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Quarto.  Pp.  30. 

Das  Princip  der  Entwickelung.  H.  DINGER.  Jena,  Kampfe. 
1896.  Pp.  v+75. 

Ezperimentelle  Studien  iiber  Associationen.  G.  ASCHAFFENBURG. 
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Uber  den  Einfluss  von  Arbeitspausen  auf  die  geistige  Leistungs- 
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Die  Willensfreiheit.     P.  Michaelis,  Leipzig.      1896.     Pp.  56. 

Paidologie  :  Entivurf  zu  einer  Wissenschaft  des  Kindes.  O. 
CHRISMAN.  Jena,  Vopelius.  1896.  Pp.  96. 

Abhandlungen  zur  Philosophic  und  ihrer  Geschichte.  Edited  by 
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The  Development  of  the  Doctrine  of  Personality  in  Modern  Phil- 
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relation. WESLEY  MILLS.  Parts  II.  to  VI.  Reprinted  from 
the  Trans.  Roy.  Soc.  of  Canada,  Second  Series,  1895-6,  Vol. 
I.,  Sec.  4.  Durie  &  Son,  Ottawa.  Pp.  191-252. 


WOTES.  105 

Periodische  Dcpressionszustdnde  und  ihre  Pathogenesis.  C.  LANGE. 

Translated  by  H.    KURBLLA.      Hamburg  and    Leipzig,  Voss. 

1896.     Pp.  55. 
Report  of  the  Commissioner  of  Education,  1893-4..    Vols.  I.  and  II. 

N.W.HARRIS.    Washington,  Government  Printing  Office.   1896. 
Kategorienlehre.      E.    v.    HARTMANN.      Bd.    X.    of    Ausgewahlte 

Werke.     Leipzig,  Haacke.     1896.     Pp.  xv  -f  556. 


NOTES. 

MR.  R.  P.  HALLECK  considers  the  review  of  his  book  in  the  last 
number  of  the  REVIEW  unfair  to  him.  The  reviewer,  Prof  essor  Kirk  - 
patrick,  sends  the  following  letter,  in  further  explanation  of  his  criti- 
cisms: "Inasmuch  as  Mr.  Halleck  thinks  my  review  of  his  'Psy- 
chology and  Psychic  Culture'  unfair  and  even  'brutal'  in  its  criticism 
of  his  error  in  regard  to  the  psychophysical  law,  I  wish  to  say  that  I 
do  not  believe  that  there  are  many  serious  errors  in  the  book,  for  that 
was  the  only  one  found  in  a  careful  reading  of  a  number  of  topics. 
That  one  was  of  such  a  nature,  however,  that  no  careful  reader  of 
modern  psychology  could  have  made  it,  hence  one  cannot  be  sure  that 
the  rest  of  the  book  is  reliable  without  a  careful  examination  of  every 
sentence.  I  may  also  emphasize  the  fact  that  the  author  has  succeeded 
in  his  aim  of  making  a  clear  and  interesting  text  book  in  which  many 
of  the  illustrations  are  peculiarly  apt,  and  that  he  is  to  be  criticised  for 
his  subordination  of  other  things  to  that  aim  rather  than  as  to  the  way 
in  which  he  has  carried  it  out." 


AN  EXPLANATION. 

Prof.  H.  C.  WARREN'S  appreciation  of  my  Outline  of  Psychology 
is  so  generous,  and  the  tone  of  his  criticism  so  uniformly  moderate, 
that  I  hesitate  to  offer  objection  to  any  of  his  statements.  Indeed,  for 
his  remarks  upon  the  scientific  aspects  of  my  work  I  cannot  but  be 
grateful.  As  regards  what  I  may  call  an  ethical  aspect  of  it,  however, 
he  is  so  unfair  to  what  was  at  any  rate  my  intention  that  reply  seems 
called  for.  He  says:  "  Careful  search  fails  to  reveal  a  single  refer- 
ence to  modern  psychological  literature  in  the  whole  book.  This  is 
certainly  a  most  singular  omission  and  is  much  to  be  regretted.  *  *  * 
(The  book)  takes  no  pains  to  direct  into  proper  channels  the  desire 


106  NOTES. 

for  further  reading  which  it  will  undoubtedly  provoke."  I  have  said  in 
my  preface  (p.  vi.)  :  "The  system  *  *  *  stands  *  *  *  in  the  closest 
relation  to  that  presented  in  the  more  advanced  treatises  of  the  German 
experimental  school,  Kulpe's  Outlines  of  Psychology  and  Wundt's 
Grundzuge  der  physiologischen  Psychologic.  While  I  have  tried 
to  make  the  present  work  complete  in  itself,  I  have  also  written  with 
the  view  of  producing  a  book  which  should  be  preparatory  to  these 
standard  psychologies."  I  have  thus  explicitly  directed  the  reader  to 
two  modern  hand-books  of  psychology,  in  both  of  which  he  will  find 
copious  literary  references.  E.  B.  TITCHENER. 

Prof.  TITCHENER'S  remarks  are  quite  true,  and  I  thank  him  for 
pointing  out  the  ambiguity  in  my  statement.  What  I  alluded  to  were 
page  references,  for  further  reading  on  special  topics ;  I  think  this 
evident  from  the  context.  My  criticism  here  was  intended  to  be  en- 
tirely practical,  not  ethical.  H.  C.  WARREN. 


DR.  G.  A.  TAWNEY,  Princeton,  has  been  appointed  to  the  chair 
in  philosophy  in  Beloit  College,  Wisconsin,  made  vacant  by  the  death 
of  Prof.  Blaisdell. 

THE  REVIEW  has  received  Prof.  C.  Stnmpf  s  diagrammatic  Tafeln 
zur  Geschichte  der  Philosophic.  They  will  be  found  helpful  in  the 
teaching  of  the  history  of  philosophy.  (Berlin,  Speyer  &  Peters, 
1896,  80  Pf.) 

SCHLEICHER  FRERES,  Paris,  announce  as  in  press  the  first  issue 
(for  1895)  of  an  Annee  Biologique  described  as  Comptes  Rendus 
annuels  des  Travaux  de  Biologic  generale,  directed  by  Prof.  Ires 
Delage,  of  the  Sorbonne. 

A  Philosophisches^Lexikon,  edited  by  Dr.  M.  Klein,  with  the  assist- 
ance of  a  number  of  writers,  principally  German,  is  announced  by  Reis- 
land  (Leipzig) .  It  is  to  be  issued  in  25  parts  (M.  2.40  each) .  We  note 
the  name  of  Prof.  M.  M.  Curtis,  of  Cleveland,  Ohio,  among  the  con- 
tributors. 

PROFESSOR  FLOURNOY,  of  Geneva,  has  published  a  Notice  sur  le 
Laboratoire  de  Psychologic  del'  University  de  Geneve,  on  occasion  of 
the  National  Swiss  Exposition.  It  contains  lists  of  apparatus  and 
publications,  and  interesting  remarks  on  experimental  psychology. 


VOL.  IV.     No.  2.  MARCH,  1897. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW. 


PROCEEDINGS  OF  THE  FIFTH  ANNUAL  MEETING 
OF  THE  AMERICAN  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSO- 
CIATION, BOSTON,  DECEMBER,  1896. 

REPORT  OF  THE  SECRETARY  AND  TREASURER  FOR  1896. 

The  fifth  annual  meeting  of  the  American  Psychological 
Association  was  held  in  Boston  and  Cambridge,  December  29 
and  30,  1896,  the  time  and  place  having  been  chosen  with 
reference  to  the  simultaneous  meetings  of  the  American  Society 
of  Naturalists  and  the  Affiliated  Societies.  There  were  forty-five 
members  in  attendance,  the  largest  number  since  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  Association.  Three  formal  sessions  were  held,  one 
on  the  morning  of  the  29th  at  the  Harvard  Medical  School  in 
Boston,  and  two  sessions  on  the  3Oth  at  the  Peabody  Museum  of 
Archaeology  in  Cambridge.  The  morning  session  of  the  soth 
was  given  up  to  papers  of  a  distinctly  philosophical  character. 
The  members  of  the  Association  for  the  most  part  attended  the 
discussion  on  *  The  Inheritance  of  Acquired  Characteristics ' 
before  the  American  Society  of  Naturalists  on  the  afternoon  of 
the  29th,  psychology  being  represented  in  the  discussion  by 
Professor  James,  of  Harvard.  Together  with  the  other  Affiliated 
Societies,  the  psychologists  were  present  at  Mr.  Alexander 
Agassiz's  lecture  and  reception  in  the  evening  of  the  29th,  at  the 
luncheon  given  by  the  President  and  Fellows  of  Harvard  Col- 
lege on  the  3Oth,  and  at  the  annual  dinner  of  the  Societies  at  the 
Hotel  Brunswick,  Boston,  on  the  evening  of  the  same  day. 
President  George  S.  Fullerton  presided  at  all  the  meetings  of 
the  Association. 


IOS  FIFTH  ANNUAL  MEETING, 

At  the  regular  business  meeting  and  in  the  intervals  of  the 
program  the  following  business  was  transacted :  Election  of 
officers  for  1897  :  President,  Professor  J.  Mark  Baldwin,  of 
Princeton  University ;  Secretary  and  Treasurer ',  Dr.  Livingston 
Farrand,  of  Columbia  University ;  Members  of  the  Council, 
Professors  Josiah  Royce,  of  Harvard  University,  and  Joseph 
Jastrow,  of  the  University  of  Wisconsin.  Elected  to  member- 
ship on  nomination  of  the  Council :  Dr.  Ernest  Albee,  Cornell 
University ;  Dr.  C.  F.  Bakewell,  Harvard  University ;  Dr.  E. 
F.  Buchner,  Yale  University ;  Mr.  A.  F.  Buck,  Union  College  ; 
Mr.  J.  F.  Crawford,  Princeton  University ;  Professor  F.  C. 
French,  Vassar  College ;  Dr.  Alice  J.  Hamlin,  Mt.  Holyoke 
College ;  Professor  J.  G.  Hibben,  Princeton  University ;  Dr. 
C.  W.  Hodge,  Princeton  University ;  Dr.  David  Irons,  Univer- 
sity of  Vermont ;  Professor  R.  B.Johnson,  Miami  University; 
Dr.  C.  H.  Judd,  Wesleyan  University ;  Dr.  Robert  McDougall, 
Western  Reserve  University  ;  Professor  G.  H.  Palmer,  Harvard 
University ;  Mr.  F.  C.  S.  Schiller,  Cornell  University ;  Dr.  G. 
A.  Tawney,  Beloit  College. 

An  invitation  was  received  from  the  British  Association  for 
the  Advancement  of  Science  to  attend  the  next  annual  meeting 
to  be  held  in  Toronto,  Canada,  as  members  of  the  Section  of 
Physiology.  It  was  moved  and  .carried  that  such  members  of 
the  Council,  including  the  outgoing  members,  as  are  able  to  at- 
tend, be  official  delegates  of  the  Association  to  that  meeting,  and 
that  such  members  of  the  Association  as  may  be  able  to  do  so 
accept  the  invitation  to  attend  as  members. 

An  invitation  was  received  from  the  American  Association 
for  the  Advancement  of  Science  to  join  that  Association.  It 
was  voted  that  all  members  who  might  feel  so  disposed  are 
recommended  to  present  their  names  to  the  Secretary  for  elec- 
tion to  that  Association. 

A  communication  was  received  from  the  Director  of  the  Bio- 
logical Laboratory,  at  Wood's  Holl,  inviting  the  Association  to 
hold  an  informal  meeting  at  Wood's  Holl  during  some  week  of 
the  summer  months. 

The  invitation  was  referred  to  the  Council,  which  recommen- 
ded that  the  question  of  an  informal  Summer  meeting  of  the  As- 


AMERICAN  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATION.  109 

sociation  be  favorably  considered,  and  that  Wood's  Holl  be  re- 
garded as  an  eligible  place  for  such  meeting. 

The  following  motions  were  made  by  Professor  Witmer,  and 
were  referred  to  the  Council : 

i.  That  the  Council  of  the  American  Psychological  Asso- 
ciation be  recommended  to  select  only  such  papers  and  contri- 
butions to  the  program  of  the  annual  meeting  as  are  psycho- 
logical in  subject-matter. 

^2.  That  the  Council  of  the  American  Psychological  Asso- 
ciation be  recommended  to  present  at  the  next  meeting  of  the 
Association  a  plan  for  the  formation  of  an  American  Philo- 
sophical or  Metaphysical  Association,  as  one  of  the  affiliated  or 
associated  organizations  meeting  with  the  present  Affiliated 
Societies. 

3.  That  in  the  election  of  new  members  to  the  American 
Psychological  Association  all  names  nominated  by  the  Council 
shall  be  presented  to  the  Association  at  its  opening  session  in 
written  form,  or  visibly  displayed  upon  a  blackboard,  together 
with  a  statement  of  the  contribution  or  contributions  to  psy- 
chology, in  virtue  of  which  the  persons  named  are  eligible  to 
membership,  and  that  the  action  upon  such  names  shall  be  taken 
by  the  Association  at  the  final  business  meeting. 

The  time  and  place  of  the  next  meeting  were  referred  to  the 
President,  to  be  determined  in  consultation  with  the  authorities 
of  the  Affiliated  Societies. 

The  Committee  on  Physical  and  Mental  Tests  presented  their 
report,  and,  after  a  vote  of  thanks  for  the  hospitality  shown  by 
Harvard  University  and  the  Local  Committee  of  Arrangements, 
the  meeting  adjourned. 

The  report  of  the  Treasurer  and  the  abstracts  of  papers  read 
at  the  meeting  follow  : 

REPORT   OF   THE   TREASURER : 

Livingston  Farrand  in  account  with  Am.  Psychological  Association. 
DR. 

To  receipts  from  retiring  Treasurer $308  09 

"  Dues  of  Members 177  oo 

"Estimated  Interest  on  Deposits 15  oo 

$500  09 


HO  FIFTH  ANNUAL   MEETING. 

Cr.  By  Expenditures  for 

Postage  and  Stationary $i  i  90 

Printing  and  Clerical  Work 14  25 

Expressage 40 


$  26  55 

Balance  on  hand $473  54 

Audited  by  the  Council  and  found  correct. 

LIVINGSTON  FARRAND, 
Secretary  and  Treasurer, 

ABSTRACTS   OF   PAPERS. 

The  Physiology  of  Sensation.     By  E.  A.  SINGER,  University 

of  Pennsylvania. 

States  the  fundamental  question  as :  What  would  be  an 
ideally  complete  physiology  of  sensation?  The  method  em- 
ployed in  answering  the  question  would  establish  an  analogy 
between  what  has  been  regarded  as  progress  in  the  past  and 
what  should  be  sought  by  a  progressive  psychology  of  the 
future.  All  the  validity  claimed  for  the  method  rests  upon  our 
right  to  speculate  until  facts  be  forthcoming.  The  result  of 
such  an  analogy  is  stated  in  the  following  form  :  wherever  we 
know  anything  about  the  physiology  of  sensation,  we  find  that 
the  correlate  of  a  mental  difference  is  a  structural  physiological 
difference.  Where  we  are  yet  in  ignorance  as  to  the  phy- 
siological counterpart  of  a  mental  difference  we  should  assume 
it  to  be  a  difference  in  structure  rather  than  a  difference  in 
functioning  of  the  same  structure.  This  view  is  to  be  con- 
trasted with  such  current  opinions  as  would  regard  the  physio- 
logical counterpart  of  intensity  as  the  greater  or  less  activity  of 
the  same  nervous  structure ;  feeling  tone  as  the  greater  or  less 
disintegration,  or  as  dependent  upon  conditions  of  greater  or 
less  nutrition  of  the  same  structure,  etc.  Some  attempt  is 
made,  rather  by  way  of  illustration  than  as  framing  a  com- 
pletely tenable  hypothesis,  to  suggest  a  physiology  of  these  so- 
called  properties  of  sensation  that  would  relate  them  to  quality 
of  sensation.  Thus  the  physiological  basis  of  intensity  differ- 
ences is  sought  in  part  in  the  different  end  organs  affected  in 


AMERICAN  PS  YCHOLOGICAL  A SSOCIA  TION.  1 1 1 

greater  or  less  reaction  to  a  stimulus ;  in  part  also  in  special 
apparatus  suggested  by  the  allied  nature  of  intensity  and 
saturation  in  color  sensations.  Feeling  tone  is  distinguished 
from  pleasure  and  pain ;  the  physiology  of  the  former  being 
related  to  that  of  the  emotion,  the  physiology  of  the  latter  to 
that  of  the  special  senses.  Local  sign  presents  the  inverse 
problem  as  to  how  sensations  conditioned  by  confessedly  dif- 
ferent nervous  structures  should  come  to  be  classed  together. 
The  answer  suggested  is  that  the  classing  together  of  locally 
different  sensations  and  qualitatively  similar  is  conditioned  by 
the  formal  likeness  of  the  end  organs  affected,  they  determining 
a  likeness  in  the  adequate  stimuli  and  in  the  general  way  of  be- 
having of  the  sensation.  Recognized  likeness  and  difference 
of  sensations  are  found  to  involve  psycho-physical  reflection. 

Intensity    of    Sensation.     By    JAMES    E.     LOUGH,    Harvard 

University. 

Sensations  forming  an  intensity  series  have  this  charac- 
teristic which  distinguishes  them  from  a  qualitative  series : 
namely,  that  the  intensity  series  goes  towards  or  from  zero — 
the  vanishing  point — while  a  purely  qualitative  change  leads 
neither  to  nor  from  the  zero  point  of  sensation.  Theories  of  in- 
tensity of  sensation  may  be  classed  in  general  under  two  heads  : 
(a)  that  the  stronger  sensation  is  the  weaker  sensation  plus 
more  of  the  same  sensation — following  an  analogy  from  the 
physical  world  which  may  prove  dangerous  and  exposing 
psychology  to  the  troublesome  presupposition  that  our  psychic 
elements  (sensations)  are  compounds ;  (b)  that  the  intensity 
series  is  merely  a  qualitative  series,  but  ordered  in  a  series 
towards  or  from  zero  by  the  presence  of  a  second  series  of  sen- 
sations, e.  g.,  brightness  sensations  or  muscular  sensations. 

It  would  seem  much  more  satisfactory  to  discover  in  the 
nature  of  the  psycho-physical  process  itself  that  which  shall 
give  to  sensations  the  characteristic  of  an  intensity  series.  Ac- 
cordingly, this  hypothesis  is  offered :  any  sensation  of  a  given 
quality  and  intensity  that  may  arise,  depends  upon  a  certain 
physiological  condition  which  is  reached  only  after  passing  suc- 
cessively through  a  series  of  other  physiological  conditions,  each 


112  FIFTH  ANNUAL  MEETING. 

of  which  is  the  basis  of  a  sensation  of  the  same  quality,  but 
differing  in  degree  from  zero  to  the  given  sensation.  That  is, 
any  sensation  depends  upon  the  physiological  basis  which  con- 
tains, in  a  temporal  series,  the  bases  of  all  the  weaker  sensations 
of  this  particular  quality.  The  final  neural  condition,  after  pass- 
ing through  all  the  intermediate  steps,  may  be  called  the  maxi- 
mum effect  of  the  stimulus.  By  a  study  of  the  intensity  of 
sensations  produced  by  a  stimulus  of  a  known  intensity  acting 
for  a  time  less  than  that  necessary  to  produce  its  maximum  ef- 
fect, it  is  found  that  this  intensity  is  exactly  proportional  to  the 
duration  of  the  stimulation.  Concerning  the  nature  of  the  psy- 
cho-physical process  nothing  is  postulated  save  that  the  basis  of 
the  stronger  sensation  contains  that  of  the  weaker  in  the  time 
series  as  stated  above. 

Report  of  Experiments  on  the  Reduction  of  the  Tactual 
Double-Point  Threshold  by  Practice ,  and  on  the '  Vexirfehler? 
By  G.  A.  TAWNEY,  Beloit  College. 

The  first  object  of  the  following  experiments  was  to  examine 
the  view  of  Volkmann  and  Fechner  that,  by  daily  practicing 
some  one  spot  of  skin  in  the  perception  of  two  points,  the 
threshold  for  this  perception  is  reduced,  not  only  for  the  spot 
actually  practiced,  but  also  for  the  symmetrically  opposite  spot 
on  the  other  side  of  the  body.  A  number  of  threshold  determi- 
nations were  made  on  different  parts  of  the  body  varying  in 
number  from  six  to  thirty-two  for  each  subject.  One  of  these 
spots  was  chosen  for  special  practice  which  continued  for  a 
period  varying  from  two  weeks  to  a  month.  At  the  end  of  this 
time,  the  threshold  determinations  on  the  six  to  thirty-six  differ- 
ent parts  of  the  body  were  repeated,  in  order  to  compare  them 
with  those  at  the  beginning  of  the  practice  series.  The  instru- 
ment used  was  a  simple  pair  of  compasses.  The  results  show 
unmistakably  that  where  any  reduction  of  the  threshold  occurs 
as  a  result  of  practice,  it  occurs  over  the  entire  surface  of  the 
body ;  it  demands,  therefore,  a  central  explanation.  The  paper 
further  discusses  the  nature  '  Vexirfehler '  (double-point  illu- 
sion). It  was  assumed  that  the  double-point  illusion  is  the 
result  of  suggestion  and  it  was  sought  to  free  a  subject,  whose 


AMERICAN  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATION.  113 

threshold  formerly  could  not  be  determined,  from  the  suggestion 
involved.  The  experiments  seemed  to  show  that  the  reduction 
of  the  threshold  by  practice  is,  to  a  great  extent  at  least,  a  result 
of  suggestion.  Several  series  were  carried  out  for  the  purpose 
of  studying  the  psychosis  underlying  the  '  Vexirfehler.'  The 
results  seem  to  show  that  this  illusion  is  mainly  due  to  auto-sug- 
gestion, although  physiological  factors  may  play  a  subordinate 
part. 

Comparison  of  the  Times  of  Simple  Reactions  and  of  Free- Arm 
Movements  in  Different  Classes  of  Persons.  By  ALBERT 
L.  LEWIS.  (Introduced  by  Professor  Witmer.) 
This  paper  gave  the  results  of  nearly  9,000  experiments  on 
American  men  and  women,  and  on  male  Negroes  and  Indians. 
The  relative  order  of  these  four  classes  was  found  to  be  in  re- 
acting to  Sound,  arranged  from  shortest  to  longest :  Indians, 
American  men,  Negroes  and  American  women ;  to  Light, 
American  men,  Indians,  American  women  and  Negroes ;  to 
Touch,  Indians  and  American  men  the  same,  Negroes  third  and 
American  women  fourth.  With  regard  to  the  mean  variations  of 
the  average  reaction  times,  the  order  was  :  in  Sound,  American 
men,  Indians,  Negroes  and  American  women  ;  in  Light,  Ameri- 
can men,  Indians,  Negroes  and  American  women  ;  in  Touch,  In- 
dians, American  men,  American  women  and  Negroes.  Follow- 
ing this  was  given  a  comparison  of  the  flexion  and  extension 
movements  of  both  right  and  left  arm.  The  relative  order  of 
the  classes  was  found  to  be  American  men,  Indians  and  Ameri- 
can women.  This  order  holds  throughout  the  four  movements. 
No  report  on  the  Negroes  was  given,  as  the  experiments  on  this 
class  were  not  yet  completed.  It  was  noticeable  in  these  ex- 
periments that  the  American  men  were  quicker  in  their  longest 
movement  than  the  Indians  in  their  shortest,  and  the  Indians 
were  similarly  quicker  than  the  women.  Not  less  interesting 
was  the  fact  that,  although  all  the  subjects  were  right-handed, 
the  flexion  movements  of  the  left  arm  were  quicker  than  the 
corresponding  movement  of  the  right,  except  in  the  case  of  the 
American  men,  where  the  time  of  the  movement  was  the  same 
for  each  arm.  The  conclusions  drawn  were  that  there  are 


H4  FIFTH  ANNUAL  MEETING. 

characteristic  variations  in  the  reaction  time  and  rate  of  move- 
ment of  classes  of  persons ;  that  a  close  relation  exists  between 
reaction  time  and  rate  of  movement ;  that  a  number  of  reactions 
is  necessary  to  give  a  characteristic  result  in  each  individual  case. 

Researches  in  Progress  in  the  Psychological  Laboratory  of 
Columbia  University.  ByJ.  McKEEN  CATTELL. 
Among  the  subjects  in  course  of  investigation  the  following 
may  be  mentioned  as  likely  to  be  completed  soon :  Mr.  W. 
Lay,  lately  Fellow  in  Philosophy,  has  for  several  years  been 
studying  mental  imagery  by  various  methods.  In  addition  to 
questions  such  as  those  proposed  by  Mr.  Galton,  others  have 
been  set  more  independent  of  immediate  introspection  and  ex- 
tending to  auditory  and  motor  imagery.  Among  others,  includ- 
ing musicians,  100  leading  artists  have  in  letters  and  interviews 
described  their  imagery.  Imagery  has  been  investigated  by  its 
effects  on  memory,  and  in  the  compositions  of  poets  and  other 
writers.  Mr.  Lay  has,  finally,  given  special  attention  to  his  own 
imagery  and  associations.  Mr.  S.  I.  Franz,  Fellow  in  Psychol- 
ogy, is  investigating  after-images.  He  has  already  published 
experiments  on  the  threshold  for  after-images,  and  is  now  study- 
ing the  duration  and  nature  of  the  after-image  as  dependent 
on  the  intensity,  duration  and  area  of  stimulation.  He  is  able 
to  correlate  the  effects  of  these  magnitudes  for  consciousness 
and  to  analyze  physiological  and  mental  factors.  The  indi- 
vidual differences  are  of  interest,  for  with  the  same  stimulus  the 
image  differs  greatly  with  different  persons.  Mr.  L.  B.  Mc- 
Whood,  Fellow  in  Psychology,  is  studying  the  motor  accom- 
paniments of  the  perception  and  emotional  results  of  music. 
The  movements  are  a  series  of  taps  made  as  rapidly  as  possible 
and  a  pressure,  not  a  maximum  but  kept  as  nearly  as  may  be 
constant.  The  subject  decides  on  his  preferences,  etc.,  for  the 
tunes  and  combinations  used,  and  these  are  compared  with  the 
motor  effects.  Mr.  H.  E.  Houston  is  studying  color  nomencla- 
ture, with  special  reference  to  children,  and  proposes  to  extend 
his  work  to  other  senses.  The  growth  in  accuracy  and  extent 
of  the  color  vocabulary  in  schools  has  been  determined,  and  the 
attempt  will  be  made  to  find  and  set  a  normal  nomenclature  for 


AMERICAN  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATION.  115 

colors  and  other  classes  of  sensations.     Other  researches  were 
referred  to  briefly. 

The  Psychic  Development  of  Young  Animals  and  its  Somatic 
Correlation,  -with  Special  Reference  to  the  Brain.  By 
WESLEY  MILLS,  McGill  University,  Montreal. 
This  paper  is  based  on  researches  on  psychic  development 
and  on  the  development  of  cerebral  cortex  in  the  same  groups 
of  animals.  As  somatic  correlation  other  than  that  of  the  brain 
has  been  considered  in  other  papers,  that  phase  of  the  subject 
was  not  especially  treated  in  this  paper.  The  main  conclusions 
are  as  follows  :  in  the  dog  and  the  cat  there  is  a  period  extend- 
ing from  birth  to  about  the  time  of  the  opening  of  the  eyes  char- 
acterized by  reflex  movements,  the  sway  of  instincts  and  the 
absence  of  intelligence.  During  this  time  the  cerebral  cortex  is 
inexcitable  by  electrical  stimulation,  so  that  the  psychic  condition 
during  the  blind  period  is  correlated  with  an  undeveloped  state  of 
the  motor  centers  of  the  cortex  of  the  cerebrum.  The  advance 
in  movements,  first  of  the  limbs  and  later  of  the  head  and  face 
parts,  together  with  the  psychic  progress  associated  with  this,  is 
correlated  with  the  rapid  development  of  the  cortical  centres 
for  the  limbs  in  the  first  instance,  and  later  for  the  head  and 
face  in  the  period  immediately  following  the  blind  stage.  This 
is  more  rapid  and  more  pronounced  in  the  cat  than  in  the  dog, 
and  is  correlated  with  the  greater  control  in  the  cat  over  the 
fore-limbs  and  with  certain  physiological  and  psychic  develop- 
ments characteristic  of  the  cat. 

Similar  conclusions  apply  to  the  rabbit,  except  that  the  dif- 
ference in  the  rapidity  of  development  of  head  and  face  move- 
ments is  correlated  with  an  earlier  organization  of  the  corre- 
sponding cortical  centres,  and  that  there  is  a  greater  difference 
between  the  fore-limb  and  the  hind-limb,  with  all  of  which  there 
are  special  psychic  correlations  bound  up  with  certain  peculiari- 
ties of  the  rabbit's  modes  of  life. 

The  vast  difference  in  physiological  and  psychic  develop- 
ment of  the  cavy  at  birth  is  correlated  with  the  presence  of 
cortical  cerebral  centres  readily  excited  by  artificial  stimuli, 
centres  which  in  a  few  days  reach  a  practically  perfect  state  of 
development. 


Il6  FIFTH  ANNUAL   MEETING. 

The  psychic  manifestations  of  the  pigeon  and  the  fowl  have 
not  the  same  sort  of  cerebral  cortical  correlates  as  the  animals 
referred  to  above. 

The    Organization    of  Practical    Work    in    Psychology.     By 
LIGHTNER  WITHER,  University  of  Pennsylvania. 
Under  the  designation  of  practical  work  in  psychology  was 
included:    i.  The  direct  application,   whether  by   professional 
psychologists,  practicing  physicians  or  teachers,  of  psycholog- 
ical principles  to  therapeutics  and  to  education. 

2.  Such  psychophysical  investigation  of  mental  conditions 
and  processes  as  may  serve  to  throw  light  upon  the  problems 
that  confront  humanity  in  the  practice  of  medicine  or  teaching. 

3.  The  offering  of  instruction  in  psychology,  to  students  of 
medicine  or  to  teachers,  that  contains  a  promise  of  future  use- 
fulness to  them  in  their  respective  professions. 

Thus  the  plan  has  a  view  to  the  professional  practice  of  psy- 
chology, to  research  and  to  instruction,  as  these  stand  related 
to  the  two  professions  of  medicine  and  teaching. 

In  order  that  psychology  may  become  a  usable  possession  of 
the  medical  man,  details  of  organization  must  be  perfected  that 
will  bring  about  a  union  of  the  department  of  psychology  with 
the  professional  departments  of  the  medical  school. 

The  following  details  of  organization  are  suggested  as  a 
part  of  a  plan  for  the  development  of  research  work  and  in- 
struction useful  to  the  community  and  to  the  teacher : 

1.  The  University  Department  of  Psychology  should  be  in 
close  association  with  all  classes  and  grades  of  children.     Or- 
ganization is  required  to  make  possible  the  conduction  of  phys- 
ical and  mental  tests  upon  all  children  in  all  grades  from  the 
kindergarten  up  to  the  graduate  department  and  upon  such  so- 
called  abnormal  children  as  may  be  found  in  special  institutions 
for  the  feeble  minded,  the  deaf,  the  blind  and  the  morally  de- 
fective. 

2.  A  Department  of  Psychology  needs  for  purposes  of  dem- 
onstration a  Psychological  Museum  equipped  with  specimens  of 
work  done  by  defective  and  by  normal  children  with  the  instru- 
ments and  apparatus  used  in  teaching  them,  and  affording  some 


AMERICAN  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATION.  n; 

display  of  the  results  of  special  investigations  into  the  physical 
and  mental  characteristics  of  children,  exhibited,  perhaps,  in 
the  form  of  tables  and  curves. 

3.  An  experimental  training  school  presenting  the  following 
features : 

a.  Independent  schools  or  homes  for  such  children  as  can 
afford  to  pay  for  expert  psychological  and  pedagogical  treatment. 

6.  A  psychological  clinic  and  dispensary. 

c.  Special  or  ungraded  training  schools  for  children  who 
are  backward  or  physically  defective — these  to  be  organized 
under  the  control  of  the  city  school  authorities  but  to  be  in  har- 
monious and  effective  relation  with  the  Psychological  Depart- 
ment of  the  local  university. 

4.  Instruction  in  psychology  should  be  adapted  to  meet  the 
wants  of  two  classes  of  teachers  : 

a.  The  common  school  teacher  of  all  grades  from  the  kin- 
dergarten to  the  university,  who  needs,  above  all  else,  courses  in 
the  practical  study  of  children. 

b.  The  psychological  expert  who  is  capable  of  treating  the 
many  difficult  cases  that  resist  the  ordinary  methods  of  the 
school  room.     The  pedagogical  or  psychological  expert  requires 
thorough  courses  in  some  branches  of  medicine  and  in  practical 
psychology.     For  both  classes  of  teachers,  the  features  just 
enumerated  under  one,  two  and  three,  will  be  found  of  great 
service  in  supplying  the  requisite  practical  experience  in  psy- 
chology. 

Psycho-Physical    Tests  on  Normal  School  and  Kindergarten 

Pupils.     By  Miss  MARY  P.  HARMON  (Introduced  by  Prof. 

Witmer) . 

These  tests  form  part  of  a  general  scheme  which  proposes 
the  development  of  a  series  of  tests  which  shall  be  applicable 
alike  to  the  oldest  and  youngest  pupils  in  all  grades  from  the 
Kindergarten  to  the  Normal  School.  The  intention  is  to  repeat 
from  year  to  year  a  series  of  experiments  of  which  a  few  are 
included  in  this  preliminary  report  as  the  children  now  in  the 
Kindergarten  pass  through  the  various  grades. 

The  tests  reported  upon  include  family  statistics,  age,  height, 


IlS  FIFTH  ANNUAL  MEETING. 

weight,  lung  capacity,  simple  reaction  time  to  sound  and  rate 
of  free  arm  movements. 

One  hundred  girls  in  the  first  year  of  the  Normal  School 
were  tested.  Ninety-five  per  cent,  are  American  born.  Seventy- 
nine  per  cent,  of  the  mothers  and  seventy  per  cent,  of  the 
fathers  are  American  born.  The  grandparents  range  from 
forty-one  to  forty-four  per  cent.  American  born.  The  average 
age  is  18,2  years.  The  average  height  is  62.4  inches,  the 
average  weight  is  112.8  pounds,  and  the  average  lung  capacity 
is  134.4  cubic  inches.  The  average  reaction  time  taking  the 
minimum  of  five  trials  is  153  a.  The  average  quickest  move- 
ment is  for  the  right  hand  in  extension  ii4<r,  in  flexion  io8<r; 
left  hand  in  extension  1090-;  left  hand  flexion  217  a\  the  dis- 
tance moved  over  was  53  centimeters.  Some  coordination 
was  noticeable  between  intellectual  capacity  and  rate  of  reaction 
and  movement ;  those  girls  who  stood  out  as  bright  being  below 
the  average. 

Thirty-four  boys  and  sixty-three  girls  in  the  Kindergartens 
ranging  from  four  and  one-half  to  seven  years  of  age  give  an 
average  height  of  thirty-nine  to  forty-four  inches.  Weight 
thirty-five  to  forty  pounds.  The  boys  give  an  average  lung 
capacity  of  forty  cubic  inches ;  the  girls  of  twenty-five.  The 
boys  give  an  average  shortest  reaction  of  two  hundred  and 
eighty-four,  the  girls  of  two  hundred  and  eighty-one.  The 
boys  give  an  average  longest  reaction  of  five  hundred  and 
thirty-three,  the  girls  of  six  hundred  and  eighty-four.  The 
boys  move  the  right  arm  in  extension,  the  left  in  flexion,  the 
left  in  extension  and  the  right  in  flexion  in  the  following  times 
respectively:  153,  154,  158,  160;  the  girls  make  the  same 
movements  in  the  following  time:  219,  205,  228,  223.  The 
average  shortest  time  for  all  movements  is  153  for  the  boys  and 
192  for  the  girls.  Thus  the  girls  throughout  are  noticeably 
slower  than  the  boys,  although  their  reaction  time  is  but  a  trifle 
longer.  Comparing  the  Kindergarten  children  with  the  Junior 
Class  of  the  Normal  School  we  find  the  average  shortest  reac- 
tion of  the  Juniors  is  131  a  shorter  than  that  of  the  Kindergarten 
boys  and  128*7  shorter  than  that  of  the  girls.  Their  rate  of 
movement  is  62  a  less  than  for  the  boys  and  101  a  less  than 
for  the  girls. 


AMERICAN  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIA TION.  1 19 

Personal  Experiences  under  Ether.     By  WESLEY  MILLS,  Mc- 

Gill  University,  Montreal. 

This  paper  relates  the  experiences  of  the  writer  during  and 
immediately  subsequent  to  the  administration  of  ether,  together 
with  a  later  experience  which  seemed  to  grow  out  of  the  former 
and  which  produced  a  profound  impression. 

A  Preliminary  Study  of  Memory.   By  BROTHER  CHRYSOSTOM, 

Manhattan  College. 

The  paper  presented  rather  a  plan  of  work  for  the  present 
scholastic  year  than  results  already  obtained  from  experiments 
on  memory.  The  immediate  end  sought  was  a  knowledge  of 
the  relative  value  of  visual  and  aural  memory.  The  method 
adopted  is  similar  to  that  described  by  Mr.  E.  A.  Kirkpatrick  in 
the  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW,  November,  1894.  The  two  series, 
viz.,  of  objects  for  vision,  and  of  names  for  hearing,  are  shown 
on  alternate  days.  Both  names  and  objects  are  familiar,  the 
names  being  monosyllables  and  excluding  association  effects. 
The  objects  and  names  recalled  with  greatest  facility  are  then 
noted  and  classified  with  a  view  to  determine  the  cause  of  this 
phenomenon.  At  this  stage  the  work  is  again  reviewed  and 
examined  as  helping  to  answer  the  question:  "Is  conscious 
memory  a  spiritual  phenomenon  ?" 

Lest  the  conditions  under  which  the  experiments  are  formed 
might  be  exceptional,  a  series  of  thirty  questions  was  prepared 
to  be  answered  not  only  by  the  subjects  of  these  experiments, 
but  also  by  about  three  hundred  boys  and  young  men  engaged 
in  academic  and  collegiate  study  in  various  other  cities  of  the 
Union.  These  questions  refer  to  the  signs  of  attention,  the  best 
time  for  memory  work,  the  relative  difficulty  experienced  in 
memorizing  different  disciplines,  the  place  of  repetition  in  mem- 
ory, the  means  of  steadying  attention,  individual  mnemonic  de- 
vices, and  the  influence  of  heredity  upon  memory. 

On  a  Method  of  Studying  Cerebral  Circulation  (the  Eye-Pleth- 
ysmograph).  An  informal  communication.     By  E.  C.  SAN- 
FORD,  Clark  University. 
The  method  in  question  is  an  insignificant  modification  of 


I2O 


FIFTH  ANNUAL   MEETING. 


one  described  by  Dr.  F.  W.  Ellis  in  the  Boston  Medical  and 
Surgical  Journal  of  April  21,  1887,  but  little  known  as  yet 
to  psychologists.  It  is  in  essence  a  means  of  taking  pulse  and 
blood-pressure  tracings  from  the  ophthalmic  artery.  This  ar- 
tery, which  supplies  the  eye  ball  and  orbit,  is  anatomically  in 
direct  connection  with  the  cerebral  system  and  furnishes  an  in- 
dex of  its  condition. 

To  secure  these  tracings  a  plaster  cast  is  taken  of  the  upper 
part  of  the  face,  extending  a  little  above  and  below  the  eyes 
and  a  little  around  onto  the  temples.  In  making  this  cast  the 
eyes  are  covered  with  watch  glasses,  so  that  when  finished,  a 
hollow  remains  before  each  eye.  Holes  are  afterward  bored 


The  curves  read  from  left  to  right.  The  upper  one  gives  the  time  in  seconds. 
The  next  gives  the  eye  pulse ;  the  third  the  respiration — upward  movements 
showing  inspiration,  downward  expiration;  the  fourth,  the  finger  pulse — taken 
from  the  fingers  of  the  right  hand  with  a  small  air  plethysmograph.  The  short 
vertical  lines  at  the  left  give  the  relative  positions  of  the  writing  points  during 
the  tracing  of  the  curves.  The  irregular  marks  breaking  into  the  ninth  pulsa- 
tion in  the  second  and  fourth  curves  show  the  momentary  dislocation  of  the  ap- 
paratus caused  by  the  muscular  '  start '  of  the  subject,  on  hearing  the  sound. 

The  cut  is  a  photographic  reproduction,  in  the  size  of  the  original  tracings, 
of  a  five-fold  enlargement  of  them  shown  at  the  meeting  of  the  Association.  The 
enlargement  was  very  carefully  drawn  for  measurements  of  the  curves  too.i  mm., 
except  in  the  case  of  the  time  line  where  a  curve  showing  equal  seconds  was 
substituted  for  the  actual  one  which  contained  4.29+  vibrations  to  the  second. 
The  greatest  irregularity  in  the  motion  of  the  kymograph  in  any  second  of  the 
period  shown  was  under  one  part  in  forty-seven. 


AMERICAN  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATION.  Ill 

into  these  hollows  and  short  glass  tubes  inserted  and  sealed  in 
place.  When  the  cast  is  to  be  used  the  face  is  anointed  with 
thick  vaseline,  to  help  in  making  the  cast  air-tight,  and  it  is 
further  held  in  place  by  a  bandage  about  the  head.  Rubber 
tubes  are  slipped  upon  the  glass  tubes  and  their  free  ends  lead 
away  by  a  Y  to  a  single  Marey  tambour.  Every  increase  of 
blood  in  the  orbit  now  causes  a  compression  of  the  air  in  the 
cavities  before  the  eyes,  and  an  elevation  of  the  stylus  of  the 
tambour  which  can  be  recorded  in  the  usual  way  with  a  kymo- 
graph and  smoked  paper. 

During  the  spring  of  1896  this  method  was  used  by  Mr.  G. 
E.  Dawson  and  the  writer,  in  a  study  of  the  relation  of  certain 
psychical  states  to  circulation  and  respiration.  The  accom- 
panying cut  shows  a  favorable,  but  by  no  means  unique  ex- 
ample of  the  tracings  obtained.  In  it  may  be  seen  the  rise  of 
the  cerebral  blood  pressure  (second  curve  from  the  top)  and 
corresponding  fall  of  pressure  in  the  fingers  (fourth  curve) 
caused  by  startling  the  subject  with  a  sharp  and  unexpected 
noise.  A  full  report  of  the  study  is  delayed  by  the  great  time 
required  for  a  careful  study  of  the  curves  obtained. 

Color-Blindness  and   William  Pole:  A  Study  in  Logic.      By 
MRS.  CHRISTINE  LADD  FRANKLIN.     Read  by  title. 

Philosophy  in  the  American  Colleges.     By  A.  C.  ARMSTRONG, 

JR.,  Wesleyan  University. 

This  paper  was  based  on  data  obtained  from  a  number  of 
representative  colleges  and  universities  with  reference  to  the 
development  of  philosophical  instruction  in  recent  years.  It 
appeared  that  this  development  has  been  a  marked  one,  although 
the  movement  has  had  a  comparatively  late  origin.  The  causes 
of  the  increase  in  philosophical  faculties  and  courses  were  dis- 
covered, first,  in  the  general  educational  advance  and  the  deep- 
ening of  the  national  thought ;  second,  in  conditions  special  to 
the  department.  The  growth  of  the  special  science  has  occa- 
sioned a  demand  for  the  speculative  correlation  and  interpreta- 
tion of  their  results.  The  progress  of  psychology,  at  first  as 
an  empirical  and  experimental  science,  then  in  relation  to  sys- 
tematic discussions  and  even  metaphysical  problems,  has  given 


122  FIFTH  ANNUAL  MEETING. 

it  a  central  importance  in  the  philosophical  curriculum.  Logic, 
on  the  contrary,  has  lost  ground  in  comparison  with  its  position 
a  generation  ago,  and  ethics,  while  better  maintaining  its  place, 
has  become  more  systematic  and  less  practical,  except  in  that 
political  and  social  ethics  have  been  added  to  the  ethics  of  the  in- 
dividual. Apart  from  psychology,  the  greatest  advance  has 
been  made  in  general  philosophy.  Little  has  been  accom- 
plished in  the  way  of  detailed  historical  research,  but  the  his- 
tory of  philosophy,  as  now  taught,  gives  the  student  some  ac- 
quaintance with  the  history  of  intellectual  progress  as  well  as 
with  the  classical  philosophical  systems.  Constructive  thought 
and  instruction  have  been  begun,  though  the  propounders  of 
complete  systems  are  few.  Pedagogy  is  one  of  the  youngest 
branches  of  the  department,  but  not  the  least  valuable. 

With  the  extent  and  the  content  of  philosophical  teaching, 
methods  have  also  changed.  Elective  courses  have,  for  the 
most  part,  taken  the  place  of  prescribed  work.  In  psychology 
emphasis  is  placed  on  experimental  inquiry  in  the  laboratory. 
Historical,  systematic,  ethical  and  religious  philosophy  take  on 
a  more  literary  form,  with  constantly  increasing  use  of  methods 
found  fruitful  in  other  departments. 

In  fine,  philosophy  has  reestablished  its  position  in  the 
American  universities  and  may  be  expected  more  and  more  to 
influence  our  thought  and  civilization.  [Printed  in  the  Educa- 
tional Review  for  January,  1897.] 

7^5/5    of   Current   Theory   Touching  Mind  and  Body.      By 
DICKINSON  S.  MILLER,  Bryn  Mawr  College. 
The  probabilities   and  presumptions  by  which  alone  in  this 
problem  theory  can  be  guided  may  be  strictly  tested  and  gauged  : 
I.  As  regards   those  cited  on  behalf  of   the  theory  of  in- 
teraction :  the  evolutionary  argument  from  *  the  distribution  of 
pleasures  and  pains'  is  invalid,  but  the  evolutionary  argument 
from  the  concomitant  variations  of  mind  and  cerebral  complexity 
and  the  original  argument  from  the  testimony  of  conscious  ex- 
perience do,  indeed,  yield  positive  presumption  of  a  causal  tie. 
Yet  the  presumption  of  unbroken  physical  order  is  also  well- 
founded.     Were  the  two  incompatible  the  latter  must  give  way. 


AMERICAN  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATION.  123 

They  are,  however,  consistent.  The  facts  in  time  or  space  are 
presumably  as  the  parallelist  states  them  ;  the  material  order  is 
uninfringed  ;  nevertheless  one  psycho-physical  event  is  the  indi- 
visible cause  of  the  next  psycho-physical  event  (the  psychical 
and  physical  sides  being  by  hypothesis  inseparable),  and  hence 
the  psychosis  is  part-cause  of  the  total  ensuing  event,  part-cause 
consequently  of  the  ensuing  neurosis.  Thus  the  strict  sense  of 
our  terms  obliges  us  to  admit  an  unintrusive  causation  on  the 
part  of  consciousness  and  so  to  reconcile  presumptions  appar- 
ently at  odds. 

II.  As  regards  universal  parallelism  or  panpsychism ;  the 
arguments  for  it  rest  all  upon  the  need  of  ascribing  '  continuity' 
or  '  uniformity'  to  the  world.  There  are,  however,  four  reasons 
for  denying  that  panpsychism  would  yield  such  continuity. 
And  even  if  it  did,  there  prove  on  analysis  to  be  no  such  signs 
of  continuity  in  the  world  either  of  na'ive  imagination,  of  me- 
chanical atomism,  or  of  strict  metaphysics,  as  to  warrant  the 
acceptance  of  a  theory  not  otherwise  evidenced. 

The  Relation  of  Mind  and  Body.     By  C.  A.  STRONG,  Colum- 
bia University. 

The  object  of  this  paper  was  to  show  that  parallelism  is  not 
necessarily  inconsistent  with  the  efficacy  of  consciousness. 

The  interactionists  usually  fail  to  tell  us  what  they  mean  by 
the  matter  on  which  they  say  that  the  mind  acts.  But  matter 
means  either  a  content  of  consciousness  or  an  independent 
reality  symbolized  by  that  content,  either  object  or  eject.  Fur- 
thermore, many  idealists  deny  the  existence  of  ejects ;  whence 
the  following  dilemma. 

If  ejects  be  denied,  matter  no  longer  remains  in  any  palpable 
form  for  the  mind  to  act  upon ;  since  it  will  hardly  be  main- 
tained that  our  volitions  act  directly  on  the  content  of  our  per- 
ceptions. If  ejects  be  accepted,  there  is  no  reason  why  our 
volitions  should  not  act  upon  them  and  so  deserve,  in  a  sense  con- 
sistent with  Hume's  doctrine  of  causality,  the  predicate  of 
efficacy. 

But  such  efficacy  admits  of,  if  it  does  not  require,  a  paralle- 
listic  interpretation.  For  consciousness  may  itself  be  the  eject 


124  FIFTH  ANNUAL   MEETING. 

which  appears  to  an  onlooker  as  the  brain  process ;  and  in  that 
case  the  phenomenal  interaction  between  the  brain  process  and 
other  physical  events  would  run  parallel  to  and  be  the  symbol 
of  a  real  interaction  between  consciousness  and  other  ejects . 

Is  the  '  Transcendental  Ego'  an  Unmeaning  Conception  f    By  J. 

E.  CREIGHTON,  Cornell  University. 

This  paper  is  an  attempt  to  indicate  some  of  the  permanent 
elements  of  truth  in  the  doctrine  of  the  Transcendental  Ego, 
taking  into  account,  however,  only  the  theoretical  consciousness. 
There  are  two  ways  of  looking  at  the  knowing  consciousness. 
First,  that  of  psychology,  which  takes  consciousness  simply  as 
a  string  of  states  or  processes.  These,  as  they  first  appear,  are 
found  to  be  complex  and  capable  of  resolution  into  elementary 
sensations.  Now,  the  psychologist  undertakes  to  describe  the 
quality,  intensity,  extent  and  duration  of  the  sensations,  and  to 
determine  the  various  ways  in  which  they  combine  into  com- 
plexes. This  investigation,  being  concerned  only  with  the  con- 
scious processes  and  their  modes  of  existence,  finds  no  place  for 
an  Ego  of  any  sort.  But  it  is  to  be  noticed,  that  so  far  as  mental 
states  are  observed,  as  it  were,  from  the  standpoint  of  an  exter- 
nal observer,  the  investigation  deals  with  their  real,  not 
with  their  ideal  side.  And  no  description,  however  exact  and 
accurate,  of  the  various  attributes  of  sensations,  or  of  the  ways 
in  which  they  are  fused  and  associated,  can  stand  as  an  account 
of  experience.  To  understand  the  fact  of  knowledge,  then,  a 
new  standpoint — that  of  Logic  or  Epistemology — is  necessary. 
Consciousness  must  here  be  conceived  as  taking  the  form  of 
judgment.  For  knowledge  comes  only  as  the  result  of  a  process 
of  interpretation  and  evaluation,  and  in  this  consists  the  essence 
of  judgment.  Knowledge,  then,  is  the  product  of  judging 
thought.  Now  the  Transcendental  Ego  must  be  found  in  the 
judging  thought  or  not  at  all.  Both  Kant  and  Fichte  protest 
against  making  the  Ego  a  thing  or  substance  beyond  conscious- 
ness. The  real  question  is  whether  thought  as  we  actually  find 
it  possesses  the  predicates — unity,  identity,  permanence,  etc. — 
which  the  transcendentalists  apply  to  their  Ego.  After  showing 
in  what  sense  we  can  speak  of  a  conscious  or  ideal  activity  as 


AMERICAN  PS  YCHOL OGICAL  A  SSOCIA  TION.  1 25 

permanent  and  self-identical,  the  paper  concludes  with  a  state- 
ment of  the  positive  grounds  which  compel  us  to  apply  these 
predicates  to  what  we  may  call  Thought  or  the  Ego.  Our  ex- 
perience forms  one  single  system;  the  world  of  knowledge 
which  is  the  product  of  the  activity  of  intelligence  is  a  whole, 
or  at  least  is  required  to  be  a  whole,  and  not  a  thing  of  shreds 
and  patches.  Now  Kant  argued  from  the  unity  of  the  Ego  to 
the  necessary  unity  of  the  Ego's  experience.  We  may  reverse 
the  argument,  and  from  the  unity  of  experience  infer  that  the 
thought  which  has  constructed  this  experience  is  itself  a  single 
and  self-identical  principle. 

The  Relation  of  Pessimism  to  Ultimate  Philosophy.     By  F.  C. 

S.  SCHILLER,  Cornell  University. 

To  show  that  the  question  of  pessimism  is  an  ultimate  one 
for  philosophy.  Pessimism  is  not  merely  a  possible  outcome  of 
the  hedonistic  calculus,  but  the  denial  that  life  is  worth  living 
may  follow  from  the  despair  of  any  ideal  of  Value,  e.  g.,  of 
Goodness,  Knowledge  and  Beauty  as  well  as  of  Happiness.  It 
forms  an  attitude  towards  judgments  of  Value  and  the  ultimate 
ideal  of  Value  resulting  from  them,  precisely  analogous  to  the 
attitude  of  Scepticism  toward  judgments  of  Fact  and  the  ideal  of 
Truth.  In  each  case  there  seems  to  be  three  possible  attitudes  : 
affirmative  (gnostic — optimist),  negative  (sceptical — pessimist), 
and  agnostic  (or  «  critical').  But  the  third  may  be  reduced  to 
the  second.  Further,  the  question  of  ultimate  Fact  is  finally 
subordinate  to  that  of  ultimate  Value,  so  that  the  question  of 
Optimism  or  Pessimism  becomes  the  final  alternative  for  Phil- 
osophy. Pessimism,  however,  remains  secondary.  Practically, 
the  recognition  of  this  view  would  strengthen  Philosophy. 

The  Method  and  Standpoint  of  Ethics.     By  JAMES  SETH,  Cor- 
nell University. 

The  present  tendency  to  regard  Ethics  as  a  science  rather 
than  as  a  part  of  Philosophy  or  Metaphysics  is  a  reaction  from 
metaphysical  Ethics  of  Kant,  and  a  return  to  the  sounder  view 
of  Aristotle  and  of  the  earlier  British  school.  We  must,  how- 
ever, distinguish  two  types  or  groups  of  science,  the  Norma- 


126  FIFTH  ANNUAL  MEETING. 

tive  and  the  Natural.  The  normative  sciences  deal  with  our 
judgments  of  worth,  the  natural  sciences  with  our  judgments  of 
fact.  To  the  former  class  belong  Logic,  ^Esthetics  and  Ethics. 
Our  several  judgments  about  the  value  of  thoughts,  of  feelings, 
and  of  actions  are  reducible  to  a  common  denominator  of  Truth, 
of  Beauty  and  of  Goodness ;  the  discovery  of  this  unifying 
principle  and  the  construction  of  the  system  of  our  intellectual 
aesthetic  and  ethical  judgments  in  their  organic  relation  to  it,  is 
the  business  of  Logic,  of  Esthetics  and  of  Ethics  respectively. 
These  sciences  must  be  distinguished,  no  less  than  the  natural 
sciences,  from  Metaphysics,  whose  province  it  is  to  deal  with 
the  question  of  the  ultimate  validity  of  our  judgments,  whether 
they  are  judgments  of  fact  or  judgments  of  worth.  Both  the 
natural  and  the  normative  sciences  have  to  be  criticised  and 
correlated  by  Metaphysics,  whose  question  of  questions  is  that 
of  the  comparative  validity  of  the  Ought-judgments  and  the  Is- 
judgments  as  expressions  of  ultimate  Reality.  The  distinction 
here  insisted  upon  between  the  normative  and  the  natural 
sciences  is  not  a  difference  in  method,  but  only  in  subject-mat- 
ter. The  function  of  Ethics,  for  example,  is  like  that  of  Phys- 
ics, merely  to  organize  the  judgments  of  '  Common  Sense '  or 
ordinary  thought.  There  is  a  '  Common  Sense '  of  value,  as 
there  is  a  *  Common  Sense '  of  fact ;  and  there  is  a  science  of 
value,  as  there  is  a  science  of  fact.  It  is  not  possible  for  Ethics 
to  transcend  the  sphere  of  Common  Sense,  and  to  discover,  be- 
yond that  sphere,  a  Norm  or  standard  by  which  we  can  estab- 
lish or  invalidate  the  judgments  of  Common  Sense.  Like  all 
sciences,  Ethics  is  a  criticism  of  Common  Sense ;  but  it  is  an 
immanent  criticism,  a  self-criticism. 

A    Generalization  of  Immedite  Inferences.     By  JOHN  GRIER 

HIBBEN,  Princeton  University. 

When  we  have  given,  All  x  is  y,  it  is  possible  to  infer  im- 
mediately : 

(1)  The  Converse,  Somej  is  x. 

(2)  The  Obverse,  No  x  is  not-jy. 

(3)  The  Converted  Obverse,  No  not-jy  is  x. 

(4)  The  Contrapositive,  All  not-jy  is  not-A?. 


AMERICAN  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATION. 


I27 


(5)  The  Obverted  Converse,  Some^  is  not  not-* 

(6)  The  Inverse,  Some  not-*  is  notjy. 

(7)  The  Obverted  Inverse,  Some  not-.*  is  not-j. 

The  above  may  be  tabulated  in  the  following  square  of  Im- 
mediate Inferences : 

*  E  not-y 


or  I 


or  I 


O 


not-z 


The  letters  A,  E,  /,  or  O  indicate  that  the  two  terms  be- 
tween which  any  of  them  is  situated  may  be  joined  in  a  propo- 
sition of  the  form  represented  by  that  letter ;  and  in  every  case 
such  a  proposition  will  be  a  legitimate  inference  from  the  origi- 
nal proposition,  All  x  is  y. 

Thus  between  the  two  upper  terms  x  and  not-jy,  two  propo- 
sitions of  the  form  E  may  be  inferred  : 

No  x  is  not-y.  E. 
No  not-jy  is  x.  E. 

Between  the  two  lower  terms,  two  O  propositions  are 
possible : 

Some  y  is  not-x.  O. 
Some  not-*  is  not  y.  O. 

Reading  down  the  two  vertical  lines,  two  A  propositions : 

All  x  is  y.  A. 
All  not-j  is  not-*.  A. 

Reading  from  the  lower  to  the  upper  two  /  propositions : 

Some  y  is  x.  I. 
Some  not-*  is  not-_y.  /. 

Again  when  E  is  the  original  proposition,  nox  is  y,  all  the 
possible  inferences  may  be  comprehended  in  a  square  which  dif- 


128 


FIFTH  ANNUAL   MEETING. 


fers  from  the  one  above  only  by  interchanging  the  positions  of 
y  and  not-y.  This  is  in  accord  with  the  fact  that  an  A  propo- 
sition becomes  an  E  proposition  by  obversion,  in  which  pro- 
cess it  is  observed  that  not-y  displaces  y.  Given  no  x  isy,  we 
have : 

x  E  y 


A  or 


A  or  I 


not-y 


O 


not-* 


Forming  propositions  as  before  we  have  all  the  inferences 
from  an  E  proposition  : 

No  x  isy.  E  (the  original  proposition). 

No  y  is  x.  E 

Some  not-y  is  not  not-*.  O. 

Some  not-x  is  not  not-y.  O. 

All  x  is  not-jy.  A. 

All  y  is  not-.*1.  A. 

Some  not-y  is  x.  I. 

Some  not-A?  is  y.  I. 

When  /tis  given,  some  x  is  y.  We  have  the  A  and  E  in- 
ferences of  the  A  square  becoming  /  and  O  respectively ;  also 
the  horizontal  lines  are  to  be  read  from  left  to  right  only ;  and 
no  inference  is  possible  between  not-x  and  not-y. 

We  have  therefore  the  following  : 


o 


not-y 


O 


not-x 


AMERICAN  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATION. 


129 


The  possible  propositions  are  : 

Some  x  is  y.  I. 

Some  y  is  x.  I. 
Some  x  is  not  not-y.  O. 
Some  y  is  not  not-.*1.  O. 

Similarly  when   O  is  given,  some  x  is  not  y,  the  square  is 
the  same  as  the  /square  with  the  interchangejof  y  and  not-y, 

M  O  V 


not-y  O  not-* 

The  possible  propositions  are  : 

Some  x  is  not^.  O. 

Some  not-jy  is  not  not-.*1.  O. 

Some  x  is  not^y.  /. 

Some  not-jy  is  x.  I. 

[NOTE. — When  A  or  E  is  inferred,  the  weakened  form  /or 
O  is  always  possible.] 

The  Negative  in  Psychology  and  Logic.     By  A.  T.  ORMOND. 
Princeton  University. 
The  paper  is  summed  up  in  the  following  propositions : 

I.  That  the  theory  of  negation  is  involved  in  the  general 
theory  of  judgment,  which  must  be  considered  as  a  preliminary. 

II.  That  all  judgment  arises  out  of  volitional  grounds  and 
maintains  the  volitional  form  in  its  central  pulse  of  assertion. 

III.  That  the  differentiating  conditions  of  judgment  are  :  (a) 
the  rise  of  the  world  of  representation  as  objective,    (6)  the 
presence  of  some  interest  in  this  objective  world,  (c)  the  real 
subject  of  the  judgment  which  is  some  body  of  experience  or 
knowledge,  constituting  the   genus  or  universal  within  which 
the  judgment  function  acts. 


130  FIFTH  ANNUAL   MEETING. 

IV.  That  all  judgment  with  the  possible  exception  of  the 
simple  existential  is  disjunctive,  in  the  sense  that  it  is  concerned 
with    alternatives   in    a   larger    universe    in   which    these    are 
included. 

V.  That  negation  arises  along  with  affirmation  as  a  form  of 
the  self-assertion  of   the  real  subject.     The   assertion  of  this 
subject  motives  to  the  affirmation  and  negation. 

VI.  That  denial  arises  on  the  presentation  of  the  incompat- 
ible to  this  subject,  and  is  simply  the  act  of  removal  or  sup- 
pression by  means  of  which  the  subject  maintains  itself. 

VII.  That  denial  does  not  necessarily  presuppose  a  previous 
affirmation,  actual  or  supposed,  but  may  arise  directly  as  a  re- 
action against  the  incompatible,  just  as  we  may  assert  directly 
the  inequality  of  two  lines. 

VIII.  That   the  function  of   denial    must  be   distinguished 
from   its  implications.       In  its  function    denial  is    always   re- 
moval and  can  never  pass   into  affirmation.     By  implication, 
however,  affirmation  is  involved  in  various  degrees  in  denial. 

IX.  The  negative   affects  the  copula  of  a  judgment  rather 
than  its  predicate.     The  theory  that  the  negative  is  not  copular 
virtually  abolishes  negation  by  translating  all  judgment  into  the 
affirmative  form. 

X.  But  thinking  cannot  get  on  without  denial.     In  the  world 
of  alternatives  the  incompatible   arises.     In  presence  of  the  in- 
compatible, affirmation  is  powerless.     The  pulse  of  denial  is  as 
essential  to  thought  and  knowledge  as  is  that  of  affirmation. 

XL  But  while  the  functions  of  affirmation  and  denial  for- 
ever remain  distinct,  they  tend,  as  the  body  of  knowledge  in- 
creases in  scope  and  definiteness,  to  become  more  and  more 
closely  connected  in  their  implications. 

This  paper  will  appear  in  full  in  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  RE- 
VIEW. 

Address  of  the  President.    Subject :  The  'Knower  'in  Psychology. 

By  GEORGE  S.  FULLERTON,  University  of  Pennsylvania. 

An  examination  of  the  treatment  of  the  Self  in  its  func- 
tion of  'knower'  by  philosophers  and  psychologists,  and  a 
discussion  of  the  meaning  of  '  knowledge  '  in  psychology.  It 


AMERICAN  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATION.  131 

was  an  attempt  to  apply  to  this  problem  the  scientific  psycho- 
logical method  outlined  as  the  true  psychological  method  in  two 
earlier  papers  read  by  the  author  at  recent  meetings  of  the 
Association.  It  was  shown,  in  a  brief  historical  sketch  of  the 
development  of  the  idea  of  the  Self  in  the  history  of  philosophy, 
how  the  abstract  and  inconsistent  notions  which  usually  pass 
current  have  come  into  being.  The  author  then  turned  to 
modern  psychology,  and  first  criticised  the  notion  of  the  Self  as 
a  self-constitutive  activity,  which  comes  to  the  surface  in  the 
writings  of  the  Neo-Kantian  school,  finding  the  position  of  its 
advocates  inconsistent  and  untenable.  He  next  took  up  the  view 
of  the  Self  that  regards  it  as  a  noumenon,  or  a  something  to  be 
distinguished  from  the  phenomena  of  consciousness,  and  in  some 
sense  underlying  them,  taking  as  the  chief  subject  of  his  criti- 
cism the  recent  works  of  Professor  Ladd,  which  do  not,  it  is 
true,  hold  to  a  noumenal  self  in  a  bald  and  uncompromising 
form,  but  which,  in  his  opinion,  combine  this  notion  with  that 
held  by  the  Neo-Kantians,  and  with  a  third,  which  he  discussed 
later.  He  held  that  this  position  necessarily  leads  to  difficulties 
which  prove  its  untenability. 

Following  this,  he  referred  to  a  class  of  thinkers  which  he 
described  as  belonging  to  the  Humian  school,  using  that  term 
in  a  broad  sense  to  indicate  those  who  repudiate  noumena,  and 
accept  the  phenomena  of  consciousness  and  their  inter-relations 
as  furnishing  the  whole  material  with  which  the  psychologist 
has  to  deal.  He  referred  particularly  to  the  later  writings  of 
Wundt,  and  those  of  Ziehen,  Kiilpe  and  Titchener.  With  the 
general  position  taken  by  these  authors  he  expressed  himself  as 
in  substantial  harmony,  although  he  did  not  regard  them  as 
having  seen  the  full  significance  of  their  own  teachings  on  the 
question  of  the  nature  of  knowledge  either  for  psychology  or 
epistemology. 

The  latter  part  of  his  address,  embodying  his  own  positive 
conclusions,  maintained  that  the  attempts  to  explain  knowledge 
by  the  intervention  of  a  '  Knower '  of  either  the  noumenal  or  the 
Neo-Kantian  sort  are  based  upon  a  misunderstanding,  and  re- 
garded the  notion  of  the  abstract  and  inconsistent  '  Knower ' 
still  current  among  philosophers  and  psychologists  as  a  survival 


132  FIFTH  ANNUAL  MEETING. 

from,  and  development  of,  the  crude  notion  of  the  bodily  self 
which  precedes  the  beginning  of  reflection,  and  the  duplicate  of 
this  seen  in  the  animism  of  savage  races. 

[The  address  has  been  published  in  full  in  THE  PSYCHO- 
LOGICAL REVIEW  for  January,  1897.] 

PRELIMINARY  REPORT  OF  THE  COMMITTEE  ON  PHYSICAL  AND 
MENTAL  TESTS. 

The  Committee  on  Physical  and  Mental  Tests  appointed  at 
the  last  annual  meeting  of  this  Association  submits  the  follow- 
ing report : 

The  committee  has  drawn  up  a  series  of  physical  and  men- 
tal tests  which  is  regarded  as  especially  appropriate  for  college 
students  tested  in  a  psychological  laboratory.  The  same  series 
would  also  be  suitable  for  the  general  public  and,  with  some 
omissions  and  slight  modifications,  for  school  children.  The 
committee  has  had  in  view  a  series  of  tests  requiring  not  more 
than  one  hour  for  the  record  of  one  subject.  In  selecting  the 
tests  and  methods  the  committee  regarded  as  most  important 
those  which  seemed  likely  to  reveal  individual  differences  and 
development,  but  also  took  into  account  ease  and  quickness  in 
making  the  tests  and  in  interpreting  and  collating  the  results. 

Each  member  of  the  committee  selected  a  tentative  series  of 
tests.  The  report  includes  these  selections,  together  with  brief 
descriptions  of  methods.  After  each  test  and  method  are  placed 
the  initials  of  the  members  of  the  committee  recommending  it.* 

*  We  refer  especially  to  two  publications  for  descriptions  of  some  of  the 
tests:  Official  Catalogue  of  Exhibits,  Department  M.,  World's  Columbian  Ex- 
position, Section  of  Psychology,  Joseph  Jastrow  in  charge,  1893;  and  Physical 
and  Mental  Measurements  of  the  Students  of  Columbia  University,  J.  McKeen 
Cattell  and  Livingston  Farrand,  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW,  Nov.,  1896.  The 
following  papers  on  the  subject  may  also  be  mentioned:  "Mental  Tests  and 
Measurements,"  J.  McK.  Cattell,  with  an  appendix  by  Francis  Galton,  Mind, 
1890;  "  Zur  Individual  Psychologic,"  Hugo  Miinsterberg,  Centralblatt  f. 
Nervenheilkunde  und  Psychiatric,  1891 ;  "  Researches  on  the  Mental  and  Physi- 
cal Development  of  School  Children,"  J.  A.  Gilbert,  Studies  from  the  Yale 
Laboratory,  1895  ;  reported  also  by  E.  W.  Scripture,  Zeitschrift  f.  Psychologic, 
etc.,  X.,  1896,  and  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW,  III.,  1896;  Der  psycholo- 
gische  Versueh  in  der  Psychiatric,  Emil  Kraepelin,  Psychologische  Arbeiten, 
1895  ;  La  psychologic  individuelle,  A.  Binet  et  V.  Henri,  L'Annee psychologique, 
1896. 


AMERICAN  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATION.  133 

Preliminary  Data :  B.  C.  J.  S.  W. 

Date  of  birth;  birthplace;  birthplace  of  father;  birthplace  of 
mother;  occupation  (including  class  in  college,  or,  if  not  a  student, 
the  last  educational  institution  attended);  occupation  of  father;  any 
measurements  previously  made.  B.  C.  J.  S.  W. 

Color  of  eyes ;  color  of  hair ;  right  or  left-handed.     B.  C.  J.  S. 

Mother's  maiden  name;  number  of  brothers;  sisters;  order  of 
birth ;  age  of  parents  at  birth ;  birthplace  and  occupation  of  grandpar- 
ents. W. 

Two  schedules  of  observations  and  records  to  be  filled  in,  one  by 
the  recorder  and  one  by  the  subject,  as  in  the  Columbia  tests,  with 
such  modifications  as  experience  shall  make  desirable.  C. 

A  blank  to  be  filled  in  by  the  recorder,  noting  asymmetry  of  head 
or  body,  color  of  eyes  and  hair,  complexion,  degenerative  or  other 
stigmata  of  head,  eyes,  ears,  mouth,  teeth,  hands  or  feet,  posture,  gait, 
manner,  coordination  and  speech,  indications  of  intellectual,  emotional 
and  moral  characteristics.  W. 

Physical  Measurements :     B.  C.  J.  S.  W. 

Height,  weight  and  size  of  head.     B.  C.  J.  S.  W. 

Breathing  capacity.     C.  J.  S.  W. 

Height  sitting.     C.  W. 

The  measurements  should  be  made  in  the  metric  system.  The 
weight  should  be  taken  in  ordinary  indoor  clothing.  The  height 
should  have  the  height  of  the  heel  subtracted.  At  least  the  length 
and  breadth  of  the  head  should  be  measured.  B.  C.  S. 

Keenness  of  Vision :     B.  C.  J.  S.  W. 

The  maximum  distance  at  which  diamond  (4^  point)  numerals 
can  be  read  with  each  eye  singly.  B.  C.  J.  S. 

The  illumination  should  be  in  the  neighborhood  of  100  candle-me- 
ters ;  about  eight  out  of  ten  numerals  should  be  read  correctly  at  the 
rate  of  about  2  per  second.  The  minimum  distance  should  also  be 
determined,  if  possible.  B.  C. 

In  addition  or  as  a  substitute,  drawing  a  series  of  forms  as  recom- 
mended. J. 

Use  Snellen  Test-types.     B.  S. 

Some  other  substitute  for  these  tests,  to  be  suggested  after  satis- 
tory  trial.  W. 

Color  Vision :     B.  C.  J.  S.  W. 

Select  as  quickly  as  possible  four  greens  from  a  series  of  wools ; 
measure  the  time ;  if  long,  make  further  tests.  C. 


134  FIFTH  ANNUAL   MEETING. 

Combine  with  test  of  rate  of  perception  by  requiring  subject  to 
name,  as  rapidly  as  possible,  a  series  of  colors,  either  wools  or  papers. 
B.  W. 

Use  the  chart  exhibited  at  the  World's  Fair.     J. 

Keenness  of  Hearing:    B.  C.  J.  S.  W. 

The  distance  at  which  a  continuous  sound  can  be  heard  with  each 
ear  singly.  B.  C.  W. 

Use  some  artificial  external  meatus  if  the  test  is  to  show  small  dif- 
ferences in  sensibility.  W. 

The  sound  should  be  from  a  watch  reduced  to  a  standard.  An 
arrangement  should  be  used  by  which  it  can  be  periodically  cut  off 
without  the  knowledge  of  the  subject.  C.  S. 

Use  for  this  a  stop-watch.     B.  J.  S. 

I  endorse  the  stop-watch ;  it  can  be  manipulated  so  that  the  time 
is  recorded,  showing  how  long  it  took  the  subject  to  decide  that  the 
watch  has  stopped.  J. 

Perception  of  Pitch:  B.  C.  J.  S. 

Adjust  one  monochord  or  pipe  to  another,  the  tones  not  to  be 
sounded  simultaneously.  C.  J. 

Select  a  match  from  a  set  of  forks,  making  a  fixed  number  of 
vibrations  per  second  more  or  less  than  a  standard,  e.  g.,  standard 
5oov.  per  second;  other  forks  497,  497.5,  498,  498.5,  etc. ;  500,  500.5, 
501,  etc.  B.  S. 

I  prefer  the  adjustment  to  the  selection  method.  The  test  can  be 
made  with  two  Gilbert  tone-testers.  J. 

fineness  of  Touch :  C.  J.  S.  W. 

The  aesthesiometer  is  unsatisfactory ;  the  discrimination  of  rough- 
ness of  surfaces  and  touching  a  spot  previously  touched  should  be 
tried.  C.  J.  W. 

Sensitiveness  to  Pain :  B.  C.  J.  S.  W. 

The  gradually  increasing  pressure  that  will  just  cause  pain.  The 
point  or  points  in  the  body  to  be  used  to  be  agreed  upon.  B.  C.  J.W. 

Perception  of  Weight  or  of  Force  of  Movement:  B.  C.  J.  S.  W. 

Arrange  a  series  of  weights.  B.  J.  W.  With  and  without 
sight.  B. 

Make  movements  of  equal  force  and  determine  the  error.     C. 

The  best  method  still  to  be  developed.     J. 

Dynamometer   Pressure   of  Right  and   Left   Hands:     B.  C.  J. 
S.  W. 


AMERICAN  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATION.  135 

In  place  of  or  in  addition  to  the  ordinary  dynamometer  test  make 
movements  of  the  thumb  and  forefinger  and  continue  as  rapidly  as 
possible  for  fifteen  seconds.  B.  C. 

Use  mechanical  counter  for  this  and  take  reading  at  end  of  every 
minute.  S. 

Thumb  and  finger  dynamometer.  Record  best  and  worst  of  five 
trials.  W. 

Rate  of  Movement:  W. 

Distance  of  35  cm.  One  preliminary  trial  with  right  hand  in  ex- 
tension, then  two  trials  in  succession  of  R.  E.,  L.  F.,  L.  E.,  R.  F. 
Collate  shortest  of  two  trials  under  each  typical  movement.  W. 

Fatigue:  B.  C.  W. 

Muscular  exertion.     B.  W.     As  described  above.     C. 
Intellectual  exertion.     B.  W. 

Will  Power:  W. 

The  ability  of  the  subject  to  respond  after  fatigue  has  set  in  to  a 
suggestion  of  the  experimenter  with  an  extra  effort  of  will.  W. 

Voluntary  Attention : 

Test  by  simple  mental  operations  under  distraction.     B. 

Coincident  variations  in  Psycho-physical  process.     W. 

The  modifiability  of  the  knee  jerk,  or  of  a  sustained  bodily  pro- 
cess, such  as  rate  of  breathing  or  pulsation  of  a  volitional  muscular  or 
intellectual  process,  when  the  subject's  attention  is  engaged  by  some 
mental  content.  W. 

Measure  at  the  same  time  concentration  or  distraction  of  atten- 
tion. W. 

Right  and  Left  Movements :  J.  W. 

The  accuracy  with  which  movements  are  made  to  the  right  and  left. 
J-  W. 

Some  such  test  as  this  for  indication  of  right  and  left-handed- 
ness.  W. 

I  do  not  insist  on  this  test  as  one  of  great  importance.     J. 

Rapidity  of  Movement :     C.  J.  S.  W. 

Taps  on  a  telegraph  key.     J.  W. 

Movements  requiring  force,  as  described  above.     C. 

Make  short  marks  as  rapidly  as  possible  for  twenty  or  thirty  sec- 
onds, e.g.,  |  |  |  |  |  .  S. 

Trilling  with  two  fingers  and  with  five.     W. 


I36  FIFTH  ANNUAL  MEETING. 

Accuracy  of  Aim:     B.  J.  S.  W. 

Throwing  a  marble  at  a  target.     J. 

Or  striking  a  point  upon  the  table  with  a  pencil  point.     W. 

Touch  an  insulated  spot,  as  proposed  by  Scripture.  S.  B.  Also 
for  steadiness  of  hand.  B. 

Reaction-time  for  Sound:     B.  C.  J.  S.  W. 

The  reaction  to  be  made  with  the  right  hand  with  a  signal  about 
two  seconds  before  the  stimulus.  B.  C.  J.  W. 

Five  reactions  to  be  made  without  preliminary  practice ;  after  the 
reactions  have  been  made,  the  observer  to  be  asked  whether  the  direc- 
tion of  the  attention  was  motor  or  sensory.  B.  C. 

It  is  not  much  use  to  ask  for  direction  of  attention  with  most  sub- 
jects. W. 

Sensory  and  motor  reaction  with  instruction,  after  the  above  test. 
B. 

Reaction-time  with  Choice :     B.  J.  W. 
Use  card  sorting.     B.  J.  S. 

Rate  of  Discrimination  and  Movement :     B.  C.  J.  S.  W. 

100  A's  in  500  letters  to  be  marked  or  as  many  as  can  be  marked 
in  one  minute.  B.  C. 

One  out  of  a  number  of  geometrical  forms  to  be  marked :  deter- 
mine the  number  marked  in  90  seconds.  J.  W. 

Or  colors,  or  pictures  of  objects.     W. 

Quickness  of  Distinction  and  Movement:  B.  J.  S. 
Rate  at  which  cards  are  sorted.     B.  J.  S. 
Combine  with  reaction  with  choice.  B. 
With  the  effects  of  practice,  etc.,  as  proposed  by  Bergstrom.     S. 

Perception  of  Size :  C.  J.  S.  W. 

Draw  a  line  equal  to  a  model  line  5  cm.  in  length,  bisect  it,  erect 
a  perpendicular  of  the  same  length  and  bisect  the  right-hand  angle. 
C.J. 

Perception  of  Time:  B.  C.  J.  S.  W. 

The  accuracy  with  which  a  standard  interval  of  time,  say  ten  or 
twenty  seconds,  can  be  reproduced.  C.  W. 

Thirty  seconds  or  one  minute.     W. 

Memory:  B.  C.  J.  S.  W. 

The  accuracy  with  which  eight  numerals  heard  once  can  be  re- 
produced and  the  accuracy  with  which  a  line  drawn  by  the  observer 


AMERICAN  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATION.  137 

at  the  beginning  of  the  hour  can  be  reproduced  at  the  end  of  the  hour. 

C.  W. 

Line  to  be  identified  (not  drawn).     Ten  numerals  to  be  used.    B. 

Nine  numerals.     S. 

A  combined  test  of  memory,  association  and  finding  time  as  de- 
scribed in  the  catalogue  of  the  Columbian  Exposition.  J.  W. 

Accuracy  of  observation  and  recollection  as  proposed  by  Cattell 
and  by  Bolton.  J.  W. 

Memory-type:  B. 

Variations  in  use  of  10  numerals;  method  as  follows: 

1 .  Show  numerals  in  chance  order  and  have  subject  write  them 
from  memory  after  a  small  interval. 

2.  Speak  numerals  in  chance  order  and  have  subject  write  them 
from  memory  after  the  interval. 

3.  Show  and  speak  in  chance  order  and  have  subject  write  them 
from  memory  after  the  interval. 

4.  Show  and  have  the  subject  speak  them  and  then  write  them 
from  memory  after  the  interval. 

Compare  the  results  for  indications  of  memory  type  and  kind  of 
imagery  preferred.  Question  the  subject  as  to  his  mental  material  in 
each  case.  B. 

Apperception  Test  of  Ebbinghaus.     B. 

Imagery:  B.  C.  J.  S.  W. 

Questions  proposed  in  the  Columbia  tests.     C. 

Methods  should  be  worked  out  more  fully.     B.  C.  J.  W. 

Cf.  Method  under  preceding  head.     B. 

Make  memory  span  tests,  showing  and  speaking  the  digits  at  the 
same  time,  and  ask  the  subject  which  sense  (sight  or  hearing)  he 
found  himself  using,  and  if  either  seemed  to  him  a  distraction.  S. 

The  committee  urges  that  such  tests  be  made,  so  far  as  pos- 
sible, in  all  psychological  laboratories.  It  does  not  recommend 
that  the  same  tests  be  made  everywhere,  but,  on  the  contrary, 
advises  that,  at  the  present  time,  a  variety  of  tests  be  tried,  so 
that  the  best  ones  may  be  determined.  Those  who  make  tests 
which  they  regard  as  desirable  are  requested  to  send  these  with 
sufficient  description  to  the  committee. 

The  committee  hopes  that  the  tests  proposed  may  be  dis- 


138  FIFTH  ANNUAL   MEETING. 

cussed  fully  at  the  present  meeting  of  the  Association,  and  asks 
that  the  present  committee  be  continued  for  another  year. 

(Signed,) 

J.  MARK  BALDWIN, 
JOSEPH  JASTROW, 
E.  C.  SANFORD, 
LIGHTNER  WITHER, 
J.  McKEEN  CATTELL,  Chairman. 

OFFICERS  AND  MEMBERS  OF  THE  AMERICAN  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSO- 
CIATION, 1897. 

President,  Professor  J.  Mark  Baldwin,  Princeton  University.    Sec 
retary  and  Treasurer,  Dr.  Livingston  Farrand,  Columbia  University. 

Council,  term  expiring  1897 — Professor  G.  T.  Ladd,  Yale  Uni- 
versity, Professor  J.  McK.  Cattell,  Columbia  University;  term  ex- 
piring 1898 — Professor  E.  H.  Griffin,  Johns  Hopkins  University, 
Professor  E.  C.  Sanford,  Clark  University;  term  expiring  1899 — 
Professor  Josiah  Royce,  Harvard  University,  Professor  Joseph  Jastrow, 
University  of  Wisconsin. 


LIST   OF  MEMBERS. 

AIKINS,  DR.  H.  AUSTIN,  Western  Reserve  University,  Cleveland, 
Ohio. 

ALBEE,  DR.  ERNEST,  Cornell  University,  Ithaca,  N.  Y. 

ALEXANDER,  PROFESSOR  ARCHIBALD,  10  W.  54th  Street,  New  York 
City. 

ANGELL,  PROFESSOR  J.  R.,  University  of  Chicago,  Chicago,  111. 

ARMSTRONG,  PROFESSOR  A.  C.,  JR.,  Wesleyan  University,  Middle- 
town,  Conn. 

BAKEWELL,  DR.  C.  F.,  Harvard  University,  Cambridge,  Mass. 

BALDWIN,  PROFESSOR  J.  MARK,  Princeton  University,  Princeton,  N.  J. 

BIGHAM,  DR.  JOHN,  DePauw  University,  Greencastle,  Ind. 

BLISS,  DR.  C.  B.,  University  of  the  City  of  New  York,  New  York 
City. 

BOAS,  DR.  FRANZ,  Museum  of  Natural  History,  New  York  City. 

BRYAN,  PROFESSOR  W.  L.,  Indiana  University,  Bloomington,  In- 
diana. 

BUCHNER,  DR.  E.  F.,  Yale  University,  New  Haven,  Conn. 


AMERICAN  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATION.  139 

BUCK,  MR.  A.  F.,  Union  College,  Schenectady,  N.  Y. 

BURNHAM,  DR.  W.  H.,  Clark  University,  Worcester,  Mass. 

BUTLER,  PROFESSOR  N.  M.,  Columbia  University,  New  York  City. 

CALKINS,  Miss  M.  W.,  Wellesley  College,  Wellesley,  Mass. 

CATTELL,  PROFESSOR  J.  McKsEN,  Columbia  University,  New  York 
City. 

CHRYSOSTOM,  BROTHER,  Manhattan  College,  Grand  Boulevard  and 
13151  Street,  New  York  City. 

COPE,  PROFESSOR  E.  D.,  University  of  Pennsylvania,  Philadel- 
phia, Pa. 

COWLES,  DR.  E.,  McLean  Hospital,  Somerville,  Mass. 

CRAWFORD,  MR.  J.  F.,  Princeton  University,  Princeton,  N.  J. 

CREIGHTON,  PROFESSOR  J.  E.,  Cornell  University,  Ithaca,  N.  Y. 

DANA,  PROFESSOR  CHARLES  L.,  Post-Graduate  Medical  School,  New 
York  City. 

DELABARRE,  PROFESSOR  E.  B.,  Brown  University,  Providence, 
R.  I. 

DEWEY,  PROFESSOR  JOHN,  University  of  Chicago,  Chicago,  111. 

DONALDSON,  PROFESSOR  H.  H.,  University  of  Chicago,  Chicago,  111. 

DUNCAN,  PROFESSOR  G.  M.,  Yale  University,  New  Haven,  Conn. 

FARRAND,  DR.  LIVINGSTON,  Columbia  University,  New  York  City. 

FITE,  PROFESSOR  WARNER,  Williams  College,  Williamstown,  Mass. 

FRANKLIN,  MRS.  CHRISTINE  LADD,  1507  Park  Ave.,  Baltimore, 
Md. 

FRENCH,  PROFESSOR  F.  C.,  Vassar  College,  Poughkeepsie,  N.  Y. 

FULLERTON,  PROFESSOR  G.  S.,  University  of  Pennsylvania,  Phila- 
delphia, Pa. 

GARDINER,   PROFESSOR  H.  N.,  Smith  College,  Northampton,  Mass. 

GILMAN,  DR.  B.  I.,  Museum  of  Fine  Arts,  Boston,  Mass. 

GRIFFIN,  PROFESSOR  E.  H.,  Johns  Hopkins  University,  Baltimore, 
Md. 

HALL,  PRES.  G.  STANLEY,  Clark  University,  Worcester,  Mass. 

HAMLIN,  DR.  ALICE  J.,  Mt.  Holyoke  College,  South  Hadley,  Mass. 

HIBBEN,  PROFESSOR  J.  G.,  Princeton  University,  Princeton,  N.  J. 

HODGE,  DR.  C.  W.,  Princeton  University,  Princeton,  N.  J. 

HUME,  PROFESSOR  J.  G.,  University  College,  Toronto,  Canada. 

HYSLOP,  PROFESSOR  J.  H.,  Columbia  University,  New  York  City. 

IRONS,  DR.  DAVID,  University  of  Vermont,  Burlington,  Vt. 

JAMES,  PROFESSOR  W.,  95  Irving  Street,  Cambridge,  Mass. 

JASTROW,  PROFESSOR  JOSEPH,  University  of  Wisconsin,  Madison, 
Wis. 


140  FIFTH  ANNUAL  MEETING. 

JOHNSON,  PROFESSOR  R.  B.,  Miami  University,  Oxford,  O. 
JUDD,  DR.  C.  H.,  Wesleyan  University,  Middletown,  Conn. 
KIRKPATRICK,  MR.  E.  A.,  Winona,  Minn. 

KIRSCHMANN,  DR.  A.,  University  of  Toronto,  Toronto,  Canada. 
KROHN,  PROFESSOR  W.  O.,  University  of  Illinois,  Champaign,  111. 
LADD,  PROFESSOR  G.  T.,  Yale  University,  New  Haven,  Conn. 
LLOYD,  MR.  A.  H.,  University  of  Michigan,  Ann  Arbor,  Mich. 
LOUGH,  MR.  J.  E.,  Harvard  University,  Cambridge,  Mass. 
MACDONALD,  DR.  ARTHUR,  Bureau  of  Education,  Washington,  D.  C. 
MACDOUGALL,  DR.  ROBERT,  Western  Reserve  University,  Cleveland, 

Ohio. 

MARSHALL,  MR.  HENRY  RUTGERS,  874  Broadway,  New  York  City. 
MEAD,  PROFESSOR  GEORGE  H.,  University  of  Chicago,  Chicago,  111. 
MEZES,  PROFESSOR  SIDNEY  E.,  University  of  Texas,  Austin,  Texas. 
MILLER,  DR.  DICKINSON  S.,  Bryn  Mawr  College,  Bryn  Mawr,  Pa. 
MILLS,  PROFESSOR  WESLEY,  McGill  University,  Montreal,  Canada. 
MINOT,  PROFESSOR  C.  S.,  Harvard  Medical  School,  Boston,  Mass. 
MUNSTERBERG,   PROFESSOR  HUGO,  Harvard  University,  Cambridge, 

Mass. 
NEWBOLD,    PROFESSOR  W.   ROMAINE,  University  of   Pennsylvania, 

Philadelphia,  Pa. 

NICHOLS,  DR.  HERBERT,  3  Berkeley  St.,  Cambridge,  Mass. 
NOYES,  DR.  WM.,  Boston  Insane  Hospital,   Pierce  Farm,  Mattapan, 

Mass. 

ORMOND,  PROFESSOR  A.  T.,  Princeton  University,  Princeton,  N.  J. 
PACE,  PROFESSOR  E.,  Catholic  University,  Washington,  D.  C. 
PALMER,  PROFESSOR  G.  H.,  Harvard  University,  Cambridge,  Mass. 
PATRICK,  PROFESSOR  G.  T.  W.,  University  of  Iowa,  Iowa  City,  Iowa. 
PIERCE,  MR.  EDGAR,  3  Thompson  Street,  Ann  Arbor,  Mich. 
ROYCE,  PROFESSOR  JOSIAH,  Harvard  University,  Cambridge,  Mass. 
SANFORD,  PROFESSOR  E.  C.,  Clark  University,  Worcester,  Mass. 
SCHILLER,  MR.  F.  C.  S.,  Cornell  University,  Ithaca,  N.  Y. 
SCHURMAN,  PRES.  J.  G.,  Cornell  University,  Ithaca,  N.  Y. 
SETH,  PROFESSOR  JAMES,  Cornell  University,  Ithaca,  N.  Y. 
SHOREY,  PROFESSOR  PAUL,  University  of  Chicago,  Chicago,  111. 
SINGER,  DR.  E.  A.,  University  of  Pennsylvania,  Phila.,  Pa. 
SMITH,  DR.  W.  G.,  Smith  College,  Northampton,  Mass. 
SNEATH,    PROFESSOR  E.   HERSHEY,  Yale   University,  New  Haven, 

Conn. 
STANLEY,  PROFESSOR  H.  M.,  Lake  Forest  University,  Lake  Forest, 

I1L 


AMERICAN  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ASSOCIATION.  141 

STARR,  PROFESSOR  M.  ALLEN,  22  West  48th  Street,  New  York  City. 
STRONG,  PROFESSOR  C.  A.,  Columbia  University,  New  York  City. 
TAWNEY,  PROFESSOR  G.  A.,  Beloit  College,  Beloit,  Wis. 
WARREN,  PROFESSOR  H.  C.,  Princeton  University,  Princeton,  N.  J. 
WASHBURN,  DR.  MARGARET,  Wells  College,  Aurora,  N.  Y. 
WILDE,  DR.  NORMAN,  Columbia  University,  New  York  City. 
WITMER,  PROFESSOR  LIGHTNER,  University  of  Pennsylvania,  Phila., 

Pa. 
WOLFE,  PROFESSOR  H.  K.,  University  of  Nebraska,  Lincoln,  Neb. 

Members  will  please  notify  the  Secretary  of  any  errors  in  names 
or  addresses  as  given  in  the  above  list. 


UPRIGHT   VISION. 

BY  PROF.  JAMES   H.   HYSLOP. 
Columbia   University. 

The  present  paper  discussing  the  problem  of  upright  vision 
directly  has  been  suggested  by  what  I  have  already  said  in  a 
previous  number  of  the  PSYCHOLOGICAL,  REVIEW  in  regard  to 
Dr.  Stratton's  experiments.  I  wish  here  to  discuss  the  whole 
question  on  its  own  merits  and  without  regard  to  anything  that  has 
occurred  in  that  connection,  and  the  first  task  must  be  to  show 
just  what  the  problem  really  is.  In  order  to  do  this  effectively 
it  may  be  well  to  look  a  moment  at  its  origin,  after  stating  the 
form  in  which  the  question  is  usually  put  for  an  answer.  It  is : 
'  'Why  are  all  things  seen  upright  when  the  image  on  the  retina 
is  inverted  ?" 

Before  I  get  through  I  shall  endeavor  to  show  that  this  way 
of  putting  the  question  easily  leads  to  an  illusion  in  regard  to 
the  nature  of  the  problem,  but  for  the  present,  taking  it  as  per- 
fectly intelligible,  we  may  further  ask  how  such  a  question  ever 
came  to  be  put  at  all  ?  No  one  ever  thought  of  asking  it  until 
the  discovery  was  made  that  the  eye  is  really  a  camera  obscura 
which  inverts  its  images.  The  problem  created  by  the  emana- 
ting corpuscles  of  Democritus  and  by  the  etherial  vibrations  be- 
tween the  object  and  the  eye  did  not  suggest  it,  and  probably 
could  not,  as  the  formation  and  inversion  of  the  image  was  not 
known  until  the  property  of  lenses  was  known.  Nothing  anoma- 
lous in  the  phenomena  of  vision  was  suspected  before  the  fact 
of  refraction  was  recognized.  But  as  soon  as  it  was  discovered 
that  the  image  on  the  retina  was  inverted,  the  apparent  anomaly 
at  once  suggested  the  question  why  the  object  was  seen  upright 
when  the  image  is  inverted,  and  various  theories  have  been  in- 
vented to  explain  the  phenomenon.  Among  them  we  have  the 
ocular  movement  theory,  the  projection  theory,  the  re-inversion 
142 


UPRIGHT   VISION. 


'43 


theory,  and  the  theory  of  correction  by  experience  in  connec- 
tion with  touch.  The  last  theory  holds  that  in  respect  of  visual 
functions,  the  inversion  of  the  retinal  image  is  not  necessary  to 
upright  vision,  but  that  the  conception  of  uprightness  is  the 
product  of  experience  and  that  naturally  we  may  or  do  perceive 
things  upside  down. 

This  view  of  the  case,  and  the  question  creating  the  problem 
or  supposing  that  the  phenomenon  is  anomalous,  are  founded 
upon  two  illusions.  The  first  of  these  illusions  is  that,  to  be  in- 
telligible to  our  minds,  the  process  ought  not  to  involve  an  inver- 
sion of  the  retinal  image.  Until  it  was  discovered  that  the  eye 
was  a  camera  it  was  natural  to  conceive  the  process  after  the 
analogy  of  touch,  this  conception  being  modified  by  the  idea  of 
vibrations.  There  were  metaphysical  and  idealistic  puzzles 
enough  in  the  phenomenon,  and  perhaps  also  epistemological 
problems,  but  more  for  psychology  or  perception  as  a  fact.  In 
touch  we  were  accustomed  to  a  perfect  correspondence  between 
the  impression  upon  the  sensorium  and  the  object  producing  it. 
There  was  apparent  no  disparity  or  inversion  of  relations. 
The  space  relations  of  impression  and  object  were  taken  or 
known  to  be  symmetrical  and  nothing  seemed  to  be  anomalous 
about  them.  But  as  soon  as  it  was  found,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
that  the  retinal  image  is  inverted — that  is,  its  position  reversed 
from  that  of  the  real  object — the  question  arose  how  we  could 
see  the  object  upright. 

Now  it  is  to  be  noted  that  the  question  was  not,  how  this  retinal 
image  becomes  inverted,  because  we  have  no  immediate  knowl- 
edge of  the  fact,  and  so  it  could  not  be  a  problem.  Its  exist- 
ence was  simply  inferred  as  a  necessary  result  of  what  is  known 
of  the  property  of  lenses,  though  it  was  easily  confirmed  by  ex- 
periment after  the  fact  was  inferred  as  a  consequence  of  the  nature 
of  the  eye.  Hence  the  reason  for  the  inversion  of  the  image  was 
explained  before  its  existence  could  be  demonstrated  empirically, 
or  at  least  it  could  be  explained.  Hence  the  anomaly  did  not 
consist  in  the  fact  of  inversion,  but  in  the  relation  of  this  fact  to  the 
opposite  relation  of  the  object,  and  the  question  arose,  How  does 
perception  take  place  under  these  conditions  ?  Or  why  do  we  see 
the  object  in  an  upright  position  when  the  retinal  image  is  inverted  ? 


144  JAMES  H.  HYSLOP. 

But  what  precisely  does  the  question  mean?  Does  it  ask  for 
the  explanation  of  an  anomaly?  After  all,  is  not  the  question 
essentially  absurd?  It  certainly  does  not  appear  so  to  those 
who  ask  it.  But  the  reason  is  an  unconscious  assumption  which 
creates  the  whole  problem  to  be  solved,  but  which  may  have  no 
ground  upon  which  to  rest.  It  is  the  assumption  that  in  order 
not  to  be  an  anomalous  phenomenon  the  object  and  the  image 
ought  to  correspond.  The  old  Democritean  view  of  perception 
involved  precisely  this  conception  of  the  case :  the  lidwha  im- 
printed themselves  on  the  eye,  we  should  say  retina.  The  un- 
dulatory  theory  of  light  hardly  altered  the  conception,  except 
for  metaphysics.  There  was  here  the  idea  of  correspondence 
between  image  and  object,  whether  rightly  or  wrongly  assumed. 
Of  course,  as  soon  as  this  assumed  correspondence  was  dis- 
proved, there  would  arise  the  conception  of  something  anoma- 
lous, and  the  question  mentioned  would  arise.  As  long  as  the 
phenomenon  of  vision  did  not  appear  thus  exceptional,  there 
would  not  be  anything  to  suggest  that  it  was  a  non-natural  fact. 
Upright  vision  would  be  taken  as  a  matter  of  course.  But  the 
moment  that  it  appeared  as  an  exception  to  what  it  was  sup- 
posed it  ought  to  be,  instead  of  supposing  that  this  was  just  as 
natural  as  any  other  process,  the  assumption  was  made  that  we 
ought  to  see  things  the  inverse  of  what  we  do  as  a  fact,  and  that 
experience  corrects  the  illusion.  Instead  of  supposing  that  the 
old  assumption  or  conception  of  the  process  was  an  illusion,  men 
were  disposed  to  accept  it  as  the  standard  by  which  to  judge  the 
anomalous  character  of  the  facts,  and  rushed  off  to  experience 
to  correct  or  change  what  was  supposed  to  be  the  natural  per- 
ception of  the  infant ! 

I  do  not  say  that  all  persons  conceived  the  question  exactly 
in  this  way ;  for  there  were  some  who  still  supposed  the  process 
to  be  natural  enough,  but  regarded  it  nevertheless  either  as 
anomalous  or  as  presenting  special  features  which  required  ex- 
planation. Where  it  was  felt  to  be  anomalous,  even  if  natural, 
it  was  judged  somewhat  after  the  analogy  of  touch.  In  this 
sense  the  correspondence  between  the  impression  and  the  object 
was  such  as  to  bring  into  bold  relief  the  opposition  in  vision ; 
and  the  natural  tendency  was  either  to  go  to  experience  for  the 


UPRIGHT.    VISION.  I4> 

adjustment  of  the  two  sets  of  phenomena  to  the  same  law,  or  to 
some  anomalous  function  in  sight  to  compensate  for  the  deviation 
of  the  law  of  touch.  This  was  making  touch  the  standard  of 
what  is  natural,  just  as  Berkeley  did  in  the  matter  of  space  per- 
ception. But  what  right  have  we  to  judge  vision  by  any  such 
assumption  ?  Might  not  upright  vision  be  just  as  natural  with 
the  inversion  of  retinal  images  as  the  symmetrical  relation  in 
touch.  Why  should  we  judge  the  law  of  one  sense  by  that  of 
another?  Does  not  the  action  of  each  sense  suffice  for  itself, 
and  is  it  not  an  assumption  requiring  justification  that  the  proc- 
ess of  vision  may  be  rendered  intelligible  by  tactual  analogies  ? 
There  is  a  deep-rooted,  and  perhaps  legitimate,  impression  that 
there  is  some  sort  of  unity  between  the  senses,  and  this  we  may 
be  able  to  establish  in  the  conclusion.  But  no  such  unity  can 
be  assumed  as  would  either  identify  their  percepts  or  necessitate 
the  same  law  of  action  between  them,  and  as  long  as  this  is  the 
fact  there  will  be  no  intrinsic  reason  in  the  fact  of  inverted 
images  to  justify  our  assumption,  so  frequently  made,  that  it  is 
anomalous,  and  contary  to  our  ordinary  notion  of  perception  as 
drawn  from  the  impressions  of  touch.  That  this  comparison 
should  be  made  is  an  illusion,  perhaps  pardonable  enough,  but 
still  an  illusion. 

This  illusion  is  reinforced,  perhaps  in  some  cases  created, 
by  a  very  interesting  ambiguity.  This  is  in  the  conception  of 
'  uprightness.'  The  idea  of  '  uprightness  '  denotes  a  relation  to 
the  earth,  which  is  assumed  to  represent  the  natural  and  uniform 
position  of  bodies.  I  might  have  said  a  relation  to  gravitation, 
which  undoubtedly  expresses  the  case  for  most  persons,  who 
come  to  know  that  uprightness  is  merely  relative  to  a  point  at 
the  earth's  center,  and  determined  by  gravity,  and  not  an  abso- 
lute position  in  space.  Now  the  most  invariable  of  all  the  ex- 
periences by  which  we  estimate  the  direction  of  gravity  is  our 
own  sense  of  weight.  We  can  determine  it  by  the  visual  per- 
ception of  falling  bodies,  but  movements  in  the  visual  field, 
until  we  learn  the  ultimate  influence  of  gravity  on  the  bodies 
thus  moving,  would  hardly  suggest  gravity  so  soon  or  so  forcibly 
as  the  absolutely  constant  sense  of  weight  and  the  limitations 
upon  free  personal  movement  in  space.  Then  the  final  discovery 


H6  JAMES  H.  HYSLOP. 

from  the  general  result  of  all  experiences,  that  gravitation  defines 
a  line  of  direction  or  position  for  all  bodies  in  relation  to  the 
earth,  creates  the  idea  that  '  uprightness '  is  this  line  and  it  be- 
comes convertible  with  the  tactual  and  muscular  sensations  which 
are  the  constant  and  surest  determinants  of  it,  though  vision 
gives  a  line  of  direction  which  coincides  with  it.  But  we  con- 
ceive it  as  related  to  gravitation  rather  than  as  any  mere  fact  of 
the  visual  field  alone.  It  is  true,  however,  that  the  idea  of  up- 
rightness can  have  the  same  meaning  for  vision  as  for  touch,  in 
the  sense  that  it  means  merely  a  reference  to  the  direction  of 
gravitation.  But  this  is  not  because  the  sensations  or  experiences 
determining  it  are  in  any  respect  like  each  other.  It  is  because 
one  of  them  may  always  be  taken  as  the  associate  of  the  other, 
or  as  an  index  of  its  possibility.  They  become  associated  by 
their  synthetic  unity  in  perception,  and  when  any  question  is 
raised  as  to  the  validity  of  one  of  them  it  is  natural  to  refer  to 
its  associate  as  an  index  of  what  the  one  in  question  means.  In 
this  way,  when  the  question  how  we  perceive  uprightness 
under  the  conditions  mentioned  is  raised,  in  view  of  the  sceptical 
implications  of  the  question  itself,  and  the  desire  to  obtain  an  ex- 
planation without  simply  restating  the  fact  itself  in  a  mysterious 
form,  it  was  natural  to  resort  to  the  tactual  process  for  the  datum 
with  which  the  visual  sensation  is  associated  and  which  repre- 
sents the  uprightness.  But  the  fact  is  that  the  visual  conception 
of  uprightness  is  just  as  definite  a  content  of  visual  experience 
as  the  tactual  is  of  touch,  and  it  would  never  have  any  connec- 
tion with  the  latter  but  for  the  uniformities  of  certain  experiences. 
This  aside,  however,  the  fact  that  vision  can  determine  independ- 
ently of  touch  a  relation  to  gravitation,  as  a  notion  of  upright- 
ness, is  sufficient  to  show  that  the  datum  is  not  necessarily  tac- 
tual, so  that,  however  valuable  it  may  be  to  use  touch  for  explain- 
ing the  synthetic  conception  of  uprightness,  it  still  remains  to 
explain  the  visual  process  within  the  limits  of  that  sense. 

But  this  reference  of  the  term  uprightness  to  the  direction  of 
gravity,  or  the  direction  which  gravity  determines,  and  to  the 
same  relation  expressed  in  tactual  and  muscular  experiences  of 
a  certain  order,  leads  to  an  entire  misunderstanding  of  the  real 
question  by  making  us  think  of  uprightness  as  felt,  when  the 


UPRIGHT   VISION.  147 

visual  problem  uses  the  term,  not  necessarily  to  express  the  direc- 
tion of  gravity  in  harmony  with  touch,  but  the  inverted  position  of 
that  relation  in  the  image,  whether  it  represents  a  line  in  ref- 
erence to  gravity  or  not.  It  happens  in  normal  experience  that 
the  objects  we  see  in  vertically  linear  extension  are  arranged 
with  reference  to  the  direction  of  gravity  and  we  call  them  'up- 
right.' That  is,  visual  uprightness  and  the  uprightness  of  gravity 
coincide,  while  that  of  touch  coincides  with  the  same  objec- 
tive reality,  and  when  the  retinal  image  appears  inverted 
we  ask  how  the  object  can  be  seen  in  the  inverse  position 
under  these  conditions,  but  instead  of  saying  'inverse'  we 
say  '  upright '  and  create  the  liability  of  confusion  either  with 
tactual  and  muscular  uprightness  or  with  the  adjustment  of 
tactual  and  muscular  experience  to  the  visual.  The  way  to 
avoid  this  confusion  is  to  examine  the  phenomena  themselves 
upon  which  the  problem  is  based  and  to  remark  that  it  can  be 
stated  without  using  the  word  '  upright'  at  all.  Now  when  we 
note  the  relation  between  the  object  and  the  retinal  image  we  do 
not  require  to  ask  how  we  see  things  upright,  but  how  do  we 
see  things  in  a  certain  relation  when  the  retinal  image  repre- 
sents the  inverse  relation.  The  term  '  upright'  does  not  appear 
here,  nor  is  there  any  reference  to  the  real  direction  which  it 
represents  in  relation  to  either  gravity  or  the  other  senses.  In 
the  visual  problem,  therefore,  the  term  ought  either  not  to  be 
used  at  all  or  it  must  be  understood  to  mean  nothing  but  the  in- 
verse of  the  relation  of  the  image  on  the  retina.  In  this  way 
we  see  that  all  the  associated  conceptions  of  other  senses  are 
excluded,  and  there  remains  nothing  but  the  real  or  apparent 
anomaly  of  opposition  between  the  position  of  real  objects  and 
that  of  retinal  images. 

I  have  dwelt  at  length  on  the  illusions  and  the  true  concep- 
tion of  the  problem,  because  it  is  necessary  to  clear  away,  once  for 
all,  all  those  experiments  and  theories  of  the  process  which  are 
determined  by  a  reference  to  tactual  and  muscular  adjustments 
to  visual  objects.  They  are  designed  to  prove  that  the  inversion 
of  the  image  is  not  normally  necessary  to  the  perception  of 
things  as  we  see  them,  but  that  when  reversed  by  artificial 
means  we  easily  learn  to  adapt  ourselves  to  these  new  conditions. 


I4*>  JAMES  H.  HYSLOP. 

The  adaptation  is  true  enough  as  a  fact,  but  it  is  not  relevant  to 
the  problem.  Nor  in  speaking,  as  I  do,  of  what  such  attempts  at 
experiment  and  theory  imply  in  favor  of  empiricism,  do  I  mean  to 
imply  my  own  denial  of  the  influence  of  experience  in  correct- 
ing what  might  be  the  original  appearance  of  things  to  sight. 
I  mean  only  to  state  the  case  so  that  we  can  see  that,  however 
much  experience  may  have  to  do  with  the  adjustment  of  touch 
to  the  visual  field,  we  have  not  in  this  any  fact  from  which  we 
can  justly  infer  that  experience  corrects  the  original  perception 
of  vision  and  enables  us  to  see  things  the  inverse  of  what  they 
once  appeared,  as  it  would  be  necessary  to  maintain  if  we  af- 
firmed the  proposition  that  the  inversion  of  the  image  is  not 
normally  necessary  to  upright  vision.  Within  the  limits  of 
sight  a  man  may  hold  what  opinion  he  pleases  on  the  point.  I 
am  not  at  present  denouncing  empiricism  within  such  limits,  but 
only  the  inference  from  the  experiential  nature  of  adjust- 
ment to  sight  to  the  experiential  nature  of  the  process 
in  sight.  Whether  the  visual  process  is  native  or  empirical 
will  have  to  be  determined  by  phenomena  wholly  within  the 
range  of  that  sense,  and  it  is  an  entire  misconception  of  the 
problem  to  talk  about  any  tactual  or  muscular  adjustments  to 
visual  impressions.  Ocular  movements  might  appear  relevant, 
but  no  others  are  relevant  that  involve  a  visual  judgment  of  co- 
existence in  space. 

Now,  having  shown  that  tactual  experiences  are  not  relevant, 
but  give  rise  to  an  illusion  in  the  problem,  we  may  examine  the 
assumption  of  empiricism  wholly  within  the  limits  of  visual  phe- 
nomena. If  we  assume  that  experience  corrects  the  original 
perception  of  vision  by  supposing  that  the  inversion  of  the 
retinal  image  is  not  necessary  to  '  upright '  vision,  we  imply  that 
originally  there  was  complete  correspondence  between  image 
and  object,  as  between  tactual  impression  and  object.  This  is 
the  assumption  of  a  created  function  wholly  supplanted  by  ex- 
perience. But  what  facts  justify  such  an  assumption?  There 
is  absolutely  no  fact  to  justify  it  except  the  a  priori  idea  of  the 
analogy  between  touch  and  sight,  or  those  stories  which  we 
occasionally  hear  about  the  inversion  of  objects  in  case  of  dis- 
ease, which  require  to  be  much  better  verified  and  analyzed  be- 


UPRIGHT   VISION.  149 

fore  they  are  entitled  to  use  in  this  connection.1  We  should 
never  suspect  the  influence  of  experience  in  the  case  were  it  not 
for  the  unwarranted  and  unjustifiable  assumption  following  in 
the  wake  of  the  theories  of  Democritus  and  the  undulatory  na- 
ture of  light.  Here  we  took  for  granted  the  identity  of  the  re- 
lation between  impression  and  object  in  the  senses  of  touch 
and  sight,  and  allow  an  apparent  anomaly  to  convince  us  of  the 
influence  of  experience,  when  we  might  just  as  well  have 
abandoned  the  assumption  of  the  nativity  of  the  correspondence 
between  them.  The  fact  is  that  it  was  experience  and  a  -priori 
reasoning  that  led  us  to  suppose  that  the  phenomenon  was 
anomalous  at  all,  when  we  ought  to  have  seen  that  it  repre- 
sented the  natural  condition  of  things,  and  that  any  correspond- 
ence in  symmetry  between  retinal  images  and  objects,  if  possible 
at  all,  would  have  to  be  either  the  product  of  experience  or  the 
result  of  abnormality. 

1 1  have  often  heard  second  and  third-rate  stories  about  persons  who,  under 
certain  abnormal  conditions,  actually  saw  things  upside  down.  But  I  have  to 
say  that  all  attempts  that  I  have  made  to  secure  a  perfectly  authentic  case  have 
utterly  failed.  Persons  who  have  told  me  of  them  could  not  vouch  for  them, 
and  I  always  find  them  eluding  investigation  much  as  do  ghost  stories.  I  have 
never  found  any  reference  to  them  in  books,  and  Dr.  Peterson,  of  the  College  of 
Physicians  and  Surgeons,  in  connection  with  Columbia  University,  allows  me 
to  quote  him  as  saying  that,  in  all  his  study  of  nervous  diseases  and  reading,  he 
has  not  met  with  a  single  case  of  it,  and  would  not  believe  the  narrative  if  he 
did  meet  one.  Two  years  ago  I  thought  I  had  secured  a  case  on  the  testimony 
of  a  physician.  On  careful  interrogation  it  turned  out  that  his  observation  had 
been  limited  to  the  fact  that  a  young  boy  in  Brooklyn  had  been  known  always 
to  write  and  read  upside  down  and  experienced  great  difficulty  in  correcting  his 
habit.  This  had  occurred  twelve  years  before,  and  the  boy  could  not  be  traced. 
But  it  is  evident  that  he  did  not  require  to  be  traced,  because  the  phenomenon  does 
not  present  the  slightest  evidence  of  inverted  vision.  I  would  ascertain  nothing 
about  the  boy's  habits  previous  to  his  entrance  to  the  public  schools.  Children 
taught  the  alphabet  and  to  spell  upside  down  will  read  by  holding  the  book  in  an 
inverted  position.  But  this  does  not  prove  inverted  vision,  and  I  suspect  most 
reported  cases  are  of  this  kind.  Moreover,  any  reported  instances  of  a  pathological 
kind  have  to  be  viewed  with  suspicion,  for  obvious  reasons.  One  instance,  how- 
ever, and  this  an  apparent  exception  to  all  my  experience,  came  within  my  knowl- 
edge a  short  time  ago.  A  lady  told  me  that  she  had  often  seen  things  upside  down. 
On  interrogation  it  appeared  that  she  could  not  give  any  clear  account  of  her  ex- 
perience. She  remarked  that  the  phenomenon  was  always  connected  with  very 
severe  headaches,  which  were  often  almost  unendurable  and  blinding.  She  said 
also  that  she  could  immediately  correct  the  impression  by  reaching  out  to  the 
object  with  her  hand,  and  that  the  whole  field  did  not  seem  inverted,  but  only 


150  JAMES  H.  HYSLOP. 

I  have  dwelt  at  length  upon  the  analysis  of  the  problem 
partly  for  the  purpose  of  limiting  it  to  its  proper  field,  and 
partly  for  the  purpose  of  clearing  away  its  imaginary  difficulties 
and  defining  exactly  what  an  explanation  of  the  phenomenon 
must  do.  It  is  usual  with  the  empiricist  to  be  content  with  a 
reference  to  some  fact  or  process  which  involves  the  influence 
of  tactual  or  muscular  experience.  He  implies,  if  he  does  not 
assert,  that  we  either  correct  a  primary  illusion  by  this  process 
or  we  never  obtain  any  properly  visual  quale  which  has  a  right 
to  be  called  uprightness.  In  this  way  he  conceives  the  whole 
problem  as  one  regarding  the  genesis  of  the  idea  of  uprightness 
in  a  sense  that  does  not  naturally  give  it  or  is  supposed 
not  to  give  it.  Whatever  he  thinks  about  the  naturalness 
of  the  percept  in  the  tactual  and  muscular  sense,  he  can  only 
conceive  sight  as  giving  signs  which  may  be  used  as  data 
for  inference  to  the  existence  of  certain  tactual  and  muscular 
relations.  But  he  construes  the  whole  question  as  if  it  were 

certain  objects  in  it,  though  I  could  not  get  any  satisfactory  account  of  the  ex- 
perience in  its  details.  On  the  whole,  however,  I  found  nothing  in  the  case 
that  might  not  be  explained  by  an  illusion  of  judgment  in  connection  with  the 
mental  confusion  incident  to  severe  headache.  Now  it  is  to  be  remarked  that  if 
the  whole  field  appeared  inverted  in  the  case  the  fact  could  not  be  discovered 
except  in  comparison  either  with  a  memory  image  or  with  disturbed  coenses- 
thesia  and  memory  images  together.  But  this  would  not  require  any  inversion 
of  the  apparent  object  to  vision,  but  would  only  show  an  inversion  of  the  feel- 
ings that  serve  as  a  criterion  of  the  relation  between  memory  images  and  those 
feelings.  Moreover,  touching  the  object  would  not  correct  the  impression  of 
sight  if  it  represented  an  organic  disturbance  or  inversion  of  retinal  impres- 
sions. It  would  only  correct  her  judgment.  This  is  seen  in  the  ordinary  ex- 
perience with  the  microscope,  where  we  easily  correct  our  judgment  of  locality 
for  touch,  without  altering  the  seen  relations  of  space  in  the  object.  It  is  worth 
remarking  also  that  in  microscopical  experiments  we  should  never  suspect  the 
inversion  of  objects,  except  for  the  fact  of  memory  images  with  which  they  are 
compared.  Moreover,  if,  in  the  case  under  consideration,  only  the  object  looked 
at  appeared  inverted,  this  fact  and  its  correction  immediately  by  touch  would 
prove  that  the  case  was  an  error  of  judgment  and  not  organic  inversion  of  im- 
ages. Otherwise  we  should  have  to  suppose  organic  disturbance  for  the  one 
object  while  the  remainder  of  the  field  was  normal,  and  it  would  require  a  great 
deal  of  evidence  to  support  such  a  fact.  I  have,  however,  treated  this  case  more 
seriously  than  it  deserves,  but  only  because  it  is  the  single  one  in  my  experience 
which  could  claim  a  moment's  scientific  attention.  There  is  nothing  in  it  which 
cannot  be  explained  by  supposing  an  illusion  of  judgment  instead  of  an  inver- 
sion of  visual  reference. 


.UPRIGHT   VISION.  151 

merely  one  between  the  theories  of  nativism  and  empiricism, 
when,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  this  is  not  the  proper  way  to 
conceive  it.  This  may  be  an  interesting  question,  but  what  we 
want  to  know  first  is  the  law  of  sensorial  reference  which  either 
explains  upright  vision,  that  is,  the  inversion  between  image 
and  object,  or  proves  it  to  be  anomalous.  If  we  prove  it  to  be 
anomalous  we  suggest  a  reason  for  resorting  to  foreign  and 
empirical  influences  as  secondary  agencies  in  the  matter.  But 
whether  we  ever  find  it  necessary  to  discuss  nativism  or  empiri- 
cism in  connection  with  it,  it  is  certain  that  we  should  first  as- 
certain, or  exhaust  every  effort  to  ascertain,  the  conditions  in  the 
sense  of  vision  that  may  explain  the  phenomenon.  That  we 
are  under  obligation  to  do  this  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  there  is 
an  absolute  universality  of  agreement  in  visual  experience  re- 
garding the  position  in  which  things  are  seen  (barring  possibly 
abnormal  cases  above  referred  to).  That  is,  no  one  ever  re- 
members a  time  when  his  visual  judgments  required  correc- 
tion, except  in  reference  to  memory  images,  and  no  illusions 
occur  in  normal  experience,  as  they  should  do,  if  empirical 
theories  were  true.  The  uniformity  of  experience  in  the  matter, 
negatively  confirmed  by  apparent  exceptions  which  will  not 
bear  investigation,  only  indicates  or  proves  that  we  must  seek 
some  conditions  within  the  sense  of  vision  to  explain  this  regu- 
larity and  exemption  from  illusion. 

All  such  theories  as  re-inversion  of  the  image  or  mysterious 
central  agencies  may  be  thrown  out  of  court  at  once  as  simply  a 
restatement  of  the  problem  at  a  point  where  it  cannot  either  be 
investigated  or  subjected  either  to  proof  or  disproof.  The  two 
most  prominent  explanations  have  been  the  ocular  movement 
and  the  projection  theories,  which  represented  respectively 
the  empirical  and  the  nativistic  points  of  view,  and  whose  ex- 
amination will  show  that  they  either  begged  the  question  or 
simply  restated  the  question  in  more  mysterious  terms. 

The  ocular-movement  theory  supposes  that  we  learn  the 
direction  of  a  point  in  the  field  of  vision,  or  rather  its  position 
above  or  below,  by  the  movements  necessary  to  bring  it  upon  the 
fovea.  But  this  supposition  will  not  stand  a  moment's  examina- 
tion. It  has  to  assume  either  a  perception  of  the  point  to  which 


152  JAMES  H.  HYSLOP. 

the  movement  of  the  eyes  has  to  be  directed  or  a  consciousness 
of  the  relation  between  this  movement  and  the  tactual  percept  of 
position  and  uprightness.  To  assume  the  first  of  these  alterna- 
tives is  to  admit  the  existence  in  consciousness  of  the  datum  which 
has  to  be  derived  from  the  muscular  sensations  in  ocular 
movements.  That  is  to  say,  it  admits  a  perception  of  the  up- 
rightness before  the  ocular  movements  can  have  any  meaning 
for  consciousness  at  all.  The  eye  may  not  yet  know  that  the 
positions  perceived  correspond  to  certain  directions  represented 
by  gravity — that  is,  it  may  not  have  identified  visual  with  tactual 
uprightness — but  the  relations  are  given  in  the  visual  percept  or 
manifold  which  determine  the  meaning  of  the  ocular  movement 
and  are  not  determined  by  it.  The  fact  is,  moreover,  that  in  all 
ordinary  processes  of  ocular  movement  we  have  no  knowledge 
of  such  movements  directly,  but  only  of  the  objects  across  the 
field  of  vision.  There  is  not  even  a  muscular  sensation  to  serve 
as  a  TTOU  <JT<0  for  judgment,  except  in  extreme  or  strained  posi- 
tions or  movements  of  the  eyes,  and  it  is  specially  noticeable 
in  these  conditions  that  the  perception  of  direction  or  uprightness 
is  not  made  any  more  evident  by  it.  Hence  the  fact  is  that  the 
direction  of  ocular  movement  is  determined  by  the  previous  per- 
ception of  relations  which  the  theory  assumes  are  determined 
by  the  movement,  the  sense  of  movement  being  known  only  in 
the  changes  across  the  visual  field,  and  not  in  the  muscular  sen- 
sations. To  assume  the  second  alternative,  which  involves  a 
knowledge  of  the  relations  between  the  movement  and  the  tac- 
tual percept  of  uprightness,  is  to  make  matters  worse  still. 
For  nothing  is  clearer  than  the  circumstance  that  we  do  not 
learn  the  fact  of  ocular  movements,  or  the  meaning  of  any  sen- 
sation connected  therewith,  from  any  knowledge  of  its  relation 
to  tactual  percepts,  except  from  its  conjunction  with  a  sure  tac- 
tual adjustment  or  movement  on  the  one  hand  and  a  sure  move- 
ment of  objects  on  the  other.  That  is  to  say,  both  tactual  and 
ocular  movements  get  their  whole  conception  from  visual  con- 
struction in  so  far  as  they  are  known  to  be  related  to  it,  and  do 
not  determine  that  construction. 

The  projection  theory  has  secured  several  forms  of  expres- 
sion, which  it  will  not  be  necessary  to  consider.     But  they  are 


UPRIGHT   VISION.  153 

all  attempts  to  prove  a  theory  of  nativism,  and  avail  only  to  re- 
state the  problem  which  they  pretend  to  solve.  The  most 
plausible  statement  of  the  doctrine  is  that  the  eye  projects  im- 
ages or  objects  into  space  in  the  direction  which  the  rays  of 
light  enter  the  eye  or  are  thrown  upon  the  retina.  This  view 
can  get  a  mathematical  representation  according  to  the  laws  of 
optics.  But  the  trouble  with  all  projection  theories  is  that  their 
form  of  statement  implies,  at  least  apparently,  that  a  process  of 
translation  is  required  to  effect  the  result  to  consciousness,  when, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  whole  content  of  perception,  magnitude, 
distance  and  uprightness  is  given  without  the  '  projection '  of 
anything.  If  the  terms  localization  or  reference  were  employed 
without  implying  any  conception  of  translation  there  would  be 
less  inherent  difficulty  in  the  theory.  But  when  it  seems  to  in- 
volve the  idea  of  '  projection '  into  space  it  implies  a  distinction 
between  objects  as  known  in  space  and  impressions  which  it 
has  no  right  to  suppose.  And  it  is  worse  when  mysterious  cen- 
tral activities  are  imported  for  reversing  the  retinal  image,  when, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  very  distinction  between  the  impression 
and  the  object  of  consciousness  may  be  an  illusion.  But  inas- 
much as  it  may  create  confusion  to  force  the  problem  of  idealism 
upon  attention,  we  may  assume  that  there  is  an  interesting  phe- 
nomenon requiring  explanation,  and  only  protest  against  the  use 
of  central  processes  which  merely  repeat  the  problem  at  another 
point  and  which  cannot  be  verified  or  suggested  by  anything 
except  the  fact  to  be  explained. 

Now  when  it  comes  to  presenting  a  positive  explanation  of 
upright  vision,  or  of  the  compensation  for  the  inversion  of  the 
retinal  image,  it  will  be  necessary  to  avoid  misunderstanding  of 
what  is  meant  by  *  explanation.'  I  do  not  mean  to  appeal  to 
any  known  or  unknown  cerebral  functions  which  involve  a 
peculiar  reaction  upon  impressions,  but  only  to  a  law  of  sensorial 
action  traceable  in  other  senses  and  adapted  to  the  modified  con- 
dition of  vision.  This  explains  the  process  by  assimilating  it  to 
a  known  and  supposably  understood  process.  "  In  science,"  says 
Professor  Le  Conte  very  pertinently,  "  what  we  mean  by  an  ex- 
planation is  a  reducing  of  the  phenomena  in  question  to  a  law 
which  includes  many  other  phenomena,  and  especially  the  most 


154  JAMES  H.  HYSLOP. 

common  and  familiar  phenomena."1  This  statement  was  made 
in  a  short  article  or  discussion  endeavoring  to  explain  the  very 
phenomena  here  occupying  our  attention,  but  I  question  whether 
many  of  Professor  Le  Conte's  readers  realized  fully  the  value 
and  importance  of  his  conception  thus  formulated.  But  ex- 
planation by  a  more  widely  recognized  law  than  the  fact  in  ques- 
tion is  distinct  in  its  nature  from  explanation  by  an  antecedent 
fact  or  process,  and  is  the  proper  resource  in  the  problem  of 
upright  vision,  because  it  is  the  only  one  capable  of  direct  veri- 
fication. It  will  be  best,  however,  to  approach  my  own  way  of 
stating  the  case  through  that  of  Professor  Le  Conte. 

In  his  work  on  Vision  some  years  ago  he  stated  his  theory, 
and  more  recently  in  Science,  where  he  gives  a  good  diagram 
in  illustration  of  the  process,  which  may  be  repeated  here. 


Prof.  Le  Conte's  explanation  of  the  process  is  that  we  refer' 
objects  back  along  the  ray  lines  of  light,  and  "  thus  the  external 
image  is  reinserted  in  the  act  of  external  reference"  The  fig- 
ure brings  out  this  conception  by  showing  that  the  light  from  B 
falls  upon  A  and  is  referred  back  to  the  point  B>  and  the  light 
from  D  falls  upon  C  and  is  referred  back  to  D.  And  it  is  the 
same  with  all  other  points,  J^,  and  S  and  P  and  R.  In  his 
work  on  Vision?  Professor  Le  Conte  gives  the  same  explana- 

lScience.    New  Series,  Vol.  II.,  p.  629. 
2  Le  Conte.      Vision.     First  Edition,  p  83. 


UPRIGHT   VISION.  155 

tion  of  the  phenomenon,  though  without  any  accompanying 
diagram,  as  above.  After  stating  the  problem,  he  says  :  *'  The 
true  scientific  answer  is  found  in  what  is  called  the  '  law  of 
visible  direction.''  This  law  may  be  stated  thus  :  When  the  rays 
from  any  radiant  strike  the  retina  the  impression  is  referred 
back  along  the  ray-line  {central  ray  of  the  pencil)  into  space 
and  therefore  to  its  proper  place." 

Before  correcting  certain  misimpressions  which  I  conceive 
belongs  to  this  way  of  stating  the  case,  I  must  mention  a  per- 
sonal matter.  For  a  number  of  years  I  had  supposed  this  ex- 
planation of  the  phenomenon,  though  getting  very  near  the 
solution  of  it,  to  be  wrong  and  different  from  my  own,  which  I 
had  been  presenting  to  my  classes.  But  a  year  or  two  ago  I 
had  occasion  to  correspond  with  Professor  Le  Conte  on  this  and 
some  experiments  in  binocular  vision,  and  I  found  that  our  con- 
ception of  the  process  was  essentially  the  same,  and  that  I  had 
been  led  astray  by  his  language  in  the  case,  which  implies  a 
coincidence  between  the  ray  and  reference  line,  that  appears  to 
be  functional,  while  I  wished  to  separate  them  functionally, 
though  they  might  actually  coincide.  What  I  shall  have  to  say 
of  his  theory,  therefore,  will  be  to  correct  the  misconception  to 
which  I  think  it  is  liable,  rather  than  to  object  to  its  real  con- 
ception and  intention. 

The  objections,  therefore,  which  may  be  made  to  Professor 
Le  Conte's  formula  of  the  law  and  mode  of  illustration  are  the 
following:  (i)  The  illustration  in  Figure  I.  seems  to  imply 
that  the  horopter  or  points  from  which  the  light  comes  represent 
a  curved  line  more  or  less  symmetrical  with  the  retina.  This 
may  be  a  very  good  theoretical  construction  of  the  case,  but  the 
same  result  would  hold  with  a  straight  line,  and  this  fact  re- 
quires to  be  kept  in  mind.  (2)  In  discussing  the  theory  Pro- 
fessor Le  Conte  often  speaks  of  *  projection '  of  the  image  into 
space,  a  form  of  expression  which  is  misleading,  because  it  as- 
sumes space  as  given  and  the  *  projection '  of  the  point  or  object 
into  it,  as  if  the  percept  of  space  itself  were  not  a  mental  act  es- 
sentially a  part  of  the  « projection.'  There  will  be  no  objection 
to  the  language  provided  we  understand  this  fact.  But  it  is 
certain  that  the  space  percept  is  an  integral  part  of  the  total 


156  JAMES  H.  HYSLOP. 

visual  impression,  not  an  independently  given  datum  for  con- 
sciousness into  which  it  may  either  'project'  or  refer  objects. 
(3)  His  statement  of  the  law  implies  a  coincidence  between  the 
reference  line  and  the  ray  line  of  light,  and  most  persons  read- 
ing it  would  infer  that  they  are  essentially  connected,  and  that  a 
variation  of  the  ray  line  would  be  accompanied  by  a  corre- 
sponding variation  of  the  reference  line.  This  organic  connec- 
tion I  mean  to  deny,  except  in  so  far  as  evolution  may  have  es- 
tablished an  actual  coincidence  which  is  not  necessarily  func- 
tional, and  I  was  glad  to  discover  by  my  correspondence  with 
Professor  Le  Conte  that  we  agreed  in  our  conception  of  the  proc- 
ess. Quite  a  number  of  his  own  experiments  in  the  work  on 
vision,  as  well  as  his  comparison  of  the  several  senses  on  the 
law  of  direction,  establishes  this  separation  between  the  actual 
and  the  functional  coincidence  in  normal  vision,  that  is,  between 
the  reference  and  ray  lines,  though  it  is  concealed  in  the  formula 
for  stating  the  law  in  vision.  Hence  my  own  formulation  of 
the  process  in  erect  vision  is  designed  to  keep  this  distinction 
clear,  and  thus  to  remove  the  misconception  to  which  I  think 
Professor  Le  Conte's  language  is  exposed. 

The  following  Fig.  II  will  illustrate  the  process  for  normal 
vision.     The  light  from  P  falls  on  all  parts  of  the  pupil  and  is 


D 


Fier.  H. 

refracted  to  the  point  D ;  from  R  to  the  point  C.  PAD  repre- 
sents the  direction  from  Pfor  the  ray  falling  on  the  upper  limits 
of  the  line,  PB  ZMhe  ray  on  the  lower  limits.  Similarly  for 
RA  C  and  R B  C.  Now  either  we  cannot  speak  of  a  single  ray 


UPRIGHT   VISION.  157 

line  from  any  given  point  such  as  P  and  /?,  or  we  should  have 
to  call  it  the  average  direction  of  such  a  ray  line.  In  the  former 
case,  which  represents  the  facts,  there  being  any  number  of  ray 
lines  with  different  degrees  of  angular  incidence  between  the 
two  extremes  A  D  and  B  D,  the  reference  line  P D  cannot  coin- 
cide with  them  without  multiplying  the  number  of  objects  to  be 
seen.  The  law  of  retinal  points  determines  this,  and  we  simply 
construct  the  reference  line  as  determined  by  this  fact  and  with- 
out relation  to  the  ray  line.  In  the  second  alternative  not  only 
is  the  conception  of  a  ray  line  arbitrary,  but  there  is  no  evidence 
of  its  coincidence  with  the  reference  line  P  D.  I  would  there- 
fore formulate  the  law  of  direction  without  any  reference  to  the 
ray  line,  but  only  in  reference  to  the  function  of  the  retina.  If 
we  observe  the  direction  of  the  reference  line  in  Fig.  II.  and  its 
relation  to  the  retina  we  can  note  that  it  is  at  least  approxi- 
mately vertical  to  the  surface  on  which  the  light  falls.  Conse- 
quently I  shall  formulate  the  law  of  vision  upon  the  basis  of  this 
fact.  The  law  of  visual  direction  or  reference  is  that  it  is  in  a 
line  that  is  vertical  to  the  surface,  or  point  upon  which  light 
falls.  This  statement  implies  neither  coincidence  nor  variation 
from  the  ray  line  of  light,  but  it  expresses  a  real  or  supposed 
law  of  the  retinal  sensorium.  Whether  the  reference  line  is 
really  or  only  approximately  vertical  to  the  retina  it  is  not  neces- 
sary to  determine.  This  would  have  to  be  a  subject  for  mathe- 
matical calculation.  But  I  may  state  the  theoretical  form  for 
definiteness  and  leave  any  variations  from  it  to  be  explained  by 
the  appropriate  causes.  It  is  certain  that  the  reference  line  sus- 
tains actually  or  approximately  the  relation  to  the  retina  that  I 
have  given  it,  and  it  remains  to  give  other  evidence  than  the  phe- 
nomena of  normal  vision,  that  will  show  at  the  same  time  both 
the  separation  of  the  reference  and  the  ray  lines  and  the  fixity  of 
the  reference  line,  which  will  be  found  to  be  vertical  as  indi- 
cated. 

The  simple  phenomena  that  prove  the  law  as  here  formulated 
are  those  of  phosphenes  and  Purkinje's  experiment.  The  first 
of  these  are  produced  by  the  familiar  experiment  of  pushing 
with  the  finger  against  the  eye-ball  on  either  side,  or  above  or 
below,  with  the  eye  closed.  The  bright  circles  of  light  thus 


I5S  JAMES  H.  HYSLOP. 

produced  are  not  referred  in  the  direction  of  the  pressure,  but 
in  the  very  opposite  direction,  at  least  apparently  vertical  to  the 
point  of  the  impression.  In  Purkinje's  experiment  a  pencil  of 
bright  light  may  be  thrown  upon  the  sclerotic  coat  at  the  side  of 
the  pupil  by  means  of  a  microscope,  and  if  the  instrument  be 
very  lightly  shaken,  the  light  that  passes  through  the  translucent 
membrane  falls  on  the  retina  without  refraction,  and  the  shaking 
of  it  gives  rise  to  after  images  caused  by  retinal  shadows  of 
the  blood  vessels  either  on  the  retina  or  in  the  sclerotic  coat,  and 
these  when  seen  are  referred,  not  in  the  direction  of  the  light, 
but  directly  in  front  of  us  in  the  background  at  which  we  are 
looking.  The  effect  of  the  experiment  is  illustrated  by  the  fol- 
lowing diagram,  (Fig.  III.)  : 


Tie1.  IE. 

The  line  S  Q  represents  the  direction  of  the  light  and  the 
line  PQihe  reference  line  of  vision  for  the  retinal  shadows. 
What  is  shown  by  it  is  the  fact  that  the  reference  and  ray  lines 
do  not  functionally  coincide,  and  that  the  reference  line  is  verti- 
cal to  the  surface  of  incidence  for  the  light.  That  is  to  say,  the 
reference  line  for  vision  is  an  organically  fixed  function  of 
the  retina,  which  has  no  necessary  relation  to  the  direction  from 
which  the  stimulus  comes.  Professor  Le  Conte  ought  to  have 
remarked  this  fact  when  he  described  these  very  phenomena  in 
his  book,  and  it  might  have  saved  the  misconception  likely  to  be 
enacted  by  his  statement  and  diagrammatic  representation  of 
the  law.  He  might  have  observed  this  separation  of  the  two 


UPRIGHT   VISION.  159 

lines  very  clearly  in  the  experiment  regarding  retinal  shadows, 
in  which  he  says  that  '  while  retinal  images  are  inverted,  retinal 
shadows  are  erect,'  but  are  seen  inverted,  the  direction  of  the 
light,  or  rather  shadow,  that  causes  them  not  having  anything  to 
do  with  their  reference.  As  the  experiment  showing  this  is  im- 
portant for  the  theory  here  advanced  it  may  be  quoted  :  "  Make 
a  pin-hole  in  a  card,  and  holding  the  card  at  four  or  five  inches  dis- 
tant against  the  sky  above  the  right  eye  with  the  left  eye  shut,  bring 
the  pin-head  very  near  to  the  open  eye,  so  that  it  touches  the 
lashes  and  in  the  line  of  sight ;  a  perfect  inverted  image  of  the 
pin-head  will  be  seen  in  the  pin-hole." l  The  pin  creates  a 
shadow  on  the  pupils  and  lens,  and  shadows  are  not  refracted. 
Hence  their  images  are  erect  on  the  retina,  their  line  of  inci- 
dence being  perfectly  straight  toward  the  retina,  and  the  refer- 
ence actually  giving  an  inverted  object  of  sight,  while  the  lines 
of  incidence  and  reference  cannot  possibly  coincide.  The 
same  fact  is  shown  in  the  illusion  caused  by  the  refraction  of 
light  in  passing  through  « the  watery  meniscus  between  the  two 
lids  and  the  surface  of  the  cornea.'  These  are  all  Professor 
Le  Conte's  experiments,2  and  they  simply  attest  the  uniformity 
of  the  reference  line  regardless  of  the  ray  or  incidence  line,  and 
this  reference  appears  in  the  direction  of  a  vertical  to  the  point 
upon  which  the  light  or  image  falls.  It  will  be  apparent  from 
this  how  it  compensates  for  the  refraction  of  light  and  the  inver- 
sion of  the  image  in  normal  vision. 

Now  whether  in  normal  conditions,  as  represented  in  Fig. 
II.,  the  ray  line  and  reference  line  ever  actually  coincide,  assum- 
ing the  mean  of  all  that  issue  from  the  same  point  as  the  ray  line, 
must  be  decided  by  mathematical  calculation.  Evolution  may 
have  adjusted  the  retina  with  its  reference  lines  to  the  ray  line 
after  refraction,  but  not  because  this  adjustment  is  necessary  to 
erect  vision.  But  we  must  not  mistake  any  real  or  supposed 
adjustment  for  other  purposes  as  evidence  of  functional  connec- 
tion, because  it  is  easy  to  show  that  visual  reference  has  func- 
tional stability  while  the  incidence  of  stimulus  varies  in  all  sorts 
of  directions. 

'Le  Conte,  Vision,  First  Edition,  p.  86. 

*Le  Conte,  Vision,  First  Edition,  p.  88.  Philosophical  Magazine,  Vol.  LXI., 
p.  266,  1871.  Science,  New  Series,  Vol.  II.,  p.  667. 


160  JAMES  H.  HYSLOP. 

We  have  seen  now  how  erect  vision  is  possible  in  spite  of 
inverted  images,  and  it  remains  to  show  that  the  reference  line 
is  only  an  illustration  of  the  same  law  in  the  other  senses. 
Professor  Le  Conte  remarks  this  fact  and  describes  it  so  fully  and 
clearly  that  I  need  only  refer  readers  to  his  work.  But  I  may 
observe  that  it  is  only  an  illustration  of  the  law  of  '  eccentric 
projection,'  which  is  used  to  describe  the  tendency  of  touch  to 
refer  a  stimulus  in  a  direction^vertical  to  the  sensorium  or 
point  of  contact.  This  may  be  a  theoretical  way  of  putting  the 
case,  but  it  expresses  substantially  the  direction  of  reference 
when  a  stimulus  impresses  the  sensorium.  Now  accepting  Mr. 
Spencer's  conclusion  that  the  sense  of  touch  was  the  original 
germ  out  of  which  all  the  senses  were  developed,  among  them 
sight,  we  can  readily  see  that  nature  had  only  to  give  the  retina 
a  curved  form,  circular,  elliptical,  or  parabolic,  in  order  to  ad- 
just the  law  of  '  eccentric  projection '  to  the  modified  conditions 
of  vision  involving  refraction  of  light  and  inverted  images. 
The  law  of  direction  is  thus  the  same  for  all  sensory  impres- 
sions, though  it  is  undoubtedly  vague  in  smell  and  greatly  influ- 
enced by  association  and  experience  in  hearing.  But  in  the 
tactual,  thermal  and  visual  senses  it  is  very  clearly  the  same. 
It  will  be  especially  interesting  to  remark  here  that,  with 
this  explanation  of  upright  vision,  we  at  last  secure  a  direct 
analogy  with  touch.  The  assumption,  which  we  said  was 
not  absolutely  necessary,  turns  out  at  last,  under  a  modi- 
fied form,  to  represent  a  connection  which,  whether  neces- 
sary or  not,  is  a  fact.  The  analogy  with  touch,  however, 
which  we  criticized,  was  not  based  upon  the  conception  of 
the  law  of  direction  or  eccentric  projection,  but  upon  theo- 
retical conceptions  about  visual  impressions,  before  it  was  known 
that  there  was  an  inverted  retinal  image,  and  these  conceptions 
happened  to  coincide  with  the  notion  of  tactual  impressions.  But 
with  the  law  of  eccentric  projection  in  touch  and  the  adaptation 
of  the  retina  to  compensate  for  refraction  and  the  inversion  of 
the  retinal  image,  we  have  the  analogy  restored  and  the  phe- 
nomenon of  erect  vision  explained  by  a  wider  law  of  sense  per- 
ception which,  in  the  other  senses,  presents  nothing  anomalous. 

It  will  be  apparent  from  the  law  of  visual  reference  thus 


UPRIGHT   VISION.  l6z 

established  that,  other  things  remaining  the  same,  if  the  retina 
were  a  plane  or  a  convex  surface,  instead  of  concave,  objects 
would  appear  inverted.  Thus  in  Fig.  II.  if  the  retina  were  a 
plane  surface  and  the  law  of  direction  be  as  formulated,  the  point 
P  would  be  seen  in  a  direction  vertical  to  the  point  D  in  the 
plane  C  D>  and  so  be  located  or  referred  to  a  position  some- 
where between  P  and  R.  If  the  surface  were  convex,  objects 
might  appear  both  inverted  and  magnified.  All  this,  of  course, 
assumes  that  nature  might  not  make  compensating  adjustments 
for  such  surfaces,  and  only  serves  theoretically  to  show  that 
with  the  law  of  direction  there  is  nothing  really  anomalous  in 
erect  vision  with  inverted  images,  but  that  the  anomaly  would 
exist  in  the  truth  of  the  experiential  theory  that  tactual  and  mus- 
cular sensations  correct  the  original  perceptions  of  sight.  Erect 
vision  with  inverted  images  is  the  natural  and  proper  thing, 
while  any  conclusion  that  the  inversion  of  the  retinal  image  is 
not  necessary  to  the  present  result  would  contradict  the  law  of 
direction,  and  simply  create  instead  of  solve  a  problem.  Erect 
vision  is  simply  a  fixed  function  of  the  eye,  just  as  is  that  of  corre- 
sponding points,  and  we  have  only  to  use  this  law  of  reference 
or  direction,  as  Professor  Le  Conte  does,  in  order  to  explain 
single  vision  by  corresponding  points. 

There  is  indirect  evidence  of  natural  functions  for  upright 
vision  in  the  uniformity  of  its  occurrence  and  the  impossibility 
of  securing  pathological  cases  of  real  inversion  that  will  bear 
scientific  investigation.  But  if  the  theory  that  the  inversion  of 
the  retinal  image  is  not  necessary  to  normal  vision,  and  that  the 
impression  is  derived  from  tactual  experience  be  true,  there 
ought  to  be  frequent  illusions  even  in  normal  sight  in  regard  to 
the  position  of  objects.  People's  experience  varies,  and  we  find 
in  all  other  fields  that  the  products  of  experience  alone  show 
such  a  variety  of  conceptions  and  opinions  contradicting  each 
other  that  it  is  the  sure  origin  of  illusion  and  no  uniformity  of 
results  accompanies  it.  But  there  is  such  absolute  agreement 
in  human  experience  about  the  fact  of  erect  vision  that  the  pre- 
sumption in  favor  of  its  being  a  normal  and  necessary  function 
connected  with  inverted  images  ought  to  be  as  strong  as  the  be- 
lief that  perception  of  any  kind  is  a  native  function  of  the  retina. 


1 62  JAMBS  H.  HYSLOP. 

This  uniformity  is  even  so  great  that  we  cannot  be  sure  about  the 
genuineness  of  pathological  cases  which  either  elude  authenti- 
cation altogether  or  must  stand  the  ordeal  of  explanation  by  illu- 
sion of  judgment.  Moreover,  we  can  raise  the  serious  ques- 
tion whether  it  would  even  be  possible  to  prove  a  case  of  in- 
verted reference,  normal  or  pathological,  when  reported.  Such 
a  result  or  experience  will  depend  either  upon  a  comparison 
with  memory  images  or  upon  a  comparison  of  simultaneous 
impressions  with  each  other  and  with  memory  images,  and  here 
the  question  of  illusions  of  judgment  would  arise  as  a  ghost  to 
be  laid  before  we  could  form  any  opinion  as  to  real  inver- 
sion. But,  however,  this  may  be  the  uniformity  and  univer- 
sality of  human  experience  in  respect  to  erect  vision,  attests  an 
organic  function  for  sight  which  is  not  consistent  with  the  supposi 
tions  of  mere  experience  in  touch  and  muscular  adjustment,  nor 
with  the  liability  to  illusion  in  the  variability  involved  in  all  prod- 
ucts of  experience.  The  only  way  to  gain  support  for  pos- 
sible differences  of  experience  in  the  matter  is  to  raise  the  ques- 
tion as  to  our  knowledge  that  others  do  not  see  things  the  inverse 
of  our  own  perception.  But  granting  that  they  may  do  so,  if  it  is 
as  uniform  in  their  experience  as  ours,  and  if  they  experience 
an  inversion  of  impressions,  whenever  we  do  under  artificial 
conditions  we  have  the  same  evidence  of  organic  fixity  of  func- 
tions in  this  case  as  ours,  and  nativism  stands  as  against  empiri- 
cism, while  to  suppose  that  there  is  no  inversion  between  the 
retinal  image  and  real  or  apparent  objects  in  such  imaginary 
cases  of  difference  between  ourselves  and  others,  is  to  suppose 
that  the  same  physical  structure  and  conditions  of  the  eyes  are 
not  followed  by  the  same  optical  laws  of  refraction.  Assuming 
these  laws,  however,  we  should  have  the  relation  of  inversion 
between  image  and  object,  even  if  we  supposed  that  the  image 
is  erect,  that  is,  in  the  same  relative  position  to  objects  as  seen 
by  another,  but  inverted  in  relation  to  objects  as  seen  by  the 
subject.  We  should  still  have  both  nativism  and  the  law  of  ver- 
tical reference  in  such  cases.  It  only  shows  again,  however, 
that  the  terms  *  upright '  and  '  erect '  create  illusions  as  to  the 
nature  of  the  problem  and  that  we  conceive  it  rightly  only  when 
we  substitute  for  them  the  mere  idea  of  an  inverted  relation  be- 


UPRIGHT   VISION.  163 

tween  image  and  object.     In  this  way  tactual  conceptions  and 
associations  are  easily  excluded. 

But  the  question  of  nativism  is  not  the  main  or  first  one  to  be 
considered.  We  may  view  it  either  as  the  consequence  of  the 
explanation  here  advanced  or  as  confirming  it  if  independent 
evidence  of  nativism  be  accessible.  The  real  question  is  re- 
garding the  law  of  normal  vision,  which  will  explain  the  per- 
ception of  erect  objects  when  retinal  images  are  inverted.  This 
we  found  to  be  vertical  reference  or  eccentric  projection  from 
the  plane  or  surface  of  incidence  for  light.  This  fact,  if  it  be  a 
fact,  shows  that  inversion  of  images  is  necessary  to  normal 
visions,  and  that  all  experiments  to  test  its  nativity  by  tactual 
and  muscular  adjustment  are  based  upon  an  illusion  as  to  what 
the  problem  really  is. 


THE  STAGES  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

BY  PROF.  ALFRED  H.  LLOYD. 
University  of  Michigan. 

Knowledge,  we  are  told,  is  a  growth.  In  conscious  experi- 
ence is  to  be  seen  a  process  that  is  resolvable  into  a  number  of 
stages.  In  fact  in  no  science  has  the  evolutional  idea  taken  a 
stronger  hold  than  in  psychology. 

The  stages  of  knowledge,  as  commonly  understood,  are  four, 
if  I  may  reduce  them  somewhat.  Thus  :  sensation,  perception, 
conception  and  intuition.  But  an  evolutional  series  of  this  kind, 
however  well  it  may  explain  its  special  phenomena,  is  really  in 
need  of  being  explained  itself.  Mayhap  it  is  in  its  entirety,  in 
its  earlier  as  well  as  in  its  later  parts,  a  result  of  the  very  evo- 
lution that  it  would  explain,  and  if  so,  the  science  depending 
upon  it  can  hardly  be  too  quick  or  too  thorough  in  recognizing 
the  fact.  Mayhap,  I  say,  but  in  truth  I  think  the  supposition  is 
a  fair  report  of  reality,  and  I  think  also  that  the  science  of 
psychology  to-day  needs  to  be  brought  to  a  clearer  conscious- 
ness of  itself  in  this  particular  respect.  Hence  the  simple 
suggestions  that  follow  in  this  paper.  I  would  reflect  in  a 
perfectly  general  way  upon  the  evolutional  series  in  the  growth 
of  knowledge,  and  expose  it,  and  in  the  end  indicate  what 
seems  to  me  the  meaning  of  the  change  in  psychology  that  the 
expos^  effects. 

Psychologists  have  said  of  sensation,  as  the  first  stage  of 
knowledge,  that  it  is  of  the  material  or  the  physical,  of  the  vis- 
ible and  the  tangible  and  the  audible  and  the  like,  being  a  con- 
sciousness of  what  the  self  is  supposed  distinctly  not  to  be. 
They  have  said  that  it  has  for  its  content  only  the  here  and  the 
now  and  the  this,  or,  in  other  words,  some  particular  thing  in 
some  particular  place  at  some  particular  time.  But  the  purely 
passive  experience  required  by  this  idea  of  sensation,  whereby, 
to  use  an  old-time  distinction,  sensation  has  contained  no 
164 


THE   STAGES   OF  KNOWLEDGE.  165 

thought,  no  universalizing  or  generalizing  tendency,  would  have 
to  be  in  unconsciousness ;  it  would  be,  after  all  is  said,  only  a 
hypothetical  stage  of  conscious  experience ;  as  soon  as  it  were 
realized,  the  account  of  it  would  cease  to  be  adequate.  So  true  is 
this  that  more  recently  we  have  found  sensation  commonly  re- 
ferred to,  not  as  consciousness  or  an  element  of  consciousness  at 
all,  but  merely  as  an  antecedent  of  actual  consciousness,  that  is, 
either  the  external  stimulus  or  the  internal  possibility.  Sensa- 
tion has  come  to  play  the  part  of  a  sort  of  zero  of  knowledge,  a 
lower  '  limit '  in  the  evolutional  scale. 

Very  simple  experiments  have  demonstrated  the  impossibility 
of  conscious  *  sensuous '  experience  without  the  quality  or  mean- 
ing of  the  object  being  determined  by  relations  beyond  its  posi- 
tion in  space  and  beyond  the  moment  of  its  being  experienced 
and  beyond  individuality  or  isolation  in  general.  In  conscious- 
ness, however  simple,  say  of  mere  color  or  of  pressure  or  of 
temperature,  other  things  and  other  times  and  other  places  de- 
termine the  character  of  this  thing  here  and  now ;  any  simplest 
object  as  it  enters  consciousness  gets  outwardly  reaching  rela- 
tions. The  later  idea  of  sensation,  then,  only  marks  a  retreat 
in  psychological  doctrine  before  this  now  undisputed  law  of  rela- 
tivity. But,  alas  !  even  science  can  make  the  mistake  of  jumping 
from  the  frying  pan  into  the  fire,  since  sensation  as  outer  stimu- 
lus or  as  inner  possibility  is,  if  possible,  more  objectionable  than 
sensation  as  physical  atom  or  element.  Knowledge  at  zero  brings 
fatal  difficulties. 

Thus  the  idea  of  sensation  as  stimulus  only  shows  an  at- 
tempt, very  common  and  doubtless  very  natural  in  human 
thought,  to  keep  the  same  relations  or  conditions  in  unconscious- 
ness that  are  observed  in  consciousness.  Sensation  as  stimulus 
carries  the  dualism  of  mind  and  matter  or  subject  and  object 
into  the  sphere  of  life  that  lies  wholly  beneath  or  back  of  con- 
scious experience.  But  doing  this  it  robs  dualism  of  all  real 
meaning  or  content.  It  makes  dualism  absolutely  formal,  a  mere 
hypothesis  based  upon  a  questionable  analogy.  From  the  point 
of  view  of  what  is  without  to  the  conscious  self,  that  is,  from 
the  point  of  view  of  the  object,  the  psychologist  who  entertains 
the  notion  of  an  wholly  independent  stimulus  to  consciousness 


1 66  ALFRED  H.  LLOYD. 

undertakes  to  present  a  stage  or  a  state  of  life  in  which  the  dis- 
tinction between  what  is  without  and  what  is  within  is  quite  im- 
possible. That  distinction  is  a  development,  not  an  antecedent 
condition. 

The  justice  of  this  criticism  is  evident  also  from  the  compli- 
mentary idea  of  sensation  as  the  subjective  basis  of  possibility, 
that  is,  as  a  '  sensation  continuum'  or  an  originally  wholly  undif- 
ferentiated  consciousness,  a  sensuous  consciousness  of  no  distinc- 
tions, whether  in  its  object  or  in  the  organism,  out  of  which  a 
highly  differentiated  experience  with  organism  to  correspond  is 
evolved.  But  surely  one  does  not  need  glasses  to  see  that  *  sensa- 
tion continuum '  not  only  is  but  another  name  for  unconsciousness, 
but  also,  like  sensation  as  stimulus,  is  a  sort  of  indirect  or  would- 
be  dualistic  account  of  a  condition  in  which  mind  and  matter  or 
subject  and  object  are  really  not  two  but  one.  At  least  the  only 
object  to  which  it  can  claim  any  right  is  as  thin  a  ghost  as  ever 
crossed  the  path  of  science.  Sensation,  then,  whether  as  objec- 
tively a  mere  stimulus  of  consciousness  or  as  subjectively  a  con- 
tinuous or  undifferentiated  consciousness,  in  so  far  as  to  be 
regarded  the  first  stage  of  knowledge,  bears  witness  to  an  origi- 
nal state  of  unity  or  identity  between  self  and  not-self. 

It  sums  up  the  foregoing  to  say  that  *  sensation  continuum ' 
and  sensation  as  physical  stimulus  are,  in  the  first  place,  oppo- 
sites  or  extremes  that  meet,  since  the  dualism  on  which  their  op- 
position depends  cannot  stand,  and,  in  the  second  place,  purely 
formal  ideas,  descriptive  of  the  beginning  of  mental  life  only 
analogically  and  retrospectively.  If  you  must  recognize  them 
call  them  limits,  since,  as  already  suggested,  they  show  knowl- 
edge at  zero ;  call  them  abstract  limits,  but  remember  that  the 
idea  of  a  limit  always  gives  reality  rather  to  a  law  operating 
within  the  observed  members  of  a  series  than  to  a  separate 
thing  or  a  separate  state.  A  limit  never  is ;  only  the  series 
and  its  law  are ;  the  limit,  so  to  speak,  only  sets  the  law  and  so 
deepens  the  reality  of  each  member  of  the  series  by  making  the 
series  itself  an  organized  whole.  In  mathematics  the  infinite 
and  the  infinitesimal  are  not  real  as  quantities;  they  are  real 
only  as  relationship  within  quantity  or  among  quantities ;  they 
are  quantitative  indirections  for  quality  and  law.  So,  again,  in 


THE  STAGES   OF  KNOWLEDGE.  167 

psychology,  sensation,  at  best  only  the  infinitesimal  of  knowl- 
edge, whether  as  continuum  or  as  stimulus,  can  not  be  real  as  a 
separate  antecedent  stage  of  knowledge ;  it  must  be,  on  the  con- 
trary, the  epistemologist's  indirection,  or  apology,  for  something 
deeper  than  mere  knowledge  and  its  stages,  say  for  the  vital 
principle  itself  or  for  the  impulse  to  self-expression.  The  epis- 
temologist  has  been  ready  enough  to  be  an  evolutionist,  but  he 
has  also  insisted  on  abstracting  the  knowing  or  merely  cognitive 
self.  Hence  his  notion  of  sensation  as  a  first  stage,  when  in  re- 
ality it  is  not  that.  Psychology,  in  short,  is  more  than  episte- 
mology  ;  it  is  biology  also  ;  and  sensation,  as  evolutional  episte- 
mology  has  reported  it,  is,  I  repeat,  an  indirection  or  abstraction 
for  the  principle  of  vital  spontaneity. 

Just  what  this  principle  is,  in  what  terms  it  must  define  itself 
to  the  new  psychology,  the  foregoing  has  all  but  indicated. 
Thus  the  law  or  principle  to  which  the  limits,  sensation  as  mere 
stimulus  and  sensation  continuum,  testify  or  give  reality,  can 
have,  I  think,  no  better  elementary  statement  than  this,  namely, 
that  external  stimulus  and  internal  motive  are  one  and  identical  ;* 
and  in  this  identity,  which  makes  knowledge  from  the  start,  not 
a  mere  consciousness  of  an  outer  world,  but  at  once  a  part  of 
and  a  means  to  active  self-expression,  in  brief  a  something  on 
which  depends  the  freedom  of  the  vital  impulse,  in  this  identity 
lies  the  first  law  of  knowledge,  a  law  which  I  would  have  psy- 
chology substitute  for  its  still  lingering  doctrine  of  sensation  as 
the  first  stage  and  the  infinitesimal  of  knowledge.  As  a  law  of 
knowledge  it  is,  of  course,  a  key  to  the  understanding  of  posi- 
tive or  conscious  sensation,  which  is  obviously  quite  distinct 
from  sensation  as  mere  stimulus,  and  of  perception  and  concep- 
tion and  intuition,  and  to  the  understanding  also  of  the  order 
that  psychology  has  come  to  give  to  them  in  the  growth  of 
knowledge. 

Positive  or  conscious  sensation,  to  which  I  now  turn,  involves 
the  reference  of  some  so-called  sensuous  quality  to  some  external 
object.  In  different  senses  the  degree  of  this  objective  refer1 

1  Certainly,  quite  apart  from  what  has  been  said  here,  one  must  indeed  have 
difficulty  in  entertaining  the  idea  of  a  stimulus  so  external  as  not  to  be  also  mo- 
tive or  of  a  motive  so  internal  as  not  to  be  also  stimulus. 


1 68  ALFRED   H.  LLOYD. 

ence  varies.  For  example,  it  is  commonly  much  greater  in  the 
experiences  of  the  eye  than  in  those  of  the  organs  of  smell  or 
taste,  but  differences  in  degree  in  no  wise  change  the  fact  or 
principle,  which  is  our  present  concern.  Conscious  sensation  is 
never  purely  subjective.  Psychologists  are  now  well  agreed  on 
this  point.  The  experiments  alone,  already  referred  to,  which 
have  demonstrated  the  absolute  dependence  of  any  sensation  for 
its  meaning  or  quality  upon  other  experiences  beyond  its  own 
time  and  place,  have  left  them  in  no  doubt.  Some  have  even 
imagined  that  the  relationship  between  different  mental  states 
could  be  mathematically  determined ;  others  refuse  to  go  so  far ; 
but  all  accept  the  general  law  of  relativity.  Thus  to  give  Hoff- 
ding's  very  conservative  wording  of  the  law:  "From  the 
moment  of  its  first  coming  into  being  the  existence  and  proper- 
ties of  a  sensation  are  determined  by  its  relation  to  other  sensa- 
tions." That  this  is  a  law  of  the  objectivity  as  well  as  of  the 
relativity  of  all  conscious  sensation  hardly  needs  to  be  indicated, 
but,  to  be  perfectly  explicit,  I  may  add  that  *  relation  to  other 
sensations '  must  mean  to  other  sensations  in  space  as  well  as  in 
time  or  that  dependence  of  any  particular  experience  for  its  own 
special  meaning  on  other  moments  is  also  necessarily  depend- 
ence on  other  places  or  positions.  If  the  time  relations  tend  to 
keep  the  meaning  of  the  experience  subjective,  the  space  rela- 
tions must  make  it  objective.  In  other  words,  the  simple  law  of 
relativity  must  be  taken  as  signifying  that  all  conscious  sensa- 
tion is  of  a  spatially  external  object,  or  not-self,  but  of  an  object 
whose  qualities  are  in  a  certain  interesting  way  subjective,  in 
that  they  must  embody  by  implication,  if  not  directly,  the  self's 
past. 

But  this  is  not  final ;  for,  while  the  sensuously  qualified  object, 
or  not-self,  must,  in  the  light  of  the  law  of  relativity,  be  thought 
as  the  past  self  objectively  present  to  the  self,  or  as  the  self's  ob- 
jectified past,  yet  it  is  clear  that  the  very  fact  of  presentation  or 
objectification  points  to  some  change  in  that  past,  say  to  some  op- 
eration therein  performed  upon  it,  and  an  understanding  of  ex- 
actly what  this  operation  is,  is  all-important.  To  get  such  under- 
standing, however,  we  must,  if  possible,  get  back  of  the  law  of 
relativity  or  objectivity ;  we  must  get  back  of  this  law,  at  least  so 


THE  STAGES  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  169 

far  as  our  comprehension  of  it  depends  on  an  application  of  its 
principle  merely  to  differences  of  position  in  space  and  time  or 
even  of  stimuli  of  measurable  quantity  or  intensity.  Relation- 
ship, let  us  reflect,  is  as  much  a  matter  of  unity  as  of  difference, 
of  continuity  as  of  isolation,  of  organic  movement  as  of  external 
ratios,  and  the  objective  world  must  in  general  owe  its  reality  to 
something  even  deeper  than  '  difference  thresholds '  or  *  thresh- 
old values '  or  than  mere  quantities  of  any  kind. 

The  real  difficulty  is  that  so  far  we  have  been  looking 
rather  to  what  the  sensuous  object  is  than  to  how  it  is.  The  law 
of  relativity,  as  sketched  above,  binds  all  experiences  into  one 
differentiated  whole,  and  with  space  and  time  as  the  distinct  but 
inseparable  bases  of  the  relations  a  past  self  as  that  which  quali- 
fies and  a  not-self  as  that  which  is  qualified  get  their  definite 
places  in  a  theory  of  knowledge,  and  are  seen  of  course  to  have 
most  intimate  connection  each  with  the  other ;  but  assuredly  more 
must  be  known  than  the  formal  bases  of  the  relations.  We  must 
get  at  the  living  reality,  at  the  vital  principle  of  relationship  in- 
stead of  its  formal  bases.  The  theory  of  knowledge  has  been 
tarrying  too  long  at  the  sign  of  the  formal  bases. 

And  what  is  the  living  reality,  the  vital  principle?  Plainly 
it  is  the  impulse  to  self-expression  with  its  identical  aspect  of 
motive  and  stimulus.  Impulse  to  self-expression,  at  once  differ- 
entiating and  organizing,  since  both  a  wholly  random  act,  an 
act  in  general,  and  a  wholly  specific  act,  an  act  in  isolation,  are 
not  only  unknown  but  also  unthinkable,  is  a  principle  that  quite 
transcends  the  special  forms,  space  and  time,1  and  yet  that,  so 
far  as  manifesting  itself  in  motion,  is  spatially  and  temporally 
interpretable.  Action,  identical  with  self-expression  being 
neither  random  nor  specific,  neither  general  nor  individual,  must 
be  as  expressive  of  control  as  of  spontaneity.  Accompanying 
all  action,  then,  there  must  be  a  tension,  or,  the  same  thing,  a 
consciousness,  consciousness  being  always  a  tension  between 
control  and  impulse  or  spontaneity.  Control,  however,  is  just 
that  aspect  of  self-expression  which  gives  reality  to  a  not-self 

1  One  has  here  to  think  of  Spinoza's  self-caused  and  self-intelligible  substance, 
existing  in  se  and  per  .<r,  that  transcended  thought,  the  time  aspect  of  law,  and 
extension,  the  space  aspect  of  law,  in  that  it  had  infinite  other  attributes.  Spin- 
oza, be  it  remembered,  all  but  gave  Leibnitz  his  self-acting  monad. 


170  ALFRED  H.  LLOYD. 

with  stimulating  qualities,  while  spontaneity,  as  a  positive  impulse 
in  tension  with  control,  shows  these  qualities  to  be  real  only  as 
embodying  the  past,  since  such  qualities  must  be  reminiscent. 
In  short,  the  not-self,  as  qualified,  does  but  show  the  self's  past 
in  tension,  and  whether  we  approach  the  matter  from  the  stand- 
point of  self-control  or  from  that  of  the  not-self  in  whose  quali- 
ties the  self's  past  is  seen  to  be  in  tension,  the  presence  of  a 
process  of  organization,  of  an  organic  activity,  is  beyond 
question,1  and  the  organization  plainly  is  not  less  of  the  ob- 
jective qualities  than  of  the  controlled  activities  or  impulses 
belonging  to  them.  But  organization  of  any  particular  im- 
pulse signifies  reduction  of  it  to  a  pure  means  wholly  adapted 
to  the  single  end  of  the  organism,  or  to  such  a  condition 
that  when  expressed  the  whole  self  can  identify  itself  with  it ;  and 
organization  of  all  the  manifold  impulses  must  signify  the  de- 
velopment of  activities  every  one  of  which  can  and  must  fully 
express  the  self.  And  on  the  side  of  the  objective  qualities,  often 
called  the  outer  stimuli,  a  perfectly  correlative  process,  as  al- 
ready said,  must  take  place,  in  that  each  individual  quality,  or 
sensuous  content,  corresponding  to  an  individual  impulse,  must 
in  its  function  of  stimulus  appeal  to  the  whole  self,  not  to  the  im- 
pulse as  an  isolated  activity ;  and  must  therefore  in  its  qualita- 
tive character  be  determined  by  a  relation  to  the  other  qualities. 
Each  qualitative  part,  or  content,  of  the  not-self,  in  so  far  as 
stimulus,  must  be  at  the  same  time,  by  *  fusion,'  if  you  will,  or 
*  assimilation '  or  *  association,'  the  qualitative  whole,  and  just 
herein  we  see  from  the  standpoint  of  impulse  to  self-expression, 
which  is  in  action  a  process  at  once  of  differentiation  and  of  or- 
ganization ;  just  herein  do  we  see  what  the  law  of  relativity  means, 
how  it  is  a  law  of  objectivity,  that  is,  a  principle  of  control,  and 
in  being  this  is  also  a  law  of  organic  activity,  and  how,  secondly, 
from  the  same  standpoint,  stimulus  just  in  so  far  as  it  produces 
'  reaction'  must  be  absolutely  identical  with  motive. 

1  Compare  with  this  account  of  the  origin  of  the  not-self  the  extremely  inter- 
esting special  case  of  it  in  the  generally  accepted  explanation  of  the  idea  of  space 
as  rising  with  organization  and  symbolization  (through  association  of  muscular 
and  tactual  and  retinal  sensations )  of  the  motor-impulses.  Space  as  geometrical — 
that  is,  as  mathematically  definable — is  the  objective  correlate  of  free  movement. 
An  exact  geometry  is  possible,  '  innate,'  only  to  such  as  have  the  power  of  free 
movement. 


THE  STAGES   OF  KNOWLEDGE.  171 

The  identity  of  motive  and  stimulus,  above  suggested  as  the 
first  law  of  knowledge,  very  materially  modifies  a  current  idea 
of  *  reaction,'  as  but  just  now  hinted,  and  gives  a  notion  of  en- 
vironment, heretofore  styled  the  not-self,  that  has  far-reaching 
consequences  alike  in  psychological  and  in  ethical  theory.  To 
add  a  few  words  upon  the  first  point,  that  of  the  proper  concep- 
tion of  reaction,  it  is  evident  that  identifying  stimulus  and  mo- 
tive reduces  reaction  wholly  to  a  process  of  the  self  acting  upon 
itself  or  within  itself,  or  even  of  environment  acting  upon  itself 
or  within  itself,  and  not  to  what  has  been  so  often  assumed,  a  pro- 
cess of  self  or  mind,  as  something  essentially  distinct  in  nature, 
acting  or  reacting  in  its  own  peculiar  way  upon  not-self  or  mat- 
ter. Indeed,  *  reaction '  is  a  term  imbued  altogether  too  much 
with  the  spirit  of  dualism  to  be  at  all  safe  in  self-controlled  dis- 
course. '  Self-activity '  is  far  better,  and  with  the  conception  of 
environment  here  required,  whether  one  means  self-activity  of 
environment  or  self-activity  of  self  is  of  no  importance.  "En- 
vironment did  it "  equals  "  self  did  it"  in  all  cases  of  action,  since 
the  stimulating  quality  by  reason  of  its  determining  relations  is 
environment  as  a  whole  and  the  organically  qualified  environ- 
ment as  a  stimulating  whole  is  one  and  the  same  with  the  organic 
self  and  its  impulse  to  complete  self-expression.1 

The  notion  of  environment  that  our  law  of  knowledge  en- 
forces is  this :  Environment  is  the  self  present  to  itself,  in  an 
other-than-it  form,  the  otherness  always  signifying  a  tension  be- 
tween control  and  impulse  to  act.  So  much  was  really  implied 
in  what  was  said  in  a  former  paragraph,  namely,  that  the  not- 
self  must  be  regarded  as  the  past  self  presented  to  the  self,  or  the 
self  s  objectified  past,  or  with  regard  to  its  stimulating  qualities 
as  the  past  in  tension ;  but  now  we  have  clearly  before  us  the 
operation  performed  upon  that  past,  as  implied  in  the  very  fact 
of  the  presentation  or  the  objectification,  this  operation  being 
nothing  more  nor  less  than  organization  into  the  present  or  ad- 

'Quite  another  way,  and  to  me  a  very  suggestive  way,  of  putting  the  foregoing 
is  that  the  human  body  is  to  be  looked  upon  only  as  a  part  of  '  environment.'  The 
tendency  to  cherish  it,  whether  in  the  passing  psychology  of  reaction  or  in  reli- 
gion— of  course  the  two  are  related — must  give  a  false  idea  of  activity.  In  reality 
the  human  body  is  but  a  part  of  a  physical  whole ;  it  is,  however,  a  part  whose 
activity  is  that  of  the  whole ;  hence  it  has  mind  or  soul. 


I72  ALFRED  H.  LLOYD. 

justment  to  the  present,  so  that  environment  or  not-self  proves  to 
be  the  past  made  present,  its  qualification  being  always  a  process 
of  adjustment  to  the  present.  In  other  words,  environment  as 
differentially  qualified  and  self  as  organically  free  and  active 
develop  together,  not,  as  some  have  seemed  to  think,  does  en- 
vironment with  stimulating  quality  exist  before  a  living  self  with 
interest  in  it,  nor,  as  others  have  maintained,  does  the  living  self 
or  soul  antedate  its  environment.  God  did  not  create  the  world 
nor  is  man  in  any  sense  so  creative,  nor  on  the  other  hand  is 
man  in  the  ordinary  understanding  of  the  doctrine  evolved  out 
of  the  physical.  Both  the  physical  with  its  qualities,  primary 
and  secondary,  and  the  freedom  of  self  expression  are  evolved 
together.  Evolution  of  course  has  been  disposed  to  put  the  quali- 
fied world  first  in  time,  and  creationism  to  put  the  fully  devel- 
oped spirit  first  in  time,  and  which  has  committed  the  grossest 
anachronism  it  is  really  hard  to  say,  since  to  reiterate,  neither 
came  first,  or  rather  both  were  first  and  have  kept  the  contem- 
poraneity from  the  beginning.  Thus,  to  suggest  large-written 
illustrations,  I  can  imagine  man,  when  first  assuming  the  erect 
position  congratulating  himself  on  having  relegated  so  much  of 
his  past  as  was  in  the  going  on  all  fours  to  a  mere  object  or 
symbol  in  his  consciousness,  and  I  can  even  feel  the  interest  he 
must  have  taken  in  the  new  qualities  and  the  more  organic  char- 
acter that  his  world  came  to  have  for  him  with  the  change.  The 
wanderer  returning  after  long  years  to  the  scenes  of  childhood 
and  seeing  as  object  with  emotional  qualities  that  in  which  he 
had  once  lived,  with  which  he  had  once  wholly  identified  him- 
self, could  sympathize  too.  But  how  absurd  it  would  be  for 
either  the  returned  wanderer  or  the  erect  man  to  say  with  ma- 
terialistic evolution  that  out  of  that  object  as  so  qualified  he  had 
been  evolved,  or  with  orthodox  creationism  that  in  the  object 
there  was  evidence  of  a  fall  from  an  ideal  state  to  which,  how- 
ever, he  has  now  at  last  returned.  And  yet  upon  such  abstrac- 
tions, upon  such  anachronisms,  even  recent  psychological  doc- 
trine, in  its  idea  of  reaction  and  in  its  idea  of  the  stimulating 
medium  very  largely  relies.  True,  the  past  is  in  the  object,  or 
the  environment,  or  the  stimulating  medium,  but  because  the  ob- 
ject is,  and  is  at  once  organic  and  relationally  differentiated,  the 


THE  STAGES  OF  KNOWLEDGE.  173 

present  is  there  too,  and  if  the  present  also  the  future.  The  ob- 
ject is  not  reminiscent  merely ;  in  being  object  it  belongs  to  the 
present ;  it  is,  again,  in  so  far  as  qualified  and  in  so  far  as  con- 
structed or  ordered  literally  '  up  to  date ;'  it  is  a  stimulus  that  is 
also  motive ;  it  is  a  revelation  as  well  as  a  reminiscence,  the 
future  as  well  as  the  past. 

In  environment,  or  object,  as  now  present  to  our  thinking, 
we  have  of  course  the  '  perceived  world.1  The  study  of  positive 
or  conscious  sensation  has  brought  us  to  a  comprehension  of 
what  psychology  knows  as  perception,  the  second  stage  of 
knowledge.  The  law  of  relativity,  as  also  a  law  of  objectivity 
and  of  organic  self-expression,  under  which  a  sensuous  con- 
sciousness develops  into  a  consciousness  of  an  ordered  outer 
world  present  to  a  self-controlled  self,  under  which  the  world  of 
experience  becomes  in  the  technical  sense  a  'perceived'  world, 
carries  with  it,  as  we  have  found,  three  things  :  (i)  the  persist- 
ence of  the  past  or  of  past  experience  in  any  present  conscious- 
ness, (2)  a  differential,  or  negative,  qualification  of  conscious- 
ness, by  which  the  objective  reference  springs  up,  and  (3)  an 
organic  activity,  whereby  consciousness,  becoming  objective, 
gets  what  is  commonly  called  symbolic  character,  being  sym- 
bolic of  the  activity  itself.  Perception,  then,  is  a  process  by 
which  the  past  may  be  said  to  move  over  into  the  object  and  to 
abide  there  as  an  important  phase  of  the  present,  and  the  per- 
cept, the  self  so  present  to  itself,  is  the  original  unity  of  the  self 
as  an  organism  differentiated  and  in  the  differentiation  projected 
as  not-self.  The  percept,  accordingly,  is  not-self,  but  very 
much  as  the  band  of  prismatic  colors  is  the  not-self  of  unre- 
solved light,  or  as  tools  and  shop  and  materials  are  the  not-self 
of  the  tool-using  mechanic,  or  finally  as  a  social  community,  in 
which  labor  is  divided,  is  not-self  to  each  one  of  its  members. 
The  percept  is  not-self,  but  also  the  incarnate  self.  What  else 
can  its  tendency  to  symbolic  character  signify  ?  Now  percep- 
tion, as  the  perceived  image  evolves  into  mere  symbol,  becomes 
conception  and  intuition.  This  is  technical  and  abstract.  But 
the  meaning  of  images  becoming  mere  symbols  is  not  far  to 
seek. 

Any  image  in  which  by  virtue  of  its  being  objective  and 


174  ALFRED  H.  LLOYD. 

of  its  sensuous  qualities  being  organized,  the  past  is  fully  ad- 
justed to  the  present  is  become  a  symbol ;  it  is  a  mere  symbol. 
With  the  perfect  adjustment  the  image's  or  object's  qualities  lose 
their  reminiscent  and  individually  stimulating  character;  the 
'  associated '  past,  on  which  the  consciousness  depends,  comes 
to  be  so  real  in  the  present  as  no  longer  to  be  suggestive  of  the 
past ;  whereupon  the  reminiscent  qualities  lose  value,  except  that 
of  the  relation  embodied  in  them,  and  the  object  as  a  mere  system 
of  relations,  an  organically  relational  whole,  becomes  not  an 
object  of  sensuous  consciousness,  but  a  symbol,  that  is,  a  basis 
of  activity )  and  has  the  same  relation  to  the  life  of  the  self  in 
general  that  language  with  its  'parts  of  speech'  has  to  the 
expression  of  thought.  In  an  image  or  object  or  symbol  so 
developed,  the  self  is  set  free.  No  symbol  is  mere  symbol  that 
is  not  proved  so  by  some  action  in  use  of  it,  and  the  action  of 
course  fulfills  motive  and  stimulus  as  one. 

The  term  language,  so  says  this  psychology,  must  be  ex- 
tended to  include  the  object  of  consciousness  in  this  sense  of  the 
used  symbol.  Indeed  one  has  to  think  of  parts  of  fluent  activity 
in  general  instead  of  merely  of  parts  of  speech.  In  parts  of 
fluent  activity  psychology  sees  the  survival  of  the  sensuously 
stimulating  qualities  or  elements  which  in  the  evolution  of  ex- 
perience gradually  pass  into  mere  terms  in  a  system  of  relations. 
Indeed,  in  the  narrow  sense,  what  is  language,  if  not  a  complex 
of  '  dying  metaphors'  or  '  material  associations,'  or  *  passing  rem- 
iniscences', dying  or  associated  or  passing  in  the  interest  of  or- 
ganization or  adjustment  or  fluency?  Yes,  the  whole  world  of 
perception,  as  it  becomes  symbolic,  as  in  it  the  past  is  adjusted 
to  the  present,  is  essentially  linguistic,  the  basis  of  fluency  in 
action  ;  it  is  language  that  the  perceiving  self  can  use,  with  this 
limitation  that  when  the  self  uses  it  as  language,  when  the  self 
acts  fluently  in  it  instead  of  simply  observing  it,  it  is  more  prop- 
erly called  the  world  of  conception,  since  the  self  is  then  rather 
conceiving  than  perceiving  reality. 

It  is  common  enough  in  psychology  to  connect  intimately 
conception  and  the  use  of  language,  but  observe  that  here,  as 
the  term  language  is  made  to  include  so  much  more  than  it  usu- 
ally covers,  there  is  demand  also  for  a  more  inclusive  idea  of 


THE  STAGES   OF  KNOWLEDGE. 


'75 


conceptual  thought.  All  sensuous  images  becoming  symbols 
are  linguistic ;  all  fluent  expression  of  self,  all  free  activity,  is 
thought  in  the  stage  of  conception.  Language  obviously  is  only 
another  name  for  the  not-self  as  the  self  incarnate.1 

But  to  some  I  shall  doubtless  seem  to  be  denying  the  very 
most  essential  function  of  language,  which  is  to  name  or  report 
or  describe.  Language,  I  am  reminded,  enables  its  user  to  stand 
aloof  from  the  physical  world  and  to  carry  on  an  abstract  activity 
— with  reference  to  the  world,  it  is  true,  but  quite  apart  from  it. 
So  separate  from  ordinary  activity  has  language  been  regarded 
that  it  has  even  been  declared  to  be  a  gift  of  heaven,  not  of 
earth,  an  integral  part  of  man's  spiritual  equipment.  But  let  me 
say,  varying  a  little  what  has  been  said  already,  that  all  free 
fluent  activity  is  abstract  or  separate  in  exactly  the  sense  meant. 
Finding  a  use  of  language  in  all  fluent  activity  is  not  at  all  op- 
posed to  the  orthodox  ideas  of  language.  Forsooth,  are  writing 
and  speaking  the  only  cases  of  self-activity?  Every  spontane- 
ous act,  every  expression  of  the  living  self  shows,  in  the  first 
place,  an  experience  organized  into  a  symbol  or  a  past  brought 
into  adjustment  with  a  present,  and  in  the  second  place  this 
symbol  as  something  belonging  to  the  active  self,  something 
which  mediates  the  activity,  something  quite  as  much  motive  as 
stimulus,  applied  as  a  *  name,'  or  a  *  report,'  if  you  like,  to  an 
outer  world.  All  action,  I  would  assert,  from  the  lowest  to  the 
highest,  from  the  simplest  to  the  most  complex,  is  of  a  self  nam- 
ing a  not-self.  When  action  is,  the  object  or  the  symbol  is  as 
much  the  agent  as  the  subject.  So,  in  the  sense  of  language 
being  original,  one  cannot  object  to  thinking  of  it  even  as  a  gift 
from  heaven ;  it  is  as  original  as  activity.  Biologically,  freedom 
in  an  environmont  is  also  freedom  of  an  environment,  and  organ- 
ism and  environment  are  one  as  thinking-self  and  language  are 
one. 

It  has  not  infrequently  been  a  matter  of  controversy  if 
thought  were  possible  without  language,  and  the  solution  of  the 
problem  seems  to  be  that  thought  is  possible  without  language 

1  On  the  more  general  use  of  the  term  language  compare  the  short  discus- 
sion :  '  A  Psychological  Interpretion  of  Certain  Doctrines  in  Formal  Logic.' 
PSYCH.  RBV.,  Vol.  III.,  No.  4,  July,  1896— pp.  422-426. 


I76  ALFRED  H.  LLOYD. 

in  the  narrower  sense,  that  is,  written  and  spoken  language,  but 
impossible  without  language  as  such,  that  is,  without  environ- 
ment. Do  animals  think  ?  Do  they  know  relations  ?  Are 
they  addicted  to  language  ?  Assuredly  they  are  and  do,  if  ever 
they  act  in  self-expression.  What  living  creature  is  not  *  ad- 
dicted '  to  an  environment  ? 

The  rise  of  language  as  such,  so  our  psychology  here  would 
lead  us  to  conclude,  means  nothing  more  nor  less  than  the  me- 
chanicalization  of  environment  or  the  perceived  world.  In 
other  words,  the  pure  symbol,  used  in  conception,  in  so  far  as  a 
basis  of  fluent  activity,  is  only  a  mechanism  that  the  individual 
has  become  free  to  use.  And  in  such  mechanism,  I  would  sug- 
gest in  passing,  as  objective  or  physical,  is  evidence  always  of 
the  rise  of  a  community  of  individuals  acting  organically.  In 
short,  the  fully  developed  object  of  perception  is  more  than  mere 
symbol ;  it  is  a  mechanism  in  which  is  the  basis  of  the  life  of  a 
social  organism.  Its  character  as  language,  as  '  medium  of  the 
exchange  of  thought,'  can  have  no  other  import  than  this,  since 
thought  itself  is  organized  social  life.  This  intimate  connec- 
tion, moreover,  between  the  rise  of  language  and  conception, 
the  mechanicalization  of  environment,  and  the  development  of 
the  social  organism,  is  a  most  important  outcome  of  the  stand- 
point taken  here,  but  discussion  of  it  is  not  within  the  scope  of 
the  present  article.  Motive  and  stimulus  are  identical ;  environ- 
ment is  essentially  linguistic ;  and  language  is  not  the  medium 
of  the  exchange  of  abstract  thought,  but  the  basis  of  an  organ- 
ized life.  That  is  the  whole  story  in  a  nut-shell.  Simply  the 
linguistic  environment  makes  possible  individual  self-expression 
in  a  social  group ;  or  mechanicism,  like  the  a  priori^  which  ac- 
cording to  Kant  makes  the  experience  of  it  possible,  is  social.1 

So  far  I  have  insisted  on  extending  the  use  of  the  term  lan- 
guage to  make  it  include  environment  or  the  medium  of  expres- 

1  Social,  I  repeat,  in  the  sense  of  free  industrialism  or  of  society  as  an  or- 
ganism ;  in  history  the  social  mechanicalism  of  Rome  is  evidently  the  '  a  priori 
from '  in  which  modern  life  as  industrial  and  organically  international  has  been 
possible.  Rome,  with  her  Christian  idolatry,  her  spiritual  monarchism,  her  lin- 
guistic formalism,  her  Jewish  finance,  only  have  witness  to  the  originality  of  the 
medium  of  self-expression,  an  idea  which  the  modern  individual  has  naturally  enough 
taken  to  himself.  But,  in  general,  mechanism  is  the  a  priori  condition  of  indi- 
vidualism and  organism. 


THE   STAGES   OF  KNOWLEDGE.  Iff 

eion  without  limitation  or  abstraction.  But,  of  course,  language 
in  the  narrower  sense,  in  the  sense  that  limits  it  to  special  forms 
of  sounds  and  shapes,  has,  even  in  its  very  narrowness,  an  im- 
portant relation  to  the  activity  of  thought.  In  emphasizing  the 
broader  view  of  language,  therefore,  I  have  appeared  to  slight 
the  narrower.  Hence  I  wish  to  add  the  following  much  con- 
densed paragraphs  by  way  of  atonement. 

It  is  a  generally  recognized  principle  that  self-expression 
brings  interpretation  or  meaning  to  the  impulse  expressed,  and 
that  meaning,  coming  so,  controls  the  impulse.  In  other  words, 
after  expression  impulse  is  held  for  a  time,  longer  or  shorter,  in 
abeyance.  Impulse  in  abeyance,  however,  not  only  confines 
the  self's  activity  within  the  self,  but  also  changes  the  special 
centres  or  organs  of  consciousness,  and  the  confinement  and  the 
change  would  seem  to  be  what  make  language  in  the  narrower 
sense.  Thus,  to  give  the  most  obvious  illustration,  an  impulse 
of  man's  in  abeyance  does  not  mean  inactivity,  but  activity  ab- 
stracting itself  and  identifying  itself  with  eyes  and  ears,  with  the 
writer's  hand  and  the  speaker's  tongue.  Where,  indeed,  could 
activity  find  itself  more  at  home  than  in  these  marvellously  mo- 
bile organs?  They  are,  in  fact,  but  the  stage  upon  which  the 
self  rehearses  its  part.  They  show  the  self  acting  '  to  itself,'  as 
we  say  specially  of  a  child  that  learns  to  read  without  speaking ; 
that  is  to  say,  acting  apart  or  abstractly  or  reflectively. 

Control,  then,  abstracts  activity  and  develops  very  mobile 
organs  for  the  special  function  so  arising,  the  function  of  acting 
to  oneself  or  quite  within  oneself.  But  acting  to  oneself  brings 
the  consciousness  of  environment  or  not-self;  and,  more  than 
this,  the  environment  gets  what,  in  lack  of  a  better  account,  I 
have  to  call  a  double  character.  Thus  there  arises  a  special  con- 
sciousness, or  experience,  inhering  in  the  special  organs  of  the 
abstract  activity  and,  at  the  same  time,  a  special  consciousness 
inhering  in  the  organs  of  the  self's  complete  activity,  and,  ob- 
viously enough,  the  special  object  of  the  former  serves  as  a 
name  or  symbol  of  the  latter ;  the  special  object  of  the  organs 
of  activity  to  oneself  names  the  special  object  of  the  organs  of 
the  possible  activity  to  one's  world.  The  self  does  not  talk 
talks  nor  see  sights,  nor  hear  sounds  ;  it  names  the  not-self. 


178  ALFRED  H.  LLOYD. 

And,  furthermore,  in  the  name,  arising  as  the  object  or 
natural  medium  of  the  abstracted  activity,  relationship,  that  is, 
relational  or  organic  structure,  will  far  outweigh  all  considera- 
tion of  mere  size.  The  name,  in  short,  will  be  only  a  sort  of 
after-image  of  the  sphere  of  the  self's  original  expression  of  im- 
pulse— original,  that  is,  antecedent  to  the  rise  of  control.  That 
the  original  expression  will  have  already  determined  the  rela- 
tions, or  given  the  self  an  experience  of  them,  is  clear  enough, 
since  without  such  determination  the  expression  itself  could 
never  have  taken  place.  So  the  reproduction  in  an  after-image 
is  no  miracle,  but  only  shows  how  realized  relationship  in  ex- 
perience brings  independence  of  mere  quantitative  determina- 
tions. The  theory  of  language  as  originating  in  pictures, 
reduced  reproductions  of  natural  objects,  has  its  limitations,  but 
it  will  serve  here  in  illustration.  Its  limitations,  after  all,  are 
rather  in  terms  of  narrow  application  than  of  principle  involved. 

So,  in  summary,  expression  of  impulse  puts  impulse  in  abey- 
ance ;  impulse  in  abeyance  brings  an  after-image  of  the  special 
experience,  which,  as  a  relational  whole,  expression  has  defined  ; 
and,  the  after-image  being  a  freed  image,  or  the  sphere  of  an 
abstracted  activity,  the  direct  use  of  it,  the  use  of  it  with  refer- 
ence to  its  origin,  the  controlled,  mediated  use  of  it,  gives  what 
we  commonly  understand  as  the  linguistic  expression  of  self. 

But  we  have  yet  to  consider  the  last  stage  of  knowledge, 
intuition.  Intuition,  however,  is  but  the  perfect  freedom  of 
using  language,  or  of  adaptation  to  environment.  It  is  a  stage 
of  knowledge  very  much  as  sensation  was  a  stage  of  knowledge. 
Thus  the  used  mechanism  is,  as  it  were,  the  limit  that  the  sen- 
suously qualified  symbol  approaches,  and  intuition  as  stage  of 
knowledge  is  a  limit  too,  being  such  a  limit  as  we  have  seen 
sensation  to  be  and  giving  evidence  of  the  same  law  of  knowl- 
edge. Intuition  comes  with  the  completion  of  the  process  of 
mediation ;  with  it  consciousness  ripens  into  fluent  action ;  with 
it  thought  is  set  free.  If  in  sensation  stimulus  and  motive  are 
one,  in  intuition  at  the  other  end  of  the  scale  developed  mech- 
anism as  the  stimulus  and  free  agent  as  the  motive,  in  short, 
language  and  thought,  are  one.  The  mechanism  is  nothing 
more  nor  less  than  stimulus  to  the  free  agent's  will. 


THE   STAGES   OF  KNOWLEDGE.  l1?? 

So  at  both  ends  of  the  scale  evolutional  psychology  has 
erred.  It  has  retained  intuition  as  the  last  stage  of  knowledge 
with  the  same  blind  persistence,  or  rather  with  the  same  mis- 
understanding of  the  true  meaning,  that  has  characterized  its 
treatment  of  simple  sensations  or  of  sensation  as  stimulus  or 
original  continuum.  Neither  sensation  nor  intuition  is  a  con- 
tent of  consciousness.  The  former  is  the  vital  impulse  to  self- 
expression  ;  the  latter  is  that  impulse  fully  mediated  in  an  act. 
As  stages  of  knowledge  they  are  limits,  the  infinitesimal  and  the 
infinite  respectively,  and,  so  understood,  they  only  show  how 
psychology,  bent  on  keeping  knowledge  in  a  sphere  quite  by 
itself,  has  striven  to  do  without  physiology  and  biology.  Thus, 
again,  sensation  as  stage  of  knowledge  is  the  back-door  by 
which  psychology  has  spirited  life  into  the  domain  of  knowl- 
edge ;  and  intuition  in  its  turn  is  but  an  epistemological  dis- 
guise for  the  ripened  act ;  and  if  the  former  is  due  to  the  gratui- 
tous construction  of  retrospection — on  the  part,  say,  of  self-con- 
scious inactivity — the  latter  results  from  a  closely  related  pro- 
spection. 

And  the  change  in  psychology,  finally,  that  recognition  of 
this  origin  of  the  evolutional  stages  of  knowledge  effects  is 
simply  the  turning  of  the  eld-time  idea,  or  concept,  into  an  act ; 
of  self-conscious  inactivity  into  activity ;  of  psychology,  science 
of  the  soul,  into  biology,  the  science  of  life  on  earth. 


DISCUSSION  AND   REPORTS. 
THE   PRESIDENT'S  ADDRESS. 

In  his  recently  published  address  (PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW,  Jan- 
uary, 1897)  Professor  Fullerton,  after  firing  random  shots  at  a  full 
score  of  ancient  worthies  and  modern  colleagues,  trains  the  heavy  guns 
of  his  critical  raillery  on  my  views  as  to  the  nature  of  mind.  His 
reiterated  charges  of  'obscurity'  and  'inconsistency,'  made  in  the 
lightsome  mood  to  which  we  have  all  become  accustomed,  I  am  en- 
tirely content  to  let  stand  for  what  they  may  seem  worth  to  those  who 
have  carefully  read  my  books.  I  only  wish  at  present  to  call  atten- 
tion to  two  or  three  misapprehensions.  Perhaps,  however,  even  this 
may  have  some  bearing  upon  the  charges  if,  as  it  seems  to  me,  the 
misapprehensions  are  so  obvious  and  on  the  surface  as  to  show  cause 
in  the  critic,  why  he  should  find  the  views  of  nearly  every  one  else, 
with  mine,  guilty  of  essentially  the  same  errors. 

In  the  first  place,  I  am  charged  with  having  abandoned  the  stand- 
point of  psychology,  because  I  have  insisted  that  all  the  phenomena  of 
consciousness  must  be  considered  not  merely  '  content-wise,'  but  also 
'  function-wise,'  and  indeed  as  forms  of  self-activity ;  and  also  because 
my  analysis  of  cognition  shows  that  cognition  always  implicates  real- 
ity, '  envisaged,  believed  in,  or  inferred.'  But  I  find  Professor  Ful- 
lerton himself,  in  this  very  address,  insisting  upon  a  '  broad  and  rea- 
sonable sense  of  the  word  content,'  and  affirming  by  it  "  /  mean  all 
that  is  to  be  found  in  consciousness,  including  relations,  changes  and 
activities."  Moreover,  he  commends  Professor  Wundt  for  treating  the 
subject-matter  of  psychology  in  the  proper  way ;  although  he  patroni- 
zingly adds  in  a  note  that  Wundt,  too,  does  not  appear  '  to  fully  appre- 
ciate the  significance  of  his  own  position.'  But  does  not  all  the  psy- 
chological world  know  that  Professor  Wundt  makes,  in  his  psycho- 
logical writings  throughout,  prominent  use  of  the  doctrine  of  the 
soul  as  a  conscious  self-activity,  and  that  concerning  the  relation  of 
psychology  and  philosophy  he  has  even  expressly  denied  the  possi- 
bility of  treating  them  as  independent  disciplines.  As  to  knowledge, 
however,  in  this  very  paper  also  Professor  Fullerton  repeats,  with  evi- 
dent increase  of  self-satisfaction,  what  he  had  to  say  in  a  paper  of 
three  years  ago :  The  psychologist  '  must  assume  (sic)  the  existence 
of  an  external  physical  world,'  of  which  our  ideas  are  copies  that  are 
1 80 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  181 

'  intimately  related  to  particular  bodily  organisms.'  Now  it  seems  to 
me  that  any  clear  and  consistent  thinker  will  be  forced  to  exclaim  over 
such  a  tenet  as  this  :  Here  is  '  belief,'  and  ontological  '  implicates '  in- 
ferred, with  a  vengeance.  Perhaps  Professor  Fullerton  will  sometime 
free,  for  us  all,  his  little  bit  of  an  '  assumption '  from  the  '  obscurity ' 
and  '  vagueness '  and  '  inconsistency '  in  which  he  has  left  it. 

But  a  much  more  serious  and  quite  indefensible  misapprehension 
seems  to  me  the  only  explanation  of  Professor  Fullerton's  method  of 
criticizing  my  views  by  a  kind  of  see-sawing  between  the  two  books, 
4  Psychology,  Descriptive,  etc.,'  and  '  Philosophy  of  Mind.'  He  is,  in- 
deed, so  kind  as  to  admit  that  I  am  developing  these  views  in  *  the 
right  direction.'  But  curiously  enough,  the  one  which  is  really  the 
earlier  of  these  two  works,  but  which  my  critic  appears  to  regard  as  the 
later,  sets  the  high-water  mark  of  my  poor  attempts  to  be  clear  and 
consistent,  as  well  as  '  learned  and  really  scholarly,'  respecting  the  doc- 
trine of  mind.  What,  however,  is  the  actual  case  ?  The  first  book  is 
what  its  title  signifies,  namely,  an  attempt  to  describe  the  development 
of  human  mental  life  in  the  individual ;  and,  among  other  forms  of  de- 
velopment, the  growth  in  clearness  and  complexity  of  the  conception 
of  Self,  just  as  observation  and  experiment  and  scientific  analysis  find 
it.  With  my  accomplishment  of  this  task  Professor  Fullerton  has  little 
fault  to  find.  But  the  avowed  purpose  of  the  '  Philosophy  of  Mind 
is,  without  abandoning  the  standpoint  of  psychology,  but  by  transcend- 
ing this  standpoint  and  passing  on  to  the  standpoints  of  metaphysics 
and  epistemology,  to  give  speculative  treatment  to  the  phenomena  of 
consciousness.  In  other  words,  I  have  made,  in  this  later  work,  the 
effort  to  construct  a  rational  doctrine  of  the  real  nature  of  mind.  Now, 
like  any  other  critic,  Professor  Fullerton  might  deny  to  me  the  right 
or  the  ability  to  attempt  such  a  task,  or  he  might  refute  the  positions 
taken  in  the  course  of  the  attempt.  But  to  overlook  the  relations  of 
the  two  works ;  to  cite,  as  my  final  view,  sentences  from  jthe  former 
which  I  have  quoted  into  the  latter  so  as  to  furnish  my  speculation 
with  empirical  data ;  to  impart  meaning  into  metaphysical  terms  which 
I  have  most  expressly  guarded  against  or  even  rejected,  and  thus  to 
throw  into  confusion  and  inconsistency  what  is  clear  and  consistent 
when  read  in  the  connection  and  in  the  light  of  the  author's  intent — 
this  seems  to  me  a  style  of  criticism  which  is  best  left  to  itself  to  refute. 
One  more  misapprehension  I  wish  to  notice.  I  am  accused  of 
teaching  a  kind  of  '  diluted '  Kantian  doctrine  of  the  soul  as  ding-an- 
sich  or  noumenon,  lying  behind  all  actual  self-known  existence  and 
answering  either  to  a  purely  negative  and  limiting  conception  or  to  the 


1 82  UPRIGHT   VISION  AND  RETINAL   IMAGE. 

bare  idea  '  that  it  is,'  without  the  possibility  of  knowledge  as  to  '  what 
it  is.'  Shades  of  the  great  founder  of  critical  agnosticism  !  And  yet 
I  have  been  studying  carefully  over  and  over  again  the  '  Critique  of 
Pure  Reason'  for  years  and  with  scores  of  keen  and  critical  minds  as 
pupils  and  co-workers,  and  have  never  discovered  my  agreement  on 
this  particular  doctrine  with  the  sage  of  Konigsberg.  But  since  I  can 
scarcely  ask  Professor  Fullerton  to  read  again  the  '  Philosophy  of 
Mind,'  where  I  have,  as  clearly  as  language  can  and  so  often  as  really 
to  run  great  conscious  risk  of  wearying  my  readers,  tested  and  re- 
jected the  Kantian  view,  I  know  nothing  better  to  suggest  for  him  than 
a  revised  study  of  Kant.  Perhaps  this  will  lead  him  to  discover  un- 
limited chances  for  obscurity  and  inconsistency  in  his  own  attempt  to 
place  a  writer  who  affirms  that  we  do  know  reality,  beyond  all  power 
of  sceptical  idealism  or  agnostic  positivism  to  shake  the  foundations  of 
such  knowledge,  in  every  act  of  self-knowledge,  and  that  all  knowl- 
edge is,  quoad  knowledge,  essentially  transcendent,  agree  with  the 
great  author  of  the  '  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,'  who  taught  on  all 
these  points  precisely  the  contrary  view. 

Much  more  might  be  said  about  Professor  Fullerton's  manner  of 
treating  those  whose  names  and  opinions  he  is  wont  to  handle  with 
such  effective  appearance  of  grace  and  ease.  But  I  prefer  to  leave 
sword-play  for  the  most  part  to  men  who  like  it  and  who  really  think 
it  leads  to  truth,  and  to  content  myself  with  the  humbler  and  less  im- 
pressive use  of  trowel  and  spade. 

GEORGE  TRUMBULL  LADD. 

YALE  UNIVERSITY. 


UPRIGHT  VISION  AND   THE   RETINAL  IMAGE. 

Professor  Hyslop's  recent  objection  to  my  article  on  '  Vision  with- 
out Inversion  of  the  Retinal  Image,'  in  the  November  number  of  this 
REVIEW,  is  a  welcome  criticism  of  the  bearing  of  my  experiments, 
even  though  the  form  in  which  he  has  seen  fit  to  express  his  objec- 
tion is,  perhaps,  needlessly  brusque.  He  says,  in  substance,  that  I 
have  missed  the  real  problem  of  upright  vision  in  taking  it  as  a 
problem  of  the  harmonious  interorganization  of  motor,  tactual  and 
visual  experience,  and  that  the  real  problem  is  an  exclusively  visual 
one.  According  to  his  view,  the  question  of  upright  vision  is  :  How 
do  apparent  objects  get  a  spatial  position  inverse  to  that  which  they 
have  in  the  retinal  image?  And  since  my  article,  to  his  mind,  shows 
clearly  that  during  the  experiment  the  position  of  apparent  objects  was 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  183 

still  the  reverse  of  their  position  in  the  retinal  image,  my  experiment 
has  nothing  to  do  with  the  problem  of  upright  vision. 

I  am  glad  that  Professor  Hyslop  has  taken  the  trouble  to  show 
that  the  problem,  as  I  understand  it,  is  quite  different  from  this  prob- 
lem which  he  counts  the  true  one.  The  two  problems  have  hardly 
anything  in  common,  and  it  is  well  that  everyone  should  see  that  mine 
is  not  his.  For  his  problem  is,  I  feel  sure,  an  illusory  one  and  van- 
ishes as  soon  as  one  sees  the  true  relation  which  vision,  as  a  whole, 
bears  to  the  retinal  image. 

It  is  sometimes  said  that  one  never  has  an  experience  of  his  own 
retinal  image.  This  is  perhaps  strictly  true,  and  yet  it  is  often  mis- 
leading, in  that  it  is  understood  to  mean  that  the  retinal  image  is  out- 
side my  experience  and  yet  not  so  alien,  but  that  somehow  I  can  com- 
pare its  position  with  that  of  my  visual  experience.  The  fact  is,  the 
retinal  image  is,  by  representation,  made  a  part  of  my  experience,  just 
as  all  things  which  I  represent  become  thereby  parts  of  my  experience, 
even  though  I  do  not  directly  perceive  them.  And  only  by  thus  rep- 
resenting my  retinal  image  and  definitely  assigning  it  a  position  within 
the  world  of  things  actually  visible  to  me  does  any  comparison 
of  its  position  with  that  of  other  objects  become  possible.  It  is 
visualized,  or  otherwise  represented,  in  definite  spatial  relation  to 
those  parts  of  the  world  which  I  see,  and  thus  becomes  an  integral 
part  of  my  larger  world  of  visual  and  visualized  experience,  built 
out  beyond  and  in  between  the  objects  of  actual  sight.  My  brain, 
for  instance,  becomes  a  part  of  my  visual  world  because  I  assign  it  a 
definite  position  within  the  visual  total,  though  I  have  never  seen  it. 
I  represent  my  brain,  not  as  enveloping  my  experience  nor  as  having 
lines  of  direction  independently  comparable  with  those  of  my  visual 
world,  but  as  itself  a  part  of  that  total  visual  world  and  as  having 
for  me  no  position  nor  direction  except  as  within  that  total  and  as 
relative  to  the  other  parts  of  the  whole.  Its  position  in  my  world  of 
experience  is  nothing  absolute,  but  is  determined  merely  relatively 
to  the  internal  lines  of  direction  and  points  of  reference  of  that  ex- 
perience. Likewise  my  retinal  image  is  an  integral  part  of  my  visual 
world.  Its  place  is  within  my  visual  total,  and  its  position  and  direc- 
tion are  determined  only  by  making  use  of  the  directions  of  reference 
within  that  total.  Why  it  should  have  the  position  and  direction 
there  which  it  does  have ;  in  other  words,  why  the  rest  of  my  visual 
world  and  that  small  portion  of  it,  which  I  call  my  retinal  image, 
should  have  the  peculiar  spatial  relation  they  do  have,  is  a  matter  of 
optics  and  vertebrate  morphology,  not  a  problem  for  psychology. 


184  UPRIGHT   VISION  AND  RETINAL  IMAGE. 

The  position  which,  from  our  knowledge  of  optics,  we  assign  the 
visual  image  within  our  visual  world  does  not  mean  that  our  visual  ex- 
perience bears  an  inverse  relation  to  something  external  to  that  visual 
experience,  as  Professor  Hyslop  seems  to  think.  This  relation  is  in 
no  sense  a  relation  between  two  heterogeneous  terms,  one  of  them  a  sys- 
tem of  visual  experiences,  and  the  other  an  alien  counterpart  inverse  to 
these.  Since  our  only  way  of  comparing  the  image  with  our  visual 
perceptions  is  by  representing  it  relative  to  their  position,  and  as  em- 
bedded in  their  larger  system,  its  relation  to  the  rest  is  no  indication 
of  the  relation  of  the  whole  system  of  visual  perceptions,  or  of  the 
visual  process  as  such,  to  something  else.  It  does  not  give  us  the 
slightest  warrant  for  holding  that  the  visual  process  includes,  for  in- 
stance, a  process  of  spatial  transposition  of  objects  into  some  other 
direction  or  order  than  that  given  in  the  immediate  retinal  stimulus. 
The  interrelation  of  objects,  not  the  absolute  position  of  objects,  is 
what  we  wish  to  know  by  sight,  as  by  touch.  Even  if  we  could  make 
absolute  position  at  all  intelligible,  a  knowledge  of  it  would  be  of  no 
earthly  use  to  us,  except  in  so  far  as  it  might  guide  us  to  a  knowledge 
of  the  relative  situation  of  things.  Now  our  vision  gives  us  this  inter- 
relation of  objects  exactly  as  their  images  are  interrelated  in  the  retinal 
image.  We  see  things  in  the  very  same  relation  to  our  body  that  the 
images  of  those  things  bear  to  the  image  of  our  body  on  the  retina. 
Later  on,  the  reflective  mind  wishes  to  add  into  its  visual  system  of 
objects  other  objects  not  given  in  vision,  and  among  the  rest  inter- 
polates one  small  item  not  appearing  among  the  images  on  the  retina, 
namely,  the  retinal  image  itself.  The  fact,  that  I  represent  among 
my  objects  a  smaller  inverted  image  of  some  of  them,  seems  to  me 
no  better  evidence  than,  for  instance,  an  inverted  chair  among  my 
visual  objects  would  be  that  transposition  or  reversal  takes  place  in 
the  process  of  vision  itself.  If  Professor  Hyslop  really  thinks  that 
the  position  of  visual  objects  with  reference  to  the  visual  image  re- 
veals a  peculiar  character  in  the  visual  process  itself,  such  as  to  con- 
stitute a  problem,  there  must  be  for  him  a  still  more  serious  problem 
in  the  fact  that  our  visual  objects  appear  to  be  in  front  of  our  head, 
though  the  real  organ  of  vision  is  in  the  occipital  cortex. 

Vision  as  a  whole  and  by  itself  is  indeed  neither  inverted  nor  up- 
right. Objects  -within  the  visual  system  may  be  inverted  or  upright 
with  respect  to  other  objects  in  the  system ;  but  the  whole  cannot  by 
itself  have  either  of  these  characteristics.  For  this  reason  there  can 
never  be  a  purely  visual  problem  of  upright  vision.  And  since  visual 
experience  cannot  be  compared  with  things-in-themselves,  nor  con- 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  185 

•equently  with  the  retinal  image-in-itself,  upright  vision  must  mean  a 
vision  which  gives  us  objects  upright  with  reference  to  some  non- 
visual  experiences  which  are  taken,  for  the  time  being,  as  the  standard 
of  direction.     Upright  vision,  in  the  final  analysis,  is  vision  in  harmony  , 
with  touch  and  motor  experience ;  and  the  only  problem  of  upright 
vision  is  one  concerning  the  necessary  conditions  for  a  reciprocal  harj 
mony  in  our  visual  and  tactual  or  motor  perceptions. 

Now  the  actual  conditions  of  vision  make  it  seem,  to  a  person  who 
takes  an  uncritical  common-sense  view  of  things,  a  matter  of  surprise 
that  there  is  harmony  between  these  different  kinds  of  perceptions. 
Since  the  retinal  image  of  any  object  lies  in  a  direction  inverse  to  the 
object  as  a  touch  experience,  the  nervous  basis  of  vision  seems  to  be  in 
discord  with  the  system  of  tactual  perceptions;  how  does  it  come 
about,  then,  that  there  is  mutual  harmony  in  the  two  forms  of  percep- 
tion ?  The  theories  which  may  be  roughly  styled  the  projection  and 
the  eye-movement  theories  answer  this  question  by  stating,  each  for  a 
different  reason,  that  vision  reverses  the  retinal  direction  of  objects. 
The  real  visual  direction,  as  distinct  from  the  merely  retinal  direction, 
is  thus,  according  to  these  theories,  identical  with  the  touch  direction, 
and  the  problem  is  solved.  But  an  implied  corollary  of  either  of 
these  theories  is,  that  if  the  retinal  image  were  not  inverted  with  re- 
spect to  the  tactual  position  of  things  there  -would  be  discord  between 
the  two  kinds  of  perception.  For  the  same  mechanism  which  hitherto 
had  produced  a  reversal  would  remain;  the  reversal  ought,  therefore, 
to  take  place  persistently,  and  visual  objects  would  in  that  case  be 
spatially  the  inverse  of  their  tactual  counterparts.  These  theories 
tend,  therefore,  to  the  result  that  an  inverse  relation  between  tactual 
direction  and  the  direction  of  the  retinal  image  is  one  of  the  necessary 
conditions  for  a  harmony  between  touch  and  sight. 

My  experiments  make  it  extremely  probable  that  the  harmony 
rests  on  no  such  condition  whatever ;  and  this  probability  is  still  far- 
ther strengthened  by  later  and  more  extended  experiments,  of  which  I 
hope  soon  to  give  a  detailed  report.      Both  sets  of  experiments  go  to  ) 
show  that  when  the  retinal  direction  of  objects  becomes  identical  with 
their  tactual  direction  the  discord  in  the  experience  is  only  temporary^ 
In  fact,  the  experimental  results  confirm  the  truth  of  the  view  stated 
near  the  beginning  of  this  paper,  that  we  have  no  reason  to  suppose 
that  there  even  is  a  reversal  or  transposition  of  directions  in  the  visual 
process.     A  fortiori,  we  need  no  theory  to  explain  the  reversal. 

Professor  Hyslop,  however,  points  with  assurance  to  certain  pas- 
sages in  the  report  of  my  preliminary  experiment,  as  proof  that  such 


1 86  UPRIGHT   VISION  AND  RETINAL   IMAGE. 

a  reversal  was  present  even  under  the  conditions  there  described. 
What  I  have  already  said  of  the  relation  of  visual  experience  to  the 
retinal  image,  is,  it  seems  to  me,  a  sufficient  answer  to  his  interpreta- 
tion of  the  facts.  But  even  from  his  own  point  of  view  the  passages 
he  refers  to  are  innocent  enough,  when  one  distinguishes  carefully 
between  that  portion  of  my  experience  which  was  based  on  the  older 
visual  conditions  and  that  portion  which  was  being  constructed  under 
the  new  (experimental)  conditions.  I  stated  in  my  paper  that  when 
I  artificially  turned  the  retinal  image  upright  I  saw  things  at  first  up- 
side down.  Now,  since  the  retinal  image  was  turned  180°  and  visual 
objects,  in  consequence,  were  turned  180°,  this  means  to  Professor 
Hyslop  that  the  normal  inverse  relation  between  image  and  objects 
still  held,  and  that  my  experiment  is  only  an  additional  evidence  of 
how  persistent  this  relation  is.  I  admit  that  in  my  mixed  experience 
at  the  beginning  of  the  experiment,  and  in  general  throughout  the 
experiment  (for  the  experience  to  the  end  was  a  conflict  between  old 
and  new),  this  relation  existed.  But  it  existed  simply  because  the 
experience  was  a  mixture  of  old  and  new  perceptions,  and  the  direc- 
tions of  reference  were  largely  still  the  old  ones.  My  '  real '  body 
was,  in  general,  localized  as  I  had  seen  it  in  my  pre-experimental 
vision.  The  retinal  image  was  localized  with  reference  to  this  older 
visual  position  of  my  body,  and  not  in  the  way  which  a  complete  sub- 
mission to  the  new  visual  experience  would  have  required.  As  long 
as  my  body  was  localized  according  to  the  old  experience,  and  other 
things  in  sight  were  localized  according  to  the  new,  the  two  standards 
for  localizing  my  retinal  image  were  in  conflict ;  so  that  the  image's 
correct  relation  to  one  of  these  standards  meant  its  inharmonious 
relation  to  the  other.  An  entirely  harmonious  organization  of  the 
new  experience,  based  on  a  full  knowledge  of  the  laws  of  light, 
would  have  required  that  the  retinal  image  should  be  localized  among 
the  objects  of  my  experience,  in  an  upright  position  with  respect  both 
to  my  body  and  to  the  objects  represented  in  the  image.  But  since 
my  body  was,  in  general,  still  localized  by  recalling  pre-experimental 
perceptions  of  it,  a  localization  of  the  image  in  proper  relation  to  this 
old  position  of  the  body  made  the  image  inverted  with  respect  to  the 
things  I  saw.  And  if,  on  the  other  hand,  I  localized  the  image  in  proper 
optical  relation  to  the  things  it  imaged,  the  relation  between  the  im- 
age and  my  body  was  incorrect.  In  general,  I  no  doubt  remained 
faithful  to  my  body  and  let  the  outer  contradiction  take  care  of 
itself. 

But  all  this  is  only  a  transitional  state  of  consciousness.     Suppose 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  187 

that  the  partial  reharmonization  of  my  experience  had  given  place  to 
a  complete  harmony  of  tactual  and  visual  perceptions  and  to  a  sup- 
pression of  my  old  localizations  brought  over  from  the  earlier  experi- 
ence— a  result  toward  which  the  experiments  surely  point ; — I  would 
then  feel  and  see  my  body  unreservedly  in  its  new  place  in  the  visual 
field,  and  in  the  same  relation  to  the  new  objects  around  my  body,  as 
existed  between  my  body  and  surrounding  objects  in  the  older  experi- 
ence, viz.,  my  feet  on  the  ground,  my  head  toward  the  sky,  etc.  The 
proper  localization  of  my  retinal  image  according  to  the  laws  of  ex- 
perience, would  now  produce  no  such  contradiction  as  was  inevitable 
during  the  earlier,  transition  state.  I  could  localize  the  image — and  a 
self -consistent  organization  of  my  new  experience  would  force  me  to 
localize  it — upright  with  respect  both  to  my  body  and  to  the  objects 
pictured  in  my  image.  The  inverse  relation  between  my  retinal  image 
and  the  objects  perceived  would  here  have  disappeared. 

The  result  toward  which  the  experiment  points  has  thus  a  most 
definite  bearing  on  the  problem  of  upright  vision,  even  in  Professor 
Hyslop's  sense  of  the  term.  And  instead  of  adding  testimony  to  the 
persistence  of  the  inverse  relation  between  image  and  objects,  it  really 
shows  that  this  inverse  relation  is  a  psychologically  non-significant  ac- 
companiment of  the  peculiar  lens-arrangement  of  the  eye,  and  would 
disappear  could  we  but  change  the  eye  in  that  regard  alone.  If  our 
eye  had  contained  a  more  complex  system  of  lenses  instead  of  the  sim- 
ple arrangement  we  actually  have,  there  would  have  been  no  hint  in 
our  experience,  and  certainly  none  outside  of  our  experience,  of  any 
mutually  inverse  relation  of  objects  and  their  retinal  images. 

Through  the  courtesy  of  the  editor,  I  have  been  permitted  to  read 
advance  sheets  of  Professor  Hyslop's  article  in  the  present  number  of 
this  REVIEW.  The  grounds  upon  which  he  denies  the  pertinence  of 
my  experiments  to  the  question  I  had  in  view  are  fully  covered,  it 
seems  to  me,  by  what  I  have  already  said.  Nor  do  I  see  that  he  has 
yet  produced  a  single  fact  to  show  that  the  interrelation  of  visual  ob- 
jects is  not  identical  with  the  interrelation  of  their  retinal  stimuli. 
Since  visual  objects  have  no  absolute  position  or  direction,  but  only 
relative  position  and  direction,  there  is  no  evidence  that  vision  reverses 
or  transposes  anything,  until  some  one  shows  that  vision  gives  us  ob- 
jects in  some  different  order  or  interrelation  from  that  which  their 
images  or  stimuli  have  among  themselves  on  the  retina.  Only  a  re- 
versal of  this  sort  would  give  us  a  visual  problem.  And  since  no  such 
reversal  or  transposition  occurs,  there  is  no  exclusively  visual  problem 
of  upright  vision,  as  Professor  Hyslop  supposes. 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA.  GEORGE  M.  STRATTON. 


188  ORIGINALITY  OF  ESTHETIC  FEELING. 

THE  ORIGINALITY  OF  ESTHETIC  FEELING. 

In  the  September  number  of  this  REVIEW,  Dr.  Livingston  Farrand 
has  deserved  well  of  all  interested  in  the  philosophy  of  art,  by  calling 
attention  to  Grosse's  Anf tinge  der  Kunst.  Agreeing,  as  I  do,  with  his 
high  estimate  of  the  book,  I  wish  to  point  out  briefly  the  significance  of 
some  of  its  conclusions.  As  the  title  indicates,  the  author  has  limited 
himself  to  the  historical  and  descriptive  treatment  of  his  subject,  but 
his  results  seem  to  have  some  bearing  upon  the  nature  of  the  aesthetic 
impulse  itself.  Is  the  beautiful  a  variety  of  the  useful?  Does  it  exist 
in  and  for  itself,  or  has  it  an  end  beyond  itself?  Can  we  analyze  our 
feeling  for  it  into  yet  simpler  elements,  or  is  it  an  immediate  and  ulti- 
mate judgment  of  value  ?  The  bearing  of  Herr  Grosse's  work  upon 
these  questions  is  what  I  wish  to  discuss  in  this  paper. 

The  author's  conclusions  are  best  considered  with  reference  to  the 
particular  divisions  of  the  arts  made  by  him,  for  the  results  vary 
slightly  in  the  different  arts,  (i)  Personal  adornment  holds  the  first 
place  in  his  classification ;  does  this  show  an  immediate  feeling  for 
beauty  or  is  it  undertaken  for  ulterior  ends  ?  Apparently  it  serves  a 
two-fold  end,  that  of  attraction  and  that  of  repulsion.  Primitive  man 
adorns  himself  either  to  attract  his  mate  or  to  terrify  his  enemy. 
Even  the  most  primitive  form  of  dress  seems  to  have  this  external  end, 
rather  than  the  more  immediate  one  of  serving  as  a  protection  from 
the  cold  or  as  a  concealment  of  the  person.  The  main  purpose  of 
early  adornment  was  the  same  as  that  found  in  animals,  the  further- 
ance of  sexual  selection.  Early  art  in  this  most  primitive  form  had 
thus  an  important  function  in  the  development  of  the  race.  It  was 
not  a  mere  accident  of  evolution,  but  one  of  its  forces,  a  means  to  the 
survival  of  the  fittest.  (2)  Again,  the  ornamentation  of  weapons 
and  domestic  implements  in  most  cases  seems  to  have  been  undertaken 
for  utilitarian  reasons.  Their  smoothness  and  polish  were  a  direct 
advantage  to  their  owner.  Moreover,  their  symmetry  and  proportion 
were  not  necessarily  due  to  aesthetic  feeling,  but  were  the  result  of  the 
inherent  possibilities  of  the  instrument  itself  or  due  to  imitation  of 
nature.  The  laws  of  mechanics  are  accountable  for  much  apparently 
aesthetic  purpose  in  nature.  (3)  As  we  might  expect,  painting  and 
carving  give  more  direct  evidence  of  aesthetic  feeling.  The  fact  of 
their  existence  as  distinct  objects  shows  that  to  some  extent  they  have 
their  end  in  themselves.  Of  course,  many  of  these  apparent  pictures 
are  examples  of  picture  writing,  drawn,  not  from  delight  in  the  forms, 
but  in  order  to  give  information  to  friends.  Others,  again,  are  re- 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  189 

ligious  symbols,  but  the  majority  must  be  classed  as  products  of  pure 
aesthetic  feeling.  Wherever  the  faculties  of  observation  and  execu- 
tion are  well  developed  there  they  are  sure  to  find  expression  in  an  ac- 
tivity having  its  end  in  itself  in  the  pure  delight  of  creative  ac- 
tivity. A  remarkable  illustration  of  this  is  given  in  the  fact  that  the 
hunting  tribes,  although  inferior  in  general  culture  to  others,  are  the 
ones  in  which  drawing  and  carving  seem  to  have  reached  their  greatest 
development,  the  hunter's  eye  and  hand  having  been  abnormally 
trained  by  virtue  of  his  occupation.  (4)  The  function  of  the  dance 
is  largely  religious  and  social.  It  gives  expression  to  the  emotions  of 
the  performers  and  rouses  those  of  the  spectators.  The  fact  that  the 
primitive  dance  is  not  a  performance  of  individuals,  but  of  the  whole 
tribe  or  village  indicates  its  nature  as  an  integrating  agency  in  society, 
uniting  the  tribe  among  themselves  and  making  them  more  effective 
against  external  foes.  (5)  Early  poetry  is  undoubtedly  an  aesthetic 
phenomenon,  arising  as  it  does  out  of  pure  delight  in  the  story  or  as 
the  natural  outlet  of  emotion.  It  also  had  an  undoubted  social  signi- 
ficance and  value  in  binding  together  the  shares  of  the  common  litera- 
ture and  song.  (6)  Finally,  music  seems  to  be  the  one  art  of  purely 
aesthetic  origin.  It  seems  impossible  to  assign  to  it  any  end  beyond 
itself.  It  is  the  furthest  removed  from  all  considerations  of  practical 
utility.  Mr.  Darwin,  it  is  true,  would  derive  it  from  circumstances 
connected  with  sexual  selection,  but  his  explanation  is  an  obvious 
petitio  principii. 

These  conclusions  may  perhaps  be  summarized  under  these  three 
heads:  (i)  All  primitive  peoples  have  some  form  of  art.  (2)  These 
art  forms  are  not  always  due  to  purely  aesthetic  impulses,  but  have  a 
utilitarian  purpose.  (3)  The  function  of  early  art  is  social  preserva- 
tion. With  reference  to  our  subject  these  results  might  seem  to  point 
to  a  negative  conclusion  in  regard  to  the  originality  and  independence 
of  the  aesthetic  impulse.  If  art  can  be  shown  in  so  many  cases  to 
serve  ends  beyond  itself,  why  may  it  not  have  done  so  universally? 
Why  may  not  utility  have  been  the  mother  of  the  arts  and  the  essence 
of  their  meaning?  And  if  aesthetic  appreciation  is  thus  a  secondary 
product,  reached  late  in  the  process  of  development,  this  fact  is  in 
some  way  interpreted  to  the  disadvantage  of  art.  Its  naturalness  is 
questioned,  and  with  its  naturalness,  its  value  in  itself. 

On  the  contrary,  it  is  necessary  to  note,  in  the  first  place,  that  art 
cannot  be  used  as  a  means  until  it  first  exists  as  an  end.  The  utility 
of  art  arises  from  its  aesthetic  quality,  rather  than  its  aesthetic  quality 
from  its  utility.  Unless  ornament  and  decoration  were  already  at 


190  ORIGINALITY  OF  AESTHETIC  FEELING. 

tractive  to  the  primitive  female  they  would  have  no  value  as  an  ele- 
ment in  sexual  selection.  It  is  because  they  already  please  the  eye 
that  they  play  the  part  they  do  in  early  social  life.  The  social  func- 
tion of  art  is  dependent  wholly  on  its  aesthetic  character.  This  holds 
in  music,  poetry,  and  the  dance,  as  well  as  in  the  plastic  arts.  Mr, 
Darwin's  explanation  of  the  origin  of  music  leaves  unexplained  the 
essential  point,  the  cause  of  the  agreeableness  of  the  elementary  cries. 
It  may  be  contended  in  reply  to  this  statement  of  the  relations  of  art 
to  utility  that  it  takes  no  account  of  the  many  cases  in  which  it  has 
been  proved  that  aesthetic  pleasure  in  objects  has  arisen  from  long 
experience  of  their  utility,  that  is,  from  association  of  non-aesthetic 
pleasures.  This  is  quite  true,  but  it  is  because  this  point  involves  a 
different  problem,  a  problem  which  may  be  quite  as  important,  but 
which  is  yet  perfectly  distinct.  The  one  concerns  the  conscious  nature 
of  aesthetic  feeling,  the  other  involves  the  history  of  its  unconscious 
conditions  or  origins.  The  one  is  within  the  sphere  of  art  itself ;  the 
other  is  wholly  outside  these  limits.  The  worth  or  dignity  of  art 
does  not  depend  upon  any  theory  of  its  origin ;  these  pre-artistic  be- 
ginnings cannot  depreciate  in  any  degree  the  value  of  the  completed 
product.  Art  is  distinct  from  its  causes  or  antecedents.  It  is  the 
same  question  which  has  been  so  often  fought  over  in  the  history  of 
thought,  nature  versus  origin,  but  it  is  continually  cropping  up  again 
in  new  forms  demanding  repeated  consideration.  Whatever  may 
have  been  the  origin  of  art,  it  exists  now  as  an  independent  expression 
of  man's  nature.  The  only  way  in  which  its  value  might  be  ques- 
tioned would  be  through  the  proof  that  it  exists  as  art  only  by  virtue 
of  its  relation  to  an  ulterior  end.  Just  as  the  ethical  value  of  man  de- 
pends upon  his  autonomy  and  his  right  to  exist  as  an  end  in  himself, 
so  the  aesthetic  dignity  of  art  consists  in  its  sufficiency  to  itself.  It 
may  further  social  unity,  must  do  so  if  it  is  to  exist  permanently,  but 
it  does  so  by  virtue  of  its  inherent  nature.  Its  use  as  a  means  presup- 
poses its  value  as  an  end,  and  this  fact  Herr  Grosse's  conclusions  only 
serve  to  confirm.  They  show  that  art  is  useful,  but  not  that  utility  is 
the  essence  of  art. 

Again,  this  fact  may  be  brought  out  more  clearly  by  considering 
the  distinction  between  art  forms  and  aesthetic  pleasure  in  them,  or 
between  forms  which  may  at  one  time  be  artistic  and  another  time  not  so. 
The  fact  that  certain  forms  once  served  utilitarian  ends,  and  that  the 
same  forms  at  a  later  period  gave  pure  aesthetic  pleasure,  by  no  means 
indicates  identity  of  nature  in  the  subjective  appreciation.  Identity  of 
the  object  does  not  imply  identity  of  feeling  for  it.  What  anthropol- 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  191 

ogy  can  do  for  aesthetics  is  to  trace  the  history  of  these  objective  forms, 
thus  showing  the  antecedents  of  art,  but  this  history  of  forms  is  not  a 
history  of  the  subjective  feelings  for  art.  In  the  truest  sense  conscious- 
ness has  no  history.  Its  states  are  eternally  themselves ;  there  is  suc- 
cession of  these  states,  but  they  themselves  remain  in  nature  self-iden- 
tical and  distinct  from  one  another.  Hence  it  may  very  well  be  that 
a  form  which  has  later  become  known  as  an  art  form  existed  origi- 
nally for  other  than  aesthetic  ends.  It  may  have  been  useful  for  hunt- 
ing, or  clothing,  or  agriculture,  or  it  may  have  been  but  an  accidental 
variation  grown  dear  by  custom,  or  it  may  have  presented  a  peculiarly 
pleasant  stimulation  to  our  perceptive  powers,  but  it  is  not  an  object 
of  aesthetic  appreciation  until  ulterior  ends  have  been  lost  sight  of,  and 
it  is  enjoyed  for  itself  alone.  The  feeling  for  beauty  is  simple  and 
not  to  be  analyzed,  whatever  may  have  been  the  history  of  its  becom- 
ing, or  of  the  objects  which  arouse  it.  That  is  to  say,  it  shares  the 
nature  of  all  feeling  in  being  immediate.  It  is  a  self-evident,  though 
apparently  often  forgotten,  fact  that  all  mediacy  presupposes  the  im- 
mediate. Utility  is  only  a  secondary  notion  acquiring  its  meaning 
from  its  relation  to  an  end.  This  is  true  both  in  ethics  and  aesthetics. 
The  beautiful  as  well  as  the  good  carries  us  back  to  the  nature  of  man 
as  an  ultimate  standard  beyond  which  explanation  cannot  go.  The 
original  judgment  of  value  must,  therefore,  have  been  a  simple  and 
irreducible  one,  a  feeling  of  immediate  satisfaction  in  some  action  or 
passion  congruent  with  the  human  organism.  Into  this  instinctive 
judgment  the  question  of  utility  cannot  enter,  since  it  in  turn  is  founded 
on  it  as  its  presupposition  and  standard.  Between  this  instinctive  feeling 
and  the  most  highly  developed  aesthetic  appreciation  there  is  no  differ- 
ence in  kind ;  hence,  unless  we  are  prepared  to  deny  the  existence  of 
any  such  immediate  satisfaction,  we  must  admit  the  originality  of  the 
aesthetic  judgment.  Herr  Grosse's  results,  therefore,  while  giving  us 
valuable  information  as  to  the  conditions  of  primitive  art,  are  not  to  be 
taken  as  furnishing  any  derivation  of  the  aesthetic  feeling  itself,  since 
these  earliest  art  forms,  so  far  as  they  evidence  aesthetic  appreciation 
at  all,  indicate  that  the  feeling  for  the  beautiful  was  as  simple  then  as 
now. 

NORMAN  WILDE. 
COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE. 

Agnosticism  and  Religion.    JACOB  GOULD  SCHURMAN.    New  York, 

Charles  Scribner's  Sons,  1896.     16°.    Pp.  181. 

Two  addresses  (one  being  to  the  students  of  Cornell  University) 
and  an  essay,  all  written  in  the  broad  rich  oratorical  style  of  which 
President  Schurman  is  a  master.  He  defends  theistic  religion  against 
agnostic  denials,  on  the  one  hand,  and  against  the  dogmatism  of  theo- 
logians, on  the  other.  Since  Kant  this  attitude,  which  is  unquestion- 
ably that  of  wisdom,  has  been  gaining  strength ;  but  so  ardent  is  man's 
love  for  sharp  conceptions  that  such  vague  belief  as  this  little  book 
expresses  will,  so  far  from  being  universally  greeted  as  a  happy  via 
media,  probably  gain  for  its  author  the  reprobation  of  influential 
circles  on  both  sides.  The  theologians  will  doubtless  express  them- 
selves most  strongly,  and  in  these  days  of  wariness  in  official  position 
President  Schurman  is  to  be  praised  for  the  courage  with  which  he 
exposes  himself  to  their  ire.  The  work  makes  little  pretence  to  origi- 
nality of  argument.  The  first  essay  is  an  interesting  account  of  Hux- 
ley's career.  The  author  yields  him  hearty  praise,  but  complains, 
first,  that  he  never  treated  religion  as  if  it  too  could  be  a  positively 
evolving  thing;  second,  that  he  failed  to  see  through  the  absurdity  of 
the  Kant-Hamilton  dogma  that  God  must  be  essentially  unknowable 
to  man ;  and  third,  that  he  too  trustingly  assumed  that  the  scientific 
investigator  as  such  must  be  the  chief  authority  in  all  things,  even 
those  of  the  spirit.  The  second  essay  is  a  defence  of  man's  knowledge 
of  the  Divinity  that  expresses  itself  in  the  Universe,  as  against  what 
the  writer  calls  '  the  farce  of  nescience  playing  the  part  of  omniscience 
in  setting  the  bounds  of  science.'  The  last  paper  eloquently  rejoices 
in  the  evolution  of  our  Christian  churches  towards  non-doctrinal 
theism.  "  If  a  true  Christian  discovers  that  the  creed  of  his  church  is 
no  longer  tenable,  his  plain  duty  *  *  *  *  is  not  to  leave  the  church, 
but  to  let  his  light  so  shine  that  others  may  come  to  a  knowledge 
of  the  fact  that  the  church  is  not  the  mere  embodiment  of  a  creed,  but 
the  plastic  organization  of  a  life  which  is  spiritual.  His  insight  into 
the  real  situation  of  affairs  forbids  desertion,  even  though  he  is  aware 
that  fidelity  may  be  rewarded  by  banishment  or  persecution"  (p.  170). 
The  little  book  deserves  a  wide  success.  W.  J. 

192 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  193 

Studies   in    the   Hegelian   Dialectic.     J.   M.    E.    MACTAGGART. 

Cambridge,  University  Press,  1896.     Pp.  xvi-|-259. 

By  these  Studies  Mr.  McTaggart  leaps  at  one  bound  into  the 
foremost  rank  among  the  interpreters  of  Hegel,  and  in  the  course  of 
his  exegesis  he  displays  so  much  ingenuity  and  subtlety  that  his  book 
cannot  but  prove  extremely  stimulating  to  all  who  read  it.  It  is,  of 
course,  impossible  to  follow  him  through  all  the  depths  and  ramifica- 
tions of  his  argument,  but  an  idea  of  his  main  results  may  be  attained 
by  considering  his  answers  to  three  of  the  leading  questions  about  the 
Hegelian  Dialectic.  They  are :  I.  What  is  the  aim  it  sets  before  it- 
self? II.  What  is  its  relation  to  experience?  III.  What  is  the 
significance  in  it  of  Negation? 

I.  Its  aim,  according  to  Mr.  McTaggart,  is  to  show  that  only  in  the 
Absolute  Idea  can  the  ultimate  explanation  of  anything  be  found  and 
that  all  other  principles  of  explanation  are  necessarily  inadequate. 
And  the  sole  postulate  it  requires  in  order  to  refute  scepticism  and  to 
establish  all  knowledge  upon  this  impregnable  rock,  is  the  existence 
of  experience,  t.  e.,  the  validity  of  the  idea  of  Being,  from  which  the 
Dialectic  sets  out.     If  Being  is  admitted,  the  nature  of  thought  is  such 
that  all  the  other  categories  follow,  and  not  even  the  extremest  scepti- 
cism can  deny  that  something  is.     But  Being  is  the  most  abstract  of 
the  categories  and  in  restoring  to  science  the  category  of  the  Absolute 
Idea  the  Dialectic  corrects  the  error  of  a  course  of  abstraction  which 
has  been  driven  to  equate  Being  with  Nothing. 

II.  It  is  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  the  Dialectic  is  independent  of 
experience  or  tries  to  reduce  the  universe  to  pure  thought.     When  it 
is  called  a  process  of  pure  thought,  that  only  means  that  it  is  "de- 
pendent not  on  experience  being  thus  and  thus,  but  only  on  experience 
existing  at  all.     And  the  existence  of  experience  cannot  be  called  an 
empirical  fact.     It  is  the  presupposition  alike  of  all  empirical  knowl- 
edge and  of  all  pure  thought."    And  this  general  nature  of  experience 
is  the  passive  basis  of  the  dialectic  movement,  which  is  "  due  exclu- 
sively to  that  element  of   experience  which  we  call  pure  thought" 
(p.  19).     This  indispensable  but  passive  condition  of    the  working 
of  '  pure  thought '  forms  an  immediate  element  in  knowledge  (p.  41), 
but   is   not   in    itself   knowledge.     In  this   sense,  then,  Hegelism  is 
'without  presupposition.' 

III.  With  regard  to  the  place  of  negation  in  the  Dialectic,  Mr. 
McTaggart  holds  that,  so  far  from  denying  the  law  of  Contradiction, 
it  is  essentially  based  on  it.     And,  moreover,  though  at  first  and  in 
the  case  of  the  lower  categories  the  antithesis  negates  the  thesis  and 


194  STUDIES  IN  THE  HEGELIAN  DIALECTIC. 

has  to  be  reconciled  to  it  by  the  synthesis,  yet,  as  we  pass  to  the  higher 
categories,  the  sharpness  of  the  opposition  is  gradually  mitigated,  un- 
til at  the  end  we  progress  almost  continuously.  "  The  really  funda- 
mental aspect  of  Dialectic  is  not  the  tendency  of  the  finite  category  to 
negate  itself,  but  to  complete  itself  "  (p.  10).  It  follows  that  the  Dia- 
lectic, as  depicted  by  Hegel,  does  not  at  first  fully  express  the  nature 
of  thought — its  own  nature  (pp.  138-9)  is  in  a  sense  subjective  and 
represents  only  the  way  in  which  the  human  mind  proceeds  from 
error  to  truth.  But  that  only  brings  out  into  clearer  relief  the  fact 
that  the  whole  truth  and  the  sole  truth  is  nothing  less  than  the  Abso- 
lute Idea.  Mr.  McTaggart  somewhat  hesitates  to  claim  Hegel's  ap- 
proval for  these  inferences  from  his  method,  and  admits  that  "  the 
change  in  the  type  of  the  process  is  not  sufficiently  emphasized  in 
Hegel,"  but  he  regards  it  as  necessary,  "  since  it  is  only  by  the  aid  of 
some  such  theory  that  we  can  regard  the  system  as  valid  at  all" 
(p.  158). 

After  this  comes  a  chapter  on  that  sorest  of  vulnerable  points,  the 
relation  of  the  Dialectic  to  Time,  concerning  which  I  have  had  my 
say  elsewhere,1  and  two  chapters  on  the  final  result  and  application  of 
the  Dialectic.  In  these  latter  McTaggart  drops  the  r61e  of  reverent 
discipleship  and  in  his  own  name  reaffirms  objections  against  which 
he  had  elaborately  defended  Hegelism  in  the  earlier  chapters,  denying, 
e.  g.,  that  pure  thought  and  the  philosophy  which  systematizes  it  is  an 
adequate  expression  of  the  whole  nature  of  the  Spirit,  and  that  the 
applications  are  the  really  valid  part  of  Hegel's  system  (p.  238). 
Some  of  his  conclusions  here  seem  strange  emotional  exotics  to  grow 
upon  the  arid  and  alien  soil  of  Hegelism,  e.  g.,  that  all  reality  con- 
sists of  spirits  which  are  individual  (p.  222).  But  after  all  the  main 
questions  suggested  by  his  book  are  :  (i)  Will  his  interpretation  of 
Hegel  stand?  And  (2)  if  it  will,  what  does  Hegelism  amount  to? 

Of  the  first  of  these  questions  it  would  be  unbecoming  to  essay  a 
decision  wrhile  life-long  students  of  Hegel  show  the  reticence  and  cau- 
tion observable  in  Professor  Wallace's  review  in  Mind  (N.  S.  No.  20) . 
And  after  all  science  is  more  concerned  with  the  validity  of  Hegel's 
plea  as  presented  by  Mr.  McTaggart  than  with  the  actual  meaning  of 
a  writer  who  certainly  neglected  many  opportunities  for  speaking  out 
clearly.  Hence  the  second  is  the  question  of  more  pressing  impor- 
tance, and  an  answer  will  probably  be  most  facilitated  by  a  critical 
discussion  of  the  three  characteristics  of  Mr.  McTaggart's  interpreta- 
tion stated  above. 

1  Mind,  N.  S.     No.  13.     The  Metaphysics  of  the  Time-process. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  195 

I.  It  may  be  pointed  out,  to  begin  with,  that  only  a  very  accommo- 
dating sceptic  would  assert  Being  in  such  a  sense  that  the  whole  Dia- 
lectic can  be  extracted  from  it.  The  ordinary  kind  would  probably 
object  that  Mr.  McTaggart's  argument  most  palpably  involved  the 
characteristic  Hegelian  confusion  of  essence  and  existence,  and  that 
the  admission  of  a  (possibly  illusory)  appearance  of  existence  did  not 
carry  with  it  the  validity  of  the  idea  of  Being. 

As  to  II.,  it  is  very  hard  to  construe  the  independence  of  experience 
which  Mr.  McTaggart  ascribes  to  '  pure  thought.'  The  Dialectic  is  a 
process  of  '  pure  thought '  which  is  represented  as  the  active  principle 
in  knowing,  whereof  it  monopolizes  the  credit.  Yet  it  is  admitted  to 
be  abstract  (e.  g.,  p.  18,  105,  233),  z.  <?.,  the  product,  together  with 
pure  sensation,  of  a  merely  logical  analysis  of  the  actual  process  of 
knowledge  which  alone  is  a  concrete  experience.  We  are  expressly 
warned  (p.  74)  that  "  the  importance  lies  only  in  the  concrete  whole," 
and  that  "  this  reality  is  not  to  be  considered  as  if  it  were  built  up  out 
of  thought  and  sensation."  It  follows  that  "  pure  thought "  "never 
really  exists  except  as  an  element  in  experience"  (p.  105),  i.  e.,  it  is 
never  found  as  a  fact  at  all.  How  then  can  the  Dialectic  be  a  descrip- 
tion of  any  actual  process  of  knowledge  ? 

Further,  it  is  doubtless  true  that  the  '  lower '  categories  are  abstract 
and  very  far  from  the  concreteness  of  the  actual.  But  is  this  any  less 
true  of  the  highest  category,  of  the  Absolute  Idea  itself  ?  Mr.  Mc- 
Taggart talks  as  if  it  were  concrete,  but  it  is  concrete  only  in  the 
sense  of  coming  at  the  end  of  an  unavailing  effort  to  transcend  the  ab- 
stractness  of  all  thought.  To  become  really  concrete,  the  Dialectic 
would  have  to  get  back  to  the  concrete  individuality  from  which  ab- 
straction started.  Why,  if  it  has  such  a  horror  of  abstraction,  did  it 
ever  abandon  it  ?  That  is  a  vital  question  for  all  such  schemes  of 
thought.  For  they  are  all  rendered  superfluous  by  the  recognition 
that  knowledge  serves  a  purpose,  that  it  is  always  necessarily  abstract, 
that  the  abstraction  is  useful,  and  progressive  because  it  is  useful.  In 
the  whole  process  it  is  only  the  first  step  which  costs,  the  step  that 
takes  us  from  the  concrete  individual  to  the  abstract  universal.  But 
after  that  everything  is  plain  sailing,  requiring  no  justification ;  we 
proceed  gaily  to  the  highest  abstractions,  nay  to  the  idea  of  Being — a 
symbol  so  abstract  that  its  content  cannot  be  distinguished  from 
nothing — whenever  such  abstraction  is  needed  for  our  calculations. 
Such  is  the  state  of  things  which  Hegelism  so  elaborately  misunder- 
stands that  it  feels  bound  to  prove,  by  an  (unsuccessful)  reduction  to 
their  starting  point,  the  validity  of  instruments  of  thought  which  are 


196  STUDIES  IN   THE  HEGELIAN  DIALECTIC. 

fully  sanctified  by  their  usefulness.  And  all  for  what?  To  justify, 
it  is  said,  the  use  of  '  higher '  categories.  But  is  it  not  simpler  to  de- 
fend their  validity  by  recalling  that  the  lower  originally  proceeded  out 
of  them  by  progressive  abstraction?  The  Dialectic  undoes  the  ab- 
straction of  science — but  had  science  no  reasons  for  its  abstractions, 
and  if  it  had,  will  it  not  suffice  to  remind  it  of  those  reasons  ?  What 
need  then  for  the  Dialectic  ? 

III.  The  same  question  is  echoed  by  Mr.  McTaggart's  conclusions 
as  to  the  subjective  element  in  the  Dialectic.  If  "  the  opposition  of  one 
idea  to  another  and  the  consequence  negation  and  contradiction  do  not 
mark  any  real  step  towards  attaining  the  knowledge  of  the  essential  na- 
ture of  thought"  (p.  147),  if  the  Absolute  Idea  alone  is  adequate,  then  it 
is  surely  better  never  to  lose  sight  of  it  than  to  recover  it  by  a  dialectic 
process  which,  in  spite  of  Mr.  McTaggart's  utmost  elucidations,  remains 
an  enchanted  forest  in  which  the  babes  in  philosophy  are  sure  to  lose 
their  way.  To  admit  that  not  the  Dialectic  itself,  but  only  its  result, 
can  pretend  to  absolute  truth,  is  surely  to  reduce  it  to  a  pedagogical 
method  due  to  the  infirmity  of  human  intelligence.  And  not  only  is 
the  method  bad  pedagogically,  but  no  cause  is  shown  why  it  should 
be  the  only  method.  If  the  Absolute  Idea  (or  better  still,  as  shown 
above,  the  concrete  individual)  is  to  be  reached,  the  shorter  and 
simpler  the  method  the  better.  And  better  methods  readily  suggest 
themselves.  The  necessity  of  ultimately  recognizing  the  anthropo- 
morphic basis  of  our  interpretation  of  our  experience — for  that  accord- 
ing to  Mr.  McTaggart  is  what  the  Dialectic  demonstrates — may  easily 
be  made  clear  both  directly  and  indirectly.  Directly,  by  showing  that 
none  of  the  categories  used  in  science  or  ordinary  life  ever  free  them- 
selves from  their  human  reference ;  indirectly,  by  showing  that  the 
lower  categories  annul  themselves  when  taken  as  independent.  Both 
these  methods  would  seem  far  preferable  to  the  illusory  starting  point, 
the  paradoxical  phrasing,  the  cumbrous  and  obscure  progression  of  the 
the  Dialectic,  which  seems  nothing  but  a  highly  contentious  way  of 
reaching  assumptions  which  in  science  and  ordinary  life  we  accept 
without  contention  and  in  philosophy  can  justify  far  more  simply. 
So  that  to  me  at  least  it  seems  not  the  slightest  merit  of  Mr.  McTag- 
gart's work  to  have  given  fresh  urgency  to  the  question  :  What,  then,  is 
the  good  of  the  Hegelian  Dialectic  ? 

F.  C.  S.  SCHILLER. 

CORNELL  UNIVERSITY. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  197 

S.    Kierkegaard  ah  Philosoph.     HAROLD  HOFFDING.     Stuttgart, 

Frommann,  1896.     Pp.  x+jyo. 

This  brochure  is  the  third  in  Frommann' s  Classiker  der  Phi- 
losophic, a  series  similar  to  Black-wood's  Philosophical  Classics 
which  is  being  issued  under  the  editorial  supervision  of  Prof.  Falcken- 
berg  of  Erlangen,  already  well  known  through  his  Grundriss  der 
Geschichte  der  neueren  Philosophic.  Besides  the  present  work,  vol- 
umes on  Fechner  by  Professor  Lasswitz  and  Hobbes,  by  Professor 
Tonnies  have  already  appeared.  Among  the  notable  announcements 
of  numbers  to  come  are  Riehl's  Hume,  Paulsen's  Kant,  Hoffding's 
Rousseau,  Lasson's  Hegel  and  the  volume  on  Lotze  by  the  editor. 
The  series  will  be  of  especial  value  because  of  its  additions  to  our 
list  of  standard  compendiums  on  the  classical  writers  and  systems. 

Kierkegaard  (1813-1855)  finds  a  place  in  the  series  as  the  fore- 
most thinker  which  Denmark  has  produced  (p.  2)  and  as  a  notable 
personality  in  the  phi losophico- religious  movements  of  the  century. 
Professor  Hoffding  leads  up  to  his  subject  proper  by  chapters  on  Die 
romantisch-spekulative  Religionsphilosophie  (Schleiermacher  and 
Hegel),  Kierkegaard's  dltere  Zeitgenossen  in  Ddnemark  and 
Kierkegaard's  Personlichkeit.  Then  follows  the  discussion  of 
Kierkegaard's  philosophy  under  the  two  principal  heads  of  episte- 
mology  and  ethics.  This  forms  the  body  of  the  work,  which  con- 
cludes with  a  somewhat  briefer  explanation  and  criticism  of  the 
philosopher's  attitude  toward  the  Christian  faith  and  his  breach  with 
the  '  weakened  and  softened  Christianity  '  of  the  Church.  Central  in 
the  whole  development  and  of  great  psycho  logical  interest  is  the  influ- 
ence of  Kierkegaard's  temperament  upon  his  speculation.  Possessed 
by  an  inherited  melancholy  tendency,  extremely  conscientious,  and 
with  a  dialectical  gift  which  forbade  him  to  glide  over  antinomies, 
he  reproduced  in  his  thinking,  especially  in  his  ethical  and  religious 
conclusions,  the  lonely  individualism,  the  unceasing  inner  conflict,  the 
paradoxical  outcome  of  his  life.  In  the  beginning  he  is  satisfied 
neither  with  Hegel's  speculative  theology  and  its  impossible  iteration 
of  the  threefold  rhythm  nor  Schleiermacher's  easy  renunciation  of  a 
direct  knowledge  of  the  absolute.  As  he  frames  his  own  ethic,  he 
emphasizes  freedom  and  the  essential  individualism  of  moral  culture, 
only  to  void  morals  of  all  social  content  and,  by  giving  them  an  ex- 
clusively transcendent  basis,  to  reduce  morality  to  asceticism.  Toward 
the  close  of  his  life  he  feels  himself  compelled  publicly  to  censure 
the  existing  Christianity  as  a  degenerate  travesty  of  the  pure  religion  of 
Christ  and  to  demand  a  return  to  the  unworldly  simplicity  of  the 


198  MODERN  PSYCHO-PHYSICAL  PARALLELISM. 

primitive  Christian  community.  Then,  worn  out  by  his  labors  and  his 
sufferings,  he  dies  when  only  forty-two,  after  profoundly  affecting  the 
thought  of  his  time  and  country. 

The  book  is  written  with  the  customary  skill  of  its  author.  The 
touch  is  so  deft  that  the  reader  wishes  it  were  possible  to  read  the 
Danish  original  of  Professor  Hoffding  instead  of  the  German  transla- 
tion ;  and  so  sympathetic,  in  spite  of  grave  differences  of  position  be- 
tween the  subject  and  the  writer  of  the  work,  that  he  is  ready  to  agree 
with  the  opinion  expressed  in  the  preface  by  Schrempf ,  one  of  Kierke- 
gaard's principal  German  admirers :  Dass  hier  ein  Philosoph  der 
Continuitdt  den  Irrationalismus  Kierkegaard's  darstellt  und  auf 
seinen  ivirklichen  Wahrheitsgehalt  priift,  kann  auch  der  Ver- 
ehrer  Kierkegaard's  nicht  bedauern,  sondern  nur  mit  Freude 
begriissen. 

A.  C.  ARMSTRONG,  JR. 

WESLEYAN  UNIVERSITY. 


Ueber  physische  und  psychische  Kausalitat  und  das  Prinzip  des 

psycho-physischen  Parallelismus.    MAX  WENTSCHER.    Leipzig, 

Barth,  1896.     Pp.  x-f  122. 

The  two  essential  elements  of  modern  psycho-physical  parallelism 
are  stated  by  the  author  to  be :  first,  the  assumption  of  a  uniform 
parallelism  between  any  given  psychical  process  and  its  corresponding 
cerebral  process ;  and  second,  the  affirmation  of  an  entire  absence  of 
any  causal  interaction  between  these  two  kinds  of  processes.  Wundt 
lays  greater  emphasis  on  the  second  part  of  the  doctrine,  but  concedes 
the  impossibility  of  consistently  maintaining  an  absolute  independence 
of  the  individual  consciousness.  This  principle,  which  is  advanced 
by  its  supporters  merely  as  an  expression  of  empirical  facts,  is  in 
reality  a  metaphysical  doctrine,  for  it  goes  beyond  experience  in  all  its 
teachings,  and  if  it  were  really  based  on  observed  facts  it  could  serve 
only  as  a  preliminary  formula  and  would  require  some  explanation. 

A  study  of  physical  causation  shows  the  impossibility  of  prov- 
ing that  we  are  here  dealing  with  a  closed,  independent  system  of 
processes.  We  can  discover  only  the  phenomenal  aspect  of  causa- 
tion; its  essential  nature  is  beyond  the  reach  of  our  observation. 
That  any  description  of  phenomena  by  the  physical  sciences  should 
seem  to  support  the  doctrine  of  an  independent  physical  causa- 
tion follows  from  the  circumstance  that  only  physical  facts  enter  into 
the  discussion.  The  extension  of  the  principle  to  realms  in  which 
other  kinds  of  facts  enter  in,  is  not  justified  by  its  apparent  confirma- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  199 

tion  in  the  physical  sciences.  But  in  the  natural  sciences  themselves, 
even  if  we  admit  the  assumption  that  the  amounts  of  energy  in  the 
cause  and  in  the  effect  are  equivalent,  we  are  by  no  means  forced  to 
admit  that  no  outside  agent  can  enter  into  the  process.  Take,  for  ex- 
ample, a  case  of  potential  energy  which  is  converted  into  kinetic 
energy.  The  moment  at  which  this  stored  up  energy  shall  begin  to 
discharge  is  not  determined  by  the  energy  itself.  It  is  determined  by 
circumstances  which  do  not  depend  on  the  expenditure  of  any  physical 
energy.  If  some  liberating  cause  sets  the  process  in  operation  the 
energy  of  this  liberating  cause  is  not  destroyed  in  the  act  of  bringing 
about  the  discharge,  but  its  energy  is  added  to  that  of  the  efficient 
causes,  and  its  equivalent  appears  in  the  effect.  The  determination  of 
the  moment  at  which  a  cause  shall  operate  may  thus  be  effected  by 
some  agent  without  the  expenditure  of  any  physical  energy.  In  this 
way  we  have  a  reasonable  explanation  of  the  frequently  observed  fact 
that  the  psychical  processes  determine  the  moment  at  which  certain 
physical  processes  shall  take  place,  without  there  being  any  demand 
for  additional  physical  energy  either  in  the  cause  or  in  the  effect. 

Living  organisms  exhibit  individual  peculiarities.  We  have  here 
in  the  physical  world  certain  groups  of  processes  obeying  laws  which 
are  peculiar  to  themselves.  Such  organisms  may  well  be  regarded 
as  mediators  between  pure  physical  processes  and  processes  which  are 
non-physical  in  their  nature. 

Psychical  causation  is  limited  to  certain  individuals  of  a  unitary 
character ;  their  unity  consists,  not  of  some  objective  relation  of  parts, 
but  of  immediately  perceived  unity  in  consciousness.  Such  individ- 
uals are  capable  of  communicating  with  each  other  only  through  the 
physical  world.  The  question  arises,  are  these  circles  of  individual, 
unitary  consciousness  entirely  closed  to  the  action  of  any  external 
cause?  In  their  origin  they  can  not  be  regarded  as  independent. 
Breaks  in  the  temporal  continuity  of  the  series  of  processes  and  the 
appearance  of  new  processes,  such  as  sensations,  can  not  be  explained 
from  the  foregoing  conscious  states  or  conditions,  but  require  the 
action  of  some  outside  agency.  Psychical  activities  are  not  deter- 
mined by  the  temporal  relations  of  outside  causes,  but  by  the  relations 
which  exist  between  the  actual  contents  of  processes  resulting  from 
these  causes.  It  is  the  logical,  ethical  or  aesthetic  relation  between 
contents  of  consciousness  that  leads  to  volition.  The  subject  thus  de- 
termined by  relations  of  content  may,  in  the  manner  indicated,  influence 
the  temporal  order  of  physical  processes. 

Instead  of  parallelism  between  two  independent  series  of  processes 


200  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

we  have,  then,  a  form  of  interaction  which  maybe  called  causal.  The 
attempts  to  avoid  the  word  cause  by  using  the  term  occasion  are  mere 
verbal  evasions.  This  kind  of  an  explanation,  formulated  in  the 
spirit  of  Lotzean  philosophy,  seems  to  the  author  to  meet  the  observed 
facts  and  metaphysical  requirements  involved,  better  than  any  form  of 
parallelism. 

CHAS.  H.  JUDD. 

MlDDLETOWN,  CONN. 


Grundriss  der  Geschichte  der  Philosophic.     JOHANNES  REHMKE. 

Berlin,  Duncker;  New  York,  G.  E.  Stechert,   1896.     Pp.  304. 

This  is  a  compendious  volume  covering  the  whole  range  of 
European  philosophy  from  Thales  to  Lotze.  It  differs  from  many  of 
the  recent  Outlines  in  its  almost  entire  exclusion  of  bibliographic 
material,  titles  of  works  of  the  authors  discussed  as  well  as  specific 
references  to  these  works  being  rarely  introduced,  and  no  reference 
being  made  to  other  histories  or  to  monographs  covering  the  same 
ground.  It  is  not  a  '  manual,'  therefore,  in  the  sense  of  being  a  guide 
to  study  beyond  itself ;  its  value  lies  in  its  own  individual  interpreta- 
tion of  the  systems  of  which  it  treats.  It  differs  also  markedly  from 
some  of  the  smaller  and  many  of  the  more  extended  Outlines  in  that 
it  does  not  attempt  at  any  point  to  give  the  general  historical  setting  of 
the  philosophical  movement,  but  confines  itself  rigidly  to  an  account 
of  the  substance  and  relations  of  systems  of  philosophy  proper — "wis- 
senschaftliche  Philosophic.  So  complete  is  this  abstraction  that 
even  the  specific  contributions  of  Christianity  and  the  influence  of  the 
modern  scientific  movement  alike  receive  no  recognition.  It  may  be 
questioned  whether  such  a  method  of  treatment  can  be  in  the  fullest 
sense  true ;  and,  from  the  pedagogical  point  of  view,  one  may  doubt 
whether  it  conduces  to  the  best  philosophical  culture.  At  the  same 
time,  it  is  but  fair  to  judge  a  book  by  what  it  does  give  us  within  the 
limits  it  has  set  for  itself,  rather  than  by  what  it  purposely  does  not 
give.  And  we  find,  on  examination,  an  unusually  clear,  vigorous  and 
interesting  presentation  of  the  leading  systems  and  schools  from 
ancient  to  modern  times.  The  author's  interest  is  evidently  strongest 
in  the  direction  of  Metaphysics  and  Erkenntnisstheorie.  He  has 
given  much  more  than  a  bare  statement  of  principles  and  doctrines ; 
rather  we  find  a  sympathetic  and  thoughtful  interpretation,  and  oc- 
casionally, when  the  author  gives  himself  room,  a  fine  logical  and 
psychological  analysis  and  development  of  the  problem  in  hand.  This 
is  notably  the  case  in  his  account  of  Kant.  The  treatment  is  '  objec 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  2OI 

tive  '  in  the  best  sense,  with  frequent  reference  to  the  relations,  posi- 
tive and  negative,  which  one  system  bears  to  its  predecessors.  Only 
now  and  then  does  the  author  let  fall  a  criticism  or  suggestion  which 
indicates  his  own  point  of  view,  e.  ^.,  pp.  24,  250,  295. 

Dr.  Rehmke  divides  his  work  into  Ancient  and  Modern  philosophy. 
Notable  here  is  his  inclusion  under  the  former  head,  not  only  of  the 
philosophies  of  the  Hellenistic  period,  but  also  of  Scholasticism  and 
the  philosophy  of  the  Renaissance,  on  the  ground  that  these  are  essen- 
tially only  pupils  of  the  Greeks.  The  Christian  Middle  Ages  is 
treated  very  briefly,  only  15  pages.  Modern  philosophy  is  divided 
into  Pre-Kantian,  Kantian  and  Post-Kantian.  Naturally  a  large  place, 
46  out  of  200  pages,  is  given  to  the  exposition  of  Kant,  while  Post- 
Kantian  philosophy  gets  a  space  of  only  44  pages.  The  chapter  on 
Kant  shows  the  author  at  his  best,  and  is  decidedly  a  fine  piece  of 
work.  Naturally  a  considerable  preponderance  is  given  by  the  author 
to  Continental  and  especially  German  thought.  The  more  recent 
English  thought  is  omitted  entirely. 

A  few  minor  errors  have  caught  the  eye  in  a  somewhat  rapid 
reading:  on  page  4  (1.  26)  Anaximander  stands  instead  of  An- 
aximenes;  on  page  84  the  date  of  Philo  is  given  wrongly ;  on  page  103 
Bacon's  famous  simile  for  final  causes  has  strayed  from  its  original 
connection. 

JAMES  SIMMONS,  JR. 

IOWA  COLLEGE,  GRINNELL,  IA. 

Die  Impersonalten.     M.  JOVANOVICH.     Belgrade,  1896.     Pp.  143. 

After  a  short  introduction  in  which  he  deals  with  the  history  of 
previous  investigations,  Jovanovich  presents  his  point  of  view  and 
then  enters  upon  the  consideration  of  his  subject  proper,  the  imper- 
sonal judgment,  under  the  three  heads — origin,  function,  limits. 

Previous  investigators  mistakenly  isolated  the  grammatical  and 
the  psychological-logical  points  of  view.  On  the  one  side  an  identity 
of  thought  and  language  was  maintained ;  on  the  other  there  was  a 
discrepancy.  The  representatives  of  both  views  fell  into  hopeless 
confusion  and  contradiction.  A  true  estimate  does  not  admit  the 
identity  of  thought  and  language  nor  a  discrepancy  between  them. 

Anthropology  forbids  us  to  maintain  that  impersonal  judgments 
are  the  original  embryonic  forms  out  of  which  all  others  have 
been  differentiated.  Animism  as  expressive  of  the  earliest  form  of  ex- 
perience teaches  us  that  primitive  man  interpreted  all  outer  occur- 
rences in  terms  of  his  own  personal  life;  the  clouds  and  heavens 


202  THE   IMPERSONAL  JUDGMENT. 

'rained.'  In  the  mythological  age  these  personal  activities  were  gen- 
eralized; Jupiter,  Zeus,  Indra,  'rained.'  Finally,  when  thought  freed 
itself  from  personification,  the  causes  of  certain  experiences  became 
completely  undetermined  and  unknown.  At  this  stage  the  impersonal 
'  It '  arose. 

The  function  of  impersonals  was  and  is  that  of  indicating  a  subject 
which  is  altogether  unknown,  but  which,  nevertheless,  the  mind  must 
still  think. 

From  this  also  the  limits  of  the  impersonal  are  clear.  All  en- 
deavor to  determine  the  subject,  in  whatever  degree  this  determination 
may  be  presented,  is  artificial  and  arbitrary.  It  inevitably  leads  to 
confusion  and  perversion  of  meaning.  Our  only  method  of  classifica- 
tion must  be  based  solely  upon  the  different  kinds  of  experience  which 
are  referred  to  the  unknown  subject. 

So  much  for  Jovanovich's  own  treatment;  the  monograph  is, 
throughout,  dependent  entirely  upon  Wundt's  interpretation.  In  fact, 
the  author's  deference  to  his  master,  and  his  confident  assertion  of  the 
falsity  of  views  differing  from  his  own,  do  not  seem  to  be  consistent 
with  the  supposed  impartiality  and  scientific  thoroughness  of  the  Ger- 
man student. 

The  investigation  is  indicative  of  the  difficulty  which  has  met  all 
enquirers  in  this  field  from  the  time  of  the  Greek  grammarians.  The 
impersonal  judgment  has  been  considered  an  anomaly  which  must  be 
dealt  with  from  the  standpoint  of  certain  presuppositions.  Underly- 
ing Jovanovich's  treatment  I  find  these  :  (i)  All  experience  is  objec- 
tive; (2)  the  fundamental  relation  is  that  of  subject  and  object;  (3) 
judgment  consists  in  the  uniting  of  thought  and  reality,  i.  e.^\\.  is  dis- 
cursive. 

The  mere  statement  of  the  first  two  presuppositions  will  suggest 
the  criticisms  likely  to  be  made.  The  third  is  the  most  important.  If 
we  admit  that  all  judgment  is  discursive  then  a  subject  must  be  sought 
for  the  impersonal.  Predication  without  a  subject  of  predication 
is  a  contradiction.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  no  subject  has  been  found 
for  the  impersonal.  Is  the  controversy  then  to  be  continued  forever? 
The  difficulty  might  suggest  that  it  would  be  profitable  to  lay  aside 
our  presuppositions,  in  order  that  we  might  understand  the  imper- 
sonal not  as  a  judgment,  nor  as  having  a  subject  or  a  predicate,  but  as 
an  experience.  This  point  of  view  leads,  in  my  own  opinion,  to  the 
following  result.  The  impersonal  presents  us  with  a  situation  im- 
mediately recognized  as  such.  It  distinguishes  itself  from  intuition  in 
that  the  impersonal  is  vague,  schematic,  while  the  intuition  is  clear  and 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  203 

definite.  Again,  certain  forms  of  the  impersonal  indicate  a  breaking- 
up  of  this  immediate  recognition  and  a  reference  to  a  vague  whole  not 
immediately  grasped.  Now  in  as  much  as  reality  is  grasped,  differ- 
entiated or  measured  in  the  impersonal,  we  may  rightly  call  it  a  judg- 
ment. But  it  is  a  judgment  in  which  subject  and  predicate  do  not  ap- 
pear. This  analysis  leads  us  to  believe  that  the  essential  nature  of 
judgment  is  recognition  or  differentiation,  not  reference.  In  the  im- 
personal and  intuitive  forms  recognition  is  immediate;  in  the  ordinary 
discursive  form  it  is  mediate. 

This  view  is  supported  by  child  psychology  in  which  we  find 
definite  situations  or  realities  recognized  before  there  is  any  use  of 
noun  and  verb.  Again,  comparative  philology  shows  that  the  noun 
cannot  be  derived  from  the  verb  and  vice  versa,  but  it  points  (as  Jovan- 
ovich  admits)  to  a  stage  in  thought  where  they  were  simply^implicit. 
Finally,  when  we  recognize  that  in  the  child's  consciousness  the  use  of 
noun  and  verb,  and  the  recognition  of  a  self  as  opposed  to  an  object, 
arise  together,  we  see  how  our  theory  fits  in  with  the  necessity  felt  by 
Romanes  of  getting  a  connecting  link  between  the  perceptive  proc- 
esses of  animals  and  the  conceptual  processes  of  man.  The  imper- 
sonal recognizes  the  facts  which  Romanes  brought  forward  and  frees 
his  position  from  the  logical  entanglements  which  it  presents,  in  giv- 
ing us  percepts  apart  from  concepts. 

Thus  as  the  immediate  recognition  (though  in  a  vague  schematic 
way)  of  reality  and  the  beginning  of  a  reference  to  a  mediately  recog- 
nized whole,  the  view  of  the  impersonal  above  presented  unites  the 
various  conflicting  theories.  As  immediate  recognition  there  is  neither 
subject  nor  predicate ;  as  a  vague  reference  to  a  larger  whole  a  subject 
is  found  in  varying  degrees  of  determinateness.  Finally,  when  the 
"It"  represents  merely  a  shorthand  way  of  indicating  a  familiar  ob- 
ject, we  have  the  singular  judgment. 

S.  F.  MACL.ENNAN. 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO. 

Quelques  Remarques  sur  L?  irr  ever  sib  ilitt  des  Phenomenes  psycho- 
logiques.     E.  HAL£VY.     Rev.  de  Met  et.  de  Mor.,  Nov.,  1896. 
M.  HaleVy's  article  is,  in  the  main,  a  criticism  of  the  attempt  made 
by  psychologists  of  the  Association  School  to  apply  to  mental  phe- 
nomena the  principle  of  mechanical  reversibility.     In  a  purely  quan- 
titative science  like  geometry  all  terms  have  the  same  logical  value, 
and  may  be  defined  in  the  same  manner  with  change  of  sign.     If  all 
Force  be  reduced  to  modes  of  motion  the  same  doctrine  will  hold  in 


204        PRINCIPLE   OF  MECHANICAL  REVERSIBILITY. 

the  case  of  the  physical  sciences.  But  does  it  hold  when  we  come  to 
deal  with  mental  phenomena  ?  Is  the  past  interchangeable  with  the 
future,  and  can  memory  be  substituted  for  will  ?  Psychology  cannot 
be  classed  among  the  purely  positive  sciences  until  this  seeming  irre- 
versibility  of  its  phenomena  is  explained.  Hence  the  attempt  made 
by  M.  Ribot  and  others.  These  theories  M.  HaleVy  examines. 

The  one  postulate  of  Associationism  is  'a  succession  of  states  fol- 
lowing one  another  according  to  the  laws  of  resemblance  and  of  con- 
tiguity.' A  series  of  states  related  to  one  another  by  these  laws 
would  be  completely  reversible.  If  '  past '  and  '  future  '  as  psycho- 
logic states  follow  this  same  order,  one  can  be  substituted  for  the 
other.  Memory  and  will  also  become  psychologic  functions,  one  the 
inverse  of  the  other.  Associationism  has  to  explain  their  apparent 
difference. 

Suppose  we  say  that  the  difference  is  that  between  a  present  state 
and  the  associated  state  not  present,  that  does  not  tell  us  why  the  not- 
present  is  named  sometimes  future,  sometimes  past.  We  do  not  dis- 
pose of  the  difference  by  proving  that  the  psychological  process  is  the 
same  (association)  when  a  state  is  referred  now  forward,  now  back- 
ward. Again,  M.  Ribot  seems  to  give  up  the  problem  when  he  assumes 
that  the  present  state  has  duration — hence  a  beginning  and  an  end, 
giving  rise  in  present  consciousness  to  an  immediate  intuition  of  past 
and  future. 

But  suppose  the  distinction  is,  in  part  at  least,  a  function  of  will. 
The  past  is  that  which  is  determined,  the  future  is  dependent  in  part 
upon  my  undetermined  volition.  If  this  be  true  it  remains  for  Asso- 
ciationism to  explain  their  apparent  difference — they  must  become 
reversible ;  likewise  the  distinction  between  '  me '  as  cause  and  '  thing ' 
as  cause.  Volition  differs  also  from  foresight  (prevision).  If  this 
difference  be  abolished,  freedom  of  the  will  becomes  identical  with 
foreknowledge.  "  To  be  free  is  to  know  what  one  will  do  and  why 
one  will  do  it."  This  complete  convertibility  of  phenomena  demanded 
of  Associationism,  M.  Hal£vy  concludes,  is  impossible. 

In  the  second  part  of  the  paper  he  takes  the  ground  that  while 
'past'  and  'future'  are  irreversible  in  the  sense  of  being  convertible, 
yet  that  both  may  be  reduced  to  terms  of  logical  succession.  There 
is  a  distinction  to  be  made  between  the  order  of  desire  (vouloir)  and 
the  order  of  perception  (percevoir}.  In  the  first  case  we  proceed 
from  end  to  means — D  C  B  A.  In  the  other  we  proceed  directly 

from  means  to  end — A  B  C  D .  There  is  a  sense  in  which  the 

series  A  B  C  D  is  completely  irreversible,  and  of  this  Associationism 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE. 

fails  to  take  account,  viz,  in  the  order  of  logical  representation  the 
conclusion  cannot  precede  the  premise.  But  this  series  may  be  inter- 
preted in  time,  either  in  the  order  of  will  or  in  the  order  of  percep- 
tion, one  the  inverse  of  the  other.  Thus  there  is  no  contradiction 
between  psychic  reversibility  and  logical  irreversibility.  Synthesis, 
for  example,  represents  an  interpretation  in  the  order  of  perception, 
which  is  the  same  in  direction  as  the  logical  order.  Analysis,  on  the 
other  hand,  corresponds  to  the  order  of  volition. 

M.  HaleVy  rejects  the  associationist's  identification  of  past  and 
future,  and  rightly.  But  can  they  be  reduced,  as  he  thinks,  to  terms  of 
logical  succession?  In  the  first  place,  the  logical  order  does  not  in- 
volve time,  and  is  interpreted  as  succession,  only  when  the  idea  of 
time  has  arisen  from  some  other  source.  Again,  the  order  of  percep- 
tion of  phenomena  is  not  always  logical,  yet  they  get  referred  to  their 
appropriate  places  in  the  time-series.  So  the  arrangement  of  events 
in  the  future  by  imagination  does  not  follow  always  their  logical 
order.  Genetically  the  child  remembers  before  it  reasons ;  the  time 
order  does  not  depend  on  logical  sequence.  We  are  inclined  to  think 
that  the  reference  of  things  forward  and  backward  is  as  fundamental 
as  perception  itself. 

PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY.  J.  M.  TROUT. 


EXPERIMENTAL. 

Observations  sur  quelque  Types  de  Reaction  simple.  TH.  FLOUR- 
NOY.  Geneva,  Librairie  Ch.  Eggiman  &  Cie.,  1896.  Pp.  42. 
The  object  of  the  series  of  investigations  of  which  the  present 
monograph  is  a  report  is  to  determine  how  many  clearly-marked 
types  of  simple  reaction  there  are  and  what  are  the  characteristics  of 
each.  By  a  type  of  reaction  Professor  Flournoy  means  the  way  in 
which  a  comparatively  unpracticed  subject  reacts  in  the  shortest  time. 
In  the  course  of  the  experiments  he  tested  about  seventy  students  of 
both  sexes.  The  number  of  reactions  obtained  from  each  subject  is 
very  unequal,  but  unity  of  method  makes  the  results  comparable. 
The  reactions  were  all  taken  with  the  d'Arsonval  Chronometer  and 
are,  therefore,  not  reliable  for  absolute  time.  Their  value  lies  in  the 
comparison  of  group  averages.  The  tests  were  made  in  series  con- 
sisting of  two,  and  sometimes  more,  groups  of  about  fifteen  reactions 
each,  in  which  the  direction  of  attention  was  the  only  factor  varied 
from  group  to  group.  To  avoid  the  possible  effect  of  fatigue,  the 
temporal  order  of  the  series  was  varied  from  group  to  group.  The 


206  EXPERIMENTAL. 

stimuli  used  were  tactual,  visual  and  auditory.  The  response  was  the 
closing  of  a  key  by  the  index  finger.  Careful  notes  were  kept  upon 
the  bodily  attitude  and  the  subjective  experiences  of  the  reactor  dur- 
ing each  group  of  reactions,  upon  whose  importance  Professor  Flour- 
noy  lays  great  stress.  From  the  results  thus  obtained,  Professor 
Flournoy  differentiates  four  principal  types  of  reaction,  two  of  which 
are  divided  into  sub-types.  They  are :  i ,  the  motor  type,  consisting 
of  (a)  the  natural  motor  type  and  (b)  the  forced  motor  type ;  2,  the 
central  type;  3,  the  indifferent  type,  and  4,  the  sensory  type;  sub- 
divided into  (a)  the  visual  motor  type  and  (b)  the  kineso-motor  type. 
The  criterion  for  the  separation  of  the  principal  types  is  the  shortness 
of  reaction  time ;  that  for  the  separation  of  the  sub-types,  the  subjec- 
tive condition  of  the  reactor.  Each  type  is  named  from  the  direction 
which  the  attention  takes  when  the  reaction  time  is  shortest.  In  all 
cases,  except  the  forced  motor  type,  the  shortest  reaction  was  also  the 
one  naturally  adopted,  the  easiest  and  the  most  automatic.  Professor 
Flournoy  does  not  consider  his  enumeration  of  types  exhaustive.  It 
includes  only  those  which  have  come  out  clearly  in  his  experiments. 
Mixed  and  indeterminate  cases  of  his  own,  as  well  as  the  logical  possi- 
bilities of  the  case,  make  him  think  that  further  research  may  differen- 
tiate more  types.  Beside  the  data  mentioned,  Professor  Flournoy  has 
kept  a  record  of  the  nationality  of  the  reactor,  the  branch  of  work  he 
was  pursuing  and  his  type  of  mental  imagery.  It  is  to  be  regretted  that 
detailed  results  from  only  seven  of  his  seventy  subjects  are  published  and 
that  we  are  not  told  what  proportion  of  them  belong  to  each  type. 

Although  Professor  Flournoy  expressly  states  that  his  work  is 
not  intended  as  an  interference  in  the  long  and  heated  discussion 
about  the  existence  of  simple  reaction  types  other  than  the  type 
of  Lange,  and  the  relation  of  reaction  type  to  mental  imagery,  his  in- 
vestigations deal  directly  with  both  these  questions  and  cannot  but 
have  a  bearing  on  them.  In  opposition  to  the  Leipzig  investigators, 
he  finds  that  there  are  types  (in  his  sense  of  the  word)  of  simple 
reaction  other  than  that  investigated  by  Lange.  Whether  or  not 
these  types  could  be  reduced  to  the  Lange  type  by  indefinitely  long 
practice,  he  leaves  an  open  question.  With  the  amount  of  practice  he 
gave  his  subjects,  he  finds  no  indication  that  the  other  types  of  reac- 
tion approach  the  motor.  On  the  contrary,  practice,  as  far  as  he  has 
observed  it,  tends  to  reduce  the  time  of  the  typical  reaction  faster  than 
it  does  the  times  of  the  other  reactions,  with  the  result  that  the  charac- 
teristic difference  in  time  is  lengthened  and  the  types  become  more  dis- 
tinctly marked.  In  so  far  as  Professor  Flournoy's  results  corroborate  the 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  207 

type  theory  of  reaction,  they  agree  with  those  obtained  in  the  labora- 
tories of  Princeton  and  Chicago.  But  his  observations  on  the  effects  of 
practice  are  just  the  opposite  of  the  Princeton  and  Chicago  results. 
Professor  Baldwin,  who  is  motor  in  type,  noticed  incidentally  that  his 
sensory  time  approached  his  motor  time  with  practice.  Professor  An- 
gel 1  and  Mr.  Moore,  whose  primary  interest  was  in  the  effect  of  prac* 
tice  on  reaction  time,  found  in  all  three  cases  which  they  investigated 
that  the  non-typical  reaction  approached  the  typical  with  practice. 
According  to  the  theory  of  reaction  type  advanced  by  Professor  An- 
gell  and  Mr.  Moore  the  effect  of  practice  would  necessarily  be  to  de- 
crease the  difference  in  type.  The  facts  at  command  are  insufficient 
for  any  dogmatic  statement.  Professor  Flournoy  gives  statistics  on 
the  effects  of  practice  for  only  one  case.  The  other  four  cases  for 
which  we  have  statistics  on  this  point  (Professor  Baldwin  and  the 
three  subjects  tested  at  Chicago)  all  give  results  opposed  to  Professor 
Flournoy's.  In  the  tests  made  at  Chicago  it  was  found  that  it  took 
some  practice  for  the  two  types  to  emerge  clearly,  but  that  after  they 
were  once  clearly  differentiated  they  began  to  approach.  In  as  much 
as  in  Professor  Flourney's  isolated  case  the  two  reaction  times  were 
at  first  practically  identical  (sensory  137,  5  <r,  m.  v.  22  ;  motor  140,  2  <r, 
m.  v.  28,  3)  and  the  reactor  found  great  subjective  difficulty  in  getting 
a  genuine  motor  reaction  at  all,  it  is  at  least  possible  that  it  took  a 
much  greater  amount  of  practice  than  usual  for  the  two  types  to  be- 
come differentiated ;  that  his  results  stop  with  the  differentiation  of  the 
type,  and  that  further  practice  would  have  made  them  approach  one 
another.  The  number  of  reactions,  however,  is  as  great  as  the  num- 
ber which,  in  the  tests  made  at  Chicago,  sufficed  for  both  differentiation 
and  approach  of  type. 

From  the  statistics  which  Professor  Flournoy  kept  with  regard  to 
the  type  of  mental  imagery  of  his  reactors  he  agrees  with  Professor 
Baldwin  that  the  general  tendency  of  the  individual  to  use  sensory  or 
motor  images  corresponds  with  his  reaction  type.  But  any  assertion 
that  reaction  type  corresponds  to  mental  imagery  so  closely  that  one 
can  be  determined  by  the  other  he  thinks  is  more  than  the  facts  at 
present  warrant.  The  mixture  of  type  and  fluctuations  of  imagery 
found  in  a  single  individual,  and  the  large  variety  of  possible  sensory- 
motor  coordinations,  make  it  seem  improbable  that  any  hard  and  fast 
relationship  between  the  two  can  ever  be  formulated.  Professor 
Flournoy  makes  the  suggestion  that  nationality  may  prove  to  be  VI 
much  of  an  index  of  reaction  type  as  mental  imagery. 

HELEN  B.  THOMPSON. 
UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO. 


208  EXPERIMENTAL. 

The  Effects  of  Odours,  Irritant  Vapours  and  Mental  Work  upon 

the  Blood  flow.    T.  E.  SHIELDS.    The  Journal  of  Experimental 

Medicine.     Vol.  I.,  No.  I.     1896. 

The  author,  in  summarizing  his  results,  tells  us  that  "  the  most  im- 
portant outcome  of  this  investigation  has  been  the  completion  of  vari- 
ous improvements  in  the  construction  and  use  of  the  plethysmograph, 
by  means  of  which  numerous  errors  attending  the  use  of  the  instru- 
ment have  been  eliminated."  It  is,  in  fact,  a  far  way  from  the  appa- 
ratus employed  by  Fick,  Mosso  and  Lehmann  to  the  elaborate  contri- 
vances described  in  this  dissertation ;  and  in  view  of  the  many  problems 
whose  solution  has  been  sought  in  this  line  of  work,  the  more  impor- 
tant of  these  modifications  deserve  notice. 

With  earlier  forms  of  the  plethysmograph  it  was  doubtful  whether 
the  changes  recorded  were  due  to  variations  in  the  volume  of  blood  or 
to  movements  of  the  enclosed  arm  and  fingers.  This  source  of  error 
Shields  eliminates  by  means  of  an  arm-holder  which,  without  hinder- 
ing the  circulation,  keeps  the  arm  rigidly  in  place  and  prevents  pant- 
ing of  the  elastic  sleeve.  Again,  in  the  records  hitherto  obtained,  the 
pulse  and  the  gross  volume  changes  were  shown  in  the  same  curve  and 
tended  to  mask  each  other.  To  separate  these,  the  vasomotor  effects 
are  registered  by  a  suspended  test  tube  (Bowditch),  while  the  pulse 
effects  are  taken  care  of  by  an  air  cushion  which  responds  to  smaller 
waves  from  the  arm  cylinder  and  transmits  them  to  the  Marey  tambour. 
The  volume  and  pulse  changes,  along  with  the  pneumographic  and 
time  curves,  are  inscribed  by  frictionless  glass  pens  upon  a  horizontal 
kymograph  so  constructed  that  a  continuous  record  of  any  desirable 
length  may  be  obtained.  For  psychological  purposes  the  main  ad- 
vantage of  this  arrangement  is  that  a  whole  series  of  reactions  may  be 
studied  in  their  mutual  connection,  and  without  the  disturbance  occa- 
sioned by  change  of  kymograph  drums. 

In  the  first  class  of  experiments  of  which  an  account  is  given, 
various  odors  were  administered  to  the  same  subject  through  tubes 
ending  in  an  odor  plate,  and  were  controlled  by  electric  valves  in 
such  a  way  that  nothing  could  be  known  of  the  stimulus  except 
through  the  sense  of  smell.  In  a  second  series  of  experiments,  twelve 
subjects  were  tried.  In  addition  to  the  effects  produced  by  odors  and 
vapors,  other  changes  were  noted  and  attributed  to  '  mental  activity,' 
but  the  precise  character  of  the  stimulation  which  called  these  forth  is 
not  sufficiently  indicated. 

The  results,  illustrated  by  plotted  curves  at  the  close  of  the  disser- 
tation, show  that  olfactory  sensations,  irritant  vapors  and  mental 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  209 

•work  cause  a  diminution  in  the  volume  of  the  arm.  "Whenever  the 
stimulation  (odor)  occasions  an  increase  in  the  volume  of  the  arm,  as 
sometimes  happens,  it  seems  to  be  due  to  acceleration  of  the  heart 
rate,  which,  of  course,  tends  also  to  increase  supply  of  blood  to  the 
brain."  But  no  support  is  afforded  to  the  view  "  that  pleasant  sensa- 
tions are  accompanied  by  a  diminution  of  the  blood  supply  to  the 
brain  and  unpleasant  sensations  by  the  reverse  effect."  In  the  state- 
ment of  these  conclusions  and  throughout  the  dissertation,  there  is  a 
cautious  tone  which  in  no  way  lessens  the  value  of  the  work. 

E.  A.  PACE. 
CATHOLIC  UNIVERSITY,  WASHINGTON. 

Attention :      Experimental    and    Critical.       By   FRANK    DREW. 

American  Journal  of  Psychology,  VII.,  533-573.      1896. 

The  experimental  part  of  Dr.  Drew's  study  consists  of  three  dis- 
tinct lines  of  work :  A,  measurements  of  reaction  and  association 
times  of  various  degrees  of  complexity  under  various  conditions  of  dis- 
traction; B,  a  qualitative  study  of  association  by  Galton's  method 
(Human  Faculty,  pp.  185  ff.)  with  concentrated  and  distracted  atten- 
tion ;  and  C,  a  study  of  the  recognition  of  the  order  of  nearly  simulta- 
neous stimuli  with  voluntarily  directed  attention. 

Though  many  reactions  were  taken  for  A  and  the  general  results 
were  in  substantial  agreement  with  those  of  other  observers,  they  were 
not  regarded  as  satisfactory  and  no  use  is  made  of  them  here  except  as 
they  furnished  introspective  and  other  casual  observations. 

In  B  the  question  was :  What  effect,  if  any,  is  produced  in  the 
normal  run  of  association  by  distraction  ?  Tests  were  made  in  parallel 
series :  in  one  the  experimenter  looked  at  the  stimulus  word  and  then 
gave  himself  up  to  securing  as  many  associations  as  possible  within  a 
fixed  interval,  at  the  end  of  which  those  gotten  were  noted ;  in  the 
other  he  tried  to  do  the  same  thing  while  adding  a  number  of  digits 
requiring  an  approximately  equal  time.  Four  sets  of  100  stimulus 
words  each  were  used  and  each  set  was  gone  over  twice  at  intervals 
of  a  month,  the  repetitions  being  sometimes  arranged  to  duplicate  the 
first  conditions  and  sometimes  to  alter  them,  as  shown  in  the  follow- 
ing little  table. 

First  time.  Second  time. 

ist  Set :  Distraction  Distraction 

and  Set :  Concentration  Concentration 

3rd  Set:  Distraction  Concentration 

4th  Set:  Concentration  Distraction 


210  EXPERIMENTAL. 

In  this  way  over  3,00x5  associations  were  collected  and  treated 
statistically.  The  most  striking  result  is  the  relatively  small  effect 
produced  by  the  adding.1  There  is  a  somewhat  larger  proportion  of 
fresh  associations  in  the  second  trial  of  sets  first  gone  over  with  distrac- 
ted attention  than  in  those  first  gone  over  with  concentrated  atten- 
tion ;  the  sets  with  concentrated  attention  show  more  associations  from 
the  last  three-fifths  of  life  (excluding  the  immediate  past)  ;  there  is  an 
indication  that  word  jingles  and  purely  verbal  associations  are  inter- 
fered with  by  the  adding,  probably  because  the  language  apparatus  is 
partially  taken  up  by  that  activity;  but  in  almost  every  case  the  per- 
centage of  difference  is  small.  This  result,  though  at  first  surprising, 
is  not  so  strange  when  the  conditions  of  the  experiment  are  regarded. 
It  seems  likely,  on  the  one  hand,  that  the  haste  of  getting  the  greatest 
number  of  associations  in  a  limited  time  and  from  a  single  word  is  a 
distraction  in  itself,  and  on  the  other  that  many  associations  in  the 
series  with  adding  are  secured  in  momentary  wavering  from  that  task. 
Two  incidental  observations  are  of  some  interest,  namely,  that  the 
first  thing  to  follow  the  sight  of  the  stimulus  word  (when  the  novelty 
of  the  experiment  had  worn  off)  was  almost  always  a  mental  pronun- 
ciation of  it  which  furnished  the  nucleus  from  which  the  associations 
developed;  and  second,  that  almost  all  associations  were  given  a 
*  spatial  setting '  or  localization  in  motor  or  visual-motor  terms.  This 
latter  was  often  the  first  thing  to  come  and  was  tardily  followed  by 
the  other  elements  of  the  association. 

The  third  line  of  experiments  had  to  do  with  the  time  order  of 
nearly  simultaneous  stimuli,  and  the  question  took  this  form,  namely : 
Given  a  pair  of  stimuli  (two  clicks,  for  example,  addressed  one  to 
each  ear)  so  near  together  that  their  order  can  just  be  recognized,  will 
any  change  be  produced  by  voluntarily  attending  to  one  or  the  other  ? 
A  very  little  work  on  this  matter  had  already  been  done  by  Dr.  Alice 
J.  Hamlin  {American  Journal  of  Psychology,  VI.),  but  with  nega- 
tive results.  The  stimuli  used  by  Dr.  Drew  were  telephone  clicks 
(one  to  each  ear),  electric  shocks  (one  to  each  hand)  and  a  click  and 
shock  to  ear  and  hand;  the  interval  for  the  first  two  pairs  was 
0.024  sec.  and  for  the  click  and  shock  0.031  sec.  Parallel  series  with 
balanced  attention  and  attention  concentrated  on  one  side  or  the  other 
were  taken  in  considerable  variety,  chiefly  upon  two  subjects.  The 

lrThis  experiment  was  made  by  Drew  on  himself.  A  similar  series  under 
slightly  varied  conditions  was  undertaken  by  the  writer  at  the  same  time  and 
the  statistics  partially  worked  up.  Drew's  general  negative  result  is  supported 
by  them. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  »" 

following  are  the  most  important  results :  With  two  clicks  concentra- 
tion of  attention  is  a  positive  hindrance,  fewer  right  judgments  being 
made  on  the  average,  and  still  fewer  (relatively)  when  the  stimulus  ar- 
rived first  on  the  side  to  which  attention  was  directed,  due  possibly  to  an 
unconscious  change  in  the  manner  of  judging.  To  test  whether  the 
criterion  by  which  the  order  was  judged  was  one  of  intensity,  experi- 
ments were  made  with  loud  and  faint  clicks,  and  it  was  found  that  both 
subjects  tended  to  call  the  fainter  the  earlier.  With  shocks  it  was 
found  (contrary  to  the  click  results)  that  attention  to  one  side  or  the 
other  favored  the  stimulus  received  on  that  side.  With  strong  and 
weak  shocks  the  fainter  again  seemed  earlier,  but  the  tests  on  this 
point  are  few  and  not  fully  accordant.  When  the  subject  was  dis- 
tracted from  both  shocks  by  being  required  to  read  aloud,  there  was 
in  no  case  a  decrease  in  accuracy  and  sometimes  a  decided  gain.  The 
experiments  with  disparate  senses  (ear  and  hand)  show,  with  balanced 
attention,  a  strong  bias  in  favor  of  the  order  shock-click,  which 
renders  difficult  the  interpretation  of  the  results  with  directed  attention. 
Both  subjects  show  gain  with  directed  attention,  but  disagree  as  to 
whether  it  is  more  advantageous  when  directed  toward  the  leading 
stimulus  or  the  other.  Such  biases  were  also  found  at  other  stages  of 
the  work  and  add  greatly  to  the  laboriousness  of  the  experiments  and 
the  complexity  of  the  results,  especially  as  they  were  not  constant,  but 
underwent  slow  changes  as  the  research  continued.  Introspection 
under  the  conditions  of  the  experiment  was  also  singularly  difficult 
and  threw  little  light  upon  its  real  nature. 

To  make  a  generalization  which  shall  unify  these  varying  results 
is  hardly  possible  until  further  experiments  have  established  more 
fully  the  effects  of  several  of  the  factors  involved.  While  not  under- 
taking to  do  this,  Dr.  Drew  makes  many  suggestions  and  presents  a 
theory  of  perception,  apperception  and  attention  which  was  developed 
in  considerable  part  by  these  experiments.  It  is  an  extreme  example 
of  those  that  would  reduce  mind  almost  or  quite  to  kinaesthetic  terms. 
For  the  detail  of  it  the  reader  must  consult  the  paper  itself,  though 
with  the  warning  that  in  parts  the  thought  suffers  much  from  ob- 
scurity of  presentation. 

CLARK  UNIVERSITY.  E.  C.  SANFORD. 

ANTHROPOLOGY  AND  CRIMINOLOGY. 

Psychologic     der     Naturvolker.        Ethnographische     Parallelen, 
JACOB  ROBINSOHN.     Leipzig,  Friedrich,  1896.     Pp.  i  +  176. 
This  is  a  very  comprehensive  title  for  a  rather  contracted  work. 


212  ANTHROPOLOGY  AND    CRIMINOLOGY. 

The  author  has  made  a  creditable  compilation  of  records  regarding  the 
primitive  conception  of  the  soul,  but  his  work  was  anticipated  twenty- 
five  years  ago  by  Tylor  and  in  a  much  more  thorough  and  philosophi- 
cal spirit  than  that  exhibited  in  the  book  before  us.  There  is  hardly 
a  single  point  brought  out  by  Herr  Robinsohn  that  is  not  treated  in 
Tylor's  chapters  on  animism  in  his  well-known  'Primitive  Culture' 
and,  while  the  amplification  of  evidence  is  welcome,  there  is  not 
much  more  to  be  said  for  it. 

There  is,  on  the  other  hand,  a  good  deal  to  be  said  against  the 
waste  of  energy  on  an  already  well-threshed  subject  while  so  many 
fruitful  ethnological  fields  are  left  untouched.  This  is  not  an  argu- 
ment against  rehandling  an  old  topic,  especially  in  a  new  light,  but 
our  author  has  neither  new  light  nor  new  methods,  yet  his  book  appears 
with  all  the  air,  though  not  the  express  claim,  of  an  original  and  valuable 
contribution  to  ethnological  knowledge.  Further,  as  already  implied, 
the  title  is  misleading.  One  opens  the  book  expecting  naturally  a 
treatise,  good  or  otherwise,  on  comparative  psychology,  but  it  is  a  sad 
day  for  our  science  if  the  psychology  of  primitive  man  is  to  be  con- 
fined to  primitive  man's  conception  of  his  own  non-bodily  self,  which 
is  what  we  are  offered  here. 

By  way  of  praise,  it  maybe  said  that  the  subject-matter  is  well  ar- 
ranged and  well  handled,  the  bibliography  is  useful,  and  the  whole 
would  be  a  capital  piece  of  work  if  it  had  not  all  been  done  before. 
As  it  is,  it  is  a  very  good  guide-book  to  Tylor. 

LIVINGSTON  FARRAND. 
COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY. 

The  Female  Offender.  C.  LOMBROSO  and  W.  FERRERO.  With  an 
Introduction  by  W.  DOUGLAS  MORRISON.  New  York,  Appleton, 
1895. 

In  the  present  volume,  one  of  the  '  Criminology  Series,'  edited  by 
Douglas  Morrison,  Lombroso's  '  La  Donna  Delinquente '  has  been 
made  accessible  to  the  English  speaking  public.  The  work  is  a  typi- 
cal example  of  Lombroso's  acute  observation,  but  also  of  the  entire  in- 
adequacy of  his  statistical  methods.  No  variation  from  the  normal 
type  escapes  his  notice,  but  the  comparison  of  the  frequencies  of  their 
occurrence  among  various  social  groups  is  entirely  unsatisfactory,  be- 
cause it  is  based  on  very  small  series  of  observations.  To  give  an  in- 
stance:  Plagiocephalism  is  found  in  42%  of  66  male  criminals;  in 
17.2%  of  normal  women;  in  28.8%  of  55  criminal  women.  There- 
fore, the  error  of  mean  squares  of  the  first  group  is  about  6.3%,  that 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  213 

of  the  last  group  6.7%.  The  difference  between  these  two  groups  is 
13.2%,  but  its  error  amounts  to  9.1%.  Therefore  this  difference  of 
frequencies  of  occurrence  is  very  uncertain.  The  theory  of  proba- 
bilities proves  that  we  might  expect  these  results  to  be  fundamentally 
changed  if  the  number  of  observations  were  increased.  In  the  in- 
stance given  here  the  differences  of  observed  .values  are  great ;  in 
most  cases  they  are  entirely  inside  the  limits  of  errors.  We  hold, 
therefore,  that  Lombroso  has  not  succeeded  in  establishing  the  validity 
of  any  of  the  characteristics  of  the  criminal  type  which  he  claims  to 
have  discovered. 

It  is  true  that  signs  of  degeneracy  are  frequent  among  criminals 
and  that  a  correlation  of  degeneracy  and  of  criminality  exists  which 
may  be  directly  physical,  but  which  is  likely  to  be,  to  a  great  extent, 
social.  A  consideration  of  the  fact  that  these  signs  are  not  confined 
to  the  criminal  classes  shows  that  it  is  an  incomplete  correlation  with 
which  we  have  to  deal.  That  is  to  say,  signs  of  degeneracy  are  some- 
times, not  always,  connected  with  criminality  and,  vice  versa,  crimi- 
nality is  sometimes,  not  always,  connected  with  degeneracy.  There- 
fore the  problem,  in  order  to  be  satisfactorily  solved,  should  be  treated 
in  a  manner  differing  from  that  applied  by  Lombroso.  Setting  aside 
the  necessity  of  basing  descriptions  on  much  more  extensive  series 
which  would  enable  us  to  prove  that  differences  are  not  merely  acci- 
dental, both  aspects  of  the  correlation  should  be  investigated.  We 
must  not  only  gain  systematic  knowledge  of  the  characteristics  of  the 
criminal  classes,  but  also  of  the  general  distribution  of  each  of  these 
characteristics  among  a  variety  of  classes  not  criminal.  Only  in  this 
manner  can  we  hope  to  understand  their  significance. 

While  Lombroso  will  always  deserve  the  credit  of  having  forcibly 
called  attention  to  the  physical  and  psychical  characteristics  of  ab- 
normal man,  his  statistical  methods  are  so  unsatisfactory  that  very  few 
of  his  results  can  claim  to  be  well  established,  and  I  believe  hardly  a 
single  one  in  the  volume  under  review  can  be  considered  as  proved  by 
the  material  offered. 

COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY.  FRANZ  BOAS. 

CHILD  PSYCHOLOGY. 

Paidologie.    Entivurf  zu  einer  Wissenchaft  des  Ktndes.    OSCAR 
CHRISMAN,  In  Diss.,  Jena,  1896.    Pp.  72  +  24  pages  of  bibliog- 
raphy. 
This  is  a  sketch  of  '  Paidology '  by  the  original  inventor  of  the 

term.     The  introduction  is  a  general  plea  for  the  recognition  of  pai- 


214 


CHILD  PSYCHOLOGY. 


dology  as  a  university  study.  The  author  would  have  it  pursued  as  a 
pure  science  and  wants  everything  relating  in  any  way  to  children  to 
be  included  in  the  work,  whether  it  has  any  practical  bearing  or  not. 
The  short  History  of  Paidology,  which  follows,  consist  mainly  of 
mere  names  and  titles  of  works,  but  gives  no  statement  of  results  or 
summary  of  ideas  contained  in  the  authorities  quoted.  Everything 
is  made  to  seem  equally  valuable. 

The  system  of  Paidology  is  sketched  as  follows : 


I.  The  Child  in  History. 


II.  The  Child  in  the  Present.- 


The  Child  among  uncivilized  and  half-civilized  peoples. 

f  Defectives. 
I    Delinquents. 

The  Abnormal     )    Dependents. 
Child. 


The  Child  in  civilized  society. 


:pen 
Wild. 
Extraordinary 

children. 


The  Normal 
Child. 


C  Body. 

Soul. 

|    Activity. 


Paidometry. 
Observations. 
Laboratory. 
Genr'l  Materials. 


Directions  as  to  the  apparatus,  measurements  and  observations. 


III.  Laboratory  Course  in 
Paidology  (83  Tests  to  be-s 
made  on  each  child). 


Special 
Tests. 


a)  strength. 
6)  lung  capacity. 
c)  hearing. 
a)  sight. 


The  laboratory  course  consists  of  the  usual  tests  of  experimental 
psychology.  Certainly  the  most  valuable  part  of  the  pamphlet  is  the 
list  of  522  books  and  articles  relating  to  children  and  catalogued  in 
the  appendix.  HERMAN  T.  LUKENS. 


Ly  instinct  de  la  conservation  chez  les  enfants.     PAOLA  LOMBROSO. 

Revue  Philosophique,  Oct.,  1896.     Pp.  379-39°- 

Children  may  be  compared  to  the  little  infusorian  animalculae 
which  are  all  the  more  tenacious  of  life  the  more  microscopic  they 
are.  As  if  conscious  of  the  fragile  character  of  their  existence,  they 
maintain  their  grip  with  all  their  force.  This  is  seen  as  follows : 

i.  In  the  physiological  development  of  children.  Their  respira- 
tion, circulation  and  changes  in  tissues  are  more  rapid,  and,  in  propor- 
tion to  their  size,  they  eat  twice  as  much  as  adults.  Like  savages, 
they  are  less  sensitive  to  physical  pain  than  civilized  man,  and  their 
wounds  heal  more  easily  and  more  quickly.  In  fact,  children  of  less 
than  two  or  three  years  can  seldom  locate  a  pain  definitely,  and  their 
attention  is  readily  diverted  from  it. 

This  innate  tendency  to  the  protection  of  their  ego  characterizes 
as  well  their  whole  psychic  life;  and,  since  effort  consumes  tissue 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE,  215 

and  produces  fatigue,  children  may  be  said  to  follow  the  law  of 
economy  of  effort,  which,  in  subordination  to  the  law  of  self-protec- 
tion, is  the  great  law  of  psychic  life  in  childhood. 

2.  In  learning  language  children  adopt  those  forms  easiest  to 
them,  using  instinctively  gestures  before  words  and,  later,  imitating 
the  sounds  of  objects  in  onomatopoesis,  which  is  itself  a  sort  of  oral 
gesture.   The  so-called  generalizations  of  children  and  their  sometimes 
striking  association  of  ideas  are  all  owing  to  the  repugnance  on  their 
part  to  making  the  effort  necessary  in  using  new  terms.     To  keep 
applying  old  terms  to  new  objects  is  often  easier  than  to  learn  new 
words,  and  hence  children  continue  using  the  same  word  for  objects, 
sometimes  the  most  disparate,  which  however  have  happened  in  their 
mind  to  be  associated  in  some  far-fetched  way. 

3.  In  all  his  conceptions  and  thinking  the  child  tends  to  economy 
of  effort.     His  ideas  and  images  are  concrete,  because  the  concrete  is 
easier  to  grasp  than  the  abstract.     He  repels  instinctively  the  idea  of 
infinity  and  immortality,   because  these  require  too  much  effort  in 
thinking  them.     For  the  same  reason  he  hates  innovations,  likes  to 
hear  the  same  story  over  and  over  again  without  the  change  of  a  single 
phrase,  and  must  be  put  to  bed  with  the  same  ceremony  every  night. 
This  4  mison^ism '  is  very  serviceable  to  the  child  in  helping  to  estab- 
lish habits  of  routine  and  to  give  a  certain  settled  equilibrium  to  his 
ideas. 

4.  The  sensibilities  and  feelings,  when  excited,  are  still  more 
wasteful  of  vital  energy,  and  here  too  the  children  tend  to  conserve 
their  strength.    They  are  'myopic  to  pain  and  presbyopic  to  pleasure.' 
Anything  may  serve  them  as  a  plaything  and  the  most  commonplace 
happenings  of  their  everyday  life  may  delight  them.     Their  imagina- 
tion turns  reality  into  a  romance  and,  since  wishes  do  become  horses, 
beggars  may  ride.     But  the  joys  and  sorrows  of  childhood  are  only 
skin  deep,  and  the  caresses  and  jealousies  of  children  are  often  only 
an  exaggerated   mimicry  of  the  affections.     The  tendency  of  child- 
hood, therefore,  is,  not  to  love,  but  to  be  loved ;  because  this  gives 
pleasure  and  protection;   while,   on  the  other  hand,   to  sympathize 
with  others  and  share  their  joys  and  sorrows  would  consume  vital 
energy. 

5.  Hence  the  young  child  is  scarcely  susceptible  to  real  love  at 
all.     That  this  is  true  is  shown  by  the  rarity  of  cases  in  which  children 
fall  in  love,  e.  g.,  Berlioz  at  eight  years,  Rousseau  at  eleven,  and 
Marie  Baskirtseff  at  twelve.     These  exceptions  to  the  rule  serve  only 
to  show  what  an  enormous  expenditure  of   nervous  energy  accom- 


2i6  PHYSIOLOGY  AND  BIOLOGY. 

panics  the  presence  of  deep  passion  and  how  important  it  is  that  chil- 
dren should  be  preserved  from  it,  as,  indeed,  they  usually  are  by  the 
very  superficiality  of  their  affectionateness. 

6.  Even  the  moral  sense  is  subject  to  the  '  law  of  the  least  effort.' 
A  child  is  naturally  prone  to  resentment,  readily  lies,  easily  becomes 
conceited,  and  thinks  the  whole  world  was  made  for  him.  In  morals 
he  is  essentially  an  egotist,  but  gradually  puts  himself  into  accord  with 
us  and  learns  to  respect  the  rights  of  others,  because  he  receives  more 
caresses  and  bonbons  by  so  doing. 

In  a  word,  the  same  'law  of  least  effort'  that  governs  all  the  phe- 
nomena of  sociology  and  psychology  necessarily  governs  all  the  phe- 
nomena of  child  life  likewise.  Before  birth,  the  foetus,  like  a  para- 
site, draws  off  to  itself  from  its  hostess  all  the  materials  it  needs  for  its 
growth  and  development,  utilizing  all  the  maternal  organism,  blood, 
respiration,  and  everything  to  its  own  advantage  without  giving  any- 
thing in  return.  The  selfishness  of  the  young  child  is  but  a  continua- 
tion of  the  same  process  of  unconscious  parasitic  assimilation  of  its 
environment. 

HERMAN  T.  LUKENS. 

BRYN  MAWR  COLLEGE,  PENNA. 


PHYSIOLOGY  AND   BIOLOGY. 

An  American   Text-book  of  Physiology.     Edited  by  WILLIAM  H. 

HOWELL.     Philadelphia,  W.    B.    Saunders,    1896.      Pp.    1052. 

$6.00. 

A  standard  text-book  of  physiology  is,  perhaps,  more  important  for 
the  student  of  psychology  than  a  handbook  of  psychology.  Each  of 
us  must  form  his  own  apperceptive  system  of  psychology  based  on 
data  gathered  from  many  sides,  but  physiology  is  essential  to  us,  and 
here  we  are,  to  a  certain  extent,  dependent  on  compilations.  We  have 
been  fortunate  in  having  such  excellent  works  as  Foster's  Text  Book 
and  Hermann's  Handbuch.  Foster  has  an  extraordinary  insight  into 
the  essential  bearings  of  physiological  research  and  great  ability  as  an 
expositor.  For  purpose  of  reference,  however,  his  book  is  defective, 
because  it  gives  no  references  and  not  sufficient  facts.  Hermann's 
Handbuch  dates  from  1879,  and  the  intervening  years  have  witnessed 
great  progress  in  physiology.  There  is  consequently  room  for  a  new 
text-book  useful  to  the  psychologist. 

The  work  before  us  is  called  an  American  Text-book,  which  may 
be  taken  to  indicate  that  it  is  written  by  American  authors  and  per- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  2 if 

haps  that  it  contains  frequent  references  to  research  carried  out  in 
America.  The  cooperation  of  ten  of  our  leading  professors  of  physi- 
ology sets  an  example  to  other  sciences,  and  the  result  shows  that  this 
example  should  be  followed.  With  the  progress  of  science  special- 
ization and  cooperation  become  equally  needful.  There  is  no  physiol- 
ogist so  competent  to  cover  the  whole  field  of  the  science  as  to  write 
on  a  subject  selected  by  him.  The  fact  that  there  is  some  overlapping 
and  some  diversity  of  opinion  as  to  methods  and  results  will  probably 
be  stimulating  to  the  student  and  give  him  a  correct  idea  of  unsolved 
problems  and  recent  progress. 

The  introduction  and  the  parts  on  secretion,  chemistry  of  digestion 
and  nutrition,  movements  of  the  alimentary  canal,  bladder  and  ureter, 
and  blood  and  lymph  are  written  by  the  editor,  Professor  Howell, 
who  shows  the  clearness  of  exposition  of  Professor  Martin,  his  teacher 
and  predecessor  at  the  Johns  Hopkins  University.  Circulation  is 
treated  by  Professor  Curtis  of  Columbia  University  and  Professor  Por- 
ter of  Harvard  University ;  respiration  and  animal  heat  by  Professor 
Reichert,  of  the  University  of  Pennsylvania ;  reproduction  by  Profes- 
sor Lee,  of  Columbia  University,  and  the  chemistry  of  the  animal  body 
by  Professor  Lusk,  of  Yale  University.  These  sections  are  likely  to 
be  of  special  interest  to  the  psychologist,  as  he  is  most  ignorant  of  the 
subjects.  The  exposition  is  clear  throughout,  and  the  reputation  of 
the  authors  is  a  sufficient  guarantee  of  its  accuracy. 

The  section  on  general  physiology  of  muscle  and  nerve  is  by 
Professor  Lombard,  of  the  University  of  Michigan,  and  that  on  the 
central  nervous  system  is  by  Professor  Donaldson,  of  the  University 
of  Chicago.  The  latter  occupies  139  pages,  and  will  be  found  to  be  of 
great  value  for  reference.  The  author  treats  separately  the  nerve  cell, 
the  groups  of  nerve  cells  and  the  nervous  system  taken  as  a  whole. 
This  article,  as  others  in  the  book,  is  well  illustrated  by  tables, 
curves  and  illustrations. 

The  article  on  vision  by  Professor  Bowditch  is,  I  think,  the  best 
we  have,  with  the  exception  of  the  large  works  by  von  Helmholtz  and 
Aubert,  and  these  are  less  contemporary.  Within  the  limits  of  64 
pages  the  more  important  facts  of  physiology  and  psychology  are 
shown  in  excellent  perspective,  with  due  regard  to  the  more  recent 
advances.  The  psychological  part  of  the  article  on  hearing  by  Professor 
Sewall,  of  the  University  of  Denver,  does  not  seem  to  me  so  good.  We 
are  told  that  "  sound,  in  its  physiological  meaning,  is  a  sensation  which 
is  the  conscious  appreciation  of  internal  changes  occurring  in  certain 
cells  of  the  cerebral  cortex ;"  that  loudness  depends  on  *  amplitude  or 


2i8  PHYSIOLOGY  AND  BIOLOGY. 

the  extent  of  motion  of  the  air  molecules,'  of  '  the  middle  C  of  the 
piano  *  *  *  representing  132  vibrations,'  etc. 

The  editor  holds  that  "  consciousness  is  a  property  of  the  cortical 
nerve  cells,"  as  contractility  is  a  property  of  muscle  tissue,  and  that 
psychology  is  a  province  of  physiology ;  but  he  admits  that  conscious- 
ness is  a  fact  which  physiology  '  cannot  as  yet  explain.'  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  psychology  is,  as  a  rule,  excluded  from  the  book,  which  does 
not  interfere  with  its  value  to  the  psychologist.  I  believe  that  the  stu- 
dent of  psychology  should  have  followed  a  regular  course  in  physiol- 
ogy, and  should  keep  such  a  work  as  this  at  hand.  In  turn,  I  think 
that  the  physiologist  and  the  physician,  especially  now,  when  ophthal- 
mology, otology  and  neurology  are  important  departments,  should 
have  followed  a  course  in  psychology,  and  should  subsequently  not 
neglect  his  handbook  of  psychology. 

J.  McKEEN  CATTELL. 

Charles  Darwin  and  the  Principle  of  Natural  Selection.     E.  B. 

POULTON.     Century  Science  Series.     New  York,  The  Macmillan 

Co.,  1896.     Pp.  viii+224.     $1.25. 

This  is  a  remarkably  clear,  direct  and  modest  account  of  the  life 
and  work  of  Charles  Darwin,  by  the  Oxford  exponent  of  Natural  Se- 
lection. Professor  Poulton  has  known  how  to  give  the  truest  relief  to 
the  portrait  of  a  great  man,  the  relief  which  is  secured  by  simplicity 
of  statement  and  the  unadorned  narration  of  facts  which  are  in  them- 
selves their  own  glory.  One  rises  from  the  perusal  of  the  narrative 
with  a  sense  that  science  is  not  easy  even  to  the  man  to  whom  it 
comes  easiest — to  the  man  of  the  industry,  good  judgment  and  ability 
which  constitute  the  most  normal  and  sane  genius — and  that  it  is  inap- 
proachable to  the  man  to  whom  the  secrets  of  nature  are  tools  to  be 
juggled  with  or  stones  for  the  building  up  of  systems.  Indeed,  the 
two  things  which  impress  the  student  of  the  work  of  Darwin  are,  to 
my  mind,  his  freedom  in  the  use  of  hypotheses  and  the  soundness  of 
the  'judgments  of  value'  which  he  passed  upon  the  facts  of  nature. 
Professor  Poulton  marks  both  of  these  lessons,  and  they  are  both 
needed  in  this  time  when  one  school  decries  the  use  of  imagination 
which  constitutes  the  life  of  science,  in  the  interest  of  the  sort  of 
cataloging  of  facts  which  the  child  in  the  nursery  does  before  he  be- 
gins to  think,  and  the  other  shows  little  sanity  of  judgment  in  dealing 
with  the  value  of  this  fact  or  that  for  the  purposes  of  synthesis. 
There  will  always  be  classifiers  by  trade  and  systematizers  by  pas- 
sion ;  but  it  is  just  the  nature  of  true  science  that  she  bars  the  gate  of 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  219 

her  kingdom  to  both  of  them  and  opens  it  to  the  man  whose  vision  of 
a  fact  is  at  once  also  a  sound  judgment  of  its  meaning  and  value. 

Thatsachlich,  the  one  thing  on  which  there  may  be  difference  of 
opinion  among  those  who  believe  in  natural  selection,  is  Professor  Poul- 
ton's  treatment  of  it  as  a  causal  or,  as  he  says,  a  *  motive '  principle. 
I  say  among  those  who  believe  in  natural  selection,  for,  of  course,  there 
is  no  gain  in  anticipating  the  criticisms  of  those  who  do  not.  But 
speaking  strictly  entre  nous  to  the  Darwinians  themselves— can  natural 
selection  be  spoken  of  in  these  terms  ?  It  gives  the  enemy  cause  for 
stumbling,  for  they  immediately  fall  to  asking:  "How  can  a  thing  be 
selected  before  it  is  produced?  And  if  it  is  first  produced,  there  is 
your  motive,  your  causation,  already  accomplished  before  natural  selec- 
tion comes  in  at  all."  I  believe  this  position  is  quite  invalid ;  Professor 
Poulton  shows  it  so  over  again :  but  the  general  question  familiar  to 
psychologists  as  between  the  efficient  and  the  formal  cause  comes  to 
mind.  The  form  of  the  result,  as,  for  example,  in  Darwin's  own 
illustration  of  the  house  as  given  in  this  book  (page  116)  is  due  to 
natural  selection  in  the  sense  that  without  natural  selection  it  would 
not  have  been  what  it  is.  Here  there  is  no  dispute  among  Darwinians. 
But  the  efficient  or  real  motive  principle  is  to  be  found  rather  in  the 
positive  forces  of  life  which  enables  the  creature  selected  to  live  and 
beget  his  kind,  under  the  recondite  laws  which  issue  in  continued 
variations;  these  are  the  positive  things,  and  the  the  operation  of 
natural  selection  is  absolutely  dependent  on  their  continued  working. 
Suppose,  for  example,  they  should  be  right  who  seek  to  prove  that 
there  is  an  impulse  toward  certain  preferential  lines  of  growth  and  re- 
production in  the  life  processes  themselves,  then  natural  selection 
would  remain  exactly  the  same  principle  that  it  is  now;  it  would  still 
state  the  conditions  which  limit  the  survival,  and  so  the  perpetuity  of 
kinds.  I  think  Darwinians  should  recognize  this ;  for  it  is  only  when 
they  do  that  they  will  put  an  end  to  the  senseless  criticism  which  they 
get  in  the  terms  of  the  pseudo-quotation  above. 

And  the  need  of  insisting  upon  it  goes  farther,  since  it  is  in  this 
assumption  that  natural  selectionists  sometimes  get  their  air  of  *  claim- 
ing the  earth,'  so  to  speak.  It  is  clear  that  there  is  an  immense 
amount  of  research  ahead  in  the  defining  of  the  positive  principles  of 
life  and  development,  in  accounting  for  the  quantity  and  distribution 
of  variations,  in  ascertaining  the  positive  qualifications  which  some 
creatures  may  have  over  and  above  others,  whereby  the  former  are 
constituted  as  the  fittest  to  survive  under  the  operation  of  natural  selec- 
tion. And  each  statement  of  a  positive  qualification  is  a  real  addition 


220  VISION. 

to  the  theory  of  evolution,  although  it  leave  natural  selection  exactly 
where  it  was  before,  only  defining  its  sphere  of  application  as  wider  or 
narrower,  as  the  case  may  be.  None  of  these  new  determinations,  it 
seems  to  me,  can  ever  overturn  natural  selection,  since  that  is  a  state- 
ment simply  of  the  difference  of  fate  which  must  overtake  organisms 
as  long  as  there  are  different  conditions  of  living,  differences  of  endow- 
ment, and  different  phases  in  the  cycles  of  life.  But  just  in  as  much 
as  these  determinations  truly  describe  the  creatures  which  survive,  it 
is  they,  and  not  alone  the  mere  ordeal  which  they  may  have  survived, 
that  is  of  positive  value  for  evolution  science. 

In  conclusion,  it  is  of  interest  to  note — and  of  *very  peculiar  interest 
to  psychologists  to  note — as  Professor  Poulton  does,  that  both  Darwin 
and  Wallace  declare  in  their  correspondence,  each  for  himself,  that  it 
was  the  study  of  Malthus  on  population  which  led  to  the  discovery  of 
the  principle  of  natural  selection. 

J.  MARK  BALDWIN. 


VISION. 

Eine  neue  Theorie  der  Gesichtsivahrnehmung.     K.  UEBERHORST. 

Ztschr.  fur  Psychol.   u.  Phys.  der  Sinnesorgane.     XIII.,  54-65. 

1896. 

The  author  proposed  a  new  theory  of  visual  perception  in  1876, 
which  he  now  perceives  to  be  erroneous ;  and,  in  the  course  of  years,  he 
has  composed  the  one  which  is  here  published  and  which  was  read  be- 
fore the  International  Congress  of  Psychologists  at  Munich  last  summer. 
He  states  his  present  theory  at  once,  and  in  these  terms :  Visual  per- 
ception, like  perception  in  general,  is  neither  sensation  nor  knowledge, 
but  the  product  of  a  special  psychic  activity,  whose  essence  consists  in 
the  binding  together  into  a  peculiar  unity  of  a  sensation  given  by  an 
organ  of  sense  with  another  sensation,  idea,  or  memory  image  which 
is  present  to  the  soul  at  the  same  time,  which  two  factors  are  con- 
ceived by  the  unconscious  intelligence  as  signs  of  one  and  the  same 
object.  When  we  enter  a  room  that  is  well  known  to  us  perception 
proceeds  far  more  rapidly  and  completely  than  if  the  room  is  un- 
familiar ;  this  is  usually  explained  by  saying  that  in  the  former  case 
a  crowd  of  memory-images  are  called  forth  by  the  present  impression 
and  unite  with  it,  and  thus  a  clear  idea  of  the  content  of  the  room  is 
produced.  This  explanation  is  near  to  being  the  correct  one,  but 
nevertheless  it  does  not  exactly  hit  it  off ;  the  supposed  fusion  is  not 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  221 

what  takes  place,  but  the  real  process  is  that,  first,  an  intelligence 
which  is  unconsciously  present  in  us,  or,  in  Kantian  phrase,  an  a 
priori  knowing,  refers  the  present  impression  and  the  memory  image 
to  one  and  the  same  object ;  thereupon  the  intuition  function  becomes 
active  and  produces  out  of  the  two  the  new  form,  the  present  clear 
perception,  as  a  peculiar  unitary  thing.  The  author  admits  that  this 
thought  will  not  instantly  dawn  upon  one,  but  he  believes  that  the 
reader  will  be  convinced  of  its  truth  and  value  by  the  consideration  of 
those  illusions  by  which  we  see  certain  plane  drawings  as  solid  forms. 
He  discusses  a  number  of  these  illusions,  but  it  seems  to  the  reviewer 
that  he  underestimates  the  difficulty  of  leading  the  reader  to  see  that 
his  explanation  differs,  except  in  words,  which  represent  fictions,  from 
the  explanation  usually  given.  All  this,  he  says,  after  describing  a 
number  of  common  illusions,  is  a  union  effected  by  the  Unconscious  In- 
telligence between  the  present  sensation  and  the  idea  which  is  in  the 
mind ;  but  it  is  difficult  to  see  that  there  is  anything  in  the  instances 
chosen  which  throws  light  upon  the  question  at  issue — whether  the 
fusion  is  effected  by  the  Unconscious  Intelligence,  or  whether  it  just 
takes  place,  without  the  aid  of  that  mythical  creation.  The  idea  that 
there  is  something  in  the  mind  which  does  everything  is  not  so  much 
in  favor  among  the  psychologists  as  it  was  once,  and  merely  stating  it 
as  a  belief  is  not  enough  to  carry  conviction.  Nor  does  it  seem  well- 
advised  to  devote  a  good  portion  of  a  paper  to  a  diagram  for  showing 
that  two  points  which  are,  to  a  single  eye,  in  the  same  direction  when 
looked  at  directly  are  not  so  when  looked  at  peripherally — a  point 
which  most  text-books  (that  of  Norris  and  Oliver,  to  mention  the 
latest)  are  content  to  dispose  of  in  a  line ;  moreover,  the  difference  is 
so  slight  that  it  can  only  be  effective  for  points  which  are  very  far  re- 
moved from  each  other,  and  it  is  certainly  of  no  moment  in  determining 
the  solidity  of  ordinary  objects,  and  cannot  therefore  furnish  the  com- 
plete basis  for  our  notion  of  the  third  dimension.  In  conclusion,  the 
author  affirms  that,  since  Hartmann's  Philosophic  des  Unbewussten, 
no  one  has  any  right  to  doubt  the  existence  of  the  Unconscious  Intelli- 
gence, and  hence  that  no  one  can  find  it  unjustified  if  he  seeks  to  take 
cognizance  of  its  activity  in  the  production  of  the  perception. 

Ueber    Erythropsie.    ERNST  FUCHS.   Archiv  fur  Ophthalmologie, 

xlii.  (4),  207-292. 

This  is  an  extremely  careful  piece  of  experimenting  and  also  of 
reasoning,  and,  on  account  of  its  connection  with  recent  theory,  it  is 
worth  while  to  report  it  at  some  length. 


222  VISION. 

It  has  been  known  for  some  time  that  persons  who  have  been 
operated  upon  for  cataract  frequently  see  things  in  a  red  light ;  this 
happens  after  an  injury  which  permanently  increases  the  size  of  the 
pupil,  or  after  the  loss  of  the  lens,  and  particularly  when  both  defects 
occur  together.  These  are  circumstances  which  predispose  to  true, 
typical  erythropsia,  but  the  immediate  cause  is  exposure  of  the  eyes  to 
a  dazzling  light ;  sunlight  reflected  from  large  fields  of  snow  is  suffi- 
cient to  cause  it  even  without  these  favoring  circumstances,  but  much 
more  so  if  the  snow  fields  are  at  a  high  altitude.  The  red  color  is 
particularly  noticeable  upon  entering  a  hut  after  some  hours  of  moun- 
tain climbing  among  the  Alps,  and  it  was  upon  such  an  occasion  that  it 
first  attracted  the  author's  attention.  Its  extreme  brightness  at  this 
time  was,  doubtless,  owing  to  an  unusual  amount  of  ultra-violet  rays  in 
the  light  reflected  from  the  snow,  for  severe  sun-burn  was  also  experi- 
enced, and  sun-burn  has  been  shown  by  Widmark  to  be  due  to  the 
ultra-violet  rays.  In  spite  of  the  certainty  of  its  occurrence,  this 
erythropsia  of  the  normal  eye  has  received  hardly  any  mention  in 
ophthalmic  literature. 

Fuchs'  experiments  were  conducted  partly  on  a  mountain  near 
Vienna  and  partly  after  widening  the  pupil  of  the  eye  by  homatro- 
pin,  in  both  cases  by  means  of  looking  for  a  rather  long  time  at  bright 
snow,  which  does  not  need,  however,  to  be  of  a  blinding  brightness. 
They  were  confirmed  by  several  observers,  some  of  whom  were  able 
to  obtain  the  effect  without  either  of  the  preliminary  steps.  It  was 
found  convenient,  upon  entering  the  moderately  darkened  room,  to 
look  upon  a  chessboard  of  alternate  white  and  black  squares.  At 
the  first  instant  one  sees  nothing,  then  there  is  a  brief  period  of  seeing 
green,  and  then  the  red  color  appears,  upon  the  bright  squares  much 
sooner  then  upon  the  dark,  to  remain  for  three  or,  at  the  most,  four 
minutes.  With  some  persons  the  red  is  preceded  and  followed  by  a 
flash  of  orange  and  citron-green.  But  within  a  region  of  from  three 
to  five  degrees  at  the  center  of  the  field  the  phenomenon  is  entirely 
wanting  (except  with  certain  persons  upon  one  or  two  occasions) . 
Peripherally,  the  red  color  does  not  reach  to  the  limit  of  vision,  but  it 
does  extend  beyond  the  usual  field  for  red.  In  color-tone,  it  is  comple- 
mentary to  a  slightly  yellowish  green.  Looking  at  the  snow  through 
variously  colored  glasses  did  not  in  the  least  change  the  color  of  the 
erythropsia,  but  with  glass  of  the  same  color  the  phenomenon  did  not 
occur  at  all. 

Fuchs  proceeds  to  discuss  the  cause  of  the  phenomenon.  The 
color  of  daylight  is  reddish,  and  that  of  snow- light  approaches  violet; 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  213 

the  green  that  precedes  the  red  may,  therefore,  be  the  after-image  of 
this  color,  though  that  is  not  quite  certain.  The  erythropsia  itself 
is  certainly  not  an  after-image,  either  positive  or  negative,  of  the  ordi- 
nary kind.  It  bears  many  resemblances,  however,  to  what  Fuchs  calls 
the  after-effect  of  dazzling,  concerning  which  he  offers  a  large  number 
of  new  observations,  but  it  also  differs  distinctly  from  this.  He  comes 
to  the  rather  doubting  conclusion  that  it  is  the  entoptic  vision  of  the 
visual  purple,  but  his  readers  will  certainly  feel  that  this  hypothesis 
has  everything  in  its  favor.  The  subjective  color  is  exactly  the  same 
as  that  of  the  so-called  *  visual  purple.'  [It  is,  of  course,  not  purple 
at  all,  in  English,  but  crimson ;  purple  is  a  piece  of  shockingly  bad 
translation ;  nor  is  it  by  any  means  made  out  that  the  substance  is  a 
visual  substance.  I  am  glad  to  see  that  my  name  for  it,  rod  pigment, 
is  becoming  accepted.]  Usually  the  color  is  invisible  to  us,  like  any 
color  which  is  unchanging  and  which  covers  the  whole  field  of  view ; 
but  after  it  has  been  thoroughly  bleached  out  the  eye  is  sensitive  to  its 
sudden  re-appearance.  Even  though  the  rods  do  not  perceive  color,  it 
would  be  sufficiently  reflected  from  them  upon  the  cones  to  become 
visible,  and  there  may  easily  be  enough  of  the  substance  in  the  pig- 
ment of  the  epithelium  to  account  for  the  rare  cases  in  which  it  is 
seen  in  the  fovea.  That  red  glass  prevents  its  occurrence  corresponds 
with  the  fact  that  red  light  does  not  bleach  out  the  rod  pigment ;  and 
that  it  is  most  vivid  after  blinding  through  green  glass  is  in  accordance 
with  the  fact  that  the  maximum  absorption  of  the  rod  pigment  is  in 
green.  Ewald,  Tait  and  Boll  believe  that  they  perceived  the  rod  pig- 
ment entoptically  on  first  waking  up  in  the  morning,  and  by  these 
painstaking  experiments  of  Fuchs  their  supposition  is  made  probable 

beyond  a  reasonable  doubt. 

CHRISTINE  LADD  FRANKLIN. 
BALTIMORE. 


PATHOLOGICAL. 

Manuel  Pratique  des  Methodes  cT  Enseignement  speciales  aux  En- 

fants  Anormaux  {Sourds-muets,  aveugles,  idiots,  begues,  etc.). 

HAMON    Du    FOUGERAY    et    L.    COUETOUX.     Preface   du   DR. 

BOURNEVILLE.     Paris,  Progr^s  Medical,  1896.     Pp.  288. 

This  volume  appeals  to  such  physicians,  teachers  and  professors 
as  are  especially  interested  in  the  questions  of  the  care  and  education 
of  certain  classes  of  defective  children.  The  book  is  divided  into  five 
parts,  the  first  of  which  is  concerned  with  deaf-mutes,  the  second  with 


224  PA  THOL  O  GICAL. 

the  blind,  the  third  with  idiots,  the  fourth  with  stammerers  and  stut- 
terers, and  the  last  with  individuals  presenting  combined  anomalies, 
such  as  the  deaf-mute-blind,  the  deaf-mute-idiotic,  the  blind-idiotic 
and  the  deaf-mute-blind-idiotic.  Under  each  heading  we  are  given  an 
historical  account  of  the  condition  described,  statistics  of  the  disorder, 
details  as  to  institutions  existing  in  France  for  the  care  and  treatment 
of  these  classes  of  cases,  a  summary  of  the  legislation  relating  to  them 
and  a  r£sum6  of  the  methods  of  pedagogic  treatment  employed. 

In  the  instruction  of  deaf-mutes  the  authors,  after  presenting  the 
arguments  pro  and  con,  express  themselves  wholly  in  favor  of  the 
pure  oral  method  of  inculcating  language  and  opposed  to  the  mimetic 
method  or  mixed  oral  and  mimetic  method.  The  chapter  describing 
the  pure  oral  method  is  based  on  the  work  of  Goguillot.  This  method, 
in  brief,  consists  of  a  preparatory  course  of  education  of  the  sight, 
touch  and  muscular  sense,  followed  by  touch-studies  of  the  action  of 
the  respiratory  muscles,  then  of  the  lips,  tongue,  buccal  cavity  and 
larynx.  After  this  comes  the  emission  of  sound,  and  by  proper  pla- 
cing of  the  muscles  of  articulation,  under  direction  of  the  teacher  and 
with  the  help  of  a  mirror,  the  pupil  acquires  first  the  words,  then  the 
consonants,  and  finally  the  combinations  in  syllables  and  words. 

The  chapter  on  the  instruction  of  idiots  is  simply  a  reproduction 
of  the  writings  of  Bourneville  upon  that  subject,  the  methods  em- 
ployed at  Bicetre  and  fully  described  in  the  various  reports  issued 
from  that  institution  during  the  past  sixteen  years. 

For  stammering  and  allied  disorders  of  speech  the  authors  recom- 
mend and  detail,  at  some  length,  the  Chervin  method  of  treatment. 
Chervin  began  to  apply  his  method  in  1846  and  published  a  book 
upon  the  subject  in  1895.  The  method  does  not  differ  essentially 
from  the  rational  physiological  systems  in  vogue  all  over  the  world  at 
the  present  day. 

Richer -ekes  cliniques  et  therapeutiques sur  I'Epilepsie,  V Hysterie  et 
I' Idiotic,  compte  rendu  du  service  des  enfants,  idiots, epileptiques 
et  arrieres   de  Bicetre  pendant  Vannee  1895.      Par  BOURNE- 
•   VILLE,  medecin  de  Bicetre,  avec  la  collaboration  de  MM.   Bon- 
court,    Comte,    Dardel,  Dubarry,    Leriche,    Lombard,    J.    Noir, 
Pilliet,  Ruel,  Sollier,  Tissier.     Vol.  XVI.,  avec  31  figures  dans  le 
texte  et  8  planches.     Paris,  Progres  Medical,  1896.     Pp.    254. 
This  is   the   sixteenth   volume  of   the  famous   studies  made   by 
Bourneville  and  his  assistants  at  the  several  hospitals  united  under  the 
name  Bicetre.     These  annual  reports  are  a  rich  field  for  the  searcher 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  225 

after  facts  in  the  domains  of  pathology,  thereapeutics  and  pedagogy  as 
applied  to  epilepsy,  hysteria  and  idiocy.  The  first  part  of  the  volume 
for  1895,  as  in  former  years,  is  devoted  to  a  history  of  the  service  dur- 
ing the  year,  and  in  this  we  note  the  creation  of  special  classes  for  the 
feeble-minded  and  a  chapter  on  the  medico-pedagogic  treatment  of 
abnormal  children.  The  second  part  consists  of  clinical  and  patholog- 
ico-anatomical  studies  of  thirteen  cases  of  idiocy  and  epilepsy,  con- 
taining a  valuable  addition  to  our  repository  of  facts  relating  to  these 
subjects.  The  third  part  gives  us  the  result  of  observations  upon  the 
effects  of  certain  remedies.  Three  cases  of  cretinism  treated  by  ex- 
tract of  the  thyroid  gland  exhibited  marked  improvement  in  the  in- 
tellectual sphere  as  well  as  nutritive  changes,  such  as  loss  of  weight  and 
increase  in  height.  In  regard  to  the  matter  of  nutrition,  Bourneville 
shows  in  a  number  of  other  cases  the  value  of  the  thyroid  juice  in 
diminishing  obesity.  A  chapter  on  the  exhibition  of  bromide  of 
camphor  in  vertiginous  epilepsy  demonstrates  its  great  utility  in  that 
form  of  the  disorder. 

FREDERICK  PETERSON. 
NBW  YORK. 


Grundriss  der  Psychiatric  in  klinischen  Vorlesungen.  Theil  /. : 
Psycho-physiologische  Einleitung.  Theil  II. :  Dieparanoischen 
Zustande.  C.  WERNICKE.  Leipzig,  Thieme,  1894-6.  8°.  Pp. 
178. 

Drily  written  and,  though  clear,  not  easy  reading,  Professor 
Wernicke's  book,  short  as  it  is,  is  already  the  weightiest  of  the  at- 
tempts, of  which  several  have  lately  been  made,  to  apply  psycho  logical 
laws  to  the  unravelling  of  what  happens  in  disordered  mental  function. 
Part  I.  is  a  synopsis,  many  pages  of  which  deserve  to  become  classic 
types  of  exposition,  of  that  modern  scheme  of  cerebro -mental  action 
of  which  Wernicke  by  his  little  work  on  Aphasia  was  himself  one 
of  the  founders.  The  great  lucidity  of  the  statement  now  made  shows 
us  once  more  how  surely  protracted  meditation  on  a  subject  makes  a 
man  its  master.  For  psychiatric  purposes  the  chief  result  of  this  Part 
is  that  the  insanities  (being  diseases  of  the  cortex,  which  is  the  organ 
of  association)  should  psychologically  all  be  explicable  as  disorders,  de- 
fects, excesses  or  perversions,  as^the  case  may  be,  of  the  associative 
function. 

In  Part  II.  the  author  applies  this  notion  to  delusional  conditions, 
his  account  of  which  is  entirely  unconventional  and  reveals  the  man  of 
original  perceptions  on  every  page.  For  most  of  his  new  distinctions 


226  ,  PATHOLOGICAL. 

and  classifications — unfortunately  all  with  Greek  names — the  reader 
must  consult  the  original.  I  will  confine  myself  to  a  brief  no- 
tice of  the  most  important  thing  in  the  book,  which  is  the  explana- 
tion, by  a  single  underlying  cause,  of  the  whole  complex  of  delu- 
sional symptoms.  How  is  it  possible  to  find  such  a  mass  of  false 
ideas  at  war  with  each  other  and  with  reality,  such  a  loss  of  the 
sense  of  probability,  such  hallucinations,  such  inter-current  emotional 
states  and  motor  tendencies,  in  one  patient?  Professor  Wernicke 
answers  by  what  he  calls  his  hypothesis  of  sejunction  or  dissoci- 
ation. A  pathological  process  has  loosened  the  firmly  connected 
system  of  associations,  so  that  a  large  number  of  those  originally 
there  have  become  impossible,  and  a  '  disintegration  of  the  person- 
ality '  results.  Confusion  in  perception  and  dementia  are  evidently 
nothing  but  gaps  in  normal  association,  replaced  or  not  by  associations 
that  are  non-normal.  But  our  author  explains  the  phenomena  of  ex- 
cess, the  impressed  thoughts  and  hallucinations  by  his  theory,  as  well  as 
the  phenomena  of  defect.  The  two  run  together,  excess  in  the  proc- 
esses that  stand  over  being  the  consequence  of  the  loss  of  such  other 
processes  as  may  have  disappeared.  Defect  is  thus  primary  and  excess 
secondary,  as  in  the  ordinary  theory  of  dreaming  and  the  theory  by 
which  the  present  reviewer1  and  Mr.  Parish1  have  treated  illusions 
and  hallucinations.  Professor  Wernicke  applies  the  theory  of  sejunc- 
tion very  ingeniously  to  a  large  number  of  symptoms,  sensorial, 
ideational  and  motor,  and  of  course  dilates  at  length  on  delusions  as 
explanatory  theories  by  the  patient  of  his  elementary  disturbances. 
The  false  connection  with  himself  {Beziehungswahn)  which  the  pa- 
tient finds  in  so  many  different  experiences,  the  distortions  of  memory, 
the  distinction  between  presently  active  and  residual  morbid  processes, 
all  come  in  turn  to  be  suggestively  discussed. 

I  cannot  help  thinking,  for  my  own  part,  that  the  explanation  of 
irritative  phenomena  (or  Reizerscheinungeri)  by  defects  of  association 
(or  Ausfallserscheinungeri)  has  to  bear  somewhat  too  heavy  a  bur- 
den in  Professor  Wernicke's  pages.  If  the  mere  stoppage  of  associa- 
tion-paths be  by  itself  enough  to  heighten  any  process  at  which  the 
stoppage  may  occur,  then,  whenever  we  hesitate  for  a  word,  we  ought 
to  get  the  last  cue-word  in  the  shape  of  an  hallucination  of  hearing 
— of  what  W.  calls  a  phonem,  rather  than  as  a  mere  verbal  idea. 
But  I  can  discover  no  tendency  to  such  sensorial  vivacity  in  the  last 
idea  reached  in  such  cases,  and  this  fact,  I  must  confess,  has  given  me 

1  Principles  of  Psychology,  II.,  122  ff. 

sUeber  die  Trugwahrnehmung,  Munchen,  1894,  p.  105  ff. 


NEW  BOOKS.  22? 

some  uneasiness  about  the  theory  of  hallucination  suggested  in  my  own 
book.  It  seems  now  time  for  the  'discriminating  stage*  of  criticism 
to  be  applied  to  that  theory,  and  of  course  the  field  of  paranoia  pre- 
sents itself  as  the  place  par  excellence  for  working  the  discriminations 
out.  The  great  lucidity  and  rationality  of  many  paranoiacs,  their 
freedom  from  any  speech  disturbances  or  other  Heerderscheinungen 
in  the  way  of  directly  perceivable  defect  are  hard  to  reconcile  with 
the  view  that  their  'false  voices'  (which  would  seem  to  be  Heerder- 
scheinungen of  excess)  are  secondary  rather  than  primary  symp- 
toms. In  many  important  respects  there  are  analogies  between  pa- 
tients with  delusions  and  cases  of  hysteria  such  as  those  that  Janet, 
Brewer  and  Freud  have  explored,  and  this  would  suggest  that  it  might 
be  well  to  search  for  parasitic  systems  of  subconscious  ideas  as  a  possible 
source  of  some  of  the  trouble  in  the  former  cases.  In  one  way  ('disinte- 
gration of  personality')  Wernicke's  '  sejunction '  formula  coincides  with 
Janet's,  yet  Wernicke  ignores  altogether  the  notion  of  subconscious 
ideas ;  and  indeed  it  is  evident  that  if  they  exist  we  need  quite  new 
methods  of  finding  them  out.  But  be  all  this  as  it  may,  it  is  still  cer- 
tain that  Wernicke's  hypothesis  of  sejunction  or  dissociation  opens  a 
new  era  of  interpretation  in  mental  pathology  and  gives  to  all  observers 
of  the  insane  a  new  task  in  the  way  of  something  definite  to  verify, 
complete  or  refute.  This  is  a  great  service  and  the  book  that  has  per- 
formed it  ought  to  be  translated  without  loss  of  time. 

W.  J. 


NEW   BOOKS. 

Psychologic  der  Natur-volker.    Ethnographische  Parallelen.   JACOB 

ROBINSOHN.     Leipzig,  Friedrich,  no  date.     Pp.  176. 
Lehrbuch  der  Psychologic.     F.  JODL.     Stuttgart,  Cotta'sche  Buch- 

handlung,  1896.     Pp.  xxiv-f-767-     M.  12. 
Outlines  of  Psychology.     W.   WUNDT.     Trans,    by  C.   H.   JUDD. 

Leipzig,   Engelmann;   New  York,  Stechert,   1897.     Pp.  xviii  + 

342.     $1.75. 

Theorie  der  Begabung.  R.  BAERWALD.  Leipzig,  Reisland,  1896. 
Pp.  x+289.  M-  5- 

Das  kontrdre  Geschlechtsgefiihl.  H.  ELLIS  and  J.  A.  SYMONDS. 
Bibliothek  der  Socialwissenschaft.  Ed.  by  H.  KURKLLA,  No.  7 
(original  Ausgabe).  Leipzig,  H.  Wigand,  1896.  Pp.  xi+3o8. 


228  NEW  BOOKS. 

Atlas  of  Nerve  Cells.  M.  A.  STARR.  With  the  cooperation  of 
OLIVER  S.  STRONG  and  EDWARD  LEAMING.  New  York,  The 
Macmillan  Co.,  1896.  LIII.  plates,  13  diagrams.  Pp.  79,  4to. 
$10.00 

Das  Ideal  des  '  ewigen  Friedens?   LUDWIG  STEIN.    Berlin,  Reimer, 

1896.  Pp.  65.     M.  1.20. 

Die  Freiheitslehre  bet  Kant  und  Schopenhauer.  D.  NEUMARK. 
Hamburg  and  Leipzig,  Voss,  1896.  Pp.  xii+89«  M.  2. 

Die  Autonomie  der  Moral.  K.  B.  R.  AARS.  Hamburg  and  Leip- 
zig, ?  1896.  Pp.  121.  M.  3. 

Die  Psychologic  in  der  Religionsivissenschaft.  E.  KOCH.  Frei- 
burg and  Leipzig,  Mohr,  1896.  M.  2.80. 

The  Cell  in  Development  and  Inheritance.  E.  B.  WILSON. 
Columbia  Univ.  Biolog.  Series,  IV.  New  York  and  London, 
The  Macmillan  Co.,  1896.  $3. 

Dritter  internationaler  Congress  fur  Psychologic  in  Munchen 
(Aug.  4-7,  1896).  Munchen,  Lehmann,  1897.  Pp.  xliv+49O. 

Studien  zu  Methodenlehre  und  Erkenntnisskritik.  F.  DREYER. 
Leipzig,  Engelmann,  1895.  Pp.  xiii+223.  M.  4. 

Addresses  and  Proceedings  of  the  National  Educational  Associa- 
tion, Buffalo,  N.  T.  Published  by  the  Assoc.,  Chicago 
University  Press,  1896.  Pp.  viii-fio88.  $2. 

Manual  of  Logic.  J.  WELTON.  University  Tutorial  Series.  Vol.  I. 
Deductive,  2d  ed.,  revised.  Vol.  II.  Inductive.  London, 
W.  B.  Clive;  New  York,  Hinds  and  Noble,  1896.  Pp.  xxii+ 
411  and  xiii-j-292. 

Manual  of  Ethics.  J.  S.  MACKENSIE.  University  Tutorial  Series. 
2d  ed.  London,  W.  B.  Clive;  New  York,  Hinds  and  Noble, 
no  date.  Pp.  xxx+355« 

Matiere  et  Memoire;  essai  sur  la  relation  du  corps  a  F  esprit. 
H.  BERGSON.  Paris,  Alcan,  1896.  Pp.  iii-f  279.  Fr.  5. 

Charles  Darwin  and  the  Theory  of  Natural  Selection.  E.  B. 
POULTON.  Century  Science  Series.  New  York,  The  Macmillan 
Co.,  1896.  Pp.  viii+224.  $1.25. 

Christianity  and  Idealism.  JOHN  WATSON.  Publications  of  the 
Philosophical  Union  of  the  University  of  California.  Edited  by 
G.  H.  HOWISON.  Vol.  II.  New  York,  The  Macmillan  Co., 

1897.  Pp.  xxxviii+2i6.     $1.25. 

Problems  of  Biology.  GEORGE  SANDEMAN.  London,  Sonnen- 
schein;  New  York,  The  Macmillan  Co.,  1896.  Pp.  213.  $2, 


NOTES.  229 

AN  EXPLANATION. 

My  attention  has  been  called  to  the  fact  that  a  meaning,  far  other 
than  any  intended,  might  be  put  in  certain  words  of  mine,  in  my  es- 
timate of  Mr.  Sterrett's  book  in  the  January  issue  of  the  REVIEW.  It 
is  suggested  that  a  reader  might  take  my  words  (p.  78)  to  mean  that 
Mr.  Sterrett's  results  were  not  reached  independently  and  that  he  had 
used  the  work  of  recent  investigators  without  giving  them  due  credit. 

I  wish  to  prevent  any  such  misinterpretation  by  saying  that  when 
I  wrote,  I  had  no  such  thought  in  mind  and  that  I  have  good  reason 
for  knowing  that  Mr.  Sterrett's  results  are  the  outcome  of  his  own  in- 
sight and  independent  reflection.  In  pointing  out  the  agreement  of 
his  thought  with  that  of  the  authors  mentioned  in  my  review,  the  real 
intention  was  to  emphasize  the  healthiness  of  his  originality. 

ROGER  BRUCE  JOHNSON. 
MIAMI  UNIVERSITY. 


NOTES. 

DR.  JAMES  WARD  has  been  appointed  to  the  new  Professorship  of 
Mental  Philosophy  and  Logic  in  Cambridge  University. 

WE  regret  to  record  the  death  of  Professor  W.  Wallace,  Professor 
of  Moral  Philosophy  in  the  University  of  Oxford,  who  was  killed  on 
February  i9th  by  a  fall  from  a  bicycle. 

WITH  the  current  issue  the  Vierteljahrsschrift  fur  ivissenschaft- 
liche  Philosophic  begins  a  new  volume  (XXI.),  with  a  somewhat  en- 
larged programme,  under  the  editorship  of  Fr.  Carstenjen  and  O. 
Krebs,  to  whom  the  editorial  care  had  been  transferred  by  Avenarius 
before  his  death. 

THE  same  issue  of  the  Vierteljahrsschrift  announces  a  prize  (of 
500  M.)  for  the  best  essay  on  the  subject:  Nackweis  der  metaphy- 
sisch-animistischen  Elemente  in  dent  Satz  der  Erhaltung  der 
Energie  und  Vorschlag  zur  Ausschaltung  dieser  Elemente.  The 
length  is  to  be  3  to  4  forms  of  the  Vierteljahrsschrift,  the  language 
German,  and  the  limit  of  time  October  i,  1897.  The  essays  may  be 
sent  to  either  of  the  editors,  to  Professor  E.  Mach,  of  Vienna,  or  to 
Professor  A.  Riehl,  of  Kiel. 

THE  firm  of  Ruether  u.  Reichard,  of  Berlin,  announce  a  Samm- 
lung  von  Abhandlungen  aus  dem  Gebiete  der  pddagogischen  Psy- 


230  NOTES. 

chologie  und  Physiologic,  to  be  issued  in  complete  essays,  6  to  8  per 
year.  The  series  is  to  be  edited  by  Professor  H.  Schiller,  of  Giessen, 
and  Professor  Th.  Ziehen,  of  Jena. 

WITH  the  number  of  December,  1896,  the  Revue  Philosophique 
issues  its  second  general  Index  (1888  to  1895,  pp.  91,  Fr.  3),  prepared 
by  J.  Claviere.  As  it  contains  an  analytical  table  of  matter,  as  well 
as  an  index  of  names,  it  will  be  serviceable  as  an  index  to  the  impor- 
tant literature  of  that  period. 

WE  have  received  the  annual  '  Addresses  and  Proceedings  of  the 
National  Educational  Association'  for  1896  (University  of  Chicago 
Press) ,  and  the  '  Report  of  the  Commissioner  of  Education '  for 
1893—4  (2  vols.),  and  1894—5  (2  vols.)  ;  Washington,  Government 
Printing  Office,  1896;  both  valuable  repositories  of  information  for 
students  of  education. 

PROFESSOR  JAMES  SETH  has  been  added  to  the  editorial  staff  of  the 
Philosophical  Review. 

L?  Anthropologie  states  that  a  government  School  of  Science  has 
been  established  at  Madrid  with  twenty-seven  professorships,  one  of 
them  being  a  chair  in  physiological  psychology  to  be  occupied  by 
Professor  Simmara. 

WE  may  call  attention  to  the  full  description  (with  cuts)  by  Pro- 
fessor Mosso,  of  his  new  Myotonometer  (for  studying  the  tonicity  of 
the  muscles  in  man),  in  the  Arch.  Ital.  de  Biologie,  XXV.,  fasc.  3, 
1896. 

THE  Psychological  Index  for  1896  will  be  issued  about  the  mid- 
dle of  March.  The  arrangement  whereby  it  is  also  published  in  the 
Annee  Psychologique  is  continued,  and  the  Index  will  hereafter 
have  the  cooperation  of  M.  N.  Vaschide,  of  the  Sorbonne,  in  the 
preparation  of  the  French  titles.  We  are  glad  also  to  announce 
that,  by  cooperation  between  the  REVIEW  and  the  Zeitschrift  fur 
Psychologic  u.  Physiologie  der  Sinnesorgane,  an  interchange  of 
titles  between  the  English  and  German  bibliographies  has  been  ar- 
ranged, so  that,  beginning  with  the  Index  for  1896,  the  two  will  be 
in  these  respects  substantially  alike.  A  difference  in  the  number  of 
titles  in  favor  of  the  German  bibliography  will,  however,  still  be 
probable  in  view  of  its  later  date  of  publication. 


This  issue  of  the  REVIEW  is  enlarged  to  accomodate  the  Proceed- 
ings of  the  American  Psychological  Association. 


VOL.  IV.    No.  3.  MAY,  1897. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW. 


THE  NEGATIVE  IN  LOGIC.1 

BY  PROFESSOR  A.  T.  ORMOND. 

Princeton   University. 

Historically  the  negative  has  occupied  the  attention  of 
logicians  since  the  first  beginnings  of  the  science.  Aristotle 
gave  it  a  prominent  place  in  his  reflection  and  in  modern  times 
it  has  been  discussed  by  all  the  masters  in  this  field ;  by 
Leibnitz  and  Kant,  by  Hamilton,  Lotze,  Sigwart,  Wundt, 
Bradley,  Bosanquet  and  Benno  Erdmann.  It  is  not  my  purpose 
in  this  paper  to  review  the  work  of  these  thinkers,  even  in  out- 
line, but  rather  with  their  results  in  mind  to  attempt  a  statement 
of  what  I  conceive  to  be  the  most  important  features  of  an 
adequate  theory  of  logical  negation.  In  the  first  place  it  is  clear, 
I  think,  that  the  logical  negative  is  very  closely  implicated  in 
the  general  theory  of  judgment  and  that  a  radical  treatment  of 
it  must  go  to  the  roots  of  judgment  itself.  For  this  reason  a 
considerable  section  of  this  paper  will  be  devoted  to  judgment 
with  a  view  to  seeking  its  psychological  and  logical  grounds. 

In  treating  judgment  psychologically  we  must  conceive  it 
as  a  conscious  function,  and  this,  followed  back  to  its  very  first 
presupposition,  would  involve  the  question  of  the  origin  of  the 
consciousness  in  which  the  function  arises.  But  whatever  the 
responsibility  of  psychology  may  be  for  the  genesis  of  con- 
sciousness, logic  is  free  I  think  to  assume  the  medium  in  which 
the  functions  it  is  interested  in  are  found.  A  question,  however, 
which  does,  indirectly  at  least,  concern  the  foundations  of  logic 

1  Read  in  abstract  at  the  Boston  meeting,  American  Psychological  Associa- 
ciation.  The  discussion  is  mainly  psychological. 


232  A.   T.   ORMOND. 

is  that  of  the  organic  conditions  in  which  consciousness  operates. 
The  tendency  of  the  genetic  thinking  of  the  time  is  to  go  back 
of  the  psychological  to  the  biological  in  order  to  discover  the 
first  laws  or  conditions  of  conscious  activity.  And  this  is,  I 
think,  on  the  whole,  a  healthy  disposition,  inasmuch  as  the 
vital  and  the  psychic  activities  cannot  be  separated  in  an  organ- 
ism which  has  once  become  the  bearer  of  consciousness.  I  do 
not  mean  that  there  are  none  of  the  activities  of  such  an  organ- 
ism that  are  not  psychic,  but  that  within  the  circle  of  the  con- 
scious, the  vital  and  the  psychic  are  one  and  the  same.  To 
omit  all  detail,  the  important  question  here  is,  how,  for  our 
purposes,  shall  the  relation  of  the  biological  to  the  psychic  be 
conceived?  There  are  two  view-points  that  are  to  be  kept  sepa- 
rated in  our  thinking  :  the  external  or  physical  and  the  internal 
or  psychic.  From  the  physical  standpoint,  which  is  the  biolog- 
ical, we  view  consciousness  as  something  in  the  organism  and 
superadded  to  the  organic  functions,  whereas,  from  the  psychic 
point  of  view,  which  is  that  of  mind  itself,  consciousness  is  not 
simply  in  an  organism  or  an  appendage  to  its  activities,  but  it  is 
^comprehending  term,  the  medium  in  which  the  existence  of 
everything  is  realized,  and  in  which  the  organism,  in  order  to 
get  itself  recognized  among  existent  things,  must  somehow  be- 
come immanent  as  part  of  its  content.  Realizing  this  point  of 
view  we  will  be  led  to  regard  that  duality  which  constitutes  the 
mould  of  organic  activity  in  general,  the  interaction  of  organ- 
ism and  environment,  as  immanent  and  structural  in  the  sphere 
of  conscious  activity,  and  from  the  same  point  of  view  the 
biological  laws  of  habit  and  accommodation  will  become  imma- 
nent laws  of  consciousness.  I  mean  by  this  that  consciousness 
does  not  simply  contemplate  the  biological  functions  as  external 
and  conditional  to  its  own  activities,  but  that  when  conscious 
activity  arises,  say,  as  will,  the  laws  of  habit  and  accommoda- 
tion are  taken  up  into  consciousness  and  become  constitutional 
principles  of  volitional  activity. 

Assuming,  then,  that  the  vital  conditions  the  psychic  in  its 
own  sphere  by  becoming  immanent  and  constitutional  to  it,  our 
notion  of  psychic  activity  will  resolve  itself  into  that  of  conscious 
vital  function  transforming  and  yet  obeying  the  life  categories 


THE  NEGATIVE  IN  LOGIC.  233 

which  have  been  taken  up  into  the  conscious  sphere  as  imma- 
nent laws  of  psychic  activity.  Nor  will  it  be  difficult  from  this 
point  of  view  to  realize  the  ground  on  which  the  first  conscious 
activity  may  be  characterized  as  volitional,  inasmuch  as  it  will 
take  the  form  of  conscious  reaction  of  the  organism  upon  its 
environment,  which,  operating  under  the  laws  of  habit  and  ac- 
commodation, it  gradually  assimilates  and  absorbs  into  itself. 
The  general  concept  which  I  have  sought  to  emphasize  at  this 
point  is  the  immanence  of  the  vital  from  the  psychic  point  of 
view  and  the  consequent  necessity  for  translating  the  biological 
categories  into  internal  and  structural  principles  of  the  con- 
scious activities. 

If  we  regard  the  conscious  organism  simply  as  acted  upon 
by  its  environment,  that  is,  as  a  recipient  of  stimulations,  there 
is  no  ground  for  ascribing  will  to  it.  It  is  only  when  we  con- 
ceive it  as  active  and  as  reacting  upon  the  ground  of  stimulation 
that  we  can  think  of  it  as  will.  What  we  call  will  can,  in  these 
early  psychic  activities,  be  nothing  but  the  conscious  responses 
by  which  the  organism  effects  its  assimilative  and  adaptive  move- 
ments. We  may  call  them  -pulses  of  self-assertion,  by  which 
the  organism  wreaks  itself  upon  the  ground  of  stimulation,  and 
the  acts  will  be  acts  of  self-conservation  and  will  fall  under  the 
general  category  of  survival. 

These  earlier  acts  of  volition  will  not  be  primarily  motived  by 
any  idea  or  representation,  but  rather  by  some  feeling  of  pleasure 
or  pain,  most  likely  one  of  pain,  since  mere  pleasure  feeling  could 
not  serve  as  a  motive  for  activity,  but,  on  the  contrary,  in  itself 
and  without  some  accompanying  idea  or  representation  which 
would  translate  it  into  teleological  terms,  would  tend  to  arrest 
motion.  If  we  assume  then  that  the  very  first  motive-impulse, 
logically  considered,  is  painful  feeling  we  may  conceive  the 
primal  impulse  of  volition  as  some  want  or  unsatisfactory 
condition  which  impels  the  conscious  organism  to  escape  from 
its  present  state  into  one  that  shall  be  less  intolerable.  We  have 
then  the  conception  of  a  will  motived  in  a  negative  sense  from  be- 
hind, but,  so  far  as  this  element  of  motivity  is  concerned,  blind  as 
to  what  is  before  it  and  having  no  other  guidance  than  the  specific 
quality  of  the  painful  impulse,  to  enable  it  to  pick  its  way  among 


234  A.   T.   ORMOND. 

the  pleasant  and  painful  stimulations  of  the  environment.  But 
by  the  pain-motive,  which  is  a  principle  of  avoidance,  we  may 
conceive  the  organism  as  feeling  its  way  with  a  certain  degree 
of  selective  intelligence,  it  being  understood  that  the  pleasure- 
motive  becomes  also  active,  and  that  representation  when  it  arises 
attaches  itself  to  both  pleasure  and  pain  as  a  teleological  prin- 
ciple of  positive  and  negative  selection. 

The  will  of  such  an  organism  would  be  an  active  function 
of  appropriation  and  avoidance  moving  under  the  guidance  of 
the  selective  motives,  and  the  special  question  which  arises  here 
from  our  point  of  view  is  how  the  volitional  activity  comes  to 
take  on  an  intellectual  character  and  become  what  we  call  judg- 
ment. To  answer  such  a  question  in  detail  would  involve  a 
wide  excursion  into  genetic  psychology.  The  following  state- 
ment must  suffice  at  this  point.  The  conscious  organism  not 
only  collides  volitionally  with  the  grounds  of  its  stimulations,  but 
out  of  these  collisions  arise  representations  (the  spatial  no  doubt 
arising  first)  which  are  to  be  conceived  as  elements  of  form 
under  what  these  grounds  appear  to  us  as  objective  and  intelligi- 
ble. Let  us  suppose  this  process  as  completing  itself  in  the  pres- 
entation to  consciousness  of  the  objects  of  a  world  in  the  midst 
of  which  its  functions  are  performed.  So  that  what  was  blindly 
and  vaguely  realized  before  through  feeling  now  stands  out  in 
a  representation.  If  from  this  representation  we  subtract  the 
volitional  pulse  we  have  simply  a  world  presented  but  not 
affirmed.  But  if  we  restore  this  pulse  as  a  conscious  reaction 
upon  the  presentation  we  have  the  simplest  assertion  of  the 
object;  that  is,  judgment  in  its  most  elemental  form.  This 
is  essential.  In  all  judgment  the  central  thing  is  a  volitional 
pulse.  To  this  as  genus  certain  differentiae  must  be  added  in 
order  to  constitute  judgment,  and  the  next  section  must  be  taken 
up  with  a  determination  of  these  differentiae. 

From  the  genetic  point  of  view  there  are  originally  only  two 
kinds  of  judgments  :  existential,  or  judgments  which  assert  sim- 
ple existence,  and  relational  judgments,  which  assert  relations 
among  existents.  The  elements  of  the  existential  judgment  are  : 

(1)  the  objective  representation  of  something  to  consciousness; 

(2)  the  act  of  positing,  which  is  virtually  our  willing  the  ex- 


THE  NEGATIVE   IN  LOGIC.  235 

istence  or  non-existence  of  the  thing.  But  between  the  repre- 
sentation and  the  volitional  fiat,  let  this  thing  be,  there  must  in- 
tervene the  motive  of  the  fiat,  which  is  some  interest.  This  in- 
terest must  coalesce  with  the  representation  in  order  that  the 
volitional  pulse  may  be  stirred  to  utter  itself  in  the  let  this  thing 
be  or  not  be.  Thus  arises  the  simple  existential  judgment.  It 
is  more  than  mere  perception ;  we  must  perceive  and  then  do 
something  to  our  perception  before  the  content  or  object  may 
exist  to  and  for  us.  Interest  must  fall  upon  the  object  repre- 
sented, and  there  must  be  that  pulse  of  self-commitment  which 
has  been  translated  into  the  let  this  thing  be,  before  the  judg- 
ment of  existence  can  be  said  properly  to  arise.  The  judgment 
thus  puts  a  kind  of  personal  stamp  of  endorsement  on  the  ob- 
ject of  perception. 

The  relational  judgment  is  more  complex.  Its  prototype  will 
be  found  in  volitional  alternation,  or  that  process  by  which  the 
animal  or  the  young  child  selects  out  of  conflicting,  or  at  least 
competing  means,  those  which  will  serve  its  end.  Thus  the 
chick,  whose  end  is  food  and  whose  alternatives  are  cinnabar 
caterpillars  and  other  caterpillars,  will  choose  the  other  cater- 
pillars, rejecting  the  cinnabar  species.  This  process  ceases  to 
be  purely  volitional  and  takes  on  judgmental  complexion  when 
the  alternatives  are  consciously  conceived,  or  become  related  in 
thought  as  alternative  means  of  satisfying  the  volitional  end ; 
that  is,  when  a  body  of  experience  or  knowledge  becomes  the 
guiding  principle  of  selection.  In  the  chick's  case  the  selective 
principles  are  all  below  the  level  of  thinking.  The  end,  food, 
although  not  conceived  in  any  intellectual  terms,  yet  functions 
in  the  chick's  consciousness  as  a  limiting  and  guiding  principle. 
The  chick's  universe  is  one  of  food,  and  the  included  alterna- 
tives are  food-alternatives.  The  body  of  experience  acquired 
by  the  chick  thus  conditions  its  selective  activity.  The  motives 
of  selection  rise  to  the  plane  of  thinking  when  they  themselves 
become  the  objects  of  representation.  The  child  performs  a 
judgment  of  relation  when  it  pronounces  an  object  good  or  selects 
it  because  it  is  good.  In  such  an  act  the  relation  of  the  object 
to  some  end  sought  by  the  child  is  seized  and  affirmed.  This 
is  the  simplest  kind  of  judgment  of  relation.  The  more  com- 


236  A.   T.   ORMOND. 

plex  forms  arise  when  the  less  obvious  relations  on  which  classi- 
fications proceed  come  into  consciousness.  In  this  progress  the 
immediate  relations  of  the  object  to  the  survival  of  the  subject 
gradually  drop  into  the  background  and  the  activity  takes  on  a 
more  purely  intellectual  form.  The  principal  differentiae  of  the 
judgment  of  relation  may  then  be  stated  as  follows  :  (i)  a  body 
of  experience  or  knowledge  which  determines  the  sphere  or  uni- 
verse of  existential  relations;  (2)  the  appearance  in  this  uni- 
verse of  a  number  of  competing  alternatives  whose  relations  to 
some  interesting  end  also  rise  into  consciousness  and  specifically 
determine  the  judgment.  These  are  the  differential  features  of 
the  act-  in  which  the  volitional  pulse  of  assertion  is  central  and 
which  takes  the  form  of  appropriation  or  rejection  of  some  among 
the  included  alternatives. 

Now,  it  may  be  asked  at  this  point,  do  we  not  beg  the  ques- 
tion when  we  postulate  a  universe  which  includes  all  the  alterna- 
tives as  a  condition  of  the  judgment  of  relation?  How  else,  it 
may  be  asked,  than  through  a  process  of  judgment  could  such 
a  universe  arise  ?  We  answer  that  our  first  universes  arise  in 
perceptual  experience.  Judgment  is  never  without  presupposi- 
tions. The  chick  no  doubt  learns  from  experience  what  objects 
are  food  for  it  before  it  is  able  to  select  among  the  objects  pre- 
sented to  it.  Our  logical  universes  may  be  and  no  doubt  are  in  the 
later  stages  of  experience,  products  of  logical  processes.  But  this 
is  evidently  not  the  case  at  the  point  where  judgment  first  arises. 
The  first  universe  must  be  one  that  is  supplied  by  extra-logical 
experience.  When  arrived  at,  however,  the  judgment  function 
will  operate  within  it  in  the  manner  indicated. 

We  have  then  the  two  distinguishable  types  of  judgment — 
the  Existential,  which  asserts  simply  existence,  and  the  Rela- 
tional, which  is  more  complex  and  selects  among  alternatives 
included  in  a  broader  genus  or  universe  of  existent  relations. 
If,  now,  we  leave  the  first  species  out  of  view  as  being  for  our 
purposes  relatively  unimportant,  we  may  say  that  the  judgment 
function  is  a  disjunctive  operation  'within  a  larger  genus  or 
universe.  Bosanquet  recognizes  this  character  in  his  doctrine 
that  every  judgment  involves  as  its  presupposition  a  larger 
comprehending  judgment.  The  comprehending  term  need  not, 


THE  NEGATIVE   IN  LOGIC.  237 

however,  as  we  have  contended  above,  be  a  judgment.  It  may 
be  some  body  of  experience  which  for  the  time  being  functions 
as  the  real  subject  of  judgment.  In  other  words,  the  ground  of 
the  disjunction  may  be  purely  psychological. 

To  summarize  the  discussion  up  to  this  point,  judgment  rises 
out  of  volitional  gounds.  It  is  informed  by  the  motive  of 
volition  and  it  includes  the  volitional  pulse  as  its  central  essence. 
All  judgment  then  is  volitional  in  its  nature.  The  volitional 
pulse  becomes  a  pulse  of  judgment  when  a  field  of  representation 
arises  to  which  some  interest  attaches.  The  simple  judgment 
of  experience  is  the  first  result.  The  subject  of  a  logical  judg- 
ment need  not  be  logical ;  it  may  be  purely  psychological,  a 
body  of  extra-logical  experience.  The  judgment  of  relation 
preserves  the  volitional  character  and  simply  adds  other 
differentiae.  We  have  seen  that  the  ground  of  this  judgment  is 
a  genus  which  comprehends,  and  at  the  same  time  limits,  the 
alternatives  about  which  the  judgment  is  pronounced,  and  that 
the  judgment  itself  is  essentially  disjunctive.  But  the  compre- 
hending genus  need  not  be  a  judgment ;  it  may  be  psychological 
and  not  logical.  Now  this  conclusion  is  the  one  that  might  be 
anticipated  from  the  point  of  view  of  logical  immanence.1  For 
just  as  the  vital  is  immanent  in  the  psychic  so  in  the  region  of  the 
logical  processes  the  later  comprehends  the  earlier  which  acts  as 
its  inner  motive  and  the  psychologial  is  immanent  in  the  logical. 
We  see  at  this  point  how  the  psychological  universe,  which  is 
the  concrete  universal  of  the  Lotzean  school  of  logicians,  be- 
comes the  immanent  motive  and  spring  of  logical  processes,  so 
that  it  is  not  necessary  to  postulate  an  infinite  series  of  logical 
universals,  but  experience  passes  by  insensible  gradations  from 
the  pre-logical  into  the  logical  stage. 

The  fact  that  every  judgment  either  affirms  or  denies 
led  Aristotle  to  regard  affirmation  and  negation  as  coordinate 
moments  in  judgment.  Modern  logicians  have  tended  rather 
to  subordinate  negation  to  affirmation,  and  some  have  gone  so 
far  as  virtually  to  deny  the  reality  of  negation.  Without  delay- 

'The  doctrine  of  immanence  set  forth  here  is  not  identical  with  Erdmann's. 
What  it  means  is  the  internal  activity  of  psychological  content  as  a  motive  in 
logical  processes. 


238  A.   T.   ORMOND. 

ing  on  historical  details,  however,  we  may  seek  an  answer  to 
two  questions  concerning  the  negative  :  (i)  How  does  negation 
arise?  (2)  What  is  its  function  in  judgment?  If  we  bear  in 
mind  the  relation  of  judgment  to  volition  we  will  be  ready  to 
agree,  I  think,  that  all  judgment  is  positive.  There  cannot  be 
a  judgment  in  which  something  is  not  asserted.  All  judgment 
is,  therefore,  positive  and  assertative.  The  distinction  between 
affirmation  and  denial  must  then  be  a  distinction  between  two 
kinds  of  positive  assertion.  So  much  seems  clear.  But  it  is 
not  so  clear  what  an  assertion  that  is  neither  affirmative  nor  nega- 
tive can  be  or  how  such  assertion  can  be  real.  How  shall  we 
render  the  question  intelligible  ?  In  the  first  place,  it  is  clear, 
I  think,  that  when  I  say  in  a  negative  existential  judgment,  for 
example,  that  no  griffin  exists,  the  nominal  subject,  griffin,  is 
not  the  real  subject  which  motives  the  assertion.  The  real 
subject  is  something  known  ;  some  conception  of  reality  which 
necessitates  the  denial.  Now  the  assertive  force  of  the  judg- 
ment lies  in  the  self-conserving  force  of  this  backlying  knowl- 
edge or  conception  which  simply  maintains  itself  against  what  is 
incompatible  with  it.  Every  existential  judgment  may  then  be 
regarded  as  the  self-assertion  of  its  real  subject,  -pro  the  com- 
patible, contra  the  incompatible.  There  is  always  a  positive ; 
the  self-assertion  of  the  real  subject  which  conditions  both  af- 
firmation and  negation.  Suppose,  for  illustration,  that  this  were 
not  the  case  and  that  griffin  were  the  real  subject  of  the  judg- 
ment, the  function  of  the  denial  would  be  to  remove  its  own 
subject  and  thus  commit  logical  suicide.  The  real  subject  is 
that  which  necessitates  the  denial  and  is  some  backlying  knowl- 
edge or  conception  of  reality  which  is  incompatible  with  the 
existence  of  griffins.  The  real  subject  maintains  itself  against 
its  incompatible.  Thus  the  negative  judgment  arises.  We  see, 
then,  how  the  negative  existential  judgment  rests  on  position. 
It  is  not  pure  destruction  and  removal,  but  something  establishes 
itself  in  and  through  it. 

If  we  take  the  judgment  of  relation  the  same  fact  comes  out 
even  more  clearly.  We  have  seen  that  the  judgment  of  rela- 
tion is  disjunctive  and  that  it  presupposes  a  genus  or  universal 
that  is  either  logical  or  psychological.  Take  the  judgment : 


THE   NEGATIVE  IN  LOGIC.  239 

men  are  not  infallible.  Here  the  real  subject  which  necessi- 
tates the  denial  is  some  backlying  knowledge  or  conception  of 
human  nature  with  which  the  notion  of  infallible  men  is  incom- 
patible. Let  us  suppose  that  this  is  not  the  case,  and  see  what 
follows.  The  denial  simply  sweeps  away  the  notion  of  infal- 
lible men  and  leaves  nothing  behind.  There  is  thus  no  motive 
for  further  progress.  We  can  escape  this  irrational  result  only 
by  identifying  the  real  subject  of  the  judgment  with  the  knowl- 
edge or  conception  of  reality  that  necessitates  the  denial.  This 
need  not  be  a  definite  affirmation  that  men  are  fallible  or  even 
the  knowledge  of  that  fact,  but  rather  some  knowledge  or  con- 
ception of  human  nature  that  is  incompatible  with  its  infallibility. 
This  real  subject  it  is  that  asserts  itself  in  every  judgment  and 
renders  it  positive,  whether  its  form  be  affirmative  or  negative. 
And  this  it  is,  and  this  alone,  which  enables  judgment  to  make 
progress  through  denial  as  well  as  through  affirmation. 

How,  then,  are  affirmation  and  negation  related?  The  answer 
cannot  be  given  without  recognizing  the  position  of  the  real 
subject  as  the  condition  and  motive  of  both  affirming  and  deny- 
ing. Some  logicians,  as  Sigwart  and  Bradley,  take  the  ground 
that  a  negative  judgment  presupposes  an  affirmation  or  an  at- 
tempted affirmation  of  the  opposite.  This  is  also  substantially 
the  view  of  Benno  Erdmann.  But  it  is  clear  at  this  point,  I 
think,  that  what  the  denial  does  presuppose  is  the  position,  the 
self-assertion  of  the  real  subject.  The  real  subject  maintains 
itself  and  necessitates  the  specific  denial  or  affirmation,  as  the 
case  may  be.  This  real  subject  is  always  related  to  the  judg- 
ment as  the  genus  or  universal  within  which  the  affirmation  or 
denial  falls.  It  is  this  larger  assertion,  and  not  a  specific 
affirmation  of  the  thing  denied,  that  is  necessarily  presupposed  in 
the  negative  judgment. 

In  what  sense  then  are .  affirmation  and  denial  related  to 
each  other?  We  do  not  inquire  here  what  the  actual  relation 
between  any  two  given  affirmations  and  denials  may  be,  for 
a  denial  may  be  the  contradiction  of  a  previous  affirmative 
assertion ;  but  rather  what  is  the  essential  and  necessary 
relation  between  affirmation  and  denial  as  such?  If  we  bear 
in  mind  that  it  is  the  real  subject  that  necessitates  the  judg- 


240  A.   T.  ORMOND. 

ment  which  is  in  its  nature,  an  appropriation  of  what  is 
compatible  or  a  rejection  of  what  is  incompatible  with  its  actual 
content,  it  would  seem  not  to  be  necessary  that  even  proposed 
or  suggested  affirmation  should  precede  denial,  as  is  the  con- 
tention of  Bradley  and  Bosanquet.  For  if  the  real  subject  which 
is  the  genus  or  universe  within  which  the  judgment  functions, 
necessitates  the  affirmation  or  denial  on  the  ground  of  compati- 
bility or  incompatibility,  it  would  seem  to  follow  that  inasmuch 
as  the  relation  of  incompatibility  may  be  directly  apprehended, 
like  the  inequality  of  two  lines,  therefore  denial  may  be  direct 
and  unmediated  by  any  suggested  or  attempted  affirmation.  It 
seems  gratuitous  for  us  to  say  that  we  cannot  deny  without  hav- 
ing first  gone  through  the  form  of  affirming.  Limiting  the 
implications  of  the  relation  to  the  requirement  of  necessity,  I 
cannot  see  any  sufficient  justification  for  the  doctrine  that  nega- 
tion is  mediated  by  affirmation.  On  the  contrary,  so  far  as  the 
logical  relations  of  the  two  moments  are  concerned,  they  seem 
to  be  perfectly  coordinate.  The  real  subject  approaches  the 
alternatives  contained  in  the  limiting  genus  without  logical  pre- 
possession and  affirms  or  denies  them  with  direct  relation  to  itself 
and  without  regard  to  their  relations  to  one  another. 

But  from  another  point  of  view  there  is  a  difference.  We 
have  seen  that  the  real  subject  gets  on  through  both  affirmation 
and  denial.  But  it  gets  on  directly  by  affirmation,  while  its 
progress  through  denial  is  only  indirect.  The  organism  main- 
tains itself  through  the  avoidance  of  what  is  hurtful,  as  well  as 
by  the  assimilation  of  what  is  beneficial ;  but  the  two  functions 
do  not  advance  it  in  the  same  way.  It  is  directly  benefited  by 
food,  but  only  indirectly  and  mediately  by  the  avoidance  of  the 
hurtful.  The  same  is  true  of  affirmation  and  denial.  While 
logically  they  are  coordinate  in  the  sense  that  neither  is  mediated 
by  the  other,  yet  affirmation  ministers  more  directly  to  its  sub- 
ject than  does  negation.  Naturally,  then,  the  interest  in  affirma- 
tion will  be  stronger  than  that  which  attaches  to  denial  and,  there- 
fore, psychologically,  if  not  logically,  negation  will  be  forced 
into  a  secondary  place. 

To  the  question,  then,  of  the  necessary  relation  of  affirma- 
tion and  negation  we  answer  that  logically  they  are  coordinate 


THE   NEGATIVE   IN  LOGIC.  241 

and  inconvertible  modes  of  assertion,  and  that  the  real  subject 
of  discourse  advances  through  denial  as  well  as  through  affirma- 
tion. The  first  part  of  this  conclusion  seems,  however,  to  be 
contradicted  by  double  negation,  which  by  common  consent  of 
logicians  is  held  to  be  identical  with  affirmation.  Now,  it  is 
true  that  the  denial  of  a  denial  leads  up  to  an  affirmative  judg- 
ment. But  this  is  not  the  same  as  to  say  that  double  nega- 
tion and  affirmation  are  identical.  The  truth  is  the  denial  of 
a  denial  simply  sweeps  the  first  denial  away  and  leaves  the 
ground  clean  for  an  affirmation  which  immediately  follows.  But 
this  affirmation  is  a  third  judgment.  That  this  is  true  will  ap- 
pear not  only  from  an  inspection  of  the  movement  of  thought  in 
such  cases,  but  also  from  the  consideration  that  a  denial  of  a  de- 
nial contradicts  it,  and  leads,  therefore,  by  a  process  of  imme- 
diate inference  to  the  assertion  of  the  contradictory  affirmative. 
Double  negation  is  not  affirmation,  then,  but  simply  prepares  the 
way  for  affirmation  by  destroying  the  negative  that  blocks  its 
path.  It  is  one  of  the  modes  by  which  the  real  subject  necessi- 
tates an  affirmative  judgment.  Logical  analysis  thus  fails  to 
lend  any  support  to  the  idea  that  affirmation  and  denial  are  not 
perfectly  distinct  mental  functions,  or  that  there  is  any  point 
where  they  tend  to  lose  their  difference  and  become  identical. 

There  has  been  great  difference  of  opinion  among  logicians 
as  to  whether  the  negative  ought  to  be  referred  to  the  predicate 
or  to  the  copula  of  a  judgment.  If  we  distinguish  at  all  be- 
tween predicate  and  copula,  which  seems  to  me  to  be  a  doubt- 
ful performance,  then  the  predicate  will  be  the  name  of  some- 
thing that  is  conceived  to  affect  the  subject  in  some  way  and 
the  copula  will  stand  for  the  mode  of  this  affection.  The  copula 
may  then  be  regarded  as  a  conceived  relation  between  the  sub- 
ject and  the  predicate  matter.  Let  us  take  the  judgment,  men 
are  not  fallible.  If  the  negative  belongs  to  the  predicate,  then, 
as  Benno  Erdmann  points  out,  the  judgment  becomes  affirmative, 
men  are  non-fallible  and  the  distinction  between  affirmation  and 
negation  is  virtually  abolished.  But  if  it  belongs  to  the  copula 
the  negative  maintains  itself  and  a  certain  conceived  content  is 
rejected  by  the  subject  on  the  ground  of  incompatibility.  Benno 
Erdmann  holds  that  the  negative  is  to  be  referred  to  the  copula,1 

1  Logik,  Erster  Band,  §  57,  348. 


242  A.  T.   ORMOND. 

and  in  this  I  think  he  is  unquestionably  right,  and  would  only 
take  issue  with  him  on  the  point  that  what  the  negative  copula 
sweeps  away  is  an  affirmation  or  a  proposed  affirmation.  It 
has  been  shown,  I  think,  that  all  that  is  necessarily  involved  in 
negation  is  the  presence  of  an  alternative  that  is  equally  open  to 
affirmation  or  negation  and  that  whatever  more  than  this  may  be 
involved  in  any  given  case  must  be  determined  by  the  context  of 
the  judgment.  The  denial  removes  an  alternative  that  might 
have  been  affirmed  had  it  been  compatible,  and  it  removes  it  as 
a  whole  out  of  the  sphere  of  possibilities.  The  function  of 
denial  is  thus  always  removal,  sublation. 

The  implications  which  the  negative  judgment  may  contain 
is  a  consideration  that  is  to  be  carefully  separated  from  that  of 
the  meaning  of  denial.  The  implications  of  the  denial  when  it 
has  once  performed  its  function  are  to  be  determined  in  view  of 
the  relations  of  opposition  which  subsist  between  it  and  other 
conceivable  judgments  involving  the  same  terms.  Denial  con- 
tradicts affirmation  in  the  sense  of  wiping  it  out  completely. 
This  insight  is  as  old  as  Aristotle.  But  when  the  denial  is 
taken  as  a  judgment  form  then  it  stands  related  differently  to 
other  judgment  forms,  affirmative  and  negative.  Thus  if  we 
say  all  regular  students  are  eligible  to  college  honors,  we,  in 
effect,  say  that  any  regular  student  is  eligible.  The  denial  of 
this  implies  that  there  are  regular  students  who  are  not  eligible. 
This  gives  the  traditional  opposition  of  all  are  and  some  are  not. 
But  the  negative  judgment  may  be  denied  by  others  which  are 
not  contradictory.  Thus  all  are  will  be  denied  by  none  are. 
But  it  is  not  necessary  to  enlarge  on  a  topic  so  familiar.  The 
important  point  of  the  discussion  here  is  the  necessity  for  dis- 
tinguishing between  the  meaning  of  denial  and  the  implications 
of  the  judgment  in  which  the  denial  is  incorporated. 

Benno  Erdmann's  doctrine  of  the  immanence  of  the  predi- 
cate in  the  logical  subject  makes  it  possible  for  him  to  speak 
more  profoundly  than  most  logicians  on  the  subject  of  negation. 
Every  denial,  he  says,  rests  on  the  failure  of  immanence  of  the 
predicate  in  the  subject.1  This  is  true.  But  Erdmann  does  not,  I 
think,  develop  the  full  implication  of  his  own  doctrine.  If  we 

iLogik,  Erster  Band,  §57,  353. 


THE  NEGATIVE   IN  LOGIC.  243 

take  the  subject  in  the  narrow  technical  sense  in  which  it  is 
ordinarily  used,  then  no  question  of  immanence  can  arise  and 
the  denial  simply  sweeps  away  a  possible  synthesis,  leaving 
nothing  behind.  Thus  if  we  deny  that  men  are  infallible  we 
remove  the  notion  of  infallible  men  and  leave  nothing  in  its 
place.  Thinking  is  thus  brought  to  a  standstill  with  no  motive 
for  any  further  progress.  In  order  to  avoid  such  a  disaster  the 
real  subject  of  the  judgment  must  be  something  that  survives 
both  affirmation  and  denial.  It  must  be  some  universe  or  piece 
of  knowledge  lying  in  our  consciousness  which  asserts  itself  in 
the  removal  of  the  incompatible  or  in  the  assimilation  of  the 
compatible.  The  real  subject  survives  the  denial  and  gets  on 
by  means  of  it.  And  it  is  this  subject  alone  which  has  imma- 
nent in  it  all  the  real  alternatives  on  which  affirmations  might 
be  founded,  while  denial  in  such  a  case  indicates  a  failure  of 
immanence  in  the  sense  that  what  it  denies  is  no  real  alternative 
at  all.  It  does  not  exist  within  the  confines  of  this  larger  sub- 
ject. This  amendment  I  would  suggest  to  Erdmann's  doctrine 
of  the  immanence  of  the  predicate  in  the  subject ;  an  amendment 
that  would  be  perfectly  consistent  with  his  refusal  to  allow  to 
denial  any  independent  significance.  Denial  always,  on  this 
view,  points  back  to  a  larger  self-asserting  subject,  in  relation 
to  which  it  is  the  cancellation  of  an  affirmative  possibility,  and 
although  it  does  not  as  definitely  point  forward  to  affirmation  as 
Erdmann  thinks,  it  does,  in  fact,  prepare  the  way  for  the  more 
definite  self-assertion  of  the  real  subject. 

The  fruitful  question  regarding  the  function  and  value  of  the 
negative  is,  as  Bosanquet  says,  why  in  knowledge  we  cannot  do 
without  denial?  A  full  answer  to  such  a  question  is,  perhaps, 
impossible.  But  if  we  have  rightly  conceived  the  relation  of 
judgment  to  the  volitional  processes  which  underlie  it,  an  equiva- 
lent question  would  be,  why  cannot  volition  do  without  rejec- 
tion ?  The  obvious  answer  here  is  that  the  environment  contains 
things  that  are  incompatible  with  the  organism's  survival.  And 
just  as  we  have  reason  to  think  that  pleasure  without  pain  could 
not  supply  an  adequate  stimulus  to  volitional  activity,  or  a  princi- 
ple of  selection  that  would  enable  it  to  avoid  the  hurtful,  so  for 
analogous  reasons  we  have  grounds  for  thinking  that  knowledge 


244  A.   T.   ORMOND. 

could  not  get  on  with  simple  affirmation.  The  infinite,  sphere 
of  alternatives  that  may  confront  any  given  subject  will  contain 
the  incompatible  as  well  as  the  compatible.  Now,  before  the 
incompatible,  affirmation  is  powerless.  There  is  needed  a  selec- 
tive principle  which  will  enable  the  subject  to  assert  itself  against 
and  in  spite  of  the  incompatible.  Hence  the  necessary  func- 
tion of  negation.  Knowledge  makes  progress  as  much  by  de- 
nial as  by  affirmation.  But  it  progresses  in  a  different  way 
through  denial,  and  at  no  point  can  the  two  modes  be  identified. 
Denial  we  have  seen  to  be  a  selective  principle  in  the  activity 
of  knowing.  In  practice,  however,  it  possesses  various  degrees 
of  selective  value.  To  begin  at  the  bottom  of  the  scale  the 
value  of  negation  is  at  its  minimum  in  what  Kant  has  called  the 
infinite  judgment.  This  judgment  definitely  assigns  the  negative 
to  the  predicate  of  the  judgment.  When  we  say,  for  example, 
virtue  is  not  four-cornered,  we  assign  virtue  to  the  infinite  universe 
of  non-four-cornered  things  where  it  has  stones,  vegetables,  cater- 
pillars and  other  things  for  its  companions.  The  negative  is  at 
its  lowest  terms  here  because  it  is  most  indeterminate ;  it  has 
simply  expelled  virtue  from  the  province  of  four-cornered  things, 
but  otherwise  leaves  it  to  wander  at  large  in  an  undetermined 
universe.  If  we  leave  out  of  view  the  infinite  judgment  and 
connect  denial  where  it  properly  belongs,  with  the  copula  of  the 
judgment,  its  value  will  be  found  to  vary  indefinitely.  Its  func- 
tion is  uniform,  the  removal  of  a  false  alternative,  but  what  this 
removal  does  for  knowledge  is  variable.  The  point  on  which  I 
wish  to  put  emphasis  in  this  connection  is  that  the  significance 
of  negation  will,  other  things  being  equal,  vary  with  the  extent 
and  richness  of  the  real  subject,  which  necessitates  the  denial. 
The  denial  of  the  scientist  means  more  for  knowledge  than  that 
of  the  unlearned,  though  both  denials  be  equally  valid.  The 
denial  of  the  child  is  less  significant  than  that  of  the  man.  The 
savage  looks  out  on  the  stars  and  shakes  his  head ;  the  trained 
astronomer,  looking  through  his  telescope,  makes  the  same  sign. 
The  difference  in  significance  is  vast,  and  why?  Because  the 
denial  is  necessitated  by  knowledge,  and  just  in  proportion  as 
this  knowledge  is  rich  and  exact  will  the  denial  be  definite  and 
specific.  The  astronomer's  denial,  perhaps,  brushes  aside  a 


THE    NEGATIVE  IN  LOGIC.  245 

false  hypothesis,  or  removes  the  only  obstacle  in  the  way 
of  a  great  discovery,  while  that  of  the  savage  signifies,  it 
may  be,  only  the  failure  of  some  combination  which  has  a 
superstitious  import  to  his  mind.  Some  of  the  later  writers  on 
logic  represent  this  tendency  of  negation  to  become  more  specific 
as  approximation  to  the  significance  of  affirmation.  Or,  to  put 
the  same  thing  in  different  language,  denial  tends  to  become 
the  equivalent  of  affirmation  until  at  the  highest  point  it  has  the 
same  value.  It  seems  to  me,  however,  that  these  logicians  state 
a  truth  in  language  that  is  misleading.  In  order  to  say  anything 
intelligent  about  the  value  of  denial  we  must  first  distinguish 
between  its  function  and  its  implications.  The  function  of 
denial  is  always  and  invariably  removal.  As  such  it  is  as 
unique  in  its  character  as  affirmation.  We  have  also  seen  that 
in  its  relation  to  the  knowing  process  it  is  a  principle  of  selection. 
In  this  regard  it  is  also  unique,  and  not  to  be  merged  in  affirma- 
tion. But  the  implication  of  denial  will  in  most  instances,  at 
least,  be  something  positive.  It  will  at  least  limit  and  define  the 
sphere  of  alternatives  by  removing  the  false  and  incompatible. 
And  as  knowledge  becomes  richer  and  more  specific  a  denial 
will  come  to  point  with  greater  and  greater  precision  to  an 
affirmation  which  will  be  involved  in  it  by  some  relation  of 
opposition.  It  is  incident  on  the  growth  of  knowledge  that  the 
system  which  it  immanates  becomes  more  closely  knitted  to- 
gether and  that  the  judgment  functions  become  more  specific. 
If  knowledge  could  once  complete  itself  we  would  then  have  a 
subject  whose  every  affirmation  would  exclude  a  specific  nega- 
tion and  whose  every  denial  would  lead  by  direct  implication  to 
a  specific  opposite  affirmation. 


CONTRIBUTIONS   FROM  THE  HARVARD  PSYCHO- 
LOGICAL LABORATORY. 

COMMUNICATED  BY  WILLIAM  JAMES. 

A.  DISCRIMINATION  IN  CUTANEOUS  SENSATIONS. 

BY  LEON  M.  SOLOMONS. 

It  is  well  known  that  the  power  to  discriminate  between  a 
touch  from  two  points  and  that  produced  by  one  is  susceptible  of 
great  improvement  by  practice.  But  the  process  by  which  this 
comes  about,  as  well  as  its  general  bearing  on  the  origin  of 
cutaneous  perceptions,  has  been  considered  only  speculatively. 
At  the  suggestion  of  Professor  James  I  undertook  an  experi- 
mental investigation  of  this  problem. 

My  first  object  was  to  determine  whether  it  was  a  simple 
question  of  exercise,  like  the  growth  of  a  muscle  through  use, 
or  whether  there  was  a  distinctly  mental  element  of  an  educa- 
tional nature,  allied  to  such  processes  as  learning  to  read.  For 
this  purpose  two  subjects  were  selected  and  each  regularly  prac- 
ticed in  the  discrimination  of  touches  made  with  dull  compass 
points  on  the  fleshy  part  of  the  forearm.  But  one,  S,  was 
regularly  told  whether  he  was  right  or  wrong,  while  the  other, 
G,  never  was.  At  the  start  both  distinguished  two  points  as 
two  at  about  a  distance  of  an  inch  and  a-half .  After  a  few 
weeks'  practice  the  one  who  had  been  told  when  he  was  right 
and  when  wrong,  S,  had  reduced  the  distance  to  about  one- 
fourth  inch,  while  the  sensitivity  of  the  other,  G,  remained 
practically  the  same.  To  make  sure  that  this  was  not  due  to 
individual  differences  the  second  subject  was  then  for  a  while 
told  when  he  was  right  and  when  wrong,  whereupon  he  im- 
proved rapidly.  The  subjects  were  always  touched  with  one 
point  about  as  often  as  with  two,  care  being  taken  to  avoid  any 
kind  of  regularity  in  the  alternation.  The  tendency  to  call 
one  two  was  often  as  marked  as  the  tendency  to  call  two  one. 
246 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY.  247 

From  these  experiments  I  concluded  that  the  process  of  train- 
ing was  essentially  a  mental  one,  a  real  learning,  a  formation 
of  new  associations. 

The  next  question  then  was,  what  peculiarity  of  the  sensa- 
tion produced  by  two  points  causes  them  to  be  recognized  as 
such.  This  seemed  to  resolve  itself  into  two  lines  of  inquiry : 

1.  What  other  judgments  as  of  distance,  area,  locality,  etc., 
seem  to  be  related  to  this? 

2.  How  must  the  sensations  from  two  points,  and  the  con- 
ditions of  their  application,  be  varied  in  order  to  have  them  ap- 
perceived  as  one  and  similarly,  mutatis  mutandis ',  for  one  point? 

Along  the  first  line  experiment  soon  developed  the  following  : 

(a)  The  impression  of  area-covered  which  accompanies  a 
judgment  of  one,  is  often  greater  than  that  accompanying  a 
judgment  of  two  in  the  same  neighborhood ;  so  we  cannot  sup- 
pose the  judgment  of  twoness  to  be  based  upon  the  impression 
of  area.  In  other  words,  when  we  judge  the  points  to  be  dou- 
ble it  is  not  because  they  seem  to  affect  us  over  more  than  a  cer- 
tain area,  which  area  we  take  to  characterize  the  contact  of  a 
single  point. 

(3)  In  a  subject  trained  to  discriminate  two  points  from  one, 
the  ability  to  localize  touches,  that  is,  to  touch  with  the  other 
hand  the  place  touched,  was  no  better  than  the  average,  and  not 
nearly  so  accurate  as  the  discrimination.  That  is,  the  error  in 
localizing,  measured  by  distance,  was  much  greater  than  the  dis- 
tance apart  necessary  for  discerning  two  points  to  be  two. 
From  this  it  would  appear  that  judgment  of  doubleness  does  not 
depend  upon  separate  localization  of  the  different  points  ;  that  we 
do  not  know  the  touch  to  be  caused  by  two  points  by  perceiving 
them  as  in  two  different  locations. 

(c)  When  touched  in  one  place  and  then  in  two  others,  an 
untrained  subject's  ability  to  tell  which  of  the  second  touches 
was  nearer  the  first,  was  much  more  accurate  than  his  ability 
to  detect  simultaneous  doubleness,  measuring  accuracy  by  dis- 
tance as  before.  A  difference  of  less  than  one-half  inch  be- 
tween the  distance  of  the  two  successive  touches  from  the  first 
was  readily  perceived  by  a  subject  whose  discrimination  of 
simultaneous  doubleness  required  a  distance  of  one  and  one- 


248  LEON  M.  SOLOMONS. 

half  inches.  This  would  seem  to  shut  out  any  theories  trying 
to  explain  the  detection  of  simultaneous  doubleness  through  a 
feeling  of  '  distance-apart.' 

Along  the  other  line  of  inquiry,  the  first  thing  tried  was  ex- 
pectant attention.  The  subject  was  told  beforehand  what  the 
stimulus  would  be,  but  requested  to  make  judgment  entirely  in- 
dependently of  this  knowledge,  so  that  the  effect  of  the  sug- 
gestion upon  the  actual  feeling  might  be  judged.  The  result 
was  that  two  points  were  felt  as  two  when  so  near  together  that 
without  the  expectation  they  would  certainly  be  perceived  as 
one.  The  judgment  was  fully  twice  as  delicate  when  aided  in 
this  way. 

Then  the  subject  was  told  that  he  might  be  deceived — that 
when  told  that  the  stimulus  would  be  two,  it  might  really  be 
one.  He  was  to  put  himself  in  the  condition  of  expectation  for 
the  stimulus  as  it  was  told  him  it  would  be,  but  to  take  care  he 
was  not  deceived  when  it  came  to  judging.  The  result  was 
always  as  in  the  previous  experiment.  That  is,  the  influence 
of  the  expectation  predominated,  so  that  when  touched  by  one 
point  he  would  perceive  two  if  he  had  been  led  to  expect  two  ; 
and  when  touched  by  two,  set  farther  apart  than  was  necessary 
for  perceiving  them  as  two  ordinarily,  he  would  perceive  them 
as  one  if  told  to  expect  one. 

Judgments  of  two  might  often  be  changed  into  judgments  of 
one  by  inserting  a  dull  pencil  point  between  the  compass  knobs. 
Similarly  a  judgment  of  one  could  often  be  changed  into  two  by 
touching  the  arm  in  some  other  place.  The  extra  touch  seem- 
ing to  suggest  the  doubleness  of  the  stimulus  without  itself  be- 
ing clearly  perceived  or  localized. 

The  absence  of  connection  between  the  judgment  of  twoness 
and  other  judgments — area,  position,  etc. — as  well  as  its  great 
susceptibility  to  suggestion,  both  direct  and  indirect,  seemed  to 
point  to  the  whole  thing  being  nothing  but  a  matter  of  simple  as- 
sociation. We  learn  that  a  certain  kind  of  sensation  means  two 
points,  just  as  we  learn  that  certain  marks  mean  the  letter  H, 
that  another  group  of  sensations  means  *  book,'  etc.  If  this 
were  true  it  ought  to  be  possible  to  establish  any  arbitrary  asso- 
ciation desired — to  train  a  person  so  that  he  would  call  one  two 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  249 

and  two  one.  To  test  this  the  following  experiment  was  tried  : 
Beginning  with  the  points  far  enough  apart  to  be  readily  per- 
ceived as  two,  the  subject  is  practiced  in  discriminating  this  sort 
of  contact  from  that  of  one  point.  The  touch  from  two  points 
is  made  by  a  rather  sharp  blow,  and  in  one  region  of  the  arm  ; 
while  that  from  one  is  made  more  by  a  pressure,  and  in  an  ad- 
joining portion  of  the  arm.  Gradually  the  double  points  are 
brought  nearer  together.  The  moment  the  subject  shows  a  ten- 
dency to  call  them  one  they  must  be  separated  farther  again 
and  approached  more  gradually.  When  the  two  points  have 
in  this  way  been  brought  very  near — I  always  waited  until 
they  were  within  one-fourth  inch  of  each  other — the  posi- 
tion and  character  of  the  touches  are  reversed.  That  is,  the 
double  points  are  now  ^pressed  down,  and  in  the  place  where 
the  single  point  was  formerly  applied,  while  the  single  touch 
is  made  with  a  blow,  and  in  the  place  where  at  the  start  the 
double  touch  was  made.  Under  these  circumstances  the  judg- 
ment reverses,  two  is  called  one,  and  one  two.  That  is,  the 
peculiarities  of  the  sensation  due  to  the  method  of  applica- 
tion, and  the  locality,  have  completely  superseded  those  due  to 
the  number  of  points,  as  a  basis  for  the  judgment.  Generaliz- 
ing, we  might  say :  any  cutaneous  sensation  may  give  rise  to  a 
perception  of  two  contacts,  if  the  past  experience  of  the  indi- 
vidual has  established  the  proper  associations.  That  we  com- 
monly do  not  make  errors  in  this  regard  is  due  to  favorable  past 
experience.  An  artificial  environment  might  educate  us  entirely 
otherwise. 

Coming  back  to  our  original  question — the  process  by  which 
improvement  comes  about,  and  its  general  bearing  on  the  theory 
of  cutaneous  sensations — we  may  say  that  it  cannot  be  traced  to 
a  refinement  of  our  power  to  localize,  or  to  a  refinement  of,  or 
an  establishment  of  relations  with,  our  judgments  of  distance  or 
area.  Simple  direct  association  between  the  sensation  produced 
by  two  points,  and  the  idea  of  two  points  has  been  shown  to  be 
perfectly  capable  of  explaining  the  phenomena.  That  it  actually 
is  the  cause  is  a  conclusion  that  seems  almost  forced  upon  us. 
But  this  particular  judgment  is  so  intimately  connected  with  other 
cutaneous  judgments — position,  area,  etc. — so  probable  is  it  that 


250  EDGAR  A.  SINGER. 

what  holds  for  one  holds  also  for  the  others,  that  it  would  seem 
well  to  postpone  a  verdict  until  they  have  been  similarly  investi- 
gated and  shown  to  obey  similar  laws.  This  I  hope  to  be  able 
to  show  in  the  near  future.  Meanwhile  we  may  give  a  provis- 
ional answer,  at  least,  to  the  second  of  our  questions.  Since 
any  cutaneous  sensation  may  be  judged  two  if  the  proper  asso- 
ciations are  established,  then  our  perception  of  two-touches,  even 
though  obtained  through  sensations  of  touch  only,  must  involve 
other  elements.  The  elements  of  number  and  space  which 
enter  into  the  complete  presentation  must  be  non-cutaneous,  that 
is,  associated  with  the  activity  of  a  different  portion  of  the  brain 
from  that  immediately  connected  with  the  nerves  from  the  skin. 


B.    STUDIES  IN  SENSATION  AND  JUDGMENT. l 

BY  EDGAR  A.  SINGER,  JR.,  ASSISTANT. 
I.  DIFFERENTIATION  OF  SENSE  ORGANS. 

A  group  of  coordinated  experiments  was  conducted  with  the 
view  of  determining  how  far  the  process  of  differentiating  the 
physiological  bases  of  sensation  could  be  carried.  These  in- 
cluded the  sensory  fields  of  touch,  pain,  temperature,  taste  and 
sight.  The  limits  of  the  present  contribution  compel  us  to  con- 
fine ourselves  to  the  first  three  of  these  fields  as  perhaps  the  most 
interesting. 

a.    Touch  and  Pain. 

The  results  of  Goldscheider,  Frey,  Nagel,  Dessoir  and  others 
have  given  a  decided  impetus  to  the  investigation  of  the  pe- 
ripheral apparatus  connected  with  the  senses  of  touch  and  pain. 

JThis  and  the  following  studies  are  the  partial  outcome  of  a  course  given 
to  the  undergraduates  of  Harvard  University  during  the  Winter  and  Spring  of 
1896.  In  permitting  them  to  be  published  I  am  conscious  of  the  comparatively 
elementary  character  of  the  work  and  of  the  little  that  it  offers  in  the  way  of 
real  conclusions.  Nevertheless,  it  occasionally  presents  new  points  of  view, 
and,  where  this  is  not  the  case,  the  care  with  which  the  experiments  were  per- 
formed renders  them,  I  think,  worthy  of  consideration  as  confirmatory  evidence 
in  fields  where  such  is  greatly  needed. 

E.  A.  S.,  JR. 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY.  2$l 

With  these  results  before  us,  a  series  of  experiments  was  insti- 
tuted with  a  view  to  the  answering  of  the  following  questions : 
i.  Can  points  be  found  possessing  consistently  different  thresh- 
olds of  touch,  and,  if  so,  how  great  a  difference  of  threshold 
is  to  be  found?  2.  A  precisely  similar  question  with  respect 
to  pain.  3.  Do  points  bearing  similar  threshold  relations  for 
touch  and  pain  coincide?  For  example,  is  a  point  sensitive  to 
touch  also  sensitive  to  pain,  and  so  on?  4.  Can  the  threshold 
values  of  touch  and  pain  be  made  to  vary  independently?  5. 
Are  there  any  constant  conditions  of  distribution? 

Two  groups  of  experiments  were  conducted  :  the  first  rather 
preliminary  in  nature  and  broader  in  scope,  but  accurate  enough 
to  deserve  mention ;  the  second  conducted  with  greater  refine- 
ment and  confining  itself  to  the  pain-sense.  The  apparatus  in 
the  two  series  was  the  same,  to  wit :  a  delicately  poised  balance 
beam,  on  one  end  of  which  was  fastened  sometimes  a  bristle, 
sometimes  a  fine  jeweler's  needle.  The  arcs  through  which  the 
beam  swung  were  marked  upon  a  graduated  scale.  By  dis- 
placing the  beam  through  a  constant  arc,  releasing  it  and  allow- 
ing it  to  swing  freely  toward  a  position  of  equilibrium,  very 
constant  conditions  of  applying  the  stimulus  were  obtained. 
The  portion  of  the  body  operated  upon  (the  back  of  the  hand, 
or  the  volar  surface  of  the  arm)  was  laid  in  a  clay  cast  and 
held  firmly  in  such  a  position  that  the  end  of  the  bristle  or  the 
point  of  the  needle  would  just  make  contact  with  it  when  the 
balance  was  in  equilibrium. 

In  the  preliminary  series  above  mentioned  a  small  portion 
of  the  skin  (a  rhomb  of  4  x  6  mm.  about)  was  selected  on  the 
back  of  the  hand.  In  this  region  eleven  spots  were  located  by 
minute  peculiarities  of  the  skin,  for  the  most  part  revealed  only 
by  the  use  of  a  lens.  No  ink  was  used  in  marking  these 
points  on  the  hand :  the  spots  were  plotted  on  paper  and 
designated  by  numbers.  This  region  was  gone  over  in  two 
ways :  first  with  a  bristle  and  then  with  a  jeweler's  needle. 
Each  point  was  stimulated  from  fifteen  to  twenty  times  in  each 
way ;  the  experiments  extending  over  a  number  of  days.  The 
series  was  completed  with  one  subject  only,  although  the 
experiments  performed  on  other  subjects  gave  no  cause  to 


252 


EDGAR  A.  SINGER. 


doubt  our  main  conclusions.  When  the  bristle  was  used, 
various  arcs  of  fall  were  first  tried  until  one  was  found  (2°  30') 
which  sometimes  yielded  a  sensation,  sometimes  remained  unfelt. 
When  the  needle  was  used,  several  arcs  (10°,  7°,  5°)  fulfilled 
these  conditions ;  and  all  were  used,  the  average  result  of  the 
three  being  taken.  The  results  obtained  may  be  graphically 
represented  as  in  Fig.  i.  The  numbers  on  the  horizontal  line 


1 

j 

.- 

1-  

.. 

1 

I 

1 

F 

i 

j 

\ 

1 

1 

• 

1 

• 

1 

, 

t 

i 

>J 

, 

1 

i 

• 

it 

10  31     * 


FIG.  i. 


stand  for  the  eleven  points  selected  for  investigation.  Of  the  two 
lines  corresponding  to  each  point  the  full  line  represents  the 
percentage  of  times  the  application  of  the  bristle  yielded  a  sen- 
sation of  touch  ;  the  dotted  line,  the  percentage  of  times  stimu- 
lation by  the  needle  yielded  pain.  The  horizontal  full  line 
represents  the  average  percentage  of  times  the  bristle  yielded  a 
sensation  at  the  points  touched  ;  the  horizontal  dotted  line,  the 
average  percentage  of  times  the  needle  produced  pain  at  the 
same  points.  We  may  take  these  percentages  as  measures  of 
the  sensitiveness  of  the  points  to  touch  and  to  pain  stimuli 
respectively.  The  threshold  of  each  kind  of  sensation  and  the 
mean  of  these  are  only  capable  of  comparison  inter  se.  All 
that  we  wish  to  determine  is  whether  points  possessing  more 
than  average  sensitiveness  to  touch  coincide  with  those  possessing 
more  than  average  sensitiveness  to  pain  and  v  ice  versa. 

It  is  exceedingly  difficult  to  obtain  consistent  results  when 
we  vary  the  conditions  of  time  as  they  should  be  varied,  keeping 
only  the  points  touched  as  nearly  as  possible  constant.  The  lat- 


HARVARD   PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY.  253 

ter  presents  a  most  difficult  problem,  and  is,  probably,  the  chief 
source  of  variation.  The  results,  therefore,  must  be  accepted 
with  all  the  reserve  that  is  naturally  inspired  by  an  average  of 
considerably  varying  elements.  Nevertheless,  until  we  obtain 
more  satisfactory  evidence,  the  following  view  of  the  problem 
may  be  conservative  enough,  and  within  the  limits  of  observa- 
tion. To  our  first  two  questions  we  should  say  that  differences 
of  threshold  of  pain  and  touch  respectively  do  exist  correspond- 
ing to  fixed  points  of  the  skin,  and  that  these  differences  are 
considerable  enough  to  be  easily  noticeable.  To  our  third  ques- 
tion we  should  answer :  the  minimal  and  maximal  thresholds  of 
touch  and  of  pain  respectively  cannot  be  readily  shown  to  coin- 
cide locally  and  probably  do  not  coincide.1 

As  the  most  general  formula  for  the  results  so  far  obtained 
we  might  say :  the  sensitiveness  to  touch  and  the  sensitiveness 
to  pain  are  not  identical  functions  of  position.  Our  fourth  ques- 
tion raises  the  query  as  to  whether  the  sensitiveness  to  touch 
and  to  pain  respectively  are  similar  functions  of  some  other 
variable.  One  variable  factor  that  at  once  suggests  itself  is  the 
condition  of  the  skin.  The  variation  of  this  factor  with  the 
location  of  the  point  touched  (e.  g.,  location  in  a  furrow,  or  on 
a  ridge),  we  shall  discuss  later.  But  it  can  be  made  to  vary 
artificially  for  the  whole  region  by  softening  the  skin  with  warm 
water,  soap  and  glycerine.  Under  these  conditions  the  thresh- 
old for  touch  was  quite  noticeably  raised,  though  apparently 
not  for  all  points.  The  few  experiments  tried  on  the  threshold 
of  pain  under  these  conditions  showed  it  to  be  lowered.  A  more 
complete  research  in  this  direction  is  needed ;  but  these  results 
were  fairly  marked.  If  they  are  correct  we  could  answer  our 
fourth  question  in  the  affirmative.  The  sensitiveness  to  touch 
and  to  pain  respectively  can  be  made  to  vary  independently ; 
the  sensitiveness  to  touch  varying  inversely,  that  to  pain  directly 
with  the  softness  of  the  skin  covering  the  parts  affected. 

'An  exception  should  be  made  in  the  case  of  the  point  marked  i.  This 
point  was  sensitive  both  to  touch  and  to  pain.  It  was,  however,  a  singular 
point,  lying  at  the  base  of  the  longest  hair  of  the  region  and  at  the  junction  of 
several  furrows.  It  could  be  compared  with  points  described  by  Goldscheider 
and  interpreted  by  him  as  being  the  seat  of  a  number  of  close-lying  points  of 
different  specific  nature,  such  as  at  other  locations  we  find  separated. 


254  EDGAR  A.  SINGER. 

In  the  second  series  of  experiments  (conducted  by  Messrs. 
Kline  and  Parker)  a  refinement  was  introduced  in  the  method 
of  mapping  the  surface  experimented  upon.  To  this  the  *  but- 
tered '  side  of  a  glass  slide  covered  with  melted  paraffine  was 
applied.  The  paraffine  froze  upon  striking  the  skin,  and  not 
the  slightest  furrow  escaped  the  paraffine  '  print.'  The  print 
was  then  transferred  to  paper  by  means  of  a  pantograph,  thus 
being  enlarged  to  any  convenient  size.  The  general  method 
of  experimenting  was  the  same  as  before,  only  the  jeweler's 
needle  being  used  and  only  the  threshold  of  pain  investigated. 
We  need  therefore  only  describe  the  conclusions  reached  after 
a  large  number  of  experiments. 

1.  After  increasing  the  intensity  of  the  stimulus  beyond  the 
threshold  of  touch,  one  of  two  results  was  obtained.    Either  (a) 
the  increased  intensity  gave  only  touch  even  after  blood  was 
drawn,  or  (b)  the  touch  sensation  merged  into  pain. 

2.  Points  exceedingly  sensitive  to  pain  gave  this  sensation 
with  an  intensity  of  stimulus  very  slightly  above  that  which 
marked  the  threshold  of  touch. 

3.  The  points  sensitive  to  pain  were  distributed  in  a  char- 
acteristic way.     Calling  those  points  that  gave  only  touch  with 
considerable  intensities  of  stimulus   (corresponding  to  areas  of 
from  i5°-22°)  non-sensitive,  and  those  points  that  gave  pain  for 
low  intensities  of  stimulus  (5°-io°)  sensitive  points,  the  follow- 
ing facts  of  distribution  were  revealed :  97  %   of  non-sensitive 
points  were  on  the  elevations  of  the  part  investigated,  3  %  were 
in  the  furrows;  73-5%  of  the  sensitive  points  were  in  the  fur- 
rows, 26.5  were  on  the  elevations.     Thus  it  will  be  seen  that 
sensitive  points  are  more  numerous  in  the  furrows  of  the  skin ; 
non-sensitive  points  mostly  confined  to  the  elevations. 

To  these  definitely  objective  results  may  be  added  those 
which  depend  upon  the  introspection  of  the  subject.  In  this  way 
the  following  points  were  brought  out : 

i.  In  the  field  of  touch  it  is  perfectly  possible  to  distinguish 
between  ordinary  touch  and  pressure  (the  '  kernel-like '  feeling 
of  Goldscheider) .  We  did  not  succeed  in  obtaining  consistent 
results  showing  these  sensations  to  be  permanently  attached  to 
definite  points,  but  it  is  not  improbable  that  a  more  extended 


HARVARD   PSYCHOLOGICAL    LABORATORY.  255 

research  would  prove  them  to  be  so.  However  that  may  be, 
the  difference  was  only  such  as  could,  in  the  opinion  of  the  sub- 
jects, be  explained  by  the  structure  of  the  skin  at  the  point  af- 
fected. 

2.  The  qualities  of  pain  produced  at  sensitive  points  were 
quite  different.     They  were  called  *  acute,'  '  aching,'  *  numb- 
ing,'   4  pricking,'    *  tingling.'     These   different   qualities   were 
fairly  characteristic  of  the  point  touched  and  did  not  replace 
each  other  to  any  great  extent. 

3.  Nearly  every  pain  was  preceded,  or  succeeded,  or  both, 
by  an  itching  or  tingling  not  to  be  found  in  touch  points.    Some- 
times the  tingling  would  remain  alone  without  pain,  but  usually 
at  a  point  that  was  in  the  habit  of  yielding  pain. 

4.  Pain  could  thus  follow  touch  or  tingling  after  a  consider- 
able interval,  but  when  it  was  of  the  '  acute'  kind  seemed  to  be 
just  as  immediate  as  touch. 

No  theory  of  the  physiological  basis  of  touch  and  pain 
could  be  deduced  from  such  results  as  the  preceding  alone. 
Such  a  theory  must,  we  feel,  take  into  account  a  much  larger 
range  of  facts,  notably  those  connected  with  the  independent 
variation,  under  pathological  conditions,  of  the  touch  and  pain 
senses.  It  may  be  well,  however,  to  point  out  a  few  theoretical 
inferences  from  our  experiments:  i.  From  the  fact  that  the 
threshold  of  touch  is  raised  for  some  points  by  softening  of  the 
skin,  while  that  of  the  pain  points  is  lowered ;  from  the  fact  that 
pain  points  are  more  numerous  in  the  furrows  where  the  skin  is 
softer ;  and,  if  Goldscheider's  observation  is  true,  from  the  fact 
that  touch  points  are  more  numerous  on  the  elevations  where  the 
skin  is  harder ;  it  would  seem  that  touch  is  dependent,  not  only 
on  the  nervous  equipment  of  the  skin  at  any  point,  but  also  upon 
its  ability  to  conduct  the  stimulus  to  surrounding  points.  Thus 
touch  might  quite  well  be  possible  at  a  point  from  which  pain 
(under  proper  conditions;  was  absent,  without  showing  that  a 
nerve  could  be  sensitive  to  touch  that  was  not  sensitive  to  pain. 
2.  On  the  other  hand,  any  theory  that  tried  to  identify  the  nerves 
of  touch  and  of  pain  would  have  to  show  that  the  points  of  greatest 
sensitiveness  to  the  one  sensation  were  also  unusually  sensitive 
to  the  other.  For  while  the  fact  that  conditions  of  the  skin  which 


256  EDGAR  A.  SINGER. 

render  it  a  better  conductor  of  stimuli  may  increase  the  sensitive- 
ness to  touch  of  certain  points  not  provided  with  nerve  endings 
(much  as  a  small  coin  placed  on  the  skin  would  transmit  a 
slight  pressure  better  than  would  a  bit  of  dough  under  the  same 
conditions),  yet  it  does  not  seem  plausible  merely  to  identify 
touch  points  with  points  of  best  conduction.  It  would  not,  for 
example,  seem  probable  that  a  point  supposed,  on  the  ground 
that  it  was  unusually  sensitive  to  pain,  to  be  provided  with  an 
easily  stimulated  nerve-ending,  would  be  less  sensitive  to  touch 
than  some  hard  part  of  the  skin  which  yields  touch  by  trans- 
mitting the  stimulus  to  several  nerve-endings.  It  would  seem 
to  require  greater  energy  to  set  all  this  machinery  in  motion 
than  to  affect  one  slightly  protected  nerve-ending. 

So  far  as  our  experiments  go,  then,  we  regard  them  as  point- 
ing toward  a  discreteness  of  the  end  apparatus  of  touch  and 
pain.  The  explanation  of  the  different  '  timbres '  of  pains  (their 
'  acute,' 'tingling,'  'aching 'etc.  character,)  would  require  a  much 
more  general  discussion  than  would  be  here  in  place.  We  can 
only  suspect  that  we  are  here  dealing  with  a  more  complex  sen- 
sation than  mere  touch  or  mere  pain,  but  that  it  is  not  yet  neces- 
sary to  suppose  a  specific  apparatus  to  explain  these  peculiar- 
ities of  sensation. 

b.    Temperature-sense. 

The  now  well-known  results  of  Goldscheider1  formed  the 
basis  of  a  series  of  experiments  on  the  temperature  sense. 
While  the  grosser  results  of  this  investigator  are  now  largely 
accepted,  those  who  have  tried  to  confirm  his  more  refined  (and 
perhaps  more  important)  conclusions  have  realized  the  difficulty 
attending  such  an  effort — a  difficulty  that  has  been  recently  ex- 
pressed as  an  impossibility  by  Dessoir.2  In  such  a  field  the  tes- 
timony of  many  observers  is  needed. 

After  trying  various  kinds  of  apparatus  the  original  metal 
cylinders  of  Goldscheider  were  found  to  afford  the  most  satis- 
factory means  of  applying  the  stimulus.  These  cylinders  were 
heated  in  water  at  36°  C.  for  locating  warm  spots,  and  cooled 

1  Goldscheider,  Archiv  f .  Physiologic,  '89. 
2I)essoir,  Archiv  f.  Physiologic,  '92. 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY.  257 

in  a  similar  way  to  3-4°  C.  for  locating  the  cold  spots.  The 
surfaces  investigated  were  on  the  back  of  the  hand  and  on  the 
volar  surface  of  the  arm. 

The  investigators  (Messrs.  Marsh  and  Mathews)  found 
the  arrangement  of  the  spots  as  Goldscheider  has  described  it. 
The  spots  radiate  from  centres  at  which  they  are  relatively  nu- 
merous. The  centres  of  the  cold  spots  usually  lie  close  to,  or 
coincide  with,  the  centres  of  the  warm  spots.  The  cold  spots  are, 
on  the  whole,  more  numerous,  they  react  more  quickly  and  are 
more  easily  located.  Again,  both  cold  and  warm  spots  seem  to 
vary  inter  se  in  the  strength  of  their  reactions.  Their  sensitive- 
ness differs  at  different  times. 

The  investigators  regard  as  the  chief  interest  of  their  experi- 
ment the  results  of  applying  mechanical  and  electrical  stimuli 
to  the  spots  already  located  by  a  temperature  stimulus.  The 
mechanical  stimuli  used  were  the  metal  cylinder  before  de- 
scribed, but  kept  at  a  mean  temperature,  and  a  slender  wooden 
splinter,  with  a  cork  tip  of  the  same  size  as  the  blunt  point  of 
the  metal  cylinder.  By  a  slight  pressure  upon  the  temperature 
spots  already  located  (and  marked  in  Goldscheider's  way  with 
dilute  ink),  warmth  and  cold  were  experienced  at  the  warm  and 
cold  spots  respectively.  The  same  success  attended  the  experi- 
ments with  electrical  stimulation.  The  stimulus  was  applied 
by  means  of  an  electric  needle,  the  point  of  which  was  brought 
lightly  in  contact  with  the  temperature  spot ;  a  weak  current, 
just  failing  to  give  the  usual  tickling  sensation,  being  employed. 
Both  mechanical  and  electrical  stimuli  were  tried  only  on  the 
spots  that  had  before  proved  most  responsive.  In  every  case, 
however,  in  which  they  were  tried,  they  succeeded. 

Finally,  the  analgesic  nature  of  the  temperature-spots  was  in- 
vestigated. In  every  case  one  point  within  the  spot  was  found 
which  would  bear  a  heavy  weight  on  a  stimulating  needle  with- 
out yielding  pain.  The  needle  point  being,  of  course,  much 
smaller  than  the  spot  of  ink  marking  the  temperature  spot,  it 
was  necessary  to  experiment  within  this  area  for  some  time  be- 
fore an  analgesic  point  was  found.  In  no  case,  however,  did 
the  investigators  fail  to  find  such  a  point. 

As  a  result  of  their  experiments  the  investigators  feel  that 


258  EDGAR  A.  SINGER. 

Goldscheider's  results  are  generally  reproducible.  It  is  beyond 
the  scope  of  the  present  communication  to  comment  upon  his  de- 
ductions from  these  data.1 

II.  INTENSITY. 

With  the  advance  of  psychology  more  and  more  attention  is 
being  given  to  questions  relating  to  the  nature  of  Intensity  of 
sensations.  Not  only  have  the  meanings  of  '  threshold'  and  of 
*  difference  threshold '  frequently  been  discussed  (of  which 
later) ,  but  the  nature  of  the  concept  of  intensity  itself  has  been 
treated  in  new  ways  (e.  g.,  by  Miinsterberg) .  Experimental 
psychology  has  so  far  had  little  to  do  in  the  discussion,  which 
has  remained  theoretical  in  character.  It  is  possible,  however, 
that  the  laboratory,  by  investigating  the  conditions  upon  which 
variations  in  the  judgment  of  intensity  depend,  may  contribute 
something  to  the  settlement  of  the  problem. 

The  facts  that  find  expression  in  some  such  law  as  that  of 
Weber,  whatever  may  be  their  ultimate  meaning,  at  least  reveal 
this  :  that  between  the  point  at  which  a  stimulus  is  administered, 
and  that  at  which  a  judgment  of  its  intensity  is  pronounced,  a 
certain  factor  enters  into  the  result  which,  for  brevity's  sake,  we 
may  call  '  subjective.'  The  search  for  this  subjective  factor  has 
largely  confined  itself  to  imagining  ways  in  which  the  energy 
represented  by  the  physical  stimulus  might  be  lost  before  setting 
in  motion  the  apparatus  of  judgment.  It  seems  plausible,  how- 
ever, to  suppose  that  the  physiological  effect  of  every  stimula- 
tion is  not  merely  to  excite  some  special  sensory  nerve,  but  to 
produce  a  profound  change  in  the  entire  organism,  and,  further, 
that  the  judgment  of  the  nature  of  the  stimulus  must  have  for  its 
physiological  basis  these  secondary  effects  of  stimulation  as 
well  as  the  primary  one  of  the  specific  sensory  excitation.  It  is 
impossible  to  say,  a  -priori,  how  fully  such  secondary  effects  as 
these  represent  that  which  we  have  above  called  the  *  subjective  ' 

^ne  must  always  hesitate  to  say  that  suggestion  has  played  no  part  in  such 
experiments  as  those  here  described.  A  subject  sufficiently  trained  to  be  a  reli- 
able observer  of  the  delicate  phenomena  involved  must  also  have  become  familiar 
with  the  results  of  past  workers  in  the  field.  We  can  only  say  that,  so  far  as  a 
conscientious  effort  to  be  unbiassed  effects  freedom  from  suggestibility,  the  ex- 
periments here  recorded  are  as  reliable  as  can  well  be  hoped  for. 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL    LABORATORY.  259 

factor  in  the  judgment  of  intensity.  It  cannot  be  without  inter- 
est, then,  to  examine  the  way  in  which  variations  of  the  physio- 
logical reaction  to  a  stimulus  affect  the  judgment  of  the  intensity 
of  the  stimulus.  The  reaction  must,  of  course,  be  a  very  general 
and  a  very  subtle  one.  Nevertheless,  we  may  take  simple  types 
of  it  in  the  form  of  pronounced  and  readily  measurable  reflexes. 
A  series  of  experiments  along  this  line  we  shall  proceed  to  de- 
scribe. 

Judgment  of  Intensity  as  Affected  by  Involuntary  Reactions 

to  Stimulus. 

In  this  series,  conducted  by  Messrs.  Dearborn  and  Gaylord, 
use  was  made  of  the  well-known  phenomenon  of  the  knee-jerk. 
The  apparatus,  being  similar  to  that  used  by  all  experiments  in 
this  line,  needs  no  description.  The  jerk  in  the  vertical  plane 
was  selected  as  being  most  convenient  for  the  purpose.  About 
300  experiments  were  made,  each  consisting  of  a  pair  of  stimuli, 
one  being  kept  constant,  the  other  being  made  equal  to,  greater 
or  less  than  this  normal.  The  subject  was  directed  to  estimate 
the  intensity  of  the  second  stimulus  with  respect  to  the  first.  The 
experiments  were  made  upon  three  subjects,  one  of  whom  was 
throughout  ignorant  of  the  object  of  the  experiment.  Sometimes 
the  squeezing  of  a  hand  dynamometer  was  found  useful  for  in- 
creasing the  general  innervation.  The  specific  object  of  the  inves- 
tigation was  to  find  how  far  the  relative  lengths  of  the  jerks  ac- 
companying the  two  stimuli  determined  a  subject's  judgment 
of  the  relative  intensities  of  the  blows. 

In  examining  the  results  there  are  two  cases  to  be  considered. 
Either  (i)  the  relation  of  the  second  kick  to  the  first  was  the 
same  as  the  relation  of  the  second  stimulus  to  the  first,  or  (2) 
the  relation  of  the  second  kick  to  the  first  was  different  from 
that  of  the  second  stimulus  to  the  first. 

Examining  now  the  distribution  of  the  right  and  the  wrong 
judgments,  the  following  facts  are  revealed  :  (i)  Of  the  right 
judgments,  71%  were  in  cases  in  which  the  relations  between 
the  stimuli  were  the  same  as  the  relations  between  the  kicks ;  in 
29%  they  were  different.  (2)  Of  the  wrong  judgments,  in  the 
cases  in  which  the  relations  between  the  stimuli  were  different 


260  EDGAR   A.  SINGER. 

from  the  relations  between  the  kicks,  93  %  were  in  accord  with 
the  relations  between  the  kicks,  only  *j%  were  contrary  thereto. 
In  brief,  then,  an  agreement  between  the  relations  of  the  stimuli 
and  those  of  the  kicks  increases  the  percentage  of  right  judg- 
ments ;  in  the  case  of  a  disagreement  between  the  two  the 
judgments,  under  the  conditions  of  the  experiment,  showed  a 
far  greater  tendency  to  be  determined  by  the  relations  of  the 
kicks  than  by  those  of  the  stimuli. 

There  are  three  possible  interpretations  of  these  results. 
Either  (i)  the  physiological  conditions  that  favor  a  greater 
kick  include  the  conditions  of  a  heightened  sensibility,  or  (2) 
the  association  between  a  larger  reaction  and  a  more  intense 
stimulus  being  established,  the  influence  of  the  kick  upon  the 
judgment  of  intensity  involves  a  more  or  less  direct  inference 
from  our  psychological  experience,  or  (3)  our  concept  of  inten- 
sity contains  as  an  immediate  element,  the  muscular  sensations 
arising  from  our  adaptation  or  reaction  to  the  stimulus. 

The  first  explanation  finds  nothing  to  support  it  in  what 
little  we  know  of  the  physiology  of  the  knee-jerk.  While  it  is 
not  at  all  an  impossible  hypothesis,  it  is  not  a  necessary  one, 
and  confirmation  of  it  can  scarcely  be  hoped  for.  The  second 
hypothesis  is  a  perfectly  possible  explanation,  and  finds  analogies 
in  many  of  our  psychological  experiences.  For  example,  when 
a  large  object  of  the  same  weight  as  a  small  one  is  judged  to  be 
heavier  we  have  the  influence  of  an  association  of  this  kind. 
The  third  hypothesis  must  exist  for  the  present  as  a  mere  specu- 
lation, and  our  attitude  toward  the  phenomenon  will  depend,  for 
the  present,  largely  upon  the  theoretical  stand  we  take  respect- 
ing the  nature  of  intensity  in  general.  It  can  only  be  said  that 
the  phenomenon  would  be  of  the  nature  we  should  expect  if  one 
of  the  chief  *  subjective '  factors  in  our  judgment  of  intensity 
were  the  reaction  of  the  organism  to  the  stimulus ;  for  here  we 
find  the  variations  of  that  reaction  to  be  the  chief  determinant 
of  variations  of  the  judgments. 

III.  JUDGMENT. 

There  is,  perhaps,  no  problem  calculated  to  throw  more  light 
upon  the  psychology  of  judgment  than  that  of  the  nature  of  a 


HARVARD   PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  261 

difference  threshold.  Attempts  to  fix  the  meaning  of  the  term 
have  robbed  it  of  that  confidence  reposed  in  it  by  the  older  psy- 
cho-physicists. The  essentially  relative  nature  of  the  concept 
has  been  insisted  upon  by  Wundt1 ;  in  a  still  more  thorough-going 
way  by  Fullerton  and  Cattell2  and  a  mean  position,  seeking  to 
define  in  more  careful  terms  the  meaning  of  the  much  used  term 
*  just  noticeable'  stimulus  or  difference  of  stimuli  has  been 
adopted  by  Schumann3.  We  have  found  it  helpful  to  treat  the 
judgment  simply  as  a  reaction.  The  organism  is  affected  by  a 
certain  kind  of  stimulus.  We  find  the  organism  reacts  in  several 
ways  to  the  stimulus,  one  of  which  ways  may  be  the  expression  of 
a  judgment.  Between  these  two  objective  facts  lies  a  chain  of 
events  within  the  organism  of  which  we  know  little,  but  whose 
nature  we  may  be  led  to  suspect  by  introducing  new  factors  and 
noting  the  variations  resulting.  One  form  of  variations  con- 
cerns the  time  elapsing  between  stimulus  and  the  reaction,  which 
reaction  may  express,  in  some  form  or  other,  a  judgment. 
Another  variation  concerns  the  amount  of  stimulus  that  is  re- 
quired to  produce  a  given  kind  of  judgment.  So  far  we  are  not 
dealing  with  theory,  but  simply  trying  to  obtain  a  general  ex- 
pression of  the  facts  of  the  case. 

Our  work  was  confined  to  the  judgment  of  differences.  This 
is  only  an  apparent  limitation,  since  all  judgments  are  judg- 
ments of  difference.  Whether  we  say  that  there  is  a  difference 
in  intensity  between  two  tones  presented  to  us,  or  that  a  book  is 
before  us,  we  are  in  both  cases  dealing  with  judgments  of  differ- 
ence. Only,  in  the  latter  case  the  judgment  is  more  complex, 
involves  more  comparisons,  some  of  them  with  that  which  is  not 
immediately  given.  Turning  then  to  the  problem  of  the  judgment 
of  difference  as  the  most  general  that  we  can  consider,  the  question 
arises  as  to  the  nature  of  a  threshold.  Evidently  our  only  objec- 
tive criterion  for  the  fact  that  a  difference  is  perceived,  or  rather 
what  we  mean  by  a  difference  being  perceived,  is  that  the  sub- 
ject reacts  to  it  correctly.  Thus,  he  says  that  a  difference  is  be- 

1  Wundt,  Grundziige.     4  te  Auf.     V.  I,  p.  397. 
2 Fullerton  and  Cattell,  Perceptions  of  Small  Differences,  p  n. 
'Schumann,   Zeitschrift  f.  Physiologic  u.    Psychologic  d.  Sinnesorgane. 
V.  6,  p.  476. 


262  EDGAR  A.  SINGER, 

fore  him,  or  he  imitates  the  difference  in  some  way,  or  he  indi- 
cates a  difference  a  certain  percentage  of  the  times  that  one  is  pre- 
sented. Now  it  does  not  follow  that  all  these  kinds  of  reaction 
are  *  set  off,'  or  discharged,  by  the  same  degree  of  difference  be- 
tween the  stimuli.  To  say  that  a  subject  reacts  rightly,  although 
he  does  not  perceive  the  difference  presented,  means  that  one  kind 
of  reaction  is  set  off  by  less  difference  than  is  another  (the  vocal 
expression  of  a  judgment,  for  example).  The  various  ways  in 
which  the  judgment  is  expressed  give  in  turn,  as  is  known,  dif- 
ferent values  for  the  threshold.1 

Just  such  variations  as  these  are  significant.  It  would  be  a 
wrong  conception  of  the  nature  of  a  threshold  to  suppose  them 
to  be  accidental  errors  to  be  eliminated,  or  to  suppose  that  any 
one  result  came  more  near  to  being  some  *  real '  threshold  value 
than  any  other.  The  discrepancy  arises  from  the  fact  that 
what  we  call  a  judgment  of  difference  is  not  of  the  same  psy- 
chological nature  in  each  case.  If  we  analyze  the  intra-organic 
elements  that  enter  into  a  judgment-reaction  we  may  roughly 
divide  them  into  the  centripetal  (sense  organs,  directly  or  sym- 
pathetically involved,  conducting  tract,  etc.)  ;  the  centrifugal 
(e.  g:,  motor  coordination  involved  in  expressing  a  judgment)  ; 
and  the  central  (the  perceptive  background  upon  which  the  stim- 
ulus falls).  The  first  two  factors  interest  us  only  in  so  far  as 
we  must  keep  them  constant  while  examining  the  third.  Our 
problem  is  :  How  may  the  central  apparatus  of  judgment  be 
varied  ? 

a.  Preperception. 

An  element  that  has  been  found  to  affect  the  quickness  of 
our  reaction  to  a  stimulus  suggests  itself  as  probably  having  an 
influence  upon  the  sensitiveness  of  this  reaction.  This  element 
it  is  convenient  to  call  preperception,  i.  e.,  an  expectation,  the 
psychological  elements  of  which  we  need  not  stop  to  analyze,  of 
the  kind  of  stimulus  that  is  to  be  presented.  Experiments  in- 
volving this  factor  can  be  arranged  in  a  great  variety  of  ways. 
We  confined  ourselves  to  a  very  simple  and,  therefore,  a  very 
difficult  case.  Ordinary  series  of  experiments  for  the  purpose 

1  Cf .  the  extensive  work  of  Merkel  on  psycho-physical  methods.  Wundt's 
Phil.  Stud. 


HARVARD   PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  263 

of  determining  the  difference-thresholds  of  intensity  and  of  pitch 
of  sound  were  instituted.  In  a  number  of  successive  sets  the 
kinds  of  difference  presented,  and  hence  the  possible  kinds  of 
judgment,  were  increased  in  variety.  There  were  four  types 
of  experiments  including : 

I.  Difference  of  intensity  in  one  direction;  /.  £.,  the  subject 
knew  that  the  test  stimulus  would  be  always  greater  (or  always 
less)  than  the  normal. 

II.  Difference  of  intensity  in  two  directions  (*'.  e.,  greater 
and  less). 

III.  Difference  of  pitch  in  two  directions  (t.  e.,  higher  and 
lower). 

IV.  Difference  of  intensity  and  difference  of  pitch,  each  in 
two  directions: 

It  will  be  seen  that  in  I  there  was  only  one  possible  judg- 
ment of  difference.  In  II  and  III  there  were  two ;  in  IV 
there  were  four  possible  judgments  of  difference.  The  subject 
was  always  asked  to  compare  the  two  stimuli  in  all  the  respects 
in  which  they  could  differ.  The  apparatus  used  was  a  tuning 
fork  (Ut4)  the  prong  of  which  was  struck  by  a  rubber  hammer 
falling  through  a  vertical  arc.  The  intensity  was  varied  by 
changing  the  arc,  while  the  pitch  was  altered  2  or  4  vibra- 
tions per  second  by  placing  a  piece  of  wax  on  the  prong.  The 
experiments  were  performed  on  two  subjects,  whose  results  we 
shall  give  together,  since  they  are  of  the  same  kind.  In  each 
series  the  similar  stimuli  and  each  kind  of  difference  were  given 
in  equal  numbers.  The  number  of  experiments  was  not  equal 
in  all  the  series,  the  lowest  number  being  250  in  series  III. 
The  following  table  gives  the  percentage  of  right  judgments  of 
sameness  and  difference  in  each  series : 

Intensity.  Number 

Same.  Different.         of  Possibilities. 

I-         7i-5  57-5  i 

II.         61.0  56.3  2 

IV.        41.3  44.5  4 

Pitch.  Number 

Same.  Different.  of  Possibilities. 

III.  79.0  49.8  2 

IV.  71.8  32.5  4 


264  EDGAR  A.  SINGER. 

From  this  table  it  will  be  seen  that  the  greater  the  number 
of  possibilities  of  judgment  the  less  the  accuracy  of  the  judgment 
or  the  higher  the  threshold.  To  present  this  as  a  set  formula 
we  might  say :  the  sensitiveness  to  differences  between  stimuli 
varies  inversely  with  the  number  of  possibilities  of  judgment 
presented.  A  parallel  formula  has  already  been  stated  con- 
necting the  quickness  of  discriminating  reactions  with  the  num- 
bers of  possibilities  presented.  And  the  two  would  seem  to 
have  similar  theoretical  explanations.  Every  perception  involves 
a  combination  with  the  stimulus  of  a  concept  prepared  by  past 
experience.  A  stimulus  is  above  the  threshold  that  is  suffic- 
iently strong  to  set  in  motion  the  central  mechanism  that  cor- 
responds to  this  concept.  Usually  the  number  of  concepts  likely 
to  be  aroused  by  any  stimulus  is  only  limited  by  the  context  of 
events  into  which  the  stimulation  has  entered  :  in  the  experi- 
ment we  still  further  limit  this  number.  In  proportion  as  we 
limit  it  do  we  lower  the  threshold  value  of  the  stimulus.  In  our 
present  experiment  it  is,  of  course,  with  the  difference  between 
stimuli,  each  of  which  is  perfectly  noticeable,  that  we  are  dealing. 
The  concept  in  question,  then,  is  that  of  a  kind  of  difference,  and 
it  is  the  number  of  these  concepts  likely  to  be  awakened  that  we 
limit.  But  as  before  stated,  the  fact  that  the  judgment  is  given 
as  a  judgment  of  difference  does  not  change  the  nature  of  the 
problem. 

b.    General  and  S-pecific  Judgments. 

The  last  experiment,  showing  the  effect  of  the  psychological 
factor  of  preparation,  leads  to  a  new  question.  However  great 
the  number  of  differences  presented  in  such  a  series  as  the  pre- 
ceding, i.  £.,  however  numerous  the  possibilities  that  offer  them- 
selves to  a  subject  at  every  choice,  there  yet  remain  two  factors 
constant  throughout,  to  wit :  sameness  and  difference.  The 
question  arises  whether,  in  case  we  could  in  some  way  obtain 
judgments  that  correspond  to  difference  in  general  and  compare 
with  these  judgments  of  particular  kinds  of  difference  obtained 
under  the  same  conditions  of  stimulations,  we  should  find  the 
two  classes  to  possess  different  threshold  values.  It  was  with 
this  question  that  we  sought  to  deal. 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  265 

A  few  observations  drawn  from  e very-day  life  may  be  ap- 
propriate by  way  of  introduction.  It  is  well  known  that  where 
differences  exist,  comparatively  slight  in  nature,  between  objects 
of  considerable  complexity  of  structure  (such  as  human  faces) 
one  may  be  quite  aware  of  a  difference  without  being  able  to 
tell  in  what  the  difference  consists.  And  this  is  not  merely 
owing  to  our  lack  of  a  name  for  this  particular  kind  of  differ- 
ence, for  we  may  afterwards  recognize  it  in  the  color  of  the 
eyes,  the  size  of  a  feature,  etc., — differences  that  are  easily  de- 
scribable.  Have  we  here  a  mere  anomaly,  or  a  phenomenon 
deeply  pervading  our  mental  life? 

Again,  one  may  quite  frequently,  when  expecting  a  certain 
kind  of  difference,  react  to  another  kind.  The  reaction  is  right 
in  so  far  as  there  is  some  kind  of  difference  presented ;  it  is 
wrong  in  judging  what  tfrat  kind  is.  A  series  of  experiments 
will  illustrate  and  confirm  this  statement.  With  a  small  dyna- 
mometer provided  with  a  blunt  point,  the  skin  on  the  volar  side 
of  the  arm  was  pressed.  The  series  of  250  experiments  upon 
a  subject  unacquainted  with  the  object  of  the  experiment  in- 
cluded 100  in  which  there  was  no  difference  between  a  normal 
stimulus  and  a  second  stimulus  which  the  subject  was  asked  to 
compare  with  it ;  75  in  which  there  was  a  slight  difference  of 
pressure,  and  75  in  which  the  same  pressure  was  administered 
at  a  slightly  different  point.  Both  of  these  differences  were  be- 
low what  is  ordinarily  called  the  threshold.  The  subject  was 
informed  that  the  experiment  was  designed  to  determine  the 
threshold  of  difference  of  location,  and  that  the  stimuli  would 
sometimes  be  the  same  and  would  sometimes  differ  in  location. 
The  judgments  were  always  given  as  same  or  different  in  loca- 
tion. The  following  table  gives  the  percentages  of  judgments 
of  sameness  and  difference  : — 

Judgments. 

Same.  Different  in  Location. 

.3          Same.  69.  31. 

Dif.  in  Location.  40.  60. 

y$          Dif.  in  Pressure.  57.  43. 

There  were  then  43  %  of  the  stimuli  that  did  not  differ  in 
location,  but  differed  slightly  in  pressure,  that  were  judged  to 


266  EDGAR  A.  SINGER. 

be  different  in  location.  But  so  were  there  31  %  of  stimuli 
that  differed  in  neither  that  yet  were  judged  to  be  different  in 
location.  The  difference  between  these,  viz.  12  %,  represents 
the  percentage  of  times  in  which  the  subject  was  led  by  the 
presence  of  an  unexpected  difference  to  judge  that  an  expected 
one  was  presented.  This  judgment  was  right  in  its  general, 
wrong  in  its  particular  character.  Examining  the  subject  after- 
ward revealed  the  fact  that  she  was  ignorant  of  any  differences, 
save  those  of  location,  having  been  present. 

The  problem  of  the  relation  between  the  thresholds  of  general 
and  of  specific  judgments  of  difference  may  be  approached  in 
several  ways.  The  simplest  way  that  suggests  itself  would  be 
to  conduct  two  series  of  experiments, — in  one  of  which  the  sub- 
ject would  be  asked  to  judge  whether  or  not  a  difference  were 
present,  in  the  other  of  which  he  would  be  required  to  pro- 
nounce upon  the  kind  of  difference ;  several  different  kinds 
being  included  in  each  case.  This  would,  of  course,  presuppose 
an  ability  on  the  part  of  the  subject  to  distinguish  consistently 
between  the  awareness  of  difference  and  the  awareness  of  a 
special  kind  of  difference.  It  must  be  confessed  at  the  outset 
that  the  absence  of  such  an  ability  would  by  no  means  settle 
the  question.  Still,  since  it  is  impossible  to  pronounce  upon 
such  a  question  a  priori,  a  series  of  experiments  was  conducted 
with  the  view  of  seeing  how  far  such  a  distinction  between 
general  and  specific  judgments  was  possible. 

The  experiments  were  conducted  by  Messrs.  Holt  and 
Southard,  the  apparatus  used  being  the  same  tuning  fork  struck 
by  a  falling  hammer  that  was  before  described.  Differences 
of  intensity  were  obtained,  as  before,  by  varying  the  arc  of  fall, 
differences  of  pitch  by  placing  a  small  piece  of  wax  at  different 
heights  upon  the  prong  of  the  fork.  The  subject  was  asked  to 
judge  between  the  stimuli  varying  in  intensity  and  in  pitch. 
There  were  two  subjects ;  upon  each  of  which  were  performed 
400  experiments,  arranged  to  eliminate  the  effects  of  practice 
and  of  over-estimation.  They  were  divided  into  two  sets, — in 
the  first  of  which  the  subject  was  asked  to  decide  simply  whether 
the  stimuli  were  alike  or  different ;  in  the  second  of  which  he 
was  required  to  pronounce  upon  the  specific  differences  presented 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  267 

(i.  e.,  greater  or  less  intensity,  higher  or  lower  pitch,  in  any 
combination).  Calling  the  first  set  general  judgments,  the 
second  specific,  the  results  may  be  classified  as  follows,  the 
figures  giving  the  percentages  of  correct  judgments. 

Subject.  General.  Specific. 
S.                             70.0  74.0 

H.  74.4  82.7 

Mean.  72.2  78.4 

It  would  seem  from  these  results  that,  so  far  as  a  voluntary 
attempt  to  distinguish  between  the  general  and  the  specific  ele- 
ments in  judgment  is  concerned,  the  advantage  of  sensitiveness 
is  somewhat  in  favor  of  the  latter.  The  introspective  testimony 
of  the  subjects  may  suggest  a  reason  for  this.  "  It  would  seem 
to  both  subjects  that  to  look  for  general  differences  and  not  to 
perceive  specific  was  as  easy  as  looking  for  a  star  with  the  eyes 
voluntarily  closed.  The  subjects  could  not  voluntarily  assume 
the  attitude  of  mind  for  perceiving  general  differences.  The 
subject  asked  to  make  general  judgments  really  made  specific. 
All  he  could  do  to  assume  the  '  attitude '  was  to  think  vaguely  of 
nothing  and  to  relax  his  attention.  Thus  the  less  accuracy  of 
the  general  judgment  as  compared  (in  the  above  table)  with 
the  specific  is  accounted  for." 

But,  though  a  voluntary  effort  to  distinguish  between  the 
general  and  the  specific  element  in  judgment  may  not,  in  general, 
be  successful ;  yet  it  does  not  follow  that  a  subject  may  not  react 
more  sensitively  to  difference  in  general  than  to  specific  differ- 
ence, although  every  reaction,  taking  the  form  of  an  articulate 
judgment,  should  assume  in  consciousness  a  specific  character. 
With  a  view  of  investigating  this  question  another  plan  was 
adopted. 

Three  series  of  experiments  were  made :  the  first  including 
differences  of  intensity  and  of  pitch  of  sounds  ;  the  second,  dif- 
ferences of  pressure  and  of  location  of  touch ;  the  third,  dif- 
ferences of  color,  of  size,  and  of  form  of  figures  drawn  on  cards. 
The  subject  was  made  aware  of  the  kinds  of  difference  that 
would  be  presented  to  him  and  was  asked  to  pass  judgment, 
comparing  the  stimuli  in  all  respects  in  which  they  could  differ. 


268  EDGAR  A.  SINGER. 

There  are,  then,  five  kinds  of  judgment  with  which  an  analysis 
of  the  results  obtained  must  deal : 

1.  Similar  stimuli  judged  to  be  the  same. 

2.  Similar  stimuli  judged  to  be  different. 

3.  Different  stimuli  judged  to  be  the  same. 

4.  Different  stimuli  judged  to  be  different,  including  those 
in  which   the   specific  nature  of   the   difference  was  wrongly 
judged. 

5.  Different  stimuli  judged  to  be  different  and  in  which  the 
specific  nature  of  difference  was  rightly  judged. 

If  the  vertical  columns  contain  the  judgments,  the  horizon- 
tal lines  the  relations  of  the  stimuli  judged,  we  may  represent 
the  five  classes  in  the  following  way : — 

Judgments. 

Same.  Different.  Spe.  Diff.  rightly  judged 

1  Same.  loo-a  a 

'£   Different.         io&-b  b  c 

w 

a = percentage  of  similar  stimuli  judged  to  be  different. 

b=         "          "  different     "  "         "  " 

c=          u  "          "          "         in  which  the  specific   difference 

was  rightly  judged. 

If  b=a  the  difference  between  the  stimuli  is  too  slight  to  be 
noticed. 

If  c=b  the  difference  between  the  stimuli  is  so  great  as  to  be 
always  distinguishable. 

In  general  a  series  can  be  arranged  in  which  b  will  be 
greater  than  a  and  less  than  c.  This  simply  shows  that  the  dif- 
ference between  the  stimuli  influences  the  judgment  to  some  ex- 
tent and  that  mistakes  as  to  the  kind  of  difference  sometimes 
occur.  But  the  fact  that  such  mistakes  occur  does  not  of  itself 
prove  that  the  presence  of  a  difference  has  influenced  the  judg- 
ment, while  the  specific  nature  of  that  difference  has  remained 
without  effect.  For  the  varying  conditions,  physiological  or 
other,  that  would  make  similar  stimuli  appear  different  might 
(and  generally  would)  also  be  sufficient  to  make  one  kind  of  a 
difference  appear  as  another.  We  have,  however,  a  datum 
that  enables  us  to  eliminate  this  factor.  For  we  know  the  per- 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  269 

centage  of  times  that  objectively  similar  stimuli  are  judged  to 
be  different  in  a  certain  specific  way,  and  this  percentage,  what- 
ever the  cause  of  its  existence,  must  be  at  least  as  great  as  that 
which  represents  the  proportion  of  perverted  judgments  of  dif- 
ference. For  example,  a  sound  would  be  judged  to  be  greater 
than  another  sound  of  the  same  objective  intensity  at  least  as 
often  as  would  a  sound  of  less  intensity.  The  only  class,  then, 
of  perverted  judgments  of  specific  difference  that  we  can  use  in 
showing  that  differences  may  produce  a  correct  reaction  when 
the  specific  kind  of  difference  remains  without  influence  on  the 
judgment,  is  that  which  remains  after  we  have  subtracted  the 
percentage  to  be  accounted  for  by  mistaken  judgments  of  simi- 
lar stimuli. 

From  these  considerations  we  derive  the  following  formulae 
—  in  which  x  stands  for  the  general  judgments  of  the  nature 
sought  ;  p  for  the  correct  particular  judgments  not  explainable 
by  chance  ;  n  for  the  number  of  possible  judgments  of  dif- 
ference presented  ;  «  ,  b  and  c  having  the  same  significance  as 

before  : 

b  =  a  -f  p  -+-  x 


n 


then  x  =  -  (b  —  c)  — 
n—  i^ 

The  experiments  conducted  yielded  the  following  results  : 

I.  Series  including  differences  in  pitch  and  intensity. 

Judgments. 

Same.  Different.  Right  Part.  Dif  . 

Same  56.3  43.7 

jjj          Different         26.1  73.9  4^-4 

Substituting  in  the  above  formula  43.  7  for  0,  73.9  for  £,  46.4 
for  c,  2  for  n  (since  difference  in  intensity  and  differences  in 
pitch  were  the  only  judgments  possible)  we  find  x  to  be  11.3. 

II.  Series  including  differences  in  pressure  and  in  location 
of  touch. 

Judgments. 

Same.  Different.  Right  Part.  Dif. 

Same  47.5  62.5 

£          Different         27.8  72.2  37.1 


270  EDGAR  A.  SINGER. 

Substituting  in  formula  as  before  (n  again  being  2)  we  find 
x  to  be  77. 

III.  Series  including  differences  in  form,  color  and  size  of 
figures.  This  series,  carried  out  by  Messrs.  Hackett  and 
Thorndike,  required  somewhat  special  apparatus.  Figures  of 
more  or  less  complex  shape  were  drawn  on  cards.  The  figures 
were  either  exactly  alike,  or  differed  in  size,  shape,  color,  or 
any  combination  of  these.  It  would  have  been  difficult  to  make 
the  differences  sufficiently  slight  to  have  yielded  any  consider- 
able percentage  of  wrong  judgments  if  the  subject  were  allowed 
an  indefinite  time  in  which  to  formulate  his  judgment.  The 
plan  was  preferred  of  making  the  differences  fairly  apparent, 
exposing  them  for  a  small  fraction  of  a  second  only.  This  was 
done  by  fixing  the  card  behind  a  pendulum  provided  with  a 
screen ;  the  screen  being  perforated  by  a  window.  The  time  of 
exposure  was  kept  constant  by  keeping  the  pendulum-arc  con- 
stant. The  figures  to  be  compared  were  exposed  simultaneously. 
In  90  experiments  the  figures  were  alike;  in  320  they  differed 
in  one  of  the  above  respects.  The  series  yielded  the  following 
results  : 

Judgments. 

Same.  Different.  Right  Part.  Diff. 

'J3  Same  84  16 

55          Different       30.6  69.4  49.1 

Since  there  were  three  possible  judgments  of  difference,  n 
in  this  series  is  3,  whence  x  =  14.5. 

It  will  be  seen  then  that  in  each  of  the  above  series  there  is 
a  certain  percentage  of  right  judgments  of  difference  which 
cannot  be  explained  as  due  to  chance  and  to  complete  apprecia- 
tion of  the  particular  differences  presented.  We  may  refer  to 
this  as  the  pure  general  judgment  of  difference.  This  is  not 
the  place  to  attempt  any  further  interpretation  of  this  factor. 
That  there  can  be  an  actual  content  corresponding  to  such  a 
factor — a  mere  feeling  of  difference  in  general — seems  intro- 
spectively  clear  from  observations  of  every-day  life.  That  such 
a  content  was  alone  present  in  the  percentage  of  cases  that  we 
have  called  pure  general  judgments  of  difference  we  cannot 
pretend.  All  that  we  can  say  is  that  the  subject  judged  as  he 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  2jl 

would  have  judged  had  this  factor  alone  been  present  and  had 
the  particular  determination  of  the  judgment  been  an  arbitrary 
addition  of  his  own,  not  dependent  upon  objective  conditions  of 
stimulation.  In  this  sense  we  may  say  that  the  general  judgment 
of  difference  has  a  lower  threshold  than  the  particular. 

If  we  ask  now :  What  light  do  these  facts  throw  upon  the 
theory  of  the  threshold?  the  following  answer  may  be  given. 
The  main  standpoint  of  the  early  psycho-physicists  will  seem  to 
involve  the  assumption  that  when  two  stimuli  were  presented  there 
was  only  one  sense  in  which  they  differed,  as  also  there  was  only 
one  way  in  which  this  difference  could  be  expressed  by  the  sub- 
ject. Their  problem  was  :  How  great  must  this  definite  differ- 
ence be  in  order  that  it  may  call  forth  this  definite  expression 
from  the  subject?  With  closer  investigation  of  the  psycho-physic 
methods  it  became  apparent  that  a  '  just  noticeable '  difference 
might  mean  quite  a  number  of  things,  the  meaning  being  de- 
pendent upon  what  was  regarded  as  the  expression  of  a  judg- 
ment on  the  part  of  the  subject.  Some,  like  Fullerton  and 
Cattell,  would  be  willing  to  say  that  there  was  no  difference  so 
slight  but  that  in  some  sense  it  was  noticed  by  the  subject.  As 
the  result  of  our  own  researches  we  feel  justified  in  going  a 
step  further.  Not  only  may  a  difference  be  noticeable  or  not, 
according  to  the  way  in  which  we  define  '  noticeable,'  but,  for 
any  given  criterion  of  noticeability,  a  difference  may  be  notice- 
able or  not,  according  to  what  we  may  mean  by  '  difference.' 
Mere  difference  may  be  noticeable  at  a  point  at  which  the  spe- 
cific kind  of  difference  may  be  unnoticed.  And  finally,  with 
the  same  criterion  of  noticeability,  a  specific  kind  of  difference 
may  be  noticeable  or  not,  according  to  purely  mental  prepared- 
ness of  the  subject  to  receive  it.  With  these  facts  recognized, 
the  problem  of  psycho-physics  awaits  a  re-statement. 


THE  IDENTIFICATION  OF  THE  SELF. 

BY  DR.  SMITH  BAKER. 
Utica,  Nevj  York. 

While  watching  certain  clinical  cases  my  attention  became 
attracted  to  the  tenacity  with  which  the  sufferer  would  some- 
times hold  on  to  seemingly  undesired,  and  many  times  actually 
harmful,  strands  of  morbid  experience.  Why  one  should  ever 
do  that  which,  whether  he  be  well  or  ill,  will  prove,  in  every 
way  and  all  along,  to  be,  not  only  detrimental,  but  distressing 
and  dangerous,  is,  so  far  as  I  can  ascertain,  one  of  the  problems 
of  the  Self  not  yet  solved. 

As  the  problem  seems  to  be  closely  associated  with,  if  not 
clearly  involved  in,  that  of  self-identity,  it  appears  probable 
that  its  successful  study  may  be  made  in  this  vital  connection,  if 
anywhere. 

The  study  of  the  process  of  the  identification  of  the  ob- 
served Self  necessitates,  primarily,  the  recognition  of  some 
fixed  point,  or  permanent  line,  or  '  innermost  center  within  the 
circle,'  of  the  normal  self,  from  which  departure  can  be  noted. 
But  to  what  phase  or  aspect  of  psychical  experience  shall  we 
look  for  such  a  point  of  departure?  The  Self,  when  normal, 
seems  capable  of  experiencing  every  sort  and  degree  of  con- 
scious life,  without  necessarily  disclosing  the  principle  of  its 
identity,  or  the  limits  within  which  it  is  circumscribed.  But 
notwithstanding  this,  it  seems  to  be  commonly  appreciable  also, 
that  there  is  actually  somewhere  in  the  personal  summation  a 
prime  characteristic,  which  always  focusses  all  the  other,  even 
wayward  features,  to  a  more  or  less  stable  density ;  and,  more- 
over, that  so  long  as  this  comes  to  pass,  the  Self  actually  stands 
out  as  a  satisfactory  realization — a  persistent  Identity  not  to  be 
trespassed  on,  and  likewise  demanding  notice  and  record.  This 
focussing  characteristic  is  discussed,  usually,  under  Attention, 
272 


IDENTIFICATION  OF  THE  SELF.  273 

Memory,  Unity,  Resemblance,  Synthesis,  Selective  Industry  of 
the  Mind,  Continuity,  etc. 

Of  the  ways  by  which  the  focussing  ability  and  its  processes 
are  accounted  for  in  psychology,  two  seem  to  be  worthy  of 
especial  consideration  in  this  connection.  One  is  described  by 
saying  that,  upon  proper  stimulation,  the  elements  of  conscious- 
ness seem  to  *  fall  together '  around  some  one  or  more  central 
characteristic,  as  if  by  their  own  or  by  its  own  attraction. 
Thus  in  the  presence  of  a  sensation  or  an  idea  or  a  motor  sugges- 
tion, say  of  a  coin,  all  the  elements  of  consciousness  having 
any  predilection  so  to  do  are  said  to  '  fall '  or  '  drop '  into 
line ;  while,  someway  out  of  this  process  of  precipitation,  there 
arises  the  notion  of  a  Self,  identical  with  the  one  realized  at 
previous  times,  in  connection  with  other  coins.  As  revealed  by 
observation  of  the  adult  mind,  this  may  possibly  be  the  case, 
especially  after  the  self-notion  has  become  an  automatic  affair 
of  many  experiences.  But  the  suspicion  arises  that,  in  reality, 
this  is  only  a  reminiscence  of  the  early  impulsive,  and  instinc- 
tive activities,  becoming  more  vivid  and  more  impressive  as  the 
later,  more  actively  self-energizing  processes  are  developed. 
And  I  take  it  that  the  actual  worth  of  such  a  foundation  of 
self-identity  is  very  small  in  the  ordinary  adult  life,  so  full  of 
variableness,  both  within  and  without.  Morever,  the  ques- 
tion as  to  whether  one  would  ever  have  attained  to  a  complete 
notion  of  self-identity,  had  this  been  the  all  of  individual  experi- 
ence in  this  connection,  is  legitimate. 

The  other  way  in  which  the  Self  is  said  to  become  identified 
by  itself  is  through  some  process  of  actual  effort  with  which  there 
is  always  associated  a  more  or  less  distinct  '  feeling  of  effort.' 
Here,  instead  of  the  elements  of  the  Self  simply  falling  together, 
at  the  suggestion  of  appropriate  stimuli,  they  are  determinedly 
pulled  or  forced  together,  by  the  Self,  in  conscious  or  possibly 
infra-conscious  activity.  The  feeling  of  effort  thus  experi- 
enced is  that  of  a  real  energizing  in  accordance  with  some  pre- 
conceived purpose,  or  plan  of  self,  or  method  of  finding  the 
self,  in  the  midst  of  all  the  multitudinous  affairs  of  conscious- 
ness ;  while  the  assurance  of  selfhood  results  from  the  con- 
ceived possibility  of  searching  for  and  successfully  finding  it, 


274  DR.  SMITH  BAKER. 

whenever  it  is  designedly  or  necessarily  thought  of  or  needed. 
As  such  an  assurance  of  self,  it  may  be  treated  objectively,  as  a 
most  important  interest,  and  presented  and  represented  in  what- 
soever way  may  seem  most  conducive  to  the  furtherance  of  the 
interest  in  hand.  Thus,  if  for  a  moment,  the  Self  becomes 
lost,  in  no  matter  how  complex  a  maze  of  experiential  factors, 
and  then  has  occasion  to  recover  its  identity,  in  order  that 
its  realization  may  be  at  the  moment  complete,  it  seems  to  be 
able  to  accomplish  this  very  surely,  instead  of  being  obliged  to 
wait  the  assurance  which  comes  involuntarily,  and  always,  as 
an  heritage  probably,  of  antecedent,  purposeful  experiences. 

Psychology  must  necessarily  deal  with  this  phase  of  active 
energizing,  no  matter  what  its  theory  of  origin,  process,  or  of 
relative  importance ;  for  it  enters  into  all  conscious  experience, 
and  undoubtedly  is  the  vital  element  in  what  is  understood  by 
volition,  as  distinguished  analytically  from  other  phases  of 
psycho-motor  activity.  Latterly  the  tendency  seems  to  have 
been  to  affirm  the  sense  or  active  energizing  or  '  feeling  of 
effort,'  as  being  exclusively  recognizable  after,  instead  of  before 
or  during  the  event.  It  does  not  appear  to  be  quite  inclusive 
enough,  however,  to  simply  say  that  only  as  we  are  finishing, 
or  immediately  at  the  finish,  of  a  volitional  experience  are  we 
able  thus  to  retrospectively  cognize  the  feeling  of  effort.  In 
every  conation  we  seem  to  energize  invariably  and  actively  from 
the  very  moment  when  the  focussing  and  fixating  of  attention 
begins  to  be  effected ;  and  as  a  matter  of  fact  we  are  conscious 
from  the  very  first  of  the  processes  involved.  Immediately  the 
ideo-motor  need  is  responded  to,  whether  the  processes  of  re- 
sponse are,  broadly  speaking,  automatic  and  not  so  clearly 
recognizable,  or  initiatory  and  willed,  and  so,  more  fully  con- 
scious, the  feeling  of  effort  keeps  pace  with  the  effort  itself,  and 
correspondingly  feature  by  feature  is  cognized  as  such.  Archaic 
as  this  may  appear,  I  confess  after  reading  and  experimenting 
and  pondering  so  far  as  I  have  thus  been  able  to,  my  utter  in- 
ability to  see  that  any  other  conclusion  is  in  accordance  with  the 
facts,  at  any  rate  as  revealed  in  my  own  consciousness.  Logic- 
ally, how  can  one  talk  about  the  elements  of  consciousness 
*  falling'  together,  if  one  does  not  recognize  the  commotion 


IDENTIFICATION   OF  THE   SELF.  275 

engendered  ?  But  the  commotion  itself  has  in  it  the  element  of 
effort — admitted  by  everyone ;  the  point  of  difference  being,  as 
to  initiation,  or  the  place  in  the  conative  processes  where  it 
emerges  into  consciousness. 

Conceiving,  then,  that  the  elements  of  consciousness  may 
either  fall  into  or  'accrete  round'  an  attention-focus  (automatism), 
or  else  be  actually  brought  to  such  a  point,  by  conscious  effort 
(volition),  it  follows  that  the  content  of  the  attention-focus  and 
of  the  conative  processes  will  depend  largely  on  the  degree  and 
kind  of  satisfaction,  which  either  may  be  anticipated  in  the  re- 
sult or  purposely  required  of  it.  Probably  anticipated  satisfac- 
tion is  never  realized  from  purely  effortful  activity  alone  recog- 
nized as  such  ;  always  there  are  present  certain  reminiscent  fac- 
tors, derived  from  past  experience,  and  now  become  incorpo- 
rated in  the  self-feeling.  But  volition  to  be  volition  must  always 
include  the  conscious  energizing  for  something,  which  some- 
thing may  be  added  to,  and  so  be  made  to  contribute  to,  the  com- 
pleteness of  the  result  so  largely  expected  as  being  chiefly  of  a 
ready-made  character.  This  something — this  fresh  element, 
which  we  ever  seek  to  add  to  the  ideo-motor  activity,  in  order 
that  it  may  be  satisfactorily  extended  and  recognized — is  not  a 
Wil-'o-th'-Wisp  simply  luring  us  on  so  much,  as  a  native  im- 
pulsion, a  central  and  centering  line  of  force,  or  central  '  line  of 
selective  industry  of  the  mind,'  inherent  in  our  being  and  con- 
stituting the  assurance  of  a  '  never-lapsing  ownership,'  always 
to  be  recognized  as  such  (under  ordinary  conditions) . 

Trying  now  to  trace  and  describe  this  central-most  line- 
point  of  permanent  and  positive  energizing,  one  finds  it  very  diffi- 
cult to  do  so  in  one's  own  normal  condition,  for  here  the  psycho- 
physical  mechanisms  all  run  so  smoothly  and  in  such  accurate 
balance  that  only  as  one  for  a  time  abnormalizes  himself,  as  it 
were,  can  he  catch  even  a  glimpse  of  it,  and  then  he  is  not  very 
sure  that  what  is  revealed  is  not  an  illusion  simply.  It  seems 
scarcely  possible  to  observe  accurately  the  normal  self  in  this 
respect,  save  in  the  light  of  abnormality. 

Letting  oneself,  then,  postpone  the  hour  for  conclusions, 
until  he  shall  have  had  an  opportunity  to  study  the  problem  in 
connection  with  his  own  relevant  morbid  experiences,  and  the 


276  DR.  SMITH  BAKER. 

more  permanently  morbid  states  in  others,  clearer  visions  of  the 
innermost  Self  and  of  the  processes  by  which  it  characterizes 
itself  may  possibly  result,  even  though  this  source  may  not  give 
one  the  ability  to  formulate  what  one  sees  or  to  express  it  fully. 
This  certainly  has  been  my  own  experience,  and  for  that  matter 
it  is  obvious  enough  that  I  am  not  relieved  of  the  difficulty  yet. 
For  long,  as  I  suppose  it  may  have  been  the  case  with  many  others, 
I  caught  glimpses,  more  or  less  satisfying,  of  the  identical  and 
identifying  Self,  in  the  very  midst  of  its  so  mysterious  processes 
of  self-identification ;  and  many  times  did  I  find  myself  trying 
to  put  what  I  had  observed  into  appropriate  language.  But  it 
was  not  until  while  conducting  a  series  of  experiments  to  ascer- 
tain the  ordinarily  warm  element  of  different  individual  minds 
that  such  glimpses  became  assurances  that  there  might  be  ob- 
tained actual  evidence  of  a  universal,  more  or  less  graspable, 
something,  which  had  no  business  to  forever  escape  clear  appre- 
hension and  description.  Granting  latitude  for  individual  type 
influence,  people  seemed  to  resemble  one  another  in  the  way 
by  which  they  bring  about  the  attention  focus ;  and  also  in 
the  way  by  which  they  lose  the  ability  to  bring  it  to  pass  in 
abnormal  conditions.  If  "the  only  point  that  is  obscure  is  the 
act  of  appropriation  itself"  (James),  then  it  began  to  seem  to  me 
that  this  very  act  was  submitting  itself  to  observation  and  was 
challenging  some  one  to  see  and  understand. 

Would  the  studies  of  Professor  Royce  on  'Imitation'  and 
those  of  Professor  Baldwin  on  '  Mental  Development '  apply 
here ;  and  likewise  would  more  detailed  studies  of  some  of  the 
patients  which  I  happened  to  have  on  hand  throw  any  light  on 
the  subject  of  the  principle  or  process  of  personal  identity,  nor- 
mal or  abnormal?  Whether  so  or  not,  I  soon  found  myself 
under  the  spell  of  these  discussions  and  groping  about  in  the 
psychological  field  for  cues  and  confirmations  and  helps  of 
every  kind  so  much  needed.  Applying  the  principle  of  imita- 
tion to  many  of  the  phases  of  misery  under  observation,  and 
seeking  etiological  information  under  its  guidance,  and  then 
trying  to  bring  about  curative  results  in  the  same  way,  I  soon 
had  to  confess  that  never  before,  had  things  worked  so  easily 
and  with  such  clearness  of  view.  Conceiving  that  through  imita- 


IDENTIFICATION  OF  THE   SELF.  277 

tion  of  outside  copies  the  mental  processes  were  always  being 
effected  in  definite  ways,  and  in  a  centrifugal  manner,  so  to 
speak,  why  not  conceive  that  imitation  of  a  self  copy,  derived 
secondarily  from  the  primary  not-self  copy,  should  constitute, 
through  a  centripetal  determination,  the  very  act  of  appropria- 
tion, the  self-identifying  act  which  was  the  object  of  search? 
Especially  did  this  notion  seem  to  be  required  in  connection 
with  the  origin,  development,  and  course  of  certain  diseases, 
and  even  more  so  still  in  connection  with  the  most  obstinate  non- 
response  to  therapeutical  measures,  encountered  so  frequently. 
Here  it  sometimes  becomes  very  apparent,  that  each  section 
of  the  self-experience  stream  determinedly  hugs  to  itself,  and 
adopts  and  incorporates,  not  only  whatever  happens  to  be  imi- 
table  from  without,  but  likewise  something  called  up,  as  it  were, 
from  within,  and  patterned  after  as  closely  as  attendant  circum- 
stances admit.  This,  that  is  called  up,  serves  as  a  veritable 
copy  (or  if  not,  why  not?).  The  trigger  pulled  by  suggestional 
impact,  all  the  explosive  energy  of  the  Self  endeavors  purposely, 
if  you  please,  to  mimic  the  last,  or,  if  not  this,  then  some  other 
past  self-summation,  in  just  as  close  feature  as  possible.  The 
Process  of  Energizing,  if  we  could  personify  it,  might  be  said 
to  actually  call  up  the  characteristics  of  the  past-self,  and  to 
imitate  them  accordingly.  And  this  process  of  energizing,  this 
actual  mimicry  of  Self,  might  be  said  to  really  constitute  the 
process,  the  fact  of  self-identity,  everywhere  and  always,  and 
moreover  to  be  recognizable  as  such. 

The  outcome  of  this  was  embodied  in  a  paper  read  by  ab- 
stract before  the  American  Neurological  Association  and  now 
published  in  full,1  and  which  elucidates  this  general  conclusion  : 
that  imitation  of  an  extra-personal  copy  constitutes  the  initiation 
of  many  disease  processes  ;  while  imitation  of  a  self-developed 
and  self-summated  copy  constitutes  the  process  by  which  they  so 
persistently  and  so  obstinately  perpetuate  themselves  either  con- 
tinuously or  recurrently.  This  idea  of  the  perpetuating  of  a 
self-set  copy  derived  primarily  from  a  non-self  copy,  in  an  imi- 
tation series,  prolonged  either  until  the  original  impelling  force 
is  spent  or  until  inhibited,  deviated,  or  overcome  by  the  counter- 

1  The  Journal  of  Nervous  and  Mental  Diseases,  New  York,  March,  1896. 


278  DR.  SMITH  BAKER. 

acting  influence  of  some  more  forceful  copy  originally  derived 
in  its  own  turn  from  without,  has  grown  with  subsequent  obser- 
vation, and  seems  to  be  especially  applicable  as  thus  noted  to 
instances  of  hysteria,  neurasthenia,  hypochondria,  psychalgia, 
imperative  conceptions,  and  impulses,  and  the  like,  and  like- 
wise to  be  of  much  service  not  only  in  comprehending  their  de- 
velopment and  nature,  but  in  instituting  and  conducting  methods 
of  treatment. 

But  observation  in  this  lump  sort  of  way  and  under  pressure 
of  clinical  necessity  is  not  exactly  of  the  modern  experimental 
kind,  and  I  suppose  no  psychologist  gives  much  attention  to  re- 
sults obtained  in  this  way.  So  the  need  of  more  accurate  ex- 
perimentation came  to  be  appreciated ;  and  this  prompted  to 
various  attempts  to  either  verify,  modify  or  annul,  if  need  be,  a 
conclusion  so  taking  and  seemingly  so  serviceable. 

In  order  to  do  this  I  trained  the  attention  to  focus  itself  upon 
the  feeling  of  effort  when  coupled  with  the  feeling  of  satisfac- 
tion derived  from  effort  of  the  right  kind ;  for  I  conceived  this 
to  constitute  the  '  me-feeling,'  the  personal  assurance,  the  inner- 
most indication  of  normal  psycho-physical  activity,  in  myself,  if 
not  in  others  of  a  different  type.  At  first  I  simply  watched  for 
that  element  in  the  passing  multifarious  self-experience  which, 
common  to  all,  might  appear  always  to  savor  most  thoroughly 
of  the  self-fact ;  and  naturally  I  looked  for  evidence  of  unity 
as  probably  being  this  most  surely.  But  soon  it  did  not  seem 
that  unity  of  consciousness  was  what  I  would  better  search  for 
after  all,  for  in  me,  at  any  rate,  there  were  to  be  noted,  even  during 
my  most  active  moments,  unquestionable  gaps ;  in  fact,  that  be- 
tween the  succeeding  pulses  of  consciousness,  so  far  as  intro- 
spection could  determine,  there  were  unconscious  blanks  which 
must  be  included  in  any  attempt  to  account  for  a  continuing  per- 
sistent self-identity.  Of  course,  this  does  not  deny  conscious 
unity  to  others,  or  the  most  persistent  sub-conscious  activity  in 
myself ;  but  it  does  affirm  that  in  my  own  consciousness  blanks 
are  to  be  discovered  and  recognized  as  such  retrospectively, 
and  that  if  each  section  or  pulse  of  consciousness  actually  en- 
gages in  '  hugging  to  itself  and  adopting  the  past  selves ' 
(James")  it  does  so  across  certain  definite  hiatuses,  and  so  does 


IDENTIFICATION   OF   THE   SELF.  279 

not  admit  of  my  saying  exactly  that  the  Self  as  *  a  closed  indi- 
vidual '  is  evidenced  by  consciousness  in  this  particular  way. 
« The  inexplicable  tie '  is  in  me  not  of  this  order  seemingly,  so 
far  as  I  have  been  able  to  discern,  and  continuity  of  self-assur- 
ance does  not  thus  express  itself  as  a  fact. 

Admitting,  then,  tentatively  the  introspective  revelation  that 
each  nascent  thought  appropriates  the  past  thought  across  an 
unconscious  chasm,  and  that  consciousness  is  at  best  made  up  of 
a  series  of  waves  passing  and  touching  and  being  realized  by 
crests  only,  and  not  by  conscious  coalescing,  it  becomes  perti- 
nent to  investigate  the  manner  in  which  the  chasm  is  either 
traversed  in  outline  or  bridged  over,  in  order  that  the  past 
thought  may  become  merged  into  the  present,  and  so  made  to 
be  a  most  serviceable  part  of  it. 

If  the  chasm  be  traversed  depth  by  depth  we  may  be  pretty 
sure  that  at  some  particular  depth  the  process  ceases  to  be  con- 
scious ;  and  so  again  we  are  forced  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
only  way  by  which  past  and  present  can  be  made  to  marry  is 
by  their  being  brought  together  over  a  route  a  part  of  which  is 
always  in  the  dark.  What  there  is  in  this  dark  portion  of  the 
route  of  course  does  not  concern  scientific  psychology.  What 
was  recognized  on  the  past  side  of  it,  however,  and  what  is 
recognized  on  the  present  side  of  it,  and  how  these  are  con- 
sciously related,  as  they  normally  always  seem  to  be,  are  mat- 
ters of  such  deep  concern  that  'without  solution,  in  some  uni- 
versal sort  of  way,  self-identity  itself  must  remain  unaccounted 
for.  From  what  happens,  in  my  own  experience  at  least,  I 
seem  justified  in  affirming  that  immediately  the  Self  emerges 
from  the  chasm  between  the  conscious  past  and  the  now-becom- 
ing-conscious present — emerges  from  momentary  latency  into 
potency — it  is  aware  of  the  past  as  possessing  certain  character- 
istics which  it  would  now  again  live  over,  in  more  interesting 
realization.  Or  if  there  be  failure  on  the  part  of  the  past  to  be 
present,  or  on  the  part  of  the  present  to  discern  in  it  a  definite 
set  of  features  for  re-living,  then  imagination  not  only  rich  with 
reminiscent  elements,  but  with  expectant  ones  also,  furnishes 
them ;  and  in  either  case  there  sets  in  a  conscious  activity  to- 
ward a  satisfactory  realization  of  the  self-like  copy  thus  pre- 


280  DR.  SMITH  BAKER. 

sented.  Mostly  this  is  done  so  automatically  and  so  smoothly 
that  no  notice  is  or  can  be  taken  of  it.  The  past-thought 
features,  or  the  imaginative-prospect  features,  or  the  present- 
extra-self  features  so  quickly  and  harmoniously  glide  into 
position,  either  more  or  less  separately  or  colligated  into  a  com- 
posite whole,  that  the  re-living,  the  re-producing  (re-realizing), 
takes  place  before  one  can  be  aware  of  it.  '  Caught  on  the 
fly,'  however,  especially  when  favored  by  some  phase  of 
abnormality,  one  discovers  that,  from  the  moment  of  projec- 
tion from  the  nascent  point,  there  becomes  manifest,  more  and 
more  clearly,  an  ambitious  purpose  and  activity  to  imitate 
the  self-copy  in  as  close  feature  as  the  varying  past,  present, 
and  prospective  elements  admit,  changing  in  accordance  with 
the  weight  of  influence  exerted  by  each  respectively.  What  is 
held  up,  or  rather  what  appears  during  each  moment  or  phase 
of  consciousness  as  a  self-copy,  becomes  the  inspiration  of  a 
process  of  re-living  or  re-realizing  it,  which,  if  not  mimicry,  is 
close  to  this  in  fact. 

A  concrete  illustration  of  this  idea  was  timely  afforded  by  a 
personal  experience  with  'toothache.'  A  hard  bite  upon  a 
resisting  substance  gave  a  decided  hurt  at  first,  which  was  fol- 
lowed duly  by  a  slight  tenderness.  After  a  number  of  days, 
exposure  to  bleak  winds  induced  an  irregularly  recurrent  pain, 
with  comfortable  spells  between.  Occasionally,  for  an  hour  or 
two,  there  would  be  no  distress  whatever,  or  a  night  would  be 
passed  in  undisturbed  sleep.  Then  would  recur  a  succession  of 
strokes,  or  pulses,  or  waves  of  pain  varying  in  intensity,  ac- 
cording to  exciting  circumstances,  01  its  own  essential  rhythm. 

What  was  the  usual  attitude  of  my  feeling,  thinking,  acting 
Self  toward  this  intruder?  A  portion  of  the  time  it  was  one  of 
more  or  less  vivid  expectancy ;  and  when  this  was  the  case 
much  confusion  as  to  the  threshold  between  actual  pain  and 
not-pain  was  always  experienced,  while  the  self-reaction  dif- 
fered widely  according  to  the  intensity  and  degree  of  conscious 
recollection  of  previous  twinges.  Always  noticeable,  however, 
was  the  tendency  of  the  neuro-muscular  mechanisms  to  assume 
very  similar  tensions  and  activities  with  the  recurrence  of  each 
attack.  When  the  pain  came  unexpected,  either  because  of  a 


IDENTIFICATION  OF  THE  SELF.  281 

lack  of  premonition  or  else  on  account  of  pre-occupation,  it 
was  very  evident  that  both  mind  and  body  sought  to  strengthen 
the  lines  of  endurance  and  defence,  by  practicing  such  of  these 
reflexo-automatic  devices  as  had  been  more  or  less  usefully 
established  in  former  experiences — in  fact,  by  imitating  the  steps 
assumed  under  similar  provocations.  The  involuntary  fixating 
of  chest  walls,  of  jaws,  of  eyes,  of  attention,  of  emotion,  of 
thought,  and  then  the  relaxing  and  subsequent  seeking  for  re- 
lief, constituted  a  copy-cycle  which  certainly  dominated  largely 
and  in  detail  the  successive  experiences,  expressed  most  truly 
in  terms  of  mimicry.  Here  was  evidence  to  show  that  I  am  this 
moment  the  same  Self  that  I  was  during  the  last,  seemingly, 
because  my  innermost  activity  is  to  be  during  this  moment  simi- 
lar, in  a  general  way,  to  what  it  has  been  in  the  immediate 
past,  or  during  all  the  series  of  past  moments,  not  simply  in 
that  I  have  remembered  the  features  of  the  past,  or  in  that  I 
recognize  outside  copies  just  now  that  were  fascinating  just 
then,  or  in  that  I  imagine  certain  attainments  possible  to  the 
future — not  these  alone  or  chiefly,  but  in  that  I  can  take  what- 
ever past,  present  or  future  presents,  and  actively  imitate  it, 
feature  it,  realize  it  in  every  possible  here  and  now  of  my 
normal  conscious  existence — this  it  is,  which  gives  me  most  as- 
surance of  my  own  Self,  as  being  capable  of  satisfactory  iden- 
tification whenever  needful. 

Occasional  needs  of  self-identification  become  sufficiently 
prominent  to  awaken  notice,  in  connection  with  almost  every 
intense  experience.  Marked  joy,  grief,  anger,  moodiness,  de- 
pression, cerebral  or  muscular  tension,  pain,  insistent  ideation, 
active  engagement,  inventive  exercise,  reverie,  etc.,  are  in- 
stances from  which  to  select  a  field  for  experimentation.  Se- 
lecting one  that  promised  vivid  results,  it  occurred  to  me  that 
two  series  of  experiments,  one  representing  the  inhibitory  and 
resisting  side  of  life,  and  the  other  the  stimulating  and  aggres- 
sive side,  would  lead  on  to  such  eventually.  The  toothache 
suggesting  bodily  pain  for  the  field  of  inhibito-resistant  experi- 
mentation, I  was  interested  to  see  what  would  be  my  constant 
and  repeated  attitude  toward  it,  both  when  attended  to  expect- 
antly and  when  suffered  unexpectedly.  For  the  former  I  ap- 


282  DR.  SMITH  BAKER. 

plied  a  drop  of  weak  acid  to  the  semi-abraded  skin,  and  awaited 
the  somewhat  slow  but  certain  development  of  the  smart.  How 
I  felt ;  how  I  strove  to  blot  it  out  mentally,  by  certain  shrinkings, 
resistances,  diversions ;  how  I  lapsed  into  simple  endurance 
more  and  more,  until  finally  fleeing  to  remedial  relief,  all  to- 
gether made  up  a  striking,  composite  self-experience,  not  de- 
scribable  but  certainly  most  appreciable.  One  experiment  after 
three  days'  practice  came  near  to  being  a  failure  because  of  the 
unexpected  intrusion  of  a  friend,  whose  suggestional  influence 
was  sufficient  not  only  to  largely  overcome  the  sensational 
effects  of  the  acid,  but  to  interfere  with  the  responsive  adjust- 
ments of  the  self-characteristics  in  a  natural  way.  And  so  with 
some  of  the  others.  However,  before  the  ten  every  third-day 
series  was  concluded,  I  was  afforded  a  rather  convincing  in- 
sight into  the  way  in  which  my  behavior  was  regularly  but  simply 
an  endeavor  to  live  over  again  the  motions,  tensions,  thrills  of  the 
first  and  succeeding  experiments.  Moreover  I  frequently  no- 
ticed a  very  definite  dissatisfaction  when,  for  any  reason,  I  was 
prevented  from  doing  this.  As  the  experimentation  proceeded, 
it  became  almost  amusing  to  note  the  sort  of  strife,  as  it  were, 
between  the  two  lines  of  dissatisfaction — the  one  which  came 
from  the  suffering  proper,  and  the  other  arising  from  incom- 
plete realization  of  all  the  self-commitance,  usual  to  pain.  But 
the  latter  always  secured  dominance  and  sort  of  lorded  it  over 
the  former  until  its  sway  became  supreme.  In  other  words,  in 
spite  of  the  smart  proper,  the  self  would  have  its  own  total  re- 
alization in  the  direction  intended,  even  though  the  total  suffer- 
ing was  increased  thereby.  The  realization  of  the  awakened 
Self  appeared  to  be  the  very  chiefest  business  all  along.  An- 
other thing  came  to  pass,  namely :  with  each  successive  experi- 
ment the  Self  aimed,  so  to  speak,  to  live  over  again  not  only  the 
results  of  the  painful  experimentation,  but  also  some  of  its 
former  dire  experiences  not  experimentally  imposed.  On  the 
whole,  I  brought  to  light  much  that  seemed  to  show  that  in  the 
presence  of  pain  expectantly  developed,  I  as  a  self  actually 
endeavor  to  reproduce  all  the  concomitance  previously  associ- 
ated with  pain  of  every  sort ;  and  that  my  self  is  best  satisfied 
when  this  is  accomplished  most  accurately  and  fully.  "  If  I 


IDENTIFICATION  OF   THE  SELF.  283 

am  to  have  pain,"  says  the  Self,  "  I  want  it  my  own  way — I 
demand  the  liberty  to  imitate,  re-live  the  pain-mind-body  copy 
developed  beforehand,  as  I  please. " 

Arranging  a  mechanical  device  by  which  a  smart  blow  on 
the  back  of  the  hand  was  given  at  irregular  intervals  and 
simultaneously  occupying  the  attention  as  absolutely  as  possible, 
I  was  enabled  to  study  the  effect  of  pain  received  unexpectedly. 
My  conclusion  after  the  experimental  series  was  concluded 
was,  that  repeated  irregular  unexpected  hurts  always  lead  in 
the  direction  of  a  cumulative  self-copy,  even  if  the  Self  does  be- 
come calloused  in  the  process ;  and  that  this  more  and  more  de- 
termines the  devotion,  so  to  speak,  of  the  succeeding  imitative 
Self  to  its  own  copy ;  and  that  each  pulse  of  painful  conscious- 
ness is  related  to  the  consciousness  of  self,  through  the  tie  which 
imitation  itself  furnishes.  With  attention  reminiscent,  expect- 
ant or  held  in  abeyance,  the  disturbed  self  immediately  flies  to 
cover  in  an  active  mimicry  of  that  before  found  most  vivid, 
satisfactory,  or  otherwise  determined. 

Finally,  my  experimentation  included  an  observed  series  of 
errors  or  tendencies  to  error  while  attempting  to  play  the  zither. 
Having  but  little  musical  knowledge  or  skill,  any  new  piece  of 
music  furnished  material  for  prolonged  study.  Upon  first  trial 
certain  notes  and  strains  would  be  played  accurately  and  with 
some  sort  of  positive  satisfaction.  But  always  there  were  many 
others  upon  which  both  fingers  and  ears  bungled  and  halted 
most  disastrously.  Of  course,  some  of  the  previous  errors 
would  be  repeated  and  others  corrected  with  each  succeeding 
trial.  In  time  the  number  would  be  greatly  reduced  and  the  char- 
acter of  each  error  or  tendency  to  error  would  be  more  accu- 
rately defined.  A  persistent  study  of  these  latter  chiefly 
furnished  the  data  for  the  conclusions  eventually  arrived  at, 
namely  :  that  the  fingering,  the  interest  in  success,  the  fear  of 
failure,  the  general  pleasure  or  displeasure,  the  expectation  of 
pleasing  others,  the  memory  of  other  zither  music  and  perform- 
ers, etc.,  all  had  to  do  in  a  most  egoistic  way  in  forming  a 
statuesque  copy  of  variable  proportions  and  vividness  concerning 
which,  upon  each  trial,  all  that  was  within  me  struggled  to  re- 
produce in  terms  of  most  vital  and  persistent  mimicry;  and 


284  DR.   SMITH  BAKER. 

that,  in  the  lasting  instances  of  error,  the  error-element  was  the 
most  striking  characteristics  of  the  self-copy.  Repeatedly  at 
times  there  was  actually  more  satisfaction  in  making  an  error 
than  in  playing  the  music  properly.  And  not  until  the  imitable 
copy  had  become  infused  sufficiently  with  the  influence  of  some 
lucky  play,  for  instance,  or  of  some  ideational  conception  of  suc- 
cess, or  some  anticipated  applause  mayhap,  or  some  other  vital 
and  determining  characteristic,  did  the  imitation  process  mani- 
fest improvement. 

So  on  many  hands,  seemingly,  have  I  found  tentative  resort 
to  a  mimicry  of  a  self-copy,  ever  renewed  and  ever  renewable  in 
the  imitation  product.  And  furthermore,  it  has  appeared,  more 
or  less  convincingly,  that  the  Self  is  sure  of  itself  normally, 
only  through  the  bridging  over  from  one  pulse  of  self-scious- 
ness  to  another,  by  the  active  play  of  imitation ;  and  that  the 
*  inexplicable  tie,'  the  *  act  of  appropriation, '  the  most  elusive 
characteristic  of  self,  is  possibly  this  very  ability  to,  at  any 
time,  actually  realize  (i.  £.,  in  the  present),  to  a  more  or  less  rec- 
ognizable degree,  all  that  I  was  and  as  I  was  then  (i.  e.,  in  the 
past).  And  that,  when  the  consciousness  of  this  self-same 
ability  is  lost,  no  matter  to  what  extent,  nor  in  reference  to  what 
particular  feature,  always  to  just  such  an  extent  and  in  just  such 
a  way,  is  the  possibility  of  self-identification  gone.  Normally, 
we  can  to-day  imitate  the  self-copy  of  yesterday  with  satisfac- 
tory success.  Abnormally,  this  ability  is  abridged,  perverted 
or  lost. 

A  side  conclusion  came  into  view ;  namely,  that  much  of 
our  so-called  identity  is  simply  fictitious,  founded  seemingly  on 
our  ability  to  imagine  and  affirm  instead  of  that  to  prove  it  thus. 


SHORTER  CONTRIBUTIONS. 

SOME  MEMORY  TESTS  OF  WHITES  AND  BLACKS. 

The  tests  were  made  on  1,000  children  in  the  fourth  and  fifth 
grades  in  the  Washington  Schools  equally  divided  between  the  two 
races.  The  average  age  of  the  whites  was  eleven  years,  with  extremes 
of  eight  and  fourteen.  Of  the  blacks,  12.57  vears>  with  extremes  of 
eight  and  eighteen  years. 

The  tests  adopted  consisted  of  a  recitation  by  the  writer  of  one  of 
four  simple  verses  written  for  children  by  Mr.  Eugene  Field,  followed 
by  an  explanation  of  all  the  possibly  difficult  words,  and  the  recita- 
tion in  concert,  twice  repeated,  by  the  20  or  40  children  gathered 
(but  never  exceeding  the  latter  number) . 

Each  child  was  afterward  required  to  repeat  the  verse  separately 
in  private.  The  degree  of  proficiency  was  marked  by  the  system  in 
use  in  the  schools :  E.  indicating  excellent,  G.  good,  F.  fair,  P.  poor. 
To  obtain  the  average  E.  was  valued  at  100,  G.  at  75,  F.  at  50,  and  P. 
at  25. 

The  verses  employed  were  the  following : 

No.  I.  "Give  me  my  bow  said  Robin  Hood, 

An  Arrow  give  to  me  ; 
And  where  'tis  shot,  mark  then  that  spot, 
For  there  my  grave  shall  be." — (Field.) 

The  average  of  memory  retention  obtained  by  the  blacks  in  this 
number  was  63.22  in  a  possible  100  with  a  minimum  of  48.63  and  a 
maximum  of  71.25  in  the  different  schools,  and  by  the  whites  an 
average  of  62.54  with  a  minimum  of  60,  and  a  maximum  of  66. 

No.  II.  "  I  once  knew  all  the  birds  that  came 

And  nested  in  our  orchard  trees ; 
For  every  flower  I  had  a  name, 
My  friends  were  woodchucks,  toads  and  bees." — (Field.) 

In  this  number  the  blacks  obtained  an  average  of  62.86%  with  a 
minimum  of  33.75%,  and  a  maximum  of  73.43%.  The  whites  an 
average  of  58.92%,  with  a  minimum  of  48.02%  and  a  maximum  of 

79-37%- 

285 


286  MEMORY  TESTS   OF    WHITES  AND  BLACKS. 

No.  III.  "  One  night  a  tiny  dew  drop  fell 

Into  the  bosom  of  a  rose  ; 
Dear  little  one,  I  love  thee  well, 
Be  ever  here  thy  sweet  repose." — {Field.) 

In  this  number  the  blacks  obtained  an  average  of  65.64%,  with  a 
minimum  of  61.25%,  and  a  maximum  of  7^-75%'  The  whites  an 
average  of  54.54%  with  a  minimum  of  35.81%  and  a  maximum  of 
66.37%.  Possibly  the  simpler  language,  the  more  familiar  ideas,  and 
the  pleasing  cadence  of  this  number  will  account  for  the  great  superi- 
ority of  the  blacks. 

No.  IV.  "  My  Shepherd  is  the  Lord  my  God, 

There  is  no  want  I  know ; 
His  flock  He  leads  in  verdant  meads. 
Where  tranquil  waters  flow." — (Field.} 

(Paraphrase  of  the  23d  Psalm.) 

In  this  number  the  blacks  obtained  an  average  of  but  32.93%  with 
a  minimum  of  5%  and  a  maximum  of  54.40%.  The  whites  an 
average  of  42.14%  with  a  minimum  of  38.76%  and  a  maximum  of 
45.52% .  One  would  naturally  suppose  that  in  the  verse  so  closely  cor- 
responding to  a  familiar  psalm,  that  both  races  would  have  made  a 
much  better  record  than  that  obtained  in  the  other  numbers  which 
were  unfamiliar.  It  will  be  observed  that  in  one  black  school  there 
was  nearly  a  complete  failure  (5%)  and  that  the  average  obtained 
was  30.97%  less  than  the  combined  average  obtained  in  the  other 
numbers,  while  in  the  whites,  the  percentage  was  but  16.52%  less 
than  the  combined  average.  The  difficulty  appeared  to  consist  chiefly 
in  the  rather  abrupt  changes  or  want  of  continuity  in  the  ideas,  and 
the  use  of  three  unfamiliar  symbols.  Verdant,  Meads,  and  Tranquil, 
which  were  supported  by  no  visual  or  other  sense  presentations,  and 
possibly,  because  of  the  familiarity  with  the  first  line  there  was  a 
failure  to  keep  the  attention  alert. 

The  renderings  given  the  lines  were  in  some  instances  not  only 
grotesque,  but  indicated  an  ignorance  of  the  meaning  of  simple 
words,  an  entire  absence  of  the  sense  of  rhythm  and  rhyme,  and  a 
confusion  of  ideas.  I  quote  a  few  of  these  renderings  : 

Line  I.  My  shepherd  is  the  Lord  my  God. 

"  The  Lord  God  is  my  Shepherd." 

Line  II.  There  is  no  want  I  know. 

"  There  is  no  one  I  know." 
"  There  is  no  one  I  love." 


SHORTER   CONTRIBUTIONS.  287 

Where  the  only  one  I  know. 
44  There  is  no  other  God  before  me." 
"  I  know  there  is  one." 
"  There  is  no  one  like  me." 

Line  III.  His  flock  He  leads  in  verdant  meads. 

"  He  leads  His  flock  in  vast  fields." 
"  He  leads  his  flock  in  needant  fields." 
"  He  feeds  His  flock  by  night." 

Line  IV.  Where  tranquil  waters  flow. 

"  Where  vast  waters  flow." 
"  Where  trinkling  waters  flow." 
"  Where  trennikel  waters  flow." 
"  Where  peaceless  waters  flow." 
41  Where  tremble  waters  flow." 

As  may  be  inferred,  the  false  renderings  were  more  frequent  in 
the  blacks  because  of  their  more  limited  vocabulary  and  feebler  com- 
prehension of  the  language. 

In  confirmation  of  the  theory  that  the  capacity  for  intellectual 
achievement  depends  very  largely  upon  the  acquired  control  of  the 
attention  and  the  degree  of  memory  susceptibility  or  concentration,  I 
find  striking  evidence  in  the  close  correspondence  of  the  average 
markings  for  study  rank,  made  by  the  different  teachers  and  the  mark- 
ings for  memory  rank  made  by  the  writer. 

The  average  obtained  by  the  blacks  in  studies,  being  64.73  in  a 
possible  100,  and  in  memory  58.27,  and  by  the  whites,  74-33  *n 
studies,  and  58.09  in  memory.  In  making  comparisons  allowance 
must  be  made  on  the  one  hand  for  excessive  and  insufficient  marking 
on  the  part  of  teachers,  and  on  the  other  for  the  fear  and  embarass- 
ment  caused  by  reciting  to  a  stranger. 

I  am,  however,  convinced  that  if  the  study  and  memory  markings 
were  made  by  one  person  that  they  would  correspond  still  more 
closely ;  and  that  it  is  possible  to  determine  by  the  memory  test  the 
capacity  of  the  teacher  to  instruct,  as  well  as  that  of  the  pupil  to  ac- 
quire ;  as  memory  depends  upon  the  habit  of  attention,  to  the  growth 
of  which  the  intelligence  is  proportionate  (Ferrier).  Another  feature 
in  the  results  obtained  is  the  very  remarkable  and  unexpected  corre- 
spondence in  the  memory  rank  of  each  race,  58.09  in  the  whites,  and 
58.27  in  the  blacks;  from  which,  in  the  absence  of  any  data  for  com- 
parison, nothing  can  be  positively  assumed. 

To  summarize  the  results,  the  average  age  of  the  whites  was  1 1 
years,  of  the  blacks,  12.57  years,  a  difference  in  favor  of  the  blacks  of 
1.57  years.  The  average  obtained  by  the  blacks  in  study  rank  was 


288  MEMORY  TESTS   OF    WHITES   AND  BLACKS. 

64.73,  in  memory  rank,  58.27,  a  difference  of  6.46%.  The  average 
obtained  by  the  whites  in  study  rank  was  74-32,  in  memory  rank 
58.09,  a  difference  of  16.23%.  The  average  obtained  by  both  races 
in  study  rank  was  69.52,  in  memory  rank,  58.18,  a  difference  of 
11.34%  ;  in  study  rank  the  memory  rank  of  both  races  being  equal. 

If  Ribot  is  correct  in  the  opinion  that  voluntary  or  controlled  at- 
tention in  distinction  from  "  spontaneous  or  instinctive  attention,  is  a 
product  of  civilization,  an  instrument  that  has  been  perfected,"  we 
have,  in  these  races  as  found  in  Washington,  an  apparent  equality  in 
development. — (The  Psychology  of  Attention.) 

No  positive  conclusions  can  be  drawn  from  these  tests  as  to  the  in- 
crease or  decrease  of  mnemonic  capacity  in  the  whites,  as  to  my 
knowledge,  there  is  no  standard  of  comparison  of  the  same  number 
and  ages.  In  both  races,  of  course,  the  memory  is  in  decadence  from 
primitive  conditions,  but  as  the  blacks  are  much  nearer  those  condi- 
tions I  naturally  expected  to  find  a  much  greater  auditory  mnemonic 
ability  than  is  possessed  by  the  whites. 

The  decadence  in  the  blacks  is  serious  enough  to  be  easily  recog- 
nized by  those  familiar  with  the  race  in  slavery,  or  in  the  early  days 
of  freedom,  or  with  the  isolated  communities  of  illiterate  negroes  of 
purer  blood  still  to  be  found  in  portions  of  the  South. 

The  enfeeblement  of  the  memory  is  accompanied  in  both  races  by 
a  parallel  decline  in  the  powers  of  sight  and  hearing,  and  is  appar- 
ently due  to  neglect  in  training  the  attention  and  of  compulsory  exer- 
cise of  the  memory,  to  educational  methods  which  foster  an  increas- 
ing dependence  on  technical  aids  to  mental  effort,  to  the  abnormal  in- 
crease in  visual  presentations  to  the  memory,  until  they  exceed  and 
displace  all  other  sense  presentations,  to  the  neglect  of  mnemonic 
training,  and  to  the  mental  paralysis  consequent  upon  a  too  complex 
and  overloaded  curriculum. 

The  children  selected  from  the  blacks  for  this  test  were  the  darkest 
to  be  found  in  the  schools.  Of  these,  72%  were  classed  as  'dark,' 
22.80  %  as  '  medium,'  and  5.20%  as  'light';  but  such  a  classification 
is  extremely  arbitrary,  as  the  degree  of  admixture  of  blood  cannot  be 
determined  by  the  complexion,  and  negroes  of  absolutely  unmixed 
blood  are  rare  in  our  large  centres  of  population. 

It  would  be  interesting  to  have  examinations  made  in  smaller 
communities  of  blacks  of  much  purer  blood,  in  isolated  districts  like 
the  sea  islands  on  the  Atlantic  seaboard.  The  memory  rank  of  those 
subjected  to  this  test  is,  undoubtedly,  lessened  by  the  admixture  of 
blood,  which  tends  to  equalize  the  conditions;  but,  as  will  be  ob- 


SHORTER   CONTRIBUTIONS.  289 

served,  their  memory  rank  in  its  decadence  much  more  frequently  ex- 
ceeded the  study  rank  than  among  the  whites — an  excess  also  due  to 
their  acknowledged  racial  deficiency  in  reasoning  power. 

The  intellectual  deficiency  of  the  blacks  as  compared  with  the 
whites  is  more  particularly  shown  by  the  average  ages  at  which  the 
grades  were  attained  by  both  races;  the  blacks  having  attained  the 
fourth  grade  at  12  years,  and  the  fifth  grade  at  13.14  years,  while  the 
whites  attained  the  fourth  grade  at  10.63  years>  an<^  ^e  fifth  a*  11*40 
years,  a  difference  in  favor  of  the  whites  of  1.37  years  in  the  fourth, 
and  of  1.74  years  in  the  fifth  grade,  differences  which  indicate  the 
value  of  heredity  in  racial  culture  even  if  ability  to  memorize  be  equal. 

It  is  not  within  the  purpose  of  this  paper  to  deal  with  educational 
methods,  but  rather  with  results. 

In  studying  the  latter,  it  is  painfully  apparent  "that  the  fundamen- 
tal, discouraging  and  almost  insurmountable  difficulty  in  the  educa- 
tion of  the  Negro  is  his  ignorance  of  our  language ;  in  his  home  and 
in  the  field,  in  the  church  and  school,  he  speaks  a  patois  without  a 
literature,  and  with  a  very  limited  vocabulary.  The  great  mass  of  the 
Negro  population  of  the  country  very  rarely  hears  the  English  lan- 
guage spoken  in  its  purity,  and  the  children  fortunate  enough  to  be 
taught  by  one  of  their  race  who  has  acquired  it,  only  hear  it  in  the 
school  room  or  in  the  houses  of  their  white  masters."  (Article, 
'The  Negro  and  the  Church,'  by  the  writer,  Prot.  Epis.  Rev., 
July,  1896.)  In  both  races  there  is  a  better  knowledge  of  the  signs  or 
symbols  than  of  the  things  signified,  or  an  imperfect  mastery  of  the 
language.  Among  the  blacks,  it  will  especially  be  found  that  many 
words  in  very  simple  prose  and  verse  convey  no  conception  of  the 
thought  or  object  represented.  They  also  exhibit  a  decadence  of  the 
observing  faculties  from  earlier  conditions. 

In  both  races  there  is  a  too  great  reliance  on  exterior  aids,  and  a 
neglect,  deficiency,  or  failure  in  habits  of  thought  or  the  ability  to 
think  clearly,  which  makes  it  difficult  for  a  child  to  use  its  own 
natural  mental  gifts,  and  which  ultimately  results  in  a  loss  of  brain 
power  and  an  inability  to  assimilate,  or  to  determine  the  general  prin- 
ciples to  be  derived  from  the  great  variety  of  particular  knowledge 
presented  in  our  school  curricula.  GEORGE  R.  STETSON. 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C. 

EXPERIMENTS  ON  MEMORY  TYPES. 

It  has  been  said  that  "the  great  mystery  of  memory  lies  in  the 
mind's  apparent  power  to  transcend  time  and  bring  itself  into  contact 


290  EXPERIMENTS   ON  MEMORY  TYPES. 

with  the  vanished  past."  It  is  not  the  purpose  of  the  present  paper  to 
solve  the  '  mystery  of  memory,'  but  to  show  how  memory,  under  cer- 
tain conditions,  acts.  This  article  will  give  the  results  of  experiments 
tried  upon  auditory  and  visual  memory. 

Auditory- Memory.  The  following  experiment  was  tried  on 
public  school  children,  students  in  a  commercial  school,  and  juniors 
and  seniors  in  a  college.  Three  groups  of  numbers  were  chosen,  each 
group  consisting  of  ten  numbers.  The  first  group  was  read  at  the 
rate  of  one  number  per  second.  The  second  group  was  read  twice, 
and  the  third  group  three  times,  each  number  being  pronounced  at  the 
same  rate  as  those  of  the  first  group. 

The  purpose  of  the  experiment  was  to  find  how  much  the  memory 
would  be  strengthened  by  the  second  and  third  reading.  The  experi- 
ment was  tried  several  times  upon  a  class  of  seventh  grade  pupils  and 
the  results  were  as  follows:  They  numbered  52%  of  the  total  number 
with  one  reading;  50%  with  two  readings,  and  58%  with  three  read- 
ings. Sixth  grade  pupils  gave  the  following:  42%  of  the  total  num- 
ber with  one  reading,  41%  with  two,  and  54%  with  three  readings. 
The  experiment  tried  upon  the  commercial  students  varied  a  little 
from  the  sixth  and  seventh  grade  pupils,  giving  these  results:  one 
reading  36%  of  total  number;  two  readings  37%,  and  54%  with 
three  readings.  The  experiment  which  was  tried  upon  a  class  in  psy- 
chology at  San  Jose  College,  gave  the  following  results:  One  read- 
ing 58%  of  total  number;  44%  of  total  number  with  two  readings, 
and  66%  of  entire  group  with  three  readings.  Some  results  obtained 
from  a  class  in  psychology  at  Napa  College  were  as  follows :  48%  of 
total  number  with  one  reading,  40%  with  two  readings,  and  65%  with 
three  readings ;  or,  to  put  them  in  tabular  form,  they  would  be  as  fol- 
lows: 

Class.  I.  II.  III. 

7th  Grade.  .52  .50  .58 

6th       "  .42  .41  .54 

Com.  Stud't.  .36  .37  .54 

S.  J.  C.  .58  .44  .66 

N.  C.  .48  .40  .65 

These  figures  seem  to  indicate  that  two  readings  nearly  always — 
there  being  but  one  exception — weakens  the  memory.  I  noticed  in 
trying  the  experiment  that  after  the  group  was  pronounced  once  and 
was  being  pronounced  again  there  nearly  always  appeared  a  look  of 
confusion  in  the  faces  of  the  pupils.  In  the  first  reading  associations 


SHORTER   CONTRIBUTIONS.  291 

would  be  formed,  associating  certain  numbers  together  and  giving 
them  a  certain  order,  such  as  might  be  suggested  as  they  were  being 
read.  But,  when  they  were  read  the  second  time,  new  associations 
would  be  formed,  and  some  of  the  former  ones  lost,  thus  making  a 
confusion  in  their  thought  and  causing  them  to  lose  all  the  associa- 
tions they  had  made. 

In  every  case  there  was  a  decided  improvement  with  three  read- 
ings. This  may  be  because  the  third  reading  harmonized  the  associa- 
tions made  in  the  two  previous  readings  and  thus  the  confusion  that 
was  caused  was  dispelled. 

The  data  obtained  shows  that  the  power  of  retaining  or  recalling 
the  memory-image  varies  with  different  persons.  Some  were  able  to 
recall  the  entire  list  while  others  could  only  recall  two  or  three  num- 
bers. But  the  fact  that  one  person  is  better  than  another  in  reproduc- 
ing memory-images,  it  does  not  indicate  that  he  has  a  better  mind,  as 
is  thought  by  some  people.  Usually  the  boy  or  girl  with  a  '  parrot- 
like  memory '  pleases  everybody,  while  he  who  has  to  cognate  and 
con  over  what  he  wishes  to  remember  does  not  stand  very  high  in  the 
popular  estimation. 

It  was  found  that  younger  pupils  nearly  always  reproduce  the 
numbers  without  any  hesitation,  while  college  students  always  hesi- 
tated and  required  more  time  to  reproduce  the  list.  This  would 
seem  to  indicate  that  pure  spontaneous  memory  depends  on  the  degree 
of  impressibility,  while  a  cultured  intellect  depends  more  upon  the 
power  of  reason.  Young  children  are  superior  to  men  in  impressi- 
bility, in  the  power  of  retaining  the  memory-image,  and  in  spon- 
taneous recollection,  while  the  latter  have  gained  more  power  of  vol- 
untary acquisition  and  recollection.  Hence  the  training  of  memory 
should  not  only  be  to  increase  the  power  to  recall  an  image,  but  the 
power  to  determine  'what  shall  be  recalled. 

Some  experiments  seem  to  indicate  that  the  power  of  recognition 
is  nearly  double  that  of  recall,  that  is,  if  some  of  the  numbers  not 
reproduced  be  mentioned,  they  are  recognized  in  nearly  every 
instance. 

Visual- Memory.  Two  lists  of  words,  consisting  of  fifteen  each, 
were  chosen,  care  being  taken  in  the  arrangement  of  the  words. 

They  were  as  follows : 

I.  II. 

Bottle  Table 

Pen  Man 


292  EXPERIMENTS   ON  MEMORY  TYPES. 

I.  II. 

Coat  Book 

Floor  Room 

Gun  Cat 

Picture  Desk 

Stove  Spade 

Ring  Ship 

Tree  Knife 

House  Carpet 

Rock  Lamp 

Sun  Pencil 

Bridge  Window 

Hill  Fan 

Chair  Mouse. 

The  two  lists  were  placed  upon  the  blackboard  and  covered.  The 
cover  was  taken  from  the  first  list  and  it  was  exposed  for  thirty  sec- 
onds. The  second  list  was  exposed  at  the  rate  of  one  word  every  two 
seconds,  the  word  being  erased  at  the  end  of  that  time. 

The  object  of  the  experiment  was  to  determine  which  was  stronger, 
successive  or  simultaneous  memory. 

It  was  tried  upon  pupils  of  a  public  school,  ranging  from  eight  to 
fifteen  years  of  age,  and  the  following  results  were  obtained : 

Age.  Sim.  Sue. 

8  ."  -33 

9  -32  -49 

10  -33  -49 

11  -44  -52 

12  .55  -5°" 

13  -53  -54 
H  -56  -56 
15  -51  -52 

The  table  seems  to  indicate  that  successive  visual-memory  is  much 
better  for  the  younger  pupils  than  simultaneous  visual-memory ;  but 
as  they  increase  in  age  they  improve  in  the  power  of  the  latter,  there 
being  a  difference  of  22%  at  the  age  of  eight,  while  there  is  a  dif- 
ference of  only  one  per  cent  at  the  age  of  fifteen. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  the  increase  in  the  power  of  recall  is  not 
uniform  throughout,  those  thirteen  years  of  age  being  below  those  of 
twelve,  and  those  fifteen  less  than  those  of  fourteen.  This  is  owing 


SHORTER   CONTRIBUTIONS.  293 

to  some  idiosyncrasies  of  the  individual  pupils,  but  does  not  effect  the 
general  result. 

The  reason  the  younger  pupils  recall  more  of  the  second  group  is, 
probably,  because  their  power  of  association  is  not  so  great.  Their 
power  of  reproducing  the  words  depends  upon  their  powers  of  reten- 
tion and  the  degree  of  impressibility,  while  the  older  pupils  depend 
more  upon  association  for  retaining  the  words  and  their  volitional 
powers  to  recall  them.  In  the  second  group  the  opportunity  offered 
for  association  is  not  so  great  as  in  the  first,  and  hence,  more  are  re- 
membered by  the  younger  pupils. 

A  similar  experiment  was  tried  on  a  class  of  commercial  students, 
but  numbers  were  used  instead  of  words.  They  varied  from  fifteen 
to  twenty  years  in  age,  and  it  was  found  that  simultaneous  was  much 
stronger  for  them  than  successive  visual-memory,  there  being  42%  of 
the  entire  list  reproduced  when  the  fifteen  numbers  were  exposed 
thirty  seconds,  and  39%  when  each  number  was  exposed  two  seconds. 

This  seems  to  indicate  that  older  students  and  those  more  advanced 
can  recall  more  objects  when  exposed  simultaneously  than  when 
shown  successively.  It  is  owing  to  the  fact  that  the  power  of  associa- 
tion is  stronger  in  the  older  than  in  younger  persons. 

Visual-  and  Auditory- Memory.  This  experiment  was  tried  on 
public  school  children.  Two  groups  of  names  were  used,  each  group 
consisting  of  ten  words.  The  first  group  was  read  at  the  rate  of  one 
word  every  two  seconds.  The  other  group  was  placed  on  the  black- 
board and  covered.  Each  word  was  then  uncovered  at  the  rate  of  one 
every  two  seconds  and  erased  at  the  end  of  that  time. 

The  object  of  the  experiment  was  to  determine  which  was  the 
stronger,  visual  or  auditory-memory. 

The  data  obtained  seems  to  indicate  that  generally  auditory- mem- 
ory is  much  stronger  for  younger  pupils  than  visual-memory.  The 
following  results  were  obtained: 

Age.  Auditory.  Visual. 

8  .42  .30 

9  -54  -57 

10  .57  .54 

1 1  .69  .66 

1 2  .80  .65 

There  is  but  one  instance  in  the  above  table  where  the  visual- 
memory  excels  the  auditory,  and  this  was  probably  due  to  a  lack  of 
attention  by  a  few  pupils. 


294  THE   PROPAGATION  OF  MEMORIES. 

The  younger  children  are  accustomed  to  a  large  amount  of  audi- 
tory work,  and  it  is  natural  that  they  should  remember  spoken  better 
than  written  words. 

It  is  probably  true  that  the  auditory-memory  is  associated  with  the 
visual.  I  noticed,  in  trying  the  experiment  upon  some  pupils,  that 
they  pronounced  the  words  softly  as  they  were  exposed.  Thus,  if 
"when  the  two  senses  act  together  in  recollection  they  hinder  each 
other,"  we  must  observe  this  in  accounting  for  the  fact  that  visual  is 
weaker  than  auditory-memory. 

A  similar  experiment  was  tried  upon  a  class  of  commercial  stu- 
dents, ranging  from  fifteen  to  twenty  years  in  age,  gives  28  %  of  the 
total  number  reproduced  in  auditory  and  45  °Jo  in  visual-memory. 
This  would  seem  to  indicate  that  visual-memory  is  better  for  older 
students  than  auditory-memory.  The  reason  is  because  visual-mem- 
ory is  employed  more  by  them  than  auditory. 

CHAUNCEY  J.  HAWKINS. 
YALE  UNIVERSITY. 


THE  PROPAGATION  OF  MEMORIES. 

One  essential  condition  of  the  continuity  of  individual  conscious- 
ness in  our  present  state  seems  to  be  the  persistence  of  impressions  in 
the  substrate,  or,  in  other  words,  the  retention  of  vestiges.  It  is  ap- 
parently usually  implied,  if  not  stated,  that  this  persistence  is  due  to  the 
survival  of  the  cells  (of  the  cortex  presumably)  in  which  the  original 
impression  issuing  in  consciousness  was  made.  Were  this  theory 
correct  the  destruction  of  a  given  cell  or  generation  of  cells  would 
banish  forever  their  vestiges  and  destroy  the  power  of  reproduction  in 
so  far.  It  is,  however,  a  notorious  fact  that  the  events  of  a  very  early 
period  of  life  are  remembered  and  vividly  conceived  of  even  in  very 
late  life,  and  it  is  not  unusual  for  the  earlier  events  or  experiences  to 
crowd  out  the  later  ones  which  ought,  by  reason  of  their  freshness,  to 
be  most  prominent.  Any  theory  of  memory  which  depends  on  the 
persistence  of  the  original  elements  is  weak,  in  view  of  the  theoretical 
consideration  mentioned,  and  is  contradicted  by  facts  of  observation. 
In  the  first  place,  the  law  of  substitution  and  restoration  of  function  is 
well  intrenched  in  the  data  of  pathology  and  experiment,  and,  in  the 
second,  we  have  every  reason  to  believe  that  the  individual  cell  of  the 
cortex  has  its  birth,  adolescence  and  period  of  decline,  like  any  other 
cell,  and  it  follows  that  its  vestiges,  as  such,  disappear  with  it. 


SHORTER    CONTRIBUTIONS.  295 

Recent  investigations  show  that  a  comparison  of  a  given  number 
of  ordinary  brains  with  those  of  insane  persons  reveals  little  or  no  dif- 
ference (if  cases  of  general  paralysis  and  alcoholism  be  excluded). 
In  other  words,  there  are  nearly  as  many  cells  showing  pigmentary  de- 
generation and  vacuolation  in  one  series  as  in  the  other.  Any  section 
of  the  cortex  will  contain  some  cells  evidently  beyond  their  prime. 
With  this  phase  of  the  subject  is  associated  another;  viz, the  power  of 
multiplication.  Some  years  since  the  writer  described  a  process  of 
proliferation  by  which  the  cerebellum  in  particular  is  supplied  with  a 
germinative  zone  which,  by  constant  subdivision  of  its  elements,  gives 
rise  to  the  definitive  cells.  The  announcement  met  with  incredulity 
on  the  part  of  critics,  but  has  recently  been  fully  corroborated  by 
several  independent  investigators.  At  the  same  time  the  writer  sug- 
gested that,  in  many  groups,  germinative  or  proliferating  areas  or 
nuclei  persist,  and  from  these  cells  arise  from  time  to  time  to  supply 
later  needs.  The  details  of  this  mechanism  remain  to  be  studied,  but 
Professor  Howard  Ayers  recently  corroborated  the  existence  of  sub- 
dividing cells  in  the  mature  brain,  and  similar  cases  are  reported  by 
others.  So  far  from  exciting  surprise,  this  may  be  expected.  Many 
histologists  have  expressed  surprise  at  the  comparatively  new  doctrine 
of  nervous  transmission  by  contiguity  rather  than  continuity,  but  it  is 
not  difficult  to  see  that  this  method  of  non-exclusive  reaction  of  cell 
upon  cell  is  exactly  adapted  to  permit  the  graceful  withdrawal  of  a 
cell  as  its  age  approaches,  while  a  younger  element  gradually  in- 
gratiates itself  into  the  sphere  of  influence  of  the  other  by  the 
growth  of  its  fibrous  arborizations.  True,  there  doubtless  are  latent 
cells  in  the  cortex,  and  it  is  not  necessary  to  suppose  that  rapid  pro- 
liferation is  continued  throughout  life.  All  that  is  insisted  on  is  that 
the  mental  life  of  the  person  is  not  coextensive  with  that  of  the  cells  in 
the  cortex. 

If  it  be  granted  that  the  individual  memory  outlives  any  single 
generation  of  cortical  cells  it  is  evident  that  a  theory  of  consciousness 
is  called  for  other  than  that  commonly  in  vogue.  I  have  elsewhere 
outlined  such  a  theory.  Briefly,  it  is  presumed  that  the  unity  of  con- 
sciousness is  not  due  to  the  flickering  of  some  extraneous  illumination 
upon  part  after  part  of  the  cortical  reservoir  of  vestiges,  but  that  the 
individual  consciousness  at  any  time  is  the  totality  of  the  interrelated 
activities  or  the  associational  equilibrium.  The  histological  mechan- 
ism of  the  cortex  leaves  no  opportunity  for  doubt  that  an  excitation  of 
one  region  does  habitually  produce  the  most  extensive  set  of  interreac- 
tions  with  other  regions,  and  we  may  best  conceive  of  the  outcome  as 


296  THE  PROPAGATION  OF  MEMORIES. 

a  neurological  equilibrium,  always  varying,  but  always  a  single, 
though  complex,  correlation.  The  metaphysical  concomitants  of 
this  view  may  be  passed  over  here,  though  of  vast  importance  to 
monistic  thinking. 

If,  then,  it  be  admitted  for  the  argument's  sake  that  consciousness 
is  a  unit  of  equilibration  on  its  neurological  side,  it  may  be  farther 
understood  how  the  early  vestiges  may  be  propagated  beyond  the  life 
of  the  first  generation  of  cells,  i.  <?.,  those  which  first  received  a  given 
vestigeal  impression.  When,  e.  g.,  a  certain  event  is  recalled,  a  suc- 
cession of  equilibriated  states  occur  to  which  the  several  cells  con- 
cerned contribute  each  its  share.  When  a  new  cell  is  gradually  inter- 
polated in  the  cortical  associational  system  it  participates  in  this  kind 
of  an  equilibrium,  at  first  passively  and  afterwards  by  reproduction  of 
the  secondary  vestige  due  to  its  early  functioning.  It  being  of  the 
same  order  as  the  cell  which  is  now  aging,  it  reacts  after  its  kind, 
i.  e.,  in  a  manner  suitable  to  its  position  as  to  the  other  cells  and 
avenues  of  discharge.  Thus,  in  time,  we  conceive  that  a  nearly  com- 
plete substitution  for  an  old  cell  may  be  affected  without  our  perceiv- 
ing any  difference  in  the  tone  of  memories.  That  there  is  such  change 
is  unquestionable.  What  the  man  recalls  of  his  boyhood  is  something 
very  different  from  the  memory  of  the  same  events  soon  after  their 
occurrence. 

It  is  no  longer  difficult  to  understand  why  in  old  age  the  events 
of  youth  may  re-emerge  in  memory.  The  earlier  events  have  their  re- 
lations with  the  simpler,  broader  forms  of  association,  and  when  the 
subtle,  later  connections  fall  away,  older  forms  of  equilibrium  reap- 
pear. To  be  more  explicit,  in  the  first  few  years  of  the  child's  life 
the  avenues  of  association  are  relatively  few  and  they  are  increasingly 
complicated  with  every  new  element  introduced  into  experience.  The 
tendency  of  all  early  experiences  is  then  to  follow  lines  already  open. 
The  little  events  of  childhood  are  superposed  upon  the  elemental  as- 
sociations. Now,  when  the  more  complicated  associational  paths  are 
destroyed,  suggestions  tending  to  awaken  vestiges  are  shut  up  to  a  few 
lines  of  association,  and  these  are  just  the  ones  on  which  the  childish 
experiences  were  based.  It  is  not  necessary  to  pursue  this  line  of 
reasoning  further.  It  is  believed  that  most  of  the  hitherto  unreconcil- 
able  facts  of  memory  are  consistent  with  this  theory  of  propagation  of 
vestiges. 

C.  L.  HERRICK. 

DENISON  UNIVERSITY. 


SHORTER   CONTRIBUTIONS.  297 

NOTE  ON  »  REACTION  TYPES. ' 

The  following  observations  are  of  so  fragmentary  a  sort  as  to  seem 
hardly  worthy  of  publication,  yet  the  results  are  so  striking  and  sug- 
gestive and  it  being  impossible  to  complete  a  more  careful  series,  it 
has  seemed  best  to  present  them  and  let  them  stand  for  what  they  are 
worth. 

During  a  visit  to  the  laboratory  in  November,  1896,  of  the  well- 
known  pianists,  Rosenthal  and  Sieveking,  who  were  at  that  time  giv- 
ing concerts  in  New  York,  their  reaction-times  to  sound  were  meas- 
ured with  a  Hipp  chronoscope.  The  signal  was  the  tap  of  a  metal 
hammer,  and  they  were  told  to  raise  the  first  two  fingers  of  the  right 
hand  as  quickly  as  possible,  no  instructions  as  to  direction  of  attention, 
etc.,  being  given.  It  may  be  said  that  neither  of  the  gentlemen  had 
ever  seen  a  reaction-time  apparatus  previously,  and  the  tests  were 
made  on  each  without  the  knowledge  of  the  other,  thus  precluding 
the  possibly  disturbing  intervention  of  professional  jealousy.  A  series 
of  seven  records  on  Rosenthal  resulted  as  follows  (times  in  a)  ;  1 10, 
118,  119,  112,  119,  123,  123,  giving  an  average  reaction-time  of 
117.7,  an^  an  average  variation  of  only  3.8.  When  questioned  as  to 
the  direction  of  his  attention  during  the  tests  he  stated  emphatically 
that  it  was  entirely  directed  toward  the  signal  and  doubted,  whether  he 
could  hold  his  attention  upon  the  reacting  fingers.  When  requested 
to  do  so  a  series  of  four  reactions  resulted  as  follows :  250,  230,  270, 
268,  an  average  of  254.5,  and  average  variation  of  14.5  i.  e.,  an  aver- 
age reaction-time  of  more  than  twice  that  of  the  first  series,  and  an 
average  variation  of  about  four  times  that  of  the  first.  A  second 
series  of  seven  reactions  with  the  attention  upon  the  stimulus  resulted 
as  follows:  105,  107,  106,  101,  106,  no,  114,  an  average  of  108.4, 
and  an  average  variation  of  3.9. 

But  one  series  of  five  observations  was  made  with  Sieveking  and, 
as  in  the  former  case,  without  instructions  as  to  attention.  The  re- 
sults were  114,  114,  117,  120,  118,  an  average  of  116.6  and  an  aver- 
age variation  of  2.  When  questioned  as  to  attention,  Sieveking  was 
as  emphatic  as  his  rival  but  declared  that  his  attention  was  entirely 
concentrated  on  the  reacting  hand,  indicating  the  interossei  of  the  first 
and  second  fingers  as  the  muscles  used ;  which  statement  while  anatomi- 
cally incorrect  was  psychologically  entirely  satisfactory.  When  asked 
to  react  with  the  attention  turned  to  the  signal,  he  attempted  to  do  so 
but  declared  it  impossible  and  declined  to  proceed. 

It  is  greatly  to  be  regretted  that  the  observations  could  not  have 


298  NOTE   ON  REACTION  TYPES. 

been  pushed  further  and  carried  out  systematically,  but  circumstances 
put  it  out  of  the  question  and  it  must  be  said  also  by  way  of  apology 
that  the  experiments  were  made  more  to  exhibit  the  apparatus  than  to 
obtain  results  and  without  the  idea  of  publication.  Nothing  could 
have  been  more  striking,  however,  than  the  clearness  with  which  both 
gentlemen  grasped  the  point  at  issue  and  described  their  states  of 
mind.  It  would  be  interesting  with  longer  series  to  interpret  them  in 
the  light  of  the  peculiar  musical  training  and  characteristics  of  the  two 
artists  which  are  said  to  be  diametrically  opposed. 

As  it  is,  one  can  only  say  that,  so  far  as  single  observations  are  of 
value,  their  reactions  argue  vigorously  for  the  affirmative  in  the  debated 
question  of  the  existence  of  types  of  reaction. 

LIVINGSTON  FARRAND. 
COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY. 

As  Professor  Wundt  devotes  many  pages  of  the  fourth  edition  of 
the  Physiologische  Psychologie  to  sensory  and  motor  reactions,  I  hope 
that  he  will  find  space  in  the  fifth  edition  to  include  cases  such  as  these. 
He  writes  in  the  fourth  edition  "  Cattell  (Phil.  Stud.,  viii,  S.  403) 
*  *  *  konnte  weder  bei  sich,  noch  bei  einigen  andern  Personen 
einen  von  der  Richtung  der  Aufmerksamkeit  abhangigen  Unter- 
schied  finden."  But  of  the  three  cases  reported  by  me  in  the  article 
published  in  Professor  Wundt's  Archiv,  one  had  a  motor  reaction 
nearly  half  again  as  long  as  the  sensory  form  with  corresponding  dif- 
ferences in  the  mean  variations.  Professor  Wundt  indicates  that  I 
was  not  competent  to  react  in  a  sensory  fashion.  He  writes  further 
"  Dies  schliesse  ich  aus  der  Vergleichung  meiner  eigenen  Versuche, 
in  denen  ich  sensoriell  reagirte,  mit  denen  Cattell's,  der  sich  offenbar 
der  muskularen  Reactionsweise  bediente."1  Now  Professor  Wundt 
can  evidently  make  an  ''experimentum  cruets '  for  his  own  case  by  going 
to  his  laboratory,  directing  attention  to  the  movement  and  reacting  in 
half  the  time  and  with  half  the  irregularity  of  his  early  experiments. 

Of  Dr.  Farrand's  cases  Rosenthal  is  a  performer  of  extraordinary 
technical  expertness.  His  fingers  are  so  perfectly  trained  that  he  does 
not  need  to  give  them  the  least  attention.  Sieveking,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  impulsive  and  emotional.  I  do  not  think  that  we  should  be 
justified  in  concluding  from  these  experiments  that  Rosenthal  is  an 
'  audile'  and  Sieveking  a  '  motile.'  It  seems  to  me  rather  that  my  or- 

*As  a  matter  of  fact  my  reactions  are  not  '  motor.'  They  are  '  sensory ' 
when  the  stimulus  is  very  weak  or  very  strong,  but  in  general  the  attention  is 
diffused,  but  little  being  directed  to  the  experiments. 


SHORTER   CONTRIBUTIONS. 

iginal  suggestion  is  supported — namely,  that  people  react  most  quickly 
and  regularly  in  the  way  in  which  they  are  used  to  reacting,  and  that 
when  the  reflex  character  of  the  reaction  is  disturbed  the  times  become 
longer  and  more  irregular. 

J.  McKEEN  CATTELL. 

It  may  be  added  that  Professor  Wundfs  position  remains  un- 
changed in  his  later  published  Outlines  (pp.  198  ff.),  while  Pro- 
fessor Warren  has  indicated  (PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW,  Nov.,  1896)  the 
same  attitude  in  Professor  Titchener's  excellent  Outline.  It  seems 
worth  while  to  say  this  since  cases  galore  have  now  been  reported 
(by  Flournoy,  Angell  and  Moore,  and  myself,  besides  those  reported 
above,  and  under  more  exact  experimental  conditions)  ;  and  they  seem 
fully  to  meet  the  call  for  'facts'  made  by  the  last-named  writer,  at 
least,  several  times  over  (see  his  Mind  articles).  The  existence  of 
'  types '  of  simple  reaction  can  no  longer  be  ignored  by  any  one. 

J.  MARK  BALDWIN. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE. 

Lehrbuch  der  Psychologic.     FRIEDRICH  JODL.     Stuttgart,  Cotta'sche 

Buchhandlung,  1896.     Pp.  xxiv-f  767. 

Here  is  a  new  systematic  work  on  psychology,  750  pages  strong. 
It  is  by  Professor  Jodl,  now  of  the  University  of  Vienna,  but  for  many 
years  of  the  University  of  Prague,  well  known  in  this  country  for  his 
ethical  writings  and  as  one  of  the  editors  of  the  International  Journal 
of  Ethics.  The  reader  observes,  first,  and  not  without  a  quickly 
smothered  feeling  of  gratitude,  that  the  book  has  not  a  single  illustra- 
tion, not  a  curve  nor  a  diagram,  not  even  a  chart  of  the  brain,  nor  a 
cut  of  Zollner's  figure.  The  second  striking  feature  is  the  wealth  of 
references  to  psychological  literature.  After  every  subject  and  after 
every  subdivision  of  a  subject,  there  follows  a  paragraph  citing  the 
special  literature  upon  that  subject.  At  the  end  of  the  book  there  is 
a  collected  bibliography  of  all  the  works  cited,  comprising  almost  nine 
hundred  titles.  Not  only  by  his  references,  but  also  by  his  discus- 
sions, the  author  shows  himself  to  have  an  accurate  acquaintance  not 
merely  with  German  psychological  literature,  but  also  with  that  of 
France,  England  and  America.  This  is  especially  true  of  English 
and  American  works,  by  which  the  author  has  evidently  been  much 
influenced,  and  he  delights  in  comparing  German  and  English  termi- 
nology. 

The  work  is  divided  into  two  parts.  The  first,  introductory,  treats 
in  three  chapters  of  the  scope  and  method  of  psychology,  of  the  rela- 
tion of  body  and  soul,  and  of  the  classification  and  description  of  con- 
scious phenomena  in  general.  The  second  part  is  divided  into  nine 
chapters,  as  follows :  IV.  Sensations :  their  forms,  laws  and  meth- 
ods of  measurement.  V.  Special  sensations :  organic,  kinsesthetic, 
cutaneous,  smell,  hearing  and  sight.  VI.  Feelings  of  the  primary 
order:  sensuous  feelings  and  elementary  aesthetic  feelings.  VII. 
Elementary  phenomena  of  will.  VIII.  Secondary  phenomena : 
memory,  association  and  representative  attention.  IX.  Most  impor- 
tant products  of  the  imagination :  time,  space,  subject  and  object.  X. 
Language  and  thought :  origin  and  spirit  of  language,  word  and  idea, 
judgment  and  reasoning.  XI.  Feelings  of  the  second  and  third  order : 
300 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  301 

feelings  of  personality,  aesthetic  and  moral  feelings,  etc.  XII. 
Phenomena  of  will  of  the  second  and  third  order. 

In  reading  or  reviewing  Professor  Jodl's  book  it  is  necessary  to  re- 
member that  it  is  a  text-book,  written  for  purposes  of  instruction.  If, 
therefore,  it  should  be  found  to  contain  little  that  is  striking  or 
original,  this  would  be  its  greatest  merit.  It  is  often  asked  whether 
psychology  is  yet  a  science.  Nothing  could  be  so  discouraging  to 
those  who  have  cherished  a  hope  that  it  is,  as  the  individual  character 
of  the  various  outlines,  elements  and  text-books  that  have  appeared 
during  the  last  ten  or  fifteen  years.  So  many  books,  so  many  sciences 
of  psychology.  Some  are  mainly  physiological,  some  scorn  to  men- 
tion physiology.  Some  attempt  no  general  classification  of  mental 
phenomena,  all  the  others  give  different  classifications.  Some  are 
mere  picture  or  story  books  apparently  designed  to  astonish  the 
reader.  Many  of  these  works  are  extremely  valuable  contributions  to 
psychology,  presenting  new  experimental  methods  and  results,  new 
schemes  of  classification,  and  new  criticisms  of  former  errors,  but 
they  are  contributions  merely  and  not  text-books.  They  are  indicative 
of  the  formative  stage  of  a  science.  The  present  work  by  Professor 
Jodl  is  less  characterized  by  new  and  striking  features.  The  material 
brought  forward  is,  with  some  exceptions,  that  which  is  common  to  all 
schools.  If  this  is  not  indicated  in  the  following  review,  it  is,  of 
course,  because  it  would  be  apart  from  the  purpose  of  a  review  to 
dwell  on  tiresome  details. 

In  the  first  chapter,  after  defining  psychology  as  the  science  of  the 
forms  and  laws  of  the  phenomena  of  normal  consciousness,  which  ap- 
pear in  the  adjustment  of  living  organisms  to  their  environment,  the 
author  describes  the  various  methods  by  which  psychology  may  be 
studied.  Then  follows  an  interesting  chapter  of  50  pages  on  soul 
and  body.  It  contains  the  briefest  statement  of  the  structure  and  form 
of  the  nervous  system,  a  single  paragraph  on  localization,  and  a  long 
discussion  on  the  nature  of  consciousness  and  its  relation  to  the  body. 
The  standpoint  is  thoroughly  monistic.  Mind  is  not  a  substance,  nor 
anything  that  can  outlast  the  body  or  even  outlast  peculiar  cerebral 
conditions  of  which  states  of  consciousness  are  inner  aspects.  Mind 
is  a  convenient  term  for  the  sum  total  of  these  states.  Conscious 
states  are  not,  however,  to  be  identified  or  confused  with  physical 
states  or  physical  beings.  The  parallelism  between  them  is  not  that 
of  two  different  series,  but  of  two  aspects  of  the  same  series.  There 
is  no  dualism  of  body  and  mind ;  the  dualism  is  one  of  perception. 
But  the  author  does  not  admit  an  inner  aspect  to  all  physical  being 


302  SYSTEMATIC    WORK  ON  PSYCHOLOGY. 

and  calls  panpsychism  a  new  mythology.  Consciousness  belongs  only 
to  organized  living  bodies,  accompanying  certain  conditions  of  cerebral 
development.  Without  organic  life,  no  consciousness.  But  the  re- 
verse does  not  follow.  No  causal  relation  exists  between  mind  and 
body.  Causal  relations  exist  only  between  neurological  processes  on 
the  one  hand  and  conscious  processes  on  the  other.  But,  indeed,  we 
must  not  think  of  it  as  if  there  were  two  series.  There  is  one  only. 
In  our  description,  we  may  follow  either  the  outer  objective  aspect, 
i,  e.,  the  brain  changes,  or  the  inner,  subjective  aspect,  or  conscious 
states,  as  now  one,  now  the  other  is  more  permeable.  At  present,  we 
are  largely  confined  to  the  latter  method,  owing  to  the  extremely 
backward  condition  of  cerebral  physiology.  The  endless  difficulty 
about  unconscious  mental  states  disappears  in  a  minute  when  we  con- 
sider consciousness  as  an  attendant  phenomenon  upon  neurological 
processes,  which  is  present  under  definite  conditions  only,  but  which 
always  presupposes  nervous  activity.  All  unconscious  mental  action 
may  be  relegated  to  physiology.  On  the  whole,  concerning  the 
author's  presentation  of  the  relation  of  mind  and  body,  a  '  materialist ' 
would  have  to  be  of  the  so-called  '  crass '  order  to  find  much  in  it  that 
would  be  highly  objectionable. 

In  the  third  chapter  follows  a  more  critical  analysis  of  the  mean- 
ing of  consciousness  and  its  forms.  The  opposition  of  subject  and 
object  is  the  fundamental  postulate  of  all  consciousness.  Presentation 
(Wahrnehmung)  is  the  very  essence  of  consciousness.  In  general 
what  we  mean  by  consciousness  is  a  succession  of  such  presentations 
with  the  various  relations  between  them.  In  this  connection,  the 
author  discusses  the  question  whether  the  ontogenetic  development  of 
consciousness  is  an  abridged  recapitulation  of  the  phylogenetic,  and 
concludes  that  the  evidence  for  such  parallelism  is  yet  insufficient. 
Sleep,  somnambulism,  and  hypnotism  are  briefly  discussed  in  this 
connection,  but  with  a  curious  neglect  of  their  cerebral  accompani- 
ments, which  ill  accords  with  the  author's  theoretical  standpoint. 

Under  the  title,  elementary  forms  of  consciousness,  the  author  dis- 
cusses the  problem  of  classification.  After  criticizing  the  attempts  of 
Horwicz  and  Spencer,  Schopenhauer  and  Wundt,  Miinsterberg  and 
Lehmann  to  find  the  primary  elements  of  consciousness  in  feeling, 
will  and  idea  respectively,  he  decides  upon  epistemological  grounds 
for  the  three-fold  division  into  sensation,  feeling  and  will.  (Empfin- 
dung,  Gefuhl,  Strebung.)  The  basis  of  this  division  is  found  in  the 
antithesis  of  subject  and  object  which  is  the  very  condition  of  con- 
sciousness. It  gives  us  action  (sensation),  reaction  (will),  and  the 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  303 

connecting  central  excitation  with  its  accompanying  pain  or  pleasure 
(feeling).  This  classification,  thinks  our  author,  conforms  to  the 
functioning  of  the  nervous  system  itself.  In  sensation  we  have  the 
mental  accompaniment  of  a  stimulus  from  without  by  way  of  the 
sensory  nerves.  In  feeling  we  have  the  value  of  the  stimulus  for  the 
good  or  ill  of  the  organism.  In  will  we  have  the  reaction  expressing 
itself  in  movement  through  the  motor  mechanism. 

Sensation,  feeling  and  will  being  thus  designated  as  primary 
phenomena,  we  may  denote  all  reproductions  of  these  as  secondary 
phenomena.  Under  this  head  is  included  the  memory-image  of  every 
kind,  and  for  this  memory-image  or  mental  state  of  the  second  order, 
we  may  reserve  the  term  Vorstellung.  Finally  the  author  distin- 
guishes phenomena  of  the  third  order,  namely  those  highest  mental 
processes  resulting  from  the  fusion  and  elaboration  of  phenomena  of 
the  first  and  second  order,  such,  for  instance,  as  conception,  thought, 
and  the  constructive  imagination. 

The  first  part  closes  with  a  description  of  '  the  objective  spirit' — a 
phrase  which,  rescued  from  its  empty  Hegelian  meaning,  the  author 
uses  in  the  later  scientific  sense  of  Lewes,  Lilienfeld,  and  Carus.  It 
signifies  our  mental  environment,  the  spirit  of  the  age  as  expressed  in 
human  thought,  art,  science,  etc.  It  is  this  objective  spirit,  together 
with  the  organic  inter-relation  of  successive  generations  which  pre- 
sents the  element  of  truth  in  what  has  appeared  in  ancient  and  modern 
mythology  as  the  idea  of  personal  immortality,  an  error  which  has 
arisen  from  mistaking  a  mere  abstraction,  the  soul,  for  a  real  spiritual 
being  or  substance. 

In  the  second  part,  two  hundred  pages  are  first  devoted  to  sensa- 
tion. The  distinction  which  modern  English  psychology  makes 
between  sensation  and  perception,  is  recognized  under  the  form  of  the 
receptive  and  spontaneous  consciousness.  In  the  relating,  comparing, 
and  discriminating  spontaneity  of  consciousness  we  have  not  to  recog- 
nize any  new  or  mysterious  '  powers  '  of  mind.  That  which  is  origi- 
nally given  in  consciousness  is  not  a  series  of  isolated  sensations  which 
may  be  related  and  compared,  but  a  complex  of  related  sensations 
which  may  be  analyzed.  The  doctrine  of  the  specific  energy  of  the 
nerves  in  its  older  form  is  severely  criticized  and  the  oft-repeated 
teaching  that  electrical  or  mechanical  stimulation  of  the  end-organs  of 
taste,  smell,  or  even  of  sight  or  hearing,  is  directly  followed  by  their 
specific  sensations,  is  declared  to  be  doubtful.  Synaesthesia  is  found 
to  be  an  incorrectly  named  phenomenon  and  to  have  a  purely  psychical 
explanation.  A  section  on  the  psychophysic  law  follows.  This  is  a 


304  SYSTEMATIC    WORK  ON  PSYCHOLOGY. 

mere  discussion  of  the  validity  of  the  law  and  its  meaning.  There  is 
no  detailed  description  of  experimental  methods.  The  results  of  late 
experiments  in  the  value  of  psychophysical  constants  for  the  several 
senses  are  not  given.  The  author  rejects  the  psychological  interpreta- 
tion of  Weber's  Law  given  by  Wundt  and  does  not  decide  between 
the  other  two. 

Then  follow  140  pages  devoted  to  special  sensations,  namely,  or- 
ganic and  cutaneous  sensations,  and  sensations  of  movement,  taste, 
smell,  hearing  and  sight.  No  mention  is  made  of  the  semi-circular 
canals  as  organs  for  sensations  of  equilibrium.  The  reader  is  re- 
ferred to  other  works  for  all  details  of  experiments  and  experimental 
methods.  The  section  on  visual  sensations  is  particularly  exhaustive. 
The  author,  following  Hering,  Stumpf  and  James,  strenuously  main- 
tains that  a  spacial  quality,  even  tridimensional  inheres  in  visual  sen- 
sations in  their  native  purity.  The  empiricists  are  not  altogether 
wrong  in  emphasizing  the  educating  influences  of  other  factors  in 
completing  our  conception  of  spacial  relations,  but  they  are  wrong 
when  they  give  to  inference  or  judgment,  which  are  secondary  mental 
processes,  the  mystic  power  of  creating  something,  i.  e.,  the  space 
idea,  out  of  nothing.  Indeed,  he  distinguishes  in  sensations  of  sight 
three  distinct  elements,  intensity,  i.  e.,  brightness  or  darkness,  quality, 
/".  e.,  color,  and  extension.  He  admits  pure  quantitative  changes  in 
color  sensations  without  change  of  quality. 

After  sensations,  the  author  treats  of  feelings  of  the  primary  order, 
i.  e.,  sense  feelings.  Pleasures  and  pain  are  their  essential  qualitative 
marks  and  each  of  these  can  only  be  graded  quantitatively.  They  are 
both  positive.  Sense  feelings,  cutaneous  pain,  for  instance,  are  not 
to  be  confused  or  compared  with  sensations.  They  are  totally  dif- 
ferent forms  of  consciousness,  accompanying  and  interpreting  the  sen- 
sations, and  appearing  later.  The  author  does  not  consider  or  even 
mention  apparently  serious  objections  to  this  theory,  such  as  have  been 
educed  by  von  Frey,  Griffing  and  Nichols. 

In  the  section  on  the  elementary  aesthetic  feelings,  it  is  shown  that, 
apart  from  all  representative  or  associational  processes,  pure  aesthetic 
pleasure  is  derived  from  colors,  tones,  and  from  harmony,  rhythm 
and  proportion.  In  the  last  analysis,  the  pleasure  may  be  traced  to 
that  condition  of  nervous  activity  lying  between  excessive  and  deficient 
stimulus.  This  is  very  good,  but  the  law  is  merely  mentioned  in  this 
general  form  and  no  attempt  is  made  to  carry  the  analysis  further  after 
the  manner  of  Helmholtz  or  Grant  Allen.  This  is  an  example  of  a 
certain  tantalizing  tendency,  shown  throughout  the  whole  book,  to 
stop  just  short  of  the  final  analysis. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  305 

This  failure  to  grapple  seriously  with  psychological  problems  is 
still  better  shown  in  the  next  chapter  on  the  primary  phenomena  of 
will.  According  to  the  author's  division  of  mental  processes,  the 
primary  phenomena  of  will  are  to  be  distinguished  f rom  feelings  and 
from  sensations,  including  of  course  all  muscle  sensations.  As  they 
are  primary  states,  they  are  also  to  be  distinguished  from  all  repre- 
sentative elements,  e.  g.,  motor  images.  After  these  exclusions,  one 
wonders  just  what  there  will  be  left  to  constitute  the  primary  phenom- 
ena of  will.  Of  course,  they  must  be  purely  psychical  conscious 
phenomena,  and  when  the  author  refers  to  them  as  movements,  as  he 
often  does  (e.  g.  in  III.,  64),  we  must  suppose  that  he  is  referring 
merely  to  the  objective  correlates  of  the  purely  mental  processes. 
Pure  and  simple  effort  (Streben)  is  the  final  result  of  this  analysis, 
and  this  is  an  ultimate  primary  phenomenon  of  will.  But  when  the 
author  attempts  to  describe  this,  it  becomes  as  difficult  to  separate  it 
from  phenomena  of  feeling  and  sensation,  as  it  is  indeed  difficult  to  do 
so  in  our  own  inner  experience.  In  fact,  he  naively  admits  that  effort 
is  a  general  term  for  those  mental  states  characterized  by  the  feeling 
of  bodily  needs  and  the  reactions  consequent  upon  them.  We  cannot 
but  think  that  the  author's  attempt  to  find  in  will  any  primary  psychi- 
cal phenomenon  is  a  failure.  His  loose  and  careless  treatment  of  the 
will  is  illustrative  of  the  treatment  of  this  subject  in  nearly  all  the 
psychology  books  of  the  day,  and  in  striking  contrast  to  the  incisive 
and  analytic  treatment  of  it  in  Kiilpe's  Grundriss. 

Exposition  of  the  secondary  phenomena  is  begun  in  Chapter  VIII. 
Reproduction,  Memory  and  Association  are  clearly  and  fully  treated 
with  satisfactory  recognition  of  the  physiological  principles  involved. 

On  the  whole  this  is  the  best  systematic  work  on  psychology  that 
has  recently  appeared  in  Germany.  Its  purpose  does  not  admit  of 
comparison  with  Wundt  and  Kiilpe.  It  may  be  compared  with 
Hoffding  whose  work  it  will  supersede.  It  is,  to  be  sure,  a  compila- 
tion, but  a  most  valuable  one.  The  author  is  evidently  neither  a 
physiologist  nor  an  experimentalist,  but  he  is  in  sympathy  with  experi- 
mental methods,  and  he  handles  his  subject  with  a  fairness  and  a 
wideness  of  vision,  with  which  a  life  spent  upon  the  details  of  labora- 
tory work  would  hardly  be  consistent.  One  notices  also  a  grateful 
freedom  from  long  and  tiresome  discussions  of  disputed  questions. 

G.  T.  W.  PATRICK. 
UNIVERSITY  OF  IOWA. 


3°6  ELEMENTS   OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 

Elements  of  Psychology.  GEORGE  CROOM  ROBERTSON.  Edited 
from  notes  of  lectures  delivered  at  University  College  1870-1892 
by  C.  A.  FOLEY  RHYS  DAVIDS.  New  York,  Charles  Scribner's 
Sons,  1896.  Pp.  xvi-f  268.  $1.00  net. 

Robertson  was  a  man  whose  influence  was  greater  than  his  reputa- 
tion. Natural  ability  of  the  highest  order,  trained  by  thorough  study, 
wide  reading  and  careful  thought,  was  subordinated  to  a  character 
conscientious  and  generous  to  a  degree  not  only  rare,  but  in  my  own  ex- 
perience unapproached.  On  a  sick  bed  recovering  slowly  from  painful 
surgical  operations  or  traveling  in  the  vain  effort  to  regain  health,  he  was 
always  able  to  give  more  than  he  asked.  Carrying  for  twelve  years  the 
burden  of  a  disease  that  must  prove  fatal,  devoting  his  best  energy 
to  teaching  his  classes  at  University  College,  to  helping  his  friends 
and  forwarding  scientific  and  social  movements,  editing  each  number 
of  Mind  as  though  it  were  a  newly  discovered  MS.  by  Aristotle,  it 
is  no  wonder  that  the  amount  of  his  published  work  was  small. 
Neither  is  it  surprising  that  the  friends  and  students  of  such  a  man 
should  wish  to  preserve  all  that  he  left,  even  the  oral  instruction 
to  his  classes,  existing  only  in  the  notes  of  students. 

These  lectures  on  psychology  and  the  second  series  on  philoso- 
phy would  have  been  viewed  by  Robertson  himself  with  mingled 
feelings.  He  would  have  appreciated  the  piety  which  lead  to  their 
compilation,  but,  careful  and  conscientious  to  an  extreme  in  all  that 
he  wrote,  he  would  scarcely  have  sanctioned  the  publication  of  ex- 
temporary remarks  preserved  by  the  notes  of  students.  A  book  such 
as  this  can  scarcely  be  judged  by  ordinary  standards.  As  a  memorial 
volume  it  will  be  dear  to  Robertson's  friends;  it  shows  that  his  teach- 
ing was  stimulating  to  an  unusual  degree.  The  contributions  to  psy- 
chology as  a  science  are  not  great.  Robertson  follows  his  teacher 
Professor  Bain ;  even  his  use  of  the  German  psychology  and  his  own 
ideas  are  often  brought  forward  as  criticisms  of  Bain's  writings. 
Probably  Robertson  would  have  regarded  as  his  most  important  con- 
tribution the  elaboration  of  a  theory  of  perception  through  the  mus- 
cular sense,  but  this  is  not  likely  to  maintain  a  permanent  place  in 
psychology.  There  are,  however,  many  apt  thoughts  and  suggestions, 
which  with  the  general  point  of  view — that  of  traditional  English 
psychology  brought  in  touch  with  the  latest  continental  work — make 
the  book  one  that  will  be  read  with  profit  by  all  teachers  of  psychology. 
The  notes  are,  however,  called  '  Elements  of  Psychology,'  and  the 
book  is  placed  in  a  series  of  text-books.  At  first  sight  it  seems  to  be 
unsuited  to  this  purpose.  The  lectures  are  based  on  and  presuppose 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  307 

other  text-books — Bain,  Sully,  Murray,  or  Hoffding.  The  style  is 
colloquial  as  reported  verbatim  by  students  and  pieced  together  by  the 
editor,  with  occasional  interpolations  in  a  very  different  style  from 
Robertson's  manuscript  notes.  There  are  repetitions  and  awkward 
phrases  and  even  mistakes.  Yet  in  spite  of  all  this,  when  the  work  is 
compared  with  our  most  recent  text-books,  as  Wundt's  Outlines  or 
Titchener's  Elements  it  shows  great  freshness  and  originality.  Per- 
haps there  is  no  better  introduction  to  psychology. 

J.  MCKKEN  CATTELL. 

The    Philosophy  of    Theism.     ALEXANDER    CAMPBELL    FRASER. 

Gifford    Lectures    Before   the   University   of    Edinburgh.     Two 

Volumes.     New  York,  Scribners ;  Edinburgh,  Blackwoods.     First 

Series.      1895.     Second  Series.      1896. 

These  two  volumes  should  be  read  and  reviewed  as  a  single  work. 
Indeed,  in  the  preface  to  the  second  volume,  Professor  Fraser  ex- 
pressly urges  that  the  two  volumes  '  be  looked  at  as  a  continuous 
inquiry,  not  as  a  series  of  isolated  discussions.'  Taken  thus  as  a 
whole,  these  Gifford  Lectures  are  a  singularly  interesting  expression 
of  a  long  life  of  scholarship  and  faith.  For  sixty  years,  Professor 
Fraser,  as  student  and  teacher,  has  been  associated  with  his  university. 
He  succeeded  Sir  W.  Hamilton  as  long  ago  as  1859,  and  now,  in  his 
ripe  old  age,  he  offers  this  testimony  to  the  reasonableness  of  religion. 
His  volumes  do  not  pretend  to  maintain  new  points  of  view  or  to 
enter  far  into  philosophical  controversy.  They  are,  as  he  says  :  "An 
honest  exposition  of  results  already  reached  in  a  life  devoted  to  simi- 
lar pursuits."  No  one  can  thus  receive  from  this  veteran,  well  known 
through  his  earlier  studies  of  Berkeley  and  of  Locke,  this  final 
Apologia  pro  fide  sua  without  grateful  reverence.  It  is  a  book  which 
invites  not  so  much  criticism  as  appreciation ;  and  it  will  be  sufficient 
to  describe  its  methods  and  its  conclusions. 

In  the  first  volume,  as  Professor  Fraser  remarks,  "  the  voice  of 
the  sceptic  was  prominent ;  in  the  second,  faith  makes  itself  heard." 
At  the  outset,  and  with  great  gravity  and  dignity,  he  defines  the  '  final 
problem  '  of  all  thought.  u  Is  religion  an  intellectually  legitimate 
state  of  mind  ?  "  "  What  sort  of  a  universe  is  this  in  which  I  find  my- 
self?"; and  he  'articulates'  this  ultimate  problem  as  holding  three 
factors  of  universal  experience  —  the  material  world,  the  subjective 
self  and  the  spiritual  reality  of  God.  He  is  then  led  on  to  consider 
the  three  forms  of  monism  thus  suggested  —  the  life  of  God  and  man 
interpreted  through  materialism ;  the  life  of  God  and  matter  inter- 


308  THE  PHILOSOPHY   OF   THEISM. 

preted  in  terms  of  subjective  idealism  ;  and  the  life  of  matter  and  mind 
as  absorbed  in  Deity.  In  the  first  case  he  concludes  that  even  reason 
itself,  and  its  product,  science,  are  lost  in  the  flux  of  things,  and  even 
"  materialism  itself  disappears  in  the  abyss  of  universal  nescience." 
In  the  second  case,  while  affirming  the  superior  claim  of  idealism,  he 
urges  its  strictly  individual  limitation.  "Individual  Egoism  is  eter- 
nally confined  in  the  individual  Ego."  The  third  possibility,  that  of 
Pantheism,  detains  him  longer,  as  a  faith  "  which  has  brought  peace  to 
millions  of  human  minds;"  and  his  discussion  of  this  faith  is  the  most 
weighty  section  of  his  first  volume.  Finally,  there  remains  to  be 
negatively  criticized,  the  attitude  of  absolute  scepticism ;  and  here  he 
reviews  the  agnosticism  which,  he  believes,  should  be  identified  not 
with  modern  men  of  science  but  with  Hume. 

Science  itself,  Professor  Frazer  concludes,  is  finally  an  act  of 
faith,  not  of  reasoning,  and  the  "  agnosticism  that  retains  science  is  not 
really  a  protest  against  faith ;  it  is  only  ian  arrest  of  faith." 

At  this  point  in  the  first  volume  begins  the  positive  treatment  which 
the  second  volume  completes.  A  spiritual  interpretation  of  the  uni- 
verse, he  goes  on  to  affirm,  is,  at  least,  not  inconsistent  with  the  facts  of 
Nature,  but  it  is  disclosed  with  far  greater  fulness  by  the  self-conscious- 
ness of  man.  Man  as  a  moral  being  brings  us  into  relation  with  the 
supernatural.  Cosmic  faith  is  the  assurance  that  the  natural  world 
will  not  put  us  to  intellectual  confusion ;  moral  faith  is  the  assurance 
that  those  who  strive  for  goodness  shall  not  be  put  to  permanent  moral 
confusion.  Many  mysteries  of  the  universe  remain  unexplored,  but 
its  fundamental  character  is  indicated  by  the  spiritual  life  of  man. 
Homo  mensura.  The  second  volume  studies,  in  greater  detail, 
this  moral  and  spiritual  man  in  the  midst  of  a  moral  and  spiritual 
universe.  The  working  postulate  of  human  life  is  found  in  this 
assumption  of  a  spiritual  relation  to  reality.  This  moral  faith 
alone  permits  us  to  interpret  the  causation  and  the  design  of 
nature.  "  The  presence,  throughout  the  whole,  of  latent  meaning 
and  moral  purpose  is  not  indeed  a  conclusion  that  can  be  logically 
drawn  from  the  few  physical  or  moral  phenomena  that  are  actually 
offered  to  us  in  our  experience;  but  the  assumption  is  warranted 
******  as  the  needed  condition  of  our  escape  from 
speechless  and  motionless  Pyrrhomist  despair."  Finally,  there  is  dealt 
with  the  special  fact  which  seems  most  flatly  to  contradict  this  impres- 
sion of  spiritual  design.  "  How  can  a  universe  of  suffering  and  sin 
be  a  revelation  of  omnipotent  goodness?"  To  this  final  difficulty  the 
two-fold  answer  is  given ;  that  it  is  a  world  of  moral  discipline  and 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  309 

education,  and  that  its  full  interpretation  is  postponed  to  another  life. 
Very  soberly  and  with  much  reserve  the  mystery  of  death  is  faced. 
"Faith  in  the  persistence  of  morally  responsible  persons  is  not  the  indis- 
pensable postulate  of  all  reliable  intercourse  with  the  universe  of 
things  and  persons ;  but  its  disintegration  would  disturb  the  theistic 
trust  and  so  leads  to  universal  doubt."  *'  It  is  the  irrational  alternative 
in  the  dilemma  that  makes  optimistic  trust  the  highest  philosophy." 

Such  is  this  veteran's  philosophic  faith:  "the  natural  trust  that 
nothing  can  happen  in  the  temporal  evolution  which  can  finally  put 
to  confusion  the  principles  of  moral  reason  that  are  latent  in  man." 

FRANCIS  G.  PEABODY. 
HARVARD  UNIVERSITY. 

A    History  of   European    Thought   in    the  Nineteenth   Century. 

JOHN    THEODORE     MERZ.      Vol.     I,     Introduction;     Scientific 

Thought,  Part    i.     Edinburgh   &  London,  William    Blackwood 

&  Sons.     1896.     Post  8vo.     Pp.  xiv-f  458. 

Alike  in  science  and  philosophy  it  has  ever  been  a  marked  char- 
acteristic of  English  thought  to  be  served  by  independent  as  well  as  by 
professional  workers.  Priestley,  Davy,  Wollaston,  Young,  Dalton, 
Faraday  and  Joule  were,  like  Bacon,  Locke,  Berkeley,  Bentham,  the 
Mills,  Grote,  Buckle  and  Mr.  Spencer,  outside  the  pale  of  the  univer- 
sities. Among  this  distinguished  company  Mr.  Merz  (long  known 
favorably  to  a  limited  circle  of  the  cultivated  at  Newcastle-on-Tyne, 
and  to  the  philosophical  specialist  as  the  author  of  the  excellent  little 
monograph  on  Leibniz  in  Blackwood's  philosophical  series)  now 
takes  his  place  by  right  of  achievement.  Should  he  continue  his  His- 
tory to  completion  as  he  has  begun,  he  will  rank  not  far  from  the 
most  eminent  of  the  non-academic  writers. 

At  the  present  juncture  criticism  would  be  beside  the  mark,  and  it 
may  serve  meantime  to  call  the  attention  of  thinkers  to  the  plan  and 
execution  of  this  most  valuable  book,  to  preparation  for  which  Mr. 
Merz  has  given  no  less  than  thirty  years.  The  author  speaks  in  his 
preface  of  the  encouragement  derived  from  friends  during  his  long 
period  of  self-suppression ;  he  will  now  be  borne  up  through  the  rest 
of  his  self-imposed  task  by  the  universal  expectation  of  all  who  take 
real  interest  in  either  scientific  or  philosophical  pursuits. 

The  present  volume  consists,  jirst,  of  an  Introduction,  in  which 
three  main  points  are  discussed ; — the  necessity  for  such  an  undertak- 
ing and  its  timeliness ;  the  reasons  for  confining  attention  to  European 
culture,  especially  as  wrought  out  by  the  three  great  nationalities  of 


310  GUSTAV  THE  ODOR  FECHNER. 

Britain,  Germany  and  France,  and  the  general  groundwork  of  the  en- 
tire undertaking, which  may  eventually  extend  to  four  or  five  volumes. 
The  last  alone  need  trouble  us  now.  Mr.  Merz'  general  standpoint 
may  be  gleaned  from  the  following:  "  Unless  I  believed  that  our  age 
was  elaborating  a  deeper  and  more  significant  conception  of  this  unity 
of  all  human  interests,  of  the  inner  mental  life  of  man  and  man- 
kind, I  do  not  think  I  should  have  deemed  it  worth  while  to  write  the 
following  volumes,  for  it  is  really  their  main  end  and  principal  object 
to  trace  the  cooperation  of  many  agencies  in  the  higher  work  of  our 
century ;  the  growing  conviction  that  all  mental  efforts  combine  to- 
gether to  produce  and  uphold  the  ideal  possession  of  the  race ;  that  it 
is  not  in  one  special  direction  nor  under  one  specific  term  that  this 
treasure  can  be  cultivated,  but  that  individuals  and  peoples  in  their 
combined  international  life  exhibit  and  perpetuate  it."  (p.  33.)  The 
plan  of  the  work,  as  outlined  at  p.  63  sq.,  is  to  treat  first  of  science — 
'  thought  as  a  means  to  an  end.'  In  the  second  part,  "we  have  to  con- 
sider it  as  its  own  object,  as  a  reflection  on  itself,  carried  on  with  the 
object  of  knowing  its  own  origin,  its  laws,  its  validity.  This  disci- 
pline may,  as  a  whole,  be  called  philosophy."  So  far  as  I  am  able  to 
gather  from  Mr.  Merz'  statement,  two  volumes  are  to  be  devoted  to 
the  first  section ;  a  volume  to  the  second,  and  another  to  the  '  un- 
methodical thought,'  which  he  groups  under  the  name  of  religion. 
Following  this  scheme,  the  second  part  of  the  present  volume  contains 
three  introductory  chapters  on  the  Scientific  Spirit  in  France,  Ger- 
many and  England,  respectively ;  and  two  systematic  chapters,  one  on 
the  Astronomical  View  of  Nature,  the  other  on  the  Atomic  View  of 
Nature.  It  will  be  of  interest  to  readers  of  this  REVIEW  to  learn  that 
the  second  volume  will  present  a  similar  conspectus  of  the  Psycho- 
logical View. 

I  can  only  add  that,  in  my  judgment,  this  work  bids  fair  to  rank 
as  a  classic.  It  is  suggestive,  its  learning  is  admirably  balanced  and 
unified  and  its  objectivity  is  wholly  unusual.  Everyone  ought  to  ob- 
tain it  as  an  indispensable  -vade  mecum. 

R.  M.  WENLEY. 

UNIVERSITY  OF  MICHIGAN. 


Gustav   Theodor  Fechner.     KURD    LASSWITZ.     Frommanns  Klas- 
siker  der  Philosophic,  edited  by  RICHARD  FALCKENBERG.     No.  I. 
Stuttgart,  Frommanns  Verlag.      1896.     Pp.  207. 
The  author  presents,  not  only  the  life  and  writings  of  Fechner, 

but  also  his  view  of  the  world.     He  believes  the  study  of  this  view 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  311 

will  be  helpful  to  present  and  future  thought.  The  presentation  is 
condensed  and  systematic;  the  style  clear  and  touched  all  through  by 
an  enthusiastic  admiration  of  the  man  and  his  work.  The  book  may 
be  said  to  '  read  itself,'  and  one  comes  to  feel  that  Fechner  was  both  a 
hero  and  a  genius  as  a  result  of  this  glowing  treatment. 

The  subject  is  divided  into  two  parts:  (i)  Life  and  Works,  and 
(2)  View  of  the  World.  The  first  part  is  divided  into  three  periods. 
The  work  of  confirming  Ohm's  law  and  extending  its  application  to  the 
many  possible  variations  of  conditions  was  Fechner's.  As  the  author 
of  the  '  Comparative  Anatomy  of  Angels '  and  other  similar  pieces 
he  ranks  high  as  a  humorist  and  a  lover  of  belles-lettres.  His  work 
in  psycho-physics,  experimental  psychology  and  aesthetics  is  well 
known  and  of  acknowledged  permanent  value.  Fechner's  life  is 
made  interesting  by  the  author's  accounts  of  his  struggles  with  poverty, 
sickness  and  defective  eyesight,  as  well  as  by  his  scientific  successes. 

Fechner's  view  of  the  world  is  presented  in  two  parts :  ( i )  the 
Theory  of  Motion  and  (2)  that  of  Consciousness.  The  ingenious  and 
mathematically  beautiful  effort  of  the  philosopher  to  state  the  phe- 
nomena of  the  material  universe  in  terms  of  the  motion  of  a  system 
of  things  impresses  one  as  rich  with  suggestion.  The  most  interesting 
point  is  the  demonstration  that  the  law  of  attraction  which,  when 
stated  as  it  usually  is,  in  terms  of  force,  fails  to  explain  the  phenomena 
of  cohesion  and  chemical  affinity,  stands,  when  stated  by  Fechner  in 
terms  of  motion,  in  perfect  accord  with  these  phenomena.  This  en- 
ables him  to  extend  the  law  to  the  organic  realm,  and  he  conceives 
the  earth  itself  to  be  simply  a  universal  organism. 

As  to  consciousness,  the  physical  and  the  psychical  are  identical, 
not  two  aspects  of  the  same  thing  or  causes  the  one  of  the  other ;  they 
are  the  same  thing  looked  at  from  two  different  points  of  view,  just 
as  the  same  curve  is  convex  from  without  and  concave  from  within. 
There  is  but  one  consciousness,  as  there  is  but  one  earth,  and  individual 
minds  are  simply  points  at  which  the  universal  divine  consciousness 
'  crops  out,'  the  '  threshold '  of  its  appearance  being  a  certain  degree  in 
the  complexity  of  the  individual  organism.  His  view  of  attention  is 
psychologically  interesting.  The  principle  of  stability  seen  in  the  ex- 
ternal world  is  the  principle  of  the  tendency  to  harmony  in  the  inner — 
44  the  world  strives  toward  a  maximum  of  pleasure"  for  the  universal, 
divine  consciousness.  His  ethic  is  hedonistic  but  not  altogether  em- 
pirical, for  its  highest  good  is  the  pleasure  of  a  consciousness  which 
transcends  that  of  man.  The  will  is  determined  from  within  by  its 
own  nature,  and  is  therefore  free.  Man  is  "  a  part  of  the  divine  con- 


312  HABIT  AND  INSTINCT. 

sciousness  and,  between  men,  the  World  is  not  dark  and  dumb,  rather 
she  sees  and  hears  with  the  mind  of  God." 

G.  A.  TAWNEY. 
BELOIT  COLLEGE. 


Habit  and  Instinct.     C.  LLOYD  MORGAN.     New  York  and  London, 

Edward  Arnold.      1896.     8vo.     Pp.  351.     $4.00. 

Principal  Morgan  is  known  as  the  author  of  two  excellent  books, 
and  his  new  volume  will  go  far  towards  increasing  his  reputation  as  an 
interesting  and  original  writer.  He  is  a  disciple  of  Darwin,  a  pupil 
of  Huxley,  and  a  follower  and  friend  of  Romanes.  His  book  bears 
clearly  the  traces  of  these  three  men's  influence ;  it  is  written  from  the 
evolutionary  standpoint,  it  is  based  on  the  observations  of  a  naturalist, 
and  its  theme  is  psychological.  A  considerable  body  of  new  observa- 
tions, of  entirely  fresh  facts  are  presented.  The  immediate  object  of 
the  author  was  to  ascertain  for  some  of  the  higher  animals  the  limits 
of  instinct.  He  accordingly  devoted  himself  to  a  prolonged  and 
patient  study  by  observation  and  experiment  on  the  ways  of  young 
mammals  and  birds,  chiefly  the  latter,  as  offering  a  more  favorable 
field,  since  they  can  be  readily  reared  away  from  the  parents. 

The  main  result  of  the  book  may  be  indicated  by  saying  that  the 
author  demonstrates  the  predominating  control  of  experience  and  its 
educational  power  during  the  young  life  in  fixing  adult  habits.  It  is 
the  detailed,  keenly  analysed  evidence  of  this  which  imparts  to  the 
volume  its  chief  value  and  originality,  and  renders  it  very  refreshing 
after  the  great  mass  of  uncritical  writings  on  animal  psychology.  Of 
wider  interest  are  the  concluding  chapters,  which  are  devoted  to  a 
broad  discussion  of  the  admissibility  of  the  Neo-Lamarckian  doctrines 
in  the  author's  field  of  evolutionary  enquiry.  The  distinction  which 
Morgan  draws  between  modification  and  variation  is  a  welcome  ad- 
dition to  clearness  of  thought,  but  the  cooperation  between  the  two, 
which  he  seeks  to  establish  with  a  view  of  making  a  compromise  be- 
tween the  theory  of  the  Neo-Lamarckians  and  that  of  Darwin,  can  be 
regarded  as  hardly  more  than  an  offer  to  capitulate  the  Lamarckian 
position  if  the  honors  of  war  are  allowed. 

With  the  material  which  he  had  on  hand  the  author  could  have 
written  a  paper,  which,  published  in  some  psychological  journal, 
would  have  made  his  work  known  to  his  professional  colleagues  in  a 
very  much  briefer  form.  He  has  chosen,  on  the  contrary,  a  more 
popular  method,  and  has  based  his  book  upon  a  course  of  lectures 
delivered  before  the  Lowell  Institute  in  Boston.  He  has  thus  become 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  313 

more  readable,  and  ought  to  reach  a  wider  public,  though  to  the 
scientific  reader  the  sacrifice  is  considerable.  The  author's  presenta- 
tion of  his  subject  is  excellent  and  his  style  very  clear,  though  his 
habitual  use  of  '  would  seem '  when  he  means  '  seem '  grates  on  the 
reader's  ear.  In  the  numerous  critical  passages  he  is  calmly  imper- 
sonal, although  much  that  has  been  written  on  animal  psychology 
might  easily  call  forth  sarcastic  criticism.  It  may  not  be  amiss  to  add 
that  the  book  is  made  pleasanter  to  read  by  the  occasional  cropping 
out  of  a  vein  of  quiet  humor. 

The  work  must  be  recommended  very  warmly  to  psychologists 
and  ornithologists.  The  latter  are  probably  past  redemption,  for  an 
ornithologist  is  most  rarely  a  bird-lover  and  seldom  does  the  ornitho- 
logical mind  conceive  a  bird  as  more  than  a  species  with  a  Latin  tri- 
nomial. To  psychologists  this  book  should  bring  much.  As  a 
naturalist,  it  has  seemed  to  me  that  the  naturalist's  method  has  an 
immense  future  in  psychology.  The  method  includes  two  main  fac- 
tors :  the  observation  of  details  and  the  comparison  of  homologous 
phenomena  in  different  forms  of  life ;  and  the  method  starts  always 
from  the  standpoint  of  evolution.  There  need  be  no  restriction,  of 
course,  upon  the  three  aspects  of  psychology,  which  have  heretofore 
prevailed,  the  metaphysical,  introspective  and  experimental,  but  there 
should  come  soon  and  with  revolutionary  power,  not  merely  enlarged 
interest  in  and  sympathy  with  comparative  evolutional  psychology, 
but  more  than  that,  eagerness  to  enter  this  field  of  inquiry  and  to  share 
in  harvesting  it.  Those  who  follow  the  new  trend  can  hardly  begin 
better  than  by  making  acquaintance  with  Principal  Morgan's  recent 
volume,  which  illustrates  how  to  begin  and  shows  that  there  are  sub- 
stantial rewards  for  those  who  will  investigate  soberly  and  scien- 
tifically the  mighty  problems  of  psychological  homologies. 

CHARLES  S.  MINOT. 
HARVARD  MEDICAL  SCHOOL. 


SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

The  Crowd:  A  Study  of  the  Popular  Mind.     GUSTAVE  LE  BON. 

New  York,  The  Macmillan  Company,  1896.     Pp.  xxiv-f32o. 

We  call  attention  to  this  (slightly  clumsy)  translation  of  a  book 
already  noticed  in  these  pages,  because,  in  spite  of  its  grave  defects, 
it  is  almost  the  first  scientific  attempt  to  treat  a  subject  of  supreme 
importance,  and  ought  to  be  read  by  everyone  who  is  interested  in  the 
problems  which  popular  government  presents.  With  public  opinion 


3H  SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

ruling  more  and  more  the  world,  the  psychology  of  public  opinion, 
the  sources  of  its  strength  and  weakness,  its  pathology  and  hygiene, 
and  the  causes  of  its  stability  and  of  its  alterations,  ought  to  be  studied 
with  ever-increasing  care  by  those  interested  in  the  welfare  of  man- 
kind. It  can  hardly  be  doubted  that  M.  Le  Bon's  little  books  will 
communicate  a  serious  stimulus  to  sttidy  of  this  sort.  He  is  a  many- 
sided  person,  physiologist,  anthropologist,  traveller  and  historian, 
and  knows  the  outside  world  as  few  Frenchmen  know  it ;  but  of 
human  life  he  takes  a  purely  biological  view,  devoid  of  every  senti- 
mental or  metaphysical  ideal,  and  his  results  are  misanthropic  and 
pessimistic  in  the  extreme.  Man's  worst  enemy,  it  would  appear,  is 
man  himself ;  for  whilst  nothing  great  can  be  done  except  by  men  in 
concert,  it  happens  that  all  the  feelings  that  move  men  together,  all 
the  patriotic,  religious  and  philanthropic  ideals  which  they  will  obey  in 
crowds  and  collections,  are  more  or  less  irrational  and  insane.  Ra- 
tionality indeed  would,  on  M.  Le  Bon's  view,  seem  necessarily  con- 
fined to  the  isolated  man  of  science  or  individual  critic,  and  the  only 
ideal  permissible  to  him  would  be  that  of  sound  skin  and  safety  from 
physical  danger,  for  himself  in  the  first  place,  and  thenceforth  for  as 
many  fellow-creatures  as  circumstances  allow  to  be  embraced.  Anglo- 
mania is  the  practical  result  of  all  this — a  result  shared  by  the  entire 
school  of  Frenchmen  who  follow  the  lead  of  Taine.  For  in  England 
and  America,  whatever  minor  inferiorities  these  countries  may  show, 
the  individual  is  left  more  to  himself  and  his  affairs  are  on  the  whole 
more  safe.  France,  M.  Le  Bon  seems  to  fear,  is  rushing  blindly  to  a 
destiny  which,  being  the  outcome  of  ineradicable  ideals  of  equality  and 
centralization,  will  hardly  stop  short  of  complete  socialism,  with 
everyone  at  once  a  slave  and  a  pensioner  of  the  State. 

It  is  curious  for  us  Americans,  who  are  just  beginning  to  idealize 
less  our  national  ways,  to  hear  them  so  much  idealized  by  foreigners. 
Meanwhile,  in  a  sense,  it  is,  of  course,  true  that  man's  worst  enemy  is 
himself;  the  worst  enemies  of  some  ideals  are  other  ideals,  and  men 
in  crowds,  even  though  those  crowds  be  called  deliberative  assemblies, 
are  often  terribly  unwise.  But  it  is  only  from  the  standpoint  of  some 
one  ideal  held  for  true  that  all  other  ideals  can  be  tried  and  condemned, 
and  the  great  trouble  with  books  like  M.  Le  Bon's  is  that  whilst  they 
are  inspired  by  very  distinct  ideals  these  are  not  expressed  in  them  in 
frank  teleological  form.  To  a  reader  even  half-respectful  of  the  social- 
istic ideals  of  the  present  generation,  it  seems  rather  a  reductio  ad  ab- 
surdum  of  the  pretension  of  Science  to  look  down  upon  all  such  ways 
of  thinking  as  essentially  crazy,  to  find  that  her  own  last  word  of  prac- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  315 

tical  wisdom  about  human  life  is  to  advise  her  votaries  to  dwell  on 
the  frontier  and  have  bonds  invested  in  many  countries,  so  that  when 
that  insane  beast  Man  '  breaks  out '  in  one  they  may  get  into  another 
escape.  M.  Le  Bon  does  not  give  this  advice  in  so  many  words, 
but  it  exhales  somehow  from  his  pages ;  and,  Lebensiveisheit  for  Le- 
bensuveisheit,  it  hardly  seems  obvious  that,  in  comparison  with  this  last 
rational  outcome  of  Science,  the  religions  and  the  philanthropies, 
with  all  their  tendency  to  insanity,  make  such  an  inferior  show. 

Let  it  not  be  thought  that  our  author's  contempt  for  religious  and 
other  mob-swaying  ideals,  and  his  respect  for  Science,  involve  any 
snobbish  deference  to  '  scientists '  as  a  caste.  He  is,  on  the  contrary, 
singularly  free  from  all  caste  deference.  Witness  his  defence  of  juries, 
to  the  irrationality  of  whose  opinions  in  criminal  cases  he  has  devoted 
a  chapter : 

"  Many  writers,  some  of  them  most  distinguished,  have  started  of 
late  a  strong  campaign  against  the  institution  of  the  jury,  although  it 
is  the  only  protection  we  have  against  the  errors,  really  very  frequent, 
of  a  caste  that  is  under  no  control.  A  portion  of  these  writers  advo- 
cate a  jury  recruited  solely  from  the  ranks  of  the  enlightened  classes, 
but  we  have  already  proved  that  even  in  this  case  the  verdicts  would  be 
identical  with  those  returned  under  the  present  system.  Other  writers, 
taking  their  stand  on  the  errors  committed  by  juries,  would  abolish  the 
jury  and  have  it  replaced  by  Judges.  *  *  *  We  should  cling  vigorously 
to  the  jury.  It  constitutes,  perhaps,  the  only  category  of  crowd  that 
cannot  be  replaced  by  any  individuality.  It  alone  can  temper  the  se- 
verity of  the  law  which,  equal  for  all,  is  bound  on  principle  to  be  blind 
and  to  take  no  cognizance  of  particular  cases.  Inaccessible  to  pity, 
and  heeding  nothing  but  the  text  of  the  law,  the  Judge,  in  his  profes- 
sional severity,  would  visit  with  the  same  penalty  the  burglar  guilty  of 
murder  and  the  girl  *  *  *  driven  to  infanticide.  *  *  *  Being  well 
acquainted  with  the  psychology  of  castes  and  also  with  the  psychology 
of  other  species  of  crowds,  I  do  not  know  a  single  case  in  which, 
wrongly  accused  of  a  crime,  I  should  not  prefer  to  have  to  deal  with 
a  jury  rather  than  with  magistrates.  There  would  be  some  chance  that 
my  innocence  would  be  recognized  by  the  former  but  not  the  slightest 
chance  that  it  would  be  admitted  by  the  latter.  The  power  of  crowds 
is  to  be  dreaded,  but  the  power  of  certain  castes  is  to  be  dreaded  yet 
more.  Crowds  are  open  to  conviction;  castes  never  are"  (p.  iSS). 

In  future  books  of  this  sort  the  objective  psychology  and  the  sub- 
jective teleology  of  the  author  will  have  to  be  kept  more  distinct,  and 
the  latter  made  more  explicit.  But  the  present  volume,  with  all  its 


316  SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

faults,  is  a  most  honest  and  vigorous  production  which  should  be 
widely  read. 

W.J, 

Psychologic  du  Socialisme.     G.LEBoN.     Rev.  Philos.     December, 

1896. 

The  author  proposes  to  apply  the  principles  developed  in  his  pre- 
vious works  to  the  phenomena  of  '  socialism,'  comprising  under  this 
term  ' '  the  aspirations,  wants,  beliefs,  ideas  and  reforms  which  are 
to-day  the  profound  passion  of  many  minds."  To  appreciate  the 
power  of  socialism  we  must  consider  it  not  from  the  political  or 
economic  standpoint,  but  as  a  belief,  and  the  student  of  the  psychology 
of  beliefs  will  understand  why  argument  is  quite  in  vain  against  the 
collective  belief  of  a  multitude. 

In  its  fundamental  principles  socialism  is  but  a  repetition  of  ten- 
dencies which  emerged  in  Hebrew,  Greek  and  Roman  life,  and 
reached  an  actual  triumph  in  early  Christianity,  only  to  be  abandoned 
when  Christianity  became  itself  a  conservative  institution  at  present, 
although  the  actual  condition  of  the  poorer  classes  is  much  superior  to 
that  of  former  times,  yet  their  wants  and  desires  have  increased  so 
rapidly  that  the  ratio  is  more  on  the  side  prompting  to  discontent  than 
ever  before.  Add  to  this  the  prevalent  egoism,  demoralizing  devo- 
tion to  wealth  and  indifference  of  the  ruling  classes,  the  pessimism  of 
thinkers,  the  half-heartedness  of  the  defenders  of  the  present  social 
order,  comparable  to  the  weakness  of  the  defenders  of  dying  paganism, 
and,  above  all,  the  decay  of  the  great  dominant  beliefs  of  the  past 
which  leaves  men  ready  and  eager  for  some  new  and  inspiring  belief, 
and  the  marvel  is  not  that  a  new  religion  like  socialism  progresses  so 
fast  but  that  it  does  progress  faster.  To  understand  this  we  must  recur 
to  the  psychological  laws  of  the  evolution  of  beliefs. 

Man  is  guided  in  life  by  two  classes  of  conceptions,  ancestral 
conceptions,  or  sentiments  on  the  one  hand,  and  acquired  or  intel- 
lectual conceptions  on  the  other.  The  former  are  the  great  motives 
in  conduct.  They  are  the  atavistic  influence  to  which  is  due  the  real 
conservatism  of  crowds,  often  masked  as  this  may  be  by  temporary 
agitations.  The  acquired  or  intellectual  conceptions  remain  almost 
without  influence  upon  actual  conduct  until,  by  repeated  hereditary 
accumulation,  they  have  penetrated  the  depths  of  the  unconscious  and 
become  sentiments.  Buddhism,  Christianity,  Islam  were  no  new 
faiths.  Christianity  triumphed  not  because  it  was  new,  but  because  it 
embodied  the  sentiments  of  Greek  and  Egyptian  and  Persian  as  well 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  317 

as  of  Jew.  At  the  very  beginning  a  belief  may  have  roots  in  the 
intelligence,  but  when  it  becomes  the  actual  motor  it  becomes  rather 
the  regulator  of  the  intelligence,  the  touch-stone  of  judgment.  The 
mind  can  receive  only  what  conforms  to  the  new  belief.  Philosophy, 
literature  and  the  arts  all  receive  its  impress,  as  in  the  middle  ages,  or 
among  the  Arabs.  All  new  conceptions  and  perceptions  must  be  un- 
consciously shaped  by  these  ancestral  conceptions  before  they  can 
gain  entrance  to  the  mind.  This  is  strikingly  illustrated  in  the 
changing  meanings  attached  to  words  from  age  to  age,  or  as  used  by 
different  races  and  sexes,  a  suggestive  subject  for  psychological  inves- 
tigation. On  technical  subjects  there  may  be  intellectual  discussion 
and  agreement.  But  in  morals,  politics  and  religion  agreement,  or 
even  mutual  understanding  is  possible  only  for  those  of  a  common 
origin.  In  conference  on  these  themes  "it  is  not  the  living  but  the 
dead  who  discuss."  Ordinary  psychology  assumes  that  all  men  ex- 
perience identical  sentiments  under  the  influence  of  like  stimulation, 
but  nothing  is  more  erroneous.  A  common  well-rooted  belief  be- 
comes thus  the  source  of  common  ideas  and  the  greatest  factor  in  the 
creation  of  a  national  soul  and  will,  and  so  of  a  characteristic  orienta- 
tion for  all  ideas. 

The  psychology  of  the  apostles  of  the  new  faith  is  instructive. 
Although  alienists  usually  regard  the  advanced  socialists  as  belonging 
to  the  '  criminal-born '  type,  this  is  quite  a  mistake.  They  are  rather 
actuated,  not  as  the  true  criminal,  by  selfishness,  but  by  motives  the 
reverse  of  selfish,  leading  to  acts  quite  opposed  to  their  own  interests. 
Like  the  apostles  of  past  faiths,  the  men  of  the  Inquisition,  the  fol- 
lowers of  Mahomet,  the  men  of  the  Convention,  their  zeal  prompts 
them  to  destroy  first  institutions,  then  all  who  resist.  Their  philan- 
thropy is  as  sincere  and  as  intolerant  of  opposition  as  that  of  former 
apostles.  They  may  be  regarded  as  hypnotized  by  two  or  three  formu- 
las constantly  brooded  over. 

Sociology    and    Philosophy.      B.    BOSANQUET.     Mind.      January, 

1897. 

Sociology  is  coming  to  be  regarded  more  and  more  from  the  point 
of  view  of  social  psychology,  the  point  of  view  of  Plato's  Republic. 
This  enables  us  to  see  its  relation  to  social  philosophy.  Like  indi- 
vidual psychology  it  is  now  interested  in  asserting  its  claim  to  be  a 
natural  science,  and  as  such  to  treat  all  phenomena  in  its  field  impar- 
tially. The  'laws  of  association'  are  the  object  of  investigation, 
without  regard  to  the  logical,  ethical  or  social  value  of  the  product. 


318  NEUROLOGY  AND  PHYSIOLOGY. 

But  just  as  in  the  concept  of  apperception  we  recognize  that  the  mind 
is  not  merely  a  machine,  unaffected  by  its  content,  but  is  very  dif- 
ferent according  to  the  reality  which  it  thinks  of,  so,  in  social  psy- 
chology, when  it  has  ceased  to  be  necessary  or  worth  while  to  direct 
our  attention  solely  to  the  fact  that  there  is  a  common  element  in  all 
social  groups,  we  shall  inquire  into  the  differences  as  well.  From  this 
the  transition  to  the  consideration  of  the  relative  social  value  of  the 
different  groups  or  forms  of  organization  is  an  easy  one,  and  this  is 
the  province  of  social  philosophy.  The  service  of  social  science  to 
social  philosophy  may  then  be  similar  to  that  of  psychology  to  logic, 
ethics  and  aesthetics,  but  it  would  be  for  the  advantage  of  the  sociolo- 
gist to  familiarize  himself  far  more  intimately  than  he  has  yet  done 
with  psychological  conceptions  and  principles,  for  which  he  now 

seems  to  be  vaguely  groping. 

J.  H.  TUFTS. 
UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO. 


NEUROLOGY  AND  PHYSIOLOGY. 

The   Cell  in- Development  and  Inheritance.     EDMUND  B.  WILSON. 

Columbia  University  Biological  Series,  IV.    New  York  and  Lon 

don,  The  Macmillan  Co.,  1896.     Pp.  xvi+37i 

Within  recent  years  the  problems  of  biology  have  centered  more 
and  more  largely  in  the  cell.  As  long  as  morphologists  were  chiefly 
concerned  with  the  evidences  and  probable  course  of  organic  evolu- 
tion interest  gathered  around  questions  of  homologies  of  organs  and 
affinities  of  organisms,  but  now  that  the  paramount  problem  is  the 
cause  of  evolution  the  old  methods  are  generally  found  to  be  of  little 
service.  What  light  could  homology  or  phylogeny  throw  upon  the 
nature  and  causes  of  assimilation,  growth,  metabolism,  inheritance  or 
development?  And  yet  upon  these  very  questions  hangs  the  causal 
explanation  of  vital  phenomena  in  general,  including  evolution.  In 
almost  every  case  these  problems  have  been  found  to  be  at  bottom 
questions  as  to  the  structure  and  function  of  the  cell,  and  in  attacking 
them  morphology  has  of  necessity  become  physiological.  In  the  life 
of  the  cell  are  centered  most  of  the  present  philosophical  problems  of 
biology. 

The  appearance,  therefore,  at  this  time  of  a  general  work  on  the 
cell  is  of  more  than  ordinary  interest,  not  alone  to  the  biologist,  but  to 
all  persons  of  liberal  ideas.  Professor  Wilson's  work  is  not  the  first 
in  the  field,  though  I  think  it  may  be  said  to  be  easily  the  best.  Hert- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  319 

wig's  splendid  treatise,  Die  Zelle  und  die  Geivebe  (1893),  was  really 
the  pioneer  volume  in  this  field ;  it  treats  the  subject  in  a  more  general 
way  than  Wilson's  work,  taking  in  the  non-developmental  as  well  as 
the  developmental  cell  phenomena,  but  it  is,  of  course,  far  less  rich  in 
references  to  recent  important  literature.  The  only  other  work  which 
deserves  to  be  compared  with  Wilson's  is  Henneguy's  Legons  sur  la 
Cellule  (1896).  This  volume  is  in  typography  and  illustration  a  work 
of  art,  but,  like  so  many  other  modern  French  works  on  biology,  it  is 
in  large  part  a  huge,  encyclopedic  compilation  and  is  too  technical 
and  diffuse  for  the  general  reader. 

Professor  Wilson  has  wisely  limited  his  work  to  the  developmental 
cell  phenomena  in  which  at  present  knowledge  is  most  advanced  and 
interest  most  intense.  After  an  introduction  which  gives  a  brief  his- 
torical sketch  of  the  cell  theory  and  its  relation  to  the  evolution  theory, 
there  are  taken  up,  in  successive  chapters,  a  general  sketch  of  cell 
structure,  cell  division,  the  germ  cells,  fertilization,  chromatic  reduc- 
tion, some  problems  of  cell  organization,  cell  chemistry  and  cell 
physiology,  cell  division  and  development,  and  finally  some  theories  of 
inheritance  and  development.  In  addition  there  is  appended  an  excel- 
lent glossary  and  a  general  list  of  literature. 

The  book  contains  a  large  amount  of  Professor  Wilson's  own 
work  and  that  of  his  pupils,  some  of  which  has  not  heretofore  been 
published,  but  such  a  general  work  must  of  necessity  be  to  a  large 
extent  founded  upon  the  work  of  others.  The  author  has  brought 
together,  under  one  point  of  view,  the  isolated  observations  and 
frequently  conflicting  views  of  a  multitude  of  writers.  In  this  he 
has  graciously  and  entirely  avoided  the  old  museum  idea  of  collecting 
material  without  reference  to  its  use;  although  he  summarizes  almost 
every  important  work  of  recent  years  bearing  either  directly  or  indi- 
rectly upon  the  cell,  yet  the  book  is  no  mere  encyclopedia  of  facts  or 
theories — all  is  treated  in  a  critical  spirit  as  so  much  material  to  be 
builded  into  a  system.  The  labor  involved  in  this  sifting  of  literature 
and  collation  of  results  must  have  been  prodigious  and  all  future 
workers  in  these  lines  will  owe  Professor  Wilson  a  debt  of  gratitude 
for  the  service  which  he  has  thus  rendered. 

The  limits  of  this  notice  will  not  allow  a  review  of  the  conclusions 
of  the  author  on  the  many  subjects  discussed.  Those,  however,  which 
are  of  the  most  interest  to  the  general  reader  are  contained  in  the  final 
chapter  of  the  book  and  may  receive  brief  mention  here. 

The  author  indicates  that  all  present  discussions  of  development 
revolve  around  two  hypotheses,  both  of  which  are  regarded  as  em- 


320  NEUROLOGY  AND  PHYSIOLOGY. 

bodying  fundamental  truths.  The  first  is  the  Germinal  Localization 
hypothesis  of  His,  the  second  the  Idioplasm  hypothesis  of  Nageli ; 
the  former  asserts  that  the  cytoplasm  of  the  egg  contains  in  definitely 
localized  areas  the  germs  of  future  organs  ('  organbildende 
Keimbezirke'}  ;  the  latter  regards  inheritance  as  the  result  of  the 
molecular  organization  of  a  peculiar  kind  of  living  matter,  the  idio- 
plasm, which  is  now  generally  identified  with  the  chromatic  substance 
of  the  nucleus.  With  regard  to  the  application  of  these  principles  to 
development  there  are  two  widely  different  views.  The  Roux-Weis- 
mann  theory  of  development  holds  that  cytoplasmic  differentiation  is 
due  to  nuclear  differentiation  and  that  the  latter  arises  from  qualitative 
divisions  of  the  nuclear  substance.  The  opposing  view  of  Driesch, 
Hertwig  and  others  is  that  divisions  of  the  nucleus  are  always  quan- 
titative, never  qualitative,  and  that  the  progressive  differentiation  of 
the  cytoplasm  is  the  result,  not  of  the  progressive  differentiation  of 
the  idioplasm,  as  Roux  and  Weismann  hold,  but  of  the  relative  posi- 
tion of  cells  with  reference  to  each  other.  More  recently  both 
Driesch  and  Hertwig  have  been  compelled  to  supplement  this  view 
by  granting  that  chemical  and  physical  differences  exist  in  different 
regions  of  the  egg-cytoplasm  and  that  subsequent  differentiations  arise 
through  the  reaction  of  these  different  substances  upon  the  nuclear 
idioplasm  which  constantly  remains  the  same.  With  the  main  points  of 
this  hypothesis  Professor  Wilson  is  in  hearty  accord ;  however,  he  adds 
this  further  very  important  conception  that  the  specification  of  the 
cytoplasm,  induced  by  the  nucleus,  reacts  upon  the  latter,  bringing 
about  a  specification  of  the  idioplasm,  so  that  in  the  end  there  is  a 
differentiation  of  nuclear  material,  though  not  brought  about  by  quali- 
tative divisions. 

The  specific  character  of  the  development  with  its  orderly  course 
of  events  is  regarded,  as  in  almost  every  modern  theory  of  heredity,  as 
the  result  of  the  structure  of  the  idioplasm.  The  nature  of  this  struc- 
ture, as  Professor  Wilson  points  out,  involves  the  old  controversy  of 
preformation  and  epigenesis,  "a  controversy  which  now  has  little 
meaning  apart  from  the  general  problem  of  physical  causality.  De- 
spite all  our  theories  we  no  more  know  how  the  properties  of  the 
idioplasm  involve  the  properties  of  the  adult  body  than  we  know  how 
the  properties  of  hydrogen  and  oxygen  involve  those  of  water."  The 
problem  of  the  historical  origin  of  the  idioplasm  '  is  merely  the  prob- 
lem of  evolution  stated  from  the  standpoint  of  the  cell.'  "Whether 
variations  first  arise  in  the  idioplasm,  as  Weismann  maintains,  or 
whether  they  may  arise  in  the  body  cells  and  then  be  reflected  back 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  321 

upon  the  idioplasm,  is  a  question  upon  which  the  study  of  the  cell  has 
not  thus  far  thrown  a  ray  of  light." 

Finally,  Professor  Wilson  considers  the  nature  and  origin  of 
coordinated  fitness  as  the  fundamental  problem  of  biology.  In  this 
regard  there  is  an  enormous  gap  between  the  lowest  forms  of  life  and 
the  inorganic  world  which  the  study  of  the  cell  has  only  served  to 
widen.  With  Wigand  and  Driesch  the  author  thus,  apparently,  returns 
to  a  form  of  vitalism  which,  for  the  present  at  least,  seems  the  only 
justifiable  course. 

The  book  is  written  in  good  literary  English,  an  unusual  thing  in 
recent  biological  works,  and,  although  dealing  with  some  very  abstruse 
and  obscure  themes,  it  is  remarkably  clear  and  logical  throughout. 
Professor  Wilson's  style  is  that  of  a  teacher  at  his  best,  precise,  con- 
cise, enthusiastic.  In  typography  and  illustration  the  volume  is  a 
model  of  excellence ;  many  of  the  figures  are  entirely  new  and  few  of 
them  have  ever  before  appeared  in  a  general  work  of  this  character. 

Considering  the  great  amount  of  ground  covered  there  are  remark- 
ably few  errors  in  the  volume.  Perhaps  the  most  important  one  is  as 
to  Van  Beneden's  view  on  the  origin  of  the  centrosomes  of  the  first 
cleavage  spindle  (pp.  156-7).  This  Professor  Wilson  has  already 
corrected  (Science,  Jan.  i,  '97).  Another  error,  of  minor  importance, 
however,  is  the  statement  (p.  113)  that  the  amoeboid  egg  cells  of 
Coalenterates  probably  do  not  ingulf  other  cells. 

To  me  it  seems  that  the  feature  which  is  most  open  to  serious 
criticism  is  one  which  gives  the  work  one  of  its  particular  charms, 
•viz,  its  enthusiasm  and,  in  some  places,  its  controversial  spirit.  Pro- 
fessor Wilson  frequently  uses  strong  language,  sometimes  stronger 
than  seems  to  be  justified.  He  speaks  of  a  certain  abandoned  theory 
as  having  been  '  absolutely  proved  to  be  a  myth.'  He  says  the  Roux- 
Weismann  hypothesis  of  qualitative  nuclear  divisions  u  is  as  complete 
an  a  priori  assumption  as  any  that  the  history  of  scholasticism  can 
show  and  every  fact  opposed  to  it  has  been  met  by  equally  baseless 
subsidiary  hypotheses."  Examined  in  the  light  of  the  facts  "the  im- 
probability of  the  hypothesis  becomes  so  great  that  it  loses  all  sem- 
blance to  reality"  (p.  307).  And  yet  a  few  pages  further  on  (p.  321) 
he  strongly  supports  the  most  fundamental  part  of  the  Roux-Weismann 
theory,  viz.,  that  nuclei  progressively  become  qualitatively  different 
throughout  the  development.  Since  the  only  point  of  difference, 
therefore,  between  Professor  Wilson  and  the  Roux-Weismann  theory 
is  as  to  the  method  by  which  these  qualitative  differences  of  the  nuclei 
arise,  such  strong  statements  as  those  just  quoted  scarcely  seem  justified. 


322  NEUROLOGY  AND  PHYSIOLOGY. 

Again,  in  the  matter  of  the  origin  and  significance  of  the  centrosomes 
in  fertilization  he  goes  much  farther,  I  think,  than  the  facts  warrant. 
It  is  true  that  in  the  majority  of  known  cases  the  centrosomes  of  the 
first  cleavage  spindle  come  from  the  spermatozoon,  and  Professor 
Wilson  has  been  most  active  in  establishing  this  fact,  but  there  are 
cases  in  which  these  centrosomes  are  known  to  come  from  the  ovum, 
and,  until  we  know  whether  the  centrosome  is  really  a  permanent  cell 
organ  or  not,  it  is  too  soon  to  assert  that  the  point  of  origin  of  the 
centrosome  is  a  matter  of  primary  significance  or  that  ' '  the  centrosome 
is  the  fertilizing  element  proper." 

These  are,  however,  criticisms  of  minor  significance.  As  a  whole 
the  work  is  a  remarkably  able  and  comprehensive  presentation  of  the 
most  important  biological  problems  of  the  day  and  it  easily  takes  first 
rank  among  books  of  its  class. 

E.    G.    CONKLIN. 

UNIVERSITY  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

Atlas  of  Nerve  Cells.  M.  ALLEN  STARR,  M.D.,  PH.D.,  With  the 
cooperation  of  OLIVER  S.  STRONG,  A.M.,  PH.D.,  and  EDWARD 
LEAMING,  M.D.,  F.R.P.S.  With  fifty-three  plates  and  thirteen 
diagrams.  New  York,  Columbia  University  Press,  Macmillan, 
1896.  Pp.  78. 

The  revolution  in  methods  of  nervous  histology  brought  about  by 
Golgi's  discovery  of  the  possibility  of  defining  nerve  cells  and  pro- 
cesses by  a  precipitation  of  metallic  salts  about  the  elements  has  been 
followed  by  an  activity  in  research  in  that  field  which  has  hardly  a 
scientific  parallel.  As  might  be  expected,  we  are  now  reaping  the  re- 
sults and  without  regarding  the  rather  startling  speculations  as  to  cell 
function  which  have  made  their  appearance  during  the  last  twelve- 
month, the  fairly  well  established  and  probably  valid  conclusions  ar- 
rived at  are  of  great  interest  and  importance.  We  are  no  longer  to 
consider  the  central  nervous  system  as  made  up  of  nerve  cells  and 
nerve  fibres  but  of  units,  each  consisting  of  a  nerve  cell  with  its  pro- 
cesses, of  which  one  is  greatly  prolonged  and  is  our  old  nerve  fibre 
while  the  shorter  cell  processes  which  were  formerly  delegated  to  the 
uninteresting  duty  of  nutrition  are  now  elevated  to  the  dignity  of 
auxiliary  receptive  functional  parts.  We  no  longer  have  our  cell  with 
its  axis  cylinder  and  protoplasmic  processes  but  have  a  '  neuron '  as 
our  unit,  made  up  of  a  cell  with  its  '  neuraxon'  and  its  '  dendrites.' 

More  interesting  still  is  the  demonstration  of  lack  of  continuity  be- 
tween these  units,  the  nervous  impulse  traversing  the  series  of  neu- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  323 

rons  by  contiguity.  This  anatomical  independence,  while  perhaps  not 
proven  beyond  cavil,  may  at  least  be  accepted  as  highly  probable. 
These  facts  together  with  the  demonstration  of  the  collateral  branches 
of  the  neuraxons  are  the  essentials  of  the  discoveries  of  the  last  few 
years  and  need  only  be  mentioned  to  obtain  recognition  of  their  im- 
portance as  furnishing  a  scientific  basis  for  physiological  and  pathologi- 
cal theory. 

In  the  superb  atlas  before  us,  Dr.  Starr  has  undertaken  to  show 
by  photographs  the  state  of  things  at  the  present  day.  It  may  as  well 
be  said  at  once  that,  considering  the  methods  used,  little  criticism  can 
be  offered.  Dr.  Strong,  who  is  responsible  for  the  preparations,  has 
attained  a  perfection  of  technique  that  leaves  nothing  to  be  desired, 
Dr.  Learning's  mastery  of  micro-photography  is  well  known  and  Dr. 
Starr's  explanatory  text  is  characteristically  clear  and  comparatively 
conservative.  The  shortcomings  of  the  work  are  the  limitations  of  the 
methods.  No  photograph  can  show  more  than  one  level  of  a  section 
and  it  can  focus  but  a  small  area  and  as  a  consequence  much  that  is 
strikingly  evident  upon  a  single  turn  of  the  adjustment  of  the  micro- 
scope must  be  taken  on  faith.  In  other  words,  one  good  slide  under  the 
microscope  is  worth  all  the  photographs  in  the  world  in  acquiring  an 
idea  of  the  object.  This  is,  of  course,  a  difficulty  inherent  in  the 
means  and  the  authors  have  been  very  judicious  in  their  choice  of  levels 
of  the  sections  which  would  minimize  the  disadvantage.  Further,  the 
Golgi  method,  valuable  as  it  is,  is  gross.  It  blots  out  details  of  cell 
structure  in  the  most  ruthless  way  and  we  are  still  in  need  of  a  cell 
stain  for  finer  work  on  which  to  base  functional  conclusions.  The 
object  of  the  atlas  is,  of  course,  mainly  anatomical ;  at  the  same  time 
Dr.  Starr's  text  does  not  neglect  the  physiological  aspect  of  the  ques- 
tion and  there  are  numerous  digressions  on  that  side  which  deserve 
notice.  Particular  attention  is  called  to  the  brief  discussion  of  the 
mechanism  of  reflex  action  in  the  cord  on  pp.  24  and  25,  in  con- 
nection with  the  function  of  '  collaterals'  and  the  length  of  the  reflex 
arc  which  may  extend  and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  probably  normally  does 
extend  several  segments  up  and  down  the  cord  from  the  point  of  en- 
trance of  the  sensory  impulse.  This  is  the  clearest  statement  of  this 
phase  of  reflex  action  which  has  come  to  the  notice  of  the  writer  and 
it  is  a  phase  too  much  neglected  by  contemporary  writers  on  general 
physiology.  To  sum  up,  the  work  is  good  in  all  its  aspects  and  the  ob- 
vious question  whether  it  is  all  worth  while  is  not  to  be  answered  by 
any  individual.  It  is  not  so  much  an  original  contribution  as  a  resum£ 
of  progress  already  made  and,  as  indicated  above,  so  far  as  that  can 


324  VISION. 

be  shown  by  photography  it  is  admirably  done.  As  a  specimen  of 
book  making  the  atlas  is  magnificent,  but  the  price  is  prohibitive  for 
students  and  probably  for  many  laboratories.  It  would  be  a  great  ser- 
vice if  the  plates  could  be  reproduced  by  a  cheaper  process  and  sold 
separately  to  aid  class  room  demonstration. 

LIVINGSTON  FARRAND. 
COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY. 


VISION. 

Ueber  die  functionellen  Verschiedenheiten  des  Netzhaut-  Centrums 

und  der    Nachbartheile.     PROFESSOR   v.    KRIES.     Archiv    fur 

Ophthalmologie,  XLII.,  (3),  95-133. 

Professor  v.  Kries  here  replies  to  Koster  (see  this  REVIEW,  Vol. 
III.,  p.  1 08  and  p.  231)  who  doubts  the  conclusiveness  of  the  con- 
siderations which  go  to  show  that  the  cones  are  the  seat  of  color-sen- 
sation, while  the  rods  furnish  us  with  sensations  of  gray  of  different 
degrees  of  brightness ;  he  makes  a  very  strong  showing  in  favor  of  the 
thesis  which  he  defends,  and  his  able  summing  up  of  all  the  evidence 
can  hardly  fail  to  carry  conviction. 

V.  Kries  finds  that  the  Purkinje  phenomenon  (the  increased  rela- 
tive brightness  of  blue  in  a  faint  light)  does  not  occur  in  the  fovea ; 
that  Koster  differs  with  him  on  this  point  is  plainly  owing  to  the  fact 
that  he  is  unaware  of  the  extreme  difficulty  of  looking  at  anything 
with  the  fovea  when  the  light  is  faint, — there  is  an  almost  irresistible 
pull  in  favor  of  using  an  adjoining  part  of  the  retina  on  account  of 
its  superior  efficiency.  The  strongest  of  all  the  arguments  is  that  two 
grays  composed  of  different  complementary  colors,  if  made  to  look 
equally  bright  at  an  ordinary  illumination,  no  longer  look  so  in  a 
faint  light, — it  is  difficult  to  believe  that  only  a  single  apparatus  is  in- 
volved in  furnishing  the  sensation  at  the  two  extremes,  if  adaptation 
works  so  differently  upon  lights  of  different  composition ;  when  both 
terms  of  the  comparison  are  of  the  same  quality,  gray,  the  difficulty 
which  is  always  felt  in  comparing  different  light-qualities  in  respect 
to  their  intensity  does  not  arise,  and  hence  the  experiment  in  this 
case  is  of  a  peculiarly  convincing  nature.  Recurrent  vision  v.  Kries 
has  already  attributed  to  a  distinct  functioning  of  the  rods,  and  he 
finds  now  that  a  patient  who  was  suffering  from  night  blindness 
(which  had  already  been  made  out  by  Parinaud,  in  1883,  to  be  due  to 
a  lack  of  visual  purple)  wholly  failed  to  get  the  recurrent  image. 
Koster  found  a  discrepancy  between  the  extent  of  the  fovea  and  the 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  325 

area  of  the  space  within  which  adaptation  does  not  occur ;  v.  Kries 
has  now  measured  the  functional  fovea  (as  this  latter  retinal  space 
may  be  called)  by  several  different  methods  and  finds  an  extremely 
good  agreement  with  the  size  of  the  anatomical  fovea  as  lately  de- 
termined by  Koster.  The  diameter  of  the  functional  fovea,  when  pro- 
jected to  a  distance  of  one  meter  from  the  observer,  was  found  by  the 
different  methods  to  be : 

By  Purkinje  phenomenon,         .  .         .         59  mm. 

By  same  for  two  dichromates,  .         .         .    35  mm. 

By  recurrent  vision,           .         .  .          .         36mm. 

By  same  for  another  observer,  .         .         .    52  mm. 

Koster's  anatomical  determination  gives  for  the  rod  less  space 
33  mm.  and  for  the  space  within  which  the  rods  are  very  few  53  mm. 
The  coincidence  is,  therefore,  very  close ;  it  is  also  possible  that  a  bet- 
ter method  may  yet  be  devised  for  the  determination  of  the  functional 
defective  area. 

C.  L.  FRANKLIN. 

BALTIMORE. 

Uber   kompensatorische    Raddrehungen    der    Augen.        W.    A. 

NAGEL.    Zeitschr.  f.  Psych,  u.  Physiol.  d.  Sinnesorg.    XII.,  331- 

354.     1896. 

When  the  head  is  inclined  sideways,  do  the  eyes  rotate  about  the 
sagittal  axis  in  the  opposite  direction,  or  do  they  retain  their  normal 
positions  in  the  head  without  rotation  ?  This  question  has  been  argued 
much  on  both  sides.  It  had  been  practically  settled  in  favor  of  rota- 
tion until  1894,  when  Contejean  and  Delmas  again  disputed  it. 
Nagel  again  proves  the  existence  of  rotation  by  several  methods.  It 
can  be  seen  directly  on  the  eye  of  another  person,  or  on  the  reflection 
of  one's  own  eye  in  a  properly  arranged  mirror,  by  observing  the  posi- 
tion of  the  radial  lines  of  the  iris.  Care  must  be  taken  to  prevent 
change  in  the  direction  of  the  line  of  regard,  that  there  may  be  rota- 
tion only  about  it.  The  ray-like  figure,  due  to  irregular  astigmatism, 
seen  proceeding  from  distant  luminous  points,  will  also  demonstrate 
the  rotation  if  the  direction  of  its  rays,  which  show  the  eye's  position, 
be  compared  with  lines  on  a  spectacle-lens  whose  position  is  fixed 
relatively  to  the  head.  A  third  method  makes  use  of  after-images. 
The  denial  of  rotation  above  mentioned  was  based  on  measurement  of 
the  position  of  the  blind  spot,  determined  by  suitable  diagrams  for  dif- 
ferent positions  of  the  head.  Nagel  uses  this  same  method  for  quan- 
titative measurements.  When  the  head  is  inclined  20°,  he  finds  \  of 


3 26  VISION. 

this  compensated  by  rotation ;  the  proportion  grows  gradually  less  up 
to  80°,  where  it  is  ^. 

Experiments  on  animals  show  similar  movements  of  rotation  in 
many  cases.  Animals  whose  eyes  are  placed  in  the  side  of  the  head 
and  have  no  common  field  of  regard  show  rotation  when  the  head  is 
inclined  not  sideways  but  in  the  sagittal  plane.  It  varies  in  degree 
from  full  compensation  in  case  of  guinea  pigs  to  its  entire  absence  in 
some  birds,  where  it  is  replaced  by  compensatory  head  movements. 
The  mechanism  for  initiating  these  movements  of  rotation  is  situated 
in  the  labyrinth.  E.  B.  DELABARRK. 

BROWN  UNIVERSITY. 


EXPERIMENTAL. 

Die  motorischen    Wortvorstellungen.     RAYMOND  DODGE.     Halle, 

Niemayer.      1896.     Pp.  78. 

Mr.  Dodge  gives  an  admirable  introspective  study  of  his  own 
verbal  imagery,  analyzing  it  in  all  its  varieties.  Silent  thinking  in 
words  is  for  him  mainly  an  inner  speaking.  But  reproduced  articula- 
tory  images  are  not  the  only  element.  Connected  with  each  word  it 
is  possible  to  represent  vaguely  the  essence  of  all  that  the  whole  sen- 
tence is  intended  to  express.  Although  he  can  never  represent  clearly 
two  words  at  once,  or  even  a  single  word  in  all  its  parts,  yet  the 
shadowy  sentence-image  is  made  up  of  many  simultaneous  verbal  im- 
ages of  lesser  clearness,  and  is  not  identical  with  the  speechless  mean- 
ing or  concept,  which  the  full  sentence  expresses.  The  characteristic 
elements  of  the  words  themselves  are  reproductions  of  the  movement- 
feeling  which  arises  in  actual  speaking;  derived  mostly  from  lips, 
tongue  and  throat,  less  clearly  and  characteristically  from  breast  and 
thorax.  Contact  and  vibration  sensations  are  present,  but  not  essen- 
tial, as  was  shown  for  the  former  by  producing  through  cocain  a 
strong  anaesthesia  of  lips,  tongue  and  throat.  Strieker's  assertion, 
that  no  sensory  elements  are  present  in  his  motor  verbal  images,  and 
that  they  consist  in  innervation-images,  is  shown  to  be  indefensible. 
It  is  impossible  that  sensory  motor  images  can  be  entirely  lacking, 
whether  innervation- feelings  exist  or  not;  and  D.  can  find  by  intro- 
spection no  trace  of  the  latter.  Peripherally  aroused  sensations  from 
actual  articulatory  movements  are  not  essential  for  inner  speech ;  their 
reproduced  images  suffice.  When  present,  they  raise  the  mental  pres- 
entation of  words  to  greater  clearness.  Unusual  and  incompatible 
positions  of  the  mouth  disturb  the  mental  presentation  of  a  sound  for 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  327 

a  moment  only ;  and  show  not  that  particular  peripheral  sensations 
must  be  present,  but  that  strong  peripheral  sensations  of  another  kind 
may  inhibit  for  a  moment  the  desired  verbal  image. 

In  addition  to  the  reproductions  of  motor  sensations,  there  must  be 
other  elements  in  the  verbal  image.  For  articulatory  movements 
alone,  unpreceded  by  the  idea  of  expressing  a  word,  do  not  neces- 
sarily awaken  a  verbal  idea.  The  latter  possesses  a  filling,  a  fullness 
which  can  be  given  only  by  a  sort  of  unlocalized,  faded-out  auditory 
imagery,  which  never  attains  an  independent,  clear  and  recognizable 
reproduction.  No  trace  of  visual  elements  can  be  detected  in  any 
recognizable  characteristic  of  the  word-image.  It  is  shown,  however, 
that  they  must  be  aroused  to  a  certain  extent,  unconsciously  influencing 
and  controlling  the  conscious  imagery.  Images  derived  from  writing 
movements  cannot  be  detected  or  inferred,  unless  when  a  word  is 
spelled.  In  short,  motor  images  are  prominent,  and  are  recognizable 
as  such ;  auditory  images  are  not  recognizable  as  such,  but  furnish  a 
recognizable  portion  of  the  content ;  visual  images  cannot  be  detected 
in  any  conscious  feature  of  the  content,  but  their  presence  is  evidenced 
by  their  control. 

Similar  thorough  analyses,  with  inferences  as  to  the  brain-paths 
used,  are  given  of  the  verbal  elements  present,  prominently  or 
vaguely,  in  speaking  aloud,  in  hearing,  in  reading  and  in  writing. 
Whichever  one  of  the  four  kinds  of  word  elements  is  most  promi- 
nently aroused,  its  firm  association  with  the  others  arouses  them  also, 
though  not  all  with  equal  distinctness.  Where  they  are  not  consci- 
ously distinguishable,  yet  their  unconsciously  aroused  traces  influence 
the  conscious  content.  The  motor  images  are  always  of  demonstrably 
greatest  importance,  in  motor  speech  for  determining  it,  in  sensory  for 
understanding  it.  Auditory,  visual  and  motor  types  of  individuals  do 
not  exist  in  the  sense  that  one  or  the  other  element  is  present  exclu- 
sively in  any  of  their  verbal  images ;  they  consist  only  in  the  prom- 
inence of  one  element  over  the  others,  all  of  which  must  be  present. 

E.  B.  DKLABARRE. 
BROWN  UNIVERSITY. 


Ueber   das    Geddchtniss  fur    Sinnestvahrnehmungen.       W.    VON 
TSCHISCH.     Dritter  Internat.  Congress  f.  Psychologic.    (Munich, 
J.  F.  Lehmann,  1897.)     Pp.  95-109. 
This  paper,  read  at  the  Psychological   Congress,  is  a  report   of 

several  investigations  upon  memory  carried  on  at  the  Dorpat  Labora- 


EXPERIMENTAL. 

tory.  The  questions  taken  up  were  the  space  sense  (Raumsinn), 
position  sense  (Ortssinn),  active  and  passive  muscle  sense,  active 
movement,  sight,  sound  intensity  and  tones.  These  were  studied  by 
different  investigators,  under  the  direction  of  Professor  von  Tschisch, 
who  took  personal  charge  of  the  one  on  sound  intensity. 

The  method  pursued,  with  two  exceptions,  was  that  of  Right  and 
Wrong  Cases.  For  the  sense  of  space,  distances  on  the  skin  were  used 
as  stimuli ;  for  the  muscle  sense,  weights ;  for  sight,  light  impressions 
of  different  intensities ;  for  sound  intensity,  sounds  of  the  same  pitch 
but  different  intensities ;  and  for  tones,  sounds  of  the  same  intensity 
and  different  pitches.  The  stimuli  were  given  in  pairs ;  the  subject 
was  required  to  designate  the  louder,  higher,  brighter,  etc.,  as  the 
case  might  be.  The  proportion  of  right  answers  to  wrong  was  noted, 
judgment  of  equality  being  ruled  out. 

Having  determined  a  pair  of  stimuli  which  could  be  distinguished 
correctly  by  the  subject  in  about  70  cases  out  of  too  when  given  in 
close  succession,  this  pair  was  adopted  for  subsequent  tests,  in  which 
an  interval  of  time  was  made  to  elapse  between  the  two  stimulations. 
The  interval,  at  first  short,  was  increased  by  empirical  steps  (which 
varied  in  the  different  investigations)  until  some  marked  diminution 
of  the  percentage  of  right  answers,  usually  below  50%,  was  obtained. 
When  necessary  to  prevent  the  memory  from  lingering  over  from  one 
trial  to  the  next,  different  pairs  of  stimuli  were  used  alternatively  in 
the  same  series.  The  interval  of  time  at  which  a  marked  falling  off 
in  the  percentage  of  right  answers  occurred  was  taken  as  measure  of 
the  strength  of  memory  in  each  case. 

In  two  investigations  in  which  the  method  of  Mean  Errors  was 
used,  the  same  general  procedure  was  employed ;  the  interval  of  time 
at  which  a  marked  increase  in  value  of  the  mean  error  occurred  was 
made  the  measure  of  the  strength  of  memory. 

The  space  sense  was  investigated  by  means  of  a  pair  of  compasses, 
the  place  chosen  being  the  right  forearm.  7°  mm.  was  taken  as  nor- 
mal distance,  but  tests  were  made  for  greater  and  lesser  distances  as 
well.  For  the  sense  of  position,  the  left  forearm  was  chosen ;  a  point 
was  touched  by  the  experimenter  with  a  pencil,  and  the  subject  en- 
deavored to  touch  the  same  spot  with  another  pencil  held  in  his  right 
hand  ;  a  screen  prevented  the  arm  from  being  seen  by  the  subject,  who 
was  allowed  to  '  feel  around '  for  the  spot  after  touching.  In  this  in- 
vestigation the  method  of  Mean  Errors  was  used.  The  muscle  sense 
was  investigated  by  means  of  copper  cylinders,  of  uniform  size  and 
varying  weight.  For  the  passive  muscle  sense  these  were  laid  upon 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  329 

the  palm  of  the  subject's  hand  for  the  space  of  three  seconds  and  then 
removed;  for  the  active  muscle  sense  they  were  placed  by  the  investi- 
gator between  the  subject's  thumb  and  fore-finger,  and  raised  by  him. 
Active  movement  was  investigated  by  requiring  the  subject  to  move 
his  hand  slowly  to  the  right  or  left.  A  thin  stick  attached  to  the 
hand,  with  a  pointer  extending  upward  to  a  scale,  served  to  mark  the 
angle  of  flexion ;  in  the  first  of  each  pair  of  experiments  the  length  of 
movement  was  regulated  by  a  knob  which  the  hand  encountered ; 
this  obstruction  was  then  removed,  and  the  subject  required  to  repeat 
the  movement.  The  method  of  Mean  Errors  was  employed  here  also. 
The  investigations  in  sight  made  use  of  the  shadow  cast  by  a  steel  bar 
upon  a  white  surface,  with  varying  distances  of  the  light-source. 
For  sound  intensity,  steel  balls  were  dropped  from  varying  heights  on 
a  wood  surface.  The  last  study  was  one  on  tone  differences ;  five 
tuning-forks  were  employed,  which  differed  by  four  vibrations,  from 
436  up.  For  musical  subjects  differences  of  four  vibrations  were 
used;  for  unmusical  subjects  differences  of  eight  vibrations  were 
chosen,  as  this  was  nearer  their  perception  threshold. 

Comparing  the  results  of  the  several  investigations,  Professor  von 
Tschisch  finds  the  memory  for  space  to  be  weakest ;  it  falls  off  in  ex- 
actness the  soonest.  Memory  for  position  and  the  muscle  sense  is 
somewhat  better  developed.  Memory  for  active  movement  and  the 
higher  senses  is  decidedly  stronger.  The  memory  for  sight  and  sound, 
and  in  the  latter  sense  for  intensity  and  quality,  appears  to  be  about 
the  same ;  in  these  three  the  percentage  of  right  answers  falls  from 
70  to  about  50  in  15  minutes,  for  normal  individuals. 

H.  C.  WARREN. 
PRINCETON. 

Experimentelle  Studien  iiber  Associationen.  I.  Theil.  Die  Associa- 
tionen  im  normalen  Zustande.  GUSTAV  ASCHAFFENBURG.  Leip- 
zig, Engelmann.  1895.  Pp.  95. 

Dr.  Aschaffenburg's  aim  in  his  experimental  study  of  association 
is  the  establishment  of  a  method  of  diagnosis  in  cases  of  nervous  dis- 
ease. The  published  part  of  his  work  deals  with  normal  associations 
as  basis  for  the  later  study  of  neurasthenic  cases.  The  methods  em- 
ployed are  the  simple  ones  of  older  experimental  tests.  A  word  is 
pronounced  to  the  subject  who  responds  by  writing  down  or  by  pro- 
nouncing the  first  suggested  word;  or  (in  one  form  of  the  experi- 
ment) by  writing  down,  as  quickly  as  possible,  the  first  hundred  words 
occurring  to  him.  There  are  4,400  single  cases  of  association,  with 


33°  EXPERIMENTAL. 

17  subjects,  in  series  usually  of  100,  but  occasionally  of  200  or  of  50 
words.  In  2,300  of  these  single  cases  the  associated  word  is  pro- 
nounced, and  the  time  intervening  between  beginning  of  stimulus  and 
beginning  of  reaction  is  measured  by  the  use  of  Cattell's  lip-key,  con- 
nected with  a  Hipp  chronoscope.  Verbal  associates  only  are  studied, 
without  reference  to  the  accompanying  images,  usually  visual, 
whether  these  amplified  the  suggested  words  or  differ  from  them. 

Dr.  Aschaffenburg's  theory  and  terminology  are  frankly  Herbar- 
tian ;  his  classification  is  first  the  ordinary  distinction  of  what  Wundt 
calls  External  and  Internal  Association,  and  then  a  more  detailed 
division,  mainly  on  the  basis  of  that  of  Krapelin.  The  problem  of 
the  experiments  is  the  assignment  of  every  associated  word  to  its 
proper  class,  and  the  author  emphasizes,  with  praiseworthy  iteration, 
the  absolute  need  in  work  of  this  sort  of  the  cooperation  of  the  sub- 
ject, who  alone  can  decide  whether  a  given  association  is,  for  example, 
one  of  '  subordination '  or  of  '  predicative  relation.'  The  results  of  this 
detailed  classification  are,  however,  very  meagre  and  justify  no  definite 
conclusions,  as  Dr.  Aschaffenburg,  who  is  most  modest  in  his  claims, 
very  freely  acknowledges.  This  failure  supports  the  writer  of  this 
review  in  the  conviction  that  the  results  of  such  minute  classification 
of  material  so  elusive,  are  always  incommensurate  with  the  doubts 
and  difficulties  of  the  undertaking.  On  the  other  hand,  the  experi- 
ments clearly  justify  the  ordinary  observation  that  associations  of  the 
concrete,  matter-of-fact  variety  predominate  strongly  over  the  more 
focalized  and  abstract,  for  an  excess  of  external  over  internal  associa- 
tions is  noticed  with  every  subject  and  in  every  form  of  experiment. 
A  slight  decrease  in  time  also  distinguishes  these  external  associations. 

The  most  significant  outcome  of  the  experiments  is  perhaps  their 
demonstration  that  the  absolute  reaction-time  of  a  subject  affords  no 
important  psychic  test,  since  the  reaction-times  of  different  normal 
individuals  vary  in  so  marked  a  degree  (p.  67).  While,  for  instance, 
the  average  association-time  of  eight  subjects  varies  between  i,i8o<r 
and  i  ,426*7,  it  falls  in  the  case  of  one  subject  to  9270-,  and  rises  with 
another  to  2,151*7,  though  the  conditions  are  the  usual  ones,  and 
though  there  is  no  marked  individual  eccentricity  to  explain  the  diverg- 
ence. Dr.  Aschaffenburg  properly  insists,  therefore,  that  length  or 
brevity  of  reaction-time  cannot  be  supposed  to  distinguish  the  diseased 
from  the  sound  subject  or  the  abnormal  from  the  normal  state.  Con- 
ditions of  fatigue  or  of  emotional  disturbance  do,  however,  affect  the 
associations  by  occasioning  interruptions  in  the  continued  series,  and 
by  augmenting  the  tendency  to  associate  words  through  their  sound — 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  331 

alliterative  or  rhyming  words — and  to  respond  by  mere  disconnected 
repetitions  of  former  words.  From  the  consideration  of  these  char- 
acteristics of  association  Dr.  Aschaffenburg  will  proceed  to  his 
study  of  association  in  abnormal  subjects.  Incidentally,  the  mono- 
graph treats  other  topics :  community  of  associations,  accepted  as  an 
evidence  of  the  lack  of  originality  (p.  92)  ;  the  difficulty  of  assigning 
with  certainty  the  period  of  life  to  which  associated  images  date  back 
(p.  87);  and  finally,  the  grammatical  type  of  associations  (p.  82). 
The  associated  words,  as  Krapelin  had  indicated,  are  chiefly  nouns, 
but  three  of  the  thirteen  subjects  respond  with  a  large  number  of 
verbs,  while  another  often  associates  adjectives.  The  author  is  unable, 
however,  to  trace  these  types,  which  correspond  with  those  suggested 
by  Miinsterberg  (Beitrage,  IV.),  to  any  characteristics  of  individual 
thought. 

MARY  WHITON  CALKINS. 
WKLLESLEY  COLLEGE. 


Ueber  die  Wahrnehmung  -von  Druckanderungen  bei  verschiedenen 

Geschtuindigkeiten.      GEORGE   MALCOLM    STRATTON.      Philo- 

sophische  Studien,  Band  XII.,  Heft  4. 

Dr.  Stratton's  experiments  seem  to  have  been  carefully  made,  and 
are  discussed  with  considerable  acumen.  Were  it  not  for  what  is,  per- 
haps, a  fundamental  error  in  the  interpretation  of  results,  the  work 
would  be  far  above  the  average  thesis  in  psychology. 

The  first  of  the  three  sets  of  experiments  made  by  the  writer  was 
on  the  accuracy  of  momentary  pressure  changes.  The  method  used 
was  that  of  minimal  changes.  The  stimulus  was  applied  by  a  system 
of  levers  to  the  little  finger.  The  results  of  560  determinations  show 
clearly  that  a  change  in  the  pressure  could  be  perceived  before  the 
direction  of  the  change,  and  that  the  perception  of  an  increase  of  pres- 
sure is  more  accurate  than  that  of  a  decrease.  Weber's  law  was  found 
to  hold  for  75-200  g. 

In  discussing  these  results  Dr.  Stratton  concludes  that  the  process 
involved  is  similar  to  that  of  absolute  threshold  perception  rather  than 
that  of  difference  discrimination.  The  greater  accuracy  of  perception 
for  increase  of  pressure  is  ascribed  to  the  intensifying  effect  of  atten- 
tion, the  writer  rejecting  the  fatigue  hypothesis  of  Hall  and  Motora, 
who  had  observed  the  same  phenomenon. 

In  interpreting  his  experiments  Dr.  Stratton  assumes  that  the 
stimulus  is  pure  pressure,  and  goes  so  far  as  to  regret  that  movement 
cannot  be  entirely  excluded.  Does  he  suppose  that  a  sensation  of 


33 2  EXPERIMENTAL. 

t 

pressure  is  possible  without  movement  ?  The  fact  is,  as  can  be  shown 
by  the  simplest  experiments,  that  constant  pressure,  if  below  the  pain 
threshold,  soon  ceases  to  effect  consciousness.  Pressure  without  move- 
ment cannot,  therefore,  be  considered  a  stimulus  at  all,  or  classed  to- 
gether with  other  sensory  stimuli.  Gustatory  and  olfactory  stimuli,  it 
is  true,  seem  to  lose  their  effect  gradually,  but  this  phenomenon  is 
easily  explained  by  fatigue.  Fatigue  cannot,  however,  be  caused  by 
a  pressure  so  small  that  we  can  hardly  perceive  it.  Dr.  Stratton's  as- 
sumption is  all  the  more  remarkable  in  view  of  his  recognition  of  the 
resemblance  of  the  process  to  that  of  threshold  perception.  He  him- 
self observed  that  the  change  in  pressure  seemed  to  him  but  a  slight 
touch  of  the  stimulated  surface. 

In  another  series  of  experiments  the  writer  investigated  the  effect 
of  variations  in  the  rate  of  change  on  the  accuracy  of  perception.  The 
rate  of  change  of  the  stimulus  was  regulated  by  the  application  of 
Archimedes'  law  of  fluid  pressure,  as  in  the  other  experiments.  The 
method  of  minimal  changes  was  used.  The  least  perceptible  increase 
was  found  to  be  inversely  related  to  the  rate  of  change,  a  result  exactly 
the  opposite  of  that  obtained  by  Hall  and  Motora.  But  instead  of 
rejecting  contemptuously  the  work  of  the  previous  investigators,  as 
many  experimental  psychologists  would  have  done,  Dr.  Stratton  re- 
peated the  experiments  of  Hall  and  Motora  and  got  the  same  results. 
The  discrepancy  between  the  results  of  the  two  sets  of  experiments 
must,  therefore,  be  due  to  the  methods  employed.  The  increase  of 
the  threshold  from  decrease  of  the  rate  of  change  is  explained  by  the 
effect  of  attention  and  the  conditions  of  the  observer's  reaction.  In 
support  of  this  view  the  writer  offers  considerable  evidence.  The  op- 
posing results  he  explains  on  the  supposition  that  differences  are  more 
easily  perceived,  the  closer  the  objects  to  be  compared.  How  this 
applies  to  continuous  changes  is  not  clear.  Had  the  writer  not  started 
with  what  is,  I  believe,  a  radical  misconception  of  pressure  phenomena, 
he  would  not  have  rejected  so  hastily  the  physiological  interpretation. 

HAROLD  GRIPPING. 

NEW  YORK. 

Mesure  de  la  Clarte  de  quelques  Representations  Sensorielles.    M. 

FOUCAULT.     Revue  Phil.,  Dec.,  1896. 

The  problem  set  out  for  investigation  is  the  determination  of  sensi- 
ble discrimination  for  weight  or  pressure.  The  method  employed  is 
that  of  right  and  wrong  cases.  Small  boxes  of  uniform  size  were 
used,  in  which  the  different  weights  were  placed.  The  experiments 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  333 

were  tried  on  the  back  of  the  hand,  always  in  the  same  place  during 
same  series.  The  subject  was  not  permitted  to  see  the  weights,  the 
results  were  withheld  from  him,  and  the  order  in  which  the  different 
weights  were  tried  was  made  irregular.  By  clearness  of  a  representation 
is  meant  the  degree  of  certainty  with  which  it  can  be  distinguished 
from  any  other  representation.  Expressed  quantitatively ;  if  v  represent 
the  right  cases,  and  d  the  wrong  cases,  the  clearness  will  be  expressed 

v  —  d 
by  the  formula  -      — ^ .     The  clearness  of  the  representation  is  not  the 

same  as  its  intensity.  It  varies  with  the  fatigue,  degree  of  attention, 
etc.,  and  not  always  in  the  same  direction  as  the  intensity.  The  func- 
tional relation  between  clearness  and  intensity  has  not  been  determined 
experimentally,  but  it  may  be  said  that,  in  general,  the  greatest  clearness 
is  obtained  from  mean  excitation.  M.  Foucault's  problem  then  is  to 
establish  a  '  clearness-scale,'  proceeding  from  the  point  where  the  two 
weights  are  not  accurately  discriminated.  The  utility  of  such  a  series 
of  experiments  is:  (i)  the  determination  of  the  variability  of  sensible 
discrimination.  (2)  A  clearness  scale  will  afford  a  means  of  com- 
parison between  senses  qualitatively  different.  (3)  "The  determina- 
tion of  the  mean  clearness  for  a  certain  kind  of  perception,  will  furnish 
also  a  measure  of  sensibility  for  that  stimulus."  (4)  Such  a  study 
furnishes  an  analysis  in  quantitative  terms  of  different  mental  func- 
tions. Here  we  determine  the  function  directly  by  the  relative  ease 
with  which  the  mind  discriminates.  (5)  Lastly,  we  shall  determine 
the  type  of  the  subject.  In  this  series  of  experiments  M.  Foucault 
makes  out  two  distinct  types  of  imagination. 

The  results  are  as  follows :  I.  Determination  of  mean  clearness. 
There  were  eight  subjects.  Four  series  of  experiments  were  taken 
(540  ex.  in  each  series,  240  on  each  subject).  The  weights  varied 
from  1 8  to  20  gr.  and  were  tried  in  two  directions,  i.  (The  clearness 
varies  for  different  subjects.)  2.  This  difference  (i  to  4  gr.)  is  in  all 
the  cases  less  than  one-third  of  the  original  excitation,  which  Fechner 
thought  the  threshold  of  difference  for  pressure.  The  proportion  of 
right  cases,  and  consequently  the  clearness,  increases  according  as  the 
excitation  increases  from  i  to  4.  According  to  Fechner's  theory  the 
difference  should  be  imperceptible.  This  confirms  the  results  of 
Jastrow  and  Pierce.  3.  The  results  present  a  number  of  negative 
cases,  but  even  for  the  smallest  difference  of  excitation  the  excess  of 
right  cases  is  appreciable  so  that  the  negative  instances  may  be  con- 
sidered the  exceptions,  due  to  individual  differences  of  the  subjects,  etc. 

II.    Variation  of  clearness  due  to  relative  size  of  stimulus  dif- 


334  EXPERIMENTAL. 

ference.  There  are  two  cases:  i,  where  the  difference  increases ;  2, 
where  the  difference  decreases.  In  both  cases  "the  mean  clearness  is 
greater  according  as  the  relative  difference  is  greater." 

III.  Determination    of   sensibility  for    pressure    differences. 
This  is  on  the  assumption  that  the  relative  clearness  determined  by 
the  method  of  right  and  wrong  cases  will  be  a  measure  of  discrimina- 
tive sensibility  as  found  ordinarily  by  the  gradation  methods.     The 
results  are  obtained  here  by  combining  those  of  the  previous  experi- 
ments.    It  is  a  question  whether  they  are  exact  enough  to  be  of  any 
great  value.     The  sensibility  of  the  two  hands  was  not  found  to  be 
appreciably  different.     Whence  the  conclusion  is  drawn  that  pressure 
sensibility  does  not  depend  at  all  upon  the  fineness  of  muscular  devel- 
opment. 

IV.  Conclusion  relative  to  the  imagination.     The  subjects  di- 
vide themselves  into  two  classes:   i.  Those  who  detect  a  decrease  of 
stimulus    most    readily;     2.    Those   who    detect   an    increase   best. 
Throughout  the  experiments,   in   no  case  was  the   first  stimulus  re- 
placed, so  that  always  the  judgment  was  between  the  second  weight 
and  the  memory-image  of  the  first.     The  sensibility  is  found  to  vary 
in  either  direction.     It  is  not  found  to  be  greatest  for  the  augmenting 
series,  as  Jastrow  insists.      {Am.  Jour,  of  Psy.,  Vol.  I.,  271  ff.)    To 
explain  this  difference  of  type,  M.  Foucault  proposes  the  following 
hypothesis :  In  the  change  from  the  perceived  image  to  the  memory- 
image,  the  latter  will  be  sometimes  greater,  sometimes  smaller  than 
the  original  image.     This  change  is  due  to  the  imagination.     There 
are  then  two  types  of  imagination,  one  tending  to  enlarge  memory 
images,  the  other  diminishing  them.     The  coefficient  of  this  variation 
is  determined  as  follows :  If  Ca  represent  the  mean  clearness  for  the 
increasing  series  and  Cd  for  the  decreasing  series,  \  (  Ca  -j-  Cd)  will 
be  the  mean  clearness  of  perception.     In  the  case  where  Ca  is  greater 
than  Cd,  on  the  hypothesis  the  Cd  clearness  is  less  because  the  compari- 
son image  is  diminished.     So  the  imagination  coefficient  will  have  a 
negative   sign  and  will  equal    Ca — \  (  Ca  +  Cd)   or  ^  (Ca —  Cd). 
The  reverse  case  will  be  where  the  Cd  clearness  is  greater  than  the 
Ca  clearness  and   the  coefficient   will  equal  ^  (  Cd  —  Ca) .     No  di- 
rect relation  is  discoverable  between  the  mean  clearness,  or  sensibility, 
and  the  coefficient  of  imagination-variability,  so  that  as  one  (mean 
clearness)  increases  the  other  tends  to  disappear.  Conditions  of  fatigue, 
distraction,  practice,  etc.,  which  affect  sensibility,  do  not  influence  ap- 
preciably the  imagination  coefficient.     This  was  tested  carefully  for 
practice. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  335 

This  positive  and  negative  character  of  imagination  enables  us  to 
explain  the  negative  cases  which  have  been  mentioned.  The  person 
who  has  a  tendency  to  an  enlarged  memory-image  will  perceive  with 
most  clearness  differences  which  are  in  the  negative  direction,  and 
will  have,  consequently,  a  tendency  to  more  false  cases  in  the  aug- 
menting series,  where  the  differences  will  be  in  favor  of  thejirst  im- 
pression. And  conversely,  where  there  is  a  tendency  to  diminish  the 
image,  the  greater  error  will  be  in  connection  with  the  diminish- 
ing series,  where  the  difference  will  be  in  favor  of  the  second  impres- 
sion. 

J.  M.  TROUT. 

PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY. 


LOGICAL. 

Manual  of  Logic.  J.  WELTON.  2d  Edition.  London,  University 
Correspondence  College  Press.  New  York,  Hinds  and  Noble. 
2  vols.  Pp.  411,  292. 

This  is  a  second  edition  of  this  work,  revised  and  largely  recast. 
Much  of  the  historical  matter  of  the  first  edition  has  been  omitted. 
The  author  has  endeavored  also  in  this  edition  to  give  greater  promi- 
nence to  the  distinctions  of  thought  which  underlie  the  distinctions  of 
language  with  which  the  traditional  logic  is  concerned.  The  two 
volumes  cover  the  ground  of  deductive  and  inductive  reasoning  in  a 
very  exhaustive  manner,  dealing  with  the  important  questions  of  the 
theory  of  logic  as  a  careful  exposition  of  the  technical  rules  and 
praxis.  This  treatise  should  prove  a  valuable  help  to  teachers  of 
Logic.  It  is  adapted  for  such  a  purpose  rather  than  for  use  as  a  text- 
book. The  author's  very  thorough  elaboration  of  his  subject  has  lead 
him,  at  times,  to  rather  a  diffuse  treatment,  notably  the  chapters  on  Op- 
position, on  Eduction,  on  Figure  and  Mood,  and,  in  general,  the  more 
technical  parts  of  formal  Logic. 

Ueber  die  sogenannte  ®>uantitdt  des  Urtheils.     OTTO  SICKENBER- 

GER.     Miinchen,  1895. 

This  is  a  Doctor's  dissertation  presented  to  the  University  of  Munich. 
It  is,  in  the  main,  an  historical  survey  of  the  logical  doctrine  of  the 
quantity  of  the  judgment.  The  author  traces  the  discussion  from 
Aristotle  to  the  present,  with  special  mention  and  criticism  of  the 
positions  of  the  modern  logicians,  especially  Lotze,  Brentano,  Sig- 
wart,  Wundt  and  Erdmann.  He  concludes  with  a  short  chapter 


336  LOGICAL. 

outlining  his  own  position,  being  the  constructive  portion  of  his  work, 
which  is  evidently  secondary  to  that  of  historical  exposition  and  criti 
cism.     He  divides  judgments  primarily  into  universal  and  individual, 
with  an  intermediate  class,  which,  as  Lotze,  he  designates  by  this 
A  etc.,  to  distinguish  from  all  A's  and  some  A's. 

In  this  intermediate  class  he  finds  an  illustration  of  a  principle 
which  he  regards  as  fundamental  to  the  true  conception  of  judgment, 
namely,  that  the  distinction  between  universal  and  individual  lies  in 
thought  and  not  in  the  objects  themselves.  For  the  judgment  of  the 
form  this  A  etc.,  may  be  regarded  as  universal  or  individual,  accord- 
ing as  the  point  of  view  is  shifted  from  the  individual  to  the  universal 
aspect.  Moreover,  some  objects  essentially  different  may,  in  thought, 
be  the  same  if  regarded  exclusively  from  the  standpoint  of  their 
identity,  disregarding  completely  their  differences ;  so,  also,  one  and 
the  same  object  may  be  represented  in  thought  as  two  instead  of  one, 
as  it  is  regarded,  first  in  its  individual,  then  in  its  universal  character 
and  relations.  There  is,  however,  an  impression  left  upon  the  reader 
that  there  is  a  sundering  of  concept  from  reality.  Differences  in 
thought,  owing  to  a  shifting  of  the  subjective  point  of  view  may, 
nevertheless,  be  referred  to  the  reality  whence  they  emanate.  The 
abstract  must  have  some  basis  of  reference  which  rests  upon  the  real 
and  concrete.  The  hypothetical  universal  may  swing  clear  of  reality 
in  a  sense ;  that  is,  that  its  expressed  condition  may  never  be  realized. 
Yet  the  ground  of  the  hypothetical  relation  thus  expressed  in  thought 
must  have  a  reference  to  reality;  otherwise  it  may  be  only  an  imagi- 
native connection,  which,  even  if  the  conditions  were  to  be  realized, 
the  alleged  result  would  not  follow. 

Dr.  Sickenberger's  analysis  of  the  various  judgment  forms  is  clear 
and  exhaustive.  On  the  whole,  the  chief  value  of  the  dissertation 
lies  in  its  historical  contributions. 

JOHN  GRIER  HIBBEN. 

PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY. 


Outlines  of  Logic  and  Metaphysics.  By  JOHANN  EDUARD  ERD- 
MANN.  Translated  from  the  Fourth  (revised)  Edition,  with  Pre- 
fatory Essay,  by  B.  C.  BURT.  New  York,  The  Macmillan 
Co.,  1896.  Pp.  xviii  +  253. 

In  view  of  its  well-known  relation  to  the  Hegelian  school,  of  its 
first  publication  fifty-two  years  ago,  and  of  the  immediate  interests 
peculiar  to  readers  of  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW,  it  is  probably 
unnecessary  to  enter  here  upon  a  detailed  discussion  of  the  contents  of 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  337 

this  work.  Other  considerations,  however,  present  themselves.  In 
face  of  them  it  is  not  easy  so  to  review  the  book  as  to  do  justice  to  the 
solid  work  expended  upon  it  by  the  translator.  For,  on  the  one  hand, 
Dr.  Burt's  translation  is  careful  and  accurate,  though  far  too  literal  to 
admit  of  freedom  from  stiffness,  so  indispensable  in  an  introductory 
manual.  Further,  his  prefatory  essay  is  a  competent  piece  of  writing, 
displaying  commendable  intimacy  with  the  alterations  upon  the  Hegel- 
ian logic  made  and  proposed  by  disciples  of  the  first  generation,  like 
K.  L.  Michelet,  J.  E.  Erdmann,  Rosenkranz  and  C.  H.  Weisse.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  may  very  well  be  questioned  whether  the  book  was 
the  right  one  to  translate.  Written  within  a  decade  after  Hegel's 
death,  it  bears  abundant  traces  of  the  atmosphere  from  which  it  sprang. 
And,  in  these  circumstances,  it  is  a  very  open  question  whether  the 
student's  purpose  would  not  be  better  served  by  study  of  the  smaller 
logic  of  Hegel  in  Professor  Wallace's  translation,  especially  as  it  is 
presented  with  so  much  valuable  apparatus  in  the  way  of  eluci- 
datory comment.  Yet  again,  modern  logic  has  not  been  stationary, 
and  a  satisfactory  '  Introductory  Text-Book '  ought  to  bear  a  date  later 
than  1864,  that  of  the  edition  from  which  the  present  version  is  made. 
On  the  whole,  then,  it  must  be  said  that  between  the  classical  work  of 
Hegel  himself  and  Dr.  Bosanquet's  recent  Essentials  of  Logic,  no 
place  remains  for  this  translation.  Moreover,  its  terminology  is  as 
harsh  as  Hegel's  own,  and  is  not  lit  up  by  those  illustrative  flashes 
which  the  reader  expects  from  the  author  of  the  Phanomenologie.  Of 
course,  criticism  of  this  kind  raises  the  whole  question  of  translating. 
And  it  must  be  said  that  sufficient  discrimination  is  not  always  shown. 
The  translator  needs  common  sense  for  his  selection  as  well  as  knowl- 
edge for  his  rendering.  Dr.  Burt  has  the  latter  in  plenty ;  one  cannot 
think  that  he  has  in  this  case  weighed  the  circumstances  which  will 
certainly  militate  against  his  work  as  a  students'  manual.  It  ought  to 
be  added  that  the  '  get  up '  of  the  book  is  little  creditable  to  the  pub- 
lishers ;  and  in  this  matter  Messrs.  Sonnenschein,  of  London,  and  not 
the  Macmillan  Company,  are  to  blame. 

R.  M.  WENLEY. 
UNIVERSITY  OF  MICHIGAN. 


338  NEW  BOOKS. 


NEW  BOOKS. 

Education  and  Patho- Social  Studies.     A.  McDoNALD.     Reprint 
from  Report  of  Commissioner  of  Education.     Washington,  Gov- 
ernment Printing  Office.      1896. 
L'Attenzione  e  i  suoi  disturbi.     S.  DK    SANCTIS.     Rome,  Unione 

Coop.     Editrice.      1896.     Pp.  46. 

Genetic  Studies  (I. -I I.)    J.  MARK  BALDWIN.    Princeton  Contribu- 
tions to  Psychology,    I.,  4.     Princeton,  University  Press.  Sept., 
1896. 
Emozione  e  Sogni.     S.   DE   SANCTIS.     Reggio  Emilia,    Calderini. 

1896.     Pp.  27. 

Studies  in  the  Hegelian  Dialectic.  J.  M.  E.  McTAGGART.  Cam- 
bridge Univ.  Press;  New  York,  Macmillan  Co.  1896.  Pp. 
xvi  +  259. 

Physische  und  psychische  Kausalitdt  und  das  Princip  des  psycho- 
physischen  Parallelismus.  M.  WENTSCHER.  Leipzig,  Barth, 
1896.  Pp.  10+  122.  4.  M. 

Die    Impersonalien :     eine  logische    Untersuchung.      M.   JOVAN- 
OVICH.     In.  Diss.,    Leipzig.     Belgrad,    Koen.,    Serb.,     Staats- 
druckerei.      1896.     Pp.  142. 
Ueber  die  sogenannte  Quantitat  des  Urtheils.     O.  SICKENBERGER. 

In.  Diss.  Munich.     Miinchen,  Wolf.      1895.     Pp.  217. 
The  Will  to  Believe  and  other  Essays  in  Popular    Philosophy. 
WILLIAM  JAMES.     New  York  and  London,  Longmans,  Green  & 
Co.     1897.     Pp.  xvii  +  332. 
Die  physiologische  Beziehungen    der    Traumvorgdnge.      C.    M. 

GEISSLER.     Halle,  Niemeyer.     1896.     Pp.  47. 

A  History  of  European  Thought  in  the  Nineteenth  Century. 
JOHN  THEODORE  MERZ.  Vol.  I.  Introduction;  Scientific 
Thought,  Part  i.  Edinburgh  and  London,  Wm.  Blackwood  & 
Sons.  1896.  Pp.  xii  +  458. 

Contributions  to  the  Analysis  of  the  Sensations.  E.  MACH, 
Translated  by  C.  M.  WILLAMS.  Chicago,  Open  Court  Co.  1897. 
Pp.  x-f2o8.  $1.25. 

The  Survival  of  the  Unlike.  L.  H.  BAILEY.  New  York  and 
London,  Macmillan.  1896.  Pp.  515.  $2.00. 


NOTES.  339 

Handbuch  der  physiologischen  Optik.  H.  v.  HELMHOLTZ.  Zweite 
umgearbeitete  Auflage,  mit  254  Abbildungen  u.  8  Tafeln.  Ham- 
burg u.  Leipzig,  Voss.  1896.  Pp.  xix  +  1334.  M.  51. 

Philosophy  of  Theism.  A.  C.  FRASKR.  Gifford  Lectures,  second 
series.  N.York,  Scribners;  London,  Blackwoods.  1896.  Pp. 
xiii  -f  288.  $2.00. 


NOTES. 

THE  American  Psychological  Association  has  joined  the  Natural- 
ists and  Affiliated  Societies  in  accepting  the  invitation  of  Cornell  Uni- 
versity to  hold  the  next  annual  meeting  in  Ithaca. 

PROFESSOR  J.  G.  HIBBEN  has  been  made  full  Professor  of  Logic  on 
the  Stuart  foundation,  and  Mr.  J.  F.  Crawford  has  been  appointed 
Demonstrator  in  Experimental  Psychology,  both  in  Princeton  Uni- 
versity. 

THE  Annee  psychologique  may  hereafter  be  had  from  Mr.  G. 
Stechert,  the  New  York  bookseller  (9  E.  i6th  St.,  N.  Y.),  who  will 
act  as  the  American  agent. 

HERR  CARL  WINTER  will  issue,  from  the  Universitatsbuchhand- 
lung  in  Heidelberg,  a  jubilee  edition  of  the  Geschichte  der  neuern 
Philosophic  of  Kuno  Fischer,  who  celebrated  his  5oth  anniversity  in 
March,  1897.  The  nine  volumes  will  appear  in  40  monthly  parts  at  3  M. 

WE  are  glad  to  announce  that  Professor  Hugo  Miinsterberg,  who  is 
one  of  the  cooperating  editors  of  the  REVIEW,  is  to  resume  the  duties 
of  his  position  at  Harvard  University  in  the  autumn. 

THE  members  of  the  American  Psychological  Association  are  re- 
minded of  the  summer  meetings  of  the  American  Association  for  the 
Advancement  of  Science  in  Detroit,  Mich.,  beginning  August  9th, 
and  of  the  British  Association  for  the  Advancement  of  Science  in  To- 
ronto, Canada,  beginning  August  iyth.  Provision  is  made  by  both 
Associations  for  papers  in  experimental  psychology,  under  Section  H 
(anthropology)  of  the  American  Association  and  under  Section  I 
(physiology)  of  the  British  Association.  By  action  of  the  authorities 
of  both  associations  the  members  of  the  American  Psychological  As- 
sociation are  cordially  invited  to  attend  the  meetings  and  become  mem- 
bers. All  members  wishing  to  join  the  American  Association  are 
requested  to  notify  Professor  J.  McK.Cattell,  Columbia  University,New 
York  City,  who  will  furnish  information  regarding  that  Association. 


34°  NOTES. 

All  members  intending  to  present  papers  at  the  meeting  of  the  British 
Association  are  requested  to  send  abstracts  of  their  papers  before  May 
1 5th  to  Dr.  A.  Kirschmann,  University  of  Toronto,  Toronto,  Canada, 
Secretary  of  Section  I,  from  whom  full  information  regarding  the 
meeting  can  be  obtained. 

WE  record  with  regret  the  death,  on  April  nth,  of  Professor 
Edward  D.  Cope,  professor  in  the  University  of  Pennsylvania,  editor 
of  the  American  Naturalist,  President  of  the  American  Association 
for  the  Advancement  of  Science,  and  eminent  for  contributions  to 
paleontology,  zoology  and  a  wide  range  of  natural  science.  Professor 
Cope  was  greatly  interested  in  psychology,  and,  as  is  well  known, 
made  much  use  of  psychological  factors  in  his  contributions  to  the 
theory  of  evolution. 

PROFESSOR  J.  MARK  BALDWIN  has  been  awarded  the  gold  medal 
offered  by  the  Royal  Academy  of  Arts  and  Sciences  of  Denmark  for 
the  best  work  on  a  general  question  in  Social  Ethics.  There  were 
nine  memoirs  in  the  competition  written  in  four  languages.  Professor 
Baldwin's  work  was  entitled  '  The  Person  Public  and  Private '  and  is 
in  part  the  volume  of  '  Social  and  Ethical  Interpretations  of  the  Prin- 
ciples of  Mental  Development '  which  has  been  announced  for  early 
publication  by  The  Macmillan  Co. 

DR.  W.  B.  PILLSBURY  has  been  promoted  to  an  instructorship  in 
experimental  psychology  in  Cornell  University. 

THE  interest  of  the  Frohschammer  fund  of  the  University  of 
Munich,  amounting  to  $400,  is  offered  for  an  essay  on  '  A  Psychologi- 
cal Analysis  of  the  Facts  of  Volition,'  which  must  be  presented  before 
October  ist,  1899. 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS  have  in  press  a  work  on  Philosophy 
of  Knowledge,  by  Professor  G.  T.  Ladd,  Yale  University.  The  sup- 
jects  treated  may  be  seen  from  the  titles  of  the  chapters,  which  are  as 
follows:  I.,  The  Problem;  II.,  History  of  Opinion ;  III.,  History  of 
Opinion  (continued);  IV.,  The  Psychological  View;  V.,  Thinking 
and  Knowing;  VI.,  Knowledge  as  Feeling  and  Will;  VII.,  Knowl- 
edge of  Things  and  Knowledge  of  Self;  VIII.,  Degree,  Limits  and 
Kinds  of  Knowledge;  IX.,  Identity  and  Difference;  X.,  Sufficient 
Reason ;  XI.,  Experience  and  the  Transcendent ;  XII., The  '  Implicates' 
of  Knowledge;  XIII.,  Scepticism,  Agnosticism  and  Criticism;  XIV., 
Alleged  'Antinomies;'  XV.,  Truth  and  Error;  XVI.,  Ethical  and 
^Esthetical  '  Momenta ;'  XVII., The  Teleology  of  Knowledge ;  XVIII., 
Knowledge  and  Reality;  XIX.,  Idealism  and  Realism;  XX.,  Dualism 
and  Monism;  XXI.,  Knowledge  and  the  Absolute. 


VOL.  IV.    No.  4.  JULY,  1897. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW. 


VISION  WITHOUT   INVERSION   OF   THE   RETINAL 

IMAGE. 

BY  PROFESSOR  GEORGE   M.  STRATTON. 
University  of  California. 

In  the  November  number  of  this  REVIEW,  I  gave  a  short 
account  of  some  preliminary  experiments  on  vision  without  in- 
version of  the  retinal  image.  Brief  as  the  experiments  were, 
they  gave  certain  definite  results  and  hinted  at  others  which 
would  probably  be  obtained  if  the  artificial  conditions  were  con- 
tinued for  a  longer  time.  The  course  of  the  experience  also 
showed  that  problems  much  wider  than  that  of  upright  vision 
were  involved,  and  that  a  careful  record  of  a  longer  tesl  might 
throw  light  on  these  also.  I  was  strengthened  in  this  view  that 
the  experiment  bore  on  other  problems  at  least  as  important  as 
that  of  upright  vision,  by  the  remarks  of  Professor  Titchener 
when  the  paper  was  publicly  read  ;  while  the  questions  of  Pro- 
fessor Miinsterberg,  on  the  same  occasion,  suggested  the  need 
of  more  careful  observations  in  regard  to  dizziness  and  the  lo- 
calization of  sounds.1 

The  earlier  paper  was  thus  necessarily  vague  or  silent  on  a 
number  of  questions  in  regard  to  which  a  more  careful  and  ex- 
tended experiment  could  hardly  fail  to  produce  something  of 
interest — on  such  questions  as,  for  instance,  whether  the  recon- 
struction of  the  directions,  right  and  left,  proceeded  exactly  par- 
allel to  that  of  the  directions  up  and  down  ;  what  the  connection 
of  visual  and  tactual  localization  really  is,  which  enable?  the  one 

1  See  the  Bcrickte  of  the  Third  International  Congress  for  Pcjchologj. 
Munich,  1897,  p.  194. 


342  GEORGE  M.  STRATTON. 

to  influence  the  other  ;  and,  finally,  what  were  the  more  definite 
conditions  under  which  the  harmonious  accommodation  to  the 
abnormal  sight-perceptions  waxed  and  waned.  It  was  also 
necessary  that  a  nicer  distinction  should  constantly  be  observed 
between  acts  or  ideas  arising  as  a  result  of  deliberate  volition 
and  those  which  arose  effortless  and  unpremeditated.  In  other 
words,  the  account  should  clearly  distinguish  at  any  given  stage 
of  the  experiment  between  processes  which  occurred  spon- 
taneously and  those  which  could  be  called  up  only  by  force 
of  will. 

The  present  experiment  was  conducted  under  almost  the 
same  conditions  as  those  of  the  preliminary  experiment.  I  my- 
self was  again  the  observer,  and  the  apparatus  was  the  one  de- 
scribed in  the  earlier  article,  except  that  a  thin  cloth-lined  plaster 
cast  of  the  region  about  the  eyes  was  substituted  for  the  padded 
paste-board  case  which  before  had  held  the  tube  of  lenses.  In 
making  the  cast  a  small  mass  of  non-adhesive  material  was 
placed  directly  over  each  eye,  and  afterwards  removed  from  the 
cast ;  so  that  during  the  experiment  the  inner  lining  of  the  case 
did  not  press  on  the  eyes,  nor  interfere  in  the  least  with  their 
free  movement.  In  front  of  the  right  eye  there  was  an  opening 
in  the  cast,  into  which  the  tube  of  four  lenses  before  described 
fitted  exactly.  This  tube  was  carefully  focussed  and  set  at  such 
a  distance  from  the  eye  as  to  give  a  clear  visual  field  of  about 
45°  compass.  The  cast  could  then  be  bound  to  the  head  by  a 
set  of  tapes,  and  although  somewhat  heavier  than  the  paste- 
board case,  wras  nevertheless  much  more  comfortable,  because  it 
pressed  evenly  over  a  large  surface  of  the  face.  By  this  device 
all  light  was  excluded,  ^except  such  as  came  through  the  lenses 
into  the  right  eye. 

The  time  was  not  spent,  as  before,  entirely  indoors.  Besides 
the  free-range  of  the  house,  I  could  walk  in  a  secluded  garden ; 
and  since  the  experiment  fell  at  a  time  of  bright  moonlight.  I 
took,  every  evening  but  the  first,  a  long  walk  through  the  vil- 
lage, accompanied  and,  when  there  was  need,  guided  by  a  com- 
panion. The  experiment  lasted,  this  time,  from  noon  of  the 
first  day  until  noon  of  the  eighth  day — a  net  period  in  all  (after 
subtracting  the  time  during  which,  the  eyes  were  blindfolded), 


VISION  WITHOUT  INVERSION. 


343 


of  about  87  hours,  as  against  21^  for  the  previous  experiment. 
The  actual  record  for  the  eight  days  is  as  follows : 


HOUR  OF  PUTTING 

HOUR  OF  TAKING 

LENGTH  OF  TIME 

DAY. 

GLASSES  ON. 

GLASSES  OFF. 

GLASSES  WERE  WORN. 

Itt 

12  in. 

9  p.  m. 

9  hrs. 

2d 

9  a.  111. 

9  p.  m. 

12  hrs. 

3d 

9  a.  m. 

9  p.  m. 

12  hrs. 

4th 

9  a.  m. 

9:45  p.  m. 

12  hrs.,  45  mins. 

5th 

9  :  50  a.  m. 

10:30  p.  m. 

12  hrs.,  40  mins. 

6th 

9  150  a.  m. 

9:45  p.  m. 

ii  hrs.,  55  mins. 

7th 

§:  15  a.  m. 

9:45  p.  m. 

12  hrs.,  30  mins. 

8th 

a.  m. 

12  :  10  p.  m. 

4  hrs.,  10  mins. 

Total,  87  hrs. 

At  all  times  when  the  glasses  were  not  worn,  the  eyes  were 
thoroughly  blindfolded.  Careful  notes  were  made  every  day, 
to  record  as  exactly  as  possible  the  actual  state  of  the  experience 
at  that  time. 

Before  I  attempt  a  narrative  of  the  experience  under  the  ex- 
perimental conditions,  a  word  or  two  as  to  the  terminology  will 
be  necessary.  One  has  constantly  to  make  a  distinction  be- 
tween the  appearance  of  an  object  as  seen  through  the  reversing 
lenses,  and  either  the  appearance  it  had  before  the  lenses  were 
put  on,  or  the  appearance  it  would  have  had  if  the  lenses  were 
removed  and  normal  vision  restored.  This  appearance  just 
described  is  called  in  the  narrative  the  '  older,'  the  *  normal,' 
often  the  «  pre-experimental '  appearance  of  the  object ;  while 
the  appearance  through  the  lenses  is  called  its  '  newer '  or  « later ' 
appearance.  Similar  distinguishing  terms  have  also  to  be  used 
with  reference  to  the  mere  representation  or  idea  of  an  object, 
as  contrasted  with  its  actual  perception. 

It  is  perhaps  unnecessary  to  state  that  the  accommodation  to 
the  artificial  conditions  was,  in  my  case,  probably  more  rapid 
than  it  would  have  been,  had  I  not  retained  some  of  the  effects 
of  the  practice  gained  in  the  earlier  experiment,  about  five 
months  before. 

The  experience  from  day  to  day  was  as  follows : 

first  Day. — The  entire  scene  appeared  upside  down. 
When  I  moved  my  head  or  body  so  that  my  sight  swept  over 
the  scene,  the  movement  was  not  felt  to  be  solely  in  the  observer, 


344  GEORGE  M.  STRATTON. 

(as  in  normal  vision,  but  was  referred  both  to  the  observer  and 
to  objects  beyond.  The  visual  picture  seemed  to  move  through 
the  field  of  view  faster  than  the  accompanying  movement  of  my 
body,  although  in  the  same  direction.  It  did  not  feel  as  if  I 
were  visually  ranging  over  a  set  of  motionless  objects,  but  the 
whole  field  of  things  swept  and  swung  before  my  eyes. 
I  Almost  all  movements  performed  under  the  direct  guidance 
of  sight  were  laborious  and  embarrassed.  Inappropriate  move- 
ments were  constantly  made ;  for  instance,  in  order  to  move  my 
hand  from  a  place  in  the  visual  field  to  some  other  place  which 
I  had  selected,  the  muscular  contraction  which  would  have  ac- 
complished this  if  the  normal  visual  arrangement  had  existed, 
now  carried  my  hand  to  an  entirely  different  place.  The  move- 
ment was  then  checked,  started  off  in  another  direction,  and 
finally,  by  a  series  of  approximations  and  corrections,  brought 
to  the  chosen  point.  At  table  the  simplest  acts  of  serving  my- 
self had  to  be  cautiously  worked  out.  The  wrong  hand  was 
constantly  used  to  seize  anything  that  lay  to  one  side.  In  pour- 
ing some  milk  into  a  glass,  I  must  by  careful  trial  and  correc- 
tion bring  the  surface  of  the  milk  to  the  spout  of  the  pitcher, 
and  then  see  to  it  that  the  surface  of  the  milk  in  the  glass 
remained  everywhere  equally  distant  from  the  glass's  rim. 

The  unusual  strain  of  attention  in  these  cases,  and  the  diffi- 
culty of  finally  getting  a  movement  to  its  goal,  made  all  but 
the  simplest  movements  extremely  fatiguing.  The  observer 
was  thus  tempted  to  omit  all  those  which  required  nice  guid- 
ance, or  which  included  a  series  of  changes  or  of  rapid  adapta- 
tions to  untried  visual  circumstances.  Relief  was  sometimes 
sought  by  shutting  out  of  consideration  the  actual  visual 
data,  and  by  depending  solely  on  tactual  or  motor  per- 
ception and  on  the  older  visual  representations  suggested  by 
these.  But  for  the  most  part  this  tendency  was  resisted,  and 
movements  were  performed  with  full  attention  to  what  was  vis- 
ually before  me.  Even  then,  I  was  frequently  aware  that  the 
opposite,  the  merely  represented,  arrangement  was  serving  as  a 
secondary  guide  along  with  the  actual  sight  perceptions,  and 
that  now  the  one  factor  and  now  the  other  came  to  the  fore- 
ground and  was  put  in  control.  In  order  to  write  my  notes,  the 


VISION  WITHOUT  INVERSION.  345 

formation  of  the  letters  and  words  had  to  be  left  to  automatic 
muscular  sequence,  using  sight  only  as  a  guide  to  the  general 
position  and  direction  on  my  paper.  When  hesitation  occurred 
in  my  writing,  as  it  often  did,  there  was  no  resort  but  to  picture 
the  next  stroke  or  two  in  pre-experimental  terms,  and  when  the 
movement  was  once  under  way,  control  it  visually  as  little  as 
possible. 

The  scene  before  me  was  often  reconstructed  in  the  form  it 
would  have  had  in  normal  vision ;  and  yet  this  translation  was 
not  carried  to  such  an  extent  as  at  the  beginning  of  the  first  ex- 
periment. The  scene  was  now  accepted  more  as  it  was  imme- 
diately presented.  Objects  of  sight  had  more  reality  in  them — 
had  more  the  character  of  *  things,'  and  less  that  of  phantasms 
— than  when  the  earlier  trial  began.  Objects  were,  however, 
taken  more  or  less  isolatedly ;  so  that  inappropriateness  of  place 
with  reference  to  other  objects  even  in  the  same  visual  field  was 
often,  in  the  general  upheaval  of  the  experience,  passed  by  un- 
noticed. I  sat  for  some  time  watching  a  blazing  open  fire,  with- 
out seeing  that  one  of  the  logs  had  rolled  far  out  on  the  hearth 
and  was  filling  the  room  with  smoke.  Not  until  I  caught  the 
odor  of  the  smoke,  and  cast  about  for  the  cause,  did  I  notice 
what  had  occurred. 

Similarly,  the  actual  visual  field  was,  for  the  most  part,  taken 
by  itself  and  not  supplemented,  as  in  normal  vision,  by  a  system 
of  objects  gathered  and  held  from  the  preceding  visual  experi- 
ence. Sporadic  cases  occurred,  in  which  some  object  out  of 
sight  was  represented  as  it  had  just  been  seen ;  but  in  general 
all  things  not  actually  in  view  returned  to  their  older  arrange- 
ment and  were  represented,  if  at  all,  as  in  normal  sight.  Usu- 
ally this  was  the  case  also  in  picturing  an  unseen  movement  of 
some  part  of  my  body.  At  times,  however,  both  the  normal 
and  the  later  representation  of  the  moving  part  spontaneously 
arose  in  the  mind,  like  an  object  and  its  mirrored  reflection.  But 
such  cases  occurred  only  when  actual  sight  had  just  before  re- 
vivified the  later  memory-image. 

As  regards  the  parts  of  the  body,  their  pre-experimental  rep- 
resentation often  invaded  the  region  directly  in  sight.  Arms 
and  legs  in  full  view  were  given  a  double  position.  Beside  the 


346  GEORGE  M.  STRATTON. 

position  and  relation  in  which  they  were  actually  seen,  there 
was  always  in  the  mental  background,  in  intimate  connection 
with  muscular  and  tactual  sensations,  the  older  represention  of 
these  parts.  As  soon  as  my  eyes  were  closed  or  directed  else- 
where, this  older  representation  gathered  strength  and  was  the 
dominant  image.  But  other  objects  did  not  usually  have  this 
double  localization  while  I  looked  at  them,  unless  non- visual 
sensations  came  from  the  objects.  Touch,  temperature,  or 
sounds,  brought  up  a  visual  image  of  the  source  in  pre-experi- 
mental  form. 

Anticipations  of  contact  from  bodies  seen  to  be  approaching, 
arose  as  if  particular  places  and  directions  in  the  visual  field  had 
the  same  meaning  as  in  normal  experience.  When  one  side  of 
my  body  approached  an  object  in  view,  the  actual  feeling  of 
contact  came  from  the  side  opposite  to  that  from  which  I  had 
expected  it.  And  likewise  in  passing  under  a  hanging  lamp, 
the  lamp,  in  moving  toward  what  in  normal  experience  had 
been  the  lower  part  of  the  visual  field,  produced  a  distinct  anti- 
cipatory shrinking  in  the  region  of  the  chin  and  neck,  although 
the  light  really  hung  several  inches  above  the  top  of  my  head. 

Whether  as  a  result  of  the  embarassment  under  which  nearly 
all  visually  guided  movements  were  performed,  or  as  a  conse- 
quence of  the  swinging  of  the  scene,  described  above,  there 
were  signs  of  nervous  disturbance,  of  which  perhaps  the  most 
marked  was  a  feeling  of  depression  in  the  upper  abdominal 
region,  akin  to  mild  nausea.  This  disappeared,  however, 
toward  evening  ;  so  that  by  half-past  seven  it  was  no  longer  per- 
ceptible. 

Second  Day. — This  feeling  of  nervous  depression,  just 
mentioned,  returned  the  next  forenoon.  Movements,  though, 
had  in  many  respects  grown  less  laborious,  and  were  performed 
more  on  the  basis  of  the  actual  sight-experiences,  and  less  by 
excluding  these  as  a  means  of  guidance.  Once  at  least,  in  the 
afternoon,  I  noticed  that  in  washing  my  hands  I  had  given  my- 
self up  completely  to  the  actual  scene ;  but  at  the  next  instant 
inappropriate  movements  occurred,  and  with  the  consciousness 
that  I  had  thus  given  myself  up  the  old  pre-experimental  trans- 
lation of  things  returned. 


VISION  WITHOUT  INVERSION.  347 

Unseen  objects  could,  by  force  of  will,  be  represented  in 
harmony  with  things  in  view,  more  easily  than  on  the  preceding 
day.  I  could,  for  instance,  voluntarily  bring  before  me,  in 
consistent  relation  to  the  visual  field,  the  general  outline  of  the 
room  in  which  I  was  sitting.  My  own  body,  however,  was 
much  less  tractable ;  at  best  I  could  get  only  my  legs  and  arms 
appropriately  represented,  and  this  only  by  an  effort  not  re- 
quired by  other  objects.  And  even  an  unseen  object  of  this 
latter  sort,  when  felt  in  intimate  connection  with  some  part  of 
the  body  which  stubbornly  held  its  old  ground,  could  not  by 
effort  of  will  be  vividly  represented  in  terms  of  the  newer  sight. 

There  was  much  evidence  of  a  rigid  interconnection  of  ex- 
periences, by  which  the  place  or  reality  of  one  thing  decided 
the  place  or  reality  of  something  else.  The  vividness  with 
which  a  part  of  the  body  could  be  localized  by  visual  represen- 
tation, was  influenced  to  some  extent  by  the  consistency  of  this 
representation  with  the  actual  perceptions  of  sight.  Thus  in 
swinging  my  clasped  hands  above  my  head,  although  I  was 
aware  of  the  direction  of  such  a  movement  in  the  pre-experi- 
mental  visual  field,  yet  the  actual  disappearance  of  my  hands 
below  the  lower  border  of  the  field,  and  the  free  continuance 
there  of  the  movement,  involuntarily  made  the  region  seem,  for 
the  time,  visually  vague  and  empty  where  I  had  hitherto  repre- 
sented my  chest  and  shoulders.  Likewise,  in  walking  through 
the  room,  the  disappearance  of  a  low-hanging  electric  globe  to- 
ward the  space  in  which  my  chin  and  neck  were  represented, 
and  the  immediately  following  contact  of  the  globe  with  the  top 
of  my  head,  tended  to  disturb  the  place  of  representation  of 
both  my  chin  and  scalp ;  while  attention  to  the  ceiling  disap- 
pearing, as  I  walked  along,  in  what  was  normally  the  lower 
part  of  the  visual  field,  weakened  the  connection  of  the  image 
of  my  feet  with  this  place  in  the  field.  There  was  thus  a  sug- 
gestion of  more  than  one  way  of  appropriately  knitting  some 
item  into  the  body  of  experience.  This  not  infrequently  led  to 
two  representations  of  a  single  thing,  both  of  which  had  a  sort 
of  reality ;  although  not  to  such  an  extent  as  to  give  an  actual 
illusion  of  two  objects  where  there  was  really  only  one.  The 
unseen  fire-place  in  the  room  where  I  was  sitting  could  be  viv- 


348  GEORGE  M.  STRATTON. 

idly  represented  according  to  the  new  set  of  visual  relations,  but 
the  crackling  of  the  fire  was  involuntarily  referred  to  another 
direction,  and  in  that  direction  there  was  also  a  dim  image  of 
the  fire-place.  And  even  when  I  looked  directly  at  some  part 
of  my  body,  there  was  an  acceptance  of  the  seen  thing  as  the 
real  thing,  and  yet  there  was  an  accompanying  transposed  rep- 
resentation of  it  which  also  possessed  a  certain  reality  of  its  own. 

As  to  the  uprightness  or  inversion  of  things,  the  general 
feeling  was  that  the  seen  room  was  upside  down ;  the  body  of 
the  observer,  represented  in  pre-experimental  terms,  was  felt  as 
standard  and  as  having  an  upright  position.  But  different  cir- 
cumstances produced  a  different  shade  of  feeling.  When  I 
looked  out  over  a  wide  landscape,  the  position  in  which  I  felt  my 
body  to  be  and  the  position  of  the  scene  before  me  were  surely 
discordant  and  unnatural.  Yet  I  could  not,  as  I  had  the  day  be- 
fore, take  either  the  one  or  the  other  unreservedly  as  standard. 
It  seemed  as  if  an  abnormal  position  of  my  body  in  viewing 
things  might  just  as  well  account  for  the  facts  as  would  an  in- 
version of  the  scene.  The  very  expanse  of  the  landscape  in 
comparison  with  the  size  of  my  body  no  doubt  tended  to  subor- 
dinate the'  latter  and  render  it  less  unreservedly  a  norm  for 
judging  of  correctness  of  position.  But  even  when,  indoors,  the 
view  was  almost  completely  filled  with  the  dining-table  and  its 
furnishings,  there  was  no  striking  and  obvious  feeling  that  the 
scene  was  upside  down. 

During  a  rather  long  walk  in  the  evening  I  was  unable  to 
recognize  my  surroundings  most  of  the  time,  although  normally 
they  were  quite  familiar.  Recognition  evidently  depended  largely 
on  external  relations  of  position  and  direction,  and,  with  a  dis- 
turbance of  these,  the  objects  themselves  seemed  strange.  I 
could  voluntarily  feel  my  feet  strike  on  the  ground  seen  in  the 
upper  part  of  the  visual  field.  But  my  companion,  who  held 
my  arm,  I  could  not  represent  on  that  side  of  me  which,  I  knew, 
a  harmonious  construction  of  the  visual  field  would  require. 

On  being  blindfolded  for  the  night,  there  was  an  immediate 
and  involuntary  recurrence  to  the  older  way  of  picturing  things. 
Only  rarely  could  anything  be  represented  in  terms  of  the  later 
sight. 


VISION  WITHOUT  INVERSION.  349 

Third  Day. — I  was  now  beginning  to  feel  more  at  home  in 
the  new  experience.  At  no  time  during  the  day  did  any  signs 
of  nervous  distress  appear,  and  the  hours  passed  more  rapidly 
than  on  either  of  the  preceding  days. 

Walking  through  the  narrow  spaces  between  pieces  of  furni- 
ture required  much  less  care  than  hitherto.  I  could  watch  my 
hands  as  I  wrote,  without  hesitating  or  becoming  embarrassed 
thereby.  Yet  I  often  stretched  out  the  wrong  hand  to  grasp  a 
visible  object  lying  to  one  side ;  right  and  left  were  felt  to  be 
by  far  the  most  persistently  troublesome  relations  when  it  came 
to  translating  visual  into  tactual  or  motor  localization.  An  in- 
voluntary feeling  of  dissatisfaction  with  the  new  visual  percep- 
tions in  some  cases  produced  movements  which,  although  in- 
tended to  be  corrective,  were  really  the  contrary.  For  instance, 
while  holding  my  hands  in  water  running  from  the  customary 
faucet,  in  the  wash-bowl,  I  had  repeatedly  to  suppress  involun- 
tary movements  of  the  hands  toward  the  wrong  faucet  which 
now  occupied  a  visual  position  identical  with  that  formerly 
held  by  the  right  one  in  the  normal  experience.  The 
visual  hands  were  not  in  the  visual  place  approved  of  by  the 
older  experience ;  spontaneous  efforts  to  rectify  the  misplace- 
ment followed,  although  the  motor  perceptions  were  entirely 
appropriate  to  the  scene,  had  this  been  translated  into  pre-ex- 
perimental  terms.  The  corrective  movements  were  therefore 
evidence  that  a  translative  reconstruction  of  the  scene  had  not 
taken  place.  And  yet  the  older  criteria  of  inappropriateness  of 
visual  position  were  still  active  in  the  new  experience.  Instead 
of  a  reconstruction  or  translation  of  this  new  experience  into 
terms  of  the  old,  I  now  occasionally  became  aware  of  an  opposite 
process — a  spontaneous  translation  of  some  pre-experimental 
memory-image  into  the  form  of  the  later  vision. 

Head-movements  were  still  accompanied  by  a  slight  swinging 
of  the  scene,  although  in  a  markedly  less  degree  ttyan  on  the 
first  day.  The  movement  was  referred  more  to  the  observer,  so 
that  it  seemed  to  be  more  a  moving  survey  of  stationary  objects. 

It  is  difficult  to  describe  my  attitude  of  mind  toward  the  in- 
verted scene.  Little  more  can  be  said  than  that  there  was 
clearly  an  abnormal  relation  between  the  general  localization  of 


35°  GEORGE  M.  STRATTON, 

my  body  and  the  position  of  the  scene  as  a  whole ;  but,  as  when 
looking  at  the  landscape  the  day  before,  it  was  not  clear  which 
of  the  terms  was  standard  and  normal  and  which  was  thereby 
condemned.  I  had,  however,  a  distinct  consciousness  that  the 
feelings  connected  with  certain  positions  in  the  visual  field  were 
by  no  means  what  they  had  been  in  the  normal  experience. 
What  had  been  the  old  « upper '  position  in  the  field  was  be- 
ginning to  have  much  of  the  feeling  formerly  connected  with 
!  the  old  '  lower '  position,  and  vice  versa.  Once  as  I  stood  before 
the  fire-place,  watching  the  fire,  an  odd  sensation  came  over  me, 
as  if  I  were  looking  at  the  fire  out  of  the  back  of  my  head. 

Contacts  in  walking  past  objects  had  hitherto  for  the  most 
part  been  surprising,  because  the  contact  was  felt  in  a  different 
place  from  the  one  anticipated.  But  to-day  I  noticed  that  ex- 
pectation was  coming  more  into  harmony  with  the  actual  experi- 
ence. It  was  also  evident  that  this  expectation,  when  joined 
with  a  vivid  representation  of  the  region  of  the  body  in  question, 
had  a  perceptible  influence  upon  the  direction  in  which  the  con- 
tact was  actually  felt.  If,  for  example,  I  walked  up  to  a  low 
railing  which  came  against  my  abdomen,  the  sensations  of  pres- 
sure seemed  to  come  from  the  new  visual  position  of  the  abdo- 
men if  I  called  up  a  vivid  image  of  this  part  of  my  body  in  its 
new  position  and  expected  the  sensations  to  come  from  there. 
But  the  unexpected  contact  of  the  railing  with  my  arms  (then 
out  of  sight),  which  had  not  been  represented  in  their  new  po- 
sition, was  referred  only  in  the  old  way,  until  these  too  were  dis- 
tinctly imaged  as  the  abdomen  had  been.  But  even  when  the 
localization  was  in  accord  with  the  new  visual  experience,  there 
was  still  a  subordinate,  background  localization  after  the  old 
manner. 

Other  factors  besides  volition  or  even  recency  of  visual  per- 
ception were  observed  to  have  an  effect  on  the  direction  in 
which  unseen  objects  were  represented.  The  position  of  the 
shadow  of  my  body  in  the  visual  field,  for  instance,  involuntarily 
strengthened  the  new  representation  of  my  body.  Shadows  had 
also  a  marked  influence  in  determining  where  I  must  think  the 
window  or  the  sun  to  be.  And  movements  of  my  hands  in 
front  of  my  eyes  to  some  part  of  my  body  which  I  could  not  see, 
gave  the  clue  to  the  new  visual  position  of  the  part. 


VISION  WITHOUT  INVERSION.  35 l 

In  this  way  and  from  other  influences,  there  was  coming  to 
be  a  more  vital  connection  between  my  actual  perceptions  and 
the  larger  visual  system  of  merely  represented  objects.  It  was 
becoming  easier  to  follow  a  line  in  the  field  of  sight  and,  con- 
tinuing the  line  into  this  larger  system  of  things,  to  know  what  it 
would  lead  to.  The  rooms  beyond  the  one  I  was  in,  together 
with  the  scene  out  of  doors,  could  be  represented  in  harmonious 
relation  with  what  I  was  actually  looking  at.  Such  representa- 
tions, however,  were  more  or  less  a  matter  of  voluntary  effort ; 
the  spontaneous  pictures  were  usually  on  the  pre-experimental 
basis.  But  I  was  now  able  for  the  first  time  to  produce  even 
voluntarily  a  vivid  representation  of  those  parts  of  my  body 
which  could  not  be  brought  to  view,  in  proper  relation  to  my 
sight-perceptions.  This  was  much  easier  when  my  legs  and 
arms  were  in  sight,  but  even  otherwise  the  new  representation 
could  still  be  made.  The  representation  in  the  old  way,  though, 
was  the  spontaneous  one,  and  doubtless  was  always  at  least  in 
the  background.  But  in  this  older  representation  there  was  an 
unusual  paling  and  weakening  of  the  image  of  those  parts 
which  had  most  often  been  seen  during  the  course  of  the  experi- 
ment. By  bringing  my  legs  and  arms  into  view,  the  older 
representation  became  a  sort  of  torso,  the  filling  in  of  the  seen 
parts  refusing  to  appear,  except  in  the  vaguest  way,  even  by  an 
effort  of  will.  When  objects  other  than  the  body  were  in  sight, 
they  were  not  accompanied  by  any  background  representation 
of  them  on  the  older  basis,  unless  they  gave  some  sound.  In 
such  a  case,  the  sound  was  localized  according  to  pre-experi- 
mental relations,  and  its  source  was  dimly  pictured  in  accord 
with  this  localization. 

That  the  new  experience  was  getting  a  more  stable  place  in 
my  mind,  was  perhaps  shown  by  the  involuntary  recurrence  of 
scenes  in  their  new  visual  relations,  after  actual  perception  had 
ceased — when  I  closed  my  eyes,  for  instance,  or  in  the  evening 
when  my  glasses  were  removed  and  my  eyes  were  blindfolded. 

Fourth  Day. — By  the  fourth  day  the  new  experience  had 
become  even  less  trying.  There  was  no  sign  of  bodily  discom- 
fort, and  for  the  first  time  during  the  experiment,  when  nine 
o'clock  in  the  evening  came  I  preferred  to  keep  the  glasses  on, 


35 2  GEORGE  M.  STRATTON, 

rather  than  sit  blindfolded — which  had  hitherto  been  chosen  as 
a  welcome  relief. 

During  the  day,  actions  appropriate  to  the  new  visual  percep- 
tions frequently  occurred  without  any  conflict  or  apparent  tenden- 
cy to  react  by  a  misinterpretation  of  visual  positions.  My  hands, 
in  washing,  often  moved  to  the  soap  or  to  the  proper  position  in 
the  basin,  without  premeditation  or  any  need  of  correcting  the 
movement.  At  one  time  in  the  morning,  before  the  bandage 
was  removed  from  my  eyes,  I  pictured  the  basin  and  its  appur- 
tenances before  me  in  pre-experimental  terms.  But  my  actions 
were  the  opposite  to  those  which  would  have  been  appropriate 
to  this  image.  Here  I  reacted  in  the  new  way  on  an  old  system 
of  relations,  instead  of  reacting  in  the  old  way  on  a  new  system 
of  relations —  a  mode  of  reaction  frequent  in  the  earlier  part  of 
the  experiment,  and  by  no  means  fully  suppressed  even  yet. 
But  the  more  common  form  of  inappropriate  reaction  now  was 
a  movement  of  one  hand  when  the  circumstances  really  required 
a  movement  of  the  other ;  as  when  I  reached  with  my  right 
hand  to  pick  up  a  book  on  the  floor  to  my  left.  I  happened  to 
discover,  however,  a  simple  means  of  obtaining  without  calcula- 
tion the  use  of  the  proper  hand  in  picking  up  things  on  the  floor 
— a  means  which  I  used  thereafter  with  almost  invariable  suc- 
cess. If,  with  one  of  my  feet  near  the  object,  I  gave  a  tap  or 
two  on  the  floor  before  I  stooped  to  pick  it  up,  the  proper  hand 
immediately  came  into  play.  Curiously  enough,  it  was  easier 
at  this  time  to  start  the  proper  foot  than  to  start  the  proper  hand. 
But  there  had  also  been  great  progress  in  the  suitable  use  of  my 
hands,  shown  particularly  in  the  lessened  difficulty  in  serving 
myself  at  table,  although  this  was  still  far  from  easy. 

The  sight  of  objects  other  than  my  body,  was  not  accom- 
panied by  a  representation  in  the  form  of  the  normal  experi- 
ence. The  character  of  the  representation  of  things  not  actually 
in  sight  was  influenced  by  the  recency  of  their  visual  perception 
and  by  the  closeness  of  their  relation  to  things  in  sight.  Ob- 
jects in  sight  called  up  the  ideas  of  neighboring  objects  in 
harmonious  spatial  relation  with  the  things  I  saw.  When  I 
looked  down  the  room  in  which  I  was  sitting,  the  ideas  of  the 
other  rooms  of  the  house  were  apt  to  arise  in  appropriate  rela- 


VISION  WITHOUT  INVERSION.  353 

tion  to  my  sight  perceptions.  But  if  I  tried  to  represent  the 
other  rooms  without  first  surveying  the  room  before  me  and  ob- 
taining afresh  a  powerful  « apperceptive  mass,'  the  spontan- 
eous image  of  the  other  rooms  was  more  frequently  in  terms  of 
pre-experimental  vision.  And  yet  the  spontaneous  representa- 
tion of  things  when  all  sight-perceptions  were  shut  out  by  clos- 
ing or  blindfolding  my  eyes,  or  by  darkness,  was  far  from  being 
an  inevitable  return  to  the  older  form  of  vision.  More  than 
once  on  shutting  my  eyes,  for  instance,  the  room  was  involun- 
tarily represented  as  it  had  just  been  seen ;  or  in  walking  after 
dark  into  an  unlighted  room,  its  general  arrangement  and  more 
prominent  objects  rose  of  themselves  before  me  in  the  later  form 
of  sight.  And  even  in  the  morning,  before  I  had  put  on  the 
lenses  and  refreshed  the  new  experience,  the  flow  of  ideas  was 
not  purely  in  the  form  of  the  older  experience  but  was  strongly 
mixed  with  forms  of  the  new.  This  was  also  the  case  on  re- 
moving the  lenses  in  the  evening. 

The  mode  of  representing  the  parts  of  my  body  differed  with 
circumstances.  On  entering  the  unlighted  rooms  spoken  of 
above,  the  movements  of  my  legs  and  arms  were,  without  my 
willing  it,  imaged  in  terms  of  the  newer  sight.  As  far  as  I 
could  make  out,  this  quite  obscured  the  older  form.  At  other 
times,  the  older  representation  of  my  legs  striking  against  the 
floor  was  apparent,  but  seemed  dim  and  unreal  as  compared 
with  the  new.  Thus  not  only  was  the  spontaneous  visualiza- 
tion of  these  parts  becoming  a  mirror  of  the  new  visual  experi- 
ence, but  the  spatial  reference  of  the  touch-perceptions  was  fol- 
lowing with  greater  vividness  the  direction  given  by  the  new 
visualization.  The  feeling  of  contact  of  things  on  one  side  of 
my  body  was  likewise  becoming  more  spontaneously  referred  to 
the  proper  place  in  the  new  visual  representation.  Hitherto  the 
proper  lateral  reference  had  probably  always  been  an  after- 
thought, or  reflective  reconstruction ;  the  wrong  localization 
was  first  suggested  and  then  rejected.  Now  the  wrong  locali- 
zation, it  is  true,  still  came,  but  often  no  sooner  than  the  correct 
one,  and  in  subordination  to  this.  At  other  times  the  older  ref- 
erence alone  was  suggested.  For  instance,  it  occurred  that  two 
objects  of  different  shape,  one  in  each  hand,  when  brought  into 


354  GEORGE  M.  STRATTON. 

view,  had  just  the  transposed  position,  as  regards  right  and  left, 
from  what  I  had  expected  to  see  them  have  in  the  visual  field. 
The  touch  sensations  were  here  localized  in  incorrect  visual 
terms. 

Sounds  coming  from  objects  out  of  sight  were  localized 
as  of  old,  except  when  the  object  was  vividly  represented  in  the 
new  way.  In  the  latter  case,  the  old  localization  of  the  sound 
was  not  the  exclusive  one,  but  was  accompanied  by  a  distinct 
solicitation  to  refer  the  sound  to  the  place  where  the  object  was 
visualized.  When  the  object  was  in  plain  sight,  the  sound 
seemed  to  come  from  the  direction  in  which  the  object  was 
seen. 

The  feeling  of  the  inversion  or  uprightness  of  things  was 
found  to  vary  considerably  with  the  strength  and  character  of 
the  representation  of  my  body.  When  I  looked  at  my  legs  and 
arms,  or  even  when  I  reinforced  by  effort  of  attention  their  new 
visual  representation,  then  what  I  saw  seemed  rather  upright 
than  inverted.  But,  if  I  looked  away  from  my  body  and 
gave  exclusive  force  to  its  pre-experimental  image,  then  every- 
thing in  sight  seemed  upside  down.  Especially  was  it  notice- 
able that  during  active  movements  of  the  body,  as  in  brisk 
walking  or  in  coping  with  objects  whose  arrangement  was 
relatively  unfamiliar,  the  feeling  of  the  uprightness  of  the  scene 
was  much  more  vivid  than  when  the  body  was  quiet.  During 
such  active  operations  there  was  at  times  a  surprising  absence 
of  incongruity  in  the  appearance  of  things.  In  the  evening, 
during  my  outdoor  walk,  I  called  up  a  picture  of  my  body  in  its 
old  visual  position,  outside  the  field  of  view ;  I  had  the  distinct 
feeling  that  such  a  position  was  upside  down.  The  outer  scene 
and  the  new  arrangement  were  clearly  at  this  time  the  standard. 

The  swinging  of  the  scene  during  movements  of  my  body 
seemed  greater  or  less,  according  to  the  way  in  which  I  repre- 
sented to  myself  this  movement  of  my  body.  When  I  pictured 
the  movement  in  terms  of  the  new  visual  experience,  the  move- 
ment seemed  to  be  a  survey  of  stable  objects.  But  when  I 
lapsed  into  the  older  way  of  visualizing  the  movement,  then  the 
scene  itself  seemed  to  shift  before  my  eyes. 

Fifth  Day. — At  the  thought  of  putting  on  the  lenses,  in  the 


VISION  WITHOUT  INVERSION.  355 

morning,  there  was  an  influx  of  ideas  in  the  new  visual  form. 
I  even  noticed  in  many  cases  that  there  was  a  reconstruction,  in 
the  new  terms,  of  objects  which  I  had  just  before  been  thinking 
of  in  the  old  way. 

At  breakfast,  with  the  lenses  on,  the  inappropriate  hand  was  i 
I  rarely  used  to  pick  up  something  to  one  side.     The  movement 
I  itself  also  was  easier  and  less  wayward  ;  seldom  was  it  in  an  en- 
tirely wrong  direction.     When  hand  and  object  were  both  in 
sight  I  did  not,  as  a  rule,  have  to  calculate  or  try  to  find  the  di- 
rection and  extent  of  movement  necessary  to  reach  the  object, 
but  merely  fixed  my  attention  on  the  thing,  and  the  hand  was 
laid  upon  it  without  more  ado,  except  for  an  occasional  slight 
correction  of  the  direction. 

In  walking  I  did  not  so  often  run  into  obstacles  in  the  very  I 
effort  to  avoid  them.  I  usually  took  the  right  direction  without 
reflecting  and  without  the  need  any  longer  of  constantly  watch- 
ing my  feet.  When  the  doors  were  open  I  could  walk  through 
the  entire  house  by  visual  guidance  alone,  without  holding  out 
my  hands  in  front  of  me  to  warn  in  case  of  a  misinterpretation 
of  the  sight-perception.  For  the  first  time,  I  dared  to  turn  and 
sit  down  on  a  chair  without  beforehand  assuring  myself  with  my 
hands  that  I  had  placed  myself  aright.  My  movements  were  of 
course  still  cautious  and  awkward.  And  often  the  question  of 
right  and  left  was  troublesome ;  for  example,  I  wished  to  grasp 
the  handle  of  the  door  beside  me,  and  must  hesitate  a  moment 
before  it  was  clear  which  hand  to  use.  But  I  found  that  the  ap- 
propriate hand  often  came  to  the  appropriate  side  of  the  visual 
field  directly  and  without  the  thought  (frequently  necessary  be- 
fore) that  that  visual  side  meant  the  other  side  in  motor  or  older 
visual  terms.  An  evidence  of  the  growing  ease  with  which 
simple  movements  were  coming  to  be  done  is  given  by  the  fact 
that  I  took  a  sheet  of  my  notes  and  laid  it  upon  a  shelf  in  an- 
other part  of  the  room,  all  the  while  intent  on  something  entirely 
foreign  to  the  matter  in  hand. 

When  I  rocked  myself  in  a  chair  the  downward  and  forward 
movement  of  my  body  was  primarily  and  spontaneously  felt  as  a 
movement  toward  the  actual  visual  floor ;  that  is,  toward  the 
upper  region  of  the  visual  field,  to  express  the  direction  in  terms 


356  GEORGE  M.  STRATTON. 

of  normal  vision.  And  the  backward,  upward  movement  was 
likewise  felt  entirely  in  accordance  with  the  actual  visual  expe- 
rience. In  this  way  the  rhythmic  variation  of  the  visual  field 
during  the  rocking  seemed  a  harmonious  and  natural  result  of 
the  rocking  itself,  and  not,  as  formerly,  a  shifting  of  the  scene, 
unnatural,  and  therefore  suggestive  of  illusion.  And  on  other 
occasions,  there  often  was  no  immediate  feeling  that  the  position 
of  the  object  seen — the  position  of  a  person,  for  instance,  with 
w^om  I  was  talking — was  incongruous ;  only  after  reflection 
was  I  aware  that  the  scene  was  reversed  from  what  it  had  been 
before  the  experiment  began. 

But  in  general  the  most  harmonious  experiences  were  obtained 
during  active  operations  on  the  scene  before  me.  In  rapid, 
complicated,  yet  practiced  movements,  the  harmony  of  the 
localization  by  sight  and  that  by  touch  or  motor  perception — the 
actual  identity  of  the  positions  reported  in  these  various  ways — 
came  out  with  much  greater  force  than  when  I  sat  down  and 
passively  observed  the  scene.  During  such  a  passive  observa- 
tion I  still  involuntarily  represented  my  head,  shoulders,  and 
chest  in  the  old  pre-experimental  relation  to  the  actual  things  in 
sight.  I  could,  however,  by  an  effort  of  will  fill  out  the  entire 
form  of  my  body  upon  the  foundation  of  the  parts  then  seen, 
but  such  a  visualization  was  felt  to  be  forced ;  the  spontaneous 
image  of  the  unseen  parts  of  my  body  as  I  sat  quiet  was  thus 
what  it  had  been  during  the  older  experience,  and  did  not  at  all 
fit  the  actual  localization  of  the  parts  I  saw.  For  these  latter 
were  felt  to  be  where  they  appeared  in  sight.  But  even  they, 
when  no  longer  actually  in  view,  often  lapsed  into  the  older 
mode  of  representation ;  so  that  with  my  two  feet  pointing  in 
the  same  direction,  but  with  one  in  sight  and  the  other 
outside  the  visual  field,  they  sometimes  felt  as  though  pointing 
in  diametrically  opposite  directions ;  the  seen  foot  pointing  for- 
ward while  the  unseen  one  pointed  backward,  to  express  the 
directions  in  terms  of  the  new  visual  experience.  If  I  took  a 
fresh  look  at  the  hidden  foot,  however,  and  then  let  it  pass  out 
of  sight,  its  image  remained  for  some  time  in  accord  with  the 
recent  perception.  But  that  the  older  way  of  representing  my 
body  was  losing  ground,  even  in  the  case  of  the  unseen  parts, 


VISION  WITHOUT  INVERSION.  357 

was  evidenced  by  the  disappearance  of  that  anticipatory  "  draw- 
ing in  "  of  chin  and  chest  when  a  solid  object  passed  through 
the  visual  field  in  the  direction  which  in  normal  vision  would 
have  meant  a  blow  in  the  chest,  but  which  now  suggested  a  free 
passage  overhead.  The  clear  knowledge  that  the  object  would 
not  strike  me,  had  been  of  no  avail  on  former  days  to  prevent 
some  sign  of  practical  distrust. 

Localization  in  cases  of  unseen  contact  often  went  astray, 
mainly  in  that  the  wrong  visual  side  was  first  suggested,  but 
corrected  before  I  turned  my  eyes  on  the  thing  touching  me. 
Localization  of  sounds  was  various,  and  at  times  gave  a  sudden 
and  surprising  turn  to  the  experience.  Thus,  as  I  sat  in  the 
garden,  a  friend  who  was  talking  with  me  began  to  throw  some 
pebbles  into  the  distance  to  one  side  of  my  actual  view.  The 
sound  of  the  stones  striking  the  ground  came,  oddly  enough, 
from  the  opposite  direction  from  that  in  which  I  had  seen  them 
pass  out  of  my  sight,  and  from  which  I  involuntarily  expected 
to  catch  the  sound.  I  unhesitatingly  accepted  the  visual  direc- 
tions of  throwing  and  of  the  stones'  movement,  but  the  auditory 
spatial  suggestion  was  in  complete  discord  with  these. 

During  the  usual  moonlight  walk  it  was  evident  that  differ- 
ences of  light  and  shade  could  not  so  readily  as  in  normal  vision 
be  translated  into  differences  of  elevation  of  the  ground. 

When  blindfolded,  after  the  glasses  had  been  taken  off,  rep- 
resentations in  the  form  of  the  new  vision  were  a  more  vivid  con- 
stituent of  my  train  of  ideas  than  on  any  previous  night.  After 
I  went  to  bed,  while  still  awake,  they  came  in  concrete  and  col- 
ored scenes. 

Sixth  Day. — In  walking  about  the  room  blindfolded  for  a 
few  moments  in  the  morning,  images  in  form  of  the  pre-experi- 
mental  vision  were  almost  exclusively  present.  Once  or  twice 
at  this  time  a  strange  indecision  and  confusion  came  over  me 
when  I  did  not  immediately  lay  hands  on  an  object  which  I 
knew  was  within  reach.  I  doubted  whether  I  was  not  using  the 
opposite  hand  from  the  one  intended.  A  moment's  hesitation, 
the  bewilderment  for  some  reason  gave  way  to  assurance,  and 
the  movement  went  on  its  way.  In  putting  on  my  shoes — the 
lenses  were  now  in  place — the  problem  of  right  and  left,  which 


358  GEORGE  M.  STRATTON. 

had  hitherto  rendered  this  operation  difficult,  was  unreflectingly 
solved  by  making  a  direct  visual  comparison  of  the  contours  of 
foot  and  shoe  and  seeing  whether  they  matched. 

Movements  of  the  head  or  of  the  body,  which  shifted  the 
field  of  view,  seemed  now  to  be  in  entire  keeping  with  the  visual 
changes  thus  produced ;  the  motion  seemed  to  be  toward  that 
side  on  which  objects  entered  the  visual  field,  and  not  toward 
the  opposite  side,  as  the  pre-experimental  representation  of  the 
movement  would  have  required.  And  when,  with  closed  eyes, 
I  rocked  in  my  chair,  the  merely  represented  changes  in  the 
visual  field  persisted  with  the  same  rhythmic  variation  of  direc- 
tion which  they  would  have  shown  had  I  opened  my  eyes.  I 
tried  to  make  the  imagined  objects  take  the  opposite  course — the 
course  they  would  have  taken  in  the  older  vision  during  such 
movements  of  the  body ;  but  only  after  some  moments  of  effort 
could  I  get  even  a  faint  suggestion  of  such  changes,  and  these 
were  immediately  supplanted  by  those  in  accord  with  the  new 
visual  experience,  the  instant  I  ceased  my  attempt  to  reinstate 
the  old  by  force. 

When  I  sat  passive,  either  the  old  or  the  new  position  of  my 
unseen  body  could  be  brought  prominently  forward  by  act  of 
will.  When  the  old  representation  was  thus  reinforced,  the 
actual  scene  seemed  inverted.  But  when  the  new  representa- 
tion of  my  body  was  emphasized,  then  the  scene  felt  right  side 
up.  During  active  operations  on  the  visual  surroundings,  how- 
ever, the  older  image  of  my  body  became,  in  many  cases  with- 
out my  willing  it,  weaker  than  the  new,  and  at  times  faded  com- 
pletely away. 

Variations  of  touch-localization  under  different  conditions  of 
sight  were  clearly  observable.  I  felt  that  my  legs  were  where 
I  saw  them,  or  where  they  were  vividly  represented,  if  they 
were  out  of  sight.  If  I  tapped  upon  my  knee  in  plain  sight,  the 
contact  was  localized  only  where  sight  reported  it  to  be.  But 
if  I  tapped  while  not  looking  at  my  knee,  the  contact  was  re- 
ferred to  both  the  old  and  the  new  visual  positions,  the  reference 
according  to  the  older  visual  experience  being  probably  the 
stronger.  I  then  placed  my  two  index  fingers  in  view  before 
me,  at  equal  distances  from  my  body,  and  resting  on  a  paper 


VISION  WITHOUT  INVERSION.  359 

tablet  in  my  lap.  The  right  finger  now  was  in  that  position 
in  the  visual  field,  which  in  normal  sight  would  have  been  occu- 
pied by  the  left  and  vice  versa;  though,  of  course,  the  direc- 
tion in  which  the  fingers  pointed  in  the  visual  field  did  not 
similarly  correspond  with  the  old.  In  many  cases,  now,  a  con- 
tact (the  touch  of  a  pencil  point,  for  instance,  by  an  assistant) 
on  one  of  the  fingers  could  at  will  be  felt  in  either  of  them ;  at 
times,  indeed,  the  contact  could  be  referred  to  both  fingers 
at  once.  When  there  actually  was  a  contact  with  both  fingers 
at  once  (for  instance,  a  pencil  point  on  one,  and  the  as- 
sistant's finger  tip  on  the  other),  the  voluntary  transfer  of  the 
localization  of  the  pencil's  contact  from  one  finger  to  the  other 
was  much  easier.  And  in  this  case,  the  contacts,  although 
qualitatively  distinguished  with  ease,  and  spontaneously  re- 
ferred to  their  distinct  and  proper  places  in  the  actual  field  of 
sight,  could  nevertheless  voluntarily  be  felt  as  coming  from  the 
same  finger  at  the  same  time.  A  movement  of  one  of  the  fin- 
gers, such  as  a  slight  bending  and  straightening  of  it,  while  the 
other  remained  passive,  produced  a  marked  difference  between 
the  two  fingers,  both  as  to  their  visual  appearance  and  as  to  the 
character  of  the  tactual  sensations  just  mentioned ;  and  this 
movement  rendered  the  arbitrary  reference  of  the  two  contacts 
impossible.  Each  contact  could  then  be  felt  only  in  the  place 
where  it  was  seen  to  be. 

Likewise  the  substitution  of  a  thumb  for  one  of  the  fingers 
(the  right  thumb  for  the  right  index,  or  the  left  for  the  left)  pre- 
vented a  voluntary  control  of  the  localization.  In  the  case  of 
the  two  fingers,  however,  such  a  control  was  still  possible  when 
the  positions  of  the  fingers  in  the  visual  field  did  not  exactly 
correspond  each  to  that  of  the  opposite  finger  in  pre-experimen- 
tal  sight,  or  when  the  contacts  fell  on  relatively  different  spots 
on  the  two  fingers,  that  is,  on  spots  which  did  not  mutually 
correspond.  With  the  thumb  and  forefinger,  as  above  described, 
it  is  true  that,  when  attention  was  somewhat  withdrawn  from 
vision  and  given  more  to  touch,  I  could  voluntarily  feel  my 
thumb  on  the  opposite  visual  side  from  the  one  on  which  I  saw 
it ;  yet  there  was  no  reference  of  the  two  sensations  of  contact 
to  the  same  member,  or  an  identification  of  the  felt  thumb  with 


360  GEORGE  M.  STRATTON. 

the  seen  finger,  as  was  usually  possible  with  the  two  index  fin- 
gers. In  several  cases,  though,  the  visual  perception  of  the 
source  of  the  peculiar  sensation  of  contact  kept  also  the  touch- 
sensation  fixedly  on  that  side  where  its  source  was  seen  to  be ; 
or  even  gave  a  sudden  and  surprising  reversal  to  the  whole 
localization,  when  this  had  been  based  on  only  a  vague  and  par- 
tial report  from  sight.  This  reversal  of  localization  occurred 
several  times  when  I  was  not  directly  experimenting  on  the  mat- 
ter, and  furnishes  an  interesting  parallel  to  the  results  more 
deliberately  obtained.  More  than  once,  as  I  sat  with  both 
hands  in  sight,  holding  a  tablet  of  writing-paper,  a  sensation 
coming  from  one  hand — the  feeling  of  a  single  loose  sheet  pro- 
jecting beyond  the  others — was  involuntarily  referred  to  the  visual 
perception  of  the  other  hand.  But  as  soon  as  I  saw  where  the 
cause  of  the  sensation  visually  lay,  then  the  touch  sensations 
immediately  went  over  to  this  latter  position,  changed  hands,  in 
other  words,  and  could  not  even  by  effort  of  will  be  felt  as  at 
first. 

Localization  of  sounds,  when  the  source  of  the  sound  was 
in  sight,  followed  in  most  cases  the  visual  position  of  the  source, 
provided  I  did  not  voluntarily  recall  the  older  position  of  the 
object.  And  since  the  compass  of  the  visual  field  was  about 
45°,  the  actual  divergence  from  the  older  localization  of  the 
sound  could  thus  be  about  as  great  as  the  diameter  of  the  field 
of  view.  For  when  the  source  of  sound  was  seen  at  the  border 
of  this  field,  its  older  localization  would  have  been  on  the  oppo- 
site side  of  the  field  and  at  an  equal  distance  from  the  center. 
When  the  source  of  the  sound  was  out  of  sight,  a  much  greater 
divergence  of  localization  was  possible.  For  in  walking  I  ac- 
tually felt  my  feet  striking  against  the  floor  which  I  saw  extend- 
ing into  the  (old)  upper  side  of  the  field  of  view  before  me  ;  and 
the  sound  of  my  steps  seemed  to  come  from  the  place  where  I 
felt  my  feet  strike — in  this  case  a  divergence  of  180°  from  the 
old  direction  of  the  sound.  But  when  I  felt  my  feet  in  the  old 
place,  the  sound  too  seemed  to  come  from  that  direction. 

In  the  evening,  after  I  was  blindfolded,  the  play  of  imagi- 
nation was  almost  exclusively  in  terms  of  pre- experimental  vision. 

(To  be  concluded.) 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  SUFFICIENT  REASON. 

BY  DR.  W.  M.  URBAN. 

Princeton   University. 

§  i.  Among  those  who  make  earnest  with  the  idea  of  genetic 
psychology  it  seems  to  be  taken  for  granted  that  in  some  sense 
the  relation  between  utility  and  knowledge  is  a  close  one — that 
the  extension  of  the  doctrine  of  Selection  into  the  sphere  of 
knowledge  processes,  whether  as  natural  selection  or  selection 
of  a  peculiar  sort,  is  warranted.  That  there  is  wide  difference 
of  opinion,  however,  as  to  the  nature  of  that  selection  and  of  the 
accommodations  that  result,  a  moment's  glance  at  the  literature 
will  show.  The  uncertainty  and  differences  in  the  answer  to 
this  problem  arise  mostly  from  the  natural  difficulty  of  keeping 
the  philosophical  and  psychological  sides  distinct,  in  which 
direction  Spencer  set  an  unfortunate  example.  It  seems  to  be 
equally  unwarranted,  however,  to  consider  the  question  de- 
finitely settled  either  positively  or  negatively  by  a  one-sided 
consideration  from  the  point  of  view  either  of  psychology  or  of 
a  theory  of  knowledge.  The  following  paper  has  therefore 
nothing  more  in  mind  than  a  consideration  of  some  psychological 
phenomena  which  point  to  a  process  of  selection  according  to 
the  principle  of  utility  in  the  sphere  of  the  higher  knowledge 
processes. 

§  2.  Genetic  psychologists  prefer  to  designate  the  adapta- 
tion of  consciousness  to  its  environment  by  means  of  intelligence 
as  *  sufficient,'  rather  than  '  necessary,'  as  in  the  case  of  lower 
psychic  organisms.  By  that  distinction  they  mean  to  indicate 
the  element  of  «  subjectivity'  which  distinguishes  the  selection  in 
the  case  of  higher  will  acts  from  the  outer  necessity  which  con- 
trols the  lower  instinctive  reactions.  Thus  Spencer  makes  a 
distinction  between  the  *  necessity '  of  the  organized  reactions  of 
instinct  and  the  *  sufficiency '  of  the  less  stable  rational  reactions 
361 


3^2  W.  M.   URBAN. 

growing  out  of  the  correspondence  of  ideas  to  external  reality.1 
So  also  Professor  Baldwin :  "  The  principle  of  sufficient  reason 
is  subject  to  a  corresponding  genetic  expression  on  the  side  of 
accommodation.  Sufficient  reason  in  the  child's  mind  is  an  at- 
titude, a  belief,  anything  in  its  experience  which  tends  to 
modify  the  course  of  its  habitual  reactions  in  a  way  that  it  must 
accept,  endorse,  believe.  This  has  its  sufficient  reason,  and  he 
must  accommodate  to  it."2  With  a  consideration  of  the  nature 
of  subjective  sufficiency  is  included,  therefore,  the  elements  for 
the  solution  of  the  problem  of  accommodation  among  intellectual 
processes. 

§  3.  Sufficiency  in  the  sphere  of  intelligent  processes  does 
indeed  include  much  more  complex  elements  than  the  simple 
necessity  of  reflex  movement.  If  the  hypothesis  of  a  positive 
selective  factor,  over  and  above  the  negative  function  of  natural 
selection,  is  necessary,  as  it  seems  to  be,  even  for  the  explana- 
tion of  accommodation  in  the  sphere  of  reflexes,  still  more  is  this 
positive  factor,  in  much  more  developed  form,  a  primary  require- 
ment in  the  higher  spheres.  For,  though  both  are  alike  in  that 
they  are  reactions  upon  environment,  they  differ  materially  in 
the  nature  of  that  reaction. 

In  reflex  movement  there  are  two  terms,  the  stimulus  and  the 
reaction,  between  which  at  least  the  scientific  criterion  of  likeness 
of  cause  and  effect  may  be  found.  They  are  both  objective 
terms  and  experience  tends  to  prove  the  constancy  of  the  rela- 
tion of  stimulus  to  reaction  on  the  pleasure-pain  hypothesis. 
The  higher  apperceptive  functions,  on  the  contrary,  have  three 
terms,  the  stimulus,  the  supervening  ideal  and  emotional  com- 
plex which  gathers  about  the  stimulus,  and  the  motor  reaction 
which  follows  in  the  will  act.  Here  an  entirely  new  relation 
meets  the  eye.  Instead  of  the  relative  constancy  of  the  relation 
between  stimulus  and  reaction,  instead  of  the  relative  constancy 
of  outer  conditions,  appears  a  practically  absolute  inconstancy. 
The  number  of  possible  complexes  of  ideas  and  emotions  that 
gather  about  the  stimulus  is,  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  infinite. 
For  the  stimulus  does  not  work  directly  as  outer  reality ;  but  in 

1  Spencer,  'Principles  of  Psychology,'  Vol.  I.,  Chap.  7. 
2Baldwin,  Mental  Development,  p.  323. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  SUFFICIENT  REASON.          363 

its  place  enters  the  complex  «  motive,'  which,  though  it  stands  in 
the  place  of  outer  reality,  does  not  necessarily  correspond  to  it, 
but  oftener  does  not.  The  pleasure-pain  hypothesis  is  not 
directly  applicable,  for  the  reason  that  pleasure  and  pain  do 
not  enter  necessarily  into  these  complexes,  but  are  oftener  merely 
suggested. 

§  4.  We  may,  therefore,  express  the  relation  (a]  between  the 
*  motives  '  and  the  will  act,  or  (£)  between  the  subjective  ground 
of  a  judgment  and  the  judgment  itself  as  sufficient  reason,  but 
not  as  necessary  cause  as  in  the  relation  of  stimulus  to  reflex 
movement.  This  infinite  variability  of  motives  which  allows  us 
to  speak  of  them  as  subjectively  '  sufficient '  but  not  as  causally 
necessary  is  evident  if  we  consider  with  what  difficulty  '  motives ' 
objectively  necessary  are  found  for  the  simplest  will  acts. 

The  consequence  of  this  uncertainty  is  that  we  confine  our- 
selves to  simple  primal  effects  such  as  love,  hate,  etc.,  which 
we  have,  in  a  manner,  objectified  as  real  forces,  or  at  best  we 
make  hypotheses  on  the  analogy  of  our  own  experience.  The 
personal  equation  of  sufficiency  is  further  observable  in  spheres 
not  directly  connected  with  the  will — in  the  aesthetic  and  in- 
tellectual judgment.  In  all  thought  products  the  sufficiency  lies 
not  in  the  logical  texture,  but  in  the  ethical  and  aesthetic  feeling 
sources  of  the  production.  Almost  every  bit  of  original  thought, 
especially  where  it  is  of  the  genius  rank,  must  suffer  the  elimi- 
nation by  critical  thought  of  just  those  subjective  elements  in 
which  for  the  thinkers  the  sufficiency  lay.  The  same  is  true 
in  the  reaction  of  the  individual  upon  race  beliefs  and  customs, 
speech,  etc. ;  the  personal  equation  is  always  the  source  of  the 
sufficiency  which  determines  his  reaction.  '  Characterologie  ' 
is,  however,  notably  the  despair  of  empirical  science  simply  be- 
cause of  this  law  of  infinite  variability.  To  be  sure,  it  has  been 
sought  to  construct  a  psychology  of  metaphysical  systems,  but 
scarcely  with  success,  even  in  the  case  of  the  non-school  philos- 
ophers who  carry  their  hearts  on  their  sleeves.  The  important 
point  is  that  if  the  law  of  selective  accommodation  is  carried 
up  into  the  sphere  of  intellectual  functions,  as  a  principle  of 
explanation  for  the  existence  of  our  knowledge,  the  problem  be- 
comes extremely  complex,  because  (a) ,  as  has  been  shown,  the 


364  W.  M.   URBAN. 

reaction  is  no  longer  upon  simple  reality,  but  upon  an  intervening 
motive  complex  which  shows  infinite  variations  from  reality,  and 
(6)  as  a  consequence  of  this  infinite  variability,  instead  of  the 
law  of  simple  '  autogeneity '  of  ends  in  instinctive  reactions,  we 
have  the  law  of  heterogeneity  of  ends  as  the  governing  principle 
of  the  higher  psychological  processes. 

§  5 .  If  it  were  asked  what  in  the  nature  of  our  psychological 
organism  gives  rise  to  this  divergence  of  the  motive,  which  takes 
the  place  of  the  stimulus,  from  the  known  reality  from  which 
the  simple  stimulus  arises,  the  answer  would  come  from  almost 
every  reader,  the  presence  of  the  imaginative  processes.  To 
these  is  due  the  presence  of  such  a  law  as  that  of  the  infinite 
heterogeneity  of  ends.  If  the  simple  stimulus,  unmodified  by 
imagination,  was  reacted  upon,  the  conditions  could  be  com- 
paratively constant  as  in  instinctive  reactions.  By  imagination 
is  meant,  of  course,  not  the  vulgar  conception  of  the  phantasy 
which  confines  it  to  the  sphere  of  the  assthetical  shine  nor  of  the 
narrow  view  of  some  psychologists  which  restricts  it  to  a  partic- 
ular kind  of  apperceptive  processes,  but  rather  is  it  a  term  for 
that  general  element  in  all  apperceptivt  processes  of  a  complete 
nature  which  selectively  -projects  ideas  before  conciousness  in  an 
emotional  unity  and  sufficiency  more  complete  than  that  of  the 
merely  associational  relations.  This  conception  is  in  full  ac- 
cord with  the  doctrine  of  Wundt  which  describes  all  those  uni- 
tary complexes  of  ideas  and  feelings  {Gesammtvorstellungeri) 
which  precede  either  judgments  or  will  acts  as  the  products  of 
*  Phantasie-  Thatigkeit '  and  its  '  schopferische  Synthese '  which 
he  will  have  recognized  as  a  thoroughgoing  principle  of  all 
psychological  processes.1  That  this  general  element  of  imagin- 
ation is  the  source  of  the  divergence  of  the  motives  as  ideal 
content  from  reality  is  clear  from  the  nature  of  these  processes, 
by  means  of  which  our  stimulus  may  bring  about  an  infinite 
variety  of  imaginative  complexes  dependent  upon  the  nature  of 
the  psychological  organism. 

§  6.  But  it  is  exactly  this  characteristic  of  the  imaginative 
processes  which  suggests  them  as  a  possible  basis  for  a  doctrine 
of  accommodation.  It  is  true  that  in  imagination  we  see  the 

1  Grundriss  der  Psychologic  (1895)  p.  367. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  SUFFICIENT  REASON.          365 

source  of  the  divergence  of  motives  from  the  real  environment 
for  which  they  stand ;  but  in  this  very  divergence  is  likewise 
seen  the  possibility  of  new  adaptation,  for  this  law  of  the 
heterogeneity  of  ends  which  has  its  root  in  imagination  offers 
at  least  the  material  for  new  selection,  if  only  there  exists  a 
principle  of  selection  adequate  to  the  demands  made  upon  it. 
For  this  principle  we  need  not  look  beyond  the  imaginative 
processes  themselves ;  in  their  activity  lies  also  a  principle  of 
selection  which  counteracts  that  element  in  imagination  which 
works  as  a  source  of  estrangement  from  the  outer  environment, 
or,  if  the  expression  be  allowed,  uses  it  as  an  element  in  a 
higher  synthesis.  The  imaginative  processes  stand  in  marked 
contrast  to  the  associations  from  which  they  rise  in  two  particu- 
larly noticeable  characteristics. 

a.  While  the  associations  pass  in  succession,  according  to 
immanental  causal  laws,  the  imaginative  processes  are  governed 
by  a  law  relatively  superior  to  the  associational  flow  of  ideas, 
by  an  immanental  teleological  principle,  which,  although  it  ex- 
presses itself  in  the  already  mentioned  law  of  heterogeneity  of 
ends,  yet  is  at  bottom  ruled  by  one  motive,  namely,  the  repro- 
duction of  reality  or  the  production  of  experiences  analogous  to 
reality.     This  '  Imaginatio '  is  a  struggle  to  reproduce  reality  by 
an  imitation  on  the  basis  of  the  scattered  feeling,  and  idea, 
memories  which  already  exist  in  consciousness.     The  result  of 
this  is  a  feeling  and  ideal  complex  which  possesses  as  its  ground 
tone  a  '  reality  feeling '  very  like  to  that  of  an  actual  experience. 

b.  As  a  consequence  of  its  being  governed  by  this  motive, 
the  process  of  imagination  is  marked  by  a  certain  wilfulness 
with  which  some  associations  are  selected  and  others  rejected, 
according  to  the  criteria  of  this  reality  feeling.     With  this  wil- 
fulness comes  a  certain  increase  of  motor  energy,   an  excess 
which  tends  to  express  itself  in  actual  will  acts. 

§  7.  A  little  reflection  will  suffice  to  show  that  these  imagi- 
native processes,  thus  described,  are  spendid  attempts  at  associ- 
ation in  a  complete  sphere  of  manifold  association.  These 
associations  in  their  mechanical  state,  if  not  organized  in  the 
form  of  instinct,  stand  rather  as  a  barrier  to  direct  reflex  accom- 
modation to  environment.  They  must  first  be  brought  into  a 


w.  M.  URBAN. 

unitary  complex  of  feelings  and  ideas,  which  shall  at  least 
relatively  reflect  the  reality  which  comes  to  consciousness  in  the 
form  of  stimulus.  The  ruling  criterion  is  the  feeling  of  reality 
with  which  the  imaginative  complex,  this  imitation  of  reality,  is 
clothed.  This  sense  of  reality,  or  '  sufficiency,'  it  is  evident, 
belongs  alone  to  the  feeling  side  of  the  complex,  for  the  neces- 
sary relations  of  the  ideas  come  to  light  first  through  reflection 
upon  the  results  of  the  process,  either  in  the  judgment  or  in  the 
will  act,  and  its  relation  of  advantage  and  •  disadvantage  in  the 
environment.  Until  the  judgment  or  will  act  actually  takes 
place  and  is  reflected  upon  as  a  part  of  objective  knowledge  or 
of  actual  objective  reality,  that  is  retrospectively,  it  appeals  to 
consciousness  only  as  subjectively  sufficient.  For  the  sense  of 
reality  which  attaches  to  the  imaginative  processes,  as  back- 
ground to  the  judgment  or  act,  arises  from  the  fact  that  there 
has  been  reproduced  in  consciousness  the  same  organic  state  (or 
at  least  with  only  slight  modification)  as  existed  at  an  earlier 
time  when  reality  was  directly  reacted  upon.  This  means,  of 
course,  that  the  same  general  affect  tone,  together  with  the  par- 
ticular feelings  of  that  experience,  have  been  reproduced  by  a 
new  stimulus,  and  consequently  that  stimulus,  by  reason  of  the 
emotional  complex  gathered  about  it,  is  sufficient  to  bring  about 
the  habitual  reaction  or  one  nearly  like  it. 

From  these  considerations  arises  a  distinction  which  is  fun- 
damental to  the  whole  problem  of  genetic  psychology,  namely, 
the  difference  between  the  motor  side,  which  has  its  source  in 
the  feelings,  and  the  immanental  relations  among  the  ideas ; 
a  distinction  which  is  to  be  made  in  every  psychological  process, 
especially  in  the  imaginative  processes.  Both  the  idea  and  the 
motor  expression  are  parallel  results  of  the  one  psychological 
process,  but  stand  in  no  relation  of  cause  and  effect.  The  ideas 
are  not  motives  to  the  will  act,  much  less  are  they  causes  of  the 
affect  side  of  the  process,  but  both  are  results  of  a  common, 
more  primal  process  of  imagination. 

§  8.  With  this  distinction,  between  the  '  affect'  or  force  side 
of  the  process  and  the  ideal  complex,  we  have  a  principle  by 
means  of  which  we  may  more  clearly  understand  the  motor  ex- 
pressions which  result  upon  the  imaginative  processes.  When 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  SUFFICIENT  REASON.          367 

once  the  imaginative  intuition  of  reality,  with  its  affect  of  *  suffi- 
ciency '  and  reality,  has  come  into  existence  under  the  influence 
of  the  motive  of  accommodation  to  the  stimulus,  the  '  motor  ex- 
cess '  of  this  process  may  express  itself  in  either  of  two  ways. 
Either  the  stimulus  upon  which  the  imagination  followed  appeals 
so  directly  to  the  pleasure  and  pain  feelings,  or  the  reality  feel- 
ing is  of  such  intensity  that  a  will  act  follows  as  its  expression, 
or  else  these  conditions  do  not  exist  and  the  motor  excess  is 
turned  upon  the  ideal  content  in  a  series  of  apperceptive  analyt- 
ical processes  which  determine  the  relations  of  the  ideas  among 
themselves.  In  the  first  case  the  '  force '  of  the  process  has 
found  vent  in  a  will  act  which  brings  the  organism  into  direct 
relation  to  outer  reality,  in  the  form  of  accommodation ;  in  the 
latter  this  natural  expression  has  been  retarded  or  prevented, 
and  the  energy  is  expended  upon  an  analysis  of  the  ideal  com- 
plex, where  the  theoretical  relation  of  the  ideas  to  each  other 
becomes  the  problem.  The  important  point  is  that  both  of  these 
widely  different  results  spring  out  of  the  common  primal  term — 
the  Imaginative  Processes.  Out  of  the  union  of  ideas  and  emo- 
tional elements  which  takes  place  under  the  motive  of  the  imita- 
tion of  reality,  the  '  sufficiency '  of  both  the  will  act  and  the 
judgment  arises.  The  'sufficiency'  lies,  in  both  cases,  in  the 
affect  side  of  the  complex ;  the  coming  into  prominence  of 
either  the  motor  expression  in  the  will  act,  or  of  the  theoretical 
judgment  upon  the  relations  of  the  ideas,  is  dependent  upon 
laws  which  we  have  now  to  consider.  For  just  here  lies  the 
problem  of  Selection  ;  if  like  imaginative  processes  which  work 
under  the  teleological  norm  of  an  imitation  of  reality  at  one 
time  pass  over  into  motor  accommodation  to  environment  and 
again  fall  back  upon  their  own  ideal  content,  on  what  principle 
is  the  selection  made  as  to  which  complex  shall  result  in  will 
act  and  which  shall  not? 

§  9.  Here,  it  would  seem,  is  the  place  to  call  in  the  simple  prin- 
ciple of  utility,  and  properly  understood,  it  seems  to  us  to  be 
the  solution  of  the  problem.  The  subjective  '  sufficiency '  of 
the  motives  of  will  acts  and  of  the  *  grounds '  of  judgments 
alike  was  seen  to  lie  in  the  affective  side  of  the  imaginative 
processes  which  precede  them.  The  characteristic  of  this 


368  W.  M.  URBAN. 

affect  is  that  it  is  a  strong  sense  of  reality,  made  up  of  the 
memory  feelings  of  prior  experiences.  All  of  these  complexes 
have  the  feeling  of  reality,  closely  related  to  the  reality  of  per- 
ception in  some  degree,  but  not  all  have  the  affect  side  predomi- 
nant, in  the  sense  that  it  appeals  directly  to  the  fundamental  feel- 
ings of  pleasure  and  pain,  as  a  direct  stimulus,  and  therefore 
not  all  are  brought  directly  into  relations  to  the  principle  of  util- 
ity. In  the  place  of  the  more  definite  sense  of  utility  or  disad- 
vantage which  attaches  to  the  '  motives,'  or  the  imaginative 
processes  which  result  in  motor  reactions  upon  environment,  in 
those  complexes  which  result  in  judgments  upon  the  ideas,  the 
concept  of  general  worth  or  value  must  be  substituted.  That  is, 
the  reality  feeling  of  the  imaginative  complex  is  of  such  a  na- 
ture that  it  is  handled  as  of  value  or  worth  to  consciousness,  but 
not  as  so  intense  as  to  bring  forth  a  will  reaction — that  is  it  does 
not  involve  a  suggestion  of  immediate  pain  or  pleasure  to  the 
organism. 

§  10.  The  problem  of  Selective  accommodation  may  then  be 
stated  as  follows  :  How  is  it  possible  that  from  motor  reactions, 
which  are  based  entirely  upon  their  utility  to  the  organism — that 
is,  will  acts  of  accommodation  to  environment — imaginative  com- 
plexes may  arise  which  have  only  the  predicate  '  worth  ;'  that  is, 
which  result  not  in  immediate  reaction  upon  environment,  but  in 
judgments  as  to  the  relations  of  the  ideas?  How,  in  other 
words,  is  the  abstract  concept  of  truth  to  be  connected  with  the 
concrete  utility  of  the  particular  experience. 

The  answer  to  this  is  to  be  found  in  the  nature  of  the  imita- 
tive process  of  Imagination.  The  primary  type  of  this  process 
is  that  in  which  the  affect  side  prevails  and  the  consequent 
motor  reaction  follows.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  all  observations 
tend  to  show  that  the  less  developed  the  psychological  organism 
the  greater  the  number  of  completed  will  acts  in  proportion  to 
those  which  are  not  allowed  to  follow  their  course.  The  more 
developed  the  psychological  state  the  greater  the  degree  of 
selection  manifested  in  the  will  acts,  that  is,  the  less  the  emo- 
tional complexes  are  allowed  to  have  their  natural  motor  dis- 
charge. It  follows  that  we  must  look  upon  all  imaginative  pro- 
cesses as  originally  ending  in  will  acts ;  only  gradually  did 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  SUFFICIENT  REASON.          369 

imaginative  complexes  arise  in  which  the  attention  was  turned 
upon  the  ideal  complex  which  gathers  about  the  stimulus,  in- 
stead of  the  stimulus  itself. 

§  ii.  Definitely  formulated  then,  a  theory  of  selection 
which  adjusted  itself  to  these  facts  would  read  somewhat  as  fol- 
lows :  Reaction  of  the  organism  to  its  environment  in  the  sphere 
of  intelligence  does  not  take  place  directly  upon  the  stimulus,  but 
through  the  mediation  of  ideal  complexes  which  stand  for  the 
external  reality.  These  complexes  are  of  the  nature  of  imita- 
tions of  external  reality  in  that  they  are  the  result  of  imaginative 
processes  which  gather  together  the  experience  of  the  past  under 
the  teleological  criterion  of  reproduction  of  the  reality  feelings 
of  the  past.  All  of  the  infinite  number  of  complexes  thus  pos- 
sible tend  to  go  over  into  motor  expressions  in  will  acts,  that  is, 
in  accommodation  to  environment.  Some  of  these  are  favor- 
able, that  is,  the  imaginative  complexes  correspond  to  reality,  and 
some  are  not  favorable,  have  not  corresponded  to  actual  reality. 
Gradually  the  number  of  imaginative  complexes  which  go  over 
into  will  acts  becomes  proportionately  smaller  by  means  of  this 
selection,  and  the  number  of  those  which  are  prevented  because 
they  have  proved  themselves  not  to  be  in  harmony  with  the  ex- 
ternal reality,  the  reaction  upon  them  having  failed  to  be  ac- 
commodative, becomes  proportionately  larger. 

Thus  arises  gradually  a  sphere  of  imaginative  processes 
which  express  this  motor  energy  only  in  appreciative  analytical 
acts  upon  themselves  in  the  manner  previously  described. 
These  relations  thus  developed  are  of  general  worth  or  truth  in- 
stead of  immediate  practical  advantage  or  disadvantage. 

The  nature  of  the  selection  becomes  clearer  from  the  con- 
sideration of  certain  pathological  cases.  Hallucination  and  il- 
lusion are  conditions  where,  or  account  of  hyperaesthesia, 
imaginative  processes  retain  their  reality  feeling,  although  re- 
peated motor  reactions  upon  them  fail  to  be  accommodative. 
The  immediate  reality  feeling,  growing  out  of  the  intensity  of 
the  emotion  is  so  strong  that  the  disadvantages  (often  the  pain), 
of  reaction  upon  the  external  world  fail  to  modify  or  destroy  the 
imaginative  complex.  The  normal  imaginative  complex  is, 
however,  subject  to  modification  from  the  feelings  which  arise 


37°  W.  M.   URBAN. 

as  the  result  of  the  reaction.     And  herein  lies  the  possibility  of 
new  accommodations. 

§  12.  But  how,  it  will  be  asked,  can  such  a  theory  of  selec- 
tion account  for  the  logical  and  a  priori  relations  among  the  ideas 
which  tend  more  and  more  to  segregate  themselves  from  the 
direct  accommodations.  Surely  they  are  not  the  products  of 
selective  accommodation  and  yet  an  extension  of  the  principle 
of  selection  to  the  sphere  of  the  intellectual  processes,  must  be 
on  the  basis  of  the  principle :  that  only  those  ideas  are  true 
•which  have  proven  to  be  of  utility.  A  little  reflection  will  suffice 
to  discover  a  fallacy  in  this  principle.  Ideas  are  never  of  utility ; 
only  feelings  and  states  which  are  consequent  upon  accommo- 
dations are  of  utility.  Ideas  are  only  signs  for  psychological 
states.  To  speak  of  ideas  as  being  of  utility  implies  a  point  of 
view  which  overrides  the  boundaries  of  psychology,  and  falls 
into  the  fatal  error  of  Spencer,  of  basing  the  whole  of  genetic 
psychology  on  the  metaphysical  hypothesis  of  a  correspondence 
between  the  ideas  and  reality.  This  distinction  between  the 
'  force '  side  and  the  '  ideal '  side  of  the  imitative  processes, 
which  is  expressed  in  the  sentence  "the  idea  does  not  work  but 
only  the  process  of  getting  the  idea,"  enables  us  to  separate  com- 
pletely the  dynamical  and  utility  side  of  psychological  processes 
from  the  logical  relations  of  the  ideal  content  that  results.  And 
this  is  an  absolutely  necessary  presupposition  of  any  genetic 
study.  The  fundamental  laws  of  the  ideal  side  of  our  conscious 
complexes  are  laws  of  relations  based  upon  the  analytical  criteria 
of  '  clearness  and  distinctness.'  They  belong  distinctly  to  the  pe- 
culiar sphere  of  ideas  and  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  problem 
of  organic  accommodation.  In  the  latter  sphere  the  criteria,  as 
we  have  already  seen,  are  distinctly  affective,  growing  out  of  the 
feeling  of  reality  and  the  pleasure  and  pain  which  accompany 
it.  The  ideal  relations  as  such  lie,  accordingly,  entirely  outside 
the  line  of  direct  accommodations.  They  work  only  indirectly 
in  future  accommodations,  in  that  when  consciousness  is  gathered 
together  again  in  a  new  imaginative  complex  for  a  new  motor 
reaction,  the  ideal  content  appears  in  more  distinct  and  perhaps 
modified  relations,  but  again  the  '  sufficiency '  and  the  accom- 
modation will  lie  in  the  affect  side. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  SUFFICIENT  REASON.  371 

§  13.  But  is  not  the  fallacy  in  the  preceding  expression  that 
"  only  those  ideas  are  true  which  have  proven  themselves  to  be 
of  utility "  the  stumbling  block  to  any  application  of  genetic 
selection  in  the  intellectual  sphere ;  a  final  barrier  to  any  con- 
nection between  utility-selection  and  truth  ?  Were  it  not  better 
to  say  :  our  ideas  must  be  true,  that  is  correspond  to  outer  re- 
ality, if  the  acts  based  upon  them  are  to  be  advantageous?  Here 
the  correspondence  between  our  ideas  and  outer  reality  is 
assumed  and  the  utility  of  our  acts  concluded  from  the  assump- 
tion. The  primacy  of  immanental  a  priori  relations  among  ideas 
is  taken  for  granted  as  the  source  of  a  necessary  accommodation 
to  an  environment  corresponding  to  these  ideas.  On  the  con- 
trary, it  could  be  claimed  that  ideas  must  prove  themselves  use- 
ful, before  they  can  obtain  a  permanent  place  in  the  content  of 
our  consciousness,  they  must  be  seen  by  actual  practice  to  cor- 
respond to  reality  before  they  can  be  distinguished  as  permanent 
truth  from  the  mere  fictions  of  the  imagination.  This  apparent 
antinomy  which  so  often  stands  in  the  way  of  reconciliation  of 
empirical  and  a  priori  theories  of  knowledge  rests  upon  different 
ways  of  looking  at  a  single  process  or  fact.  In  the  first  part  of 
the  antinomy  is  expressed  an  objective  attitude  toward  accom- 
modations after  they  have  actually  taken  place.  We  conclude 
from  a  favorable  accommodation  on  the  part  of  a  particular  psy- 
chological organism  as  a  consequence,  to  a  knowledge  of  the 
true  relations  of  things  in  this  consciousness  as  ground.  On 
the  other  hand,  if  we  say  that  the  ideas  must  be  of  utility  to  be 
true,  we  conclude  from  the  subjective  ground  to  an  objective 
consequence,  because  from  our  standpoint,  as  practical  agents, 
it  is  alone  those  ideas  which  appeal  to  us  as  of  worth  which  cor- 
respond to  this  practical  accommodation  which  we  have  made 
in  will  act. 

§  14.  This  difference  in  attitude  corresponds  to  a  distinction 
which  can  be  made  in  the  general  body  of  truth.  The  relations 
among  individual  elements  of  scientific  truth  are  true  in  a  sense 
that  the  whole  of  truth  is  not,  for  they  are  analytically  deter- 
minable  according  to  the  logical  criteria  immanent  in  the  ideas 
themselves.  The  whole  truth,  however,  has  no  such  criteria  as 
Descartes  clearly  saw  when  he  made  the  whole  of  the  truth  de- 


37 2  W.  M.   URBAN. 

pendent  upon  the  certainty  of  the  intuition  of  the  self,  that  is 
upon  a  psychological  term  of  belief.  The  self  cannot  be 
doubted  because  there  are  no  higher  criteria  according  to  which 
it  can  be  proved.  The  reality  feeling  of  the  self  is,  therefore, 
the  criterion  of  the  truth  of  all  the  content  in  the  conciousness 
of  the  self.  So  also  in  this  case  the  relation  may  be  expressed 
epigrammatically  in  the  sentence  :  The  -whole  of  truth  rests  upon 
utility  which  goes  back  to  the  -psychological  affective  side,  its 
parts,  however,  upon  analytical  and  logical  necessity.  This 
contradiction  finds  its  psychological  solution,  and  that  is  all  that 
concerns  us,  in  the  reduction  of  both  terms  to  a  more  primal 
term,  the  imaginative  processes.  These  are  found  to  be  the 
background  of  will  acts  and  judgments  alike.  The  4  suffi- 
ciency '  of  the  '  motive '  as  well  as  that  of  the  psychological 
ground  of  a  judgment  lies  in  each  case  in  the  affective  side  of 
the  imaginative  complex.  Of  these  two  possible  results  of  the 
imaginative  processes,  the  will  expression  is  the  more  primal. 
The  relation  of  the  practical  will  side  of  consciousness  to  reality 
is  closer  and  more  fundamental  than  that  of  the  ideal.  In  its 
accommodation,  therefore,  is  to  be  found  the  source  of  all  new 
content  in  consciousness.  The  reflective  processes  which  are 
the  result  of  the  turning  of  the  motor  force  or  attention  upon  the 
ideal  content  are  the  secondary  results  when  the  natural  reaction 
is  hindered  or  retarded.  Thus  arises  gradually  a  sphere  of 
segregated  truth,  which  is  first  of  all  of  theoretical  and  general 
worth,  and  only  indirectly  of  practical  utility.  The  individual 
acts  of  will  which  are  based  upon  the  utility  to  the  organism 
whose  reactions  upon  environment  they  are,  must  tend  in  the 
long  run  to  fix  the  results  as  necessary  for  the  race.  When, 
however,  these  results  are  so  recognized,  they  become  parts  of 
a  settled  and  independent  body  of  truth,  which  has  its  own  laws 
outside  the  sphere  of  the  utility  reactions  which  first  brought  it 
into  being. 

§  15.  A  study  of  the  development  of  child  consciousness  and 
of  primitive  peoples  would  present  a  mass  of  material  which 
tends  to  prove  that  intelligent  accommodation  to  environment, 
proceeds  upon  the  principle  of  a  selective  reduction  of  imagi- 
native reactions  upon  given  kinds  of  environment  to  permanent 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  SUFFICIENT  REASON.          373 

bounds.  That  is  in  the  proportion  that  extension  of  the  possi- 
bilities open  for  the  imagination  is  reduced,  in  equal  proportion, 
is  the  intension  increased.  In  the  young  child  or  in  the  primi- 
tive man  the  imagination  clothes  elements  of  environment  of  the 
most  divergent  nature  with  the  same  attributes,  mostly  personal, 
and  reacts  upon  them  accordingly,  or  again  the  same  stimulus  is 
at  different  times  reacted  upon  with  different  imagination  con- 
tent, simply  because  the  reality  feeling  does  not  work  definitely 
and  certain.  Thus  arise  the  phenomena  of  superstition — the 
freedom  from  which  is  a  continuous  process  of  accommodation 
to  environment,  and  which,  when  completed,  may  leave  behind  a 
new  science  as  illustrated  in  the  development  of  chemistry  from 
alchemy.  When  such  a  stage  is  reached  where  a  definite 
amount  of  theoretical  material  is  segregated  by  the  selective 
reduction  of  the  number  of  the  possible  reactions  or  imaginations, 
the  imaginative  processes,  though  restricted  in  extension  to  this 
material,  grow  in  intension,  and  the  process  is  then  continued  in 
the  form  of  scientific  hypothesis.  But  all  this  leads  us  into  the 
sphere  of  comparative  psychology,  while  our  only  object  was  an 
analysis  of  the  psychological  processes  which  point  to  a  doctrine 
of  selective  accommodation. 

In  closing,  the  interesting  fact  may  be  noted  that  both  Kant 
and  Herbart  find  the  subjective  sufficiency  of  judgments  to  lie  in 
the  imaginative  processes.  Kant,  in  his  subjective  deduction  of 
the  categories  finds  in  the  transcendental  synthesis  of  imagina- 
tion the  ground  of  the  union  of  the  sense  intuition  and  the 
logical  forms.  Herbart  likewise  finds  the  psychological  grounds 
of  sufficient  reason  in  the  imagination.  With  both,  however, 
the  imagination  is  at  bottom  a  metaphysical  term,  and,  conse- 
quently, though  both  gave  valuable  suggestions  as  to  the  nature 
of  the  psychological  grounds  of  judgments,  it  is  only  sugges- 
tively that  their  doctrines  of  imagination  can  be  referred  to  in 
this  connection.  The  above  developed  principle  of  selective 
accommodation  rests  alone  on  the  analysis  of  the  psychological 
processes  called  imagination. 


SOME  FACTS   OF  BINOCULAR  VISION. 

BY  DR.  CHARLES  H.  JUDD. 

Wesleyan  University. 

Some  interesting  experiments  in  binocular  vision  were  re- 
ported a  few  years  ago  by  Professor  Hyslop  and  Professor 
Venn  in  Mind1  and  in  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW. 2  The 
unusual  conditions  of  vision  under  which  these  experiments 
were  performed — both  observers  are  able  to  carry  out  the  ad- 
justments of  ocular  accommodation  and  those  of  ocular  converg- 
ence independently — seem  to  have  prevented  their  conclusions 
from  receiving  the  usual  critical  treatment  which  comes  from 
general  and  extended  experimental  observation.  A  little  prac- 
tice has  enabled  me  to  follow  the  experiments  of  both,  and  while 
I  am  able  to  corroborate  the  results  in  general,  important  con- 
siderations prevent  me  from  adopting  the  conclusions  which 
Professor  Hyslop  reaches  in  his  last  paper.  These  conclusions 
may  be  summarized  in  Professor  Hyslop's  own  words  as  '  looking 
to  a  central  explanation  of  both  distance  and  magnitude,  inde- 
pendent both  of  peripheral  conditions  and  motor  impulses.'  It 
is  the  aim  of  this  paper  to  report  certain  experiments  which  seem 
to  point  in  a  different  direction,  and  it  will  be  possible,  I  think, 
to  show  where  the  error  has  crept  in. 

The  apparatus  for  the  experiments  consists  of  two  plane 
mirrors  mounted  in  two  frames  which  are  hinged  together  in 
such  a  way  that  the  mirrors  may  be  inclined  at  various  angles. 
Let  ad  and  be  be  the  mirrors.  (Fig.  i.)  They  may  be  folded 
so  as  to  come  into  the  positions  a'd',  b'd ,  or  so  that  their  posi- 
tions are  a"d",  b"c".  The  whole  may  be  held  in  the  hand  at  a 
convenient  distance  from  the  observer's  eyes.  At  the  beginning 
of  the  experiment  the  mirrors  are  held  in  the  same  plane  adbc^ 

The  eyes  are  converged  in  the  directions  me  and  «/",  so  as  to 

lMind,  Vol.  XIII. ,  p.  499;  Vol.  XIV.,  p.  251  and  p.  393. 
4 PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW,  Vol.  I.,  p.  247  and  p.  281. 

374 


SOME  FACTS  OF  BINOCULAR  VISION. 


375 


receive  the  reflected  rays  from  a  luminous  point  0,  the  relative 
positions  being  so  chosen  that  the  pencil  of  light  entering  the 
right  eye  comes  from  the  right  mirror,  and  that  entering  the  left 
eye  from  the  left  mirror.  The  points  seen  will  be  referred  to  a 
distance  behind  the  mirror  as  great  as  that  of  the  real  point  in 
front  of  the  mirrors.  If  now  the  frame  be  slightly  folded  so  as 
to  bring  the  mirrors  into  an  inclined  position,  with  the  angle  of 


**»—\JC.  -I-         ~S1  •       I      • 


b' 


inclination  turned  toward  the  observer,  as  a'd'  and  b'd*-,  the  points 
of  incidence  of  the  rays  entering  the  eyes  will  travel  from  e  tog 
and  f rom_/"  to  h .  The  effect  of  this  movement  on  the  apparent  dis- 
tance of  the  point  in  depth  will  be  imperceptible,  as  can  be  shown 
by  closing  one  eye  while  the  mirrors  are  being  inclined.  When, 
on  the  other  hand,  both  eyes  are  fixed  on  the  point,  as  the  mir- 

1  The  angle  is  exaggerated  in  the  figure. 


376  CHARLES  H.  JUDD. 

rors  are  slightly  inclined,  the  point  behind  the  mirrors  is  dis- 
tinctly seen  to  approach  the  observer.  The  eyes  must  be  con- 
verged in  the  directions  mg  and  nk,  and  the  fixation  point  evi- 
dently lies  very  much  nearer  the  mirrors  than  when  the  optical 
axes  were  in  the  positions  me  and  nf.  A  very  slight  inclination 
of  the  mirror  produces  a  marked  effect.  Just  the  opposite  phe- 
nomena follow  an  inclination  of  the  mirrors  when  the  angle  of 
inclination  is  turned  away  from  the  observer.  Here  the  point  is 
seen  to  recede  during  the  movement  of  the  mirrors.  The  point 
of  intersection  of  the  optical  axes  also  recedes.  The  whole 
series  of  phenomena  is  evidently  explained  by  the  fact  that  ob- 
jects requiring  a  greater  degree  of  convergence  are  judged  to  be 
nearer,  and  those  requiring  a  smaller  degree  of  convergence  are 
judged  to  be  more  distant.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  judgments 
of  position  are  certain  only  during  the  actual  movements  of  the 
mirrors.  As  soon  as  the  movement  ceases  the  point  seems  to 
have  that  same  sort  of  indefinite  location  in  depth  which  is  so 
characteristic  of  our  judgment  of  the  distance  of  the  stars. 

New  and  important  experiences  appear  if  an  object  is  used 
instead  of  a  luminous  point.  When  the  mirrors  are  now  inclined 
into  the  positions  a'd',  b'c',  the  object,  as  the  point  before,  seems 
to  approach  the  observer,  but  it  also  grows  very  distinctly 
smaller.  This  diminution  in  the  size  of  the  image  can  evidently 
not  be  due  to  the  fact  that  the  points  of  incidence  travel  from  e 
to  gor  fromyto  h,  for  if  this  slight  change  has  any  effect  at  all, 
and  it  is  so  slight  that  it  doubtless  has  no  such  effect,  it  would 
be  in  the  opposite  direction,  for  since  the  object  is  virtually 
brought  nearer  by  the  inclination  of  the  mirrors,  its  retinal  im- 
age is  thereby  increased  in  size.  The  decrease  in  apparent  size 
is  connected  with  the  apparent  approach.  The  whole  matter 
will  be  clear  if  we  recall  the  ordinary  facts  of  perspective.  If 
two  objects  unequally  distant  give  the  same  sized  retinal  image, 
the  more  distant  object  will  be  the  larger  and  a  long  series  of 
experiences  has  taught  us  to  judge  in  accordance  with  this  fact. 
In  ordinary  experience,  then,  when  an  object  approaches  an  ob- 
server the  convergence  will  increase  and,  at  the  same  time,  the 
image  on  the  retina  will  grow  larger.  But,  under  the  conditions 
of  the  experiment,  the  retinal  image  remains  constant  (or,  if 


SOME  FACTS  OF  BINOCULAR  VISION.  377 

anything,  grows  only  slightly  larger),  while  at  the  same  time 
the  convergence  is  increased.  The  lens  does  not  change  its  de- 
gree of  accommodation,  so  that  the  case  is  not  complicated  by 
any  factor  besides  those  of  retinal  image  and  convergence. 
There  is  evidently  only  one  objective  phenomenon  which  could 
give  this  unusual  combination  of  retinal  image  and  convergence, 
and  that  would  be  the  approach  of  an  object  which  was  rapidly 
becoming  smaller  in  size.  The  result  is  that  we  actually  per- 
ceive an  object  in  the  mirrors  which  approaches  and  at  the  same 
time  grows  smaller.  The  converse  may  be  seen  by  folding  the 
mirrors  slightly  away  from  the  observer ;  the  object  now  seems 
to  recede  and  to  grow  larger.  The  explanation  is  of  course 
similar. 

While  the  convergence  is  actually  changing  the  appearances 
of  movement  in  the  object  are  very  apparent ;  as  soon  as  the 
movement  of  the  eyes  ceases  the  absolute  distance  of  the  object 
in  space  becomes  more  indefinite,  just  as  in  the  case  of  the 
point  in  the  first  part  of  the  experiment.  The  diminished  size 
of  the  object,  on  the  other  hand,  remains  unmodified.  This 
justifies  us  in  concluding  that  the  apparent  magnitude  of  objects 
is  due  to  the  combination  of  retinal  images  and  sensations  of 
convergence  under  the  general  law  that  of  two  objects  requiring 
different  degrees  of  convergence  and  yielding  the  same  sized  re- 
tinal images^  the  one  requiring  the  greater  convergence  will 
seem  smaller.  It  will  also  appear  nearer  unless  associated  factors 
from  past  experience  come  in  to  disturb  the  localization.  These 
associated  factors  are  not  strong  enough  to  affect  the  judgment 
while  sensations  of  movement  are  actually  coming  into  con- 
sciousness, but  may  have  some  influence  when  the  only  sensa- 
tions from  convergence  are  the  somewhat  weaker  sensations  of 
position.  In  any  case  the  effect  of  the  two  peripheral  condi- 
tions, namely,  retinal  images  and  motor  sensations  (including 
sensations  of  mere  position)  are  the  determining  factors.  These 
factors,  being  combined  in  unusual  relations,  give  rise  to  unusual 
perceptions.  But  the  perceptions  are  in  accordance  with  the 
ordinary  rules  of  perspective  as  shown  above. 

All  the  above  described  facts  may  be  easily  observed  by  any 
one.  The  following  experiments  require  in  their  second  modi- 


378 


CHARLES  H.  JUDD. 


fication  some  ability  to  dissociate  the  closely  related  processes 
of  convergence  and  accommodation,  but  an  observer  with 
strong  eyes  and  a  little  practice  can  soon  acquire  the  ability  to 
perform  them.  The  same  pair  of  mirrors  is  employed,  but  they 
are  so  inclined  that  the  angle  towards  the  observer  is  consider- 
ably less  than  two  right  angles,  as  ad,  cb  (Fig.  2),  and  the 
eyes  are  so  located  that  the  only  ray  from  the  luminous  point  o 
which  is  visible  in  the  left  eye  is  incident  on  the  right  mirror,  and 


the  pencil  entering  the  right  eye  is  incident  on  the  left  mirror. 
The  only  way  in  which  the  two  images  can  be  made  to  appear 
single  is  by  converging  the  two  eyes  so  that  their  optical  axes 
shall  intersect  at  the  point  where  the  two  pencils  of  light  inter- 
sect, that  is,  at  x.  The  two  eyes  must  be  converged  in  the 
directions  mh  and  ng.  If  this  is  done  the  point  will  be  seen  as 
single,  but  its  location  in  space  will  not  be  at  all  definite.  It 
seems  to  be  behind  a  third  mirror  situated  between  the  two 


SOME  FACTS  OF  BINOCULAR   VISION.  379 

original  mirrors  which  are  visible  in  indirect  vision.  If  the  angle 
towards  the  observer  be  made  smaller,  as  a'd'^  I'd,  the  point 
will  be  distinctly  seen  to  approach  the  observer.  The  points  of 
incidence  will  travel  along  the  mirrors  from  g  to  e  and  from  h 
to  f,  but  this  change  can  be  entirely  neglected  as  in  the  earlier 
experiment.  The  opposite  effect  will  be  observed  if  the  angle 
toward  the  observer  is  gradually  increased  ;  the  point  will  then 
recede  in  a  very  noticeable  degree.  A  reference  to  the  figure 
will  show  how  the  change  in  angle  of  the  mirrors  is  accompanied 
by  a  change  in  the  degree  of  convergence.  In  all  the  cases 
described  active  movement  of  convergence  is  always  accom- 
panied by  a  decided  appearance  of  change  in  the  distance  of 
the  object  in  the  third  dimension,  and  this  change  in  apparent 
distance  always  follows  the  rule  that  the  greater  the  conver- 
gence the  nearer  the  object.  The  rule  holds  without  exception 
for  relative  degrees  of  convergence ;  when,  however,  the  abso- 
lute distance  is  to  be  judged,  other  factors  enter  in  and  the  ob- 
ject seems  further  away  than  the  real  point  of  fixation.  This 
false  reference  of  the  point  of  fixation  is  doubtless  due  to  the 
conditions  which  arise  from  the  imperfect  reflection  of  the  mir- 
ror which  gives  added  sense  data,  and  to  the  conflicting  sensa- 
tions of  accommodation  to  be  discussed  more  fully  in  the  next 
modification  of  the  experiment. 

As  in  the  first  series  of  experiments,  important  factors  are 
introduced  when  we  make  use  of  an  object  rather  than  of  the 
luminous  point.  A  new  complication  arises  in  the  fact  that  when 
the  eyes  are  converged  to  the  point  x  they  will,  under  the  ordi- 
nary circumstances  of  vision,  also  be  accommodated  so  as  to 
focus  rays  of  light  diverging  from  x.  If  an  object  whose  rays 
of  light  are  less  divergent,  as  in  the  case  of  the  real  reflected  ob- 
ject, is  to  be  seen  in  clear  outline  the  accommodation  must  be 
changed  so  as  to  adapt  it  for  a  point  whose  distance  is  greater 
than  the  point  of  fixation.  That  is,  the  accommodation  must 
be  for  distant  objects  while  the  convergence  is  for  a  near  object. 
This  is  difficult  for  the  unpracticed  observer  and  may  be  impos- 
sible for  some.  When  the  ability  to  accommodate  and  converge 
independently  is  once  acquired,  however,  the  object  can  be  seen 
very  clearly  and  sharply  defined,  even  while  the  eyes  are  con- 


380  CHARLES  H.  JUDD. 

verged  to  the  nearer  point.  If  now  we  start  with  the  mirrors  in 
the  position  ad,  be,  (Fig.  2)  the  object  will  be  seen  as  very  much 
smaller  than  the  image  in  the  plain  mirror  when  observed  with 
the  single  eye.  Its  relation  to  the  position  before  convergence 
took  place  will  be  rather  indefinite,  but  seems  at  first  somewhat 
greater  than  before.  If  the  angle  is  made  smaller,  as  a'd',  b'd , 
the  image  seems  to  grow  very  much  smaller  and  approaches 
decidedly.  As  soon  as  the  movement  stops  the  location  of  the 
object  again  becomes  indefinite,  and  it  may  appear  at  the  same 
or  even  at  a  greater  distance  than  before.  The  conditions  are 
very  much  involved  and  yet  the  results  all  obey  the  principles 
that  during  active  movement  of  convergence  the  greater  the  de- 
gree of  convergence  the  shorter  the  apparent  distance  of  the 
object,  and,  the  retinal  image  remaining  the  same  in  size,  the 
smaller  the  apparent  size  of  the  object.  Here  again,  when  the 
movement  ceases  the  diminished  size  remains  constant  while  the 
localization  becomes  less  definite.  The  fact  that  the  distance 
seems  to  be  about  the  same  when  the  mirrors  are  at  rest,  what- 
ever the  size  of  the  object,  speaks  for  the  influence  of  the  sen- 
sations of  accommodations  which  are  of  no  very  great  impor- 
tance in  the  estimation  of  depth,  but  probably  play  some  part. 
We  shall  find  evidence  later  for  assuming  that  accommodation 
has  some  influence  in  perception.  The  more  important  fact 
that  while  the  relative  position  corresponds  to  the  conver- 
gence, the  absolute  localization  is  not  at  the  point  of  fixation, 
furnishes  a  greater  difficulty,  but  here  again  it  is  to  be  noticed 
that  the  mirrors  seen  in  indirect  vision  are  smaller  and  the  illu- 
sion of  greater  distance  could  easily  arise,  as  it  often  does,  when 
a  concave  lens  is  held  before  an  object ;  the  object  is  seen  smaller 
and  further  away  until  the  attention  is  called  to  the  true  relation 
of  the  image  to  the  object. 

There  is  only  one  point  in  which  this  series  of  experiments 
differs  from  the  first,  and  that  is  in  the  dissociation  of  conver- 
gence and  accommodation.  The  size  of  the  retinal  image  here 
remains  constant  just  as  in  the  former  series.  This  follows  from 
the  fact  that  the  image  is  sharply  focused  on  the  retina,  and 
since  the  rays  from  the  object  are  equally  divergent  whatever 
the  position  of  the  mirrors,  the  lens  must  remain  constant  if  the 


SOME  FACTS  OF  BINOCULAR  VIS f ON.  381 

rays  are  always  to  be  brought  to  a  focus.  That  the  size  of  the 
aperture  in  the  pupil  can  have  no  influence  on  the  size  of  the 
image  followed  from  the  general  law  of  refraction  that  a  part  or 
the  whole  of  a  lens  casts  exactly  the  same  sized  images. 

We  turn  now  to  the  discussion  of  Professor  Hyslop's  experi- 
ments and  conclusions.  The  earlier  series  differs  from  those 
which  have  been  reported  in  this  paper,  in  the  fact  that  the 
figures  were  there  drawn  on  paper  or  glass  and  the  possi- 
bility of  comparing  a  large  number  of  successive  experiences 
was  thus  lost.  The  experiments  here  described  furnish  im- 
portant additions  to  the  general  body  of  fact  which  may  be 
used  in  explanation,  but  even  the  less  elaborate  experiments 
with  fixed  figures  seem  to  lead  to  conclusions  which  are  favor- 
able rather  than  adverse  to  the  motor-sensation  theory.  In 
fact  similar  results  have  been  used  by  Aubert,1  Professor  Le 
Conte,2  Professor  Martius,3  and  Dr.  Rivers,4  to  establish  the 
same  conclusions  that  I  have  drawn  from  my  experiments. 
Professor  Hyslop's  experiments  are  in  brief  as  follows :  Two 
circles  are  drawn  at  a  distance  of  a  few  inches  apart,  and  the 
eyes  are  converged  so  as  to  fuse  the  images,  either  by  crossing 
the  eyes  or  at  a  point  nearer  than  the  plane  of  the  paper, 
or  by  distant  convergence  at  a  point  beyond  the  plane  of  the 
paper,  as  represented  in  figures  3  and  4.  A  and  B>  A'  and  B1 
are  the  circles  in  profile.  In  order  to  get  clear  images  at  Cand 
Ot  of  course  the  accommodation  must  be  unnatural.  The  re- 
sult of  crossing  the  eyes  is  that  C  is  seen  in  direct  vision  con- 
siderably smaller  than  the  original  circle,  and  nearer  to  the  ob- 
server's eyes.  A  and  B  are  seen  in  indirect  vision  some- 
what larger  than  C,  but  smaller  than  the  original  circle,  not 
so  near  the  observer's  eyes.  All  of  these  results  I  am  able  to 
corroborate  fully.  I  find  also  the  converse  of  these  facts  when 
the  eyes  are  converged  at  a  point  beyond  the  plane  of  the  paper, 
as  does  Professor  Hyslop.  There  is  another  important  obser- 
vation which  has  evidently  not  escaped  Professor  Hyslop, 
since  it  appears  in  his  figures,  but  which  he  seems  to  have  made 

1  Physiol.  des  Netzhaut,  p.  330. 

2  Sight,  p.  158  seq. 

3 Philosophische  Studien,  Bd.  V.,  p.  601  seq. 
,  N.  S.,  vol.  V.,  p.  79. 


382 


CHARLES  H.  JUDD. 


no  use  of  in  his  explanations.  This  is  the  observation  that  the 
distance  between  A  and  B,  as  seen  in  indirect  vision,  is  very 
greatly  increased;  in  fact,  just  about  doubled,  so  that  if  we 


B 


\      <>'     i 


B 


C 


B' 


C 


think  of  C  as  lying  between  A  and  B,  the  distance  A  C  and  the 
distance  BC  are  about  equal  to  the  original  distance  AB. 
Furthermore,  Professor  Hyslop,  while  he  has  been  at  great 


SOME  FACTS  OF  BINOCULAR   VISION.  383 

pains  to  discuss  all  of  the  possibilities  of  some  change  occurring 
in  the  size  of  the  retinal  image,  seems  to  have  overlooked  the 
possibility  of  an  explanation  without  the  assumption  of  any 
change  in  the  size  of  the  image.  But,  since  the  image  is 
sharply  defined  on  the  retina,  the  lens  must  be  accommodated 
as  it  would  be  in  monocular  vision.  There  is  therefore  no 
ground  for  the  long  discussion  as  to  the  possible  changes  in  the 
image  due  to  accommodation.  Still  less  is  there  reason  for  re- 
futing the  supposition  that  difference  in  aperture  would  affect 
the  size  of  the  image.  The  oblique  distances  from  the  eyes  to 
the  circles  in  both  cases  (Figs.  3  and  4),  are  slightly  different 
from  the  perpendicular  distances,  but  the  differences  are  not 
appreciable  and  have  no  perceptible  influence.  The  smallness 
of  C  in  the  first  case  and  the  increased  magnitude  of  O  in  the 
second  case  offer  no  difficulties  in  the  light  of  the  explanation 
given  of  the  results  with  the  mirrors.  The  retinal  image  is  con- 
stant in  size,  the  convergence  is  different,  and  the  object  which 
is,  on  account  of  the  convergence,  perceived  as  nearer  in  the 
first  case  is  interpreted  as  smaller,  while  in  the  second  case  it  is 
more  distant  and  interpreted  as  larger.  The  estimation  of  abso- 
lute depth  is  very  indefinite,  but  may  be  made  clearer  by  bring- 
ing up  some  small  object,  such  as  a  pencil,  in  the  plane  of  the 
paper.  The  difference  in  the  size  of  the  circles  in  indirect  vis- 
ion and  the  central  images  furnishes  a  more  complex  pheno- 
menon. It  is  necessary  to  bear  in  mind  that  we  are  dealing 
here  with  a  case,  which  is  essentially  a  case  of  monocular  vis- 
ion. Yet  the  binocular  influences  are  present  and  must  play 
some  part  in  determining  even  this  monocular  perception.  That 
the  binocular  and  monocular  tendencies  are  in  conflict,  appears 
from  the  fact  that  the  circles  are  pushed  farther  away  from  each 
other,  that  is,  the  distance  AB  in  indirect  vision  is  very  much 
increased.  This  increased  distance  will  seem  to  grow  shorter 
if  the  attention  is  turned  toward  one  of  the  circles  visible  in  the 
indirect  field.  Professor  Hyslop  has  pointed  out  that  the  dis- 
tance in  depth  of  the  central  circle  and  of  those  in  indirect  vis- 
ion is  apparently  different ;  the  indirectly  seen  circles  appeared 
to  be  nearer  the  plane  of  the  paper.  The  apparent  increase  in 
the  distance  apart  is  due  to  an  illusion,  as  the  result  of  which  the 


384  CHARLES  H.  JUDD. 

perspective  distance  is  mistaken  for  the  horizontal  distance. 
What  is  really  seen  is  represented  in  Fig.  5,  what  is  thought  to 
be  seen  is  represented  by  Fig.  6.  This  illusion  is  due  to  the 
indistinctness  of  indirect  vision  and  tends  to  disappear  when  at- 
tention brings  out  the  perspective.  The  differences  in  size  of 
the  indirectly  seen  circles  when  compared  with  the  original  cir- 
cles may  be  explained  largely,  if  not  completely,  as  the  influ- 
ence of  the  accompanying  binocular  sensations  on  the  mon- 
ocular perception.  The  circles  are  seen  as  somewhat  nearer 
and  consequently  smaller  in  the  first  case,  as  more  distant  and 
larger  in  the  second.  Apart  from  the  special  complication 
here  pointed  out,  these  phenomena  are  perfectly  analogous  to 
those  which  appeared  in  the  experiments  with  the  mirrors.  The 
explanation  may  be  extended  so  as  to  include  certain  other  cases 
which  Professor  Hyslop  uses  in  his  criticism  of  the  association 
and  motor-sensation  theory. 

The  case  of  after-images  remarked  by  Professor  Hyslop  and 
independently  reported  by  W.  Scharwin  and  A.  Novizri  in  the 
Zeitschrififur  Psychologie  und  Physiologic  der  Sinnesorgane, 
Bd.  XI,  Hf.  5,  furnishes  a  striking  parallel.  An  after-image 
appears  larger  the  more  distant  the  plane  on  which  it  is  projected.1 
The  retinal  image  is  in  such  a  case  exactly  the  same  size  what- 
ever the  distance  of  the  plane  may  be.  The  change  in  apparent 
size  is  to  be  explained  in  the  same  way  as  in  the  cases  described. 

Other  facts,  derived  from  the  fusion  of  stereoscopic  figures 
under  various  conditions,  furnish,  in  Professor  Hyslop's  view,  in- 
surmountable difficulties  for  the  motor-sensation  theory.  If  two 
stereoscopic  figures  made  with  circles  in  such  a  way  as  to  give 
the  frustum  of  a  cone  when  fused  by  crossing  the  eyes,  be  drawn 
on  separate  pieces  of  paper  so  that  the  distance  between  the 
figures  can  be  changed  by  moving  the  papers  further  away  from 
each  other,  or  nearer  to  each  other  in  the  same  plane,  the  re- 
sults will  be  the  following.  "Thus we  move  the  circles  farther 
apart  while  increasing  the  convergence  to  retain  fusion,  the 
frustum  shortens  while  its  magnitude  diminishes.  On  the  other 
hand,  as  they  approach  each  other  and  the  fusion  is  sustained, 

XI  find  the  fact  mentioned  by  Aubert  as  a  discovery  of  Lehot  (Fechner 
Repertorium,  1832). 


SOME  FACTS  OF  BINOCULAR  VISION. 


385 


the  frustum  lengthens  and  the  magnitude  increases,  and  all  this 
while  the  figures  occupy  the  same  plane."     The  increase   in 


FIG.  7. 


FIG.  8. 


FIG.  9. 


magnitude  of  the  circles  offers  no  difficulty  in  this  case.  The 
actual  change  in  the  distance  of  the  figures  from  the  eye  as  they 
are  moved  in  a  given  plane  may  be  of  some  slight  influence  but 


CHARLES  H.  JUDD. 

this  factor  is  not  appreciable ;  the  retinal  images  are  practically 
constant  in  size.  The  variation  of  the  fixation  point,  which  re- 
cedes when  the  figures  approach  each  other  and  advances 
towards  the  observer  when  the  figures  are  drawn  apart,  suffi- 
ciently explains  the  change  in  the  apparent  size  of  the  circles. 
The  length  of  the  frustum  is  another  matter.  Under  ordinary 
circumstances  this  decreases  as  the  object  recedes,  so  that  when 
an  object  recedes  to  an  infinite,  or  even  to  a  very  great  distance, 
all  appearance  of  solidity  is  lost.  In  the  case  in  hand,  the  object 
in  question  does  really  recede  when  the  figures  approach  each 
other.  The  spaces  between  the  circles  will  share  in  the  enlarging 
effects  of  this  receding  movement,  but  when  the  frustum  is  spoken 
of  as  lengthening  reference  is  not  made  to  this  increase  in  length 
taking  place  concomitantly  with  the  other  dimensional  changes. 
The  length  of  the  frustum  increases  relatively  more  rapidly  than 
it  should  to  preserve  the  original  proportions.  This  increase  is 
still  more  important  when  we  think  that  under  normal  conditions 
the  frustum  would  naturally  become  proportionally  even  smaller. 
The  explanation  of  this  change  in  the  length  of  the  frustum  is 
to  be  sought  in  the  binocular  parallax.  This  can  be  shown  by 
the  familiar  fact  that  four  circles  drawn  as  in  Fig.  7,  where  A 
and  B)  and  C  and  D  are  concentric,  when  united  by  crossing 
the  eyes  give  no  stereoscopic  effect  whatever ;  the  binocular 
parallax  is  practically  zero.  When  the  binocular  parallax  is 
positive,  as  in  Fig.  8,  the  result  is  a  frustum  of  a  cone  with  the 
small  circle  towards  the  observer;  when  the  parallax  is  negative 
as  in  Fig.  9,  the  result  is  a  frustum  of  a  cone  with  a  large  circle 
nearer  the  observer.  As  the  positive  or  negative  parallax  is  in- 
creased the  frustum  grows  longer  as  may  be  shown  by  separ- 
ating the  centers  of  the  circles  AB  and  CD  more  and  more. 

The  binocular  parallax  under  the  conditions  of  the  experi- 
ment with  which  we  started,  increases  when  the  figures  ap- 
proach the  median  plane  as  will  be  seen  by  referring  to  Fig.  10, 
where  the  angles  anb,  bnc  and  end,  are  larger  than  the  cor- 
responding angles  a'nb',  b'nc'  and  c'nd1 ;  abed  represents  here 
the  profile  of  two  such  circles  as  are  represented  in  Fig.  8. 
The  first  position  abed  lies  nearer  to  the  median  plane  than  the 
second  position  a'b'c'd'.  The  point  n  represents  the  nodal  point 


SOME  FACTS  OF  BINOCULAR   VISION. 


387 


in  the  eye.  The  size  of  the  retinal  image  will  undergo  some 
changes  also  when  the  circles  are  moved  away  from  the  median 
plane,  but  these  changes  are  not  of  importance  when  the  dis- 
tance through  which  they  are  moved  is  small.  The  lengthen- 
ing of  the  frustum  is  therefore  a  function  of  the  visual  angle 
and  increases  -when  the  figures  approach  the  median  -plane.  A 
similar  result  appears  when'the  object  recedes  in  depth  from  the 
observer,  the  binocular  parallax  will  decrease  as  the  distance 


a'b 


from  the  eye  increases.  Of  two  equal  variations,  however,  one 
in  the  lateral  direction,  the  other  in  the  third  dimension,  the 
former  will  have  the  greater  influence  in  modifying  the  binocu- 
lar parallax.  This  proposition  can  be  mathematically  demon- 
strated for  all  distances  great  enough  to  come  into  consideration 
for  our  experiment.  These  established  results  explain  another 
series  of  facts  which  Professor  Hyslop  has  described.  If  two 
stereoscopic  figures  are  drawn  at  a  given  fixed  distance  and 
moved  backward  and  forward  in  the  third  dimension,  the  rela- 


388  CHARLES  H.  JUDD. 

tive  size  of  the  circles  will  remain  constant,  but  the  frustum  will 
increase  in  length  as  the  figures  move  away,  and  it  will  grow 
shorter  as  they  approach.  The  fact  that  the  size  of  the  circles 
seems  to  remain  constant  is  what  we  should  naturally  expect. 
When  fusion  once  takes  place  the  size  of  the  image  is  deter- 
mined by  the  relation  of  the  size  of  the  retinal  image  and  the  de- 
gree of  convergence.  If  now  the  figures  are  moved  away,  the 
convergence  and  the  retinal  image  vary  just  as  they  would  if  a 
real  object  at  the  point  of  fixation  were  being  moved  away. 
The  relative  size,  therefore,  seems  to  remain  constant.  Not  so 
with  the  binocular  parallax.  The  figures  are  at  a  fixed  distance 
apart,  and  when  moved  away  from  the  eyes  they  will  approach 
relatively  nearer  to  the  median  plane.  At  an  infinite  distance 
they  would  be  on  the  median  line,  and  near  at  hand  their  dis- 
tance from  that  line  reaches  its  maximum.  This  approach  to 
the  median  plane  when  the  figures  move  away  gives  a  relatively 
smaller  decrease  in  the  binocular  parallax,  a  result  which  is  in 
contradiction  to  all  ordinary  experiences,  for  usually  when  an 
object  moves  further  away  the  binocular  parallax  decreases 
without  this  counteracting  influence.  Here  again,  we  are  con- 
fronted by  a  series  of  conditions  which  seem  contradictory  to 
experience.  The  interpretation  of  the  sense  data  will,  however, 
be  fully  determined  by  peripheral  conditions.  The  object  ob- 
served will  seem  to  change,  for  that  is  the  only  possible  objec- 
tive condition  under  which  the  unusual  combination  of  sense 
data  could  possibly  be  presented. 

All  of  the  results  from  these  various  experiments  furnish 
ground  for  accepting  the  association  and  motor-sensation  theory 
of  visual  space  rather  than  the  contrary  as  Professor  Hyslop  con- 
cludes. The  sense-data  presented  in  every  case  are  interpreted 
in  accordance  with  past  experiences.  Where  such  combina- 
tions of  data  arise  as  are  not  in  conformity  with  any  single  past 
experience,  the  interpretation  immediately  permits  the  assump- 
tion of  a  change  in  the  object  itself;  the  size  of  the  object 
changes  or  the  position  of  its  parts  in  the  third  dimension  seems 
to  vary.  The  relation  fixed  by  past  experience  between  the 
various  sense-data  is  more  constant  than  the  belief  in  a  single 
particular  case,  so  that,  although  we  know  that  the  object  re- 


SOME  FACTS  OF  BINOCULAR  VISION.  389 

mains  constant  in  size,  it  is  interpreted  as  changing,  this  per- 
ception being  more  readily  adopted  than  any  modification  of  the 
fixed  relation  between  the  various  kinds  of  sense-data.  The 
light  thrown  by  this  fact  on  the  general  theory  of  space  percep- 
tion as  well  as  on  the  question  of  perception  in  general  requires 
more  discussion  than  can  be  allowed  after  the  detailing  of  these 
empirical  facts.  In  general,  however,  the  conclusion  is  to  be 
emphasized  that  analysis  of  the  phenomena  furnishes  striking 
evidence  in  favor  of  the  motor-sensation  theory  rather  than 
against  it. 


SHORTER  CONTRIBUTIONS. 

BLOTS  OF  INK  IN  EXPERIMENTAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

The  chance  characters  made  by  the  compression  of  one  or  more 
drops  of  writing  fluid  between  two  small  squares  of  paper  seem  to 
have  a  varied  usefulness  in  experimental  psychology.  Rectangular 
pieces  of  paper  twice  as  long  as  wide  are  folded  transversely  in  the 
middle.  Six  centimetres  by  three  is  a  convenient  size  for  use  when 
large  series  are  employed.  Small  drops  of  rather  thick  common  ink 
are  then  placed  near  the  centre  of  one  of  the  squares,  and  the  two 
halves  firmly  pressed  together  with  the  moving  fingers  until  the  fluid 
has  been  absorbed.  The  shape  and  size  of  the  blot  may  be  determined 
to  some  extent  by  the  finger  and  by  the  amount  of  ink  applied ;  several 
small  drops  make  more  various  blots  than  a  large  single  drop. 

There  being  no  proper  top  or  bottom  to  these  characters,  mere 
partial  or  complete  reversal  changes  their  apparent  nature.  Thus  the 
two  originals  may  be  used  as  reverses  of  each  other  directly,  or  by 
quarter,  half,  or  three-quarters  turning  of  one  of  them,  three  other 
relative  characters  may  be  produced.  If  circular  bits  of  paper  instead 
of  square  be  employed,  theoretically  infinite  combinations  are  at  the 
command  of  the  experimenter.  Direct  reproduction  of  any  character 
may  be  made  by  tracing  its  outline  and  filling  this  in  with  a  brush  and 
pen.  If  many  reproductions  are  required,  photography  is  the  best 
means,  and  the  negatives  used  in  that  process  may  be  useful  as  sten- 
cils, behind  which  variously  colored  papers  can  be  placed  somewhat 
as  in  the  ambrotypes  of  fifty  years  ago.  If  the  blots  be  required  in 
series,  they  are  best  made  on  heavy  gummed  paper  squares  and  stuck 
upon  sheets  of  the  required  shape  and  size.  Paper  not  too  smooth  is 
best  for  the  blots,  that  they  may  dry  quickly  and  be  colored  uniformly. 
If  copies  larger  or  smaller  than  the  original  are  desired  they  may  be 
made  with  the  pantagraph.  Colors,  of  course,  are  as  easily  used  as 
black,  and  variation  in  the  way  of  shading  is  also  unlimited. 

The  characters  may  be  exposed  behind  a  Miinsterberg  pendulum, 
attached  by  rubber  bands  to  a  kymograph  cylinder,  through  an 
aperture,  and  used  in  many  other  ways. 

It  is  suggested  that  these  characters  may  be  of  use  in  at  least  the 
390 


SHORTER   CONTRIBUTIONS.  391 

following  psychological  researches:  In  the  study  of  the  content  of 
consciousness  as  regards  the  relative  ease  of  recognizing  an  object  and 
its  reverse,  either  when  seen  alone  or  in  various  series.  In  studies  of 
memory,  by  measurements  of  the  length  of  time  after  which  a  given 
blot,  straight  or  reversed,  may  be  recognized;  also  by  the  relative 
power  of  reproducing  after  an  interval  the  outline  of  an  exposed 
character.  In  the  study  of  Imagination,  qualitatively,  in  various  ways, 
and  quantitatively,  by  measurements  of  the  relative  times  required  for 
a  presented  suggestive  blot  to  bring  to  mind  its  obvious  likeness.  In 
determinations  of  reaction  time  with  choice.  In  study  of  the  dis- 
crimination of  minute  formal  differences.  In  the  study  of  after-images 
of  various  colors,  and  positive  or  negative.  In  studying  Association. 

The  advantages  of  blots  or  characters  thus  made  seem  to  be  these ; 
The  practical  infinity  of  their  variety ;  the  ease,  rapidity,  and  cheap- 
ness of  their  production  in  black  or  colors;  the  facility  with  which 
exact  reverses  are  made ;  the  lack  of  associational  suggestiveness  of 
many  of  them,  and  on  the  other  hand  the  ease  with  which  suggestive 
ones  may  be  obtained ;  and  the  unlimited  range  in  size. 

HARVARD  UNIVERSITY.  GEORGE  V.  DEARBORN. 


THE  IMAGERY  OF  ONE  EARLY  MADE  BLIND. 

I  became  blind  at  the  age  of  five  years  and  one  month,  in  August 
of  1877.  ^7  home  was  then  in  New  Brunswick,  Canada.  I  have  an 
image  in  my  mind  of  many  of  the  scenes  which  I  saw  before  losing 
my  sight.  I  remember  how  the  trees  looked  across  the  river  where 
they  seemed  to  disappear  into  the  sky  and  I  believed  they  supported 
the  sky.  I  remember  how  the  small  ships  which  used  to  come  up  the 
river  looked.  I  also  have  a  vivid  picture  of  the  falls  in  the  river.  I 
used  to  sit  on  the  edge  of  the  bank  overlooking  the  falls  and  gaze  down 
about  fifty  feet  at  the  water.  In  fact  I  remember  almost  everything 
which  I  saw  during  the  last  summer  while  I  possessed  my  sight. 

My  Idea  of  Space. — When  I  contemplate  a  geometric  proposi 
tion,  it  is  presented  to  my  mind  ras  aised  on  a  piece  of  paper.  When 
I  studied  geometry  I  had  all  the  diagrams  used  to  prove  the  proposi- 
tion raised  on  paper.  Thick  pasteboard  was  used  so  that  the  figure 
would  endure.  Any  geometric  proposition,  therefore,  appears  to  me 
raised  on  such  a  figure  as  I  then  used. 

When  I  wish  to  represent  to  myself  something  infinitesimally  small, 
I  take  a  thin  piece  of  paper  and  tear  it  in  halves ;  then  I  tear  one  of  the 
halves  in  halves  and  continuq  this  process  until  I  have  the  smallest 


392  THE  IMAGERY  OF  ONE  EARLY  MADE  BLIND. 

piece  of  paper  which  I  can  hold  in  my  hands ;  then  I  consider  that  sub 
divided  as  many  times  as  I  subdivided  the  original  piece  of  paper,  and 
then  again  what  is  obtained  by  that  subdivision  again  subdivided,  and 
so  on  until  I  can  think  no  longer  of  the  subdivisions  for  mere  infinity 
of  numbers,  and  still  I  do  not  feel  satisfied  when  geometricians  make 
a  leap  in  the  dark  from  this  smallest  conceivable  to  zero.  I  can  not 
understand  how  zero  can  ever  be  reached  in  this  way.  The  longer 
the  piece  of  paper  which  I  at  first  divided  is  the  more  thoroughly  can 
I  approach  to  the  minutest  possible  in  the  repeated  subdivisions. 

When  I  wish  to  represent  to  myself  the  infinitely  long  I  consider 
myself  in  an  extended  body  of  water  with  a  life  preserver  on.  I  have 
sometimes  been  in  the  water  in  such  a  manner;  and  if  I  can  hear  no 
one  on  the  shore,  there  comes  to  me  some  idea  of  what  infinity  is.  My 
home  is  on  the  shore  of  Lake  Superior  and  when  in  that  body  of  water 
facing  away  from  the  land,  there  comes  to  me  some  idea  of  infinity. 

I  consider  infinity  going  away  just  as  I  would  swim  away  from 
the  land.  I  might  swim  and  swim  and  still  I  would  never  come  to  a 
stopping  place  in  that  body  of  water;  and  infinity  would  go  on  before 
me  to  the  opposite  shores  of  the  lake  four  hundred  miles  away  and 
still  it  would  continue  beyond  that  point  an  infinite  number  of  times. 
Or  again,  I  represent  infinity  to  myself  as  the  rails  of  an  extended  rail- 
road track.  When  I  wish  to  represent  to  myself  two  parallel  lines 
which,  however,  far  produced  will  never  meet,  I  consider  the  lines  of 
the  track.  I  have  frequently  followed  these  rails  for  a  long  distance, 
fourteen  miles  being  the  farthest  I  have  ever  gone  at  once ;  and  from 
this  distance  I  can  consider  those  rails  continuing  on  in  that  same  line 
with  that  same  distance  between  them  for  an  infinitely  greater  distance 
than  I  have  ever  walked. 

Of  course  I  was  not  old  enough  when  I  lost  my  sight  to  consider 
infinity,  but  I  do  remember  looking  up  into  the  sky  and  wondering 
what  was  beyond  that  and  how  far  it  went.  I  distinctly  remember 
seeing  a  ball  thrown  up  into  the  air  as  far  as  I  could  follow  it  with  my 
eyes,  and  from  that  I  got  my  only  seeing  conception  of  infinity.  I  lost 
my  eyes  with  scarlet  fever,  and  before  the  sickness  came  on  they  were 
as  perfect  as  any  eyes. 

I  cannot  consider  in  my  mind  at  once  a  figure  of  more  than  six 
sides.  If  I  wish  to  consider  more  sides  than  that,  I  have  to  consider 
them  in  parts  of  three  or  four  sides  at  a  time.  I  have  to  go  round  the 
figure  in  my  mind  slowly.  I  cannot  conceive  in  my  mind  at  once  a 
polygon  of  an  infinite  number  of  sides,  nor  can  I  imagine  how  a  poly- 
gon of  an  infinite  number  of  sides  could  ever  merge  into  a  circle. 

YALE  UNIVERSITY.  ALEXANDER  CAMERON. 


SHORTER   CONTRIBUTIONS.  393 

DETERMINATE  EVOLUTION.1 

I.    ORGANIC  SELECTION. 

Admitting  the  possible  truth  of  either  of  the  current  doctrines  of  her- 
edity, yet  there  are  certain  defects  inherent  in  both  of  them.  Natural 
Selection,  considered  merely  as  a  principle  of  survival,  is  admitted  by 
all.  It  fails,  however,  (i)  to  account  for  the  lines  of  progress  shown 
in  evolution  where  the  variations  supposed  to  have  been  selected  were 
not  of  importance  enough  at  first  to  keep  alive  the  creatures  having 
them  (i.  e.,  were  not  of  '  selective  value  ') .  The  examination  of  series 
of  fossil  remains,  by  the  paleontologists,  shows  structures  arising  with 
very  small  and  insignificant  beginnings.2  Further,  (2)  in  cases  where 
correlations  of  structions  and  functions  are  in  question,  as  in  the  case  of 
complex  animal  instincts,  it  is  difficult  to  see  what  utility  the  partial 
correlations  could  have  had  which  would  necessarily  precede  the  full 
rise  of  the  instinct ;  and  yet  it  is  impossible  to  believe  that  these  cor- 
relations could  have  arisen  by  the  law  of  variation  all  at  once  as 
complete  functions.3  These  two  great  objections  to  the  *  adequacy  of 
natural  selection '  are  so  impressive  that  the  Neo-Darwinians  have  felt 
obliged  to  deal  with  them.  The  first  objection  may  be  called  that  from 
*  determinate  evolution,'  and  the  latter  that  from  '  correlated  variations.' 

On  the  other  hand  the  doctrine  of  use-inheritance  or  Lamarckism 
is  open  to  equally  grave  difficulties  in  my  opinion,  (i)  It  is  a  pure 
assumption  that  any  such  inheritance  takes  place.  The  direct  evidence 
is  practically  nothing.4  No  unequivocal  case  of  the  inheritance  of  the 
normal  effects  of  use  or  disuse  has  yet  been  cited.  Again  (2)  it  proves 
too  much,  seeing  that  if  it  actually  operated  as  a  general  principle  it 
would  hinder  rather  than  advance  evolution  in  its  higher  reaches.  For, 
first,  in  the  more  variable  functions  of  life  it  would  produce  conflicting 
lines  of  inheritance  of  every  degree  of  advantage  and  disadvantage,  and 
these  would  very  largely  neutralize  one  another,  giving  a  sort  of  func- 
tional 'panmixia'  of  inherited  habits  analogous  to  the  panmixia  of 
variations  which  arises  when  natural  selection  is  not  operative.  Again, 
in  cases  in  which  the  functions  or  acquired  habits  are  so  widespread 

1  Matter  added  in  the  foreign  editions  of  the  author's  '  Mental  Development 
in  the  Child  and  the  Race.' 

2Cf.  the  statement  of  this  objection  by  Osborn,  Amer.  Naturalist,  March, 
1891. 

8  Cf .  Romanes,  Darwin  and  after  Darwin,  II.,  chap.  3. 

*  See  the  candid  statement  of  Romanes,  loc.  cit. ;  and  Morgan,  Habit  and 
Instinct,  Chap.  XIII. 


394  DE  TERM  IN  A  TE  E  VOL  UTION. 

and  constant  as  to  produce  similar  '  set '  habits  in  the  individuals,  the 
inheritance  of  these  habits  would  produce,  in  a  relatively  constant  en- 
vironment, such  a  stereotyped  series  of  functions,  of  the  instinctive 
type,  that  the  plasticity  necessary  to  the  acquirement  of  new  functions 
to  any  great  extent  would  be  destroyed.  This  type  of  evolution  is  seen 
in  the  case  of  certain  insects  which  live  by  complex  instincts ;  and  how- 
ever these  instincts  may  have  been  acquired,  they  may  yet  be  cited  to 
show  the  sort  of  creatures  which  the  free  operation  of  use-inheritance 
would  produce.  Yet  just  this  state  of  things  would  again  militate 
against  continued  use-inheritance,  as  a  general  principle  of  evolution ; 
for  as  instinct  increases,  ability  to  learn  decreases,  and  so  each  gener- 
ation would  have  less  acquisition  to  hand  on  by  heredity.  So  use-in- 
heritance would  very  soon  run  itself  out.  Further,  (3)  the  main  criticism 
of  the  principle  of  natural  selection  cited  above  from  the  paleontolo- 
gists, z.  e.,  that  from  '  determinate  evolution,'  is  not  met  by  use-inheri- 
tance ;  since  the  determinate  lines  of  evolution  are  frequently,  as  in  the 
case  of  teeth  and  bony  structures,  in  characters  which  in  the  early 
stages  of  their  appearance  are  not  modified  in  the  direction  in  ques- 
tion, during  the  lifetime  of  the  creatures  which  have  them.  And,  fin- 
ally, (4)  if  it  can  be  shown  that  natural  selection,  which  all  admit  to 
be  in  operation  in  any  case,  can  be  supplemented  by  any  principle 
which  will  meet  these  objections  better  than  that  of  use-inheritance, 
then  such  a  principle  may  be  considered  in  some  degree  a  direct  sub- 
stitute for  the  Lamarckian  factor. 

There  is  another  influence  at  work,  I  think,  which  is  directly  sup- 
plementary to  natural  selection,  i.  e.,  Organic  Selection. 

Put  very  generally,  this  principle  may  be  stated  as  follows :  ac- 
quired characters,  or  modifications,  or  individual  adaptations — all 
that  we  are  familiar  with  in  the  earlier  chapters  under  the  term  Ac- 
commodations— while  not  directly  inherited,  are  yet  influential  in  de- 
termining the  course  of  evolution  indirectly.  For  such  modifications 
and  accommodations  keep  certain  animals  alive,  in  this  way  screen 
the  variations  which  they  represent  from  the  action  of  natural  selection, 
and  so  allow  new  variations  in  the  same  directions  to  arise  in  the  next 
and  following  generations ;  while  variations  in  other  directions  are  not 
thus  kept  alive  and  so  are  lost.  The  species  will  therefore  make  prog- 
ress in  the  same  directions  as  those  first  marked  out  by  the  acquired 
modifications,  and  will  gradually  '  pick  up,'  by  congenital  variation, 
the  same  characters  which  were  at  first  only  individually  acquired. 
The  result  will  be  the  same,  as  to  these  characters,  as  if  they  had  been 
directly  inherited,  and  the  appearance  of  such  heredity  in  these  cases, 


SHORTER   CONTRIBUTIONS.  395 

at  least,  will  be  fully  explained.  While  the  long  continued  operation 
of  the  principle  will  account  for  '  determinate  '  lines  of  change. 

This  principle  comes  to  mediate  to  a  considerable  degree  between 
the  two  rival  theories,  since  it  goes  far  to  meet  the  objections  to  both  of 
them.  In  the  first  place,  the  two  great  objections  as  stated  above  to  the 
ordinary  Natural  Selection  theory  are  met  by  it.  (i)  The  'determinate* 
direction  in  the  evolution  is  secured  by  the  indirect  directive  influence 
of  Organic  Selection,  in  all  cases  in  which  the  direction  which  phylo- 
genetic  evolution  takes  is  the  same  as  that  which  was  taken  by  indi- 
vidual modifications  in  earlier  generations.  For  where  the  variations 
in  the  early  stages  of  the  character  in  question  were  not  of  selective 
value,  there  we  may  suppose  the  individual  accommodations  have  sup- 
plemented them  and  so  kept  them  in  existence.  An  instance  is  seen 
in  the  fact  that  young  chicks  and  ducks  which  have  no  instinct  to  take 
up  water  when  they  see  it,1  and  would  perish  if  dependent  upon  the 
congenital  variations  which  they  have,  nevertheless  imitate  the  mother 
fowl,  and,  thus  by  supplementing  their  congenital  equipment,  are  so 
kept  alive.  In  other  fowls  the  drinking  instinct  has  gone  on  to  per- 
fection and  become  self-acting.  Here  the  accommodation  secured  by 
imitation  saves  the  species — apart  from  their  getting  water  at  first  ac- 
cidentally— and  directs  its  future  development.  Farther  (2)  in  cases  of 
'  correlated  variations  ' — the  second  objection  urged  above  to  the  exclu- 
sive operation  of  Natural  Selection — the  same  influence  of  Organic 
Selection  is  seen.  For  the  variations  which  are  not  adequate  at  first, 
or  are  only  partially  correlated,  are  supplemented  by  the  adaptations 
which  the  creature  makes,  and  so  the  species  has  the  time  to  perfect 
its  inadequate  congenital  mechanism.  On  this  hypothesis  it  is  no 
longer  an  objection  to  the  general  origin  of  complex  instincts  without 
use-inheritance,  that  these  complex  correlations  could  not  have  come 
into  existence  all  at  once ;  since  this  principle  gives  the  species  time 
to  accumulate  and  perfect  its  organization  of  them. 

Similarly,  the  objections  cited  above  to  the  theory  of  use-inheritance 
can  not  be  brought  against  Organic  Selection.  In  the  first  place  (i) 
the  more  trivial  and  varied  experiences  of  individuals — such  as  bodily 
mutilations,  etc. — which  it  is  not  desirable  to  inherit,  whether  good  or 
bad  in  themselves,  would  not  be  perpetuated  in  the  development  of 
the  race,  since  organic  selection  would  set  a  premium  only  on  the 
variations  which  were  important  enough  to  be  of  some  material 
use  or  others  which  were  correlated  with  them.  These  being  of 

1  See  Morgan,  Habit  and  Instinct,  pp.  44  f .  and  his  citations  from  Eimer, 
Spalding,  and  Mills. 


DETERMINATE  EVOLUTION. 

such  importance,  the  species  would  accumulate  the  variations  neces- 
sary to  them,  and  the  individuals  would  be  relieved  of  the  necessity  of 
making  the  private  adaptations  over  again  in  each  generation.  Again 
(2)  there  would  be  no  tendency  to  the  exclusive  production  of  reflexes, 
as  would  be  the  case  under  use-inheritance ;  since  in  cases  in  which  the 
continued  accomplishment  of  a  function  by  individual  accommodation 
was  of  greater  utility  than  its  accomplishment  by  reflexes  or  instinct — 
in  these  cases  the  former  way  will  be  perpetuated  by  natural  selection. 
In  the  case  of  intelligent  adaptations,  for  example,  the  increase  of  the 
intelligence  with  the  nervous  plasticity  which  it  requires  is  of  the  great- 
est importance ;  we  find  that  creatures  having  intelligence  continue  to 
acquire  their  adaptations  intelligently  with  the  minimum  of  instinctive 
equipment.1  There  is  thus  a  constant  interplay  between  instinct  and 
accommodation,  as  the  emergencies  of  the  environment  require  the 
survival  of  one  type  of  function  or  the  other.  This  is  illustrated  by 
the  fact  that  in  creatures  of  intelligence  we  find  sometimes  both  the 
instinctive  and  also  the  intelligent  performance  of  the  same  function; 
each  serving  a  separate  utility.2 

(3) .  The  remaining  objection — and  it  holds  equally  of  both  the  cur- 
rent views — is  that  arising  from  the  cases  of  structures  which  begin  in  a 
very  small  way  with  no  apparent  utility,  such  as  the  bony  protuber- 
ances in  places  where  horns  afterwards  develop,  and  in  certain  small 
changes  in  the  evolution  of  mammalian  teeth ;  which  afterwards  pro- 
gress regularly  from  one  generation  to  another  until  they  become  of 
some  utility.  While  it  is  not  clear  that  Organic  Selection  completely 
accounts  for  these  cases,  yet  it  is  quite  possible  that  it  aids  us  in  the 
matter ;  for  the  assumption  is  admissible  that  in  their  small  beginnings 
these  characters  were  correlated  with  useful  functions  or  variations, 
and  that  the  Organic  or  Natural  Selection  of  the  latter  in  a  progressive 
way  has  secured  the  accumulation  of  these  characters  also.  The  facts 
of  correlation  are  so  little  known,  while  yet  the  correlation  itself  is  so 
universal,  that  no  dogmatism  is  justified  on  either  side ;  the  less,  per- 
haps on  the  side  of  the  paleontologists  who  assert  that  these  cases  can 
not  be  explained  by  Natural  Selection  even  when  supplemented  by 
Organic  Selection ;  for  when  we  enquire  into  the  state  of  the  evidence 
for  the  so-called  '  determinate  variations'  which  are  supposed  in  these 
cases,  we  find  that  it  is  very  precarious.3 

1Groos  (Die  Spiele  der  Thiere,  p.  65  f.)  has  pointed  out  the  function  of 
imitation  as  aiding  the  growth  of  intelligence  with  the  breaking  up  of  instincts 
under  the  operation  of  natural  selection. 

2 Baldwin,  Science,  Apl.  10,  1896. 

3 For  example,   the  only  way  to  establish  'determinate  variations'  would 


SHORTER   CONTRIBUTIONS.  397 

We  come  to  the  view,  therefore,  that  evolution  from  generation  to 
generation  has  probably  proceeded  by  the  operation  of  Natural  Selec- 
tion upon  variations  with  the  assistance  of  the  Organic  Selection  of  co- 
incident1 variations  (/.  e.,  those  which  reproduce  congenitally  the 
acquisitions  of  the  individuals).  And  we  derive  a  view  of  the  relation 
of  ontogeny  to  phylogeny  all  through  the  animal  series.  All  the 
influences  which  work  to  assist  the  animal  to  make  adaptations  or  ac- 
commodations will  unite  to  give  directive  determination  to  the  course 
of  evolution.  These  influences  we  may  call  '  orthoplastic '  or  directive 
influences.  And  the  general  fact  that  evolution  has  a  directive  deter- 
mination through  organic  selection  we  may  call  '  Orthoplasy.'2 

As  to  detailed  evidence  of  the  action  of  Organic  Selection,  this  is 
not  the  place  to  present  it.  It  is  well-nigh  coextensive  however  with 
that  for  Natural  Selection ;  for  the  cases  where  natural  selection 
operates  to  preserve  creatures  because  they  adapt  themselves  to  their 
environment  are  everywhere  to  be  seen,  and  in  all  such  cases  Organic 
Selection  is  operative.  Positive  evidence  in  the  shape  of  cases  is  how- 
ever to  be  found  in  the  papers  of  the  writer  and  others  on  the  subject.5 

be  to  examine  all  the  individuals  of  a  given  generation  in  respect  to  a  given 
quality,  and  compare  their  mean  with  the  mean  of  their  parents — not -with  the 
mean  of  all  the  individuals  of  the  earlier  generation.  For  some  influence,  such 
as  Organic  Selection,  might  have  preserved  only  a  remnant  of  the  earlier  gener- 
ation, and  in  this  way  the  mean  of  the  variations  of  the  following  generation 
may  be  shifted  and  give  the  appearance  of  being  determinate,  while  the  varia- 
tions themselves  remain  indeterminate.  And  again,  the  paleontologists  have  no 
means  of  saying  how  old  one  of  these  fossil  creatures  had  to  be  in  order  to  develop 
the  character  in  question.  It  may  be  that  a  certain  age  was  necessary  and  that 
the  variations  which  he  finds  lacking  would  have  existed  if  their  possessors 
had  not  fallen  by  natural  selection  before  they  were  old  enough  to  develop  this 
character  and  deposit  it  with  their  bones. 

1 A  term  suggested  by  Professor  Lloyd  Morgan. 

'These  terms  are  akin  to  'orthogenic'  and  'orthogenesis'  used  by  Eimer 
(  Verh.  der  Deutsch.  ZooL  Gesell.,  1895) ;  his  terms  are  not  adopted  by  me  how- 
ever, for  the  exact  meaning  given  above,  since  Eimer's  view  directly  implicates 
use-inheritance  and  '  determinate  variations '  which  are  here  rejected.  On  the 
use  of  these  and  other  terms  see  Science,  Apl.  23,  and  Nature,  Apl.  15,  1897. 

8  It  may  be  in  place  to  recall  something  of  the  history  of  this  suggestion  as 
to  Organic  Selection  and  cite  some  of  the  publications  bearing  upon  it.  The 
present  writer  indicated  it  (only)  in  the  first  edition  of  this  work  (Feb.  1895), 
presented  it  fully  with  especial  reference  to  the  origin  of  instinct  in  Science, 
March  20,  1896,  and  developed  it  in  many  of  its  applications  in  an  article  en- 
titled 'A  New  Factor  in  Evolution,'  American  Naturalist,  June  and  July, 
1896  (reprinted  in  Princeton  Contrib.  to  Psychology,  I.,  4,  September, 
1896).  Professor  H.  F.  Osborn  expressed  similar  views  briefly  in  an  abstract  in 
Science,  April  3,  1896,  p.  530;  and  more  fully  in  Science,  November  27,  1896. 


3  98  DE  TERMINA  TE  E  VOL  UTION. 

II.  THE  DIRECTIVE  FACTOR. 

We  have  now  seen  some  reason  for  the  reproduction  of  individual 
or  ontogenetic  accommodations  in  race  progress.  The  truth  of  Or- 
ganic Selection  is  quite  distinct,  of  course,  from  the  truth  of  any  par- 
ticular doctrine  as  to  how  the  accommodations  in  the  life  of  the  indi- 
vidual are  effected ;  it  may  be  that  there  are  as  many  ways  of  doing 
this  as  the  usual  language  of  daily  life  implies,  i.  e.,  mechanical,  nerv- 
ous, intelligent,  etc. 

Yet  when  we  come  to  weigh  the  conclusions  to  which  our  earlier 
discussions  have  brought  us,  and  remember  that  the  type  of  reaction, 
which  is  everywhere  present  in  the  individual's  accommodation,  is  the 
'  circular  reaction '  working  by  functional  selection  from  over-pro- 
duced movements,  we  see  where  a  real  orthoplastic  influence  in  biolog- 
ical progress  lies.  The  individuals  accommodate  by  such  functional 
selection  from  over-produced  movements;  this  keeps  them  alive  while 
others  die ;  the  variations  which  are  represented  in  them  are  thus  kept 
in  existence,  and  further  variations  are  allowed  in  the  same  direction. 
This  goes  on  until  the  accumulated  variations  become  independent  of 
the  process  of  individual  accommodation,  as  congenital  instincts.  Thus 
are  added  to  the  acquisitions  of  the  species  the  accommodations  secured 
by  the  individuals.  So  race  progress  shows  a  series  of  adaptations 
which  corresponds  to  the  series  of  individual  accommodations. 

It  may  be  remarked  also  that  when  the  intelligence  has  reached 
considerable  development,  as  in  the  case  of  man,  it  will  outrank 
all  other  means  of  individual  accommodation.  In  Intelligence  and 
Will  (as  will  appear  below)1  the  circular  form  of  reaction  becomes 
highly  developed,  and  the  result  then  is  that  the  intelligence  and  the 
social  life  which  it  makes  possible  so  far  control  the  acquisitions  of 
life  as  greatly  to  limit  the  action  of  natural  selection  as  a  law  of 
evolution.  This  may  be  merely  indicated  here ;  the  additional  note 
below  will  take  the  subject  further  in  the  treatment  of  what  then  be- 
comes the  means  of  transmission  from  generation  to  generation,  a  form 
of  handing  down  which,  in  contrast  with  physical  heredity,  we  may 
call  '  Social  Heredity.' 

Professor  C.  Lloyd  Morgan  also  printed  similar  views,  Science,  November  20, 
1896,  and  in  his  book,  Habit  and  Instinct,  November,  1896.     The  essential  posi- 
tion was  reached  independently  by  each  of  these  writers  and  has  been  developed 
by  correspondence  since  their  first  publication  of  it. 
1 7.  e.  in  the  volume,  Chaps.  X.  to  XIII. 


SHORTER  CONTRIBUTIONS.  399 

III.  INTELLIGENT  DIRECTION  AND  SOCIAL  PROGRESS. 

The  view  of  biological  evolution  already  brought  out  has  led  us  to 
the  opinion  that  the  accommodations  secured  by  the  individuals  of  a 
species  are  the  determining  factor  in  the  progress  which  the  species 
makes,  since,  although  we  can  not  hold  that  these  accommodations,  or 
the  modifications  which  are  effected  by  them,  are  directly  inherited 
from  father  to  son,  nevertheless  by  the  working  of  Organic  Selection 
with  the  subsequent  accumulation  of  coincident  variations  the  course 
of  biological  evolution  is  directed  in  the  channels  first  marked  out  by 
individual  adaptations.  The  means  of  accommodation  were  called  above 
orthoplastic  influences  in  view  of  the  directive  trend  which  they  give 
to  the  progress  of  the  species. 

It  was  also  intimated,  in  the  earlier  section,  that  when  the  intelli- 
gence once  comes  to  play  an  important  part  in  the  accommodations  of 
the  individuals,  then  we  should  expect  that  it  would  be  the  controlling 
factor  in  race-progress.  This  happens  in  two  ways  which  may  now 
allow  of  brief  statement. 

1.  The  intelligence  represents  the  highest  and  most  specialized 
form  of  accommodation  by  'circular  reaction.'     With  it  goes,  on  the 
active  side,  the  great  fact  of  volition  which  springs  directly  out  of  the 
imitative  instinct  of  the  child.  It  therefore  becomes  the  goal  of  organic 
fitness  to  secure  the  best  intelligence.     On  the  organic  side,  intelli- 
gence is  correlated  with  plasticity  in  brain  structure.     Thinking   and 
willing  stand  for  the  opposite  of  that  fixity  of  structure  and  directness 
of  reaction  which  characterize  the  life  of  instinct.     Progress  in  intelli- 
gence, therefore,  represents  readiness  for  much  acquisition,  together 
with  very  little  congenital  instinctive  equipment. 

It  is  easy  to  see  the  effects  of  this.  The  intelligence  secures  the 
widest  possible  range  of  personal  adaptations,  and  by  so  doing  widens 
the  sphere  of  Organic  Selection,  so  that  the  creature  which  thinks  has 
a  general  screen  from  the  action  of  natural  selection.  The  struggle 
for  existence,  depending  upon  the  physical  qualities  which  the  animals 
rely  on,  is  largely  done  away  with. 

This  means  that  with  the  growth  of  intelligence,  creatures  free 
themselves  more  and  more  from  Natural  Selection.  Variations  of  a 
physical  kind  come  to  have  within  limits  an  equal  chance  to  survive. 
Progress  then  depends  on  the  one  kind  of  variation  which  represents 
improved  intelligence — variations  in  brain  structure  with  the  organic 
correlations  which  favor  them — more  than  on  other  kinds. 

2.  The  other   consideration  tends   in  the  same  direction.     With 


400  DETERMINATE  EVOLUTION. 

the  intelligence  comes  the  growth  of  sentiment,  especially  the  great 
class  of  Social  Sentiments,  and  their  outcome  the  ethical  and  religious 
sentiments.  We  have  seen  in  earlier  chapters  how  the  sense  of 
personality  or  self,  which  is  the  kernel  of  intelligent  growth  involves 
the  social  environment  and  reflects  it.  Now  this  social  sense  also  acts 
wherever  it  exists,  as  an  '  orthoplastic '  influence — a  directive  influence, 
through  Organic  Selection,  upon  the  course  of  evolution.  In  the 
animal  world  it  is  of  importance  enough  to  have  been  seized  upon  and 
made  instinctive :  animal  association  acts  to  screen  certain  groups  of 
creatures  from  the  operation  of  Natural  Selection. 

In  man  the  social  sentiment  keeps  pace  with  his  intelligence,  and 
so  enables  him  again  to  discount  natural  selection  by  cooperation  with 
his  brethren.  From  childhood  up  the  individual  is  screened  from  the 
physical  evils  of  the  world  by  his  fellows.  So  another  reason  appears 
for  considering  the  course  of  evolution  to  be  now  dominated  by  the 
intelligence. 

But,  it  may  be  asked,  does  not  this  render  progress  impossible, 
seeing  that  it  is  only  through  the  operation  of  Natural  Selection  upon 
variations — even  allowing  for  Organic  Selection — that  progress  de- 
pends ?  This  may  be  answered  in  the  affirmative,  so  far  as  progress 
by  physical  heredity  is  concerned.  Not  only  do  we  not  find  such 
progress,  but  the  researches  of  Galton,  Weismann  and  others  show 
that  there  is  probably  little  or  no  progress,  even  in  intelligence,  from 
father  to  son.  The  great  man  who  comes  as  a  variation  does  not  have 
sons  as  great  as  he.  Intermarriage  keeps  the  level  of  intelligent  en- 
dowment at  a  relatively  stable  quantity,  by  what  Galton  has  called 
'  regression.' 

Yet  there  is  progress  of  another  kind.  With  intelligence  comes 
educability.  Each  generation  is  educated  in  the  acquisitions  of  earlier 
generations.  There  is  in  every  community  a  greater  or  less  mass  of 
so-called  '  Tradition '  which  is  handed  down  with  constant  increments, 
from  one  generation  to  another.  The  young  creature  grows  up  into 
this  tradition  by  the  process  of  imitative  absorption  which  has  been 
called  above  '  Social  Heredity.'1  This  directly  takes  the  place  of 
physical  heredity  as  a  means  of  transmission  of  many  of  the  acquisi- 
tions which  are  at  first  the  result  of  private  intelligence,  and  tends  to 
free  the  species  from  the  dependence  upon  variations — except  intel- 
lectual variations — just  as  the  general  growth  of  intelligence  and  sen- 
timent tends  to  free  it  from  the  law  of  natural  selection. 

*P.  361  and  364  (as  in  the  first  edition).  See  article  on  'Consciousness 
and  Evolution,'  Science,  August  23,  1895,  reprinted  with  discussion  by  Prof.  E. 
D.  Cope  and  the  writer  in  the  Amer.  Naturalist,  Nos.  from  April  to  July,  1896. 


SHORTER  CONTRIBUTIONS.  401 

These  general  truths  can  not  be  expanded  here;  they  belong  to  the 
theory  of  social  evolution.  Yet  they  should  be  noted  for  certain  rea- 
sons which  are  pertinent  to  our  general  topic,  and  which  I  may  briefly 
mention. 

First,  it  should  be  said  that  this  progress  in  emancipation  from  the 
operation  of  natural  selection  and  from  dependence  upon  variations, 
is  not  limited  to  human  life.  It  arises  from  the  operation  of  the 
principle  which  has  all  the  while  given  direction  to  organic  evolution ; 
the  principle  that  individual  accommodations  set  the  direction  of  evolu- 
tion, by  what  is  called  Organic  Selection.  It  is  only  a  widening  of 
the  sphere  of  accommodation  in  the  way  which  is  called  intelligent, 
with  its  accompanying  tendency  to  social  life,  that  has  produced  the 
deflection  of  the  stream  which  is  so  marked  in  human  development. 
And  as  to  the  existence  of  'Tradition'  and  '  Social  Heredity'  among 
animals,  recent  biological  research  and  observations  are  emphasizing 
them  both.  Wallace  and  Hudson  have  pointed  out  the  great  impor- 
tance of  imitation  in  carrying  on  the  habits  of  certain  species ;  Weis- 
mann  shows  the  importance  of  tradition  as  against  Spencer's  claim 
that  mental  gains  are  inherited ;  Lloyd  Morgan  has  observed  in  great 
detail  the  action  of  social  heredity  in  actually  keeping  young  fowls 
alive  and  so  allowing  the  perpetuation  of  the  species,  and  Wesley 
Mills  has  shown  the  imperfection  of  instinct  in  many  cases  with  the 
accompanying  dependence  of  the  creatures  upon  social,  imitative  and 
intelligent  action. 

Second,  it  gives  a  transition  from  animal  to  human  organization, 
and  from  biological  to  social  evolution,  which  does  not  involve  a  break 
in  the  chain  of  influences  already  present  in  all  the  development  of 
life. 

J.  MARK  BALDWIN. 


DISCUSSION. 
PROFESSOR  LADD  AND  THE    PRESIDENT'S  ADDRESS. 

In  his  discussion  of  my  late  address  before  the  American  Psycho 
logical  Association,  Professor  Ladd  makes  three  definite  criticisms,  viz., 

1.  That  I  misunderstand    Professor  Wundt's   position  as  to  the 
nature  and  functions  of  the  mind. 

2.  That  I  confound  his  own  earlier  and  later  books,  and  thus  seem 
to  find  inconsistency  where  it  does  not  exist. 

3.  That  I  unjustly  place  him  in  the  same  category  with  Kant,  when 
he    (Professor  Ladd)  claims  that  "  we  do  know  reality,"  and  that  "all 
knowledge  is  quoad  knowledge,  essentially  transcendent "  (PSYCHO- 
LOGICAL REVIEW,  March,  1897,  pp.  180-182). 

Regarding  criticisms  i  and  3  I  shall  say  little.  It  appears  to  me 
that  Wundt's  later  utterances  justify  what  I  have  said.  I  referred  in 
my  address  to  the  last  edition  of  the  Grundziige  and  to  the  lectures 
on  '  Human  and  Animal  Psychology.'  As  to  classing  Professor  Ladd 
with  the  noumenalists,  I  think  that  is  no  injustice.  Kant  himself  kept 
talking  about  noumena  as  though  he  knew  enough  about  them  to  at 
least  talk  intelligently  upon  the  subject  and  to  contrast  them  with  phe- 
nomena. Had  he  been  quite  consistent  in  denying  us  any  knowledge 
whatever  of  noumena,  I  think  he  would  have  dropped  the  subject  alto- 
gether. Moreover,  I  have  nowhere  charged  Professor  Ladd  with 
being  a  good  Kantian,  but  I  think  he  is  enough  like  Kant  and  a  num- 
ber of  others  whom  I  would  call  Noumenalists,  to  be  properly  de- 
scribed by  the  use  of  that  term.  He  contrasts  'phenomena'  with 
'reality.'  He  holds  (sometimes)  to  a  reality  which  is  not  phenomenal. 
It  matters  little  whether  we  accept  his  term,  or  that  which  Kant  has 
made  familiar  to  us,  he  (sometimes)  treats  this  something,  I  believe, 
in  a  distinctly  'noumenal'  way.  He  does  not  treat  it  in  precisely 
the  same  way  in  all  his  books,  being,  as  I  indicated  in  my  address, 
less  of  a  noumenalist  in  his  later  works  than  he  was  in  his  earlier.  I 
shall  give  two  or  three  references  to  prove  this  later. 

As  to  the  second  criticism  made  by  Professor  Ladd,  in  which  he 
states  that  I  have  been  guilty  of  the  '  quite  indefensible  misapprehen- 
sion '  of  confounding  his  earlier  and  his  later  works,  and  thus  of  doing 
him  a  certain  injustice,  I  will  speak  a  little  more  at  length. 

402 


DISCUSSION.  403 

Professor  Ladd  has  quite  misunderstood  my  reference  to  his  earlier 
and  his  later  works.  It  would  never  have  occurred  to  me  to  thus 
characterize  two  books  published  in  the  same  year  (1895),  even 
though  the  preface  of  one  of  them  bore  the  date  of  the  year  before. 
For  all  I  know  to  the  contrary,  that  preface  may  have  been  dated  on 
the  last  day  of  the  year,  and  the  preface  of  the  other  on  the  first  day  of 
the  year  following.  By  Professor  Ladd's  earlier  works  I  meant  his 
4  Elements  of  Physiological  Psychology,'  published  in  1887,  and  his 
1  Introduction  to  Philosophy'  published  in  1890.  It  surprises  me 
that  Professor  Ladd  should  have  fallen  into  error  upon  this  point,  for 
in  his  discussion  of  my  address  at  the  time  when  it  was  delivered,  he 
referred  to  these  earlier  works,  and  in  my  response  I  stated  that  I  had 
read  them,  and  that,  in  comparing  his  later  works  with  them,  it  ap- 
peared to  me  that  he  had  undergone  a  change  of  mind.  I  still  think 
that  an  examination  of  these  works  will  show  that  he  has  undergone 
such  a  change. 

And  as  I  did  not  arrive  at  the  opinion  that  Professor  Ladd  has 
modified  his  views,  by  comparing  his  '  Psychology '  with  his  '  Philoso- 
phy of  Mind,'  so  also  I  did  not  infer  his  inconsistency  from  an  illegiti- 
mate comparison  of  the  statements  made  in  the  two  volumes,  leaving 
out  of  consideration  the  difference  in  their  aim.  To  prove  this,  let  me 
take  a  single  volume.  An  examination  of  the  eleven  references  that 
I  have  made  to  his  '  Psychology '  will  reveal  that,  in  that  one  book,  he 
is: 

1.  A  Noumenalist :  pp.  215,  513  and  511-517. 

2.  An  adherent  of  the  doctrine  that  mind  is  a  self-activity  within 
consciousness — a  doctrine  akin  to  that  of  the  Neo-Kantians :  pp.  532, 
638. 

3.  An  Empiricist,  who  holds  that  all  objects  of  knowledge,  in- 
cluding the  self,  are,  psychologically  considered,  states  of  conscious- 
ness or  psychoses ;    and  that  the  self  in  consciousness  does  not  come 
into  being  until  consciousness  has  attained  a  considerable  develop- 
ment: pp.  508,  509,  510,  519,  523,  531  and  532. 

Thus  the  self  is,  according  to  this  one  book,  at  one  and  the  same 
time  the  object  of  a  metaphysical  faith,  an  activity  in  consciousness, 
and  an  empirical  psychosis. 

As  to  Professor  Ladd's  change  of  faith,  I  will  ask  the  reader  to 
compare  the  statements  of  his  earlier  books  with  the  two  upon  which 
I  dwelt  in  my  address.  Let  him,  for  example,  read  Professor  Ladd's 
criticism  of  Metaphysics  on  page  611  of  the  'Elements  of  Physiolo- 
gical Psychology'  (1887).  He  there  criticizes  Metaphysics  on  the 


404        PROF.  LADD  AND  THE  PRESIDENT'S  ADDRESS. 

ground  that  "  it  has  often  declared  that  we  have  an  immediate  and 
indubitable  knowledge  of  the  mind  as  one  and  the  same  real  being  in 
all  acts  of  conciousness,"  maintaining  that  '•'•consciousness  carries 
'with  it  no  immediate  knowledge  of  any  real  and  self-identical  be- 
ing— not  even  of  that  real  being  which  we  call  Mind,  and,  with  good 
reason,  assume  to  exist  as  the  ground  or  permanent  subject  of  mental 
phenomena."  He  states  that  Metaphysics  treats  of  those  assumptions 
that  underlie  all  of  our  experience  with  what  we  call  reality,  and  he 
draws  a  parallel  between  the  hypothetical  beings  called  atoms,  which 
we  assume  to  account  for  physical  phenomena,  and  the  real  unit-being 
called  the  Mind. 

In  his  'Introduction  to  Philosophy'  (1890)  Professor  Ladd  re- 
gards '  knowledge '  as  the  presence  in  consciousness  of  certain  com- 
plexes of  mental  elements  accompanied  by  a  belief  (pp.  230,  234, 
235)  or  persuasion  (p.  237)  or  conviction  (p.  230)  that  there  exists 
beyond  consciousness  (pp.  204,  225,  251)  a  something  called  '  reality' 
in  relation  to  them  (chapters  VIII.  and  IX.  passim).  We  get  reality 
as  an  inference  from  experience  (pp.  224,  233),  and  this  inference  is 
not  rational  but  'blind'  (pp.  234,  235,  247,  251)  and  'instinctive' 
(p.  251).  It  is  true  that  in  the  same  volume  Professor  Ladd,  in 
speaking  of  the  knowledge  of  the  self,  uses  the  verb  '  to  know '  as 
synonymous  with  'to  be  conscious  of  (p.  226),  but  I  think  that  is 
only  a  slip.  The  general  argument  of  the  volume  is  to  the  effect  that 
reality  is  something  that  I  think  I  may  justly  call  noumenal,  and  not 
something  immediately  known. 

In  the  two  books  to  which  I  made  so  many  references  in  my  ad- 
dress, Professor  Ladd  finds  the  reality  of  the  self  to  be  involved  in 
every  act  of  knowledge  '  as  an  immediate  datum  of  experience,'  and 
he  no  longer  describes  the  metaphysical  faith  which  gives  us  reality  as 
'  blind ;'  as  a  Neo-Kantian,  he  makes  the  real  self  a  self-activity  in 
consciousness ;  as  an  empiricist,  he  makes  it  an  empirical  psychosis. 
I  think  I  have  not  been  wrong  in  believing  that  he  has  modified  his 
views. 

I  cannot  help  thinking  the  tone  of  Professor  Ladd's  communica- 
tion a  trifle  sour.  He  speaks  of  my  criticism  as  '  raillery,'  and  inti- 
mates that  I  have  dealt  with  the  works  of  various  philosophical  writers 
in  a  spirit  of  levity.  I  have  carefully  re-read  what  I  have  written  and 
I  cannot  see  that  it  is  not  courteous  and  in  sufficiently  good  taste.  My 
address  contained  but  one  jest,  and  that  one  was  borrowed  from  Pro- 
fessor Ladd  himself  and  merely  adapted.  If  it  has  annoyed  him  I  of 
course  regret  having  used  it,  for  it  is  no  part  of  the  work  of  a  critic  to 


DISCUSSION.  405 

needlessly  hurt  the  feelings  of  the  person  criticised.  I  wrote  with  all 
seriousness.  I  believe  that  Professor  Ladd's  utterances  are  conflicting, 
and  it  seems  to  me  that  anyone  who  points  out  this  fact  does  him  a 
real  service. 

GEORGE  STUART  FULLERTON. 
UNIVERSITY  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 


VISCERAL  DISEASE  AND  PAIN. 

In  a  series  of  papers  published  between  1893  and  1896,  Dr.  Henry 
Head  has  treated  'Disturbances  of  Sensation  with  Especial  Refer- 
ence to  the  Pain  of  Visceral  Disease.'1  The  starting  point  of  his  in- 
vestigation is  the  well-known  fact  that  visceral  disorders  are  frequently 
accompanied  by  cutaneous  tenderness,  the  pain  occasioned  by  organic 
disturbance  being  '  referred  '  by  the  patient  to  an  area  on  the  surface 
of  the  body.  Dr.  Head  has  carefully  mapped  out  these  areas,  designating 
in  his  first  paper  those  which  lie  below  the  first  dorsal  segment,  and 
in  his  second  paper  those  which  are  found  on  the  head  arid  neck.  His 
third  paper  deals,  not  with  the  topography  of  the  areas,  but  with  the 
pain  caused  by  diseases  of  various  organs.  His  report  contains  a  vast 
amount  of^  clinical  evidence  interspersed  with  theoretical  considera- 
tions. The  value  of  his  contributions  to  pathology,  anatomy  and 
physiology  has  been  duly  recognized.  And,  quite  naturally,  the  re- 
sults which  he  obtained  and  which  certainly  throw  light  on  an  intricate 
problem,  have  been  pressed,  with  some  eagerness,  into  the  service  of 
psychological  theory.2  Whether  there  are  separate  nerves  for  pain  is 
a  question  which  cannot  be  fully  discussed  here ;  but  the  evidence  in 
favor  of  the  affirmative  view  supplied  by  Head's  research  is  such  as  to 
deserve  examination. 

It  seems  to  be  fairly  established  that  in  cases  of  visceral  disease  cer- 
tain skin-areas  are  affected  in  such  a  way  that  they  show  increased 
tenderness,  increased  reflexes,  and  one  or  more  maximal  points  to  which 
the  pain  is  referred  and  to  which  the  tenderness  is  limited  as  the  disturb- 
ance subsides.  The  tenderness  can  be  tested  by  applying  a  pin  to  the 
sensitive  area,  in  which  case  the  rounded  head  causes  as  sharp  a  sen- 
sation as  the  point  causes  on  normal  surfaces,  while  the  application 
of  the  point  gives  rise  to  excessive  pain.  Quantitative  data  as  to  the 
amount  or  duration  of  pressure  are  not  furnished  in  Dr.  Head's  report. 

*Brain,  XVI.,  1893,  p.  i  ;  XVII.,  1894,  p.  339;  XIX.,  1896,  p.  153. 
'Pain  Nerves.     Herbert  Nichols,    PSY.  REV.,  May,  1896,  p.  309. 


406  VISCERAL  DISEASE  AND  PAIN. 

What  is,  perhaps,  of  greater  importance,  he  has  shown  that  the  eruptions 
in  Herpes  Zoster  occupy  areas  which  have  the  same  distribution  and 
the  same  maxima  as  the  areas  of  tenderness  in  visceral  disease. 

From  these  statements  it  must  not  be  inferred  that  the  topography 
of  the  areas  of  tenderness  is  a  simple  or  easy  affair.  At  times  only  the 
maxima  can  be  determined ;  in  nearly  all  cases  more  than  one  area  can 
be  pointed  out ;  and  certain  areas  of  the  body  which  are  rarely  affected, 
appear,  when  they  do  become  tender,  in  combination  with  others. 

With  these  facts  as  a  basis,  Dr.  Head  proceeds  by  way  of  elimina- 
tion to  show  the  significance  of  the  areas.  They  bear  no  relation  to 
cortical  distribution,  nor  do  they  correspond  to  the  distribution  of  peri- 
pheral nerves.  Do  they  represent  the  supply  from  posterior  nerve- 
roots  ?  To  this  question  a  negative  reply  is  given.  The  areas  supplied 
from  the  roots  overlap,  whereas  the  areas  of  cutaneous  tenderness  and 
of  herpetic  eruption  do  not  overlap.  Hence  the  inference  that  each  of 
these  latter  areas  represents  the  supply  from  a  single  segment  of  the 
cord.  And  since  the  touch  nerves  issue  from  several  segments  and,  in 
their  distribution,  overlap,  it  would  seem  to  follow  that  there  are  sepa- 
rate paths  for  touch  and  for  pain. 

So  much  stress  is  laid,  in  deductions  of  this  sort,  upon  the  way  in 
which  the  zones  are  mapped  out,  that  one  may  be  permitted  to  look 
more  closely  at  the  facts  of  distribution.  To  begin  with,  it  must  be 
noted  that  the  proofs  for  the  overlapping  of  the  touch-areas  and  the 
proofs  for  the  limitation  of  the  pain-areas,  are  not  of  precisely  the 
same  character.  Sherrington  found  that  when,  in  the  monkey,  a  sin- 
gle posterior  root  is  divided,  there  is  no  absence  of  sensation;  and 
Head,  in  some  few  cases,  observed  the  same  thing  in  man.  The  same 
area,  therefore,  must  be  supplied  from  several  roots  and  fibres  from 
these  must  interlace.  But  in  mapping  out  the  areas  of  tenderness, 
Head  observed  a  large  number  of  subjects,  locating  an  area  in  this 
patient  and  another  area  in  another  patient  and  so  on.  His  criterion 
is  this:  "  If  they  overlapped  to  any  considerable  extent,  like  the  areas 
of  common  sensation,  the  extent  of  skin  covered  when  any  one  was 
present  must  necessarily  be  greater  than  that  left  unaffected  when  the 
areas  on  each  side  of  it  were  tender.  That  is  to  say — supposing  Nos. 
i  and  3  were  tender,  the  skin  between  their  borders,  which  was  un- 
affected, must  of  necessity  be  of  smaller  extent  than  that  affected  when 
No.  2  only  was  tender."  Whatever  be  the  accuracy  of  this  method, 
it  is  obviously  less  direct  than  the  method  employed  to  demonstrate 
the  overlapping  of  touch-zones.  Dr.  Head  himself  does  not  contend 
for  an  absolute  definition  of  the  areas  of  tenderness ;  he  admits  more 


DISCUSSION.  407 

• 

than  once  that  there  is  some  overlapping,  though  this  is  slight  as  com- 
pared with  the  overlapping  of  zones  supplied  from  the  posterior  roots. 
It  is  a  4  difference  of  degree.'  Another  investigator,  Dr.  Mackenzie, 
is  more  emphatic.  He  tells  us :  "  From  the  study  of  cases  of  Herpes 
Zoster  and  of  the  hyperaesthetic  areas  associated  with  visceral  disease, 
I  have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  there  is  distinct  overlapping  of  the 
fields  of  cutaneous  supply  in  individual  nerve  roots,  of  pathic,  thermic 
and  trophic  fibres  as  well  as  of  those  of  ordinary  sensation."  *  This 
divergence  suggests  that  further  investigation  may  be  necessary  before 
the  argument  from  overlapping  as  against  sharp  definition  can  be 
securely  formulated. 

Much  depends,  of  course,  upon  what  is  meant  by  4  different  areas 
of  distribution.'  Experiment  has  shown  that  on  the  skin  there  are 
points  for  heat  and  points  for  cold ;  whence  it  is  reasonable  to  infer 
that  there  are  separate  paths  for  these  two  kinds  of  stimulation.  If 
the  areas  in  question  were  simply  expansions  of  similar  points,  each 
having  its  special  and  exclusive  function,  the  evidence  in  favor  of 
separate  nerves  for  touch  and  for  pain  would  be  strong.  There  might 
be  irregularities  in  the  distribution  and  different  degrees  of  sensibility 
in  the  various  areas ;  but  once  the  work  of  mapping  out  had  been  ac- 
complished, we  would  be  able  to  indicate,  for  any  given  area,  its 
particular  function.  It  will  hardly  be  claimed  that  our  topography 
of  the  skin  has  attained  this  ideal  accuracy,  so  far  as  zones  for  pain 
distinct  from  touch-zones  are  concerned.  In  particular,  the  results 
published  by  Dr.  Head  do  not  establish  any  such  clear  demarcation. 
Consequently,  it  is  not  in  this  strict  sense  that  Dr.  Nichols  must  be 
understood  when  he  states  as  a  fact  that  "  the  zones  of  distribution 
for  pain,  heat  and  trophic  nerves  cover  markedly  different  fixed  areas 
of  the  skin  from  the  zones  ©^distribution  of  the  touch-nerves." 

It  is  possible  that  we  are  exacting  too  much — insisting  on  proofs 
that  will  never  be  forthcoming.  In  fact,  different  areas  of  distribution 
may  be  conceived  after  a  less  rigorous  fashion.  Different  functions 
might  occupy  in  part  the  same  area,  though  their  respective  zones  have 
different  boundaries.  It  might  be  shown,  for  instance,  that  in  a  total 
area  which  we  will  call  12,  the  zones  1-9  are  sensible  to  tactile  stimuli 
and  the  zones  3—12  are  sensible  to  painful  stimuli.  In  this  case,  we 
should  say  that  the  zones  for  touch  overlap  the  zones  for  pain,  or  vice 
versa,  without  admitting  that  one  touch-zone  overlaps  another  touch- 
zone,  or  that  the  zones  for  pain  overlap  one  another.  Under  such 
conditions,  the  argument  for  separate  pain  nerves  would  be  a  more 

1  Brain,  XVI.,  1893,  p.  349. 


408  VISCERAL  DISEASE  AND  PAIN. 

labored  one.  Nevertheless,  it  would  have  a  weight  of  its  own — pro- 
vided that  areas  of  this  sort  could  be  marked  off  on  the  normal  subject. 

There  is  more  reason  for  doubt  where  difference  of  distribution 
hinges  upon  a  change  from  normal  to  abnormal  conditions.  The 
argument  might  then  take  on  several  forms,  one  of  which  may  be 
mentioned  simply  to  show  that  the  phrase  '  markedly  different  fixed 
areas '  needs  careful  interpretation.  From  the  diagrams  furnished  by 
Dr.  Head,  it  appears  that  the  areas  of  cutaneous  tenderness  in  visceral 
disease  are  quite  large,  extending  in  some  cases  in  broad  bands  around 
the  body  or  along  the  limbs.  If  the  '  fixedness'  could  possibly  imply 
that  these  areas  are  in  all  cases,  normal  no  less  than  pathological,  re- 
served for  pain,  the  markedly  different  areas  for  touch  would  be  rather 
limited.  The  likelihood  of  such  a  misconception  is  not  great  where 
one  merely  compares  the  normal  condition  of  any  organ  with  its  ab- 
normal condition.  But  at  present  we  are  dealing  not  with  local,  but 
with  referred  pain.  The  disease  is  visceral ;  the  skin  is  supposed 
to  be  normal — or  at  least  to  be  affected  in  only  a  roundabout  way.  Ac- 
cordingly, one  might  infer,  in  consequence  of  the  markedly  different 
areas,  that  considerable  portions  of  the  skin  are  set  apart  for  painful 
stimulation,  and  that  they  enter  upon  this  function  when  the  neces- 
sary condition,  visceral  disorder,  is  realized. 

A  more  plausible  form  of  the  argument :  areas  supplied  from  the 
posterior  roots  and  serving  the  function  of  touch  overlap  in  normal  con- 
ditions, whereas,  in  visceral  disease,  areas  are  marked  off  which  serve 
the  function  of  pain  and  do  not  overlap.  This  brings  us  in  view  of 
the  question  whether  the  same  fibres  which,  under  normal  conditions 
transmit  tactile  stimulation,  do  not  serve  as  pain-paths  in  visceral  dis- 
ease. It  will  be  remembered  that,  according  to  Obersteiner's  observa- 
tions, there  are  diseases  in  which  tactile  Stimulation  of  one  portion  of 
the  skin  gives  rise  to  a  sensation  which  the  patient  localizes  in  another 
portion.  This  allocheiria  is  due  to  a  lesion  in  the  central  nervous  sys- 
tem. According  to  Dr.  Head,  "  the  phenomena  of  allocheiria  and 
of  referred  pain  in  visceral  disease  are  in  nature  and  explanation  essen- 
tially the  same.  Both  depend  for  their  appearance  upon  the  law  that 
where  a  painful  stimulus  is  applied  to  a  part  of  lower  sensibility  in 
close  central  connection  with  a  part  of  much  greater  sensibility,  the 
pain  produced  is  felt  in  the  part  of  higher  sensibility  rather  than  in  the 
part  of  lower  sensibility  to  which  the  stimulus  was  actually  applied." 
This  explanation  bears  directly  upon  the  transferred  localization  of 
tactile  and  painful  stimuli ;  but  it  will  also  account,  I  think,  for  the 
painful  feeling  itself.  As  a  result  of  visceral  disease  there  is  a  height- 


DISCUSSION.  409 

ened  excitability  at  the  point  of  central  connection;  hence  the  exag- 
gerated reflexes  which  characterize  the  affected  skin-areas.  A  stimulus 
which,  under  normal  conditions,  would  produce  only  a  sensation  of 
touch,  passes  into  the  modified  center  and  is  referred,  in  painful  phase, 
to  the  stimulated  area.  Or  again,  stimuli  originating  in  an  internal 
organ  and  producing  ordinarily  unconscious  reflexes,  are  referred,  in 
the  altered  condition  of  the  cord,  either  to  a  superficial  area  or  to  the 
diseased  region  itself,  as  is  the  case  when  the  serous  cavities  of  the 
body  are  affected.  On  this  hypothesis,  the  difference  between  parts 
of  higher  sensibility  and  parts  of  lower  sensibility  might,  to  some  ex- 
tent, be  explained.  The  higher  sensibility  of  superficial  areas  is  more 
easily  understood  if  we  suppose  the  same  fibres  to  conduct  tactile  and 
painful  stimulation.  Frequency  of  tactile  stimulation  and  transmission 
would  increase  the  sensibility  of  the  skin  areas,  whereas,  on  the  hy- 
pothesis of  separate  paths,  it  is  difficult  to  see  why  the  skin  should  be 
more  sensible  and  why  the  pain  should  be  referred  to  it  rather  than  to 
the  seat  of  disease. 

Should  this  view  prove  correct,  the  difference  of  distribution  would 
cease  to  be  a  primary  factor  in  the  problem.  The  effect  of  stimula- 
tion would  depend,  not  so  much  on  the  number  of  segments  in  the  cord 
that  it  reaches,  as  on  the  condition  of  any  or  of  all  the  segments. 
Whether  the  areas  of  cutaneous  tenderness  in  visceral  disease  are 
sharply  defined  or  distinctly  overlap,  is  at  best  an  open  question.  Its 
final  settlement,  no  doubt,  will  be  hastened  by  painstaking  research 
along  the  lines  of  Dr.  Head's  investigation.  One  may  fully  appreciate 
his  work  without  feeling  bound  to  declare,  in  the  words  of  Dr.  Nichols, 
that  it  *  must  set  this  dispute  at  rest  forever.' 

E.  A.  PACK. 

CATHOLIC  UNIVERSITY,  WASHINGTON. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE. 

Analytic  Psychology.  G.  F.  STOUT.  London,  Swan,  Sonnenschein  & 
Co. ;  New  York,  Macmillans,  1896.  2  vols.  Pp.  xi+289  and  314. 
There  can  be  no  hesitation  in  pronouncing  this  the  most  important 
work  in  general  psychology  by  a  British  author  since  Ward's  Brit- 
annica  article  of  a  dozen  years  ago.  That  article  marked  an  epoch 
in  British  psychology  by  its  complete  break  with  the  traditional  Asso- 
ciationism :  it  was  a  proclamation  of  independence.  Mr.  Stout's  work 
shows  that  the  independence  has  been  won.  "  It  may  be  said,"  he 
writes,  "that  at  present  the  psychological  world  is  divided  into  two 
camps ;  on  the  one  side  are  the  champions  of  Association,  on  the  other 
the  champions  of  Apperception.  *  *  *  I  have  definitely  sided  with  the 
second  party"  (ii.,  p.  41).  What  Oxford  has  done  for  metaphysics,  that 
Cambridge  has  accomplished  for  psychology.  And  both  movements, 
the  psychological  no  less  than  the  philosophical,  stand  evidently  under 
the  commanding  though  modified  influence  of  the  same  man,  Kant. 

The  '  Analytic  Psychology,'  however,  follows,  as  its  title  indicates, 
the  traditional  English  method.  At  the  same  time  it  suggests  a  con- 
trast to  another  genetic  psychology,  and  Mr.  Stout's  main  interest  is, 
he  tells  us,  with  the  latter.  But  just  as  the  geologist  acquires  knowl- 
edge of  the  nature  of  geological  changes  by  observation  of  the  changes 
that  are  going  on  now,  so  for  investigating  the  origin  and  growth  of 
mental  products,  it  seemed  necessary  first  to  analyze  the  developed  con- 
sciousness and  to  study  the  laws  of  mental  process  in  present  expe- 
rience. In  pursuing  this  method,  Mr.  Stout  avoids  the  infelicities  of 
an  '  evolution '  of  mental  life  on  the  basis  of  imaginary  '  principles  of 
psychology,'  and  succeeds  in  giving  a  strong  impression  of  what  our 
mental  life  really  is  and  of  the  principles  which  actually  govern  it,  at 
least  in  those  forms  of  it  here  considered.  For,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
author,  some  products  of  mental  life  can  be  more  profitably  studied 
from  the  point  of  view  of  their  development,  and  their  consideration  is 
accordingly  reserved  for  a  future  work.  The  number  of  topics 
omitted  in  the  present  work  is  certainly  striking,  but  judgment  on  the 
special  wisdom  of  the  omissions  may  be  deferred  till  the  promised 
'  Genetic  Psychology '  is  also  before  us  for  comparison. 
410 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  411 

The  general  plan  of  this  treatise  is  as  follows :  An  introduction  on 
the  scope  and  method  of  psychology  is  followed  by  two  books,  the 
first  of  which  contains  the  general  analysis,  the  second  a  more  detailed 
examination  of  processes.  Book  I.,  after  discussing  the  principle  for 
the  division  of  ultimate  mental  functions  (Chap.  I.)  and  the  possi- 
bility of  their  analysis  (Chap.  II.),  distinguishes  the  fundamental 
forms  of  the  cognitive  consciousness  (Chaps.  III.— V.)  and  concludes 
with  a  chapter  on  feeling  and  conation  (Chap.  VI.) .  Book  II.  follows 
a  similar  arrangement.  Beginning  with  a  discussion  of  the  conception 
of  mental  activity  (Chap.  I.),  it  then  examines,  in  a  general  synthetic 
order,  the  cognitive  processes  (Chaps.  II. -XI.)  and  concludes  with  a 
chapter  on  pleasure  and  pain  (Chap.  XII.) 

Psychology  is  defined  as  '  the  positive  science  of  mental  process ' 
(p.  i),  including  mental  development  (p.  9),  in  individuals  (p.  7). 
Its  data  are  distinguished  as  (i)  products  of  past  process,  (2)  the  pro- 
cess itself  as  introspectively  and  retrospectively  observed  and  (3) 
certain  external  signs.  Specially  valuable  among  the  first  is  the  ma- 
terial furnished  by  philology  and  anthropology ;  Mr.  Stout  thinks  that 
the  contributions  from  these  sources  may  ultimately  prove  of  at  least 
as  much  importance  for  psychology  as  those  yielded  by  physiology. 
Of  greater  interest  is  the  author's  adoption  of  the  hypothesis  of 
'psychical  dispositions'  as  a  means  of  connecting  present  conscious 
process  with  the  results  of  conscious  process  in  the  past.  This  con- 
ception controls  the  whole  of  his  psychology.  He  considers  it  and, 
indeed,  shows  it  to  be  distinctly  preferable  to  the  hypothesis  of  sub- 
consciousness  and  more  practicable  than  the  corresponding  physio- 
logical hypothesis.  Our  ignorance  of  the  precise  correlation  of  mental 
process  and  physiological  process  is  such,  he  says,  that  physiology 
cannot  be  made  the  sole  basis  of  psychology.  Under  certain  assign- 
able conditions,  the  two  sciences  might  be  merged  in  one;  but  the 
realization  of  those  conditions  appears  at  present  infinitely  remote. 
Even  when  it  is  recognized  that  a  '  psychical '  disposition  is  a  '  physi- 
ological' disposition  also,  it  is  still  very  often  necessary  for  the  sake  of 
clearness  to  separate  the  purely  psychological  side  of  the  process  from 
corresponding  physiological  data  and  hypotheses. 

As  a  positive  principle  for  the  division  of  ultimate  mental  func- 
tions, Mr.  Stout  adopts  Brentano's — the  mode  in  which  consciousness 
refers  to  an  object ;  but  he  criticizes  Brentano's  use  of  it,  especially  in 
identifying  the  '  object '  with  the  immediate  conscious  content.  Ac- 
cording to  Mr.  Stout,  there  is  present  in  all  '  noetic '  experience,  over 
and  above  the  presentation  as  modification  of  the  individual  conscious- 


412  STOUT'S  ANALYTIC  PSYCHOLOGY. 

ness,  a  unique  thought-reference  to  something  which,  as  the  thinker 
means  or  intends  it,  is  not  a  present  modification  of  his  individual 
consciousness.  "The  object  of  thought  is  never  a  content  of  our 
finite  consciousness"  (p.  45).  It  is  difficult  to  follow  Mr.  Stout  here. 
The  above  statement,  for  example,  taken  literally,  would  seem  to 
make  psychology  itself  impossible.  This,  of  course,  is  not  meant. 
"The  point  is  that  the  object  as  we  mean  or  intend  it,  cannot  be  a 
modification  of  our  consciousness  at  the  time  we  mean  or  intend  it " 
(p.  46) .  But  is  this  really  so  ?  It  is  true  that  the  process  of  cogni- 
tion is  distinct  from  its  object,  but  it  does  not  follow  that  the  object  is  not 
immanent.  Mr.  Stout  says,  indeed,  that  in  thinking  of  a  sensation,  I 
qualify  it,  as  an  event  in  my  mental  history,  by  reference  to  other  ex- 
perience not  present,  and  that  in  considering  abstractly  a  content  as 
such,  I  generalize  it,  regard  it  as  one  of  an  indefinite  series.  But 
clearly,  if  for  psychological  purposes  I  attend  to  a  visual  appearance, 
as  such,  whatever  reference  to  an  '  external '  object  or  to  other  portions 
of  my  experience  may  be  implied,  what  I  mean  and  intend  is  not  those 
objects  but  just  this  present  modification  of  my  visual  experience.  It 
may  be  said,  perhaps,  that  a  modification  of  consciousness  is  continu- 
ally changing,  and  that  to  be  conscious  of  it,  I  must  be  conscious  of 
it  as  a  process,  but  that  the  parts  of  a  process  cannot  possibly  be  all 
present  together,  and  that  consequently  in  grasping  the  unity  of  its 
successive  phases,  I  necessarily  transcend  the  immediate  present.  The 
reply  to  this  is,  that  there  is  no  evidence  that  modifications  of  con- 
sciousness form  a  succession  of  timeless  instants.  What  we  mean  by 
a  present  modification  of  consciousness  is  a  modification  in  the  '  spe- 
cious '  present.  The  evidence  has  yet  to  be  given  that  a  present  con- 
tent of  consciousness  cannot  be  an  object  of  thought  while  it  and  the 
process  of  attending  to  it  lasts. 

In  the  second  chapter,  the  theoretical  objection  against  the  possi- 
bility of  analyzing  presentations,  viz.  :  that  a  discriminated  content 
cannot  be  identical  with  one  that  is  undiscriminated,  is  met  by  the  re- 
joinder of  irrelevancy ;  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  two  contents  should 
be  identical,  but  only  that  the  undistinguished  differences  present  in 
the  original  experience  should  be  adequately  represented  by  the  ana- 
lytic distinctions  in  the  new.  A  similar  explanation  is  given  of  the 
analysis  of  dispositions.  Here,  to  be  sure,  the  discovered  distinctions 
do  not  actually  exist  prior  to  their  discovery;  they  are,  however,  de- 
termined by  a  mental  condition  other  than  the  process  of  fixing  at- 
tention. 

Sentiency  as  a  mode  of  consciousness  was  briefly  referred  to  in  the 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  413 

general  analysis  of  *  noetic '  experience  in  Chapter  I. ;  but  this  side  of 
experience  receives  scant  consideration  in  the  present  treatise.  Mere 
sentiency  would  be  '  anoetic.'  Chapters  III.  and  IV.  deal  with  modes 
of  simple  apprehension.  Emphasis  is  placed  on  the  apprehension  of 
form  of  combination,  corresponding  to  the  German  '  GestaltqualitatJ 
as  a  unique  mode  of  consciousness  distinct  from  the  apprehension 
of  the  matter  and  from  the  apprehension  of  relations,  both  of  which 
presuppose  it.  Besides  these  modes  of  explicit  apprehension,  there 
are  modes  of  implicit  apprehension,  which  appear  in  all  cases  of 
'  psychic  fringe '  and  one  special  case  of  which  is  that  mental  state  we 
call  understanding  the  meaning  of  a  word.  Mr.  Stout's  admirable 
discussion  at  this  point  forcibly  illustrates  the  picturesque  remark  of 
Professor  James  in  a  similar  connection  that  "  introspective  psychology 
must  here  throw  up  the  sponge."  Stout  himself  falls  back  on  uncon- 
scious mental  process. 

Chapter  V.  follows  Brentano  in  treating  judging  or  believing  as 
distinct  from  simple  apprehension.  The  expression  '  judging  or  be- 
lieving '  is  misleading  in  that  it  suggests  that  the  two  are  identical, 
and  the  comment  on  it  on  p.  98  is  not,  we  think,  altogether  happy. 
However,  the  point  is  that  judging,  as  implying  belief,  is  a  unique  atti- 
tude of  consciousness  towards  objects.  Mr.  Stout  calls  it  '  the  Yes-No 
consciousness.'  Might  we  not,  perhaps,  call  belief  the  psychical  mo- 
dality of  judgment  ?  Certainly,  apart  from  emotional  coloring,  degrees 
of  assurance  seem  to  be,  as  Mr.  Stout  says,  '  degrees  of  firmness  or 
fixity  rather  than  of  intensity'  (p.  no). 

The  cognitive  consciousness  has  thus  been  analyzed  into  the  three 
fundamental  modes  of  sentience,  simple  apprehension  and  belief. 
Chapter  VI.  analyzes'the  volitional  consciousness  into  feeling  (pleasure 
or  displeasure)  and  conation  (desire  or  aversion).  Specially  note- 
worthy is  the  treatment  of  striving  in  *  noetic '  consciousness  as  a 
mode  of  attention,  the  two  being  distinguished  in  dynamic  reference 
only  as  the  direction  of  mental  activity  to  an  end  is  distinguished  from 
the  activity  itself  in  the  successive  phases  of  its  realization  (p.  1 26) . 
From  this  point  of  view  aversion  is  regarded  as  attention  constrained. 

The  Second  Book  opens  with  an  explanation  of  the  conception  of 
mental  activity.  Accepting  Brad  ley's  view  that  'activity'  implies  a 
self-determined  process  in  time,  Mr.  Stout  finds  physical  analogues 
for  the  psychological  conception  in  movement  under  the  law  of 
inertia,  where  the  continued  motion  of  a  body  is  traceable  to 
its  own  previous  motion,  but  particularly  in  the  reactions  designated 
by  Avenarius  vital  series,  where  the  process  not  merely  perpetuates 


4H  STOUT'S  ANALYTIC  PSYCHOLOGY. 

itself,  but  adapts  itself  to  an  end,  and  is  directly  and  indirectly  self- 
developing.  The  analogue  is  most  striking  in  the  central  nervous  sys- 
tem, where  the  physical  process  is  actually  correlated  with  the  mental. 
The  proof  that  the  mental  process  is  self-determining  is  (i)  that  it 
initiates  the  changes  on  which  its  propagation  immediately  depends, 
and  (2)  that  the  brain-substance  in  which  these  changes  take  place 
has  been  rendered  capable  of  them  only  through  previous  psychophysi- 
cal  process  in  which  it  has  taken  part.  The  fact  that  its  self-determi- 
nation is  indirect  is  no  reason  for  regarding  it  as  a  fiction.  In  the 
sense,  therefore,  in  which  '  activity '  can  be  referred  to  physical  pro- 
cess, it  can  be  referred  to  mental  process.  The  point  in  which  all 
physical  analogies  fail  is  that  the  mental  process  feels  its  own  current. 
James,  Baldwin  and  Bradley  are  wrong  in  identifying  the  activity  of 
consciousness  with  certain  selected  aspects  of  the  process.  The  dis- 
tinction between  its  passivity  and  its  activity  is  relative.  The  whole 
process  is  active.  Mr.  Stout  seems  at  times  to  say  that  we  have  an  im- 
mediate experience  of  its  degrees  (see,  e.  g.,  pp.  160  f).  He  finds  no 
meaning  in  the  attempt  to  place  the  feeling-aspect  of  the  consciousness 
in  organic  or  muscular  sensations.  But  suppose  the  question  is  put  in 
this  form:  Could  a  disembodied  spirit  actually  feel  his  conscious  life 
as  distinguished  from  being  conscious  of  it? 

The  special  analysis  of  mental  process  takes  up,  first,  (Chaps.  II., 
III.)  attention,  which  is  regarded,  not  as  a  'special  activity,'  but  as  a 
process  coincident  with  noetic  consciousness  generally.  The  treat- 
ment is  masterly  from  every  point  of  view.  It  has  the  prevision,  the 
sureness  of  touch,  the  finish  of  a  skilful  demonstration  in  anatomy  or, 
let  us  say,  of  a  performance  by  a  great  artist  on  the  violin.  Stress  is 
laid  on  the  systematic  complexity  of  the  process,  on  its  character  as  a 
prospective  attitude,  on  its  relation  to  mental  development,  especially 
in  its  dependence  on  preformed  dispositions.  Its  teleological  aspect — 
its  tendency  to  go  on  until  the  end  is  reached  and  then  to  stop — is  ex- 
cellently considered,  as  is  also  its  inhibitive  aspect,  for  which  a  purely 
psychological  explanation  is  found  particularly  in  the  systematic  unity 
of  the  process  and  its  relation  to  preformed  dispositions.  As  to  the 
physiological  correlate  of  attention,  some  such  conception  as  that  of 
higher  and  lower  level  centres  (Hughlings  Jackson)  is  preferred  to 
that  of  special  centres  of  attention  (Wundt)  as  corresponding  more 
closely  to  the  features  of  the  psychological  process.  Wundt's  postu- 
late rests  on  the  grave  psychological  error  of  separating  the  activity  of 
attention  from  its  content.  Among  other  points  of  interest  in  the 
chapter  are  the  conception  of  interest  as  the  hedonic  aspect  of  atten- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  415 

tion  (p.  225),  the  careful  discussion  (pp.  225-236)  as  to  whether  at- 
tention is  ever  determined  by  pleasure  and  pain,  as  such — which  is 
seriously  doubted — and  the  refutation  of  the  other  common  opinion 
that  attention  makes  its  object  clearer  and  more  intense  (pp.  244  ff ) . 
Exception  may  be  taken  to  this  statement  or  to  that,  but  the  analysis 
as  a  whole  is  carried  through  with  remarkable  strenuousness  and  con- 
sistency. It  would  be  easy  to  point  parallels  to  every  single  feature 
of  the  doctrine,  but  as  here  worked  out,  it  is,  we  think,  a  distinct  ad- 
vance on  anything  that  has  been  written  on  the  subject  hitherto  in 
English.  This  is  particularly  to  be  said  in  view  of  certain  applications 
of  it  in  the  sequel. 

Chapter  IV.  deals  with  the  more  mechanical  aspects  of  conscious 
process,  retentiveness,  habit  and  association.  The  well-worn  subject 
of  habit  receives  new  light  from  the  suggestion  that  the  transition  from 
volitional  to  automatic  action  is  due,  not  merely  to  the  effect  of  repeti- 
tion, but  also  to  the  teleology  of  attention  (p.  265). 

Chapter  V.  deals  with  the  synthesis  of  presentations  in  the  refer- 
ence of  thought  to  a  single  object.  'Noetic  synthesis' implies  "the 
introduction  of  a  distinct  kind  of  mental  factor,  the  apprehension  of 
the  whole  which  determines  the  order  and  apprehension  of  the  parts  " 
(ii.,  p.  41). 

In  Chapter  VI.,  with  explicit  reference  to  Bradley*  s  criticism  of 
Associationism  in  his  Principles  of  Logic,  Mr.  Stout  dwells  on  the 
constructive  synthesis  which  pervades  even  the  lowest  phases  of 
mental  process.  While  associationists  tend  to  represent  the  whole  as 
due  exclusively  to  the  combination  of  the  parts,  the  thesis  here  main- 
tained is  that  every  new  synthesis  results  from  the  further  determina- 
tion of  parts  within  a  pre-existing  whole.  The  special  aspect  of  the 
process  treated  in  this  chapter  is  '  Relative  Suggestion,'  i.  e.,  the 
continual  spontaneous  readaptation  of  already  acquired  experience  to 
novel  conditions.  There  is  no  such  a  thing  as  a  mere  *  literal  resus- 
citation, revival  or  reinstatement '  of  former  associations. 

Chapter  VII.  on  'Conation  and  Cognitive  Synthesis'  developes 
the  counterpart  of  the  doctrine  that  all  conation  is  attention,  namely 
that  all  mental  process  is,  as  such,  conation.  From  this  point  of  view 
cognitive  synthesis  is  regarded,  not  as  a  web  which  conative  tendencies 
spin,  but  as  a  further  defining  and  differentiation  of  those  tendencies 
themselves. 

Then  comes  the  great  chapter  (VIII.)  on  Apperception  in  which 
all  the  preceding  discussion  is  brought  to  a  head.  This  emphasis  on 
apperception  is  new  in  British  psychology.  Mr.  Stout's  conception 


416  STOUT'S  ANALYTIC  PSYCHOLOGY. 

of  the  process  is  also  new.  He  has  been  greatly  influenced  by  the 
Herbartians  and  it  is  in  Herbart's  sense  rather  than  in  that  of  Leibniz 
or  of  Kant  that  he  uses  the  term.  But  he  differs  from  Herbart 
primarily  in  his  conception  of  the  preformed  mental  system  as  an 
organized  whole  involving  noetic  synthesis — this  as  opposed  to  the  con- 
ception of  a  mere  apperception-mass  of  presentations — and  then  in  re- 
garding the  entire  process  as  an  evolution  in  which  neither  the  apper- 
cipient  nor  the  apperceived  factor  is  at  any  time  either  exclusively 
passive  or  exclusively  active.  He  defines  it  as  "  the  process  by  which 
a  mental  system  appropriates  a  new  element,  or  otherwise  receives  a 
fresh  determination"  (p.  112).  It  expresses  the  growing  point  of 
mind  and  is  a  feature  common  to  all  understanding,  interpreting,  sub- 
suming and  the  like.  Among  the  important  features  of  the  doctrine 
are  the  conceptions  of  '  negative '  and  '  destructive '  apperception,  the 
former  occurring  where  the  effort  to  incorporate  a  new  element  is  de- 
feated, the  latter  where  "one  system  by  appropriating  a  new  element 
wrests  it  from  its  preformed  connection  with  another  system."  The 
effect,  however,  in  either  case  is  to  develop  an  apperceptive  system 
of  some  sort.  In  the  case  of  'negative  apperception,' for  instance, 
though  the  system  incorporates  no  new  element,  it  receives  a  fresh  de- 
termination and  the  process  can  never  be  repeated  under  precisely  the 
same  conditions  again,  while  as  part  of  a  more  comprehensive  process, 
it  directly  conditions  positive  mental  development.  Of  even  greater  in- 
terest, if  possible,  is  the  working  out  of  the  conceptions  of  the  coopera- 
tion and  competition  of  apperceptive  systems,  of  the  conditions  which 
determine  their  strength  and  of  their  conflict  and  its  issue.  These 
topics  are  all  skilfully  handled  with  abundance  of  acute  observation 
and  illustrative  detail.  The  hypothesis  of  psychical  dispositions 
formed  under  the  influence  of  attention  from  which  they  derive  their 
systematic  complexity — the  conception  of  such  preformed  dispositions 
reacting  on  the  further  process  of  attention  thus  becomes,  in  the 
hands  of  the  author,  a  powerful  instrument  for  analyzing  the  most 
intricate  of  mental  processes,  the  process  of  mental  organization  and 
growth.  Doubtless  much  remains  to  be  done  in  exhibiting  the  me- 
chanical aspects  of  the  process,  and  the  unity  of  apperception 
which  appears  as  an  ultimate  datum  of  the  analysis  constitutes  an 
important  and  difficult  problem.  But  the  thorough  and  comprehen- 
sive treatment  of  the  subject  here  given  is  likely  to  remain  for  long  a 
standard  of  reference.  One  word  as  to  terminology.  Is  it  necessary 
or  desirable  to  speak  of  the  process  of  the  further  determination  of  a 
content  of  attention  as  a  process  in  which  one  idea,  group  or  system 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  417 

•  apperceives  '  the  idea  which  it  appropriates  or  by  which  it  is  other- 
wise determined  ?  We  do  not  say  that  the  idea  of  red  *  perceives '  the 
idea  of  hardness.  The  Kantian  terminology  is  here,  we  think,  de- 
cidedly preferable  to  the  Herbartian  because  it  relates  '  apperception  ' 
to  that  consciousness  of  self  as  subject  which,  whether  contributing 
anything  or  not  to  mental  process,  is  certainly  very  much  in  evidence 
and  moulds  and  colors  the  significance  of  common  speech. 

The  chapters  on  'Comparison  and  Conception*  (Chap.  IX.)  and 
on  '  Thought  and  Language  '  (Chap.  X.)  deal  especially  with  the  prob- 
lem of  the  universal.  Conceptual  thinking  is  thought  of  the  univer- 
sal, as  such.  Psychologically  the  universal  is  the  apperceptive  system 
with  its  universal  objective  reference.  The  problem  is,  to  get  this  into 
the  foreground  of  consciousness ;  its  solution  is  chiefly  by  comparison 
and  by  language.  The  great  function  of  language  is  to  fix  and  detain, 
and  so  render  capable  of  further  manipulation,  apperceptive  systems 
by  means  of  expressive  signs  (p.  192).  The  way  language  does  this 
is  very  carefully  explained. 

Chapter  XI.  is  on  '  Belief  and  Imagination.'  Belief  is  regarded 
both  as  a  condition  of  activity  and  as  a  result  of  the  limitation  of  ac- 
tivity. An  illustration  of  the  latter  principle  is  the  belief  in  external 
reality.  The  brief  summary  of  the  author's  controversy  with  Dr. 
Pikler  on  this  point  (pp.  245-248)  leaves,  however,  a  rather  confused 
impression.  And,  as  regards  the  former  principle,  while  it  is  no  doubt 
true  that  the  acceptance  of  a  proposition  means  that  I  can  make  it  a 
starting-point  or  a  link  in  a  process  of  reasoning  ultimately  affecting 
conduct  (p.  238) ,  it  is  by  no  means  clear  that  I  always  must.  A  large 
number  of  our  theoretical  beliefs,  accepted  on  mere  authority,  appear 
to  yield  themselves  in  fact  to  no  further  theoretical  uses  and  to  have  no 
direct  bearing  on  conduct. 

In  the  final  chapter  of  the  work,  the  author  applies  his  general  con- 
ception of  mental  process  as  activity  tending  to  an  end  to  the  theory  of 
'  Pleasure  and  Pain'  (Chap.  XII.).  Pleasure,  it  is  held,  arises  where 
the  activity  is  unhindered,  pain  where  it  is  for  any  reason  thwarted  or 
checked,  the  intensity  of  the  affective  state  depending  on  the  intensity 
and  complexity  of  mental  excitement  and  the  degree  of  its  hindrance. 
The  theory  is  abundantly  illustrated,  and  the  first  part  of  it,  at  any 
rate,  may  be  regarded  as  fairly  well  made  out  for  all  cases  susceptible 
of  psychological  analysis.  The  second  part — Mr.  Stout  unfortunately 
does  not  make  the  distinction — is  more  doubtful,  for  it  is  obviously 
impossible  to  compare  directly  with  any  accuracy,  degrees  of  inten- 
sity of  affective  states  or  degrees  of  complexity  of  the  processes  con- 


418  STOUT'S  ANALYTIC  PSYCHOLOGY. 

cerned  in  them.  There  is,  besides,  a  difference  between  intensity  and 
amount  of  feeling,  e.g.,  in  the  pleasure  of  indolence  as  compared  with 
some  other  pleasures,  and  this  difference  requires  to  be  accounted  for. 
In  its  psychological  form,  the  theory  is  admittedly  inadequate  to  ac- 
count for  the  so-called  pleasures  and  pains  of  sense.  At  this  point, 
Mr.  Stout  translates  the  principle  into  physiological  terms.  Follow- 
ing the  clue  of  the  psychological  analysis  and,  assuming  that  the  ten- 
dency of  mental  process  is  correlated  on  the  physiological  side  with  a 
tendency  of  disturbed  neural  arrangements  to  equilibrium,  the  thesis 
is  that  "pleasure  and  pain  depend  respectively  on  the  uninterrupted 
or  interrupted  course  of  the  vital  series"  and  that  "intensity  of  pleas- 
ure or  pain  depends  on  the  intensity  and  complexity  of  the  pleasant  or 
painful  excitation."  The  theory  is  then  applied  to  the  affective  states 
connected  with  various  classes  of  sensations,  Mr.  Marshall  and  the 
'  nutrition '  theorists  coming  in  for  a  good  deal  of  effective  criticism  by 
the  way.  His  own  theory  recommends  itself  to  Mr.  Stout,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  any  positive  knowledge  of  what  the  physiological  process 
really  is,  by  its  comprehensiveness — it  assumes  that  pleasure  and  pain 
are  produced  in  all  cases  in  the  same  way — and  because  of  its  basis  in 
psychological  experience.  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  the  psy- 
chological basis  is  the  teleology  of  the  process  of  attention.  The 
pleasures  and  pains  of  sense,  on  the  other  hand,  have  to  do  directly 
with  '  anoetic '  consciousness.  And  here  the  process  may  be  quite  dif- 
ferent. Certainly,  as  Mr.  Stout  himself  admits,  the  conception  is  quite 
vague  when  applied  to  cutaneous  pain,  especially,  we  may  add,  when 
its  purely  sensational  character  is  admitted  and  even  the  possibility  of 
special  pain-nerves. 

Though  but  a  fragment  of  a  larger  whole,  the  present  treatise  is  as 
complete  in  itself  as — may  we  say  ?  — Schubert's  '  Unfinished  Sym- 
phony.' In  each  case  the  intention  of  the  author  is  completely  worked 
out  and  in  both  the  execution  is  finished  in  the  highest  degree.  Mr. 
Stout  elaborates  his  thought  through  all  the  intricacies  of  its  move- 
ment with  masterly  freedom,  sustained  power,  copious  illustration  and 
in  the  classic  style.  The  book  is  extremely  well  written.  Severely 
rigorous  in  analysis,  fixing  and  defining  the  most  subtly  evanescent  and 
baffling  of  phenomena,  it  rarely  happens  that  the  thought  is  not  clearly 
expressed.  It  is  one  of  the  books  that  will  live.  It  will  take  its  place 
among  the  great  works  in  the  history  of  English  psychology. 

H.  N.  GARDINER. 
SMITH  COLLEGE. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  419 

Contributions  to  the  Analysis  of  the  Sensations.     ERNST  MACH. 
Translated  by  C.  M.  WILLIAMS.     Chicago,  The  Open  Court  Pub- 
lishing Co.     1897.     Pp.  xii-f  208,  37  cuts.     $1.25. 
In  the  present  condition  of  psychological  literature  in  English  an 
important  translation  is  more  of  a  contribution  than  any  except  the 
best  of  original  work,  and  such  a  contribution  has  certainly  been  made 
by  the  translation  of  this  little  book  of  Mach's.     Its  distinguishing  fea- 
ture is  freshness  of  view.     Instead  of  the  glorification  of  physics  as  the 
ideal  toward  which  psychology  should  strive  which  is  now  and  then 
heard  from  psychologists  themselves,   Mach  tells  us  in  his  preface 
that  he  is  profoundly  convinced  "  that  the  foundations  of  science  as  a 
whole  and  of  physics  in  particular,  await  their  next  greatest  elucida- 
tions from  the  side  of  biology  and  especially  from  the  analysis  of  the 
sensations." 

How  this  can  be  is  made  clear  by  the  first  two  chapters.  The  first 
develops  the  general  standpoint  of  idealistic,  or,  more  exactly,  sensa- 
tional monism ;  the  sensations  are  the  '  elements  of  the  world '  and 
their  interrelations  the  subject  matter  of  all  science — this  standpoint 
being  held,  of  course,  not  as  a  permanent  philosophy  but  as  a  work- 
ing hypothesis.  The  second  chapter,  on  the  Chief  Point  of  View  for 
the  Investigation  of  the  Senses,  advocates  a  rigid  psycho-physic  paral- 
lelism— no  sensation  without  a  corresponding  physical  change;  like 
sensations,  like  changes;  if  space  is  tridimensional,  the  underlying 
neural  process  will  also  be  found  threefold.  Such  a  parallelism  fol- 
lows more  or  less  naturally  from  the  monism  of  the  introduction. 

The  next  three  chapters  are  devoted  to  an  analysis  of  spatial  vision  : 
the  first  chiefly  to  physiological  similarity  and  symmetry,  the  second 
chiefly  to  illusions  of  movement,  and  the  third  to  normal  and  illusory 
perceptions  of  perspective  and  the  like.  The  first  emphasizes  the  mo- 
tor factor  in  visual  space ;  the  second  leads  up  to  "  the  will  to  perform 
movements  of  the  eyes,  or  the  innervation  to  the  act,"  as  the  essence 
of  that  space ;  and  the  third  offers  as  a  tentative  explanation  of  the 
phenomena  treated,  certain  habits  of  the  eye,  largely  independent  of 
consciousness  and  a  result  of  race  experience,  which  favor  seeing  ac- 
cording to  the  greatest  probability.  Something  of  this  kind,  though 
very  differently  formulated,  is  at  the  bottom  of  Thie"ry's  recent  explana- 
tion of  geometrical-optical  illusions,  and  something  of  the  kind  seems 
necessary  to  bring  order  into  this  rather  confused  field. 

The  chapter  on  Time  which  follows  is  less  interesting — in  part 
perhaps  because  of  its  greater  difficulty  and  in  part  because  Mach 
himself  has  done  less  original  work  in  this  field. 


420      CONSCIOUSNESS  AND   BIOLOGICAL   EVOLUTION. 

Sensations  of  tone  are  considered  in  the  seventh  chapter,  the  most 
important  sections  being  those  in  which  the  author  explains  pitch  on 
the  basis  of  only  two  specific  energies  instead  of  the  very  large  num- 
ber often  assumed,  and  those  in  which  he  suggests  a  hypothetical  ex- 
planation of  the  positive  character  of  harmony  which  musicians  have 
generally  declared  that  Helmholtz  neglected  in  his  theory. 

The  final  chapter  deals  with  the  philosophy  and  psychology  of  sci- 
ence from  the  monistic  standpoint  of  the  introduction.  The  psychol- 
ogy of  the  acquisition  of  knowledge,  of  judgment,  abstraction,  con- 
cepts, natural  laws,  mathematical  space  and  physical  time  are  all 
briefly  considered.  To  the  text  of  the  German  edition  a  good  number 
of  notes,  two  appendices,  and  a  full  index  have  been  added. 

The  book  is  hardly  one  which  the  general  reader  will  master  easily 
in  all  its  details,  but  as  a  book  in  which  special  students  who  have 
passed  the  stage  of  the  text-books  and  laboratory  practice  may  make  the 
acquaintance  of  some  of  the  open  questions  of  sensation,  and,  at  the  same 
time,  take  a  lesson  in  the  charm  of  scientific  modesty  and  reasonable- 
ness, it  can  hardly  be  excelled.  ^  £  SANFORD 

CLARK  UNIVERSITY. 

Consciousness  and  Biological  Evolution  (/,  21. )  The  Religious  In- 
stinct. The  function  of  Religious  Expression.  H.  R.  MAR- 
SHALL. Four  articles.  Mind,  July,  1896,  to  April,  1897. 
The  first  two  articles  of  this  series,  proceeding  upon  the  assump- 
tion of  a  Spinozistic  parallelism  of  the  physiological  and  psychical, 
seek  to  set  forth  two  correspondences,  that  of  instinct  to  biological 
constancy  and  conservatism,  and  that  of  reason  to  biological  variation 
in  its  highest  aspect.  As  to  the  first  point,  Mr.  Marshall  says  that  in- 
stinct as  lapsed  intelligence  means  merely  "that  as  habit  becomes 
more  fixed,  neural  action  becomes  more  thoroughly  organized ;  and 
that  correspondingly  the  psychic  elements  coincident  with  the  neural 
activities  become  less  and  less  emphatic  in  the  pulse  of  the  preeminent 
consciousness  with  which  introspection  acquaints  us."  But  Mr.  Mar- 
shall does  not  make  clear  why,  as  neural  activities  are  organized, 
'  preeminent  consciousness '  lapses.  On  the  contrary,  parallelism 
would  suggest  that  the  more  organized  the  neurosis  the  more  organized 
the  psychosis,  and  so  not  its  failing  but  strengthening.  Parallelism 
would  say  that  only  upon  the  supposition  that  neural  organization 
means  '  less  emphatic '  neurosis  will  psychosis  appear  as  '  less  em- 
phatic,' that  is  in  instinct  form.  But  this  supposition  is  obviously  un- 
true. Further  Mr.  Marshall  by  his  definition,  which  he  defends  at 
length,  of  instinct  as  organized  activities,  and  then  explaining  instinct 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  421 

by  organization  simply  refers  instinct  to  itself.  The  question  will 
doubtless  occur  to  many  why  instinct  should  be  restricted  to  conserva- 
tism. Are  not  '  cranks,'  originals  and  geniuses  a  type  proceeding 
from  organization  ?  Do  not  such  tendencies  run  in  families  ? 

Mr.  Marshall  later  gives  an  interesting  but  by  no  means  conclusive 
account  of  social  instinct  in  relation  to  the  individualistic  and  specific. 

As  to  variation  Mr.  Marshall  emphasizes  it  as  independent  ac- 
tivity, '  an  element  of  an  aggregate '  acting  as  '  isolated  entity.'  But 
while  variation  is  obviously  independent  activity,  it  is  not  necessarily, 
as  seems  implied,  wholly  individualistic.  On  the  contrary,  variation 
is  mainly  toward  the  aggregate,  it  is  the  initiation  of  organization. 
Indeed,  as  in  radical  clubs,  variation  may  be  said  to  be  organized. 
The  general  trend  of  variation  is  toward  solidarity  and  centralization. 
But  changeability  and  volatility  may  become  so  constant  a  characteristic 
of  a  race,  e.  g.,  the  French,  as  to  be  a  certain  kind  of  conservatism. 
That  reason  is  in  man  the  chief  variant  process  hardly  needs  '  argu- 
ment.' In  Section  16  Mr.  Marshall  thus  sums  up  his  doctrine  of  vari- 
ation :  "  The  suggestion  then  which  it  seems  to  me  biology  may  gain 
from  this  special  psychological  view  in  reference  to  the  nature  of 
variation  is  that  organic  variation  is  probably  due,  in  large  measure  at 
least,  to  the  tendency  of  elements  in  organic  aggregates  to  react  as 
though  they  were  isolated  entities,  rather  than  integral  parts  of  a  com- 
plex systematized  unity ;  acting  thus  whenever  the  force  reaching  them 
from  their  environment  is  so  emphatic  that  it  overcomes  the  forces  in- 
herent in  the  organism  of  which  they  are  elements,  or  compels  re- 
action before  sufficient  time  has  been  allowed  for  these  organic  forces 
to  become  effective."  This,  in  plain  English,  equals  "  variation  is  due 
to  a  tendency  to  vary."  Here  then,  as  in  the  case  of  instinct,  Mr. 
Marshall  travels  in  a  circle. 

The  last  two  articles  deal  with  the  religious  instinct  and  its  expres- 
sion as  an  example  of  biologic  conservatism,  the  first  article  being  a 
deduction  of  religious  instinct  as  a  necessary  function  to  socialization, 
and  the  second  article  being  an  induction  from  the  facts  of  seclusion, 
fastings,  self-torture,  initiation,  prayer,  sacrifice,  celibacy  and  pilgrim- 
age, as  religious  practices,  that  religion  has  actually  exercised  this 
function  of  restraint  of  individualism  and  promotion  of  sociality.  It 
would  take  us  much  too  far  afield  to  consider  these  articles  more  closely 
at  this  time,  but  while  they  are  suggestive,  we  think  that  the  sketch  is  too 
summary  to  satisfy  most  readers.  We  hope  they  serve  the  author  only 
as  an  outline  for  an  extended  research  and  discussion  yet  to  appear. 

HIRAM  M.  STANLEY. 
LAKE  FOREST,  ILLINOIS. 


422  RECENT    WORKS  IN  PHILOSOPHY. 

RECENT  WORKS   IN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Christianity  and  Idealism.  By  JOHN  WATSON,  LL.D.  The  Mao 
millan  Company,  New  York  and  London.  1897.  Pp.  211. 

The  Life  of  James  Me  Cosh.  Edited  by  WILLIAM  MILLIGAN  SLOANE. 
New  York,  Charles  Scribner's  sons.  1896.  Pp.  287. 

Professor  Watson's  book  is  the  first  publication,  though  second  in 
the  series,  resulting  from  the  laudable  enterprise  of  the  Philosophical 
Union  of  the  University  of  California.  Passing  over  the  first  part  of 
the  volume,  on  account  of  space  limit,  we  come  in  the  second  part  to 
the  discussion  of  special  interest  to  philosophical  readers,  that  of  the 
relation  of  modern  Idealism  to  the  Christian  ideal  of  life.  In  his  pre- 
face Professor  Watson  includes  under  the  term  Idealism  such  different 
systems  as  those  of  Descartes  and  Hegel,  Kant,  Spinoza  and  Lotze. 
The  fundamental  principle  of  idealism  is  expressed  in  the  proposition, 
the  real  is  rational.  The  departures  of  any  of  the  above  thinkers  from 
pure  idealism  is  to  be  measured  by  their  departure  from  this  principle. 
Now  broadly  conceived,  the  rationality  of  the  real  is  held  by  many  who 
are  not  accounted  as  idealists.  But  the  school  of  idealism,  with  which 
Professor  Watson  is  most  in  sympathy,  tends  to  identify  the  real  and 
the  rational  in  the  sense  that  reality  in  its  last  analysis  reduces  to  the 
activity  of  thought. 

Under  the  influence  of  this  presumption  which  tends  to  narrow  the 
principle  of  idealism  to  the  tenet  of  a  school  the  author  proceeds  to 
interpret  the  content  of  Christianity  in  accordance  with  the  rational 
categories.  But  in  this  effort  both  elements  are  subjected  to  a  severe 
strain.  The  central  category  of  Christianity,  whether  we  view  its 
historical  content  or  that  of  the  living  Christian  consciousness  of  the 
present,  is,  without  doubt,  that  of  concrete,  personal  spirit.  The  diffi- 
culty of  Professor  Watson  is  that  of  reconciling  this  category  with  the 
principles  of  a  philosophy  which  tends  to  reduce  the  real  to  ulti- 
mate terms  of  thought.  That  by  the  application  of  force  a  species  of 
adjustment  may  be  effected  is  no  doubt  true.  But  the  only  satisfactory 
treatment  of  the  relation  would  consist  in  such  an  exhibition  of  essen- 
tial unity  between  the  content  of  Christianity  and  the  principles  of  Ideal- 
ism as  would  make  it  appear  that  Christianity  itself,  when  it  becomes 
reflective,  naturally  and  normally  expresses  itself  in  the  terms  of  the 
idealistic  creed.  Now  it  is  one  thing  to  say  that  the  reflective  Christian 
consciousness  will  be  broadly  idealistic,  but  quite  another  to  maintain 
that  it  will  find  its  most  adequate  expression  in  the  ready-made  princi- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  423 

pies  of  any  of  the  idealistic  schools.  Professor  Watson  speaks  as  the 
mouthpiece  of  a  special  form  of  idealism,  and  his  is  perhaps  the  most 
eloquent  and  persuasive  voice  of  his  school.  But  there  are  those,  and 
among  them  I  am  forced  to  count  myself,  who  are  not  convinced  that 
the  main  contention  of  the  author  has  been  successful,  and  who  believe 
that  complete  unity  between  Christianity  and  Idealism  would  involve 
more  than  thinkers  of  Professor  Watson's  school  are  willing  to  concede. 

No  one  who  reads  Professor  Watson's  book  will  fail  to  be  im- 
pressed by  its  great  ability  and  its  positive  merits.  It  is  written  in  the 
author's  best  style  and  it  rests  on  the  firm  belief  that  the  vitalest  prob- 
lems of  philosophy  are  those  of  religion  and  that  a  philosophy  which 
takes  a  negative  attitude  toward  religion,  or  attempts  to  shirk  its 
problems,  proves  recreant  to  its  most  pressing  duty.  Professor  Wat- 
son's faith  in  the  ultimate  unity  of  philosophic  and  religious  truth  is 
also  reassuring  in  view  of  the  hesitating  tone  of  so  many  of  our  thinkers. 
And  that  he  has  made  a  noble  contribution  to  the  religious  thought  of 
the  time  none  will  be  more  ready  to  admit  than  those  who  are  not 
convinced  that  the  specific  aim  of  the  last  section  of  his  book  has  been 
completely  attained. 

The  life  of  James  McCosh  is  mainly  autobiographical,  taken  from 
notes  written  down  by  him  during  the  last  years  of  his  life.  But 
these  notes  were  incomplete  and  at  times  fragmentary  and  the  editor, 
Professor  Sloane,  has  performed  a  difficult  task  with  the  masterly 
skill  and  tact  of  an  experienced  literary  craftsman.  The  record  em- 
braces the  boyhood  and  youth  of  McCosh,  his  university  career  at 
Glasgow  and  Edinburgh,  his  experience  as  a  minister  during  which  he 
played  his  part  in  the  memorable  disruption  and  the  establishment  of 
the  Free  Kirk  of  Scotland,  his  career  as  a  professor  at  Belfast  and  a 
leader  in  the  national  education  of  the  Scotch  and  Irish,  closing  with 
the  splendid  chapter  which  his  twenty  years  at  Princeton  added  to  the 
educational  history  of  that  university  and  the  country.  The  whole 
story  gives  a  strong  impression  of  the  simplicity  as  well  as  the  great- 
ness of  the  man  and  will  enable  the  public  to  understand  the  secret  of 
his  immense  influence  at  Princeton  and  the  profound  impression  which 
he  was  able  to  make  on  the  educators  of  his  generation.  Space  will 
permit  only  an  allusion  to  the  educational  services  of  Dr.  McCosh  and 
we  must  hasten  to  notice  his  work  as  a  thinker  and  philosopher. 
Some  of  the  most  important  of  his  services  in  this  line  have  been 
rendered  as  a  leader  in  a  movement  of  transition  and  adjustment. 
Such,  for  example,  was  his  attitude  toward  evolution  which,  as  a 
religious  thinker,  he  adopted  and  defended  as  an  ally  rather  than  a  foe 


424  RECENT    WORKS  IN  PHILOSOPHY. 

to  religion,  at  a  time  when  evolution  was  generally  regarded  as 
atheistical.  Such  also  was  the  service  he  rendered  the  new  physiolog- 
ical psychology  at  a  time  when  traditional  methods  were  almost  uni- 
versally prevalent.  Although  not  distinctly  experimental,  Dr.  Mc- 
Cosh's  method  was  largely  observational  and  his  works  are  treasuries 
of  facts  and  shrewd  observations.  In  philosophy  Dr.  McCosh  stands 
in  line  with  the  best  Scottish  traditions.  He  was  a  stout  champion  of 
a  realistic  epistemology  and  an  intuitional  metaphysics.  His  real 
contribution  to  philosophy  consists,  however,  not  so  much  in  any 
special  doctrines  which  he  may  have  taught  as  in  certain  fundamental 
convictions,  metaphysical,  ethical  and  religious,  which  inspired  all 
his  work.  In  his  advocacy  of  these  he  was  able  to  exert  a  profound 
influence  upon  his  age  and,  at  the  same  time,  to  make  an  important  con- 
tribution to  its  thought. 

PRINCETON.  A.  T.   ORMOND. 

Contemporary  Theology  and  Theism.  R.  M.  WENLEY.  New 
York,  Charles  Scribner's  Sons,  1897.  Pp.  197.  $1.25. 
We  congratulate  Professor  Wenley  and  the  public  upon  the  happy 
thought  which  prompted  him  to  mark  his  advent  to  an  American 
university  by  the  publication  of  this  little  book,  part  of  the  material 
for  which  was  originally  presented  before  the  Theological  Society  of 
Glasgow  University  in  the  form  of  an  address.  Professor  Wenley  is 
favorably  known  as  the  author  of  Socrates  and  Christ  and  Aspects 
of  Pessimism,  and  as  a  contributor  to  the  philosophical  journals. 
The  present  volume,  like  the  earlier  ones,  is,  in  the  main,  critical  and 
expository  rather  than  constructive,  but  the  constructive  element  is 
sufficient  to  define  the  author's  position  among  contemporary  students 
of  the  philosophy  of  religion.  In  the  brief  space  here  available  one 
can  do  little  more  than  cordially  commend  this  essay  to  all  who  are 
interested  in  contemporary  Theology  and  Theism — to  the  lay  reader 
as  well  as  to  the  professed  student  of  these  subjects. 

The  author's  purpose  may,  perhaps,  fairly  be  said  to  embrace  a 
threefold  aim,  viz.,  to  show  the  influence  of  philosophical  theory  upon 
current  theological  thought,  to  offer  some  criticism  of  the  theology  re- 
sulting from  an  inadequate  philosophy  overriding  facts  and  warping 
their  interpretation,  and  finally  to  ask  whether  theology  can  not  in  its 
turn  add  something  to  philosophy,  and  so  contribute  toward  the  for- 
mation of  a  more  adequate  philosophy  of  religion.  The  first  half  of 
the  volume  furnishes  cogent  illustration  of  the  historical,  as  well  as  of 
the  logical,  inseparability  of  philosophy  and  theology — a  fact  which 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  425 

should  not,  but  which  does,  need  ever  fresh  iteration — and  offers  some 
acute  and  valuable  criticism  of  the  two  main  currents  of  contemporary 
theological  thought  which  have  been  chiefly  determined  by  their  re- 
spective philosophical  presuppositions.  The  speculative  school  is  that 
which,  building  ultimately  on  Hegel,  construes  the  historic  facts  of 
religion,  and  of  the  Christian  religion  in  particular,  in  accordance  with 
the  logical  necessity  of  the  Hegelian  dialectic ;  which  the  Ritschlian 
school,  building  on  Kant  and  Lotze,  so  separate  philosophy  from  re- 
ligion, dogma  from  fact,  that  it  holds  a  Christianity  divorced  alike  from 
metaphysics  and  from  history,  and  resting  on  no  objective  basis  of 
fact.  These  two  schools  do  not  of  course  adequately  represent  con- 
temporary theology,  since  there  are  also  the  *  mediating '  theologians 
and  the  conservative  school  to  be  noted.  In  this  regard,  therefore, 
Professor  Wenley's  title  is  bigger  than  his  book,  and  to  this  extent  it 
is  misleading.  But  his  exposition  of  the  two  theological  tendencies 
with  which  he  deals  is  clear  and  fair ;  his  criticism  of  their  defects  is 
acute,  and  the  reader  who  is  not  particularly  acquainted  with  the 
movements  of  recent  theology  will  doubtless  retain  a  more  vivid  im- 
pression from  this  bird's-eye  view  of  two  of  its  phases  than  he  would 
from  a  more  expansive  and  detailed  presentation. 

The  latter  half  of  the  volume  deals  with  'the  theistic  problem.' 
The  question  is,  "Can  theology,  accepting  the  metaphysical  first 
principles  which  spiritual  inquiry  of  necessity  involves,  so  react  upon 
philosophy  as  to  produce  a  less  inadequate  solution  of  difficulties  ? " 
Professor  Wenley  answers,  yes.  There  are  at  least  three  regions 
where  theology  can  assist  and  correct  philosophical  speculation. 
These  are  "  the  questions  of  the  personality  of  God,  of  the  creative  or 
originating  power  which  marks  the  divinity  of  Christ,  and  of  the  rela- 
tion of  man  to  sin."  It  is  with  the  first  of  these  three,  or  with  the 
theistic  problem  proper,  that  the  remainder  of  the  book  is  chiefly  con- 
cerned— at  first  by  way  of  criticism  of  the  agnostic  and  gnostic  posi- 
tions respectively,  and  then  in  offering  some  constructive  suggestions 
toward  the  solution  of  the  problem.  Possibly  the  most  important  sec- 
tions of  this  portion  of  the  book  are  those  which  contain  the  very  dis- 
criminating and  appreciative  estimate  of  Hegel,  and  the  suggestion 
that  the  key  to  the  solution  of  the  theistic  problems  may  be  found  to 
lie  in  a  more  perfect  analysis  of  the  idea  of  personality.  The  Haupt- 
problem  is  how  '  to  preserve  the  requisite  balance  between  immanence 
and  transcendence.'  The  author  thinks  he  finds  the  clue  to  the  reso- 
lution of  this  difficulty  in  the  finite  self,  which  combines  the  qualities 
of  immanence  and  transcendence,  and  so  furnishes  an  analogy  for  the 


426  PEDAGOGICAL. 

nature  of  God.  The  hint  here  let  fall  seems  to  us  full  of  suggestive- 
ness,  but  Professor  Wenley  has  not  worked  it  out  sufficiently  to  make 
his  meaning  altogether  plain.  We  close  with  an  expression  of  the 
hope  that  he  may  yet  be  able  to  do  this  for  us  in  the  more  systematic 
and  constructive  work  of  which  we  trust  the  present  essay  is  the  pre- 
cursor. Meanwhile  it  may  perhaps  be  worth  noting  that  his  general 
point  of  view  is  not  unlike  that  of  Professor  Fraser  in  that  he  too  starts 
from  man  and  man's  experience  as  the  clue  to  the  nature  of  divine 
personality.  GEORGE  L.  PATTON. 

PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY. 


PEDAGOGICAL. 

Ueber  eine  neue  Methode  zur  Prufung  geistiger  Fdhigkeiten  und 
ihre  Amvendungbei  Schulkindern.  H.  EBBINGHAUS.  Ztschr. 
fur  Psychol.  u.  Phys.  der  Sinnesorgane,  XIII.,  401-459.  1897. 

In  1895  the  city  authorities  of  Breslau  applied  to  the  Hygienic  Sec- 
tion der  Schlessischen  Gesellschaft  fur  -vaterldndische  Kultur  for 
an  opinion  and  report  on  the  advisability  of  holding  school  sessions 
five  hours  long.  The  secretaries  of  the  Section,  Professors  Flugge, 
H.  Cohn  and  Jacobi,  added  to  their  number  several  other  physicians 
and  educators,  including  Professor  Ebbinghaus,  who  has  given  us  the 
above  account  of  the  preliminary  labors  of  the  commission. 

The  method  of  Burgerstein  with  addition  and  multiplication  of 
simple  numbers,  that  of  Sikorski  and  Hopfner  with  long  dictation 
exercises,  and  that  of  Richter  with  easy  algebra  and  Greek  conjuga- 
tions, were  all  objectionable  since  they  did  not  preserve  sufficiently  the 
normal  character  of  a  recitation  period.  They  aimed  to  measure  fa- 
tigue but  vitiated  the  results  by  the  monotony  and  lack  of  interest  due 
to  their  methods. 

A  second  set  of  investigators,  recognizing  this,  have  avoided  inter- 
fering with  the  normal  school-work,  but  apply  an  appropriate  test  from 
time  to  time,  to  determine  the  amount  of  fatigue  due  to  the  regular 
work.  Thus  Griesbach  tested  pupils  at  different  periods  in  the  course 
of  the  day  by  measuring  their  sensibility  to  touch,  and  found  that 
it  varied  with  their  mental  fatigue. 

The  Breslau  commission  determined  to  combine  the  best  features  of 
both  methods ;  they  allowed  the  ordinary  school  work  to  take  its  regu- 
lar course,  but  tested  the  pupils  before  school  and  at  the  end  of  every 
period  by  having  them  spend  10  minutes  in  (i)  adding  or  multiplying 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  427 

(arithmetic  test),  or  five  minutes  in  (2)  writing  numbers  of  from  6  to 
10  places  from  dictations  (memory  test),  or  (3)  filling  in  omitted 
syllables  and  words  in  a  specially  prepared  text  (combination  test). 
The  tests  were  made  in  a  gymnasium  and  in  a  girls'  school,  on  three 
different  Wednesdays  a  fortnight  apart. 

The  second  test,  that  of  the  memory  span  for  numbers,  showed 
most  remarkable  variations  from  period  to  period  and  seemed  least  re- 
liable when  the  tests  were  not  all  made  by  the  same  teacher  so  as  to  in- 
sure uniformity  in  rate,  rhythm,  tone,  etc.,  in  giving  out  the  numbers. 

The  third  test  was  intended  to  go  deeper  and  test  intellectual 
fatigue.  The  omitted  syllables  were  indicated  by  dashes  and  pupils 
were  required  to  restore  the  omissions  as  rapidly  as  possible,  but 
always  so  as  to  make  sense.  In  general  this  test  brought  out  greater 
differences  in  the  several  classes  than  either  of  the  other  two  methods. 
By  this  method  of  testing  Untertertia  accomplished  more  than  twice 
as  much  as  Sexta  and  made  an  average  of  less  than  one-third  as  many 
mistakes,  whereas  by  the  arithmetic  test  the  difference  was  less  than 
25  %  increase  in  these  three  years. 

The  three  methods  showed  interesting  differences  within  each  class 
as  well  as  from  class  to  class.  For  this  purpose  each  class  was  di- 
vided into  three  groups  according  to  their  ranking  in  scholarship. 
The  memory  test  showed  quite  as  good  results,  or  even  better  among 
the  duller  pupils  than  among  the  brighter  ones.  The  arithmetic  test 
placed  the  duller  pupils  midway  between  the  brighter  and  the  mediocre 
ones.  The  combination  test,  however,  reflected  with  great  fidelity 
the  rank  and  scholarship  of  the  pupils.  The  quantity  of  work  as  well 
as  the  quality  of  it  increased  regularly  in  every  class  from  the  duller  to 
the  brighter  pupils.  The  differences  between  the  three  groups  were 
much  greater  in  the  lower  classes  and  least  in  the  highest  classes. 

In  the  lower  classes  the  girls  were  without  exception  behind  the 
boys  in  all  three  tests,  but  in  the  higher  classes  the  sixteen  year  old 
girls  had  completely  overtaken  the  boys  of  corresponding  age. 

The  memory  test  showed  no  sure  signs  of  fatigue  at  the  end  of 
five  hours  of  school  work.  The  arithmetic  test  brought  out  evident 
weakening  in  effectiveness  and  accuracy,  while  the  combination  me- 
thod gave  no  sure  signs  of  fatigue  in  the  upper  and  middle  classes  at 
all.  Pupils  of  10  to  12,  however,  undoubtedly  fatigued  much  more 
rapidly.  Whether  this  fatigue  is  harmful  or  useful  is  not  shown  by 
these  tests  and  would  require  other  tests  to  determine  the  fact.  It  is 
to  be  hoped  the  Commission  will  carry  out  these  further  investigations, 
for  it  is  certainly  a  very  effeminate  pedagogy  that  is  going  to  try  to 
keep  the  dear  children  from  ever  getting  tired. 


428  PEDAGOGICAL. 

Lastly,  the  results  were  worked  over  to  compare  the  effects  of  dif- 
ferent branches  of  study.  After  language  lessons  in  the  classics  the 
combination  test  showed  considerably  better  results  both  in  quantity 
and  quality,  than  after  lessons  in  any  other  branch,  e.  g.,  science, 
arithmetic  or  drawing ;  notwithstanding  that  these  subjects  afforded 
less  mental  strain  of  attention  and  consequently  probably  less  fatigue. 

The  Pedagogical  Seminary.     Edited  by  G.  STANLEY  HALL.     Vol. 
IV.,  2  and  3.     December,  1896,  and  April,  1897. 

'  A  Study  of  Dolls,'  by  Mr.  Ellis  and  Dr.  Hall  gives  the  substance 
of  an  extensive  and  laborious  collection  of  data,  tabulation  of  statistics 
and  rare  suggestions  of  applications.  The  chief  topics  are  :  material 
of  which  dolls  are  made,  substitutes  and  proxies,  psychic  qualities, 
doll's  food  and  feeding,  sleep,  sickness,  death,  funeral  and  burial  of 
of  dolls,  doll's  names,  discipline,  hygiene  and  toilet,  doll's  families, 
schools,  parties,  weddings,  accessories  and  furnishings,  miscellaneous 
anthropological  notes. 

The  doll  passion  seems  to  be  strongest  between  seven  and  ten  and 
reaches  its  climax  between  eight  and  nine,  and  the  parental  instinct  is 
far  less  prominent  in  doll  play  than  is  commonly  supposed.  How- 
ever disconnected  the  words  doll  and  idol,  some  psychic  connection 
cannot  be  doubted.  Idols  may,  perhaps,  be  valuable  object  lessons  in 
religion  for  children  at  the  pagan  stage  and  may  yet  have  a  r61e  to 
play  in  elementary  religious  training.  The  small  scale  of  the  doll 
world  focuses  and  intensifies  affections  and  all  other  feelings. 

Although  doll  play  educates  the  heart  and  will  even  more  than  the 
intellect,  many  school  subjects  are  also  helped  by  it.  Children  with 
French  dolls  incline  to  practice  their  little  French  upon  them ;  can 
this  tendency  be  utilized  in  teaching  a  foreign  language  to  young 
children?  Some  children  thus  learn  to  read,  sew,  knit,  do  millinery 
work,  observe  and  design  costumes,  acquire  taste  in  color  and  even 
prepare  food,  they  make  their  dolls  represent  heroes  in  history  or  fic- 
tion and  take  them  on  imaginary  journeys  into  foreign  lands,  and 
sometimes  the  doll  serves  as  an  ethical  ideal  and  helps  them  to  be 
good.  Dolls  are  an  excellent  school  for  children  to  practice  all  they 
know  of  rudimentary  sociology,  ethics  and  science.  Would  not  dolls 
and  their  furnishings  be  among  the  best  things  to  make  in  manual  train- 
ing schools?  Why  are  dolls,  which  represent  the  most  original,  free 
and  spontaneous  expression  of  the  play  instinct,  so  commonly  excluded 
from  kindergartens,  where  they  could  aid  in  teaching  almost  every- 
thing ? 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  429 

"  There  should  be  somewhere  (a)  a  doll  museum,  (£)  a  doll  ex- 
pert to  keep  the  possibilities  of  this  great  educative  instinct  steadily  in 
view,  and  (c)  careful  observations  upon  children  of  kindergarten, 
primary  and  grammar  grades  should  be  instituted  as  at  an  experiment 
station  in  order  to  determine  just  what  is  practicable." 

Mr.  Small's  study  of  the  ' Suggestibility  of  Children'  presents  a 
great  deal  of  concrete  material,  partly  experimental  and  partly  obser- 
vation notes  in  answer  to  a  syllabus.  He  concludes  that  in  healthy 
children  a  high  degree  of  suggestibility  is  a  universal  condition  and 
largely  within  the  control  of  any  one  in  sympathy  with  children. 
Hence  the  necessity  of  removing  from  the  public  schools,  stutterers, 
emotional  prodigals,  and  nervous  defectives;  greater  prominence  of 
motor  element  and  dramatic  instinct  in  learning;  a  possible  use  of  the 
social  instinct  as  it  crops  out  in  school  fads  to  awaken  interest  in  his- 
tory, literature  and  science;  a  hint  at  the  natural  method  of  child 
discipline  in  suggestion  as  children  use  it ;  and  the  strong  influence  of 
the  attitude  of  the  teacher  upon  the  tastes  and  ideals  of  the  pupils. 

Mr.  Dawson's  '  Study  in  Youthful  Degeneracy '  gives  us  the  re- 
sults of  a  difficult  and  embarrassing  study  of  sixty  juvenile  delinquents, 
comprising  carefully  selected  types  of  (i)  thieves,  (2)  incendiaries, 
(3)  assaulters,  (4)  sexual  offenders,  and  (5)  general  incorrigibles. 

In  the  April  number  Mr.  Street  reviews  the  chief  methods  of 
language  teaching  and  Mr.  Croswell  summarizes  the  '  Courses  of 
Study  in  the  Elementary  Schools.'  Mr.  Burk  has  worked  over  a  great 
many  returns  to  a  questionnaire  on  '  Teasing  and  Bullying '  and  be- 
lieves that  '  these  are  to  be  classed  more  as  crystallized  instincts  than 
as  conscious  and  voluntary  activities.'  He  suggests  that  the  move- 
ments involved  are  '  the  racial  form  of  all  exercise,'  and  that  as  such 
"they  are  the  only  possible  forms  of  exercise  upon  which  progress  in 
physical  development,  and  mental  development,  of  the  individual 
rests." 

Mr.  Partridge  has  contributed  two  short  articles  on  '  Second 
Breath  '  and  »  Blushing,'  and  Miss  Frear,  of  Stanford  University,  has 
worked  out  in  a  series  of  six  charts  a  number  of  general  conclusions 
based  on  the  material  in  Mr.  Russell's  book  on  imitation. 

The  work  in  these  two  numbers  of  the  Seminary  is  based  almost 
entirely  on  the  returns  to  President  Hall's  Child  Study  Syllabi,  and 
the  authors  have  taken  advantage  of  this  rich  concrete  material  for 
copious  use  in  illustrating  all  the  points  brought  forward.  Notwith- 
standing the  able  and  thoroughly  practical  conclusions  of  most  of  the 
papers,  the  chief  inspiration  of  it  all  lies  in  the  plain,  unvarnished  ob- 


43°  VISION. 

servation  notes  that  formed  the  raw  material  for  these  studies  and 
might  form  the  basis  of  dozens  of  still  other  '  conclusions.'  The  ad- 
vantage of  publishing  the  original  material  is  obvious  in  affording 
opportunity  for  further  interpretations. 

HERMAN  T.  LUKENS. 
BRYN  MAWR  COLLEGE,  PENNSYLVANIA. 


VISION. 

Ueber  intermittirende  Netzhautreizung .  FR.  SCHENCK.  Pfliiger's 
Archiv,  Bd.  LXIV.,  165-179,  607-628. 

On  Intermittent  Stimulation  of  the  Retina.  Part  I.  By  O.  F.  F. 
GR^NBAUM.  Journal  of  Physiology,  XXI.,  396-403. 

An  Account  of  Certain  Phenomena  of  Colour  Vision  'with  Inter- 
mittent Light.  G.  J.  BURCH.  Journal  of  Physiology,  XXI., 
426-434. 

Much  interest  has  been  aroused  by  the  method  of  photometry  in 
troduced  by  Professor  Rood  in  1893  (Am.  Jour.  Sci.,  XLVL), 
which  is  based  upon  the  fact,  first  observed  by  Plateau,  that  there  is  a 
definite  relation  between  the  intensity  of  two  alternating  light-sensa- 
tions and  the  rate  of  frequency  of  repetition  necessary  to  cause  them 
to  become  fused,  that  is,  to  cause  'flicker'  to  become  extinguished 
The  less  the  difference  of  intensity  of  the  two  excitations,  the  less 
rapidly  do  they  need  to  alternate  in  order  to  produce  a  homogeneous 
intermediate  sensation ;  if  a  disc  is  half  white  and  half  black,  it  must 
rotate  more  rapidly  to  extinguish  flicker  than  if  it  is  half  a  light  gray 
and  half  a  dark  gray,  and  the  less  the  difference  in  the  grays  the  less  is 
the  rapidity  of  rotation  that  is  required.  This  circumstance  gives  an 
evident  foundation  for  a  method  of  photometry,  which  is  of  particular 
advantage  for  the  estimation  of  the  brightness  of  different  colors,  since 
the  color  constituent  is  found  by  most  people  to  be  very  disturbing  in 
estimating  relative  brightness  by  plain  inspection ;  by  this  method  it 
is  only  necessary  to  select  from  a  number  of  grays  of  known  bright- 
ness the  one  with  which  the  color  in  question  will  most  readily  fuse. 

Schafhautl  (Munch.  Akad.  Abh.,  VII.)  had  already  proposed  in 
1855  a  photometric  method  based  upon  the  extinction  of  flicker,  which 
should  give  absolute  intensities  and  not  simply  comparative  ones;  he 
looked  at  a  bright  surface  through  a  hole  behind  which  a  small  screen 
was  caused  to  vibrate  which  alternately  shut  out  and  let  through  the 
light  from  the  surface  to  be  examined.  He  assumed  that  the  rapidity 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  431 

of  vibration  of  the  spring  would  be  proportional  to  the  square  root  of 
its  length  (which  would  not  be  the  case  when  the  spring  carries  a 
weight)  and  that  the  intensity  of  the  light  when  flicker  just  ceased 
would  be  proportional  to  the  square  root  of  the  rate  of  vibration  of  the 
spring  (which  is  also  not  known  to  be  true) . 

Schenck  proposes,  in  his  second  communication,  a  modification  of 
the  method  of  Rood,  by  which  the  color  to  be  tested  is  placed  upon  a 
color-disc  on  which  there  is  a  gray  which  goes  gradually,  from  the 
center  outwards,  from  white  to  black ;  this  is  secured  by  painting 
black  upon  a  white  surface  in  such  a  way  that  the  amount  of  black  at 
any  given  narrow  ring  of  the  disc  is  proportional  to  the  distance  of 
that  ring  from  the  center.  He  then  looks  at  the  rotating  disc  through 
a  small  hole  in  a  piece  of  cardboard,  and  determines  at  what  distance 
from  the  center  fusion  takes  place  with  the  lowest  possible  rapidity  of  ro- 
tation ;  this  will  be  the  position  of  that  black  and  white  mixture  which  is 
of  equal  brightness  with  the  color  which  is  being  tested,  and  the  pro- 
portion of  black  and  white  in  it  will  be  given  by  its  distance  from  the 
center.  Outside  and  inside  of  this  ring,  flickering  is  still  going  on,  be- 
cause the  gray  is  either  too  dark  or  too  light  to  fuse  with  the  color  at 
so  low  an  intermittence  frequency.  The  method  was  found  to  work 
well.  It  was  tested  by  determining  the  brightness  of  each  of  two 
complementary  colors,  and  then  the  brightness  of  their  resulting  gray 
light  and  comparing  this  last  with  the  brightness  computed  for  the  two 
colors  when  mixed  in  the  proportion  necessary  to  give  gray ;  the 
coincidence  was  very  close.  This  method  of  testing  was  of  course 
made  use  of  by  Rood,  and  described  by  him  in  his  first  communica- 
tion. But  the  curious  circumstance  developed  itself  that  when  the 
brightness  of  the  papers  was  determined  by  direct  inspection — by 
choosing  the  gray  which  seemed  to  look  equally  bright  with  a  given 
color — very  different  results  were  obtained.  The  two  brightest  colors, 
yellow  and  green,  were  given  as  much  too  bright  by  the  intermittence 
method,  yellow  especially  so,  while  all  the  other  colors,  and  par- 
ticularly red,  were  given  as  too  dull.  No  explanation  has  been  found 
by  Schenck  for  this  discrepancy.  The  idea  of  Hering  that  comple- 
mentary colors  have  an  opposite  and  compensatory  specific  brightness 
effect  does  not  apply,  because  here  yellow  and  green  belong  in  one 
category,  and  red  and  blue  in  the  other.  Moreover,  there  is  no  ex- 
tinction of  the  color  in  this  experiment,  it  is  merely  spread  in  a  thinner 
layer  over  a  larger  retinal  surface ;  therefore,  there  would  be  no  sense 
in  assuming  that  the  intermittence  method  determines  the  white- 
valence  alone,  and  by  the  test  already  referred  to,  it  is  evident  that  there 


43 3  VISION, 

is  exactly  determined  by  the  intermittence  method  that  element  of 
brightness  (whatever  it  may  be)  which  goes  to  the  formation  of  the 
brightness  of  the  gray  produced  by  the  mixture  of  two  complementary 
colors ;  from  which  it  results  that  Hering'sidea  of  the  specific  brighten- 
ing and  darkening  power  of  the  four  colors  is  as  meaningless  and  con- 
fusing when  it  comes  to  a  practical  application  as  it  is  in  theory.  The 
mere  inability  to  detect  by  direct  inspection  the  relative  brightness  of 
two  different  colors  seems  to  be  also  no  sufficient  explanation,  because 
it  would  appear  that  some  definite  affection  of  sensation  is  got  by  this 
means  which  is  common  to  different  observers  and  to  the  same  observer 
at  different  times.  The  subject  would  apparently  repay  further  in- 
vestigation. 

A  curious  circumstance  was  first  noticed  by  Filehne,  in  1885,  in 
connection  with  the  fusion  into  one  mean  sensation  of  two  rapidly 
alternating  sensations.  If  two  discs  are  prepared,  one  of  four  alter- 
nate equal  black  and  white  sectors  and  the  other  of  sixteen,  and  if 
the  first  be  given  a  rotation  velocity  four  times  as  great  as  that  of  the 
second,  then  the  rate  of  alternation  of  black  and  white  excitations  upon 
a  given  point  of  the  retina  is  alike  in  both  cases,  but,  nevertheless,  the 
conditions  are  not  equally  favorable  for  fusion ;  the  rapidly  rotating 
disc  will  present  a  fusion  of  sensation  at  a  time  when  flicker  is  still 
persisting  in  this  disc  of  many  sectors.  Mere  linear  velocity  seems 
in  some  curious  way  to  assist  the  fusion.  Thirty  alternations  per 
second  suffice  to  produce  fusion  in  the  one  case,  while  if  the  sectors 
are  numerous  and  the  disc  rotates  in  the  same  proportion  slower,  flicker 
may  persist  with  over  seventy  alternations  per  second.  Fick  found 
that  when  parallel  lines  were  drawn  on  a  drum  which  rotated  about 
an  axis  parallel  to  the  lines,  as  many  as  170  alternations  a  second 
might  be  necessary  to  produce  fusion,  but  that  if  the  moving  lines 
were  looked  at  through  a  slit,  flicker  ceased  at  forty  per  second.  He 
suggested  that  this  discrepancy  was  owing  to  the  fact  that  when  the 
speed  of  translation  is  slow  the  eye  more  readily  follows  the  moving 
contour  of  the  sectors,  and  the  alternating  excitations  do  not  fall  in 
order  upon  exactly  the  same  part  of  the  retina,  but  that  the  use  of  a  small 
aperture  for  observation  prevents  this  movement  of  the  eyes.  Schenck's 
first  paper  is  devoted  to  upholding  this  view  as  against  Marbe,  who 
maintained  that  the  slow  contour  movement  in  itself  is  enough  to  re- 
tard fusion.  He  does  this  first  by  experiment,  and  he  then  shows  with 
much  skill  that  the  theoretical  considerations  by  which  Marbe  has 
sought  to  deduce  his  view  as  to  the  effect  of  contour  motion  from  his 
theory  of  Talbot's  law  are  ineffective,  and  also  that  his  theory  is  at 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  433 

bottom  not  different  from  the  usual  theory,  and  especially  not  so  well 
stated  as  by  Boas  (Ann.  d.  Phys.  u.  Chem.,  N.  F.  XVI.).  To  sum 
up,  the  moments  which  affect  fusion  favorably  are  these : 

1.  Diminution  of  the  duration  of  the  double  period. 

2.  Increase  in  the  difference  of  duration  of  the  two  separate  exci- 
tations. 

3.  Diminution  in  the  difference  of  intensity  of  the  two  excitations. 

4.  Increase  of  the  absolute  mean  intensity. 

5.  More  rapid  contour  motion  (in  the  case  of  rotating  discs). 

Marbe's  explanation  of  the  effect  of  the  first  four  of  these  circum- 
stances is  the  same  as  that  of  Boas.  His  explanation  of  the  last, 
which  is  that  it  is  due  to  contrast,  is  counter-indicated  by  an  experi- 
ment of  Baader's,  in  which  a  disc  is  prepared  of  alternate  black  and 
white  half  rings,  and  it  is  found  that  fusion  takes  place  just  as  well  as 
with  solid  half  circles  of  black  and  white,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  ad- 
joining rings  upon  the  retinal  surface  are  in  the  first  case  constantly  in 
opposite  phases  of  excitation,  and  hence  favorable  to  the  production  of 
contrast.  Schenck  himself  seems  to  think  that,  when  fusion  is  pre- 
vented by  reason  of  eye-movements,  it  is  by  means  of  a  psychical 
effect,  ein  deutliches  Erkennen  der  Conturenj  does  he  not  here 
overlook  the  very  evident  fact  that  when  the  eye  follows  the  contour 
a  given  part  of  the  retina  is  exposed  for  a  longer  time  to  white  and 
respectively  to  black  and  that  there  is,  therefore,  a  physical  effect 
which  is  exactly  the  same  as  if  the  disc  were  rotating  more  slowly? 

Mr.  Griinbaum's  paper  presents  a  degree  of  obscurity  in  the  de- 
scription of  a  sufficiently  simple  experiment  which  one  would  have  to 
go  far  to  see  equalled;  in  grammar  even  it  is  not  above  reproach. 
His  experiments  show  apparently  that  even  the  use  of  an  aperture  does 
not  do  away  with  what  we  may  call  the  Filehne  anomaly,  described 
just  above,  unless  there  is  a  constant  relation  between  the  size  of  the 
aperture  and  the  cross-section  of  the  black  and  white  disc-sectors 
which  are  sweeping  past  it.  Consider  for  a  moment  what  would  be 
the  effect  of  a  non-constant  relation  between  the  two  quantities  just 
named :  let  a  and  b  be  two  equal  discs,  each  with  alternate  equal 
black  and  white  sectors,  but  let  the  individual  sectors  of  b  be  ten  times 
as  large  as  those  of  a,  and  at  the  same  time  let  them  rotate  ten  times 
as  rapidly.  If  they  are  looked  at  through  apertures  at  the  same  dis- 
tance from  the  center  of  each  disc,  then  the  conditions  as  regards  any 
given  retinal  poirjt  will  be  alike  in  both  cases,  it  will  be  subjected  to 
alternate  black  and  white  excitation  in  periods  of  the  same  duration. 
But  there  will  be  a  difference  as  regards  the  square  surface  of  the 


434  VISION. 

retina  as  a  whole  upon  which  the  image  of  the  aperture  falls.  If  the 
black  and  white  sectors  are  no  wider  across  at  the  point  examined  than 
is  the  aperture,  then  there  will  be  no  perceptible  time  during  which 
the  whole  aperture  is  black  or  is  white,  but  if  the  sectors  are  the  large 
and  the  rapidly  moving  ones,  then  the  whole  aperture  will  be  a  good 
part  of  the  time  exposed  wholly  to  either  black  or  white.  The  former 
case,  according  to  Griinbaum,  is  favorable  to  simultaneous  contrast, 
and  hence  the  difference  in  physiological  intensity  of  the  two  stimuli 
is  increased,  and  fusion  is  interfered  with.  He  refers  to  Sherrington's 
paper  (about  to  be  noticed)  for  proof  of  this  effect  of  contrast ;  but 
Sherrington  found,  under  favorable  circumstances,  that  contrast  caused 
34  rotations  per  second  to  be  essential  to  fusion  when  without  it  22 
were  sufficient,  while  Griinbaum  gets,  for  changing  breadth  of  sector 
(everything  else  remaining  the  same)  a  change  of  number  of  rotations 
from  43  to  225.  It  is  difficult  to  believe  that  such  a  difference  as  this 
could  be  due  to  contrast.  Moreover,  are  not  the  conditions  as  favor- 
able to  successive  contrast  in  the  latter  case  as  they  are  to  simultaneous 
contrast  in  the  first  ?  Griinbaum  considers  it  improbable  that  '  when 
an  aperture  of  5  mm.  is  used  and  the  eye  focussed  for  a  cross  drawn 
upon  the  screen '  (by  which  he  doubtless  means  to  say  that  the  center 
of  a  cross  is  fixated)  any  movement  of  the  eye  can  occur.  One  might, 
equally  well  say  that,  under  these  circumstances,  very  small  move- 
ments of  the  eye,  which  are  known  to  be  unavoidable,  would  be  suf- 
ficient. He  neglects  to  say  that  his  explanation  is  the  same  as  that 
given  by  Marbe,  and  criticised  as  above  by  Schenck. 

Burch  experimented  with  spectral  light,  which  he  made  intermit- 
tent by  means  of  a  rotating  screen  pierced  with  holes.  His  double 
period  consisted  of  a  short  duration  of  very  bright  light  and  a  long 
duration  of  darkness.  When  the  dispersion  was  wide,  so  that  the  field 
of  view  of  the  spectroscope  was  sensibly  of  one  color,  and  when  the 
rotation  was  too  slow  to  produce  fusion,  he  detected  patches  of  darkness 
of  the  same  shape  as  the  interstices  between  Purkinje's  figures.  With  a 
very  short  duration  of  the  flash,  the  yellow  spot  of  the  retina  became  sub- 
jectively evident;  under  certain  circumstances  "  upon  looking  steadily 
at  the  part  inside  the  bend  of  the  absorption  band  between  C  and  Z>, 
it  is  seen  to  be  occupied  by  an  irregular  group  of  brilliant  red  dots  on 
a  ground  of  beetle-green  or  steel-blue."  When  the  flashes  were  of 
very  great  intensity,  instead  of  a  continuous  spectrum  there  were  seen 
three  bands  of  color,  red,  green  and  blue,  upon  a  brightly  illuminated 
whitish  background.  The  explanation  given  of  this  latter  phenomenon 
by  Mr.  Burch  is  very  ingenious,  and,  as  it  happens,  it  fits  in  very  well 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  435 

with  my  theory,  in  fact,  it  is  much  the  same  as  the  explanation  that  I 
have  given,  under  simpler  circumstances,  for  the  lesser  purity  of  the 
portions  of  the  spectrum  between  the  fundamental  colors  in  general. 
It  is  this :  a  given  color-decomposition  (if  we  speak  in  chemical  terms, 
for  the  sake  of  clearness),  will  be  effected  chiefly  by  a  certain  oscilla- 
tion frequency  of  light,  which  we  may  call  its  optimum  period,  but  it 
will  also  be  effected  to  a  less  extent  by  other  rates  on  either  side  of 
this.  Now  when  the  light  employed  is  very  intense,  a  maximum  de- 
composition will  be  effected  by  periods  at  some  distance  on  either 
side  of  the  optimum  period.  With  a  steady  illumination,  this  would 
make  the  whole  spectrum  whitish,  and  very  bright,  but  with  an  inter- 
mittent illumination,  the  resulting  sensation  is  not  so  intense  as  to 
prevent  the  observer  from  recognizing  the  greater  apparent  brilliancy 
of  those  portions  where  two  color-sensations  overlap,  and  accordingly 
those  parts  look  brighter  than  the  rest  and  have  the  pale  tints  of  binary 
color-blends.  The  author  apologizes  for  this  explanation  on  account 
of  the  fact  that  it  posits  red,  green  and  blue  (in  opposition  to  Hering) 
as  the  primary  colors.  (He  saw  violet,  under  certain  circumstances, 
as  very  bright  also,  but  an  easy  explanation  lies  at  hand  for  this — 
there  are  only  a  few  red-producing  rays  at  that  end  of  the  spectrum 
with  which  to  diminish  the  purity  of  the  blue.)  This  is,  however, 
an  element  in  its  favor,  and  he  has  moreover  other  observations,  not 
yet  published,  which  will  confirm  this  view. 

C.  L.  FRANKLIN. 
BALTIMORE. 

Neue  Versuche  iiber  intermittende  Gesichtsreize.       KARL  MARBE. 
Phil.  Studien,  XIII.,  i.  106-115. 

The  author  investigates  the  relations  between  the  critical  period  of 
duration  of  intermittent  visual  stimuli  and  the  average  brightness 
(Helligkeit)  of  the  stimuli.  "  For  two  visual  stimuli  which  fall  upon 
the  retina  successively  and  periodically,  there  is  a  certain  short  period 
of  duration  in  which  they  produce  a  constant  sensation."  This  the 
author  calls  the  critical  period  of  duration.  According  to  Baader,  the 
critical  period  grows  for  two  colorless  stimuli,  as  the  difference  of 
brightness  between  the  two  sensations  decreases.  This  is  true  alike 
when  the  average  brightness  increases  with  the  increasing  difference 
between  the  stimuli,  and  when  the  average  brightness  is  constant. 
Kleiner  showed  that,  with  a  difference  of  stimuli  increasing  from  o  on, 
the  critical  period  decreases  at  first  very  rapidly,  then  slower  and 
slower,  until  finally  the  decrease  almost  ceases.  The  author  asks  and 


436  VISION. 

answers  the  questions  whether  the  conclusion  of  Kleiner  holds  for  all 
cases  of  increasing  stimuli,  indifferent  whether  the  average  brightness 
of  the  stimuli  increases,  is  constant,  or  decreases ;  and  whether,  if  this 
is  the  case,  the  regularity  is  determined  by  the  differences  in  the 
stimuli. 

Author  used  40  gray  pieces  of  paper  of  different  degrees  of  brightness 
determined  photographically,  as  described  in  the  Zeitsch.  f .  Psych,  u. 
Physiol.  d.  Sinnesorgane,  Bd.  XII.,  S.  62f.  The  brightest  piece  re- 
flected about  13  times  as  much  light  as  the  darkest,  the  determinations 
being  made  by  the  Kirschmann  photometer.  Degrees  of  brightness 
between  white  and  black  were  determined  as  follows :  A  white  and  a 
black  disk  of  i6cm.  diameter  were  placed  on  a  Maxwell  color-mixer. 
Concentrically  over  these  was  placed  the  gray  disk  whose  intensity 
was  to  be  determined.  Then  the  white  and  black  disks  were  adjusted 
to  give  the  same  brightness  as  the  gray  disk,  starting  first  from  a  mix- 
ture which  was  clearly  brighter,  then  from  one  which  was  clearly 
darker  than  the  gray  disk,  and  taking  the  average  of  the  two  deter- 
minations, which  is  given  in  the  tables.  The  method  by  which  the 
rapidity  of  rotation  was  determined  which  is  necessary  to  give  a  con- 
stant sensation  from  the  two  stimuli,  is  described  in  Phil.  Studien,  Bd. 
IX.,  S.  389ff.  Driving  force  was  produced  by  an  electromotor  with 
an  Ad.  Fick  regulator.1 

The  author's  conclusions  are  as  follows:  (i)  With  increasing 
difference  between  two  stimuli  the  critical  period  of  duration  decreases 
at  first  very  rapidly,  then  more  slowly,  and  finally  almost  none  at  all. 
(2)  This  holds  indifferently,  whether  the  average  intensity  increases 
or  decreases  with  increasing  difference  of  stimuli.  (3)  The  values  of 
the  critical  periods  of  duration  are  determined,  for  the  most  part  (im 
wesentlichen) ,  by  the  objective,  not  by  the  subjective,  differences  be- 
tween the  two  stimuli.  (4)  To  equal  objective  differences  correspond 
about  equal  critical  periods  of  duration. 

The  article  includes  five  tables  and  three  curves.  The  account  of 
the  experiments  is  somewhat  condensed  and  brief,  but  probably  a  more 
detailed  account  is  unnecessary.  The  subjects  were  the  author  and 
Professor  Kiilpe. 

G.  A.  TAWNEY. 

BELOIT  COLLEGE. 

described  by  Bradt :  Ueber  die  Warmebildung  bei  summirten  Zuchungen 
des  Muskels.  Wurzburg,  Etlinger's  Buchdruckerei.  1893.  S.  13^. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  437 

VOLITION. 

The  Psychology  of  Effort.     JOHN  DEWEY.     Philosophical  Review, 

VI.,  43-56,  January,  1897. 

Professor  Dewey  here  presents  a  theory  of  the  psychology  of  ef- 
fort in  harmony  with  his  theory  of  the  significance  of  emotion  (this 
REVIEW,  II.,  13  ff).  Accepting  the  sensationalist  view  of  the  con- 
sciousness of  effort,  he  finds  the  specific  quality  of  this  consciousness 
in  the  rivalry  between  the  sensation  of  motor  adjustment  and  the 
sensori-motor  idea  of  the  desired  end,  with  the  accompanying  dis- 
agreeableness  due  to  failure  of  habit.  The  scandal  of  the  assertion 
that  awareness  of  effort  is  a  sense  of  changes  of  breathing,  of  muscular 
tensions,  etc.,  is  removed,  he  thinks,  when  it  is  explained  that  "these 
sensations  report  the  state  of  things  as  regards  effective  realization." 
The  theory  explains  the  increase  of  the  sense  of  effort  in  fatigue  psy- 
chologically— it  is  due  to  the  introduction  of  new  distracting  elements; 
other  theories  fall  back  on  the  exhaustion  itself,  an  extra-psychical  factor. 
It  also  explains  certain  facts  in  connection  with  the  mastery  of  novel 
acts ;  in  learning  to  ride  a  bicycle,  for  example,  if  the  more  habitual 
motor  adjustments  fail  to  get  transformed  so  as  to  correspond  with  the 
image  of  the  desired  balancing,  the  sense  of  effort  may  be  at  a  maxi- 
mum, but  if  the  movements  become  utterly  unregulated,  so  that  the 
consciousness  of  the  end  aimed  at  disappears,  then,  notwithstanding 
the  mass  of  muscular  sensations,  the  sense  of  effort  vanishes  also. 
Dewey  denies  that  the  sense  of  effort  arises  from  an  activity  struggling 
against  resistance.  The  appearance  of  such  a  struggle  he  explains  as 
due  to  the  importance  attached  to  the  motor  adjustment  as  means.  If 
this  fail,  then  all  lying  outside  it  is  regarded  as  resistance.  "  The  real 
state  of  things  is  that  there  are  two  acts  mutually  opposing  each  other 
during  their  transformation  into  a  third  new  and  inclusive  act."  He 
also  opposes  the  view  that  it  arises  from  the  self  endeavoring  to  over- 
come obstacles.  The  whole  process  is  one  of  divided  self-activity,  not 
that  of  an  active  '  self '  on  the  one  side  as  over  against  muscular  resis- 
tance on  the  other. 

As  in  the  theory  of  emotion,  the  '  scandal '  of  the  sensationalist  view 
appears  to  the  present  writer  to  lie  not  so  much  in  the  assertion  that 
the  sense  of  effort  is  the  feeling  of  bodily  sensations  as  in  the  isolation 
of  these  sensations  and  the  appearance  of  treating  them  as  though  they 
existed  in  the  experience  itself  in  the  same  form  in  which  they  exist 
for  our  psychological  abstraction.  Admit  them  as  in  actual  experi- 
ence elements  in  a  specifically  related  mass  of  conscious  contents, 


438  VOLITION. 

admit  them  as  the  feeling,  the  sense-awareness  of  a  struggle  of  ad- 
justment in  which  the  actual  self  of  the  moment,  self -divided,  is  seek- 
ing expression  in  a  complete  action,  and  who  is  there  that  cannot  sub- 
scribe to  the  theory? 

H.  N.  GARDINER. 
SMITH  COLLEGE. 

Uber  ivillkurliche  Vorstellungsverbindung.  STEPHAN  WITASEK. 
Zeitschrift  fur  Psychol.  u.  Physiol.  d.  Sinnesorgane,  XII.,  3  und 
4,  Oct.,  1893. 

A  difficult  and  interesting  topic  is  handled  by  Witasek  after  a  some- 
what inadequate  and  an  unduly  diffuse  fashion.  His  subject  is  the 
nature  of  ivillkiirliche  Vorstellungsverbindungen,  that  is,  of  volitions 
which  have  as  their  '  objects '  psychic  facts,  not  bodily  motions.  How, 
for  instance,  can  one  be  said  to  '  will'  to  imagine  a  three-fourth  rhythm, 
or  the  '  color  designated  by  the  Frauenhof  er  line  B  ? '  Anticipatory 
image  of  color  and  of  rhythm  there  must  be,  or  there  is  no  volition, 
yet  the  anticipatory  image  can  not  be  precisely  like  the  intended  one, 
else  the  supposed  volition  will  coincide  with  its  object.  Witasek  an- 
swers by  distinguishing  the  anticipatory  image  as  un-perceptual  (unan- 
schaulicJi),  from  the  concrete  image  which  is  the  result  of  volition, 
while  he  observes  that  they  are  alike  in  referring  to  the  '  same  thing ' ; 
since,  however,  such  a  sequence  of  un-concrete  upon  concrete  may  be 
an  affair  of  purely  involuntary  association,  he  emphasizes  the  additional 
consciousness  of  the  relation  between  the  two.  He  proceeds  to  ana- 
lyze the  solution  into  four  psychic  factors:  (i)  the  act  of  will 
(  Willensakf),  (2)  the  unperceptual  anticipatory  image  of  the  object, 
(3)  the  relation  between  the  anticipatory  image  and  (4)  the  concrete 
image  which  is  the  object  of  the  act  of  will. 

Witasek's  exposition  of  this  analysis  discloses  its  weak  features. 
There  is  in  the  first  place,  no  justification  whatever  of  its  first  moment, 
the  '  act  of  will '  which  proves  to  be  a  perfect  fifth  wheel  to  the  coach 
(see  p.  21 1).  The  'relation'  between  (2)  and  (3)  is  another  contra- 
band article  in  modern  psychological  writing;  it  might  better  be 
treated  after  Dr.  James'  fashion  as  a  '  transitive  element '  of  the 
anticipatory  image  itself.  In  fact,  the  greatest  value  of  the  discussion 
is  its  recognition  of  the  problem  of  inner  volition,  its  emphasis  upon 
the  difficulty  of  the  distinction  between  volition  and  object  of  the  voli- 
tion, when  the  latter  is  itself  a  fact  of  consciousness.  The  real  nature 
of  the  distinction,  however,  is  only  suggested  by  the  description  unan- 
schaulich,  which,  if  one  may  judge  from  the  illustrations  offered, 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  439 

virtually  means  '  verbal.'  On  the  other  hand,  the  different  emphasis 
of  attention  in  the  case  of  anticipatory  and  of  resultant  image  is 
not  adequately  considered,  for  (in  the  opinion  of  the  writer  of  this  no- 
tice) attention  is  the  x  in  terms  of  which  the  problem  must  be  solved. 

MARY  WHITON  CALKINS. 
WELLESLEY  COLLEGE. 


EMOTION. 

The   Sense  of  Beauty,  being  the   Outlines  of  ^Ssthetic  Theory 

GEORGE    SANTAYANA.      New   York,  Charles   Scribner's    Sons. 

1896.     Pp.  ix-f  275. 

Perhaps  the  first  thing  to  be  mentioned  about  this  book  is  its  per- 
fection— if  the  word  be  not  too  cruelly  pressed — its  flawlessness.  It 
is  an  unpadded  little  masterpiece — it  fills  its  covers  as  an  athlete 
fills  his  skin,  it  '  pays '  its  way  sentence  by  sentence  down  the  page. 
It  makes  '  no  pretentions  to  originality  beyond  that  of  putting  together 
the  scattered  commonplaces  of  criticism,  under  the  inspiration  of  a 
naturalistic  psychology ' ;  but  the  inspiration  has  been  sincere,  and  the 
commonplaces  have  been  not  only  reset,  but  recut,  and  the  '  cutting  ' 
is  often,  in  its  unobtrusive  way,  exquisite.  Granted  its  point  of  view, 
it  is  all  thought  out  with  an  extraordinaiy  quietness  and  completeness 
and  uninsistent  finish;  and  the  artistic  imagination  has  everywhere 
been  discreetly  busy  with  its  phrase. 

It  '  contains  the  chief  ideas  gathered  together  for  a  course  of  lec- 
tures on  the  theory  and  history  of  esthetics  given  at  Harvard  College 
from  1892  to  1895.'  It  consists  of  a  brief  '  Preface,'  from  which  the 
foregoing  sentence  is  quoted ;  of  an  '  Introduction,'  on  the  '  Methods 
of  Esthetics ' ;  of  four  *  Parts,'  on  the  '  Nature  of  Beauty,'  the  »  Ma- 
terials of  Beauty,'  'Form,'  and  '  Expression '  respectively ;  and  of  a 
concluding  chapter.  There  is  also  an  analytical  table  of  contents  and 
an  index.  The  'Method'  recommended  (it  has  been  indicated  al- 
ready), is  the  psychological,  as  distinguished  from  the  historical  and 
from  the  didactic.  ./Esthetics  is  the  theory  of  a  certain  kind  of 
'  values,'  and  values  are  subjective.  "  We  desire  nothing  because  it  is 
good,  but  it  is  good  only  because  we  desire  it."  "  Things  are  interesting 
because  we  care  about  them,  and  important  because  we  need  them. 
Had  our  perceptions  no  connections  with  our  pleasures,  we  should 
soon  close  our  eyes  on  this  world ;  if  our  intelligence  were  of  no  ser- 
vice to  our  passions,  we  should  come  to  doubt  in  the  lazy  freedom 
of  reverie,  whether  two  and  two  make  four." 


44°  EMOTION. 

The  problem  of  the  '  Nature  of  Beauty,'  therefore,  is  simply  to 
distinguish  the  aesthetic  pleasures  from  the  non-aesthetic.  And  this 
distinction  does  not  lie  in  the  supposed  '  unselfishness '  of  aesthetic 
pleasures.  Selfishness  and  unselfishness  are  not  of  the  essence  of  any 
pleasures  whatever,  they  are  accidental,  extrinsic.  "There  is  no 
reference  to  the  nominal  essence  called  oneself  in  one's  appetites  or  in 
one's  natural  affections ;  yet  a  man  absorbed  in  his  meat  and  drink,  in 
his  houses  and  lands,  in  his  children  and  dogs,  is  called  selfish  be- 
cause these  interests,  although  natural  and  instinctive  in  him,  are  not 
shared  by  others.  *  *  *  I  care  about  myself  because  myself  is  a  name 
for  the  things  I  have  at  heart.  To  set  up  the  verbal  figment  of  personality 
and  make  it  an  object  of  concern  apart  from  the  interests  which  were 
its  content  and  substance,  turns  the  moralist  into  a  pedant  and  ethics 
into  a  superstition." 

Neither  does  it  lie  in  the  supposed  universality  of  aesthetic  pleas- 
ures. "  The  pleasures  of  the  senses  have,  it  is  said,  no  dogmatism  in 
them ;  that  anything  gives  me  pleasure  involves  no  assertion  about 
its  capacity  to  give  pleasure  to  another.  But  when  I  judge  a  thing  to 
be  beautiful,  my  judgment  means  that  the  thing  is  beautiful  in  itself, 
or  (what  is  the  same  thing  more  critically  expressed)  that  it  should 
seem  so  to  everybody."  But  preference  of  every  sort  is  ultimately  ir- 
rational and  it  is  simply  unmeaning  to  say  that  what  is  beautiful  to 
one  man  ought  to  be  beautiful  to  another.  If  their  senses  are  the 
same,  their  associations  and  dispositions  similar,  then  the  same  thing 
will  certainly  be  beautiful  to  both.  .  If  their  natures  are  different,  the 
form  which  to  one  will  be  entrancing  will  be  to  another  even  invisi- 
ble, because  his  classifications  and  discriminations  in  perception  will 
be  different,  and  he  may  see  a  hideous  detached  fragment  or  a  shape- 
less aggregate  of  things  in  what  to  another  is  a  perfect  whole.  It  is 
absurd  to  say  that  what  is  invisible  to  a  given  being  ought  to  seem 
beautiful  to  him.  Evidently  this  obligation  of  recognizing  the  same 
qualities  is  conditioned  by  the  possession  of  the  same  faculties.  But 
no  two  men  have  exactly  the  same  faculties,  nor  can  things  have  for 
any  two  exactly  the  same  values. 

The  distinction  lies,  paradoxically  enough,  in  the  accomplished  ob- 
jectivity of  aesthetic  pleasures.  ' '  Every  sensation  we  get  from  a  thing  is 
originally  treated  as  one  of  its  qualities.  The  qualities  which  we  now 
conceive  to  belong  to  real  objects  are,  for  the  most  part,  images  of  sight 
and  touch.  *  *  *  But  emotions  are  essentially  capable  of  objectifi- 
cation,  as  well  as  impressions  of  sense ;  one  may  well  believe  that  a 
primitive  and  inexperienced  consciousness  would  rather  people  the 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  441 

world  with  ghosts  of  its  own  terrors  and  passions  than  with  projections 
of  those  luminous  and  mathematical  concepts  which,  as  yet,  it  could 
hardly  have  formed." 

In  process  of  time,  however,  such  concepts  are  formed,  and  the 
list  of  pleasures  objectified  is  retrenched — mainly  on  the  ground  of 
their  association  with  some  particular'organ  of  the  body,  like  the  pal- 
ate. "The  pleasures  we  call  physical,  and  regard  as  low,  *  *  * 
are  those  which  call  our  attention  to  some  part  of  our  own  body,  and 
which  make  no  object  as  conspicuous  to  us  as  the  organ  in  which  they 
arise."  The  residue,  the  pleasures  that  are  unreclaimed,  those  whose 
'  organs  '  are  transparent,  are  the  aesthetic.  "  The  scientific  idea  of  a 
thing  is  a  great  abstraction  from  the  mass  of  perceptions  and  reactions 
which  that  thing  produces ;  the  aesthetic  idea  is  less  abstract,  since  it 
retains  the  emotional  reaction,  the  pleasure  of  the  perception  as  an  in- 
tegral part  of  the  conceived  thing." 

Beauty,  therefore,  is  '  pleasure  regarded  as  the  quality  of  a  thing.' 
The  '  Materials  of  Beauty '  are  to  be  found  in  the  various  susceptibility 
of  the  human  frame  to  pleasure,  in  especial,  among  others,  to  the 
pleasure  that  unites  the  sexes.  "  The  capacity  to  love  gives  our  con- 
templation that  glow  without  which  it  might  often  fail  to  manifest 
beauty;  and  the  whole  sentimental  side  of  our  aesthetic  sensibility, 
without  which  it  would  be  perceptive  and  mathematical  rather  than 
aesthetic,  is  due  to  our  sexual  organization  remotely  stirred."  For  in- 
dividuals that  "  need  not  unite  for  the  birth  and  rearing  of  each  gen- 
eration, *  *  *  it  would  not  be  necessary  that  any  vision  should 
fascinate,  or  any  langour  should  soften,  the  prying  cruelty  of  the  eye. 
*  *  *  Sex  is  not  the  only  object  of  sexual  passion.  When  love  lacks 
its  specific  object,  when  it  does  not  yet  understand  itself,  or  has  been 
sacrificed  to  some  other  interest,  we  see  the  stifled  fire  bursting  out  in 
various  directions.  One  is  religious  devotion,  another  is  zealous  phil- 
anthropy, *  *  *  but  not  the  least  fortunate  is  the  love  of  nature  and 
of  art ;  for  nature  is  also  often  a  second  mistress  that  consoles  us  for 
the  loss  of  the  first."  Beauty  of  'form'  is  essentially  bound  up  with 
the  intrinsic  agreeableness  of  certain  kind  of  muscular  tension,  and 
beauty  of  '  expression '  is  a  special  case,  simply,  of  psychological  sug- 
gestion. 

This  is  the  main  thread  of  the  argument,  but  the  pages  abound  in 
the  discussion  of  minuter  points  and  in  that  exercise  methodique  du 
discernement  which  has  been  declared  to  be  the  essence  of  criticism. 

ALFRED  HODDER. 
BRYN  MAWR. 


442  EMOTION. 

sEstkettsche  Untersuchungen  in  Anschluss  an  die  Lippssche 
Theorie  des  Komischen.  I.  and  II.  G.  HEYMANS.  Zeitschrift 
fiir  Psychologic  u.  Physiologic  der  Sinnesorgane.  XI.,  i  and 
5-6,  April  and  July,  1896. 

Heymans  finds  in  the  Lipps  theory  of  the  comic1  what  he  calls  the 
'  final  and  definitive  solution  of  the  old  problem,'  but  nevertheless 
discovers  certain  inadequate  features  on  which  he  comments  in  his  first 
paper.  Lipps  holds  that  the  consciousness  of  the  humorous  is  roused 
when  a  high  degree  of  psychic  force  is  lavished  upon  a  trivial  or  un- 
essential content  of  consciousness,  and  with  this  statement  Heymans 
is  in  full  agreement;  but  he  denies  the  universality  of  the  second  form 
in  which  Lipps  states  his  theory,  the  assertion  that  the  humorous  ob- 
ject of  consciousness  is  always  a  meaningless  one  following  upon  one 
which  is  significant.  Many  cases  of  the  comic,  of  course,  fall  within 
this  class,  but  the  real  contrast  involved  is  between  a  content  attended- 
to — that  is,  in  the  Herbartian  terminology  of  Lipps  and  Heymans,  a 
content  requiring  an  expenditure  of  '  psychic  force ' — and  another 
which  makes  no  such  demands  upon  the  attention.  Therefore,  the 
earlier  object  need  not  be  in  itself  significant,  but  may  be  attended  to 
merely  because  it  is  unexpected.  Heymans  illustrates  by  misprints, 
which  are  never  funny  when  the  incorrect  words  are  wholly  meaningless, 
but  only  when  they  appear  to  be  bona  fide  words,  so  that  the  contrast  is 
between  the  surprised  attention  to  a  word,  however  unimportant,  at 
variance  with  the  context  and  the  sudden  intuition  of  the  word  in- 
tended which  needs  no  special  emphasis. 

Heymans  also  instances  cases  to  show  that  Lipps  is  mistaken 
in  requiring  that  the  contrast  occur  between  contents  which  are 
qualitatively  alike.  The  paper  is  least  effective  in  the  explanation 
of  laughter  following  on  sudden  relief  from  deep-seated  feelings 
and  impulses,  for  here  Heymans  yields  to  the  temptation  of  making 
laughter  a  certain  indication  of  the  feeling  of  the  comic,  whereas 
it  is  surely  often  a  mere  physical  reflex,  and,  at  other  times,  an  ac- 
companiment of  surprise  untinged  with  the  comic  consciousness. 

In  his  second  paper  Heymans  develops  a  suggestion  of  Lipps 
into  the  theory  that  the  beautiful  is  the  object  of  facile  attention.  The 
object  of  the  aesthetic  consciousness  thus  calls  forth  the  same  psychic 
energy  as  the  preceding  content  of  consciousness,  and  is  distinguished 
from  the  comic  object,  which  demands  less  psychic  force,  and 
from  the  terrifying  object,  which  calls  for  more.  Heymans  attempts 

1  Psychologic  der  Komik.  Theodor  Lipps,  Philosophische  Monatshefte, 
XXIV  &  XXV. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  443 

to  prove  his  case  by  an  analysis  of  traditional  classifications  of  the 
beautiful,  discovering  that  the  'formally  beautiful,'  by  its  unity  in 
manifoldness,  and  the  'typically  beautiful*  by  its  conformity  to 
the  habitual,  do  really  facilitate  attention.  Two  other  classes  of  the 
beautiful  are  considered ;  the  '  imitative,'  which,  however,  at  once  re- 
duces to  one  of  the  other  classes,  or  else  turns  out  to  be  no  form  of  the 
beautiful  at  all,  and  the  '  associatively  beautiful.'  Heymans  correctly 
defines  the  associated  element  of  the  aesthetic  object  as  that  which  itself 
has  a  tendency  to  associate,  and  thus  to  emphasize,  the  perceived  part 
of  the  object,  but  he  seems  not  to  realize  that  by  this  analysis  he  really 
opposes  the  association-theory  of  aesthetics,  since  he  admits  that  a  per- 
cept is  beautiful,  not  because  it  is  associative,  but  because  it  absorbs 
attention  so  completely  that  associated  elements,  if  they  occur,  are  un- 
attended to.  The  comparison  of  the  '  interesting '  machine,  with  the 
'beautiful'  landscape,  clearly  shows  that  the  presence  of  associated 
factors — images  of  utility  and  result — which  draw  the  attention  from 
the  object  itself,  hinders  aesthetic  apprehension. 

A  closer  examination  than  Heymans  gives  would  prove  that  one 
main  characteristic  of  the  '  beautiful '  objects  is  its  isolation,  its  unre 
latedness,  its  entire  separation  from  any  considerations  of  utility  or  any 
definite  reference  to  past  or  future.  But  Heymans  admits  enough  of 
this  to  endanger  his  entire  theory,  since  he  really  shows  that  not  every 
object  of  attention,  but  only  the  perceived  or  imaged  object  of  direct 
attention,  is  beautiful ;  attention  is  indeed  then  an  important  charac- 
teristic, but  not  as  he  teaches,  the  essential  feature  of  the  esthetic  con- 
sciousness. 

MARY  WHITON  CALKINS. 

WELLESLEY  COLLEGE. 

La    Timidite,   Etude   Psychologique.     L.  DUGAS.     Revue   Phil., 
December,   1896. 

This  article  is  chiefly  an  analysis.  The  term  timidity  is  used 
broadly  to  designate  the  emotion  caused  by  inhibition  of  action,  con- 
fusion of  thought,  or  feeling,  which  arises  generally  when  others  are 
present.  It  is  distinguished  from  fear  by  the  fact  that  it  is  always 
caused  by  persons,  whereas  fear  is  an  emotion  connected  with  things 
as  well.  Nor  is  timidity  a  physiological  feeling  purely,  though  some 
of  its  forms  approach  this  type,  thus,  for  example,  the  trembling  oc- 
casioned by  the  mere  presence  of  an  audience  or  crowd.  But  even 
here  the  emotion  depends  upon  the  character  of  the  crowd  quite  as 
much  as  upon  its  number,  the  circumstances,  etc.  The  timidity  which 


444  EMOTION. 

seems  most  purely  physical  depends  largely  upon  the  ideas  which  the 
crowd  evokes  in  the  mind  of  the  individual ;  that  is,  the  influence 
which  the  crowd,  as  a  crowd,  exercises  is  secondary  to  the  feeling 
which  arises  from  the  thought  of  it. 

Timidity  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  a  psychic  state  of  special  or 
determined  kind,  but  is  rather  a  form  which  affects  different  states  of 
mind,  a  sort  of  malady,  or  temporary  derangement  of  the  'will,  the 
intelligence  and  the  feelings.  In  connection  with  the  will,  it  is  due 
to  the  momentary  inability  to  produce  certain  movements  or  failure  to 
direct  them  properly,  (gaucherie.)  All  the  while  the  timide  thus 
affected  is  intensely  conscious  of  both  the  movement  he  desires  to 
make,  and  of  his  inability  to  execute  it.  This  consciousness  consti- 
tutes the  emotion.  This  momentary  aboulia  never  attacks  the  auto- 
matic functions  of  the  body.  The  gaucherie  seems  to  be  due  to  the 
effect  produced  directly  by  the  presence  and  regard  of  others.  The 
inhibition  may  not  be  entire,  affecting  only  the  direction  of  the  move- 
ments. The  inhibiting  effect  of  the  presence  of  others  affects  the  mind, 
disturbing  its  functions.  M.  Dugas  calls  this  form  of  it  stupidite.  It 
may  be  either  complete  or  partial.  The  first  is  often  taken  for  lack 
of  intelligence  ;  thus  the  frequent  confusion  of  pupils  in  the  presence 
of  their  teachers.  The  second  type  is  that  of  mental  confusion,  where 
all  direction  of  thought  is  lost.  There  is  a  total  failure  of  mental 
adaptation  to  the  occasion  or  question  in  hand.  On  the  affective  side 
timidity  takes  the  form  of  mental  stupor,  (stupeur.)  As  described 
by  Rosseau  and  others,  this  inhibition  may  be  so  intense  as  to  cause 
a  complete  suspension  of  the  regular  intellectual  functions,  where  the 
subject  becomes  lost  in  a  purely  affective  state  of  pure  feeling,  or,  as 
in  the  other  two  cases,  it  may  be  only  partial,  resulting  in  a  sort  of 
chaos  of  feeling. 

This  timidity-feeling  is  intensely  subjective.  Not  only  is  the 
timide,  gauche  and  stufide,  he  is  intensely  conscious  of  it  in  addi- 
tion. This  is  not  true  in  the  case  of  awkwardness  and  stupidness  that 
arise  from  ignorance.  What  then  is  the  relation  of  timidity  to  con- 
sciousness? Both  are  due,  M.  Dugas  thinks,  to  mental  incoordina- 
tion.  That  is,  if  adaptation  were  perfect,  we  should  be  reduced  to 
automata,  and  consciousness  would  be  impossible.  But  consciousness 
is  the  normal  accompaniment  of  such  mental  incoordination,  while 
timidity-feeling  is  abnormal,  being  the  presence  of  an  undue  con- 
sciousness of  this  non-adaptation.  Timidity-feeling  may  be  of  two 
kinds.  It  often  becomes  reflective ;  more  generally,  it  is  spontaneous 
and  involuntary.  Thus  the  falsehoods  told  by  a  person  in  this  state 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  445 

of  excitement  are  not  reprehensible,  as  those  told  deliberately,  since 
the  man  speaks  before  he  can  reflect.  The  judgment  function  is 
more  or  less  inhibited.  All  acts  and  thoughts  under  the  influence  of 
this  social  inhibition  are  impulsive,  like  those  of  the  hypnotic  subject. 

In  its  last  analysis  timidity  is  found  to  be  due  to  a  lack  of  sympathe- 
tic correspondence  between  the  individual  and  his  social  environment. 
u  The  subject  is  not  responsive  to  social  magnetism,  unable  to  divest 
himself  of  his  own  peculiar  ways  of  life  and  thought."  In  short  he  is 
unable  to  imitate  others.  He  may  be  intensely  conscious  of  the  de- 
fect and  may  feel  keenly  the  need  of  the  sympathy  which  he  fails  to 
exercise  and  to  receive.  This  lack  of  responsiveness  to  social  sugges- 
tion shows  itself  in  several  ways.  First,  in  the  attitude  of  the  timide 
toward  the  crowd,  further  in  his  treatment  of  those  whom  he  judges  his 
superiors,  and  lastly  in  his  general  unwillingness  to  confide  in  others. 
This  spontaneous  timidity-feeling,  which  M.  Dugas  calls  intimida- 
tion, to  distuinguish  it  from  reflective  timidity,  is  '  due  to  the  distress 
arising  from  the  realization  of  the  lack  of  sympathy  between  ourselves 
and  our  environment.'  Reflection  is  apt  to  create  a  certain  exaggera- 
tion of  this  feeling,  so  that  the  person  affected  '  begins  to  despise  him- 
self, to  exaggerate  his  perplexities,  and  to  pet  his  anger.'  He  is  apt 
to  isolate  himself  intellectually.  While  his  thinking  may  be  original, 
it  will  lack  social  adaptiveness.  On  the  affective  side  there  is  a  tend- 
ency to  conceal  sentiments  of  his  own,  and  to  distrust  the  sympathy  of 
others.  Hence  the  reserve  that  is  characteristic  of  timidity.  He  may 
be  further  affected  by  a  certain  maladie  d'idcal,  or  tendency  to  de- 
spise the  things  of  ordinary  life  in  comparison  with  his  fancies.  On 
the  volitional  side  his  acts  are  apt  to  be  impulsive,  and  are  often  in- 
comprehensible to  himself,  mainly  because  he  no  longer  has  the  power 
of  deliberate  judgment. 

Finally,  in  its  spontaneous  form  timidity  marks  a  normal  state  in 
mental  growth,  that  stands  midway  between  the  pure  reflex  life  of  the 
child  and  reflective  mental  life.  Between  the  more  abnormal  form 
and  genius  a  possible  relation  is  suggested.  The  exclusiveness  which 
the  timide  seeks,  while  it  cannot  of  itself  inspire  art,  may  give  occa- 
sion for  its  development. 

J.  M.  TROUT. 

PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY. 

The   Popular  Aesthetics  of  Color.     JOSEPH  JASTROW.    Pop.  Sci. 

Monthly,  January,  1897.    **?•  361-368. 

This  is  an  application  of  statistical  methods  to  the  determination  of 
color  preferences.  The  material  for  the  study — about  4,500  records — 


446  EMOTION. 

was  collected  in  connection  at  the  Psychological  Laboratory  of  the 
World's  Fair.  By  means  of  a  convenient  system  of  cards  those  who 
were  sufficiently  interested  to  stop  recorded  age,  sex,  favorite  color, 
and  favorite  combination  of  two  colors.  Twenty-four  single  colors  were 
displayed  from  which  to  choose :  red,  orange,  yellow,  green,  blue  and 
violet,  with  six  intermediate,  and  the  twelve  lighter  shades  of  these. 
Twenty-four  combinations  were  also  shown,  presenting  as  wide  a 
range  as  possible.  The  most  important  as  well  as  the  most  interest- 
ing results  are  these : 

1 .  The  general  favorite  of  all  colors  is  blue,  more  than  one-fourth 
of  the  voters  choosing  this.     Red  holds  the  second  place,  though  it  is 
preferred  by  less  than  half  as  many.     Then  follow  lighter  blue,  blue- 
violet,  red-violet,  lighter  red  (pink)  and  violet,  while  the  least  favorite 
colors  are  orange  and  its  shadings  toward  red  and  yellow. 

2.  Darker  colors  are  decidedly  preferred  to  the   lighter  shades  of 
the  same  colors,  and  primary  colors    (red,  orange,  etc.)    to  interme- 
diate (red-orange,  orange-yellow,  etc.). 

3.  The  difference  between  the  average  male  and  female  chooser  is 
striking.     The  women's  favorite  color  is  red,  the  men's  is  overwhelm- 
ingly blue:  "of  every  thirty  masculine  votes  ten  were  for  blue  and 
three  for  red ;  while  of  every  thirty  feminine  votes  four  were  for  blue 
and  five  for  red."     Men  confine  their  choice  to  relatively  fewer  colors 
and   have  a  much  less  marked  tendency  than  women  to  choose  the 
lighter  and  daintier  shades. 

4.  Among  the  combinations  of  colors  the  two  most   frequently 
chosen  are  red  with  violet,  and  red  with  blue ;  and  the  most  generally 
avoided  are  orange  with  green,  violet,  or  lighter  blue.     In  these  com- 
binations the  same  colors,  on  the  whole,  are  preferred  and  avoided  as 
in  the  single  color-preferences. 

5.  Preference  according  to  age  shows  (a)  that  blue  is  least  selected 
by  the  youngest  group   (below  18  years),  decidedly  preferred  by  the 
oldest  (over  forty  years) ,  and  equally  chosen  by  the  groups  between 
these  ages;  (b)  that  violet  is  gradually  avoided  as  age  increases;  (c) 
that  lighter  red  is  the  preference  of  the  young  girls ;  (d)  that  relatively 
more  persons  between  twenty- five  and  thirty  than  at  any  other  age  have 
*  no  choice.' 

J.  O.  QUANTZ. 
WISCONSIN  UNIVERSITY. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  447 

PATHOLOGICAL. 

Das  kontrdre  Geschlechtsgefiihl.  HAVELOCK  ELLIS  and  J.  A. 
SYMONDS.  (Bibliothek  fiir  Socialwissenschaft.  7  Band.)  Leip- 
zig, Wigand,  1896.  xvi  +  308. 

It  would  not  be  right  not  to  enter  a  protest  against  the  appearance 
of  such  a  work  as  this  in  a  library  intended  primarily  for  popular  read- 
ing. Even  Krafft  Ebing,  although  writing  solely  for  the  medical 
profession,  has  been  severely  and  justly  criticised  for  the  unneces- 
sary emphasis  and  importance  he  has  given  this  subject  by  his  articles 
on  the  perversions  of  the  sexual  sense,  and  nothing  but  harm  can  fol- 
low if  popular  scientific  literature  is  to  suffer  a  similar  deluge.  Medical 
literature  of  the  last  few  years  contains  altogether  too  many  histories 
of  these  unfortunate  individuals  who  have  only  discovered  them- 
selves to  be  abnormally  afflicted  after  reading  a  description  of  their 
condition  in  one  of  the  many  monographs  or  medical  journal  articles, 
and  the  alienist  has  come  to  look  regularly  for  a  series  of  sexual  per- 
vert autobiographies  after  the  appearance  of  each  new  monograph. 

If  an  intelligent  understanding  of  his  condition  could  ever  lead 
to  an  amelioration  of  it  we  might  endeavor  to  endure  in  silence,  but 
his  attention  invariably  returns  to  his  case  and  the  sexual  pervert 
merely  establishes  a  bond  of  sympathy  between  himself  and  his  fellow 
sufferers ;  and  the  world  is  the  worse  off  in  that  the  sum  of  morbid 
introspection  has  been  increased  without  any  corresponding  gain 
whatever.  Apart  from  its  influence  on  the  perverts  themselves  no 
healthy  person  can  read  this  literature  without  a  lower  opinion  of  hu- 
man nature,  and  this  result  in  itself  should  bid  any  writer  pause.  The 
writers  of  the  present  volume  have  done  their  work  well,  from  their 
point  of  view,  and  have  threshed  over  the  literature  most  thoroughly 
from  Bible  times  down,  adding  three  hundred  more  pages  to  a  litera- 
ture already  too  flourishing. 

WILLIAM  NOYES. 

BOSTON  INSANE  HOSPITAL,  MATTAPAN,  MASS. 

Ueber     Spaltung  der  Personlichkeit.    (Sogenanntes    Doppel-ich.) 
VON  ScHRENCK-NoxziNG.     Vienna,  Holder.     1896.     Pp.  22. 
Human  personality  consists  of  a  complex  of  elements  blending 
into  a  unity  in  the  form  of  self -consciousness;   it  is,  therefore,  in  con- 
stant flux.     Besides  conscious  memory,  the  seat  of  which  is  in  the 
cortex,  we  must  discriminate  an  organic  or  hereditary  memory  (in- 


448  PA  THOL  O  QIC  A  L . 

nate  reflexes  etc.)  and  a  memory  for  acquired  reflexes  (walking,  etc.) 
which  is  probably  seated  in  the  basal  ganglia.  We  may  also  dis- 
criminate various  grades  in  consciousness  from  the  clear  and  focal  to 
the  dim  and  marginal,  but,  to  be  conscious  at  all,  a  mental  state  must 
belong  to  that  one  complex,  for  the  word  '  conscious '  has  no  other 
meaning.  Felidia  X  and  the  other  classical  cases  of  successive  person- 
ality are  to  be  regarded  as  springing  from  the  addition  to,  or  subtrac- 
tion from,  the  sum  total  of  psychic  processes  which  constitute  a  per- 
sonality of  sundry  elements,  especially  the  acquired  reflexes.  Hence 
the  disorder  is  manifested  in  a  bewildering  variety  of  forms,  the  only 
constant  trait  being  the  partial  or  total  destruction  of  the  memory 
bond  between  the  successive  complexes.  Pierre  Janet's  '  geistreiche 
Auffassung '  of  hysteria  is,  in  the  main,  in  accord  with  this  view,  and 
it  is  in  no  way  inconsistent  with  such  a  conception  of  the  unity  of  con- 
sciousness as  has  before  been  outlined.  That  simultaneous  person- 
alities can  exist  is,  however,  strenuously  to  be  denied.  The  cases  so 
interpreted  differ  from  those  above  described  only  in  this :  that  two 
independent  thought  trains,  instead  of  succeeding  one  another  at  long 
intervals,  shift  from  focus  to  margin  in  such  rapid  succession  that  the 
observer  is  unable  to  detect  any  lapse  in  the  movements  controlled  by 
each,  and,  as  the  memory  bond  is  broken,  the  patient  claims  that  he  is 
aware  of  one  only,  ignoring  the  other ;  hence  the  observer  infers  a 
sub-conscious  personality  to  account  for  the  movements  which  the 
patient  denies  producing.  Dr.  von  Schrenck-Notzing  adduces  no 
specific  evidence  in  support  of  this  view,  but  rests  his  case  solely  upon 
the  supposed  impossibility  of  admitting  that  two  foci  can  exist  in  one 
and  the  same  organism,  or  that  incoherent,  dream-like  states  may  exist 
out  of  all  relation  with  any  focus. 

Telepathy  and  the   Subliminal  Self.     R.  OSGOOD  MASON.     New 

York,  Henry  Holt  &  Company.     Pp.  336. 

This  book  is  designed  to  serve  as  an  introduction  to  '  Psychical  Re- 
search '  for  the  use  of  the  general  reader.  The  author  writes,  on  the 
whole,  in  a  sober  vein,  the  greater  number  of  his  cases  being  very  care- 
fully chosen  from  the  publications  of  the  Society  of  Psychical  Research, 
and  his  professional  position  as  a  physician  in  good  standing  will  doubt- 
less give  his  words  a  weight  which  they  would  not  otherwise  possess.  It 
seems,  therefore,  of  the  more  importance  to  call  attention  to  a  certain 
laxity  in  his  sense  of  the  value  of  evidence,  of  which  illustrations  oc- 
cur more  than  once  and  which  seriously  impairs  the  value  of  his  book. 
The  earlier  series  of  experiments  with  the  Creery  sisters  surely  cannot 


NEW  BOOKS.  449 

be  quoted  in  proof  of  telepathy,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  children 
confessed  to  the  use  of  signals  in  the  later  series.  The  visions  of 
Elisha,  the  responses  of  the  Delphic  oracle,  the  marvels  told  of  Pytha- 
goras, the  wonders  and  portents  narrated  in  the  pages  of  ancient  his- 
torians can  have  no  weight  in  any  cautious  mind.  More  extraordi- 
nary still  is  the  statement  that  Apollonius'  vision  of  the  assassination 
of  Domitian  rests  '  upon  the  best  of  ancient  authority,'  for  that  same 
excellent  authority,  that  is,  Philostratus'  historical  romance,  narrates, 
among  many  other  even  more  extraordinary  marvels,  how  Apollonius 
detected  the  plague  prowling  about  Ephesus  in  the  guise  of  a  beggar 
and  caused  him  to  be  stoned,  whereupon  the  beggar,  dying,  changed 
into  a  huge  black  dog  of  the  size  of  a  lion  and  the  plague  was  stayed. 
(Philostr.  Vit.  ApolL  IV,  70.)  In  quoting  such  cases  as  evidence, 
Dr.  Mason's  zeal  seems  to  have  run  away  with  his  discretion.  This 
is  the  more  to  be  regretted  because  he  gives  several  original  observa- 
tions of  phenomena,  with  reference  to  which  sound  evidence  is  much 
needed  and  which  would  be  of  great  value  were  their  accuracy  un- 
questionable. Especially  to  be  noted  is  the  case  on  page  71  of  the 
4  magnetization '  of  water ;  the  one  on  page  1 25  of  successive  per- 
sonalities and  the  planchette  case  on  page  159. 

By  way  of  explanation  the  author  merely  propounds  the  doctrine 
of  a  subliminal  self,  to  which  he  ascribes  all  phenomena  otherwise 
inexplicable.  Spiritistic  conceptions  are  carefully  excluded  and  the 
few  cases  given  which  would  suggest  such  an  interpretation  are  re- 
ferred to  the  agency  of  the  subliminal  self  telepathically  exerted. 

WILLIAM  ROMAINE  NEWBOLD. 
UNIVERSITY  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 


NEW  BOOKS. 

Telepathy  and  the   Subliminal  Self.     R.  OSGOOD  MASON.     New 

York,  Holt.     1897.     Pp.  viii  +  343.     $1.50. 
Hypnotism.     ALBERT   MOLL.     Fourth    ed.    revised   and    enlarged. 

London,  Walter  Scott.     1897.     Pp.  xiv-f  448.     35.6. 
The    Theory   of  Socialization.      A    Syllabus.     F.    H.    GIDDINGS. 

Brochure.    New  York,     The  Macmillan  Co.      1897.     Pp.  xii  + 

48.    $0.60. 
Notes  on   Children's  Drawings.     Edited   by   ELMER   E.    BROWN. 

University    of    California     Studies,    Vol.    2.     No.    I.   Berkeley, 

California.      1897.     Pp.  75. 


45°  NEW  BOOKS. 

Sight.     J.  LE  CONTE.     Internat.  Sci.  Ser.  2d  ed.     New  York,  Ap- 

pletons.     1897.    Pp.  xvi  +  318.     $1.50. 
The  Logical   Copula  and  Quantification  of  the  Predicate.     ED. 

ADAMSON.     London,  Nutt.     1897.    Pp.  19.     is. 
De  la  Spiritualite  de  I'Ame.     G.  DE  CRAENE.     Vol.  I.    Louvain, 

Institut  Sup.  de  Philosophic.     1897.    Pp.  351.     Fr.  3.50. 
Philosophy   of  Knowledge.     G.  T.  LADD.     New  York,  Scribners. 

1897.     Pp.  xv  +  614.     $4. 
Schopenhauer's  System  in  its  Philosophical  Significance.    W.  CALD- 

WELL.     New  York,  Scribners.      1896.     Pp.  xvii  +  538.     $3. 
Aristotle  and  the  Earlier  Peripatetics.     E.  ZELLER.  Trans,  by  B. 

F.  C.  COSTELLOE    and   J.  H.  MUIRHEAD.      London  and  New 
York,   Longmans.      1897.     Two  vols.    Pp.  xi  -f-  520  and  xiii  + 
512.     $7. 

Essays.     G.  J.  ROMANES.     Edited  by  C.  LLOYD  MORGAN.     London 

and  New  York,  Longmans.     1897.     Pp.  253. 
The    Theory  of  Contract  in    its    Social  Light.     W.    A.    WATT. 

Edinburgh,  Clark;  New  York,  Scribners.      1897.     Pp.  xii  -f  96. 

$1.25. 
Introduction  to  Sociology.     A.  FAIRBANKS.     New  York,  Scribners. 

1896.     Pp.  xv  +  274.     $2. 
Mind  and  Matter  and  Monism.     G.  J.  ROMANES.     Edited  by  C. 

LLOYD  MORGAN.     New  Ed.     London  and  New  York,  Longman's. 

1896.  Pp.  vii  +  170. 

Contemporary    Theology   and    Theism.     R.    M.    WENLEY.     New 

York,  Scribners.      1897.     Pp  x  +  202.     $1.25. 
The   Ethics   of  J.     S.    Mill.     Edited    with    Introductory    Essays 

by    CHARLES  DOUGLAS.     Edinburgh  and    London,   Blackwood. 

1897.  Pp.  cxxvi  +  233- 

Principes  de  Metaphysique  et  de  Psychologic.  PAUL  JANET. 
Paris,  Delagrave.  1897.  Two  vols.  Pp.  viii  +  650  and  620. 

Christianity  and  Idealism.  JOHN  WATSON.  New  York,  Scrib- 
ners. 1897.  Pp.  211. 

Sulla  cosidette  Allucinazioni  antagonist 'iche.  S.  DE  SANCTIS  and 
M.  MONTESSORI.  Roma,  Societa  Editrice  Dante  Alighieri. 
1897.  Pp.  17. 

I  fenomeni  telepatici  e  le  allucinazioni  veridiche.  E.  MORSELLI. 
Florence,  Salvadore  Landi.  1897.  Pp.  58. 

Sultimportanza  delle  recerche  relativa  alia   storia  delle  scienze. 

G.  VAILATI.     Turin,  Roux.     1897.     Pp.  22. 


NOTES.  451 

Der  Stundenplan.     H.  SCHILLER.     Sammlung  v.    Abh.    d.    paed. 

Psych,   u.   Phys.,  heft  I.     Berlin,  Reuther  u.   Reichard.     1897. 

Pp.  65.     M.  1.50. 
Was  ist  Philosophic.      Inaug.  Rede  in  der  Univ.  Prag.    A.  MARTY. 

Prague,  Calve.     1897.     Pp.  35. 
Allgemeine  Pathologic  des  Gehirns.      TH.  ZIEHEN.      Sep.  Abd. 

from  Lubarschs  Ergeb.  d.  All.  Path.      Wiesbaden,  Bergmann. 

1897.     Pp.  591-630. 
Empfindung.      TH.  ZIEHEN.     Sep.  Abd.  from  Eulenburg*s  Real- 

Encyc.  der  gesammte   Heilkunde,  ate  ausgabe.     Vienna,   Urban 

u.  Schwarzenberg. 
Zur  Frage  der  Kausalitdt.     ED.    PFLEIDERER.     On  occasion  of 

Weizsackers  Jubilaum.     Tubingen,  Armbruster.     1897.     Pp.  77. 
University  of  Iowa   Studies   in  Psychology.     G.  T.  W.  PATRICK 

and  J.  A.  GILBERT,  editors.     Vol.  I.     1897.     University,  Iowa 

City,  Iowa. 
The  Psychology  of  the  Moral  Self.     B.  BOSANQUET.     London  and 

New  York,  Macmillans.      1897.     Pp.  viii  +  132.     $1-25. 
La  studio  deir  attenzione  conativa.     S.  DE  SANCTIS.     Rep.  from 

atti  della  societa  Romana  di  Antropologia,  IV.,  fasc.  2.     Pp.  19. 
The    Lumleian    Lectures  on  Some  Problems  in    Connection   'with 

Aphasia   and    Other  Speech  Defects.     H.  C.  BASTIAN.     Re- 
printed from  the  Lancet  (London),  April  and  May,  1897.     Pp. 

"5- 
LAnnee   Psychologique.     A.    BINET.     Third   year,    1896.     Paris, 

Schleicher  Freres.      1897.     Pp.  825.     Fr.  15. 
Geschichte  der  neueren    deutschen    Psychologic.     MAX  DESSOIR. 

2te  vollig  umgearbeitete  Auflage.    Erste  Halbband.    Berlin,  Dunc- 

ker.     1897.     Pp.  356. 


NOTES. 

AMERICAN  philosophy  has  been  honored  by  the  appointment  of 
Professor  Josiah  Royce,  of  Harvard,  Gifford  Lecturer  in  the  Univer- 
sity of  Aberdeen  for  two  years  beginning  1898—1899. 

DR.  W.  B.  PILLSBURY,  of  Cornell  University,  has  accepted  the  In- 
structorship  in  Psychology  and  the  direction  of  the  psychological 
laboratory  in  the  University  of  Michigan. 


45 2  NOTES. 

THE  time  during  which  abstracts  of  papers  for  the  physiological 
section  of  the  British  Association  may  be  sent  in  has  been  extended  to 
July  i st.  (Dr.  A.  Kirschmann,  Sec.,  Univ.  College,  Toronto,  Can.) 

IN  The  Open  Court  for  May  will  be  found  an  article  on  '  The 
Prophet  of  Pessimism  '  by  the  editor,  Dr.  Carus,  together  with  a  repro- 
duction of  the  original  model  of  the  famous  bust  of  Schopenhauer  by 
Elizabet  Ney.  This  model  has  been  acquired  by  the  Open  Court  Co., 
and  they  offer  for  sale  at  the  very  low  price  of  $15  a  'limited  number' 
of  life-size  plaster  casts  made  from  it.  The  undersigned  has  secured 
one  of  these,  and  finds  it  admirable  in  every  respect.  Philosophers 
should  have  it,  whatever  their  attitude  toward  Schopenhauer ;  optimists 
from  charity  no  less  than  pessimists  from  loyalty.  J.  M.  B. 

A  MOVEMENT  is  on  foot  to  establish  a  laboratory  for  experimental 
psychology  with  instruction  in  the  subject,  in  University  College,  Lon- 
don. A  committee,  including  Francis  Galton,  E.  A.  Schafer  and 
others,  are  soliciting  funds.  Professor  James  Sully  is  secretary  of 
the  committee. 

A  LECTURSHIP  in  Physiological  and  Experimental  Psychology  has 
been  recommended  by  the  Board  of  Studies  of  Cambridge  University. 

PROFESSOR  H.  K.  WOLFE  has  resigned  the  chair  of  Psychology 
in  the  University  of  Nebraska. 

MR.  F.  C.  S.  SCHILLER,  now  at  Cornell,  has  been  elected  Fellow 
and  Tutor  in  Philosophy  in  Corpus  Christi  College,  Oxford. 

MR.  S.  I.  FRANZ  has  been  appointed  Assistant  in  Psychology  in 
Columbia  University. 

W.  M.  URBAN,  PH.D.  (Leipzig),  has  been  appointed  Reader  in 
Philosophy  in  the  Graduate  Department  of  Princeton  University ;  he 
will  give  courses  in  ^Esthetics. 

PROF.  A.  C.  ARMSTRONG,  of  Wesleyan  University,  has  been  ap- 
pointed to  a  chair  in  History  in  Princeton  University. 

DR.  W.  C.  HODGE,  of  Princeton,  has  been  appointed  Associate 
Professor  of  Philosophy  in  Lafayette  College. 

DR.  C.  E.  SEASHORE,  of  the  Yale  Psychological  Laboratory,  has 
been  made  Assistant  Professor  in  the  University  of  Iowa. 

E.  M.  WEYER,  of  the  University  of  Leipzig,  and  M.  Matsumoto, 
of  the  University  of  Tokio,  Japan,  have  been  appointed  assistants  in 
the  Yale  Psychological  Laboratory. 

THE  prospectus  has  been  issued  of  a  new  Re-vista  Italiana  di 
Sociologies,  edited  by  a  board  on  which  Professor  G.  Sergi  will  repre- 
sent psychology.  The  address  is :  Rome,  42  Piazza  Poli. 


VOL.  IV.    No.  5.  SEPTEMBER,  1897. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW. 


STUDIES  FROM  THE  HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL 
LABORATORY  (VIII). 

COMMUNICATED  BY  PROFESSOR  E.  B.  DELABARRE. 

INVOLUNTARY    MOTOR    REACTION    TO    PLEASANT   AND    UN- 
PLEASANT STIMULI. 

BY  GEORGE  V.  DEARBORN  AND  FRANK  N.  SPINDLER. 

Study  of  the  emotions,  in  one  way  or  another,  has  had  a 
conspicuous  place  in  the  work  carried  on  in  the  Harvard  Psycho- 
logical Laboratory.  In  this  field  of  all  others,  perhaps,  the 
investigator  gains  easiest  access  to  the  goal  of  physiological 
psychology — the  determination,  namely,  of  the  quantitative  and 
qualitative  relations  obtaining  between  those  wonderful  corre- 
lates, mind  and  body. 

That  elementary  organism,  the  amoeba,  when  jarred  by 
its  environment  or  more  directly  stimulated,  contracts  and 
tends  to  take  the  spherical  form.  On  the  other  hand,  all  its 
movements  of  self-gratification  are  processes  of  expansion  or 
extension.  This  observable  double  tendency  seems  to  be  the 
type,  almost  symbolically  expressed,  of  a  deep  biologic  law 
which  science  has  shown  to  exist  with  almost  infinite  adapta- 
tion to  circumstances  and  habit,  in  every  organism.  Experi- 
ment proves  that,  like  other  impulses  of  the  lower  animals,  it 
exists  persistently  in  man. 

Professor  Miinsterberg  has  advanced  the  hypothesis  that 
stimuli  which  cause  action  of  the  extensor  muscles  are  as  a  rule 
agreeable,  while  stimuli  which  cause  action  of  the  flexor  mus- 
cles are  as  a  rule  disagreeable.  This  tendency  we  should  nat- 


454         GEO.   V.  DEARBORN  AND  FRANK  N.  SPINDLER. 

urally  expect  to  find  more  fully  and  simply  expressed  in  the 
case  of  the  lower  animals  than  in  that  of  the  higher.  In  early 
organisms  such  a  correlation  is  necessary  to  ensure  the  survival 
of  the  organism  and  the  possibility  of  evolution.  For  in  the 
lower  forms  of  life  there  should  be  such  a  strict  correlation  be- 
tween the  agreeable  and  the  advantageous  on  the  one  hand, 
and  between  the  disagreeable  and  the  disadvantageous  on  the 
other,  that  the  advantageous  would  be  the  agreeable  and  would 
be  accompanied  by  expansion  and  movement  towards  the  stim- 
ulating object,  while  any  disadvantageous  and  consequently  dis- 
agreeable stimulus  would  cause  contraction  and  withdrawal  from 
the  stimulating  object. 

This  correlation,  however,  would  be  more  true  in  animals 
and  savages  than  in  civilized  man.  In  our  civilized  state  we 
have  lost  our  primitive  simplicity.  We  are  still  mal-adjusted  to 
many  civilized  conditions,  owing  to  our  change  of  environment 
from  the  savage  to  the  cultured  state.  By  immediate  inheri- 
tance and  habit  we  have  learned  to  control  our  motor  reactions, 
to  suppress  the  outward  signs  of  our  feelings.  We  often,  per- 
haps mistakenly,  think  that  even  to  ourselves  as  physical  organ- 
isms, the  disagreeable  is  advantageous  and  the  agreeable  is  dis- 
advantageous. We  often  enjoy  pain  and  dislike  pleasure.  We 
have  a  thousand  contradictory  tendencies  that  run  counter  to 
any  such  simple  rules  of  motor  reactions  as  that  above  stated. 

Yet  in  spite  of  these  complications  it  is  plausible  that  there 
exists  the  correlation  claimed  by  Professor  Miinsterberg,  showing 
itself  strongly  in  the  midst  of  conflicting  tendencies.  It  was  to 
test  the  validity  of  this  hypothesis  that  the  following  research 
was  conducted  during  the  college  year  1895-96. 

It  might  be  expected  that  a  less  educated  class  of  subjects 
than  those  we  have  had  would  give  more  marked  results,  as  far 
as  reactions  are  concerned.  Young  children  or  savages  would 
surely  show  motor  reactions  more  strongly  marked  to  disagree- 
able or  agreeable  stimulations.  But  even  in  our  results,  we 
have  found  a  plain  tendency  in  favor  of  the  theory  mentioned. 

It  must  be  mentioned  that  with  many  subjects  we  could  get 
no  perceptible  reactions  to  the  sensory  stimuli.  Some  subjects 
seemed  constitutionally  averse  to  any  motor  reaction.  The 


HAR  YARD  PS  YCHOLOGICAL  LABOR  A  TOR  V.  455 

stimulus  would  generally  be  pronounced  either  pleasant  or  un- 
pleasant, and  yet  the  subject  would  show  no  motor  reaction 
whatever.  This  lack  of  reaction  was  very  marked  in  some 
cases.  In  a  few  instances  the  subject  pronounced  the  stimulus 
indifferent,  yet  often  reacted  to  it  one  way  or  the  other. 

Some  subjects  were  very  sensitive  and  seemed  to  go  all  to 
pieces  on  any  disagreeable  stimulus,  and  would  show  most  sur- 
prising and  seemingly  contradictory  reactions.  These  points 
we  will  try  to  bring  out  fully  in  our  statement  of  the  results. 

METHOD  OF  EXPERIMENT. 

The  emotional  stimuli  mostly  employed  were  odors,  but 
sounds  and  variously  colored  lights  were  also  used,  to  a  much 
less  extent.  It  was  greatly  desired  that  the  stimulus  in  each 
case  should  give  an  effect  as  purely  painful  or  pleasurable  as 
possible.  Many  subjects  were  employed  and  the  stimuli  were 
given  often  several  times  to  each,  on  which  accounts  odors 
seemed  the  most  fitting  of  possible  agents.  These  furnish  about 
the  only  means,  indeed,  of  causing  a  constant  pleasurable 
stimulation  in  the  practice  of  the  laboratory.  Odors  have  the 
further  advantages  of  being  unlimited  in  number  and  in  action 
independent  of  the  subject's  power  of  imagination.  It  was 
much  more  difficult  to  find  for  each  subject  a  positively  disagree- 
able odor  than  a  positively  pleasant  one,  students  of  chemistry 
being  especially  hard  to  suit  with  a  sufficiently  unpleasant  smell. 
Constant  care  was  needed  and  employed  to  suit  the  tastes  of 
the  various  subjects  in  this  regard,  the  objects  being  to  employ 
types  of  pleasure  and  of  pain. 

The  particular  olfactory  stimuli  employed  were  kept  in  ounce 
vials  on  a  stand  made  for  them.  It  is  hardly  possible  to  make 
any  classification  of  them  as  pleasant  or  unpleasant.  Roughly, 
however,  they  may  be  arranged  in  the  following  order  of  agree- 
ableness  to  the  greater  number  of  the  subjects  employed, 
the  most  pleasant  first,  but  the  middle  ones  varying  greatly  in 
this  regard.  Naturally  the  most  emphatic  members  of  the  series 
were  those  most  used.  Oil  of  bergamot,  cologne  water,  helio- 
trope, methyl  acetate,  oil  of  cloves,  tincture  of  musk,  ethyl 
iodide,  spirits  of  turpentine,  xylol,  eugenol,  oil  of  eucalyptus, 


456         GEO.   V.  DEARBORN  AND  FRANK  N.  SPINDLER. 

iodoform,  cider  vinegar,  bisulphide  of  carbon,  ethyl  bomeol  and 
camphor,  sulphuric  ether,  toluidin,  allyl  alcohol,  tincture  of  as- 
afcetida,  diamylamine,  acetic  acid,  ammonium  valerianate.  A 
few  subjects  avowed  no  pain  from  any  of  these,  and  for  these 
ammonia  was  employed  in  place  of  a  real  odor.  It  will  be 
noticed  that  '  disgusts '  are  not  included  in  our  list,  associations 
not  being  desired  in  these  experiments,  but  only  pure  affective 
tones. 

Panes  of  glass  a  foot  square,  colored  red,  blue,  green  and 
orange  were  used  for  subjects  with  color  taste  highly  developed, 
the  panes  being  held  before  their  eyes.  Similarly,  for  musical 
subjects,  such  sweet  tones  as  tuning  forks  can  give  were  applied 
as  stimuli,  with  harsh  noises  for  a  contrary  effect. 

The  hands  and  the  head  were  chosen  as  the  bodily  parts 
most  suitable  for  reaction,  these  being  the  most  sensitive  to 
motor  stimuli  and  the  most  convenient.  According  to  the  theory 
in  question,  the  hands  should  relax  and  the  head  drop  back 
under  agreeable  stimulus,  while  under  disagreeable  stimulus  the 
head  should  drop  forward  and  the  hands  contract. 

The  mechanical  plan  employed  for  the  direct  registration  of 
the  flexion  and  extension  of  the  head  and  hands  was  as  follows  : 
The  subject  was  seated  in  a  comfortable  arm  chair.  A  tightly- 
fitting  pasteboard  cap  was  placed  on  the  head,  from  the  center 
of  which  a  strong  thread  extended  over  an  easy-running  pul- 
ley to  the  extremity  of  the  lever  of  a  Marey  tambour.  Because 
the  antero-posterior  movements  of  the  head  were  sometimes  con- 
siderable this  lever  arm  was  about  twenty-five  centimetres  in 
length.  By  a  careful  centering  of  the  pulley  in  the  circle  of 
head  movements,  record  of  the  occasional  lateral  motions  of 
the  head  was  avoided,  account  of  these  not  being  desired. 
Pneumatic  pressure  transferred  in  the  usual  way  the  rise  and 
fall  of  the  receiving  tambour's  arm  to  the  pen  of  another  Marey 
tambour,  writing  on  smoked  paper  on  a  revolving  drum. 

The  apparatus  adjusted  to  the  left  hand  consisted  of  a  bulb 
small  enough  to  be  fairly  grasped  in  the  closed  fist.  It  was  at 
first  difficult  to  find  a  bulb  without  so  much  resistance  to  com- 
pression that  the  subject's  constant  attention  was  necessary  to 
keep  it  in  the  state  of  partial  compression  needed  to  secure  rec- 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  457 

ord  of  the  extensor  movements  of  the  fingers.  But  at  last  a 
bulb  made  of  a  soft  sponge  from  which  the  center  had  been 
cut,  enclosed  in  thin  rubber  dam,  was  hit  upon,  and  this  served 
as  a  most  sensitive  and,  indeed,  adaptable  instrument;  for 
sponges  may  be  found  or  cut  of  any  desired  degree  of  resili- 
ance.  The  varying  pressure  of  the  hand  was  pneumatically 
carried  to  a  receiving  tambour  and  recorded  on  the  smoked 
cylinder  at  the  left  of  the  tracing  from  the  head. 

To  register  the  movements  of  the  right  hand  in  states  of  or- 
ganic pleasure  and  displeasure  a  different  form  of  instrument 
was  employed.  About  the  second  and  third  fingers,  as  the 
most  sensitive  and  most  powerful,  a  comfortable  ring  of  brass 
foil  was  fastened.  This  was  attached  directly  to  the  lever  of  a 
tambour  and  as  close  to  the  fulcrum  as  possible,  that  all  motion 
might  be  emphasized ;  and  it  was  adjusted  so  that  when  the 
fingers  were  partially  flexed  the  tambour  rubber  was  plane. 
Comfort  of  the  hand  in  this  case  was  found  important  in  order 
to  avoid  voluntary  attention  to  it  and  its  reactions.  The  flexor 
and  extensor  movements  of  the  two  fingers  were  as  before  trans- 
mitted to  a  pen  tracing  on  the  right  of  the  record  of  the  head. 

To  secure  constant  pressure  at  the  start  in  the  three  sets  of 
apparatus,  the  open  ends  of  branches  from  the  three  conducting 
tubes  were  arranged  side  by  side  convenient  to  the  operator,  and 
fitted  with  clips  so  as  to  be  simultaneously  closed  when  all  was 
ready  and  the  kymograph  in  regular  motion.  The  speed  of 
the  recording  drum  was  such  that  one  revolution  was  made  in 
about  five  minutes.  The  cylinder  was  14  cm.  in  diameter  and 
25  cm.  long,  suitable  for  two  records  such  as  these  without 
change  of  paper.  Straight  normals  for  the  better  measurement 
of  the  curves  were  regularly  run  round  the  drum  by  stationary 
pens. 

Record  of  the  various  conditions  of  each  experiment  was 
written  with  a  stylus  on  each  sheet,  including  name  of  subject, 
temperament,  subjective  experiences,  stimulus,  nature  of  effect 
whether  pleasant  or  the  contrary,  date  and  direction  of  muscu- 
lar movement  indicated  in  each  reaction.  The  subjects  were 
mostly  Seniors  and  Juniors  of  Harvard  college  and  of  Rad- 
cliffe  college  and  graduate  students  working  in  the  laboratory. 


458         GEO.  V.  DEARBORN  AND  FRANK  N.  SPINDLER. 

Their  number  was  nineteen.  Inquiries  as  to  emotional  likes 
and  dislikes  were  regularly  made  and  as  to  musical  and  *  ar- 
tistic '  education. 

RESULTS. 
i.    Under   Pleasant   Stimulation. 

Taking  each  movement  or  lack  of  movement,  whether  of 
head  or  of  either  hand,  as  a  separate  case,  we  have  recorded  500 
effects  of  sensory  stimuli  which  were  considered  pleasant  by  the 
subjects.  Of  these,  118,  or  23%,  were  cases  of  flexion  of 
hands  or  forward  movement  of  the  head,  134,  or  27%,  were 
cases  of  no  reaction  whatever,  and  248,  or  49.6%,  were  cases 
of  extension  of  hands  or  backward  head  movement.  Consider- 
ing the  cases  of  actual  reaction  alone,  there  occurred  67%  of 
movements  of  extension  and  32%  of  flexion — a  proportion  of 
more  than  two  to  one.  The  tendency  under  pleasant  stimula- 
tion is  therefore  strongly  toward  extension. 

The  two  hands  and  the  head  did  not  necessarily  act  together 
in  the  same  way.  The  left  hand  seems  much  more  sensitive 
and  more  given  to  expressive  motor  reaction  than  the  right,  and 
as  our  subjects  were  mostly  right  handed,  it  would  seem  justi- 
fiable to  infer  from  this  that  the  right  hand  is  more  civilized  and 
more  under  control  and  less  naively  expressive  than  the  left.  If 
the  idea  stated  in  the  beginning  is  tenable,  that  civilized  man  is 
more  likely  to  inhibit  emotional  expression  than  a  savage,  then 
we  might  expect  the  right  hand  to  be  the  more  inhibited  and  the 
less  likely  to  react. 

Counting  the  cases  of  pleasant  stimuli  where  the  left  hand 
showed  no  reaction,  we  have  for  the  left  hand  under  stimuli  pro- 
nounced agreeable  results  as  follows:  Flexion  21%,  extension 
60%,  no  reaction  19%.  Out  of  184  stimulations  the  left  hand 
shows  flexion  37  times,  extension  112  times,  no  reaction  35 
times.  If  we  compare  the  left  hand  with  the  right,  the  percent- 
age of  '  no  reactions '  is  seen  to  be  much  less  for  the  left  hand, 
while  that  of  both  flexions  and  extensions  is  greater.  Under 
pleasant  stimuli  the  right  hand  showed,  flexion  20%,  extension 
40% ,  'no  reaction '  40% .  That  is,  in  a  total  of  130  cases,  the 
right  hand  flexed  27  times,  extended  52  times,  showed  '  no  re- 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  459 


action'  51  times.  The  left  hand  then  was  indifferent 
when  the  right  hand  was  indifferent  40%  ;  it  extended  60% 
where  the  right  hand  extended  only  40%  ;  and  it  flexed  11% 
where  the  right  hand  flexed  20%.  Leaving  out  the  cases  of 
*  no  reaction,'  the  right  hand  flexed  34%  and  extended  6$% 
while  the  left  hand  flexed  25%  and  extended  75%. 

As  for  the  head  under  pleasant  stimuli,  it  was  found  that  it 
flexed,  or  came  forward,  29%,  showed  no  reaction  26%,  ex- 
tended or  drew  back  45  %  .  That  is,  in  a  total  of  186  pleasant 
stimuli,  the  head  came  forward  54  times,  drew  back  84  times, 
showed  no  movement  48  times.  Comparing  the  flexions  with 
the  extensions  alone,  the  head  under  pleasant  stimuli  was  flexed 
39%  of  the  times,  and  extended  61  %  •  The  head  was  more  in- 
different than  the  total  averaged  results,  but  more  expressive 
than  the  right  hand. 

It  will  be  noticed,  however,  that  the  head  shows  more  of  a 
tendency  to  flexion  under  pleasant  stimuli  than  either  hand,  viz., 
29%  flexion  to  20%  for  right  hand  and  21%  for  left  hand. 
This  was  one  of  the  surprises  of  the  experiments.  In  many 
cases  under  pleasant  stimulus  the  head  would  move  forward 
even  where  both  hands  relaxed.  At  first  it  was  thought  this 
was  true  only  of  smells,  as  the  odors  were  necessarily  presented 
suddenly  and  in  front  of  the  face,  but  the  same  thing  was  true 
of  colors  and  sounds  ;  the  head  often  flexed  when  these  stimuli 
were,  agreeable.  This  must  have  been  an  adaptive  movement; 
for  often,  after  this  forward  movement,  the  head  would  drop 
back  during  the  continuance  of  the  pleasant  stimulus. 

2.    Under   Unpleasant  Stimulation. 

If  we  now  examine  the  head  movements  in  response  to  un- 
pleasant stimuli,  similar  differences  of  reaction  will  be  seen. 
Here  it  flexed  42%,  showed  no  reaction  19%,  extended  38%  ; 
or  in  a  total  of  168  stimulations  it  moved  forward  72  times, 
showed  no  movement  32  times,  dropped  back  64  times.  Taking 
flexion  and  extension  alone,  we  find  flexion  53  %  compared  to 
extension  47  %  .  Even  more  marked  here  is  the  tendency  for 
the  head  to  extend  or  draw  back  under  an  unpleasant  stimulus 
than  it  was  for  it  to  come  forward  under  a  pleasant  stimulus  ; 


460         GEO.   V.  DEARBORN  AND  FRANK  N.  SPINDLER. 

while  both  hands  often,  and  indeed  generally,  flexed.  Yet  for 
the  head  also  flexion  predominates,  thus  supporting  the  theory 
by  a  slight  percentage.  Comparing  the  hands  as  to  their  re- 
action to  unpleasant  stimuli,  we  find  the  right  hand  here  also, 
markedly  more  inhibited  or  indifferent.  The  left  hand  shows 
flexion  66^%,  no  reaction  14.5%,  extension  18%  ;  or  in  165 
cases  it  flexed  no  times,  showed  no  reaction  24  times,  extended 
31  times.  Leaving  out  the  cases  of  'no  reaction,'  it  showed 
78%  flexion,  and  12%  extension. 

The  right  hand,  however,  flexed  only  49.5  %  of  the  times, 
while  it  showed  '  no  reaction'  29%  ,  and  extended  21  %  .  Com- 
paring flexion  and  extension  cases  alone  the  right  hand  flexed 
69%  and  extended  30%.  The  right  hand,  therefore,  shows 
more  of  a  tendency  to  indifference  and  extension  under  dis- 
agreeable stimuli  than  does  the  left  hand.  We  find  then,  in  the 
hands  a  marked  preponderance  of  flexions  under  disagreeable 
stimuli,  78%  of  the  movements  in  the  left  hand  and  69%  of  the 
movements  in  the  right  hand  being  flexions. 

Combining  the  cases  of  the  reactions  of  head  and  hands 
under  unpleasant  stimuli  we  get  S3%  flexion,  20%  'no  re- 
action,' 26%  extension;  or,  in  450  cases  we  have  flexion  240 
times,  'no  reaction '  90  times,  extension  120  times.  Leaving 
out  cases  of  no  reaction  we  have  66%%  flexions  to  ZZYz  %  of 
extension — a  proportion  of  2  flexions  to  i  extension. 

j.    Under  Indifferent  Stimulation. 

In  the  cases  where  the  stimuli  were  pronounced  indifferent, 
that  is,  neither  agreeable  nor  disagreeable,  we  find  some  inter- 
esting results.  Even  here  the  left  hand  reacted  more  than  the 
right.  The  left  hand  under  indifferent  stimuli  shows  flexion 
34%,  no  reaction  31%,  extension  34%  ;  or  in  32  cases  flexion 
ii  times,  nd  reaction  10,  extension  n  times.  It  is  interesting 
that  flexion  and  extension  are  here  exactly  equal. 

The  right  hand  under  indifferent  stimuli  was  more  immobile. 
It  shows  flexion  30  % »  no  reaction  50  %  >  extension  20  %  ;  or  in 
the  20  cases  of  indifferent  stimulation  the  right  hand  flexed  6 
times,  showed  no  reaction  10  times,  extended  4  times.  Leaving 
out  the  cases  of  no  reaction  it  flexed  60% ,  extended  40%  . 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  461 

The  left  hand  showed  only  31%  of  *  no  reaction*  under  in- 
different stimuli  while  the  right  hand  showed  50%.  The  head 
under  indifferent  stimuli  showed  30%  flexion,  no  reaction  30%, 
extension,  40%  ;  or  flexion  43%  to  extension  57%,  if  we  dis- 
regard cases  of  *  no  reaction.' 

The  total  results  of  the  hands  and  the  head  for  indifferent 
stimuli  are  31.7%  flexion,  no  reaction  35%,  extension  32.9%  ; 
or  disregarding  the  'no  reaction'  cases,  flexion  49%  to  exten- 
sion $!%•  Extension  and  flexion  here  are  almost  equal  with  a 
slight  percentage  in  favor  of  extension,  probably  due  to  adapt- 
ive efforts.  This  is  what  we  should  expect  under  indifferent 
stimuli.  We  find  also  here  more  cases  where  there  was  no  re- 
action than  occurred  when  the  stimulus  was  pronounced  pleas- 
ant or  unpleasant,  viz.,  35%  here  to  26%  under  pleasant  and  to 
20%  under  unpleasant  stimulation. 

4.  Summary  and  Additional  Observations. 

The  foregoing  results  may  be  summed  up  in  the  following 
table.  It  includes  only  the  actual  reactions  to  stimuli,  764  in 
number.  The  cases  where  stimuli  were  applied  without  result- 
ing reaction  numbered  253. 


UNDER  UNPLEASANT 
STIMULI. 

UNDER  PLEASANT 
STIMULI. 

UNDER  INDIFFERENT 
STIMULI. 

Flexion 
Extension 
Proportion 

66.6 
33-3 

2  tO  I 

32.2 
67.8 

I  tO  2  + 

49 
5i 
Nearly  equal. 

These  experiments  afford,  therefore,  a  striking  confirmation 
of  Professor  Miinsterberg's  theory,  that  there  is  a  strong 
tendency  to  expansion  under  agreeable,  to  contraction  under 
disagreeable,  stimuli.  Other  tendencies  are  present,  however, 
some  of  which  conflict  with  this  one  :  such  for  example  as  the 
tendency  to  move  toward  an  object  which  attracts  attention ;  the 
tendency  to  move  away  from  a  disagreeable  object ;  the  tendency 
to  make  particular  movements  of  adaptation  to  stimuli ;  etc.  A 
further  influence  of  great  interest  is  revealed  upon  examination 
of  the  records  of  the  separate  individuals  who,  as  subjects,  took 
part  in  these  experiments.  If  their  reactions  to  stimuli  which 


462         GEO.   V.  DEARBORN  AND  FRANK  N.  SPINDLER. 

they  pronounced  indifferent  be  examined,  it  will  be  seen  that 
some  show  a  temperamental  tendency  to  make  movements  of 
flexion  more  often  than  of  extension ;  others,  the  opposite ;  and 
others  still  to  make  both  in  nearly  equal  proportion.  These 
temperamental  tendencies  show  themselves  clearly  in  their  in- 
fluence on  reactions  to  agreeable  and  disagreeable  stimuli.  The 
'flexion'  temperament  shows,  through  the  greater  predomi- 
nance of  flexions,  a  greater  difference  in  the  proportion  of  the 
two  movements  under  pleasant  stimuli  and  a  nearer  approach  to 
equality  under  unpleasant  stimuli.  The  '  extension '  tempera- 
ment shows  the  opposite  results,  and  the  indifferent  tempera- 
ment exhibits  proportions  more  nearly  those  given  in  the  above 
table. 

Temperamental  differences  then  work  together  with  the  other 
special  tendencies  mentioned  above  in  modifying  the  tendency 
to  contract  under  disagreeable  and  to  expand  under  agreeable 
stimuli.  While,  therefore,  this  latter  is  clearly  established  by 
this  research  as  a  real  and  strong  tendency,  it  is  at  the  same  time 
shown  to  be  only  one  tendency  acting  among  many. 


VISION  WITHOUT   INVERSION   OF  THE   RETINAL 

IMAGE.1 

BY  PROFESSOR  G.  M.  STRATTON. 
University  of  California. 

Seventh  Day. — In  the  morning  the  flow  of  ideas  while  I 
was  blindfolded  was  like  that  described  for  the  evening  be- 
fore. But  I  noticed  in  bathing  that  the  old  representation  of 
those  parts  of  my  body  which  I  had  so  frequently  seen  (  at  least 
in  their  clothing)  during  the  experiment,  was  decidedly  less 
vivid,  the  outline  more  blurred,  the  color  paler,  grayer,  more 
'  washed  out,'  than  of  the  parts  which  had  never  come  within 
the  limits  of  the  visual  field. 

Later,  with  my  lenses  on,  it  seemed  at  first  as  if  the  experi- 
ence was  in  all  respects  the  same  as  on  the  previous  day.  But 
when  I  began  to  pace  rapidly  up  and  down  the  room,  I  felt  that 
I  was  more  at  home  in  the  scene  than  ever  before.  There  was 
perfect  reality  in  my  visual  surroundings,  and  I  gave  myself  up 
to  them  without  reserve  and  without  being  conscious  of  a  single 
note  of  discord  with  what  I  saw.  This  feeling  of  complete  har- 
mony throughout,  lasted  as  long  as  I  kept  my  legs  either  within 
or  near  the  borders  of  my  field  of  view.  Otherwise  the  older, 
inappropriate  representation  of  my  body  arose  at  times,  but 
faded,  while  the  new  representation  revived,  as  soon  as  some 
passing  object  was  seen  to  enter  the  region  into  which  the  older 
image  of  my  body  extended.  The  absence  of  any  tactual  ex- 
periences such  as  a  real  body  in  that  position  would  imply,  cast, 
for  the  moment,  an  illusory  character  over  the  older  form  of 
representation. 

To  what  extent  objects  in  view  suggested  the  idea  of  other 
things  in  harmonious  relation  with  the  seen  things  is  best  shown 
by  the  following  cases :  As  I  walked  into  my  bedroom  and 
saw  the  bedstead,  I  involuntarily  thought  of  the  windows,  repre- 

1  Concluded. 
463 


464  GEORGE  M.  STRATTON. 

senting  them  in  the  appropriate  direction  fixed  by  the  position 
of  the  bed.  The  general  outlines  of  the  room,  and  the  more 
important  points  of  reference,  arose  in  harmony  with  the  new 
sight-perceptions.  But  the  detailed  filling  of  this  outline  was 
far  less  complete  than  is  usual  in  my  case  in  normal  sight.  A 
large  number  of  important  things  in  the  room  simply  did  not 
arise  in  my  mind  until  their  relation  to  the  field  of  seen  things 
had  been  brought  home  afresh  by  perception.  During  the  first 
days  of  the  experiment  ideas  of  objects  frequently  arose  in  op- 
position to  the  new  sight-perception ;  now  they  either  did  not 
arise  at  all,  or  came  in  the  newer  form.  The  idea  of  the  sofa 
or  chair  on  which  I  passively  sat  did  still  come  up  in  discord 
with  the  general  experience,  together  with  the  dim  feeling  of 
my  shoulders  and  of  the  upper  parts  of  my  back.  But  these 
were  now  a  comparatively  isolated  group,  and  not  a  vigorous 
A-p-perceptions-masse  to  call  up  a  host  of  surrounding  things  in 
orderly  relation  to  itself. 

In  regard  to  movements,  the  most  striking  fact  was  that  the 
extent  of  the  movement  now  was  inappropriate,  movements  in 
the  wrong  direction  being  comparatively  rare  in  the  case  of  the 
hands,  and  even  still  rarer  in  the  case  of  the  feet.  My  hands 
frequently  moved  too  far  or  not  far  enough,  especially  when 
coming  from  beyond  the  visual  field  to  something  in  sight.  In 
trying  to  take  a  friend's  hand,  extended  into  the  (new)  lower 
portion  of  my  visual  field,  I  put  my  hand  too  high.  In  brush- 
ing a  speck  from  my  paper  in  the  (new)  upper  portion  of  the 
field  I  did  not  move  my  hand  far  enough.  And  in  striking 
with  my  index  finger  the  outstretched  fingers  of  my  other  hand 
the  movement  was  much  less  accurate  when  I  looked  at  my 
hands  than  when  I  closed  my  eyes  and  depended  on  motor 
guidance.  The  actual  distance  that  my  hand  moved,  in  such 
cases,  would,  under  the  normal  conditions  of  sight,  doubtless 
have  been  appropriate  to  bring  my  hand  to  the  desired  spot. 
But  an  object  in  what  had  before  been  the  upper  part  of  the 
field  was  now  at  a  shorter  distance  from  my  hands  than  form- 
erly ;  the  movement,  under  the  influence  of  the  habitual  inter- 
pretation of  the  visual  position,  would  therefore  go  too  far. 
And,  vice  versa,  a  movement  to  an  object  in  what  had  formerly 


VISION  WITHOUT  INVERSION.  465 

been  the  lower  part  of  the  visual  field  would  now  fall  short  of 
its  destination.  For  the  visual  position  would  now  require  a 
more  extended  movement  of  the  arm  than  formerly,  in  order  to 
reach  it. 

When  I  watched  one  of  my  limbs  in  motion,  no  involuntary 
suggestion  arose  that  it  was  in  any  other  place  or  moved  in  any 
other  direction  than  as  sight  actually  reported  it,  except  that  in 
moving  my  arm  a  slightly  discordant  group  of  sensations  came 
from  my  unseen  shoulder.  If,  while  looking  at  the  member,  I 
summoned  an  image  of  it  in  its  old  position,  then  I  could  feel 
the  limb  there  too.  But  this  latter  was  a  relatively  weak  affair, 
and  cost  effort.  When  I  looked  away  from  it,  however,  I  in- 
voluntarily felt  it  in  its  pre-experimental  position,  although  at 
the  same  time  conscious  of  a  solicitation  to  feel  it  in  its  new  po- 
sition. This  representation  of  the  moving  part  in  terms  of  the 
new  vision  waxed  and  waned  in  strength,  so  that  it  was  some- 
times more  vivid  than  the  old,  and  sometimes  even  completely 
overshadowed  it. 

The  conflict  between  the  old  and  the  new  localization  of  the 
parts  of  my  body  was  shown  in  several  instances.  The  mis- 
taken visual  localization  of  a  contact  in  the  palm  of  one  of  my 
hands,  and  the  sudden  reversal  of  even  the  touch-localization 
when  I  detected  by  sight  the  true  source  of  the  sensations,  oc- 
curred as  on  the  preceding  day.  Somewhat  similarly,  when  I 
moved  a  heated  iron  with  my  right  hand  to  that  border  of  the 
visual  field  just  beyond  which,  according  to  pre-experimental 
localization,  my  left  hand  would  have  been  lying,  I  involun- 
tarily felt  an  anticipatory  shrinking  in  my  unseen  left  hand,  as 
if  it  were  on  the  point  of  being  burnt ;  although  the  iron  in  my 
right  hand  was  actually  several  feet  from  my  left,  and  was  mov- 
ing away  from  it.  When  I  put  my  left  hand  in  sight,  or  looked 
at  it  afresh  to  make  sure  where  it  was,  the  hot  iron  caused  no 
premonitory  feeling  whatever  on  approaching  the  visual  locality 
which  had  before  been  so  suggestive  of  danger. 

Seated  by  the  open  fire,  I  happened  to  rest  my  head  on  my 
hands  in  such  a  way  that  the  fire  shone  directly  on  the  top  of 
my  head.  I  closed  my  eyes,  and  the  image  of  the  fire  remained 
true  to  the  recent  perception.  But  soon  I  noticed  that  I  was 


466  GEORGE  M.  STRATTON. 

representing  the  fire  in  pre-experimental  terms,  and  I  finally  dis- 
covered that  the  change  was  caused  by  the  growing  sensations 
of  warmth  on  the  top  of  my  head.  My  hair  and  scalp  were 
persistently  felt  in  their  older  position,  no  doubt  because  I  never 
directly  saw  them  in  any  other.  And  the  old  localization  of  the 
fire  was  the  only  one  consistent  with  this  old  localization  of  the 
hair  and  scalp.  But  by  passing  my  hands  rapidly  back  and 
forth  before  my  open  eyes,  ending  the  movement  each  time  with 
a  touch  upon  the  top  of  my  head,  it  was  not  difficult  to  produce 
a  vivid  localization  of  my  scalp  in  harmony  with  the  new  sight- 
perceptions.  And  with  this  change  the  old  localization  of  the 
fire  was  suppressed.  During  the  walk  in  the  evening,  I  en- 
joyed the  beauty  of  the  evening  scene,  for  the  first  time  since 
the  experiment  began.  Evidently  the  strangeness  and  incon- 
venience of  the  new  relations  no  longer  kept  me  at  such  a  ten- 
sion as  hitherto. 

On  removing  the  glasses,  my  visual  images  relapsed  into 
their  older  form,  with  a  constant  interplay  and  accompaniment, 
however,  of  the  new. 

Eighth  day. — Before  putting  the  glasses  on,  representations 
of  the  older  sort  held  sway. 

During  the  morning,  after  the  glasses  were  in  place,  I 
noticed  that  as  far  as  the  unseen  portions  of  my  body  were 
concerned,  the  relation  of  right  and  left  was,  for  the  most 
part,  a  reproduction  of  the  older  visual  right  and  left ;  that  is  to 
say,  a  contact  on  the  right  side  of  the  body  at  some  point  beyond 
the  reach  of  sight  was  felt  and  visually  represented  on  the  (old) 
visual  right  side.  Occasionally  the  opposite  visual  side  was 
suggested,  but  the  sensations  were  rarely  indeed  felt  there.  The 
case  was  quite  different  as  regards  the  seen  parts  of  my  body, 
although  even  here  uncertainly  and  sudden  alteration  of  refer- 
ence occurred.  The  illusion  of  contact  on  the  opposite  hand  to 
the  one  actually  touched,  arose  as  on  the  two  preceding  days. 
I  often  hesitated  which  hand  was  the  appropriate  one  for  grasp- 
ing some  object  in  view,  began  the  movement  with  the  wrong 
hand  and  then  corrected  the  mistake.  If  I  was  attentive 
to  the  new  visual  representation  of  some  part  of  my  body 
which  was  about  to  be  touched,  and  expected  the  contact 


VISION  WITHOUT  INVERSION.  467 

there,  the  contact  was  felt  in  the  new  position  and  no  change 
of  reference  occurred.  Immediately  afterwards  there  usually 
arose  a  sort  of  tactual  after-image  on  the  other  visual  side. 
When  the  original  contact  was  unexpected,  the  visual  image  and 
the  tactual  localization  might  simultaneously  be  both  old  and 
new,  or  might  be  old  alone,  with  perhaps  a  merely  visual  image 
in  the  new  direction,  although  without  any  real  reference  of  the 
touch-sensations  to  this  image. 

Localization  of  sounds  varied,  being  different  when  the 
source  of  sound  was  in  sight  from  what  it  was  when  this  was 
out  of  sight,  and  also  in  the  latter  case  differing  with  different 
directions  of  attention,  or  with  different  suggestions  as  to  the 
direction  from  which  the  sound  came.  The  fire,  for  instance, 
sputtered  where  I  saw  it.  The  tapping  of  my  pencil  on  the 
arm  of  my  chair  seemed  without  question  to  issue  from  the 
visible  pencil.  Even  when  I  tapped  on  the  wall  to  one  side, 
out  of  sight,  if  in  making  the  stroke  I  invariably  passed  my 
hand  and  pencil  before  my  eyes  and  in  the  direction  of  the  un- 
seen part  of  the  wall,  and  attempted  to  picture  the  contact  in 
harmony  with  this  movement,  I  actually  heard  the  sound  come 
from  the  new  visual  direction,  although  not  with  full  and  un- 
equivocal localization.  There  was  a  strong  temptation  to 
localize  the  sound  on  the  other  side  also.  And  this  rival  locali- 
zation rose  into  full  life  the  instant  I  ceased  to  keep  before  me 
the  image  of  the  pencil  striking  on  the  new  visual  side. 

The  influence  of  the  suggestion  coming  from  recent  and  re- 
peated movements  before  the  eyes  was  likewise  apparent  in 
localizing  parts  of  my  body  which  could  not  be  brought  into  the 
visual  field.  Thus  the  involuntary  inattentive  localization  of 
my  forehead  and  hair  was  the  old  localization  lasting  from  pre- 
experimental  sight.  But  a  series  of  visible  movements  of  my 
hand  to  my  hair,  together  with  fixed  attention  on  the  goal  of 
these  movements,  made  the  sensations  of  touch  temporarily 
come,  without  difficulty,  from  this  new  direction.  Sensations 
of  contact  on  the  lips,  however,  were  not  so  readily  dislodged 
from  their  old  position.  In  eating  at  table,  the  movements  of 
my  hands  and  of  pieces  of  food  across  the  visual  field,  con- 
stantly suggested  that  my  mouth  must  lie  between  the  line  of 


468  GEORGE  M.  STRATTON. 

sight  and  the  new  position  of  my  legs.  But  the  actual  contact 
on  my  lips  instantly  dispelled  this  suggestion  and  located  my 
mouth  definitely  and  indubitably  on  the  other  side  of  the  line  of 
sight.  The  place  of  the  actual  contact  and  that  of  the  merely 
suggested  contact  were  thus  in  striking  contrast.  But  when  I 
did  my  best  to  visualize  my  lips  in  the  direction  of  the  sug- 
gested contact  and  strained  my  attention  in  this  direction,  the 
actual  contact  did  not  dissipate  this  image  or  carry  it  to  the  old 
position  of  my  mouth,  but  the  touch-sensations  seemed  to  come 
from  the  new  direction.  Without  such  a  willful  visualization 
and  strain  of  attention  the  actual  contact  always  reversed  the 
involuntary  suggestion  coming  from  the  visible  movements 
toward  the  new  position  of  my  mouth.  Even  when  my  fore- 
head and  hair  temporarily  seemed  to  lie  on  the  (new)  upper 
side  of  the  line  of  sight,  this  did  not  prevent  my  mouth  from 
being  felt  on  the  same  side.  But  the  new  localization  of  fore- 
head and  scalp  undoubtedly  had  a  tendency  to  drive  the  mouth 
out  of  its  old  localization ;  for  I  found  that  less  effort  of  atten- 
tion and  visualization  was  required  to  make  the  tactual  sensa- 
tions of  the  lips  come  from  the  new  position,  when  the  top  of 
the  head  had  already  been  carried  over  to  its  new  position, 
No  doubt  there  was  a  disturbing  incongruity  in  having  both  my 
mouth  and  the  top  of  my  head  on  the  same  side  of  the  line  of 
sight ;  consequently  the  re-localization  of  one  tended  to  carry  the 
other  to  the  opposite  side  of  the  visual  line. 

In  other  cases  the  re-localization  of  bodily  parts  that  were  be- 
yond the  reach  of  sight  was  brought  about  by  the  suggestive  influ- 
ence of  such  movements  as  I  have  just  described,  without  any 
voluntary  attention  or  visualization  of  the  parts  whatever.  As 
I  rocked  in  my  chair,  I  found  that  by  throwing  my  arms  up 
through  the  field  of  sight  into  the  visual  region  in  which  my 
shoulders,  according  to  the  old  experience,  were  wont  to  be 
localized,  the  repeated  feeling  of  the  unimpeded  motion  of  my 
hands  through  this  region  destroyed  the  old  representation  of 
my  shoulders  and  back,  and  gave  them  a  localization  in  harmony 
with  the  new  visual  experience,  except  that  (as  I  noticed)  my 
head  seemed  too  deep-set  in  my  shoulders — in  fact,  seemed 
buried  in  them  almost  up  to  my  ears. 


VISION  WITHOUT  INVERSION.  469 

The  harmonization  of  the  new  experience  and  the  suppres- 
sion or  subordination  of  insistent  remnants  of  the  old  were 
always  apparent  during  active  operations  in  the  visual  surround- 
ings, as  has  been  described  for  several  of  the  preceding  days. 
While  I  sat  passively  the  old  localization  of  unseen  parts  of  my 
body  often  came  back,  or  perhaps  was  the  usual  form  in  which 
they  appeared.  But  the  instant  I  began  to  rock  my  chair  the 
new  position  of  these  parts  came  prominently  forward,  and, 
except  in  the  case  of  my  shoulders  and  back,  readily  felt  more 
real  than  the  old.  And  in  walking,  when  hands  and  feet  rhyth- 
mically made  their  appearance  in  the  visual  field,  the  old  rep- 
resentation, except  perhaps  for  some  faint  inharmonious  sensa- 
tions in  the  back,  was  fully  expelled  without  employing  any 
device  of  will  or  of  attention  whatever.  The  attempt  to  repre- 
sent my  body  in  its  older  form  or  position  ended  in  a  faint,  life- 
less outline,  deficient,  as  far  as  I  could  make  out,  in  those  parts 
which  (in  a  different  direction,  of  course)  were  actually  in  sight. 
The  sight  of  these  parts  made  it  impossible  to  represent  them  in 
harmony  with  the  older  experience.  If  in  walking  I  allowed 
my  feet  to  remain  outside  the  field  of  view  and  they  relapsed 
into  their  older  localization,  they  returned,  although  still  unseen, 
to  their  new  position  as  soon  as  I  approached  a  step  or  other 
slight  obstacle  on  the  floor. 

As  long  as  the  new  localization  of  my  body  was  vivid,  the 
general  experience  was  harmonious,  and  everything  was  right 
side  up.  But  when,  for  any  of  the  reasons  already  given — an 
involuntary  lapse  into  the  older  memory- materials,  or  a  willful 
recall  of  these  older  forms — the  pre-experimental  localization  of 
my  body  was  prominently  in  mind,  then  as  I  looked  out  on  the 
scene  before  me  the  scene  was  involuntarily  taken  as  the  stand- 
ard of  right  directions,  and  my  body  was  felt  to  be  in  an  inhar- 
monious position  with  reference  to  the  rest.  I  seemed  to  be 
viewing  the  scene  from  an  inverted  body. 

*»*****»»* 

When  the  time  came  for  removing  the  glasses  at  the  close  of 
the  experiment,  I  thought  it  best  to  preserve  as  nearly  as  possible 
the  size  of  visual  field  to  which  I  had  now  grown  accustomed ; 
so  that  any  results  observed  might  be  clearly  due  solely  to  the 


47°  GEORGE  M.  STRATTON. 

reversion  of  my  visual  objects  and  not  to  a  sudden  widening  of 
the  visual  field.  Instead,  therefore,  of  removing  the  plaster- 
cast  from  my  face,  I  closed  my  eyes  and  had  an  assistant  slip 
out  the  brass  tube  which  held  the  lenses,  and  insert  in  its  place 
an  empty  black-lined  paper  tube  that  gave  about  the  same  range  of 
vision.  On  opening  my  eyes,  the  scene  had  a  strange  familiarity. 
The  visual  arrangement  was  immediately  recognized  as  the  old 
one  of  pre-experimental  days ;  yet  the  reversal  of  everything 
from  the  order  to  which  I  had  grown  accustomed  during  the 
past  week,  gave  the  scene  a  surprising,  bewildering  air  which 
lasted  for  several  hours.  It  was  hardly  the  feeling,  though, 
that  things  were  upside  down. 

When  I  turned  my  body  or  my  head,  objects  seemed  to 
sweep  before  me  as  if  they  themselves  were  suddenly  in  motion. 
The  *  swinging  of  the  scene,  '  observed  so  continously  during 
the  first  days  of  the  experiment,  had  thus  returned  with  great 
vividness.  It  rapidly  lost  this  force,  however,  so  that  at  the 
end  of  an  hour  the  motion  was  decidedly  less  marked.  But  it 
was  noticeable  the  rest  of  the  day,  and  in  a  slight  degree  even 
the  next  morning. 

Movements  which  would  have  been  appropriate  to  the  visual 
arrangement  during  the  experiment,  were  now  repeatedly  per- 
formed after  this  arrangement  had  been  reversed.  In  walking 
toward  some  obstacle  on  the  floor  of  the  room — a  chair,  for  in- 
stance— I  turned  the  wrong  way  in  trying  to  avoid  it ;  so  that  I 
frequently  either  ran  into  things  in  the  very  effort  to  go  around 
them,  or  else  hesitated,  for  the  moment,  bewildered  what  I 
should  do.  I  found  myself  more  than  once  at  a  loss  which 
hand  I  ought  to  use  to  grasp  the  door-handle  at  my  side. 
And  of  two  doors,  side  by  side,  leading  to  different  rooms,  I  was 
on  the  point  of  opening  the  wrong  one,  when  a  difference  in  the 
metal  work  of  the  locks  made  me  aware  of  my  mistake.  On 
approaching  the  stairs,  I  stepped  up  when  I  was  nearly  a  foot 
too  far  away.  And  in  writing  my  notes  at  this  time,  I  contin- 
ually made  the  wrong  movement  of  my  head  in  attempting  to 
keep  the  centre  of  my  visual  field  somewhere  near  the  point 
where  I  was  writing.  I  moved  my  head  upward  when  it  should 
have  gone  downward ;  I  moved  it  to  the  left  when  it  should  have 


VISION   WITHOUT  INVERSION.  471 

gone  to  the  right.  And  this  to  such  a  degree  as  to  be  a  serious 
disturbance.  While  walking,  there  were  distinct  signs  of  vertigo 
and  also  the  depression  in  the  upper  abdominal  region,  noticed 
during  the  earlier  days  of  the  experiment.  The  feeling  that  the 
floor  and  other  visual  objects  were  swaying,  in  addition  to  the 
symptoms  just  mentioned,  made  my  walking  seem  giddy  and 
uncontrollable.  No  distinct  errors  in  localizing  parts  of  my 
body  occurred ;  I  was  more  than  once  surprised,  however,  to 
see  my  hands  enter  the  visual  field  from  the  old  lower  side. 

Objects  in  the  room,  at  a  distance  of  ten  or  twelve  feet  from 
me,  seemed  to  have  lost  their  old  levels  and  to  be  much  higher 
than  they  were  either  during  the  experiment  or  before  the  ex- 
periment. The  floor  no  longer  seemed  level,  but  appeared  to 
slope  up  and  away  from  me,  at  an  angle  of  perhaps  five  de- 
grees. The  windows  and  other  prominent  objects  seemed  also 
too  high.  This  strange  aspect  of  things  lasted  (as  did  also  the 
swinging  of  the  scene,  the  feeling  of  giddiness,  and  certain  in- 
appropriate movements)  after  the  plaster  cast  had  been  removed 
and  the  normal  compass  of  the  visual  field  was  restored.  In  the 
dim  light  of  the  next  morning,  the  upward  slope  of  the  floor 
and  the  unusual  position  of  the  windows  were  distinctly 
noticeable. 


It  is  clear,  from  the  foregoing  narrative,  that  our  total  system 
of  visual  objects  is  a  comparatively  stable  structure,  not  to  be 
set  aside  or  transformed  by  some  few  experiences  which  do  not 
accord  with  its  general  plan  of  arrangement.  It  might  perhaps 
have  been  supposed  beforehand  that  if  one's  visual  perceptions 
were  changed,  as  in  the  present  experiment,  the  visual  ideas  of 
things  would  without  resistance  conform  to  the  new  visual  ex- 
periences. The  results  show,  however,  that  the  harmony 
comes  only  after  a  tedious  course  of  adjustment  to  the  new  con- 
ditions, and  that  the  visual  system  has  to  be  built  anew,  grow- 
ing from  an  isolated  group  of  perceptions.  The  older  visual 
representations  for  the  most  part  have  to  be  suppressed  rather 
than  reformed. 

Why  then  do  the  old  visual  ideas  persist  in  their  old  form, 
and  not  come  immediately  into  accord  with  the  new  perceptions  ? 


47 2  GEORGE  M.  STRATTON. 

If  their  position  were  merely  relative  to  the  sight-perceptions, 
they  undoubtedly  would  come  into  harmony  with  these  percep- 
tions, at  least  after  the  first  moments  of  dismay  were  past.  But 
the  fact  that  the  ideas  can  for  some  time  refuse  spatially  to  con- 
form to  the  new  experience,  shows  that  their  position  and  direc- 
tion is  fixed  with  reference  to  something  other  than  the  imme- 
diate perceptions  of  sight.  What  is  it  which  caused  the  older 
visual  images  to  preserve  a  spatial  arrangement  whose  lines  of 
direction  were  opposed  to  those  of  the  actual  field  of  view  ? 

To  say  that  the  older  visual  directions  persisted  because  the 
older  tactual  directions  remained  in  force,  is  certainly  no  suffi- 
cient answer  unless  we  can  show  that  visual  direction  is  dependent 
on  tactual  direction.  But  the  preceding  narrative  furnishes 
strong  evidence  against  such  a  view.  If  there  is  any  depen- 
dence either  way  (which  I  doubt),  the  evidence  seems  to  favor 
the  primacy  of  sight. 

However  that  may  be,  the  facts  in  the  present  case  are  more 
accurately  described  when  we  say  that  the  discord  was  not 
between  tactual  directions  and  visual  directions,  but  between  the 
visual  directions  suggested  by  touch  and  the  visual  directions 
given  in  the  actual  sight.  The  real  question  then  is  :  Why  did 
touch-perceptions  so  persistently  suggest  visual  images  whose 
positions  and  directions  were  in  discord  with  the  actual  scene  ? 
The  answer  is  found,  I  think,  in  the  familiar  doctrine  of  '  local 
signs '  in  touch  and  in  sight,  and  in  the  farther  assumption  that  a 
system  of  correspondence  exists  whereby  a  sign  in  one  sense 
comes  to  be  connected  with  and  to  suggest  a  particular  sign 
in  the  other  sense. 

In  the  organized  experience,  a  perception  in  one  sensory 
field  not  only  has  in  it  that  peculiar  qualitative  or  intensive 
character  which  is  its  own  *  local  sign,'  but,  through  this  local 
sign,  suggests  in  the  other  sensory  field  the  local  sign  which  is 
most  intimately  associated  with  the  first.  A  perception  in  one 
sensory  field  suggests,  therefore,  in  terms  of  the  other  sense  an 
image  in  that  place  whose  local  sign  is  most  strongly  associated 
with  the  local  sign  of  the  original  perception.  According  to  this 
view,  the  local  signs  of  sight  correspond  to  the  signs  of  touch,  and 
vice  versa ;  so  that  each  member  in  this  system  of  corresponding 


VISION  WITHOUT  INVERSION.  473 

signs  has  its  particular  correlate  in  the  other  sensory  field.  The 
correspondence  here  indicated,  does  not,  however,  consist  in  any 
spatial  or  qualitative  identity  or  even  similarity  of  the  particular 
signs  which  correspond,  but  only  in  the  fact  that  both  have 
come  to  mean  the  same  thing.  They  have  occurred  in  con- 
nection with  disparate  sensory  perceptions  whose  times  of 
appearing  and  whose  *  curve '  of  change  have  been  so  continu- 
ously and  repeatedly  identical  that  the  perceptions  themselves 
come,  in  time,  to  be  referred  to  the  same  source,  or,  in  other 
words,  give  the  perception  to  the  same  object.  The  percep- 
tions of  the  two  senses  are  thus  identified ;  and,  at  the  same 
time,  the  disparate  local  signs  (in  the  different  senses)  which 
are  simultaneously  aroused  in  the  perception  of  the  one  object 
come  to  have  the  same  spatial  meaning.  This  correspondence 
of  local  signs  is  no  doubt  an  important  condition  for  our  per- 
ceiving one  and  the  same  thing  in  different  sensory  fields.  And 
the  persistence  of  this  correspondence  between  the  signs,  when 
once  the  power  of  mutual  suggestion  has  become  established,  is 
the  explanation  of  the  fact  that  during  my  experiment  the 
translations  of  touch-perceptions  into  terms  of  sight  continued 
so  long  in  contradiction  to  the  actual  visual  experience ;  and 
that,  on  the  other  hand,  the  visual  perceptions  so  long  suggested 
tactual  or  motor  images  not  in  accord  with  the  tactual  or  motor 
perceptions. 

For,  whatever  the  local  signs  of  vision  may  be — whether 
differences  in  the  qualitative  or  intensive  character  of  the  mus- 
cular sensations,  or  differences  of  sensation  connected  with  dif- 
ferent parts  of  the  retina,  or  intricate  combinations  of  both  of 
these  materials — the  reversion  of  the  retinal  image  would  so 
alter  the  conditions  of  sight  that  the  tactual  perception  of  an 
object  and  the  simultaneous  sight  of  the  same  object  would  no 
longer  call  into  play  the  pair  of  local  signs  which  hitherto  had 
had  the  same  spatial  meaning,  but  a  pair  of  signs  which  had 
come  to  have  opposed  spatial  meanings.  Suppose,  for  illustra- 
tion, that  any  two  tactual  local  signs,1  a  and  d,  have  in  my  nor- 

1  For  convenience  sake  let  us  speak  of  the  signs  as  though  they  could  be 
simple.  Of  course  they  are  really  complexes  of  sensations  from  joints  and 
muscles  and  skin.  Similarly  of  the  visual  signs. 


474  GEORGE  M.  STRATTON. 

mal  experience  the  same  meaning  as  the  two  visual  local  signs 
m  and  n,  respectively.  A  single  object  which  is  both  seen  and 
touched  will  arouse  the  synonymous  signs  a  and  m,  or  subse- 
quently the  pair  b  and  n,  supposing  that  the  object  changes  its 
place.  If  I  merely  touch  the  object,  in  such  a  place  that  a  is 
aroused,  this  suggests  by  associative  correspondence  the  visual 
sign  m ;  and  when  subsequently  I  look  at  the  object,  m  is  ac- 
tually aroused,  and  the  place  of  the  visual  object  is  seen  to  be 
identical  with  the  visual  place  suggested  by  touch.  Touch  in 
this  case  suggests  a  visual  experience  which  the  visual  percep- 
tion confirms.  Likewise  a  visual  perception  whose  local  sign 
was  n  would  suggest,  and  afterwards  be  followed  by,  a  tactual 
experience  whose  local  sign  was  b.  And  in  these  cases  the 
spatial  character  of  the  perceptions  by  the  different  senses  would 
be  harmonious. 

But  suppose,  now,  that  the  retinal  image  is  changed,  as  in 
the  experiment.  An  object  which  arouses  the  tactual  sign  a 
will  no  longer  give  a  visual  experience  containing  the  sign  m, 
but  will  give  one  containing,  say,  n.  And  the  visual  experience 
containing  the  local  sign  m  is  no  longer  accompanied  by  a 
tactual  experience  containing  #,  but  by  one  containing,  say,  b ; 
and  vice  versa.  By  the  long  previous  experience,  however,  a 
touch-perception  containing  the  sign  a  has  come  to  suggest  a 
visual  experience  containing  the  sign  m,  and  will  consequently 
continue  for  some  time  to  suggest  such  a  visual  experience.  But 
the  actual  sight  of  the  object  will  show  it  in  a  different  place 
from  what  touch  suggested  ;  for  the  visual  experience  will  now 
actually  contain  n  and  not  m.  And  likewise  this  visual  experi- 
ence whose  local  sign  is  n  will  for  some  time  continue  to  mean 
a  tactual  experience  whose  sign  is  3,  in  a  different  locality  from 
the  real  touch  of  the  object,  which  now  contains  the  sign  a. 
Each  sense  will  in  this  way  suggest  experiences  which  the  actual 
perceptions  of  the  other  sense  will  contradict.  Thus  touch  and 
sight  will  be  in  mutual  discord. 

According  to  the  view  here  presented,  this  discord  will  con- 
tinue as  long  as  the  local  sign  a  suggests  the  local  sign  m,  and 
vice  versa.  But  when  # ,  by  repeated  connection,  suggests  only 
the  visual  position  implied  in  the  local  sign  n,  and  this  latter  in 


VISION   WITHOUT  INVERSION.  475 

turn  means  only  the  touch  locality  whose  sign  is  a;  and  when 
m  and  b  have  come  to  have  an  identical  meaning,  or  are  in  cor- 
respondence ;  then  the  total  experience  will  again  be  harmonious. 
Each  sense  would  then  suggest  only  what  the  other  sense  would 
confirm.  We  would  see  things  where  we  felt  them  to  be,  and 
we  would  feel  them  where  we  saw  them  to  be.  But  until  this 
reharmonization  has  been  brought  about,  visual  ideas  in  the 
older  form  will  continue  to  arise  at  the  suggestion  of  tactual  ex- 
periences, and  there  will  be  discord  between  the  things  in  sight 
and  the  wider  system  of  visual  representations.  The  persistence 
of  the  old  inter-sensory  correspondences  accounts,  therefore, 
for  the  long  opposition  of  visual  ideas  and  visual  perceptions, 
during  the  experiment. 

We  are  now  enabled  also  to  see  what  the  harmony  between 
touch  and  sight  really  is.  The  experiment  clearly  shows  that 
an  object  need  not  appear  in  any  particular  position  in  the  visual 
field  in  order  to  admit  of  a  union  or  identification  of  the  tactual 
and  visual  perceptions  of  the  object.  The  visual  position  which 
any  tactual  experience  suggests — the  visual  place  in  which  we 
« feel '  that  an  object  is — is  determined,  not  by  some  fundamental 
and  immutable  relation  of  tactual  and  visual  '  spaces,'  but  by 
the  mere  fact  that  we  have  constantly  seen  the  object  there 
when  we  have  had  that  particular  touch-experience.  If  this 
particular  touch-experience  were  the  uniform  and  exclusive  ac- 
companiment of  a  visual  object  in  some  different  visual  position, 
the  two  sensory  reports  would  mean  the  same  thing,  and  the 
places  of  their  object  would  be  identical.  Of  course,  the  har- 
mony of  touch  and  sight  also  implies  that  visual  appearances 
have  the  same  relations  to  one  another  as  tactual  appearances 
have  to  one  another ;  so  that  a  given  object  in  sight  must  have 
the  same  spatial  relation  to  the  rest  of  my  visual  world  as  the 
accompanying  touch-object  has  with  respect  to  the  rest  of  my 
tactual  world.  But  this  harmony  does  not  require  that  the  visual 
manifestation  of  a  tactual  object  should  be  just  here  and  not 
there,  or  in  this  direction  and  not  in  that. 

The  inverted  position  of  the  retinal  image  is,  therefore, 
not  essential  to  '  upright  vision,'  for  it  is  not  essential  to  a  har- 
mony between  touch  and  sight,  which,  in  the  final  analysis,  is 


476  GEORGE  M.  STRATTON. 

the  real  meaning  of  upright  vision.  For  some  visual  objects 
may  be  inverted  with  respect  to  other  visual  objects,  but  the 
'whole  system  of  visual  objects  can  never  by  itself  be  either  in- 
verted or  upright.  It  could  be  inverted  or  upright  only  with 
respect  to  certain  non-visual  experiences  with  which  I  might 
compare  my  visual  system — in  other  words,  with  respect  to  my 
tactual  or  motor  perceptions. 

The  reharmonizing  of  touch  and  sight,  in  the  experiment, 
consisted  therefore  of  a  double  work.  Visual  objects  and  ideas, 
which  were  at  first  isolated,  had  to  become  a  system  whose 
parts  had  the  same  relations  among  themselves  as  the  parts  of 
the  tactual  system,  or  of  the  older  visual  system.  Not  until 
the  construction  of  a  visual  system  enveloping  and  sup- 
plementing the  actual  visual  field,  would  sight  have  some- 
thing corresponding  to  the  touch-system  brought  over  undis- 
turbed from  the  older  experience.  But  the  completion  of 
this  work  was  dependent  on  the  progress  of  the  second  work, 
namely  the  perfecting  or  entire  reconstruction  of  the  process  of 
translating  from  sight  into  touch  and  from  touch  into  sight. 
Until  this  reconstruction  was  complete,  each  sense  would  sug- 
gest experiences  of  the  other  sense  which  this  other  sense  would 
flatly  contradict.  Their  reports  would  therefore  necessarily 
seem  discordant.  But  the  restoration  of  harmony  between  the 
perceptions  of  sight  and  those  of  touch  was  in  no  wise  a  process 
of  changing  the  absolute  position  of  tactual  objects  so  as  to 
make  it  identical  with  the  place  of  the  visual  objects ;  no  more 
than  it  was  an  alteration  of  the  visual  position  into  accord  with 
the  tactual.  Nor  was  it  a  process  of  changing  the  relative  posi- 
tion of  tactual  objects  with  respect  to  visual  objects  ;  but  it  was 
a  process  of  making  a  new  visual  position  seem  the  only  natural 
place  for  the  visual  counterpart  of  a  given  tactual  experience  to 
appear  in ;  and  similarly  in  regard  to  new  tactual  positions  for 
the  tactual  accompaniment  of  given  visual  experiences.  New 
associations  had  to  develop,  and  new  forms  of  expectation  had 
to  arise ;  in  a  word,  new  correspondences  had  to  be  brought 
about.  But  the  tactual  perceptions,  as  such,  never  changed 
their  place.  They  simply  got  a  new  visual  translation. 

The  especial  obstinacy  of  the  old  representation  of  the  body 


VISION   WITHOUT  INVERSION.  477 

requires  no  extended  comment.  It  is  what  we  would  expect 
when  the  cause  of  the  persistence  of  the  older  images  in  general 
is  understood.  If  visual  suggestion  from  touch,  based  on  the 
pre-experimental  set  of  correspondences  between  touch  and 
sight,  was  the  chief  cause  of  the  persistent  return  of  the  older 
images,  then  of  course  the  conditions  were  peculiarly  favorable 
for  a  continuance  of  the  old  visual  representation  of  the  body. 
For  in  this  case  touch  was  ever-present ;  and  moreover  the  body 
was  seen  only  in  part.  Head,  neck,  shoulders,  and  the  upper 
part  of  the  trunk,  could  not  be  directly  seen  at  all.  Shadows, 
reflections,  etc.,  had  some  influence  in  bringing  to  mind  the 
new  visual  place  of  these  parts ;  but  such  indirect  agents  lacked 
the  force  of  direct  and  continued  perception.  So  that  the  pos- 
sibility of  bringing  about  new  correspondences  was  confined, 
for  the  most  part,  to  my  arms  and  legs.  But  there  is,  doubt- 
less, a  solidarity  of  the  body,  and  when  so  large  a  part  could  not 
be  reached  by  the  new  experience,  the  rest  also  was  affected 
but  little.  The  body  hung  together  as  a  unit,  and  refused  to  go 
with  the  new,  unless  all  of  it  could  go. 

In  the  daily  experience  during  the  experiment,  localization 
of  parts  of  the  body  to  one  side  (right  or  left)  of  the  visual 
field  of  representation  was  more  persistently  in  discord  with  the 
new  visual  experience,  than  wras  the  vertical  localization  of  these 
parts.  The  explanation  of  this  is  found,  I  think,  in  the  fact 
that  both  tactual  and  visual  differences  in  the  body  are  much 
more  striking  at  different  levels  of  the  body  (passing  up  and 
down)  than  on  different  sides  of  the  body.  I  frequently  saw 
one  of  my  hands  and  took  it  for  the  other,  but  of  course  I  never 
looked  at  my  foot  and  thought  it  was  my  hand.  So,  too,  I  er- 
roneously localized  in  one  of  my  hands  an  object  which  was  in 
contact  with  the  other  hand,  but  I  never  localized  in  my  foot  a 
contact  that  was  really  on  my  hand,  nor  vice  versa.  The  ex- 
perience itself  was  thus,  as  far  as  lateral  relations  were  con- 
cerned, comparatively  ambiguous,  but  not  ambiguous  at  all 
with  respect  to  vertical  relations.  When,  through  the  touch- 
experience,  a  visual  image  was  called  up  in  the  old  lateral  re- 
lations, this  image  was  not  so  violently  in  discord  with  the  new 
visual  experience,  as  a  mistake  in  vertical  reference  would  have 


478  GEORGE  M.  STRATTON. 

been.  For  the  image  of  my  right  arm  or  leg  would  also  serve 
fairly  well  for  that  of  my  left.  And  in  actual  sight  nearly  the 
same  objects  were  seen  now  on  one  side  and  now  on  the  other. 
This  hindered  a  fixed  association  of  a  particular  image  with  a 
particular  visual  side,  such  that  when  a  contact  occurred  the 
part  of  the  body  which  it  suggested  must  be  referred  to  this  side 
and  not  to  that,  if  the  contract  were  to  fit  into  the  visual  total  at 
all.  The  fact  that  the  new  visual  experience  was  tolerant  of  a 
localization  on  either  side  almost  indifferently  was  therefore 
favorable  to  a  continuance  of  the  old  lateral  localization.  But 
the  new  vision  unequivocally  pronounced  against  an  error  in 
vertical  localization ;  the  uniform  contradiction  tended  therefore 
to  break  up  the  old  suggestions,  and  to  build  anew  the  vertical 
system  more  rapidly  than  the  lateral. 

It  is  not  improbable  that  the  persistence  of  the  old  lateral 
localization  of  the  body  was  the  main  cause  of  the  relative  per- 
manence of  the  old  localization  of  sounds.  For,  vertically, 
wide  changes  in  localization  of  sounds  readily  came  by  spon- 
taneous suggestion ;  but  not  so  the  lateral  changes.  These  came 
rarely  except  by  strong  effort  of  attention  and  voluntary  vizu- 
alization.  The  chief  basis  for  determining  the  side  from  which 
a  sound  comes — the  relative  intensity  of  the  sound  in  the  two 
ears — would  lead  us  to  expect  exactly  this  result  as  long  as  the 
two  sides  of  the  body  were  involuntarily  represented  as  of  old. 
If  a  sound  was  localized  with  reference  to  a  particular  ear  or 
side  of  my  head,  then  it  would  be  localized  in  the  old  way  as  long 
as  these  were  localized  in  the  old  way  ;  and  not  until  the  localiza- 
tion of  the  two  ears  or  sides  of  the  head  was  transposed  into 
harmony  with  the  new  experience  would  the  auditory  localiza- 
tion, at  least  in  its  lateral  aspects,  come  into  harmony  with  that 
experience.  The  cases  in  which  the  lateral  localization  of 
sound  did  accord  with  the  new  sight  were  no  doubt  due  to  a  mo- 
mentary strengthening  of  the  influence  of  visual  suggestion  to 
such  a  degree  that  the  usual  dominant  factor  in  lateral  localiza- 
tion became  subordinate.  The  fact  that  the  sound  of  my  foot- 
steps conformed  to  the  tactual  and  visual  localization  of  my  feet, 
and  that  in  general  the  sight  of  the  sound's  place  of  origin  car- 
ried with  it  the  localization  of  the  sound,  shows  to  what  an  ex- 
tent our  auditory  localization  is  influenced  by  suggestion. 


VISION   WITHOUT  INVERSION.  479 

It  was  repeatedly  noticed  in  the  course  of  the  experiment  that 
the  total  experience  was  much  more  harmonious  during  active 
movements  of  my  body  than  when  I  inactively  looked  out  upon 
the  scene.  This  becomes  intelligible  when  one  sees  how  such 
movements  gave  additional  vivacity  to  the  new  visual  experi- 
ence and  to  all  that  was  in  harmony  with  it,  and  tended  to  sup- 
press those  images  of  the  body  which  did  not  accord  with  the 
new  relations.  The  movements  of  my  arms  and  legs  into  and 
through  the  visual  field  emphasized  their  new  visual  position 
more  than  their  motionless  appearance  would  have  done.  They 
caught  and  held  the  attention,  and  by  the  vigor  of  their  appear- 
ance suggested  the  rest  of  the  body  in  harmony  with  themselves. 
Moreover  the  movements  of  the  field  of  view,  when  I  nodded 
my  head,  or  moved  up  and  down  in  walking,  or  rocked  in  my 
chair,  were  such  as  harmonized  with  the  movement  of  my  body 
only  when  my  body  was  thought  of  as  in  its  new  visual  position. 
Otherwise  the  objects  passed  through  the  field  of  view  in  the 
wrong  direction, — in  a  direction  which  the  felt  movement  of  my 
head  or  body  did  not  at  all  explain.  And,  finally,  the  new 
localization  of  the  body  was  the  only  one  which  was  practically 
important  when  the  visible  environment  had  to  be  actively  en- 
countered. My  actions  could  be  guided,  not  by  keeping  in 
mind  the  pre-experimental  localization  of  the  body  and  noticing 
its  relation  to  objects  in  sight,  but  only  by  accepting  the  new 
position  of  my  body  as  real  and  constantly  watching  its  relation 
to  surrounding  things.  The  scene  itself  became  more  my  own 
by  acting  upon  it,  and  this  action  reacted  to  bring  the  represen- 
tation of  my  body  into  harmonious  relation  to  the  scene.  As  a 
result  of  these  various  influences,  the  whole  experience  was 
cleared  of  inner  discord  to  a  degree  seldom  if  ever  attained  dur- 
ing a  time  of  repose. 

At  the  close  of  the  experiment,  after  the  lenses  had  been  re- 
moved, windows  and  other  prominent  objects,  as  the  narrative 
recounts,  seemed  too  high.  This  was  puzzling  enough  until  I 
discovered  that,  when  my  apparatus  was  on  my  face,  objects  in 
the  centre  of  the  field  of  view  were  slightly  lower  than  when 
seen  without  the  lenses.  The  axis  of  the  cylinder  containing 
the  lenses  was  in  fact  not  exactly  the  same  as  the  line  of  sight 


480  GEORGE  M.  STRATTON. 

when  the  eye  was  directed  to  the  centre  of  the  field.  The  dis- 
placement this  caused  in  the  apparent  position  of  things  was  the 
less  noticeable  because  of  the  general  transposition  of  objects  by 
the  inverting  power  of  the  lenses.  But  a  careful  examination 
showed  that  the  downward  displacement  at  the  centre  was  about 
equal  to  the  apparent  upward  displacement  on  removing  the 
lenses.  No  exact  comparison  could  be  made,  for  I  did  not 
notice  this  peculiarity  of  the  apparatus  until  several  days  after 
the  close  of  the  experiment.  So  that  I  had  to  depend  on  my 
inexact  recollection  of  what  the  extent  of  the  illusion  had  been. 
It  is,  of  course,  barely  possible  that  the  illusion  was  in  some 
way  a  direct  consequence  of  reinverting  the  retinal  image.  But 
more  probably  the  general  displacement  of  objects,  by  reason 
of  the  position  of  the  tube,  had  grown  so  familiar  that,  their 
normal  position  on  removing  the  glasses  seemed  as  much  too 
high  as  their  position  during  the  experiment  had  been  too  low. 
But  to  return  to  the  more  significant  features  of  the  experi- 
ment. These  are,  without  doubt,  found  in  the  results  bearing 
on  the  relation  between  touch  and  sight,  and  through  them  on 
the  interrelation  of  the  senses  generally.  The  experiment 
makes  it  clear  that  the  harmony  between  sight  and  touch  does 
not  depend  on  the  inversion  of  the  retinal  image.  The  spatial 
identity  of  tactual  and  visual  objects  evidently  does  not  require 
that  there  should  be  a  visual  transposition  of  objects  or  that  they 
should  be  given  some  special  direction  in  the  visual  field.  The 
chief  reason  for  the  existence  of  the  projection  theory  is  there- 
fore taken  away.  Nor,  on  the  other  hand,  are  the  visual  direc- 
tions made  known  to  us  and  determined  through  our  perceiving 
the  '  absolute,'  or  pure  motor,  direction  of  the  movements 
which  alter  the  line  of  sight.  The  facts  all  go  to  show  that  the 
direction  of  movements  of  the  head  or  eyes  is  not  judged  on 
purely  muscular  evidence,  independently  of  the  simultaneous 
changes  in  vision  itself.  On  the  contrary  the  movements  are 
soon  felt  as  having  a  direction  opposite  to  that  of  the  objects 
passing  through  the  visual  field.  During  the  experiment,  for 
instance,  I  often  felt  my  eyes  turn  toward  the  sky  and  away 
from  my  feet,  although  they  really  turned  toward  my  feet. 
The  felt  direction  of  the  movement  is  therefore  relative  to  the 


VISION  WITHOUT  INVERSION.  481 

direction  of  the  movement  of  visual  objects,  and  the  *  absolute ' 
muscular  direction  cuts  no  decisive  figure  in  the  perception  at 
all.  This  will  no  doubt  seem  a  hard  saying  to  those  who  have 
been  pinning  their  faith  more  and  more  on  the  unimpeachable 
witness  of  muscular  sensations.  It  certainly  makes  the  eye- 
movement  doctrine  of  visual  directions  of  little  practical  assist- 
ance for  understanding  the  harmony  between  sight  and  touch. 
This  harmony,  as  was  said,  seems  rather  to  be  an  accord  of 
the  ideas  suggested  in  terms  of  one  of  the  senses,  with  the  per- 
ce-ptions  of  the  same  sense.  When  touch  and  sight  agree,  it  means 
that  the  perceptions  of  sight  are  spatially  identical  with  the  visual 
suggestions  produced  by  touch,  and  that  the  perceptions  of  touch 
spatially  identical  with  the  tactual  suggestions  produced  by  sight. 
The  doctrine  of  a  correspondence  of  local  signs,  stated  some 
pages  back,  makes  it  easy  to  see  how  such  a  harmony  could 
grow  up  ;  and,  at  the  same  time,  how  a  reharmonization  of  touch 
are  and  sight  is  possible,  whatever  may  be  the  position  of  the 
retinal  image.  The  view  makes  provision,  therefore,  for  the 
special  results  of  the  experiment,  as  well  as  for  the  normal 
course  of  our  experience ;  which  the  current  doctrines  concern- 
ing the  interplay  of  touch  and  sight  seem  hardly  able  to  do. 


THE    PSYCHOLOGY  OF    SOCIAL    ORGANIZATION. 

BY  PROFESSOR  J.  MARK  BALDWIN. 
Princeton   University. 

The  object  of  this  paper  is  to  present  in  outline  a  way  of  con- 
ceiving of  the  general  fact  of  human  social  organization  in  line 
with  the  tendency  which  has  proved  itself  fruitful  in  the  last  few 
years  mainly  in  France ;  the  tendency  to  recognize  the  psycho- 
logical character  of  the  motifs  at  work  in  society.  It  seems  to 
me  to  be  a  permanent  advance  that  the  biological  analogy  is 
giving  place  to  a  psychological  analogy,  and  that  this  is  lead- 
ing the  writers  in  socalled  '  sociology  '  to  examine  the  psycho- 
logical processes  which  lie  wrapped  up  in  the  activities  and 
responsibilities  called  social.  The  point  of  view  sketched  in 
the  following  pages  reproduces  some  parts  of  a  work  entitled 
*  Social  and  Ethical  Interpretations  in  Mental  Development,' 
which  is  now  in  press.1 

§  i.  The  hard  questions,  to  the  thinker  about  society,  seem  to 
me  to  be  two,  each  of  which  should  have  a  two-fold  statement. 
The  first  question  concerns  the  matter  or  content,  of  social  or- 
ganization ;  what  is  it  that  is  organized?  what  is  it  that  is  passed 
about,  duplicated,  made  use  of,  in  society?  When  we  speak 
of  a  social  phenomenon  in  its  lowest  terms,  what  is  it  all  about, 
what  is  the  sort  of  material  which  must  be  there  if  society  is 
there  ?  This  question  has  had  very  acute  discussion  lately  un- 
der the  somewhat  different  statement :  what  is  the  criterion  or 
test  of  a  social  phenomenon?  But  the  question  which  I  ask 
under  this  head  is  more  narrow,  since,  in  all  sorts  of  organiza- 
tion, a  further  question  comes  up  in  addition  to  that  of  the  mat- 
ter— the  further  question,  i.  e.,  as  to  the  processes,  methods  of 

1  Macmillans.  Seeing  that  this  paper  was  prepared,  in  the  first  place,  for  a 
sociological  Journal  (the  Rivis.  Ital.  di  Sociologia)  the  more  purely  psychologi- 
cal parts  of  the  work  are  not  given  much  notice.  The  psychological  chapters 
consist,  however,  partly  'of  further  developments  of  points  of  view  contained 
in  my  earlier  work  Mental  Development  in  the  Child  and  the  Race. 

482 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  SOCIAL  ORGANIZATION.  483 

functioning  and  laws  of  organization  of  the  social  content  or 
material.  It  has  been  the  weakness  of  many  good  discussions 
of  late,  I  think,  just  as  they  did  not  set  these  questions  sepa- 
rately, /'.  e.y  (i),  the  matter,  and  (2),  the  functional  method. 

Let  us  take  an  illustration.  Some  of  the  animals  show  a 
certain  organization  which  appears  to  be  social.  But  on  exami- 
nation, in  certain  instances,  we  find  that  the  actions  involved  are 
purely  hereditary,  congenital,  each  animal  doing  his  part,  in  the 
main  or  altogether,  simply  because  he  is  born  to  do  it  whenever 
the  organism  becomes  ripe  for  these  actions  under  the  stimula- 
tion of  his  environment.  Now  let  us  contrast  with  this  the  in- 
telligent cooperative  performance  of  the  same  actions  by  a 
group  of  men  or  children  who  deliberately  join  to  do  them  in 
common.  In  these  cases  it  is  clear  that  the  matter  of  organiza- 
tion is  different ;  one  being  a  purely  biological  and  instinc- 
tive, the  other  a  psychological  and  acquired  action.  The  results 
to  the  observer  may  be  the  same,  and  the  question  may  still 
remain  as  to  whether  the  functional  method  be  the  same  or  no, 
but  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  matter  is  different  in  type.  These 
two  questions  may  therefore  be  distinguished  at  the  outset  with 
so  much  justification. 

§  2.  But  each  of  these  two  questions  allows  of  a  two-fold  re- 
quirement. If  we  assume  that  the  distinction  between  habit 
(with  relative  fixity  of  function)  and  accommodation  (with  rela- 
tive plasticity  of  function  as  seen  in  all  progress  in  learning 
or  acquisition)  holds  of  society,  then  both  the  matter  and 
the  method  or  process  of  social  organization  must  allow  of  these 
two  modes,  and  working  together  must  besides  produce  them. 
If,  for  example,  we  take  an  individual  and  find  that  he  has  a 
habit  of  acting  in  a  certain  way,  and  at  the  same  time  im- 
proves upon  his  action  from  day  to  day,  we  yet  say  that  the  ac- 
tion remains  the  same  in  its  content  or  meaning  throughout  the 
entire  series,  from  the  fixed  habit  to  the  skilled  variation.  Our 
determination  of  the  content  of  the  action  must  have  reference 
to  just  the  possibility  of  the  entire  series  of  statements,  from 
fixed  repetitions  of  habit  to  the  extreme  variations  of  accommo- 
dation, through  all  the  intermediate  stages.  In  other  words, 
the  fact  of  growth  by  a  series  of  accommodations  must  be  reck- 


484  /.  MARK  BALD  WIN. 

oned  with  in  all  the  determinations  of  social  content.  And  state- 
ments of  progress  must  go  with  the  definitions  of  the  actual 
content  at  any  given  stage  of  social  organization.  In  other 
terms,  the  content  of  social  life  is  a  changing  growing  content, 
and  the  definition  of  the  material  of  social  organization  must 
take  account  of  this  character. 

And  so  must  the  theory  of  the  methods  of  functioning  also. 
The  process  of  social  organization  results  in  a  growing  devel- 
oping system.  Progress  is  real,  no  matter  what  its  direction, 
provided  it  result  from  the  constant  action  of  a  uniform  process 
of  change  in  a  uniform  sort  of  material.  This  we  find  in  social 
life,  and  this  is  the  prime  requirement  of  social  theory  both  in 
dealing  with  matter  and  in  dealing  with  function. 

§  3.  It  may  suffice  to  bring  these  distinctions  and  the  prob- 
lems which  emerge  more  clearly  to  the  light,  if  we  note  briefly 
some  of  the  later  attempts  to  deal  with  the  social  organization 
from  a  psychological  point  of  view.  I  shall  cite  types  of  the- 
ory, referring  to  particular  writers  merely  as  illustrating  these 
types  and  without  going  into  the  details  of  their  positions. 

The  Imitation  Theory ',  illustrated  by  M.  Tarde.  This  view 
of  social  organization  has  very  much  to  commend  it,  from  the 
point  of  view  of  method ;  indeed,  as  will  appear  in  the  sequel, 
I  think  it  is  with  modifications  of  statement  the  true,  and  possi- 
bly the  final  solution  of  the  question  of  type  of  social  function. 
As  a  complete  doctrine  of  society,  however,  it  fails  signally, 
since  it  gives  no  answer  to  the  question  of  matter.  M.  Tarde 
does  not  tell  us  what  is  imitable,  what  is  capable,  through  imita- 
tion, of  becoming  fixed  as  social  habit,  and  also  of  being  pro- 
gressively modified  in  the  forms  of  social  progress.  He  does 
seem  to  become  more  aware  of  the  need  of  answering  this  ques- 
tion in  his  later  work,  La  Logique  Sociale,  and  introduces  cer- 
tain elements  of  content  as  '  beliefs  and  desires,'  to  supply  the 
lack.  This,  however,  means  simply  a  departure  from  his  earlier 
theory,  in  which  the  phenomenon  of  imitation  was  treated  as  an 
answer  to  the  question  qu'est  ce  qu'une  societef  Apart  from  M. 
Tarde's  personal  views,  it  may  be  said  that  the  case  of  imita- 
tion at  its  purest  is  just  the  case  in  which  the  social  vanishes. 
Imagine  a  room-full  of  parrots  imitating  each  other  in  regular 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  SOCIAL   ORGANIZATION.  485 

sequence  around  the  area,  and  let  them  keep  it  up  ad  tnfinitum, 
and  with  as  much  individual  variation  as  they  may ;  where  is 
the  social  bonds  between  the  parrots?  In  so  far  as  the  imitation 
is  exact,  in  this  case  a  thing  of  congenital  instinct,  in  so  far  we 
might  substitute  tuning-forks  for  the  parrots,  and  let  them  vi- 
brate together  after  striking  one  of  them  a  sharp  blow.  Indeed, 
in  his  treatment  of  the  final  nature  of  imitation  in  his  Lois  de 
V Imitation  M.  Tarde  brings  it  into  a  sort  of  cosmic  correlation 
with  undulatory  repetition  in  physics.  I  can  not  see  that  the 
mere  presence  of  imitation  would  avail  anything,  without  tacit 
or  explicit  assumptions  of  two  kinds  :  first,  that  the  material  of 
social  organization  is  essentially  imitable  material ;  and  second, 
that  through  imitation  this  material  would  take  on  the  forms  of 
organization  actually  found  in  society. 

2.  Another  type  of  theory  which  is  open  to  the  same  criticisms 
in  effect  is  represented  by  the  'constraint '  view  of  M.  Durkheim. 
To  this  view  the  essence  of  social  organization  is  the  constrain- 
ing influence  of  one  person  upon  others.  It  is  in  line  with  the 
extreme  *  suggestion '  theory  of  society,  which  makes  the  crowd 
acting  under  the  suggestion  of  the  strongest  personalities  in  it 
the  type  of  social  organization  as  such.  The  weakness  of  this 
type  of  doctrine  appears  from  the  striking  analogy  from  hyp- 
notic suggestion  which  its  advocates  employ.  And  the  element 
common  to  such  a  view  with  that  of  M.  Tarde  is  evidenced  in  the 
use  which  he  makes  of  the  same  analogy.  The  analogy  seems 
to  me  to  be  quite  correct ;  to  this  view  the  extreme  and  the  pur- 
est instance  of  social  organization  would  be  hypnotic  rapport. 
Here  constraint  is  well  nigh  absolute,  imitation  is  perfect,  sub- 
ordination is  unquestionable.  But  it  is  only  necessary  to  state 
this  to  see  that  in  hypnotic  rapport  the  social  has  completely 
evaporated.  It  gives  no  criticism  or  criterion  of  social  material ; 
the  hypnotic  subject  or  the  generally  suggestible  subject  tends  to 
take  all  suggestions  as  of  approximately  equal  value,  to  obey 
everything,  to  understand  nothing,  to  be  the  same  sort  of  an  in- 
strument of  repetition  as  the  parrot  and  the  tuning  fork.  How 
there  could  be  any  organization  as  distinct  from  repetition,  of 
progress  as  distinct  from  arbitrary  caprice,  I  am  quite  unable  to 
see.  It  may  be,  as  a  matter  of  history,  that  the  first  social  man 


486  J.  MARK  BALDWIN. 

became  so  because  he  was  knocked  down  by  a  stronger,  and  so 
constrained  to  be  his  slave ;  but  further  progress  from  such  a 
state  of  constraint,  in  the  direction  of  cooperation,  would  be  pos- 
sible only  in  proportion  as  there  was  a  '  let-up '  or  modification 
of  the  one-sided  constraint.  In  other  words  constraint — or 
rather  the  imitation  to  which  it  may  be  reduced  as  soon  as  it 
ceases  to  be  one-sided  and  becomes  mutual — may  have  been 
the  method  and  may  continue  to  be  the  method  of  social  organi- 
zation, but  the  lines  of  progress  actually  made  by  society  would 
seem  to  be  determined  by  certain  inherent  possibilities  of  fruitful 
cooperation  and  organization  in  some  particular  spheres.  These 
spheres  must  be  defined,  and  that  raises  the  quite  different  ques- 
tion of  matter  or  content.  The  constraint  theorists,  I  know, 
take  as  type  of  constraint  not  that  of  force,  but  that  of  sugges- 
tion ;  and  it  is  just  this  tendency  which  brings  their  view  into 
line  with  the  imitation  theory  and  makes  it  available  as  an  im- 
portant, but  less  important,  contribution  to  that  theory. 

3.  There  is  another  way  again  of  looking  at  social  organiza- 
ion,  a  way  which,  however,  may  be  called  psychological  only 
with  some  latitude.  Dr.  Simmel,  of  Berlin,  may  be  taken  as 
representing  it  in  a  part  of  his  treatment  of  society.  It  consists  in 
attempting,  by  an  analysis  of  social  events  and  phenomena,  to 
arrive  at  a  statement  of  the  formal  principles  which  each  sec- 
tion or  general  instance  of  social  life  presents.  Such  formal 
principles  are  division  of  labor,  altruistic  endeavor  and  co- 
operation, etc.  This  is  a  very  serviceable  undertaking,  I  think, 
and  must  result  in  a  certain  valid  social  logic — a  system  of 
principles  by  which  social  phenomena  may  be  classified  and 
which  may  serve  as  touch-stones  of  particular  cases  of  organiza- 
tion. The  objection,  however,  to  building  a  science  of  sociol- 
ogy upon  it  is  just  that  the  principles  are  formal ;  it  would  be 
like  building  the  psychology  of  concrete  daily  life  upon  the  for- 
mal principles  of  logic.  Principles  which  get  application  every- 
where are  not  of  concrete  use  anywhere.  They  also  lack — or 
the  system  which  seeks  them  out  lacks — the  genetic  point  of 
view.  Granted  the  establishing  of  these  principles  by  the  analy- 
sis of  social  events,  the  question  would  still  remain  as  to  the 
original  form  which  they  showed  in  primitive  societies.  It  is 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  SOCIAL    ORGANIZATION.  487 

easier  to  deal  with  the  simpler  and  work  up  than  it  is  to  reverse 
this  procedure  ;  and  from  this  point  of  view  it  would  seem  quite 
possible  to  treat  all  such  principles  as  developments  from  imita- 
tion and  suggestion.  Apart  from  this,  however,  the  essential 
criticism  to  be  made  upon  this  type  of  thought  is  that  it  deals 
only  with  form  and  functional  method  and  assumes  certain  sorts 
of  matter  of  social  organization.  The  principle  of  division  of 
labor,  for  example,  assumes  conscious  thought,  in  such  divi- 
sion and  its  constant  application  by  the  members  of  society. 

4.  Another  class  of  doctrines  have  the  merit  of  being  genetic, 
those  which  found  the  social  life  of  communities  upon  certain 
primitive  emotions,  such  as  sympathy.  These  theories  are  ex 
emplified  by  Mr.  Spencer,  M.  Novikow  and  the  English  moral 
philo.-ophers.  This  is  possibly  the  oldest  form  of  social  theory, 
having  its  roots  in  Aristotle,  and  has  all  the  accumulated  au- 
thority of  age.  Its  forms  of  statement  are  also  so  numerous 
that  I  cannot  take  them  up.  From  the  pure  '  sympathy '  theory 
we  pass  to  the  '  altruistic  theory '  which  makes  social  life  a 
derivative  of  ethical ;  to  the  social  instinct  theory,  which  says 
that  man  is  natively  social,  and  sympathy  and  altruistic  feeling 
are  evidences  of  it ;  and  finally  we  reach  the  climax  of  descrip- 
tive vagueness — in  a  formula  wide  enough  to  include  all  the 
rest — the  '  consciousness  of  kind '  recently  propounded  by  Pro- 
fessor F.  Giddings.1 

As  a  class  it  may  be  said  of  all  these  theories  that  they  con- 
stantly confuse  the  questions  of  method  and  matter  in  social 
organization.  In  regard  to  method  of  function  the  imitation 
theory  comes  in  at  once  to  supplement  these  earlier  points  of 
view.  But  apart  from  this  lack  it  may  be  said  that  the  life  of 
feeling  and  instinct  does  not  furnish  the  requirements  of  matter 
for  social  organization.  There  are  two  sorts  of  sympathy,  two 
sorts  of  social  instinct,  two  sorts  of  consciousness  of  kind.  This 
appears  when  we  press  the  requirement  indicated  above  that 
the  matter  of  social  organization  should  be  such  as  to  allow  the 
formation  both  of  social  habit  and  of  the  adaptations  seen  in 
social  accommodation  and  growth.  The  life  of  instinct  as  such 

'In  the  third  edition  of  his  Prime,  of  Sociology  (Preface),  however,  Profes- 
sor Giddings  defines  '  consciousness  of  kind '  more  in  terms  of  sympathy. 


/.  MARK  BALDWIN. 

and  of  the  emotions  which  come  with  instinctive  activities — e.  g., 
organic  sympathy,  impulsive  altruism,  manifestations  of  kind, 
such  as  maternal  affection,  etc. — all  these  are  race  habits.  To 
the  degree  in  which  they  fulfill  the  requirement  that  society  live 
by  its  stock  of  habits,  to  that  degree  do  they  fail  to  enable  so- 
ciety to  modify  its  habits  and  grow.  If  we  sympathize  with 
each  other  by  pure  instinct,  and  act  on  the  movings  of  sympathy, 
new  organization  would  be  as  far  off  as  if  we  fought  tooth 
and  nail ;  for  action  would  be  as  capricious.  So  also,  merely  to 
feel  socially  inclined  would  not  beget  differential  forms  of  so- 
cial organization.  To  be  conscious  of  others  as  of  the  same 
kind  would  in  itself  not  determine,  in  the  slightest  degree,  the 
sort  of  thought  or  action  which  should  be  fruitfully  recognized 
and  developed  within  the  habits  of  the  kind.  If  we  assume 
an  adequate  content,  a  common  material,  in  short,  if  we  as- 
sume social  organization  already,  in  the  groups  which  for  con- 
venience after  they  are  made  up  in  nature,  we  call  kinds,  then 
of  course  it  is  the  simplest  thing  in  the  world  to  say  that  what  the 
members  have  in  common  is  their  consciousness  of  kind ;  but 
is  no  more  an  explanation  than  is  the  phrase  '  love  of  drink '  an 
explanation  of  inherited  tendency  to  alcoholism. 

It  is  only  when  we  come  to  see  the  second  or  higher  sort  of 
sympathy,  social  instinct,  consciousness  of  kind,  etc.,  that  the 
requirement  that  social  organization  be  progressive  becomes 
more  apparent,  because  only  there  is  it  possible  of  fulfillment. 
We  do  not  find  instincts  getting  much  organization  apart  from 
certain  fixed  and  congenital  forms  of  association.  The  higher 
emotions  and  actions  which  arise  when  consciousness  becomes 
in  some  degrees  reflective  as  opposed  to  instinctive,  take  on  as- 
pects which  are  differentiated  from  one  another  according  to 
the  mental  content  which  they  accompany.  There  is  a  reflec- 
tive sympathy,  a  reflective  sociality,  a  reflective  consciousness 
of  kind ;  and  it  is  just  their  value  that  they  now  afford  some 
criterion — a  material  criterion — over  and  above  the  mere  fact 
of  feeling  and  instinct.  This  point  is  the  main  business  of  this 
paper,  so  I  need  not  dwell  upon  it  here ;  but  it  leads  us  to  see 
that  the  theories  which  deal  in  such  general  descriptions  of 
social  organization  as  the  terms  mentioned  carry,  are  quite  in- 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  SOCIAL    ORGANIZATION.  489 

adequate,  since  they  leave  the  real  question  of  matter  unanswer- 
ed :  of  the  '  what '  of  social  organization — the  *  what '  of  such 
questions  as  "what  does  society  fruitfully  imitate?"  "  what  feel- 
ing and  acts  of  sympathy  yield  results  of  social  value  and  per- 
manence?" "what  is  the  something  found  sometimes  in  the  con- 
sciousness of  kind  which  in  these  cases  leads  to  the  sort  of 
progress  characteristic  of  an  ethical  society  as  opposed,  let  us 
say,  to  a  school  of  fish  ? "  Of  course  I  am  not  intending  to 
draw  lines,  even  between  the  ethical  society  and  the  school  of 
fish.  It  is  a  further  question,  after  we  determine  the  what  of 
social  organization,  to  find  how  far  it  is  present  also  in  the  be- 
havior of  the  school  of  fish.  But  what  is  it? — *  that  is  the  ques- 
tion.' 

§  4.  This  brief  characterization  of  theories,  all  aiming  to 
be  psychological,  enables  us  to  see  our  problem.  I  have  in- 
troduced them  only  for  this  purpose ;  and  the  inadequacies  of 
presentation  will,  I  hope,  not  be  construed  as  inadequacies  of 
appreciation.  The  way  the  emerging  problems  appear,  in  con- 
sequence of  our  review  so  far,  may  be  shown  in  certain  more 
formal  statements  to  which  the  remainder  of  the  paper  may  now 
be  addressed. 

1.  There  is  entire  justification  for  the  distinction  urged  by 
Tonnies  between  what  have  been  called  in  English  respectively 
*  colonies,'  '  droves,'  '  schools,' «  herds,'  etc.,  in  particular  cases, 
and  *  societies.'      Tonnies   distinguishes  between  the   Gemein- 
schaft  and  the  Gesellschaft.     The  difference — to  put  it  in  my 
own  way,  from  the  point  of  view  of  a  current  psychological 
and   biological    distinction — is   this,  i.  e.>    between    the   rela- 
tively unvarying,  relatively  definite,  and  relatively  unconscious 
organization  which  has  its  extreme  instance  in  animal  instinct, 
and  the  relatively  varying,  progressive,  plastic  and  conscious 
organization  seen  in  human  life.     I  shall  distinguish  these  types 
as  '  companies J1  and  '  societies.' 

2.  The  distinction  just  made  is  mainly  one  of  matter  or  con- 
tent, seeing  that  the  method  of  interaction  (/'.  e.,  granting  that 

'The  word  'community'  might  be  used  for  this,  as  a  translation  of  Ge- 
meinschaft\  but  that  word  has  another  significance  in  English.  The  term 
'  colony '  is  also  inappropriate,  I  think,  for  a  similar  reason. 


49°  /•  MARK  BALDWIN. 

it  is  imitation)  is  substantially  the    same  in   the  two  types  of 
organization. 

3.  The  first  problem  is,  therefore,  the  determination  of  the 
facts  regarding  the   '  what '  of  social  life.     What  is  it  that  is 
both  common  to  all  societies  and  also  capable  of  progressive 
organization  in  each  society? 

4.  The  assumption  that  imitation  is  the  method  in  both  col- 
onies and  societies  is  made  on  the  strength  of  recent  work  of 
various  writers.     Imitation  may,  however,  be  brought  to  a  fur- 
ther test  in  connection  with  the  problem  of  matter,  since  after 
having  determined  the  sort  of  matter  with  which  we  have  to 
deal,  we  must  then  ask  whether  the  imitative  method  of  organ- 
ization adequately  explains  the  actual  forms  which  this  material 
shows.     To  my  mind  the  strongest  proof  of  the  claim  for  imita- 
tion as  type  of  social  function  is  derived  from  its  effective  appli- 
cation after  the  nature  of  the  material  is  determined.     It  thus 
loses  the  casual  empirical  character  which  social  observation  so 
often  shows,  and  becomes  wrought  into  what  may  then  be  called, 
in  a  figure,  social  morphology.     The  psychological  portions  of 
my  work  are  devoted  to  a  detailed  exposition  of  the  imitative 
development  of  the  social  consciousness. 

5 .  Finally,  the  determination  of  phenomena  as  social  is  only 
possible  under  this  two-fold  requirement  as  to  matter  and  meth- 
od.    To  fail  in  either  of  these  is  to  fail  entirely ;  on  the  one  side 
it  would  be  like  determining  life  by  morphology  alone,  with  no 
necessary   exclusion   of   crystals  and  plough-shares,  provided 
they  were  the  right  shape  ;  or,  on  the  other  hand,  by  physiology 
alone,  which  would  not  exclude  a  cunningly-devised  india-rub- 
ber   heart   or    an    air-pump-breathing    machine,    provided   it 
worked. 

§5.  Coming,  therefore,  to  the  question  of  the  matter,  the 
'what,'  of  social  organization,  I  shall  state  a  general  result,  and 
then  indicate  certain  lines  of  evidence  for  it. 

This  result  may  be  put  in  the  form  of  a  thesis  as  follows : 
the  matter  of  social  organization  consists  of  thoughts;  all  kinds 
of  knowledges  and  informations.  And  in  the  way  of  further 
anticipation  and  description  of  the  mechanism  of  social  organi- 
zation, we  may  add  that  these  thoughts  or  knowledges  or  infor- 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  SOCIAL    ORGANIZATION.  491 

mations,  originate  in  the  mind  of  the  individuals  of  the  group, 
as  inventions,  or  more  or  less  novel  conceptions.  At  their  ori- 
gin, however,  there  is  no  reason  for  calling  them  social  matter, 
since  they  are  particular  to  the  individual.  They  become  social 
only  when  society — that  is,  the  other  members  of  the  social 
group,  or  some  of  them — also  thinks  them,  knows  them,  is  in- 
formed of  them.  This  reduces  them  from  the  individual  and 
particular  form,  to  a  general  or  social  form,  and  it  is  only  in 
this  form  that  they  furnish  social  material.  It  is  evident  that 
much  of  this  is  not  new;  my  main  interest  in  presenting 
it  lies  in  certain  psychological  principles  by  which  it  gets 
relatively  new  confirmation,  and  the  resulting  characterization 
given  below  of  the  sort  of  thought  which  is  socially  available. 

§6.  The  general  considerations  upon  which  this  opinion 
is  based  may  be  given  in  contradistinction  from  special  lines 
of  evidence.  These  general  considerations  will  be  seen  to  arise 
in  connection  with  the  general  requirements  of  social  theory 
as  stated  in  the  foregoing  pages. 

i.  It  is  only  thoughts  or  knowledges  which  are  imitable  in 
the  fruitful  way  required  by  a  theory  of  progressive  social  or- 
ganization. It  has  been  said  by  some  that  beliefs  and  desires 
are  thus  imitable.  It  is  clear,  however,  to  the  psychologist  that 
beliefs  and  desires  are  functions  of  the  knowledge  contents 
about  which  they  arise.  No  belief  can  be  induced  in  one  indi- 
vidual by  another  except  as  the  fact,  truth,  information  believed 
is  first  induced.  The  imitator  must  first  get  the  thought  before 
he  can  imitate  belief  in  the  thought.  So  of  desire.  I  can 
not  desire  what  you  do  except  as  I  think  the  desirable  object 
somewhat  as  you  do.  And  if  it  be  a  question  of  imitative  prop- 
agation or  reproduction  from  one  member  of  a  social  group  to 
another,  the  vehicle  of  such  a  system  of  reproductions  must  be 
thought  or  knowledge.  The  only  other  psychological  alterna- 
tive is  to  say  that  the  imitative  propagation  takes  place  by  the 
simple  contagion  of  feeling  and  impulse.  This,  however,  takes 
us  back  to  the  question  already  raised  above,  *.  e.,  the  question 
of  possible  progress  by  society.  We  found  that  the  reign  of 
imitative  feeling  and  impulse,  whether  it  be  by  instinct  or  by 
suggestion,  would  make  possible  only  the  form  of  organization 


492  /•  MARK  BALDWIN. 

in  which  fixed  habit  is  all,  and  in  which  no  accommodation, 
movement,  progress,  would  take  place.  This  we  found  to  char- 
acterize certain  animal  companies  in  distinction  from  true  socie- 
ties.1 

2.  It  is  only  in  the  form  of  thoughts,  conceptions,  or  inven- 
tions that  new  material,  new  '  copies  for  imitation,'  new  schemes 
of  modified  organization  can  come  into  a  society  at  any  stage  of 
its  development.  This  seems  evident  from  the  mere  statement 
of  it.  If  we  ask  how  a  new  measure  of  legislation,  a  new 
scheme  of  reform,  a  new  opinion  about  style,  art,  literature, 
even  a  new  cut  to  our  coats  or  a  changed  height  of  hat — how 
any  one  of  these  things  originates,  we  are  obliged  to  say  that 
someone  first  thought  of  hV  Thought  of  it,  that  is  the  impor- 
tant thing.  Feeling  and  desire  might  have  impelled  to  thought ; 
urgent  need  may  have  prompted  the  invention  ;  decaying  modes 
may  have  made  reform  a  matter  of  necessity ;  but  with  all  the 
urgency  that  we  may  conceive,  the  measure,  the  reform,  the 
new  style,  Has  to  originate  somewhere  in  the  form  of  a  concrete 
device,  which  society  can  take  up  and  spread  abroad.  This 
particular  form  is  then  the  thought  of  someone ;  and  society 
afterwards  generalizes  the  thought.  Just  how  this  generalizing 
is  done  by  society — that  is  spoken  of  below ;  at  this  stage  we 
may  simply  say  that  society  is  the  '  generalizing  force,'  in  social 
organization,  meaning  that  society  as  such  does  not  make  inven- 
tions, nor  think  original  thoughts,  much  less  make  progress 
without  original  thoughts  or,  as  some  teach,  without  thoughts  at 
all.  Assuming  the  new  thoughts  originating  somewhere,  it  is 
the  function  of  society  to  make  them  available  and  to  give  them 
social  currency ;  this  we  may  call  society's  generalization.'2' 

Then  we  may  say  that  the  individual  -particularizes  over 

xThe  biological  view  which  considers  the  unit-person,  as  such,  the  material 
of  social  organization  may  be  refuted  in  a  word.  It  is  as  persons  that  persons 
come  into  social  relationships,  and  the  differences  of  persons  are  just  in  the 
psychological  part.  One  physical  body  is  as  good  as  another  before  the  law. 
The  distinction  between  things  in  groups  and  persons  in  society  is  that  there 
is  a  'give  and  take'  in  the  latter  case.  The  object  of  social  study  is  thus  the 
'giving  and  taking,'  and  the  material  is  that  which  is  'given  and  taken.' 

2  It  is  really  a  generalization,  since  to  be  thought  by  minds  generally  each 
such  invention  must  be  stripped  of  what  is  peculiar  and  characteristic  of  the  first 
individual's  thought. 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  SOCIAL    ORGANIZATION.  493 

against  society.  By  this  we  mean  simply  that  the  particular 
forms  in  which  new  thoughts  first  come,  in  order  that  they  may 
afterwards  be  generalized  by  society,  originate  always  in  an 
individual's  mind.  Just  what  this  amounts  to — how  far  the  in- 
dividual thinks  from  the  platform  of  earlier  social  generaliza- 
tion— that  we  can  not  now  discuss.1  Here  we  may  simply  say 
that  it  is  the  individual  who  thinks  all  the  new  thoughts  that  are 
thought,  and  thinks  them  first  in  the  particular  form  which  con- 
stitutes their  novelty  in  contrast  with  what  is  already  spread 
abroad  in  society ;  and  that  of  all  the  individual's  doings,  it  is 
his  thoughts  which  are  the  socially  available  factors  of  his  life. 
Of  course  there  is  a  form  of  social  propagation  which  takes  its 
origin  in  the  actions  only  of  this  man  or  that,  whether  any 
thought  be  discoverable  in  the  action  or  not.  But  apart  from 
the  fact  that  such  actions  have  to  be  thought  by  the  imitators, 
however  spontaneous  or  accidental  they  may  have  been  on  the 
part  of  the  original  actor,  it  is  evident  that  this  form  of  social 
origination  on  the  side  of  accident,  mere  habit,  social  convention 
or  mob  action  is  lacking  in  itself  of  any  fruitfulness  in  the  pro- 
duction of  new  phases  of  social  progress.2 

With  these  general  considerations  in  mind — which  are 
enough  in  themselves  to  justify  a  closer  examination  of  the  posi- 
tion that  thought  or  knowledge  is  the  matter  of  social  organiza- 
tion— we  may  proceed  to  cite  two  lines  of  evidence  which  sup- 
port this  view.  One  of  them  is  drawn  from  the  facts  of  the 
child's  social  development,  and  the  other  from  the  correspond- 
ing facts  of  the  social  and  ethical  man's  relations  to  the  histori- 
cal institutions  of  society.  These  are  the  two  spheres  in  which 
the  consideration  of  the  psychological  factors  involved  in  social 
organization  would  lead  us  to  expect  reliable  results. 

§7.1.  Special  evidence  from  the  child's  social  development. 
The  general  method  of  the  child's  social  development  has  been 
worked  out  on  the  basis  of  more  or  less  extended  observations 

1  My  article  on  'The  Genius  and  his  Environment'  may  be  referred  to  :  Pop. 
Set.  Monthly,  July  and  Aug,  1896. 

'The  newer  works  in  the  psychology  of  crowds  seem  to  show  that  these 
represent  a  disorganizing  and  down-grade  factor  rather  than  the  reverse.  I  think 
mob-action  shows  a  bye-product  or  excess-play  of  the  principles  of  imitation  and 
suggestion. 


494  «/•  MARK  BALDWIN. 

of  my  own  and  other  children  in  my  earlier  volume.     I  may 
quote  the  conclusion  briefly  from  that  work  ? l 

"  One  of  the  most  remarkable  tendencies  of  the  very  young  child  in  its  re- 
sponses to  its  environment  is  the  tendency  to  recognize  differences  of  personality. 
It  responds  to  what  I  have  called  '  suggestions  of  personality.  *  *  *  I  think  this 
distinction  between  persons  and  things,  between  agencies  and  objects,  is  the 
child's  very  first  step  toward  a  sense  of  the  qualities  which  distinguish  persons. 
The  sense  of  uncertainty  or  lack  of  confidence  grows  stronger  and  stronger  in 
its  dealings  with  persons — an  uncertainty  contingent  upon  the  moods,  emotions, 
nuances  of  expression,  and  shades  of  treatment,  of  the  persons  around  it.  A 
person  stands  for  a  group  of  experiences  quite  unstable  in  its  prophetic  as  it  is 
in  its  historical  meaning.  This  we  may,  for  brevity  of  expression,  assuming  it 
to  be  first  in  order  of  development,  call  the  ' projective  stage '  in  the  growth  of 
the  personal  consciousness,  which  is  so  important  an  element  in  social  emotion. 

"  Further  observation  of  children  shows  that  the  instrument  of  transition 
from  such  a  '  projective '  to  a  subjective  sense  of  personality  is  the  child's  active 
bodily  self,  and  the  method  of  it  is  the  function  of  imitation.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  accommodation  by  actual  muscular  imitation  does  not  arise  in  most  chil- 
dren until  about  the  seventh  month,  so  utterly  organic  is  the  child  before  this, 
and  so  great  is  the  impetus  of  its  inherited  instincts  and  tendencies.  But  when 
the  organism  is  ripe,  by  reason  of  cerebral  development,  for  the  enlargement  of 
its  active  range  by  new  accommodations,  then  he  begins  to  be  dissatisfied  with 
'  projects,'  with  contemplation,  and  so  starts  on  his  career  of  imitation.  And  of 
course  he  imitates  persons.  *  *  *  But  it  is  only  when  a  new  kind  of  experience 
arises  which  we  call  effort — a  set  opposition  to  strain,  stress,  resistance,  pain,  an 
experience  which  arises,  I  think,  first  as  imitative  effort — that  there  comes  that 
great  line  of  cleavage  in  his  experience  which  indicates  the  rise  of  volition,  and 
which  separates  off  the  series  now  first  really  subjective.  *  *  *  The  subject  sense, 
then,  is  an  actuating  sense.  What  has  formerly  been  '  projective '  now  becomes 
'  subjective.'  The  associates  of  other  personal  bodies,  the  attributes  which  make 
them  different  from  things,  are  now  attached  to  his  own  body  with  the  further 
peculiarity  of  actuation.  This  we  may  call  the  subjective  stage  in  the  growth  of 
the  self-notion.  *  *  *  Again,  it  is  easy  to  see  what  now  happens.  The  child's 
subject  sense  goes  out  by  a  kind  of  return  dialectic,  which  is  really  simply  a 
second  case  of  assimilation,  to  illuminate  these  other  persons.  The  project  of 
the  earlier  period  is  now  lighted  up,  claimed,  clothed  on  with  the  raiment  of 
self-hood,  by  analogy  with  the  subjective.  The  projective  becomes  ejective  ;  that 
is,  other  people's  bodies,  says  the  child  to  himself,  have  experiences  in  them 
such  as  mine  has.  They  are  also  me's :  let  them  be  assimilated  to  my  me-copy. 
This  is  the  third  stage ;  the  ejective,  or  '  social '  self,  is  born. 

"  The  ego  and  the  alter  are  thus  born  together.  Both  are  crude  and  unre- 
flective,  largely  organic,  an  aggregate  of  sensations,  prime  among  which  are 
efforts,  pushes,  strains,  physical  pleasures  and  pains.  And  the  two  get  purified 
and  clarified  together  by  this  twofold  reaction  between  project  and  subject,  and 
between  subject  and  eject.  My  sense  of  myself  grows  by  imitation  of  you,  and 
my  sense  of  yourself  grows  in  terms  of  my  sense  of  myself.  But  ego  and  alter 

1  A  similar  view  has  also  been  reached  by  Professor  Josiah  Royce  in  various 
publications. 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  SOCIAL   ORGANIZATION.  495 

are  thus  essentially  social ;  each  is  a  socius,  and  each  is  an  imitative  creation.  So 
for  a  long  time  the  child's  sense  of  self  includes  too  much.  The  circumference 
of  the  notion  is  too  wide.  It  includes  the  infant's  mother,  and  little  brother, 
and  nurse,  in  a  literal  sense  ;  for  they  are  what  he  thinks  of  and  aims  to  act  like 
by  imitation,  when  he  thinks  of  himself.  To  be  separated  from  his  mother  is  to 
lose  a  part  of  himself,  as  much  so  as  to  be  separated  from  a  hand  or  foot.  And 
he  is  dependent  for  his  growth  directly  upon  these  suggestions  which  come  in 
for  imitation  from  his  personal  milieu." 

§  8.  A  further  development  of  this  with  a  view  of  determin- 
ing something  about  the  *  Genesis  of  Social  Interests ' *  appears 
to  bear  out  the  conclusion  that  this  so-called  '  dialectic  of  per- 
sonal growth,'  whereby  the  child  comes  to  a  knowledge  of  him- 
self, only  by  building  up  a  sense  of  his  social  environment,  may 
also  be  looked  at  from  the  side  of  social  organization. 

If  we  grant  that  the  thought  of  self  takes  its  rise  as  a  gradual 
achievement  on  the  part  of  the  child  by  means  of  his  constant 
experience  of  the  personalities  about  him,  and  that  he  has  not 
two  different  thoughts  for  himself  and  the  other — the  ego  and 
the  alter — but  one  thought  common  in  the  main  for  both2 ;  then 
it  becomes  just  as  impossible  to  construe  the  social  factor,  the 
organized  relationships  between  him  and  others,  without  taking 
account  of  his  and  their  thoughts  of  self,  as  it  is  to  construe  the 
thought  of  self  without  taking  account  of  the  social  relationships. 
The  thought  of  self  arises  directly  out  of  certain  given  social 
situations ;  indeed  it  is  the  form  which  these  actual  social  rela- 
tionships take  on  in  the  organization  of  a  new  personal  experience. 
The  ego  of  which  he  thinks  at  any  time  is  not  the  isolated-and-in- 
his-body-alone-situated  abstraction  which  our  theories  of  perso- 
nality usually  lead  us  to  believe.  It  is  rather  a  sense  of  a  net- 
work of  relationships  among  you,  me,  and  the  others,  in  which 
certain  necessities  of  pungent  feeling,  active  life,  and  concrete 
thought  require  that  I  throw  the  emphasis  on  one  pole  some- 
times, calling  it  me ;  and  on  the  other  pole  sometimes,  calling  it 
you  or  him.  But  the  social  meaning  of  this  state  of  things  comes 
out  when  we  look  into  its  psychological  presuppositions  in  the 
whole  group.  Let  us  then  call  the  child's  sense  of  the  entire 

1  Art.  in  The  Monist,  Apl.  1897. 

2This  common  or  general  part  being,  I  think,  a  felt  motor  attitude  (cf. 
my  Ment.  Development,  p.  330). 


496  «/•  MARK  BALDWIN. 

personal  situation  in  which  he  finds  himself  at  any  time  in  his 
thought,  his  self-thought-situation. 1 

Now,  whatever  is  true  of  one  individual's  growth  by  imita- 
tive appropriation  of  personal  material  is  true  of  all ;  and  we 
have  the  giver  turned  into  the  taker  and  the  taker  into  the  giver 
everywhere.  The  growing  sense  of  a  '  self-thought-situation '  in 
each  is,  just  to  the  extent  that  the  social  bonds  are  intimate  and 
intrinsic^  the  same  for  alL  The  possibility  of  cooperation — as, 
for  example,  the  detailed  cooperations  of  children's  games — 
depends  upon  this  essential  sameness  of  the  personal  thoughts 
of  the  whole  circle  in  each  situation.  My  action  depends  upon 
my  understanding  of  your  thought  and  his,  and  your  action  de- 
pends upon  your  understanding  of  my  thought  and  his,  and  so 
on.2  Looked  at  objectively,  we  say  that  the  children  are  in 
social  relationship ;  looked  at  subjectively,  the  truth  is  that  they 
are  thinking  the  same  thoughts  of  the  personal-social  situation, 
and  this  thought  is  just  the  *  self-thought '  in  the  stage  of  devel- 
opment which  it  has  reached  in  this  little  mind  or  that  and 
brought  out  on  this  or  that  occasion.  H  understands  E  in  terms 
of  her  own  motives,  desires,  tendencies,,  likes  and  dislikes,  and, 
acting  on  this  understanding,  finds  that  it  works ;  so  E  treats 
her  self-thought  as  true  to  H's  thought,  and  it  works ;  to  find 
that  either  of  these  expectations  did  not  work  in  the  great  run  of 
cases  of  action  would  be  to  say  objectively  that  the  social  rela- 
tionship was  dissolved.  But  this  could  not  be  without  at  the 
same  time  disintegrating,  so  far  as  the  factors  were  intrinsic,  the 
sense  of  personal  self  in  each  of  the  children,  or  taking  it  back 
toward  the  beginning  of  its  development. 

§  9.  The  question  of  the  material  of  social  organization 
comes  up  here  as  soon  as  we  ask  what  it  is  that  the  children 
pass  about,  give  and  take,  in  this  inter-play  with  one  another. 
And  we  find  here  just  the  distinction  which  occurred  from  the 

1  This  phrase,  which  I  use  simply  for  shorthand,  may  be  expanded  always 
into :  '  the  social  situation  implicated  in  the  thought  of  self.' 

2  In  the  nursery  we  may  frequently  see  one  child  using  this  sameness  of 
personal  attitude  for  purposes  of  acute  manipulation  and  childish  intrigue.     My 
child  H  (at  6  years)  would  put  a  high  vocal  value  on  something  she  did  not 
want,  and  so  lead  E  (4  years)  to  drop  something  else  which  H  did  want.     H 
thus  counted  on  the  sameness  of  E's  socially-induced  desire  and  discounted  it  to 
her  own  private  advantage. 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  SOCIAL   ORGANIZATION.  497 

consideration  of  the  difference  between  human  and  animal  or- 
ganization. We  find  the  child  at  first  largely  organic,  instinc- 
tive, directly  emotional  under  the  influence  of  pleasures  and 
pains.  His  sympathy  is  at  first  organic,  and  his  antipathies 
likewise.  But  close  observation  shows  that  it  is  largely  by  the 
growing  realization  of  personal  distinctions,  on  the  basis  of  which 
his  thought  of  self  develops,  that  he  comes  to  have  conscious 
imitations,  original  interpretations,  hesitations,  inhibitions,  voli- 
tions. At  first  the  relation  is  one  of  direct  stimulation  and 
direct  response.  If  this  state  of  things  continued  men  would 
form  *  companies,'  not  *  societies.'  Direct  suggestion,  emotional 
reaction,  as  much  cooperation  as  heredity  might  give  consistently 
with  the  other  features — that  would  be  the  state  of  things.  But 
now  let  the  child  begin  to  think,  and  we  find  certain  great  fea- 
tures of  social  import  springing  up  in  his  life.  First,  a  distinc- 
tion in  the  elements  of  his  environment  according  as  they  are 
personal  or  not ;  second,  a  difference  of  attitude  toward  persons 
and  toward  different  persons,  according  as  the  elements  of  per- 
sonal suggestion  which  he  gets  will  assimilate  to  this  group  of 
experiences  or  to  that ;  third,  the  interpretation  of  the  other  per- 
sons in  the  same  terms  as  himself,  /.  £.,  as  having  attitudes  like 
his  in  similar  circumstances,  and  as  thinking  of  him  as  he  thinks 
of  them.  But  all  this  is  due  to  thought,  involves  knowledges, 
and  the  sorting  of  them  out.  The  emotions  now  spring  from 
thought  experiences,  and  the  attitudes,  actions,  responses  now 
take  on  the  character  of  means  to  a  personal  end,  the  end  being 
the  thought  which  issues  in  this  or  that  attitude  or  action. 

We  may  say  then,  as  a  first  gain,  from  the  consideration  of 
the  children,  that  what  we  call  objective  social  relationships  are 
the  objective  manifestations  to  the  onlooker  of  a  common  self- 
thought-situation  in  the  different  individuals,  together  -with  the 
movements  of  its  growth  in  each  as  the  immediate  situation  calls 
it  out. 

§  10.  II.  The  next  point  offered  in  support  of  the  position 
now  outlined  raises  a  question  to  which  I  attach  so  much 
importance  from  an  historical  point  of  view  that  I  may  take  a 
little  space  to  speak  of  the  question  itself  before  attempting  its 
solution.  In  stating  and  criticising  various  theories  above,  there 


498  «/•  MARK  BALDWIN. 

was  intentionally  omitted  a  class  of  thinkers  whose  doctrine, 
disregarding  differences  of  detail,  may  be  described  as  the 
'  ideal '  theory  of  social  life.  This  theory  generally  proceeds 
by  deduction  and  reaches  a  view  of  society  from  the  presuppo- 
sitions of  idealistic  philosophy.  For  this  reason,  i.  £.,  that  the 
doctrine  is  so  purely  deductive,  it  has  little  consideration  from 
the  more  scientifically  disposed  thinkers  in  this  field.  And  this 
is  the  more  the  case  since  it  is  with  the  name  of  Hegel,  with 
the  Neo-Hegelians,  that  this  type  of  social  theory  is  associated. 

In  its  broadest  outlines,  this  philosophy  makes  reality  iden- 
tical with  thought ;  finds  consciousness,  and  especially  self-con- 
sciousness, the  '  coming-to-itself '  of  reality ;  and  sees  in  social 
organization  the  objectivation  or  universalizing  of  the  self-con- 
sciousness which  first  *  comes-to-itself '  in  the  individual.  The 
general  social  positions  of  this  school  seem  to  be  these  :  first,  the 
essential  character  of  reality,  as  thought,  is  not  lost  in  the  ob- 
jectifying whereby  the  individual  becomes  universalized  in  so- 
ciety ;  and  second,  the  complete  '  coming-to-itself '  of  reality, 
in  society  as  in  the  individual,  is  in  the  form  of  a  self.  When 
we  put  these  two  positions  together,  we  have  the  view  that  it 
is  in  the  individual's  formal  thought  of  self  that  there  is  real- 
ized both  the  subjective  form  of  reality  and  its  objective  form 
as  actually  existing  in  society.1 

It  is  in  this  conclusion  rather  than  in  the  metaphysics  which 
lies  back  of  it — and  I  wish  to  draw  a  sharp  line  between  them — 
that  our  present  interest  lies.  This  statement  regarding  the 
thought  of  self  it  is  which  our  detailed  inductive  investigation 
both  of  the  child's  development  and  of  the  movements  of  so- 
ciety seems  to  support.  This  will  appear  from  the  consid- 
eration of  an  aspect  both  of  the  thought  of  self  and  of  real 
social  organization  which  I  may  call  Publicity.  This  it  re- 
mains to  bring  out. 

§11.  We  have  already  found  so  much  justification  for  two 
positions:  first,  that  the  material  of  social  organization  must 
be  considered  as  being  thoughts  which  arise  in  individual 
minds  and  are  then  rethought  by  others,  and  so  carried  on 
through  a  social  career ;  and  second,  that  the  child's  social 

1  Hegel's  distinction  between  '  subjective  mind '  and  '  objective  spirit.' 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  SOCIAL  ORGANIZATION.  499 

sense,  that  is  his  sense 'of  all  social  situations,  however  meagre 
and  contracted  or  however  full  and  rich,  arises  and  grows  as 
a  function  of  his  thought  of  himself.  In  other  words  society  to 
the  child — society  from  the  private  subjective  point  of  view — 
is  a  concrete  situation  involving  related  changes  among  the  ele- 
ments and  attitudes  which  constitute  his  self-thought.  The  fur- 
ther question  remains :  given  this  objective  social  material — 
thought — and  given  also  this  subjective  sense  of  society  in  the 
individual,  what  is  the  objective  character  of  social  organiza- 
tion? For,  of  course,  the  question  of  science  is  just  this  ob- 
jective question ;  not  only  what  does  each  individual  think  of 
the  social  situation  when  he  thinks  of  it  at  all,  but  what  must 
the  observer  think  of  it  after  he  finds  out  scientifically  all  about 
it?  His  question  then,  in  view  of  the  two  earlier  determina- 
tions, is  this  :  is  the  thought  which  constitutes  the  material  of 
social  organization  any  thought  at  random,  thought  X,  thought 
Y,  thought  Z,  these  and  others?  Or  must  it  be  some  particular 
sort  of  thought?  And  again,  if  the  latter,  must  it  be  the  sort 
of  thought  which  the  individual  thinks  when  he  reaches  his 
sense  of  social  situations  as  functions  of  his  thought  of  himself? 
To  come  right  to  the  conclusion,  I  think  the  last  is  true  ;  and  its 
truth  appears  again  in  what  is  called  the  Publicity  of  all  social 
truth.  What  then  is  this  Publicity?  It  may  be  gathered  from 
this  statement  (which  is  illustrated  and  explained  below)  :  every 
social  thought  implies  a  public  '  self-thought-situation  '  which  is 
strictly  analogous  in  its  rise  and  progress  to  the  *  self-thought- 
situation  '  of  the  individual  member  of  society. 

We  may  take  an  illustration  from  the  ordinary  attitude  which 
society  takes  toward  human  life,  in  contrast  with  the  attitude 
which  the  individual  might  sometimes  think  himself  justified  in 
taking  toward  his  own  life.  Let  us  say  that  there  is  a  question 
in  the  mind  of  Mr.  A.,  as  to  whether  he  shall  put  a  barrier 
across  his  hay  field  to  protect  himself  from  injury  at  the  point 
at  which  a  railroad  crosses  the  field.  He  says  to  himself  "I 
have  crossed  that  field  many  times  ;  I  have  never  been  struck  by 
a  train  ;  the  chances  are  that  I  never  shall  be ;  it  would  be  use- 
less trouble  and  expense."  So  he  takes  the  risk  of  his  life,  and 
is  probably  justified  in  doing  so  by  the  event.  So  the  sanctions 


500  /.    MARK  BALDWIN. 

of  a  private  kind,  including  that  of  his  intelligence,  would  sus- 
tain him  in  this  decision. 

But  now  let  us  suppose  that  Mr.  A  is  also  a  public  official 
and  has  to  consider  the  question  of  putting  up  barriers  at  rail- 
way crossings  generally.  He  is  then  told  that  at  each  place  at 
which  a  railway  crosses  a  road,  a  certain  proportion  of  the 
pedestrians  who  go  that  way  are  killed  each  year.  He  might 
say  of  each  of  these  what  he  had  before  said  of  himself,  that 
the  chances  were  in  favor  of  safety.  But  now  that  he  takes  a 
public  point  of  view  this  is  no  longer  sanctioned  in  his  thought. 
It  is  no  longer  the  question  of  the  continuance  of  the  life  of  this 
one  man  or  that.  It  is  now  the  question  of  the  greatest  possible 
safety  to  the  collective  or  entire  life  of  the  community.  To  put 
up  barriers  at  all  the  crossings  would  undoubtedly  prevent  the 
loss  of  many  citizens  a  year.  The  social  or  public  sanction, 
then,  impels  him  in  just  the  opposite  direction ;  and  he  not  only 
votes  for  the  barriers,  but  bears  a  share  of  the  taxation  and 
allows  the  barrier  to  be  -put  up  in  his  oivn  hay  field. 

If  now  we  take  this  situation  at  its  lowest  terms  and  attempt 
to  analyse  it  we  find  that  it  implies  certain  things  : 

i.  A  shifting  of  the  individual's  point  of  view,  in  such  a 
way  that  the  early  private  thought  of  self  is  held  in  check  be- 
fore a  higher  or  ideal  thought  of  self.  The  self  of  the  man  act- 
ing in  public  is  different ;  if  he  be  true  to  it,  he  can  no  longer 
act  out  his  private  thought.  2.  There  is  in  his  mind  a  sense  of 
the  reciprocity  of  action  of  all  the  individuals  with  reference  to 
one  another  under  this  larger  thought  of  self. 

This  sense  of  reciprocity  follows  from  the  doctrine  which  we 
have  found  it  necessary  to  hold,  of  the  unity  of  the  self-content, 
in  all  its  development.  We  found  that  the  ego  and  the 
alter  were  in  great  part  identical,  especially  the  part  which 
constitutes  them  selves  as  opposed  to  mere  bodies.  We 
found  then  that  when  I  think  of  myself  I  ipso  facto  think 
of  you,  and  that  the  sense  or  emotion  which  the  thought 
arouses,  and  in  view  of  which  I  take  the  active  attitudes 
that  I  do,  reflect  that  thought  no  matter  which  the  real  ego 
may  be  as  determined  by  the  external  conditions.  But  dif- 
ferences of  attitudes  arise  in  regular  circumstances,  accord- 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  SOCIAL    ORGANIZATION.  5OI 

ing  as  this  one  self-thought  is  imitative,  aggressive,  etc. 
Having  gone  so  far,  the  very  necessity  of  making  further  use 
of  society  it  is  which  leads  the  child  on  to  the  further  step  which 
I  have  called  the  growth  of  a  general  or  ideal  sense  of  self. 
This  means  the  formation  of  a  category  of  action  which  includes 
the  essential  content  of  self  as  represented  by  all  his  earlier  par- 
tial thoughts.  He  thinks  of  self  as  independent  of  the  private 
objective  marks  of  individuality,  bodies,  locality,  etc.  To  this 
thought  all  personal  actions  must  conform ;  but  the  actual  re- 
lationships of  the  two  selves  called  ego  and  alter  must  still  ap- 
pear in  the  concrete  situations  into  which  this  higher  thought  is 
brought.  The  higher  thought  of  self  is  brought  to  judge  the 
lower  thoughts.  But  it  is  itself  a  function  of  the  lower ;  it  could 
not  arise  except  for  the  unity  of  content  which  holds  the  two  to- 
gether. So  the  result  of  the  assimilation,  the  actual  attitude 
taken  in  any  particulai  case  toward  one  or  other  of  the  low- 
er self-thoughts — the  attitude  which  constitutes  the  sense  of 
ethical  well  or  ill-desert  as  well  as  social  value — this  is  identical- 
ly the  same  attitude  toward  each  of  the  partial  selves.  I  con- 
demn the  act  of  you  as  well  as  the  same  act  of  me ;  approve  it, 
no  matter  whether  it  be  objectively  determined  in  a  particular 
case  as  really  mine  or  yours.  And  this  reciprocal  phase  of  the 
assimilation  necessarily  carries  the  judgment  over  upon  all  the 
possible  other  people  whose  ego  the  identical  thought  may  stand 
for.  This  then  brings  in  the  ejective  thought  of  you  as 
also  reaching  the  same  sense  of  approval  or  disapproval  that  I 
do.  Or,  in  other  words,  the  thought  that  the  judgment  passed  is 
actually  in  the  minds  of  all  other  men. 

This  may  be  put  in  a  different  way.  My  thought  of  the 
ideal  self  is  general ;  it  must  sustain  relation  to  all  the  particular 
cases.  Whatever  mental  movement  it  gives  rise  to — approval, 
disapproval — must  be  present  in  all  the  particular  cases.  I  find 
it  giving  rise  to  a  feeling  of  condemnation  in  my  own  case  when 
a  certain  action  is  before  me.  It  must  give  rise  to  the  same 
condemnation  of  others  by  me  and  of  me  by  each  of  them. 
But  it  is  said,  this  is  very  different  from  saying  that  I  must 
think  that  it  is  actually  present  to  them.  Certainly,  but  we 
must  remember  that  I  cannot  think  of  myself  with  any  self 


502  /.  MARK  BALDWIN. 

situation  before  me  without  in  the  act  thinking  ejectively  on  the 
same  content ;  hence  to  think  of  myself,  with  this  case  before 
me,  is  to  think  of  other  men  also  with  this  case  before  them. 
To  fall  short  of  this  is  to  think  not  in  terms  of  the  general 
thought  of  self,  not  with  reference  to  the  ideal,  but  in  reference 
to  some  particular  partial  self  to  whose  knowledge  the  case  be- 
fore me  is  confined. 

If  this  is  so  then  in  the  case  in  which  I  am  conscious  that  no 
one  but  myself  knows  the  act  which  I  am  committing,  this  con- 
sciousness contradicts  a  real  element  in  the  mental  psychosis 
which  arouses  public  and  ethical  sentiment ;  and  as  long  as  I 
fully  assure  myself  of  this,  I  cannot  get  a  completely  social  or 
moral  judgment.  Of  course  it  is  impossible  to  maintain  such  a 
private  state  of  mind  in  its  purity ;  the  drift  toward  the  general 
statement  of  the  case  in  social  terms  tends  to  establish  the  proper 
ethical  sense,  and  imagination  supplies  the  needed  elements  by 
whispering  what  my  friends  would  say  if  they  knew  my  conduct. 

This  means  that  when  I  think  of  this  ideal,  that  is,  when  I 
bring  a  given  action  to  the  test  of  assimilation  to  it — for  I  can- 
not think  of  it  in  any  circumstances  which  do  not  call  for  its  ap- 
plication to  a  concrete  case  of  action — a  part  of  the  content  of 
my  thought  is  necessarily  the  thought  that  the  judgment  is  one 
of  social  generality,  that  others  are  making  the  same  assimila- 
tion of  this  act  to  the  same  ideal.  In  case,  then,  I  know  that 
the  action  is  quite  private,  quite  secret,  absolutely  unknown  to 
anybody  else,  then  the  full  reinstatement  of  the  conditions  of  a 
social  and  ethical  judgment  are  ipso  facto  not  present.  My  ideal 
category  of  action  is  not  brought  out ;  for  to  bring  it  out  re- 
quires the  very  sense  of  reciprocity  which  my  knowledge  of 
privacy  contradicts.  If  this  be  true  to  psychology,  then  it  is  no 
wonder  that  privacy  destroys  much  of  our  ethical  competence. 

In  brief  we  find  that  the  '  ejective  '  self  is  incorporated  in  the 
very  body  of  every  concrete  social  thought  since  the  '  self- 
thought  situation '  in  the  individual  cannot  be  constituted  without 
it.  This  is  the  essential  truth  in  so-called  '  publicity.' 

3.  It  follows  directly  that  it  is  only  through  the  construction 
of  a  general  thought  of  self  that  this  publicity  can  be  reached. 
For  the  public  or  reciprocal  reference  of  the  judgment  in  each 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  SOCIAL   ORGANIZATION.  503 

case  arises  only  through  the  assimilation  of  the  private  and 
ejective  self-thoughts  in  a  larger  whole  of  the  same  kind.  The 
constituting  of  the  larger  self  is  just  the  evidence  of  the  integra- 
ting of  the  more  partial  selves ;  and  if  the  public  reference  is 
due  to  the  common  element  in  the  different  individuals'  self- 
thoughts,  then  each  individual  must  get  the  growth  which  the 
assimilation  represents,  and  all  the  individuals  must  construct 
somewhat  the  same  ideal.  The  former  is  secured  in  the  normal 
growth  of  the  self-thought-situation  in  each,  and  the  latter 
through  their  actual  life  in  a  common  social  tradition  and  heri- 
tage. 

Taking  the  point  of  view  of  society,  further,  in  contrast  with 
that  of  the  individual,  we  find  the  state  of  things  which  social 
science  is  lead  to  recognize,  t.  e.,  an  actual  integration  of  indi- 
viduals just  through  the  identical  higher  self  which  their  life 
together  makes  it  possible  for  them  to  set  up.  From  this  point 
of  view,  therefore,  we  may  call  this  a  public  'self-thought-situa- 
tion,' (expanded :  a  social  situation  implicated  in  a  public 
self-thought)  and  go  on  to  enquire  into  the  laws  of  progress  and 
development  which  it  shows,  always  with  reference  to  the  individ- 
uals of  whose  growth  it  is  a  function.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that 
in  this  public  self  thus  understood,  we  have  reached  in  some  de- 
gree a  genetic  justification  of  a  position  taken  up  by  Aristotle 
and  so  often  reasserted  in  the  history  of  ethical  discussion :  the 
position  which  finds  itself  obliged  to  fall  back  upon  a  hypothet- 
ical 'best  man'  or  oracle,  whose  judgment  would  be  correct  if  it 
could  be  had.  In  our  development,  however,  this  public  self  is 
the  objective  form  of  organization  into  which  growing  personal- 
ities normally  fall. 

§  12.  But  it  may  be  said,  surely  it  is  not  necessary  that  all 
thoughts,  inventions,  schemes,  ideas,  reforms,  etc.,  should  have 
this  quality  which  we  have  called  '  publicity '  in  order  to  be 
available  for  the  instruction  or  reforming  of  society.  Yes,  they 
should;  and  that  is  just  the  point  which  I  wish  most  to  urge. 
No  knowledge,  simply  as  knowledge,  can  be  social  knowledge 
or  become  the  instrument  of  social  advance  until  it  be  made  over 
to  the  public  self  by  becoming  in  the  minds  of  the  individuals 
who  think  it  a  public  thing,  in  contradistinction  to  the  private 


5°4  /.  MARK  BALDWIN. 

thoughts  which  they  entertain  simply  as  individuals.  Whatever 
is  thought,  however  great  the  invention,  however  pregnant  the 
suggestion  of  reform,  it  is  not  of  social  value  until,  just  by  think- 
ing it,  I  also  attribute  it  to  the  ideal  self  whose  entertain- 
ment of  it  gives  it  validity  and  general  authority  to  all  the  other 
individuals  of  the  group.  I  may,  from  my  private  judgment, 
discount  this  further  development  of  my  thought  beforehand ; 
that  is,  I  may  confidently  expect  that  my  invention  will  be  rati- 
fied by  the  general  thought  and  so  come  to  have  the  requisite 
publicity ;  but  I  then  only  do  so  as  I  appeal  just  to  that  higher 
self  already  formed  in  my  breast  through  social  experience,  and 
through  it  anticipate  the  fate  of  the  thought  which  I  thus  value. 
But  this  is  when  the  invention  is  looked  at  subjectively.  As 
soon  as  we  look  at  it  objectively — that  is  from  the  point  of  view 
of  the  science  of  social  organization — we  have  to  say  that  no 
thought  is  social  or  socially  available  which  is  still  in  the  mind 
of  an  individual  awaiting  that  generalization  by  the  public  which 
will  give  it  the  character  of  publicity  by  reason  of  the  essential 
attribution  of  it  to  a  public  self. 

In  other  words,  my  private  thought,  in  order  to  be  social 
matter,  must  enter  into  that  organization  or  integration  of  the 
public  self-thought-situation  which  is  reflected  in  every  adult 
more  or  less  adequately ;  it  is  thus  thought  also  by  that  higher  self 
in  each  which  imposes  law  upon  all.  With  this  goes  the  thought 
by  me  that  all  men  agree  with  me  in  thinking  it,  and  that  they  will 
give  the  enforcement  of  it  the  same  recognition  (including  its 
enforcement  upon  me)  that  I  give  it  (including  its  enforcement 
upon  them) .  The  thought  thus  becomes  involved  in  the  growth 
of  the  personal  self  and  just  by  this  becomes  public  also.  With- 
out this  connection  it  cannot  be  social.  The  ultimate  subjective 
criterion  of  social  thought  is  the  self-thought,  with  all  its  wealth 
of  implication  as  to  the  social  situation.  And  the  ultimate  ob- 
jective criterion  is  the  actual  ratification  of  the  thought  by  the 
individuals  through  common  action  upon  the  situation  ivhich 
they  mutually  recognize.  By  this  they  show  then  common  in- 
tegration in  a  public  '  self-  thought-situation.' 

§  13.  We  come  therefore  in  closing  in  upon  our  question 
as  last  stated  to  see  that  the  growing  *  self-thought-situation' 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  SOCIAL   ORGANIZATION. 

in  the  mind  of  the  individual  is,  when  viewed  in  its  mutual  in- 
teractions and  correlations  in  the  group,  just  the  material  of 
social  organization  itself ;  for  nowhere  else  can  we  find  the  re- 
quisites for  public  availability  fulfilled.  Thus  arises  ipso  facto  a 
public  '  self-thought-situation  ;'  on  no  other  view  can  we  account 
for  the  response  of  individuals  to  the  organization  which  society 
shows.  So  both  from  the  side  of  the  child's  and  man's  growth, 
and  from  the  side  of  society  considered  objectively,  we  are  lead 
to  identify  the  organization  of  the  individual's  personality  directly 
with  that  of  society,  in  respect  both  to  its  material  and  to  its  method 
of  acting.  This  may  be  made  a  little  clearer  by  a  short  criti- 
cism of  two  views  which  are  on  the  surface  similar  in  conclusion 
to  this ;  I  refer  to  that  of  Adam  Smith  on  the  one  hand,  and 
that  of  Hegel  on  the  other  hand. 

§  14.  Adam  Smith's  wonderful  treatment  of  the  social 
bond  under  the  term  sympathy  is  familiar  to  all  students  of  Eng- 
lish ethics.  The  criticism  which  I  wish  to  make  upon  it  is  that 
he  assumes  the  '  publicity'  requisite  to  social  organization,  and 
rests  satisfied  with  that  assumption.  According  to  Adam  Smith 
I  sympathize  with  what  I  find  *  suitable'  in  the  affections  of 
others  since  it  would  be  what  I  myself  should  experience,  and 
the  sense  of  this  agreement  is  moral  approbation.  Then  trans- 
ferred to  myself,  my  judgment  of  myself  is  a  reflex  of  my  sense 
of  your  corresponding  sympathy  with  me.  But  as  soon  as  we 
come  to  a  social  situation  as  such,  that  is  to  a  situation  involving 
two  persons,  an  aggressor  and  an  aggressee,  the  question  arises 
with  which  I  shall  sympathize.  And  the  same  question  arises 
as  soon  as  I  come  to  ask  about  my  own  self-approbation  or  dis- 
approbation, considered  as  a  reflex  of  the  sympathy  of  others 
with  me.  For  I  do  not  know  whether  the  other  will  sympathize 
with,  /'.  £.,  approve  of,  me  or  the  other  whom  my  action  affects. 
What  then  is  the  general  element  which  will  give  publicity  and 
constancy  of  value  to  a  social  action  as  such?  This  Adam 
Smith  answers  in  a  general  way  by  saying  that  that  action  is  ap- 
proved which  is  most  sympathized  with,  say  as  between  the  ag- 
gressor and  aggressee.  But  this  of  course  does  not  help  mat- 
ters ;  for  how  am  I  to  know  which  of  the  two  you  sympathize 
with  the  more,  except  as  I  again  ask  myself  which  would  call 


506  /.  MARK  BALD  WIN. 

out  the  more  sympathy  in  my  own  case.  That  is,  the  measure 
— strictly  construing  the  doctrine — would  after  all  be  just  what 
we  started  with,  the  individual's  private  sympathy.  Adam 
Smith  later  on  calls  in  the  recognition  of  the  judgment  of  a  hy- 
pothetical best  man  to  whom  tacit  appeal  is  made.  But  this 
seems  to  me  to  be  simply  an  assumption  to  which  he  had  no 
right ;  it  certainly  does  not  follow  from  the  play  of  sympathies 
as  he  has  depicted  it. 

The  doctrine  of  Hegel  on  the  other  hand  also  makes  the 
assumption  of  publicity.  Metaphysically  it  makes  this  assump- 
tion from  the  start ;  finding  just  the  coming  of  the  individual  to 
personal  self-consciousness  a  manifestation  of  the  universal  self 
all  the  while  implicit  in  nature.  But  in  taking  on  individual 
form  in  the  first  stages  of  the  realization  of  a  self — genetically 
considered — it  has  temporarily  lost  this  attribute ;  that  it  should 
get  it  again  is  to  be  expected ;  that  social  life  is  the  essential 
stimulus  to  its  getting  it  again,  is  a  ^priori  probable ;  and  Hegel 
says  that  social  life  is  in  fact  the  realization  of  this  expectation. 
Yet  how?  That  is  a  question  of  fact. 

Hegel's  answer  is,  in  its  general  character,  allied  to  the  view 
spoken  of  above  as  that  of  '  constraint.'  To  him  the  ear- 
liest fruitful  social  relation  is  that  of  subjection,  master 
and  slave.  And  its  fruitfulness  is,  it  seems,  mainly  for  the 
slave,  since  he  is  domineered  over,  and  so  made  to  realize  defi- 
nite social  situations.  Thus  certain  regular  self-limitations, 
mutual  relationships,  necessities  of  life  and  intercourse  grow  up 
which  have  the  quality  of  general  or  public  value  when  recog- 
nized by  all. 

This,  I  am  aware,  is  a  meagre  enough  statement  of  this  de- 
velopment in  Hegel's  '  Phenomenology  of  Mind,'  but  Wallace's 
exposition  may  also  be  referred  to  as  confirming  its  essential  ac- 
curacy.1 What  is  lacking  is  just  the  bridge  from  the  private 

1  Professor  Royce,  who  has  kindly  read  this  paper,  thinks  indeed  that  this 
statement  regarding  Hegel  should  be  supplemented  by  reference  to  the  func- 
tions of  the  family  and  state  as  described  in  Hegel's  Encyclopddie.  As  Profes- 
sor Royce  agrees,  however,  that  '  an  express  recognition  of  the  imitative  factor 
as  such  is  what  I  miss  in  him '  (Hegel),  and  that  is  my  main  point  of  criticism, 
I  allow  the  passage  to  stand  subject  to  later  revision.  I  may  acknowledge  grate- 
fully here  other  suggestions  made  by  Professor  Royce,  which  are  to  be  more 
adequately  jsoognized  in  my  book. 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  SOCIAL    ORGANIZATION. 

thought  to  the  public  thought;  this  the  imitative  factor  sup- 
plies. Given  complex  social  situations,  whence  their  validity 
for  all  the  members  equally,  and  whence  the  intrinsic  element 
of  public  reference  which  is  a  necessity  of  social  nature  to  us 
all  ?  Hegel's  metaphysics  of  course  supplies  this  element ;  it  is 
the  nature  of  thought  to  recover  or  recognize  itself  as  universal 
(Anerkennung)  on  this  higher  plane  of  social  self-conscious- 
ness. But  this,  when  scanned  from  the  point  of  view  of  actual 
genetic  growth,  requires  an  empirical  method  of  development 
both  in  the  individual  and  in  society. 

§  15.  The  evidence  for  the  general  conclusion  now  stated, 
drawn  from  the  actual  facts  of  social  life,  takes  on  many  phases, 
and  I  have  no  space  to  develop  it  here.  I  may,  however,  note 
certain  directions  in  which  we  may  look  for  its  confirmation. 

i.  Much  of  the  matter  accumulated  by  the  great  succession 
of  English  moralists  to  prove  that  sympathy  in  all  its  manifes- 
tations is  a  '  putting  of  oneself  in  another's  shoes '  is  directly 
available.  For  we  only  have  to  substitute  imitative  identity  of 
the  ego  and  the  alter  for  the  artificial  putting  of  one  into  the 
shoes  of  the  other,  and  the  results  follow.  This  is  to  say  that 
the  old  doctrine  of  sympathy  is  essentially  correct  as  far  as  it 
goes,  and  it  only  needs  supplementing  by  investigations  into 
the  genesis  and  nature  of  the  class  of  phenomena  covered  by 
the  term  sympathy.  This  the  view  does  which  makes  the  self- 
thought  a  progressive  imitative  outcome  with  that  play  between 
the  successive  poles  of  its  realization  which  is  just  the  method 
of  its  growth.  Thus  a  certain  unity  and  lack  of  assumption  is 
secured  to  the  whole  scheme.  For  example,  one  might  take 
the  fine  catalogue  of  arguments  given  by  Adam  Smith  at  the 
beginning  of  his  '  Moral  Sentiments '  and  go  over  them  one  by 
one,  finding  that  they  all  fall  together  on  this  view  and  support 
a  derivation  of  publicity,  where  he  could  only  assume  it.  For 
he  assumes,  first,  that  we  sympathize  with  each  other ;  this  he 
makes  his  platform.  And  then  he  assumes  that  it  is  pleasant  to 
both  the  parties  when  they  are  in  a  state  of  sympathy.  Both 
positions  are  true  as  facts,  and  true  also  of  animals.  But 
the  reason  of  the  facts,  lying  in  the  identity  of  a  progressive 
thought  which  just  by  its  growth  in  each,  integrates  all  in  social 


508  /.  MARK  BALD  WIN. 

relationships,  this  is  wanting.  Both  of  these  facts  further  are 
accounted  for  in  man,  by  the  view  that  from  the  first  the  gather- 
ing self-thought  grows  up  by  imitative  suggestion.  For  on  this 
view  sympathy  is  a  necessary  motor  attitude  flowing  from  the 
identical  thought  of  self ;  and  the  pleasure  of  mutual  sympathy 
and  cooperation  is  the  pleasure  of  personal  activity  which  is 
normally  interwoven  in  a  situation  understood  and  appealed  to 
by  all  the  individuals. 

2.  We  may  cite  the  evidence  which  goes  to  show  that  each 
person   does   depend  upon   social  stimulation  in   his    personal 
growth,  and  does  arrive  at  standards  of  social  judgment  and 
feeling  which  reflect  in  the  main  the  standards  current  in  his  en- 
vironment.    Here  the  writings  of  Leslie  Stephen,  Hoffding,  S. 
Alexander,  etc.,  may  be  utilized. 

3.  A  farther  interesting  argument  may  be  drawn  from  the 
statement  of  the  same  question  in  reference  to  ethical  publicity, 
i.  £.,  the  evidence  which  goes  to  show  that  genetically  social 
suggestion  and    social  beliefs  are  intrinsic  to  morality.     This 
point  is  mentioned  again  below  where  the  connection  between 
ethical  and  social  progress  is  indicated. 

4.  Finally,  then  is  the  evidence  from  the  history  of  the  social 
life  of  man,  showing  the  constant  '  give  and  take '  between  the 
individual  and  society  which  the  position  now  taken  would  re- 
quire. 

The  elaboration  of  any  of  these  arguments  is  beyond  the 
range  of  the  present  paper.  The  two  last  suggested  lead  us, 
however,  to  our  final  topic,  i.  e.,  the  consideration  of  the  sort 
of  doctrine  of  social  progress  we  should  have  to  hold  if,  as  I 
have  claimed,  the  matter  of  social  organization  is  thought  which 
has  the  attribute  of  publicity  springing  from  its  attribution  in  the 
mind  of  the  social  thinker  to  a  common  self,  and  that  the  method 
or  type  of  function  in  social  organization  is  all  the  while  imita- 
tion. 

§  16.  It  has  been  intimated  already  that  there  are  two  op- 
posed or  contrasted  functions  in  the  progress  of  the  thoughts 
which  are  socially  available,  seen  respectively  in  the  '  particu- 
larizing' done  by  the  individual,  and  the  'generalizing'  done 
by  society.  Both  of  these  go  on  together,  and  give  rise  to  the 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  SOCIAL   ORGANIZATION.  509 

conditions  which  social  life  in  all  its  complexity  presents.  We 
may  call  the  individual  then  the  particularizing  social  force ;  he 
invents,  constructs,  interprets,  on  the  basis  of  the  matter  already 
current  in  society  and  administered  to  him  through  « social 
heredity.'  And  society,  as  already  organized,  may  be  called  the 
generalizing  social  force ;  it  reduces,  generalizes  the  inventions 
of  the  individual  by  integrating  them  in  the  public  '  self-thought- 
shuation '  now  described.  The  further  question  then  arises : 
how  and  in  what  direction  is  social  progress  determined  under 
the  interplay  of  these  two  types  of  social  force  ? 

We  are  shut  up,  I  think,  to  a  very  definite  view  of  the  de- 
termination of  social  progress  as  soon  as  we  look  into  the  impli- 
cations of  the  positions  already  taken.  The  positions  which 
immediately  concern  us  now  are  three  :  i .  Individuals  can  par- 
ticularize only  on  the  basis  of  earlier  generalizations  of  society. 
This  gives  an  initial  trend  to  the  thought  variations  which  are 
available  for  social  use.1  2.  Society  in  its  new  acquisitions  is  ab- 
solutely dependent  upon  the  new  thoughts,  particularizations,  of 
individuals,  and  it  again  generalizes  them.  It  can  get  material 
from  no  other  source.  3.  Only  when  both  these  conditions  are 
fulfilled — when  old  social  matter  is  particularized  by  an  indi- 
vidual and  then  again  generalized  by  society — can  new  accre- 
tions be  made  to  the  social  content  and  progress  be  secured  to 
the  organization  as  a  whole.  Looking  at  these  requirements 
together,  and  attempting  to  discover  what  sort  of  a  general 
movement  will  result  we  find  what  may  be  called  the  *  Dialectic 
of  Social  Growth,'  an  expression  which  is  intended  to  suggest  a 
contrast  with  the  '  Dialectic  of  Personal  Growth,'  already  de- 
scribed above. 

§  17.  In  the  dialectic  of  personal  growth  we  saw  the  develop- 
ment of  self-consciousness  proceeding  by  a  two-fold  relation 
of  *  give  and  take '  between  the  individual  and  his  social  fellows. 
Personal  material,  coming  in  the  shape  of  suggestions  from  the 
environment,  is  first  *  projective '  as  we  called  it ;  then  it  is  taken 
over  into  the  private  circle  of  the  inner  life  by  imitation,  and  so 
becomes  personal  or  '  subjective,'  as  belonging  to  the  ego;  and 

'This  has  been  developed  in  my  article  on  '  The  Genius  and  his  Environ 
ment,'  Pop.  Set.  Monthly,  July-August,  1896. 


510  j.  MARK  BALDWIN. 

then  again  by  a  return  movement  between  the  same  two  poles, 
also  imitative  in  its  nature,  the  characters  of  the  subject  are 
ejected  out  into  the  alter  personalities,  so  becoming  '  ejective.' 

The  various  stages  into  which  consciousness  grows — be- 
coming social,  ethical,  etc. — by  this  one  method  of  social  give 
and  take  cannot  be  dwelt  upon  here ;  but  it  is  interesting  to  see 
that  this  way  of  growing  on  the  part  of  the  individual  conscious- 
ness may  be  stated  in  terms  which  reproduce  in  a  very  precise 
analogy  the  three  requirements  which  we  now  find  it  necessary 
to  lay  down  as  characteristic  of  the  growth  of  society.  We 
may  say,  (i)  that  the  individual  reaches  new  inventions,  in- 
terpretations, particularizations,  in  his  own  personal  growth 
only  on  the  basis  of  what  he  already  understands  of  personality  ; 
that  is  of  what  he  has  learned.  Each  step  of  his  progress  in 
understanding  personality  is  a  particularization  of  old  material 
in  his  own  thought,  a  personal  interpretation,  subjective  in 
its  character.  And  (2)  only  those  particularizations,  interpre- 
tations, inventions,  thoughts  of  personality,  are  permanently 
available  for  his  growth  which  he  again  ejects  outward  and 
finds  to  hold  generally  of  others  also ;  these  are  generalized  as 
habits  and  stand  as  accretions  to  his  growth.  This  last  is  also 
imitative,  since  only  the  imitable  elements  of  his  subjective 
thought  are  thus  true  and  available  in  his  treatment  of  others. 
(3)  His  self-thought-situation,  grows  only  when  both  these 
phases  are  accomplished  together. 

Here  then  is  personal  growth  quite  accurately  stated  in  the 
same  terms  as  those  which  give  the  outcome  of  our  detailed  ex- 
amination of  social  progress.  I  am  not  willing  to  leap  to  meta- 
physical or  even  logical  conclusions  on  the  basis  of  this  analogy, 
striking  as  it  seems  to  be.  But  we  may  •  at  least  use  it  as  an 
analogy,  and  see  the  further  bearings  of  it  in  the  matter  of  the 
determination  of  social  progress. 

Coming  to  make  out  the  analogy  in  more  detail,  we  see  that  so- 
ciety stands  in  a  sense  as  a  quasi-personality  under  a  two-fold  re- 
lation of  give  and  take  to  the  individuals  who  make  up  the  social 
group.  It  is  related  to  these  individuals  in  two  ways  :  first,  as  hav- 
ing become  what  it  is  by  the  absorption  of  the  thoughts,  struggles, 
sentiments,  cooperations,  etc.,  of  individuals;  and  second,  as 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  SOCIAL    ORGANIZATION.  51 1 

itself  finding  its  new  lessons  in  personal  (now  social)  growth  in 
the  new  achievements  of  individuals.  If  we  take  any  lesson 
which  .  society  learns — any  one  thought  which  it  adopts  and 
makes  a  part  of  its  organized  content — we  may  trace  the  pas- 
sage of  this  thought  or  element  through  the  two  poles  of  the 
dialectic  of  social  growth,  just  as  we  can  also  trace  the  elements 
of  personal  suggestion  in  the  case  of  the  simpler  dialectic  of  the 
individual's  growth.  The  new  thought  is  *  projective '  to  society 
as  long  as  it  exists  in  the  individual's  mind  only ;  it  becomes 
'  subjective '  to  society  when  society  has  generalized  it  and  em- 
bodied it  in  some  one  of  the  institutions  which  are  a  part  of  her 
intimate  organization ;  and  then  finally  society  makes  it  *  ejec- 
tive '  by  requiring,  by  all  her  pedagogical,  civil  and  religious 
sanctions,  that  each  individual,  class,  or  subordinate  group  which 
claims  a  share  in  her  corporate  life,  shall  realize  it  and  live  up 
to  it. 

Society,  in  other  words,  makes  her  peculiarizations,  inven- 
tions, interpretations,  through  the  individual  man,  just  as  the 
individual  makes  his  through  the  alter  individual  who  gives  him 
his  suggestion ;  and  then  society  makes  her  generalizations  by 
setting  the  results  thus  reached  to  work  again  for  herself  in  the 
form  of  institutions,  etc.,  just  as  the  individual  sets  out  for  social 
confirmation  and  for  conduct,  the  interpretations  which  he  has 
reached.  The  growth  of  society  is  therefore  a  growth  in  a  sort 
of  self-consciousness — an  awareness  of  itself- — expressed  in  the 
general  ways  of  action,  feeling,  etc.,  embodied  in  its  institu- 
tions ;  and  the  individual  gets  his  growth  in  self-consciousness 
in  a  way  which  shows  by  a  sort  of  recapitulation  this  two-fold 
movement  of  society.  So  the  method  of  growth  in  the  two 
cases — what  has  been  called  the  '  dialectic ' — is  the  same. 

§  18.  From  these  indications — which  must  in  all  cases  be 
controled  by  an  appeal  to  fact — we  see  the  direction  in  which 
social  progress  must  move.  The  individual  moves  directly 
toward  an  ethical  goal.  His  intellectual  sanctions  tend,  it  is  true, 
toward  a  personal  and  egoistic  use  of  the  forces  of  society ;  but 
that  cannot  go  far,  since,  in  its  extreme,  it  runs  counter  to  the 
cooperations  on  the  basis  of  which  the  dialectic  of  his  personal 
growth  as  such  must  proceed.  So  with  social  progress.  The 


512  /.  MARK  BALDWIN. 

use  of  intelligence  for  the  private  manipulation  of  social  agen- 
cies does  actually  represent  a  level  of  social  institutional  life, 
and  in  certain  great  departments  of  human  intercourse — as  es- 
pecially the  commercial — selfish  ends,  as  seen  in  personal  com- 
petition of  wits,  seems  to  be  as  high  as  society  has  yet  gone. 
But  as  with  individual  growth  so  here.  As  soon  as  the  personal 
use  of  the  individual's  wit  brings  him  into  conflict  with  either 
of  these  two  necessary  movements  by  which  society  gradually 
grows— or  with  the  institutions  which  represent  them — so  soon 
must  the  individual  be  restrained.  And,  further,  the  restraint  is 
no  more  an  artificial  thing,  an  external  thing,  in  society  than  it 
is  in  the  individual.  The  very  growth  of  intelligence  in  the  in- 
dividual is  itself  a  generalizing  process,  and  by  this  generaliza- 
tion, a  measure  of  higher  restraint  is  set  on  the  elements  which 
enter  into  the  generalization.  The  growth  of  intelligence  must 
itself  issue  in  those  ideal  states  of  mind  which  are  called  social 
and  ethical  and  which  set  the  direction  of  growth  as  a  whole. 
The  ethical  sanctions  come  to  replace  and  limit  the  sphere  of 
application  of  the  sanctions  of  desire  and  impulse ;  and  so  the 
individual  gets,  in  his  private  life,  a  bent  toward  social  co-oper- 
ation and  ethical  conduct. 

The  social  or  communal  growth  shows  the  same  tendency 
for  the  reason,  altogether  apart  from  analogy,  that  the  actual 
conditions  in  society  are  the  same.  Society  is,  as  we  have 
seen,  the  generalizing  force.  It  reduces  the  thoughts  which 
rise  and  claim  recognition  in  its  midst  to  forms  of  general  ac- 
ceptance, and  to  working  shape.  The  very  institution  there- 
fore, which  embodies  the  new  idea  and  enforces  it  upon  the 
individuals,  is  itself  the  work  of  the  individuals,  and  represents 
the  restraint  of  their  egoistic  and  personal  sanctions  in  favor  of 
social  and  ethical  cooperation. 

Further,  all  the  pedagogical  sanctions  of  society,  in  the 
family,  the  school,  etc.,  are  brought  directly  to  bear  for  the  pro- 
duction of  those  social  forms  of  habit  which  confirm  and  en- 
courage the  development  of  toleration,  forbearance  and  all  the 
virtues  which  are  of  social  value. 

There  is,  however,  another  and  more  profound  reason  that 
the  direction  of  social  progress  must  be  determined  by  ethical 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  SOCIAL   ORGANIZATION.  513 

and  religious  sanctions,  and  toward  the  goal  represented  by  a 
state  of  ideal  ethical  cooperation.  It  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact 
of  what  was  called  above  the  '  publicity '  of  all  ideal  thought  of 
personality.  We  saw  that  the  individual  can  not  be  a  wicked 
or  a  good  individual  in  his  own  opinion — that  is  can  not  get  a 
full  ethical  judgment  on  his  own  acts — without,  at  the  same 
time,  making  his  thought  include  the  similar  judgment  passed 
by  his  fellow  men.  His  private  self-judgment  is  a  judgment 
based  on  the  sense  of  a  prevalent  public  judgment.  The  sense 
of  the  opinion  of  the  public  is  an  ingredient  or  element  in  the 
very  synthesis  by  which  the  ethical  judgment  is  constituted. 
In  so  far,  therefore,  as  the  growth  of  his  personality  involves  a 
general  or  ideal  thought  of  self,  so  far  is  this  self  a  public 
self  whose  thought  is  tpso  facto  the  birth  of  a  sanction  of  a 
public  kind.  The  man  says  to  himself:  "  I  think  thus  of  my- 
self ;  other  men  think  thus  of  me ;  I  think  thus  of  them  when 
they  are  in  my  place ;  and  all  for  the  reason  that  what  we  each 
and  all  judge  with  reference  to,  is  that  ideal  self  which  each  of 
us  only  partially  realizes.  I  partially  realize  it  in  my  own  way, 
and  each  of  the  others  does  in  his  own  way ;  and  it  is  by  these 
partial  realizations  in  concrete  instances  alone  that  this  ideal 
gets  its  actuality." 

Now,  reflection  shows  that  social  growth  proceeds  by  just 
this  same  development.  Objectively,  and  in  fact,  it  is  seen  in 
the  actual  publicity  of  social  institutions  and  interests.  But  the 
same  result  comes  out  if  we  take  the  point  of  view  which  we 
may  call  subjective  to  society  itself.  If  we  went  so  far  with  the 
analogy  from  the  individual's  growth,  as  to  speak  of  society  as 
a  quasi-personality,  and  asked  what  thought  such  a  quasi-per- 
sonality  would  have  to  think  in  order  to  grow  and  to  go  on  de- 
veloping by  the  method  of  personal  dialectic  seen  in  the  indi- 
vidual— we  should  say  that  society  would  have  to  think  in  a 
manner  which  involves  the  publicity  attaching  to  ideal  and 
ethical  personality.  It  would  have  to  ask  what  institutions 
were  good  for  its  citizens  as  such,  not  what  was  good  for  this 
particular  individual  or  that.  Its  thought  of  personality,  all  the 
way  through,  would  be  the  form  of  general  personality,  which 
is  realized  in  the  individuals,  of  course,  but  which  is  not  iden- 


5H  «/•  MARK  BALDWIN. 

tical  with  any  one  of  them.  And  with  this  thought  of  general 
personality,  there  would  go  the  thought,  also,  that  the  thought 
that  it  did  thus  think  was  the  outcome  of  all  the  partial  person- 
ality thoughts  which  the  individuals  thought,  of  all  the  judg- 
ments which  they  passed  on  one  another ;  otherwise  the  social 
quasi-personality  would  have  no  content  out  of  which  to  consti- 
tute its  general  thought  of  itself. 

All  this  is  simply  a  realization  in  the  community,  in  public 
opinion,  of  the  ethical  standards  of  judgment  which  the  indi- 
vidual must  have  if  he  is  to  develop  beyond  the  stage  of  concrete 
egoistic  or  altruistic  intelligence  or  impulsive  action.  That  the 
individual  does  go  farther  is  a  fact ;  and  it  is  just  the  fact  which 
we  call  his  development.  He  has  attained  the  form  of  general 
thinking  about  himself  and  others  which  carries  with  it  senti- 
ments of  a  social  and  ethical  kind.  This  enables  him  to  con- 
stitute society  in  a  way  which  would  be  impossible  if  he  had 
only  reached  the  lower  development  of  the  animals,  say  with 
the  sanctions  for  action  which  go  with  this  lower  development. 

So  when  we  come  to  ask  what  the  direction  of  social  prog- 
ress must  be,  we  find  that  it  cannot  be  in  a  direction  which 
violates  the  method  and  denies  the  meaning  of  those  very  states 
of  mind — the  ideal,  social  and  ethical  states — which  have  en- 
abled the  individual  to  come  into  his  social  relationships.  The 
ethical  sanction  in  the  individual  comes  to  control  the  other 
sanctions,  since  it  generalizes  and  so  transcends  them.  Society 
represents  the  embodiment  of  these  generalizations.  Its  insti- 
tutions both  represent  and  further  the  individual's  growth.  Its 
trend  forward,  then,  must  be  in  the  line  in  which  the  individual's 
higher  growth  also  proceeds.  This  is  the  trend  toward  the  com- 
plete regulation  and  use  of  the  forces  of  the  individual  by  him- 
self in  the  interests  of  social  and  ethical  unity  and  cooperation. 

Two  things  are  accordingly  true  of  the  determination  of 
social  progress.  These  two  things  are  these :  first,  that  social 
progress  must  be  determined  by  the  generalizing  agency  al- 
ready remarked  upon  working  upon  the  thoughts  of  individuals  ; 
and  second,  that  this  form  of  determination  is  necessarily  in  the 
direction  of  the  realization  of  ethical  standards  and  rules  of 
conduct. 


PSYCHOLOGY  OF  SOCIAL    ORGANIZATION.  $1$ 

§  19.  Finally  our  outcome  may  be  gathered  up  in  a  sen- 
tence of  characterization  of  society  as  a  whole.  Society  we 
may  say  is  the  form  of  natural  organization  into  -which  ethical 
personalities  fall  in  their  growth.  So  also  on  the  side  of  the 
individual,  we  may  define  ethical  personality  as  the  form  of 
natural  development  into  which  individuals  grow  who  live  in 
social  relationship.  The  true  analogy  then  is  not  that  which 
likens  society  to  a  physiological  organism,  but  rather  that  which 
likens  it  to  a  psychological  organization;  and  the  sort  of 
psychological  organization  to  which  it  is  analogous  to  that  which 
is  found  in  the  individual  in  ideal  thinking. 


SHORTER   CONTRIBUTIONS   AND  DISCUSSIONS. 

LE  DANTEC'S  WORK   ON  BIOLOGICAL  DETERMINISM 
AND  CONSCIOUS  PERSONALITY.1 

The  recent  work  of  M.  Le  Dantec  on  biological  determinism  and 
conscious  personality  seems  to  me  likely  to  perform  a  great  service, 
since  it  expresses  with  remarkable  precision,  if  I  may  say  so,  the  con- 
fusion of  ideas  and  words  that  has  been  tending  to  insert  itself  for 
some  years  into  philosophical  language ;  as  a  consequence  this  book 
may  with  advantage  serve  as  occasion  for  a  discussion  which  has  really 
a  more  general  range. 

Let  us  say  at  the  outset,  to  put  ourselves  in  touch  with  M.  Le 
Dantec,  that  this  prolific  author  has  published,  within  the  last  two  or 
three  years,  a  number  of  biological  papers  on  the  mechanism  of  diges- 
tion and  on  theories  of  life ;  he  has,  moreover,  conceived  a  new  theory 
of  life,  which  I  have  already  noticed  in  this  REVIEW.  His  present 
volume  is  a  continuation  and  development  of  the  same  ideas ;  the  au- 
thor endeavors  to  support  two  principal  propositions :  jirst,  that  the 
phenomena  of  consciousness  have  no  sort  of  influence  on  material  bio- 
logical phenomena;  and  second,  that  the  atoms  and  the  molecules, 
not  only  of  organic  bodies,  but  also  of  inert  substances,  are  endowed 
with  consciousness.  We  shall  not  take  up  these  two  propositions  di- 
rectly, but  shall  discuss  them  as  we  trace  the  course  of  false  ideas 
which  the  author  has  followed,  in  common  with  many  of  his  con- 
temporaries. 

I  wish  to  show,  as  briefly  as  possible,  that  five  or  six  radically  dis- 
tinct notions  have  been  completely  confounded,  and  that  this  unfortu- 
nate confusion  owes  its  origin  to  an  inexact  interpretation  of  the  idea 
of  freedom  and  of  its  contrary,  determinism.  Men  have  implicitly 
assumed — and  that  generally  without  being  aware  of  the  fact — that  this 
notion  of  determinism  is  logically  linked  to  certain  other  notions,  and 
forms  one  with  them.  I  shall  endeavor  to  show  the  contrary,  by  de- 
fining anew  the  notions  of  determinism,  mechanism,  physiological 
functions,  mental  functions,  spontaneity,  and  choice. 

1  Translated  from  the  author's  MS.  by  Professor  H.  C.  Warren. 


SHORTER  CONTRIBUTIONS  AND  DISCUSSIONS.      517 

1.  Determinism. — Determinism,    in  the    very  broad    meaning 
which  it  received  from  Claude  Bernard,  expresses  the  law  of  univer- 
sal causation ;  it  means  that  there  is  no  phenomenon  without  a  cause, 
that  the  succession  of  phenomena  is  regular  and  determinate ;  in  still 
other  terms,  it  is  the  negative  of  freedom,  contingency,  and  incoherence. 
Most  scientists  to-day  admit  the  determinism  of  phenomena  of  the 
physical  order ;  as  to  psychological  determinism — the  position  opposed 
to  that  of  free-will — it  is  accepted  by  some  and  rejected  by  others ; 
the  two  chief  arguments  that  are  urged  in  opposition  to  it  are  that  it 
compromises    moral    responsibility  and  contradicts   the  inner    sense 
which  every  one  possesses  of  his  own  free-will.     I  am  not  debating 
any  theory  now,  consequently  I  need  not  take  either  side.    To  sum  up, 
there    exist  two  forms  of   determinism,  physical  determinism    and 
psychological  determinism;  against  the  first  is  urged  the   doctrine 
of  the  contingency  of  the  laws  of  nature,  and  against  the  second  the 
doctrine  of  free-will. 

2.  Mechanism. — This  is  a  concept  radically  distinct  from   the 
preceding ;  it  is  one  of  those  which  have  been  expressed  in  the  great- 
est number  of  different  terms,  and  which  have  consequently  suffered 
most  from  equivocality.     Let  us,  first  of  all,  define  the  concept  itself. 
In  man  the  acts  of  thought,  voluntary  movements,  etc.,  are  of  a  two- 
fold nature ;    they  are  at  once  physiological  phenomena,  occurring  in 
the  nervous  system,  and  phenomena  of  consciousness.     Many  philoso- 
phers have  supported  the  idea  that  the  phenomenon  of  consciousness 
is  an  epiphenomenon — something  superadded,  which  does  not  intervene 
in  the  series  of  physiological  modifications,  but  whose  r61e  is  that  of  a 
passive  witness.     Huxley  was  one  of  the  most  strenuous  partisans  of 
this  theory,  which  he  expressed  in  several  striking  figures ;    he  com- 
pares  consciousness  to  the    shadow   which  follows  the  footsteps  of 
the  traveler  without  affecting  his  progress ;    or  to  light,  which  may 
illumine  the  wheels  of  a  machine  without  exercising  the  slightest  in- 
fluence upon  its  functions.     In  France,  Ribot  for  some  time  accepted 
this  conception  and  popularized  it ;  but  he  afterwards  rejected  it. 

There  are,  indeed,  some  points  of  contact  between  determinism  and 
mechanism ;  nevertheless  these  two  concepts  are  quite  distinct.  One 
may  be  a  determinist,  for  instance,  without  being  a  mechanist ;  one 
may  admit  that  all  phenomena  are  subject  to  the  law  of  causation,  and 
at  the  same  time  admit  that  the  phenomena  of  consciousness  play  an 
active  role,  are  influenced  by  physical  phenomena,  and  influence 
them  in  turn ;  this  is  the  theory  of  the  mutual  influence  of  the  phys- 
ical and  the  moral,  a  theory  which  is  just  the  opposite  of  mechanism. 


51 S         LE  DANTEC    ON  BIOLOGICAL  DETERMINISM. 

Some  authors  have  been  either  unwilling  or  unable  to  make  the 
distinction  which  we  point  out ;  confusing  the  two  concepts  together, 
they  have  maintained  that  consciousness  is  a  useless  attribute  of  living 
matter,  because,  if  it  were  otherwise  and  consciousness  could  have  any 
influence  whatever  on  the  succession  of  phenomena,  this  would  be  a 
denial  of  the  law  of  causation.  An  example  of  this  is  met  with  in 
Le  Dantec's  book,  when  he  maintains  that  "  everything  would  come  to 
pass  just  the  same  in  the  world  if  plastic  substances  possessed 
simply  their  physical  and  chemical  properties,  to  the  exclusion  of  the 
property  of  consciousness  " — the  mechanistic  theory ;  he  seems  to  have 
been  led  to  this  theory  by  the  deterministic  theory,  which  he  expresses 
as  follows:  "Plastic  substances,  like  all  other  inert  substances,  are 
subject  to  the  law  of  inertia."  We  will  not  say  that  this  author  has 
confused  these  two  concepts ;  but  if  he  has  distinguished  them  he  has 
yet  established  between  them  a  bond  of  solidarity  which  he  supposes 
to  hold  of  itself  and  which  he  does  not  justify  in  any  other  way. 

One  word  more :  the  theory  which  we  call  mechanism  has  been 
most  often  designated  by  the  name  of  automatism.  I  have  not  used 
this  word,  and  indeed  I  am  taking  care  to  banish  it  from  this  article, 
since  it  is  a  word  equivocal  to  the  last  degree.  It  has  been  given,  as 
Morgan  has  recently  shown,  five  or  six  entirely  different  meanings ; 
men  have  called  automatic  an  habitual  act,  a  non-reflexive  act,  an  act 
which  is  unaccompanied  by  consciousness,  an  act  which  is  conscious 
but  necessary  and  determined,  etc.  One  can  never  be  sure  of  himself 
in  using  it. 

3.  Physiological  function :  another  notion  which  has  become 
singularly  obscure.  Let  us  recall  first  some  simple  facts.  We  do  not 
yet  know  the  inner  nature  of  the  material  phenomena  which  occur  in  a 
nerve  center,  in  its  cells  and  its  nerves,  when  that  center  becomes 
active ;  it  has  nevertheless  been  held  that  many  of  the  material  modi- 
fications which  occur  there  are  chemical  reactions ;  thus  for  a  long 
time  it  has  been  maintained  that  vision  has  for  its  starting  point  a 
photo-chemical  action  in  the  retina,  and  quite  recently  Frey  has  gone 
so  far  as  to  suppose  that  the  simple  stimulation  of  the  tactile  papillae 
is  propagated  by  means  of  a  chemical  reaction  which  the  contact  sets 
up  in  the  papilla  or  in  the  neighboring  cells.  However  this  may  be, 
there  still  remains  an  essential  difference  between  a  chemical  reaction 
set  up  in  a  test-tube  and  a  physiological  process  properly  so  called ; 
the  latter  is  composed  of  a  series,  a  chain  of  reactions,  which  mutu- 
ally command  and  influence  one  another — which,  in  a  word,  are  organ- 
ized. Now  this  notion,  so  simple  and  natural,  of  the  physiological 


SHORTER   CONTRIBUTIONS  AND  DISCUSSIONS.      519 

process,  has  been  greatly  obscured  of  late;  some  authors  have  re- 
jected it,  thinking  that  it  involved  a  denial  of  physical  determinism. 

It  is  in  connection  with  the  life  and  relations  of  micro-organisms 
that  this  confusion  has  come  about.  Here  is  a  little  infusorian  swim- 
ming in  a  drop  of  water  under  the  microscope ;  it  goes,  comes,  turns 
about,  stops  beside  the  nutritive  particles  suspended  in  the  liquid,  then 
starts  off  again,  changes  its  direction,  stops,  etc.  Men  sought  to  ex- 
plain the  movements  of  this  little  creature ;  it  was  observed  that  these 
movements  are,  to  a  certain  extent,  under  the  voluntary  control  of  the 
experimenter  who  watches  them  through  the  microscope ;  he  is  able, 
by  means  of  appropriate  stimuli,  such  as  light,  the  electric  current 
and  certain  chemical  substances,  to  excite  the  same  movements,  known 
in  advance  and  possible  to  foresee  as  a  whole,  in  these  micro-organisms. 
What  do  these  ingenious  experiments  of  Verworn,  Pfeffer  and  others 
prove  ?  Certainly  that  the  movements  of  these  creatures  are  determined. 
But  it  does  not  follow  from  this  that  they  are  simply  chemical  re- 
actions. Men  have  wrongly  believed  that  in  order  to  express  their 
determinateness  it  was  necessary  to  assimilate  them  to  chemical  re- 
actions; and  then,  under  the  pen  of  certain  scientists,  the  strangest 
analogies  have  been  evolved :  Le  Dantec  (  Theorie  nouvelle  de  la  Vie, 
p.  32)  goes  so  far  as  to  compare  the  infusorian  in  movement  to  a 
piece  of  potassium  turning  about  in  the  water  which  it  decomposes, 
and  pushed  mechanically  by  a  stream  of  hydrogen  and  oxygen.  This 
extraordinary  comparison  is  only  justified  by  the  desire  to  prove  that 
nothing  is  left  to  chance  in  the  movement  of  these  little  creatures,  and 
that  all  their  movements  are  explicable  by  physical  causes — the  de- 
terministic position.  But  the  deterministic  position  in  no  wise  implies 
the  conclusion  that  the  movements  in  question  are  not  physiological 
reactions. 

Another  very  curious  example.  We  know  that  the  living  bac- 
teria contained  in  a  preparation  mass  themselves  at  the  points  where 
a  release  of  oxygen  is  taking  place ;  the  same  is  true  of  the  leucocytes 
in  the  blood.  Some  years  ago,  wishing  to  express  the  constancy  and 
necessity  of  the  movement  of  bacteria  towards  oxygen,  an  eminent 
physiologist  explained  these  characteristics  by  a  chemical  attraction 
operating  between  the  body  of  the  bacteria  and  the  molecules  of  oxy- 
gen. This  was  evidently  nothing  but  a  lapse  into  polemics ! 

4.  Spontaneity. — The  notion  of  spontaneity  is  very  important 
both  in  psychology  and  in  physiology.  It  is  contrasted  with  that  of  a 
stimulated  or  a  reflex  act.  A  reflex  act  is  one  which  follows  directly 
upon  external  stimulation;  it  is  the  response,  or  echo  to  it;  it  would 


520          LE  DANTEC    ON  BIOLOGICAL   DETERMINISM. 

not  have  been  produced  if  this  external  stimulation  had  not  taken 
place.  A  spontaneous  act  is  one  which  does  not  directly  respond  to 
external  irritation ;  it  is  produced  by  a  memory,  an  act  of  reasoning, 
or  an  internal  physiological  cause,  as  for  example  the  circulation  of 
the  blood.  From  every  standpoint,  not  only  from  that  of  science,  but 
also  from  that  of  practice  and  even  of  law,  there  is  the  greatest  inter- 
est in  distinguishing  between  spontaneous  acts  and  stimulated  acts; 
the  former  are  in  general  more  reflective ;  they  are  more  personal  to 
their  author ;  they  carry  a  greater  juridical  and  moral  responsibility. 
This  is,  therefore,  a  useful  distinction  and  one  which  should  be  pre- 
served. Many  authors  have  sought  to  abolish  it  and  to  condemn  the 
use  of  the  term  spontaneity  as  being  unscientific.  Why  ?  It  is  easy 
to  guess.  These  authors  have  misunderstood  the  meaning  of  the  word 
spontaneous ;  they  imagine  that  spontaneity  means  first  cause,  the  ab- 
sence of  determination,  and  that  it  is  a  synonym  for  freedom. 

5.  Choice. — This  word  is  probably  the  one  that  has  occasioned 
the  greatest  amount  of  equivocation.  It  seemed  as  if  the  faculty  of 
choosing  implied  free-will,  and  that  if  this  faculty  were  accorded  to 
any  animalcule  he  was  thereby  removed  from  the  influences  of  envi- 
ronment, and  all  determinism  was  suppressed.  The  responsibility  for 
this  confusion  of  ideas  certainly  rests  upon  the  philosophers ;  it  is 
they  who,  in  the  discussion  of  the  free-will  position,  have  represented 
choice  as  a  demonstration  of  that  position.  A  falling  stone  does  not 
choose,  it  has  been  said,  because  its  fall  is  determined  by  the  laws  of 
gravitation,  whereas  a  thinking  being  can  choose  between  several  dif- 
ferent courses ;  this  is  proof  of  his  possessing  a  f  ree[will.  We  need  not 
enter  into  this  discussion.  Our  aim  is  to  show  that  apart  from  every 
theory,  laying  aside  that  of  free-will  and  even  admitting  a  determinism 
that  is  universal  and  without  exception,  it  is  possible  to  give  a  specific 
meaning  to  the  word  choice.  We  may  again  take  an  example  from 
among  the  micro-organisms.  It  has  been  asked  whether  certain  species 
of  infusoria  do  not  exercise  choice  in  the  matter  of  their  nutrition. 
There  are  infusorian  hunters,  who  traverse  the  waters  of  pools  with 
their  mouths  open  and  their  cilia  always  in  motion,  and  who  swallow 
all  the  particles  suspended  in  the  water,  drawing  them  towards 
their  mouth  by  the  current  which  they  produce  with  their  peristome. 
These  creatures,  then,  do  not  exercise  choice  at  all ;  provided  the 
particle  be  of  a  suitable  size  it  is  mechanically  introduced  into  the 
mouth;  it  reaches  the  plasm  of  the  body,  and  there  it  is  either  as- 
similated or  rejected,  according  to  its  nature.  The  problem  is  to  dis- 
cover whether  other  infusoria  do  not  choose  their  food  before  swallow- 


SHORTER   CONTRIBUTIONS  AND  DISCUSSIONS.      521 

ing,  that  is,  whether  the  stimulation  produced  by  the  food  does  not, 
by  a  reflex  route,  excite  a  movement  of  prehension  or  rejection  accord- 
ing to  the  nature  of  the  food.  Observation  a  lone  can  give  an  answer  to 
this  problem.  Whichever  way  it  be  resolved,  it  has  at  least  been 
possible  to  propose  it,  and  it  has  been  proposed  without  any  question 
of  free-will ;  for  choice,  thus  understood,  is  composed  of  a  series  of 
regular  and  rigorously  determined  reflexes. 

6.  Psychic  functions.  It  is  here  that  the  greatest  errors  have  ac- 
cumulated— as  it  were,  by  choice!  To  a  number  of  our  contempo- 
raries, little  versed  in  psychology — which  fact  does  not  prevent  them 
from  constructing  wretched  psychology  without  knowing  it — the  phe- 
nomena of  consciousness  present  a  sort  of  phantasy,  or  phantasmagoria 
without  cause  and  without  law.  We  need  not  reply  that  a  phenome- 
non of  consciousness  appears  to  us  to  be  as  rigorously  determined,  in 
its  production,  its  quality  and  its  minutest  details,  as  the  fall  of  a  stone 
or  the  budding  of  a  plant ;  but  it  is  useless  to  stop  over  this  point, 
since  these  are  errors  which  it  is  only  necessary  to  clearly  set  forth  in 
order  to  refute  with  the  same  stroke.  Let  us  follow  out  the  effects  of 
this  preconceived  idea  on  the  interpretation  of  phenomena.  The 
question  comes  up  again  in  the  interpretation  of  the  movements  and 
acts  performed  by  micro-organisms.  Some  authors  wishing  to  endow 
micro-organisms  with  psychic  properties — a  disputable  point,  be  it  un- 
derstood, on  which  only  hypothesis  can  be  made — the  principal  objec- 
tion raised  against  this  interpretation  consists  in  a  naive  declaration 
that  this  would  mean  the  suppression  of  fixed  laws.  "  Here  is  a 
bacterium,"  says  Le  Dantec,  "which  starts  off  for  a  region  of  the  infus- 
ion where  he  will  find  a  substance  which  pleases  him(  !)  I  direct  a 
ray  of  blue  light  upon  him  from  another  side,  and  he  is  compelled  to 
change  his  route.  But,  it  will  be  said,  this  is  because  he  likes  the 
light  better  than  the  food.  Then  I  coax  him  in  another  direction  by 
means  of  an  attractive  substance  which  is,  however,  noxious  to  him ;  he 
rushes  up  to  it  and  dies  from  its  effects ;  is  this  because  I  annoy  him 
to  such  an  extent  that  he  commits  suicide  ?" 

This  ironical  method  of  reasoning  is  not  peculiar  to  the  author 
whom  we  cite ;  it  may  be  considered  as  a  very  fair  sample  of  the  argu- 
ments of  a  certain  number  of  physiologists.  As  regards  M.  Le  Dantec 
himself,  it  is  only  necessary  to  notice  this  rather  unexpected  fact,  that 
although  he  refuses  to  the  infusorian,  in  the  preceding  passage,  the 
faculty  of  being  pleased  with  a  substance,  he,  nevertheless,  does  not 
hesitate  to  accord  consciousness  to  atoms  of  iron  and  chlorine. * 

1  Vide  some  savory  lines  on  the  azotic  consciousness  and  the  atomic  con- 
sciousness, as  opposed  to  the  molecular  consciousness,  p.  84. 


522  A   NEW  FACTOR  IN    WEBER'S  LAW. 

But  there  is  no  need  of  stopping  over  the  question  whether  infusoria 
possess  any  rudiments  of  consciousness  and  sensibility ;  in  the  present 
article  I  do  not  propose  to  interpret  observations  or  to  fight  for  a 
theory.  I  limit  myself  to  a  criticism  of  ideas,  and  from  this  stand- 
point I  find  that  the  principal  objection  advanced  against  those  who 
wish  to  allow  psychical  faculties  to  the  protozoa  is  that  such  psychical 
faculties  would  be  the  expression  of  arbitrariness  and  phantasy,  that 
they  would  be  incompatible  with  the  idea  that  "every  operation  per- 
formed by  a  protozoan  depends  solely  on  the  conditions  of  environ- 
ment and  being  under  determinate  conditions  is  itself  determinate." 
In  a  word,  to  place  well  in  relief  the  matrix-idea  of  all  the  contra- 
dictions which  have  been  noted,  we  may  say  that  there  exists,  even 
among  the  best  minds,  a  tendency  to  admit  that  determinism  applies 
less  vigorously  to  living  matter  than  to  inert  matter,  to  the  facts  of 
consciousness  than  to  the  facts  of  physics,  to  complex  phenomena  than 
to  simple  phenomena. 

ALFRED  BINET. 
SORBONNE,  PARIS. 


A  NEW  FACTOR  IN  WEBER'S  LAW. 

Does  Weber's  law  depend  upon  the  real  or  upon  the  apparent 
stimulus  ?  It  has  always  been  assumed  that  it  depends  upon  the  so- 
called  real  physical  stimulus.  The  measurements  of  some  illusions1 
led  me  to  question  this  and  investigate  whether  it  depends  upon  the 
apparent  stimulus,  and  if  so,  according  to  what  law. 

To  illustrate  the  theory  I  will  state  its  application  to  the  results  of 
a  series  of  experiments  made  for  the  purpose  of  testing  this  matter  in 
the  illusion  of  weight,  which  is  due  to  the  difference  in  size  of  bodies 
that  have  the  same  weight.  (For  details  in  regard  to  the  measurements 
of  this  illusion,  see  article  cited,  pp.  1-29. )  The  apparatus  consisted  of 
three  pairs  of  cylinders — A,  B  and  C — each  of  the  same  weight,  80  g. ; 
the  same  diameter,  37  mm. ;  and  varying  in  height,  A  being  20  mm., 
B,  1 20  mm.,  and  C,  50  mm.  With  these  I  measured  (i)  the  thresh- 
old, or  least  perceptible  difference,  and  (2)  the  amount  of  illusion  in 
A.  and  B  respectively  when  measured  by  C  as  standard. 

Representing  the  threshold  value-  by  J,  the  results  are  (i) 
A  A  =  2.8g.,  A  B  =  4«og.,  A  C  =  3«3g- ;  and  (2)  the  illusion  in  A  as 
measured  by  C  (A),  is  an  overestimation of  15.8  g.,  and  the  illusion  in 

1  Stud.  Yale  Psych.  Lab.,  1895,  III.,  1-67. 


SHORTER   CONTRIBUTIONS  AND  DISCUSSIONS.      523 

B  as  measured  by  C  (A?)  is  an  underestimation  of  12.1  g.  These 
figures  are  averages  of  two  complete  measurements  on  each  of  twenty 
students  of  psychology  who  were  aware  of  the  facts  and  conditions  of 
the  illusion. 

The  constant  multiples  which  would  express  Weber's  law  with  re- 
ference to  the  standard,  physical  stimulus,  80  g.,  are  here 


Now,  all  overestimation  lowers  the  threshold  and  all  underestimation 
raises  it,  and  we  notice,  in  the  results,  the  following  relations  between 
the  thresholds  and  the  illusions: 

A  A       C—K 


A  C          C 

AB  _  C+K' 
and~J~C~     ~C~ 


/"•  _    1£  A     D 

The  actual  results  are:  for  --7-7=,,  0.85;  for  —  -^-  ,  0.80;  for—  -p^, 

u  \+  C/  —J  O 

C  4-  K' 
1.21;  for  --  -^  —  ,   1.15.     The  errors   involved   by  substituting  the 

empirical  values  in  the  formulas  are  5  %  in  the  first  and  6  %  in  the 
second.  These  lie  well  within  the  mean  errors  of  observation  which 
are  :  for  A  A,  43  %  ;  for  A  B,  38  %  '•>  for  A  C,  48  %  5  for  K,  30  %  ; 
and  for  K\  41  %.  Therefore,  within  the  limits  here  investigated, 
Weber's  law  depends  upon  the  apparent  weight  and  not  upon  the 
physical  standard.  And,  since  there  appears  to  be  a  definite  relation 
between  the  illusion  and  the  threshold,  if  the  one  is  given  the  other 
may  be  calculated;  for,  applying  the  same  results  to  the  following 
formulas  : 


. 

C+K>  —**' 

J  C 
and  —£r  =  fa  ; 

we  obtain  a  constant,  in  this  case  practically  fa.  Hence  we  may 
state  the  principle  for  the  dependence  of  Weber's  law  upon  the  ap- 
parent stimulus  in  estimation  of  weight,  as 

AE      =c 

s+x" 

where  A  E  is  the  threshold,  5*  the  standard  weight,  K  the  amount  of 


524  NOTE  ON  THE  RAPIDITY  OF  DREAMS. 

the  illusion  (./Twill  be  plus  or  minus  according  as  the  illusion  is  an 
under  or  over  estimation),  and  C  a  constant  fraction.  Hence  the 
illusion  may  be  used  as  an  index  to  the  threshold,  and  likewise  the  re- 
verse. 

Nearly  all  estimates  of  weight  involve  illusions,  and  it  is  probable 
that  the  above  formula  holds  for  all  degrees  of  illusion  of  weight  with- 
in the  limits  in  which  Weber's  law  is  valid.  It  further  follows  from 
this  theory  that  we  shall  find  a  more  exact  and  more  extensive  validity 
for  Weber's  law  when  this  fraction  is  taken  into  consideration,  for  most 
of  the  experiments  on  Weber's  law  have  involved  illusions  like  the  one 
here  discussed,  but  they  have  not  been  taken  into  account  except  by 
attempts  to  eliminate  them.  And,  since  Weber's  law  is  a  general  law 
of  all  liminal  sensations,  we  may  assume,  upon  the  basis  of  these  ex- 
periments, that  in  whatever  sense  it  has  any  validity  it  must  be  with 
reference  to  the  apparent  stimulus.  A  full  account  of  these  experi- 
ments will  appear  in  Stud.  Tale  Psych.  Lab.,  Volume  IV. 

C.  E.  SEASHORE. 
YALE  UNIVERSITY. 


NOTE  ON  THE  RAPIDITY  OF  DREAMS. 

Does  association  attain  in  dreams  an  altogether  exceptional  rapid- 
ity? Common  opinion  answers,  yes,  and  appeals,  for  scientific  sup- 
port, to  the  records  of  such  remarkable  dreams  as  that  of  '  Maury 
guillotine1.'  M.  Victor  Egger,  however,  in  the  Revue  Philosophique 
for  July,  1895  (40-46),  subjects  the  evidence  to  searching  criticism, 
and  opposes  the  common  opinion.  He  also  hints  at  a  method  for  in- 
vestigating the  question  experimentally.  Following  this  suggestion, 
though  somewhat  altering  the  method,  I  have  obtained  definite  evi- 
dence for  M.  Egger's  position  and  against  the  common  belief. 

The  method  is  simply  this :  to  time  trains  of  association  during 
normal  waking  conditions,  count  the  number  of  scenes  in  such  trains, 
and,  when  they  are  recollections,  recall  the  time  taken  by  the  original 
experiences.  The  procedure  is  so  simple  as  hardly  to  need  descrip- 
tion. The  subject  was  told  to  begin  at  a  signal  and  let  his  thoughts 
reel  off  as  fast  as  they  would.  Sometimes  he  was  stopped  after  5  or 
20  or  30  seconds,  and  sometimes  allowed  to  keep  on  until  he  felt  the 
thoughts  come  slowly.  Immediately,  he  reviewed  the  images  which 
had  just  passed  through  his  mind,  and  made  a  mark,  on  a 
piece  of  paper,  for  each  image.  The  '  images,'  not  always  visual, 


SHORTER   CONTRIBUTIONS  AND  DISCUSSIONS.      525 

were  required  to  have  such  a  degree  of  separateness  from  the  preced- 
ing and  following  as  to  be  counted  as  separate  stages  of  the  associative 
process.  After  making  this  count  the  subject  generally  went  on  to 
record  his  reverie  in  detail. 

The  conditions  of  the  experiment  approximate  closely  to  those  of 
a  dream  recalled  on  waking.  The  main  difference  is  that  in  the 
experiment  the  flow  of  imagination  is  less  spontaneous,  and  probably, 
therefore,  somewhat  slower  than  in  either  a  dream  or  a  perfectly  spon- 
taneous reverie. 

For  the  purpose  in  hand  there  is  no  need  of  averages  or  of  a  large 
number  of  experiments.  It  is  sufficient  to  find,  without  looking  far, 
frequent  instances  of  associations  rapid  enough  to  duplicate  the 
wonders  of  the  famous  dreams.  Of  the  ten  students  on  whom  I  ex- 
perimented, one,  a  rather  heavy,  deliberate  sort  of  man,  required 
about  three  seconds  for  an  image.  Few,  however,  required  more 
than  half  that  time,  and  when  the  train  of  imagination  was  but  five 
seconds  long  the  time  required  for  an  image  sank  as  low  as  .6,  .3  or 
.25  seconds.  Now  Maury's  dream,  as  recorded,  contained  not  more 
than  1 6  images,  and  these  closely  grouped  into  four  scenes.  So 
much  may  easily  be  imagined  by  a  man  awake,  in  3  or  4  seconds ;  and 
Maury's  dream  may  have  taken  as  much  time  as  that. 

To  the  objection  that  in  dreams  we  certainly  do  live  over  again 
long  series  of  events  in  a  very  short  time,  I  would  reply  that,  except 
for  the  illusion  of  reality  in  dreams,  the  same  thing  occurs  in  waking 
reveries.  My  slowest  subject  reviewed,  in  no  seconds,  a  trip  which 
occupied  2j^  days,  recalling  35  distinct  and  complete  scenes.  Another 
reviewed,  in  37.5  seconds,  a  drive  of  three  hours,  recalling  19  images. 
Another  reviewed  very  thoroughly  a  two- weeks'  canoe  trip,  in  82 
seconds,  by  means  of  72  images.  Another  reviewed,  in  29.5  seconds, 
two  trips  among  the  mountains,  one  occupying  4  hours,  the  other  20 
hours.  This  last  recollection  was  described  as  extremely  full  and 
vivid,  and  as  comprising,  around  each  of  the  45  images,  "  many  others 
of  varying  intensity  which  seem  to  be  simultaneous."  This  same  sub- 
ject recalled,  in  5  seconds,  20  images  from  an  evening  out.  Still 
another  saw,  in  5  seconds,  a  9-scene  panorama  of  a  trip  from  Boston  to 
Detroit.  Add  to  any  of  these  the  illusion  present  in  a  dream,  and  yoi 
have  all  that  is  necessary  for  '  living  over  again,'  in  a  few  moments, 
large  segments  of  past  experience. 

I  will  transcribe  the  record  of  one  of  these  experiments. 

I  started  by  looking  at  my  table  cover.  Some  round  spots  on  this 
made  me  think  of  flecks  of  foam  on  the  sea ;  that  called  up  a  marine 


526  NOTE    ON  THE  RAPIDITY   OF  DREAMS. 

painting  which  I  had  recently  seen ;  next  I  had  before  me  in  rapid  suc- 
cession three  scenes  from  a  rowing  trip  taken  last  summer,  five  scenes 
from  a  bicycle  ride  on  the  adjacent  shore,  and  three  scenes  from  the 
railroad  journey  thence  to  Boston.  That  reminded  me  of  a  friend 
whom  I  met  on  the  train ;  and  next  I  saw  myself  leaving  the  Boston 
station,  loaded  down  with  baggage,  and  accompanied  by  my  friend. 
Soon  we  separated,  I  taking  one  of  his  cards.  I  then  thought  of  some 
visiting  cards  which  I  had  ordered  and  expected  by  mail,  then  of  a 
check  I  had  just  received,  of  going  off  and  spending  this  money,  of 
going  to  Europe,  of  climbing  the  Alps.  Next  I  seemed  to  be  swim- 
ming across  the  ocean;  in  the  middle  I  met  a  good-sized  codfish, 
which  sported  with  me,  and  finally  proceeded  to  swallow  me.  I 
passed  right  through  the  fish's  body,  coming  out  at  the  tip  of  his  tail. 
Grabbing  him  by  the  tail,  I  swung  him  around  in  the  air  and  slapped 
him  against  the  water.  Flames  now  rose  around  me,  generating  a 
gas  which  wafted  me  high  into  the  sky ;  there  I  flopped  over  a  few 
times  and  then,  diving  back  into  the  water,  penetrated  deeper  and 
deeper,  straight  through  the  earth,  till  I  emerged  in  the  Chinese  sea. 
There  on  the  grassy  shore  stood  a  row  of  gaily  dressed  Chinamen, 
who  began  a  lively  dance,  but  soon  changed  to  a  row  of  Chinese  lan- 
terns, bobbing  in  the  wind. 

At  this  point  I  consulted  my  watch,  and  found  that  the  whole  had 
taken  56  seconds.  As  there  are  but  39  images,  the  series  is  not  nearly 
so  rapid  as  some  of  those  of  my  other  subjects.  Add  the  illusion  of 
objective  reality,  and  we  have  here  the  conditions  of  a  dream  of 
«  marvellous  rapidity.'  "  Last  night,"  the  dreamer  would  report,  "  I 
had  a  dream  in  which,  besides  minor  incidents,  I  took  a  four-hours' 
row,  a  three-hours'  ride,  a  five-hours'  journey  by  rail,  a  voyage  abroad 
and  tramp  among  the  Alps,  a  swim  half-way  across  the  ocean,  a  fly- 
ing trip  to  heaven  and  a  diving  trip  in  the  other  direction,  ending  on 
the  shores  of  China."  And  all  this  in  56  seconds ! 

R.   S.  WOODWORTH. 

HARVARD  UNIVERSITY. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE. 

The    Will  to  Believe  and  other  Essays    in    Popular  Philosophy. 

WILLIAM  JAMES.     Longmans,  Green  &  Co.,  1897.     Pp.  xiv  + 

332. 

In  this  volume  Professor  James  has  collected  a  number  of  discus- 
sions in  '  popular  philosophy,'  which  for  the  most  part  were  first  de- 
livered as  addresses  before  various  associations  and  clubs,  and  then 
published  in  the  Reviews.  The  title  essay  on  '  The  Will  to  Believe ' 
and  the  second,  '  Is  Life  Worth  Living?'  are  the  latest  and,  perhaps, 
the  best  known  papers  in  the  collection ;  but  the  reader  will  be  grate- 
ful as  well  for  the  earlier  pieces  which  are  here  included  and  will 
welcome  the  whole  to  a  permanent  place  in  his  library. 

Besides  the  two  essays  mentioned,  the  third  on  '  The  Sentiment  of 
Rationality,' and  the  fourth,  'Reflex  Action  and  Theism, 'are  "largely 
concerned  in  defending  the  legitimacy  of  religious  faith."  The  next 
four,  '  The  Dilemma  of  Determinism,'  '  The  Moral  Philosopher 
and  the  Moral  Life,'  '  Great  Men  and  their  Environment'  and  '  The 
Influence  of  Individuals, 'deal  with  questions  of  ethics  and  social  prog- 
ress. The  ninth  paper,  '  On  Some  Hegelisms,'  furnishes  a  sharp 
critique  of  certain  of  the  Hegelian  assumptions  and  certain  features 
of  the  '  master's'  method ;  while  the  last,  4  What  Psychical  Research 
has  Accomplished,'  gives  the  author's  well-known  views  on  the  subject 
in  the  hope  of  arousing  interest  in  the  field  and  aid  for  the  work. 

From  the  psychological  standpoint  the  chief  interest  of  these  essays 
is  to  be  found  in  the  emphasis  which  is  laid  on  the  emotional  and 
volitional  elements  in  consciousness.  It  is  probable  that  many  readers 
will  dissent  from  the  conclusions  reached  concerning  the  legitimacy 
of  the  influence  of  the  will  on  faith ;  but  few  will  deny  the  accuracy 
of  the  psychological  analysis,  while  it  is  time  that  all  should  recog- 
nize the  deeper  psychological  principle  involved,  the  principle  of  the 
interplay  of  the  several  phases  of  consciousness  in  the  genesis  of  the 
various  mental  phenomena.  How  strange  the  '  psychologies'  of  the 
recent  past,  not  to  speak  of  contemporary  works,  will  appear  to  the 
psychologists  of  the  future !  Not  only  the  intellectualistic  theories, 
but  our  analyses  of  consciousness  as  a  class,  will  seem  often  to  have 


528         THE    WILL    TO  BELIEVE  AND   OTHER  ESSAYS. 

ignored  the  interconnections  of  the  several  kinds  of  conscious  pro- 
cesses, or  at  best  to  have  failed  to  supply  an  adequate  account  of  them 
though  convinced  of  the  truth  of  the  principle  of  connection  in  gen- 
eral. 

But  the  psychology  of  the  question  is  merely  incidental  to  the 
purpose  of  the  book  under  discussion.  The  author's  philosophical 
position  is  described  in  the  preface  (pp.  VII  ff.)  as  '  radical  empiri- 
cism,' u  'empiricism,'  because  it  is  contented  to  regard  its  most  as- 
sured conclusions  concerning  matters  of  fact  as  hypotheses,"  and 
"  '  radical,'  because  it  treats  the  doctrine  of  monism  itself  as  an  hypo- 
thesis "  and  assumes  in  contrast  the  pluralistic  view  of  the  world.  On 
this  platform  Professor  James  advocates  as  a  general  thesis  that  "our 
passional  nature  not  only  lawfully  may,  but  must,  decide  an  option 
between  propositions,  whenever  it  is  a  genuine  option  that  can  not  by 
its  nature  be  decided  on  intellectual  grounds ;  for  to  say,  under  such 
circumstances,  '  do  not  decide,  but  leave  the  question  open,'  is  itself  a 
passional  decision — just  like  the  deciding  yes  or  no — and  is  attended 
with  the  same  risk  of  losing  the  truth"  (p.  n);  and,  in  special, 
argues  the  legitimacy  of  the  religious  and  ethical  view  of  the  world, 
that  is  to  say,  of  the  belief  in  a  moral  order,  in  the  freedom  and  re- 
sponsibility of  man  and  in  the  existence  of  God.  Thus  we  get  a 
philosophy  of  belief  which,  though  it  guards  against  the  vagaries  of 
unrestrained  credulity  (pp.  x  ff.,  29  ff.),  affirms  at  once  the  need  of 
faith  and  the  legitimacy  of  its  exercise,  even  when  intellectual  demon- 
stration is  unattained  or  unattainable. 

In  spite  of  the  originality,  one  might  almost  say,  the  personality, 
of  Professor  James's  reasonings,  the  reader  of  recent  apologetic  litera- 
ture will  be  reminded  of  a  certain  tendency  toward  similar  conclusions 
on  the  part  of  many  thinkers,  indeed  of  a  certain  similar  tendency 
noticeable  in  the  spirit  of  the  time.  And  if  he  compare  with  the 
present  age  those  critical  eras  in  the  history  of  opinion  with  which  it 
is  unquestionably  to  be  classed,  he  will  remember  analogous  develop- 
ments in  many  periods  when,  received  systems  having  been  brought 
into  question  or  discarded,  appeal  has  been  taken  from  the  impotent 
conclusions  of  the  reason  to  the  deliverances  of  the  heart  and  con- 
science. The  issue,  however,  in  recent  times  has  become  of  broader 
scope.  It  is  not  merely  the  question  of  personal  faith,  momentous 
though  this  be ;  or  merely  the  legitimacy  of  the  appeal  to  the  heart 
when  the  head  has  been  brought  into  confusion,  though,  for  one,  the 
reviewer  is  disposed  to  admit  this,  at  least  in  part.  But  modern  phil- 
osophy, like  modern  psychology,  despite  its  lapses  from  grace,  has  been 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  529 

nearing  the  point  at  which  overweening  intellectualism  begins  to  yield 
before  the  perception  of  the  truth,  that  practical  principles  as  well  as 
theoretical  are  to  be  considered  in  the  determination  of  fundamental 
questions.  The  primacy  of  the  practical  reason,  it  is  true,  was  suc- 
ceeded by  a  tremendous  assertion  of  the  omnipotence  of  the  abstract 
reason.  Nevertheless,  it  is  becoming  clear  that  we  shall  hardly  es- 
cape from  the  chaos  in  which  the  downfall  of  the  a  priori  systems 
left  us  until  some  more  inclusive  synthesis  than  they  shall  be  proposed, 
the  better  to  satisfy  both  intellectual  and  practical  needs. 

Thus  the  questions  suggested  by  Professor  James's  work  involve 
more  than  a  defense  of  faith.  They  lead  into  the  heart  of  the  prob- 
lems immediately  in  the  path  of  contemporary  thought.  In  order  to 
meet  them  the  philosophy  of  the  near  future  will  need  to  summon  all 
its  forces.  Thinkers  acquainted  with  the  present  volume  will  eagerly 
look  for  the  more  systematic  treatise  on  empiricism  of  which  the  dis- 
tinguished author  gives  us  a  partial  promise  (p.  x.). 

A.  C.  ARMSTRONG,  JR. 
WESLEYAN  UNIVERSITY. 


The  Theory  of  Knowledge.  L.  T.  HOBHOUSE.  London,  Methuen 
&  Co.;  New  York,  The  Macmillan  Co.,  1896.  8vo,  pp.  626. 
The  division  of  the  several  sciences  is  a  matter  of  convenience, 
and  one  should,  perhaps,  not  insist  that  an  author  must  confine  himself 
in  a  given  volume  to  one  field  and  avoid  all  trespass  upon  those  con- 
tiguous to  it ;  but  I  cannot  but  think  it  is  conducive  to  clearness  to  observe 
certain  limits  with  a  good  deal  of  care.  Mr.  Hobhouse  describes  his 
book  in  a  sub-title  as  a  contribution  to  some  problems  of  logic  and 
metaphysics,  and  in  his  pages  the  two  disciplines  do  interpenetrate 
one  another.  Three-fourths  of  his  book  is  chiefly  logical  and  the  re- 
maining fourth  almost  wholly  metaphysical,  or,  as  I  should  prefer  to 
call  it,  epistemological. 

Logic,  as  the  science  of  proof,  can  be  successfully  treated  without 
leaving  the  plain  of  the  common  understanding  and  entering  into 
those  problems  of  reflective  thought  which  we  commonly  regard  as 
strictly  philosophical.  Apprehension,  construction  and  the  processes 
of  inductive  and  deductive  reasoning  can  be  so  treated  (and  Mr.  Hob- 
house  often  does  so  treat  them)  as  to  be  clear  to  one  who  has  not  oc- 
cupied himself  with  metaphysics,  cares  little  to  attack  the  question  in 
what  sense  the  external  world  may  be  regarded  as  external,  and  never 
raises  at  all  the  question  of  the  validity  of  all  knowledge  or  of  the 


53°  THE    THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

nature  of  ultimate  reality.  To  be  sure,  logical  methods  must  obtain 
in  treating  all  these  problems,  but  they  are  problems  which  belong,  I 
think,  to  a  distinct  and  different  science,  to  epistemology,  as  I  should 
elect  to  use  the  term,  and  not  to  the  science  of  logic.  Had  Mr. 
Hobhouse  observed  this  distinction,  I  think  he  would  have  been  in 
some  places  clearer  than  he  is,  and  would  have  avoided  a  certain 
amount  of  polemic  which  appears  to  me  not  always  immediately  re- 
lated to  the  matter  chiefly  at  issue,  though  it  is  in  itself  interesting  and 
acute.  He  would,  moreover,  possibly  have  been  led  to  treat  at  greater 
length  in  a  separate  volume  the  subjects  discussed  at  the  end  of  this 
one,  and  such  a  treatise  from  his  pen  I  should  regard  as  valuable. 
However,  he  has,  as  it  is,  given  us  a  very  interesting  and  suggestive 
book,  and  we  must  not  quarrel  with  him  for  rendering  the  meaning 
of  the  phrase  'Theory  of  Knowledge'  so  inclusive.  He  has  suffi- 
cient precedent  for  extending  the  boundaries  of  the  science  of  logic. 

In  his  preface  Mr.  Hobhouse  announces  it  as  his  intention  to  make 
an  unprejudiced  attempt  to  fuse  what  is  true  and  valuable  in  the  older 
English  tradition  with  the  newer  doctrines  which  have  become  natural- 
ized in  England.  One  feels,  however,  that  he  is  really  much  more  in 
sympathy  with  Mill  and  Spencer  than  he  is  with  Hegel,  and  one  can- 
not help  thinking  that  he  owes  most  of  his  best  work  to  an  inspiration 
obtained  from  English  sources.  I  regret  that  he  has  devoted  so  much 
attention  to  Mr.  Bradley,  who  does  not  appear  to  me  to  be  the  most 
logical  of  writers  on  logic,  and  he  has  certainly  not  gotten  his  own  care- 
ful and  consistent  habit  of  reasoning  from  this  source.  He  cites  Mr. 
Bradley,  it  is  true,  chiefly  to  disagree  with  him,  but  he  still  feels  that 
he  owes  him  much.  It  is  clear  that  he  differs  from  him  widely  in 
his  conclusions. 

The  book  is  divided  into  three  parts,  as  follows  :  (i)  Data;  in- 
cluding chapters  on  apprehension,  memory,  construction,  ideas,  re- 
semblance and  identity,  and  judgment  and  its  validity.  (2)  Inference  ; 
containing  a  careful  and  detailed  exposition  of  the  methods  of  induc- 
tive and  deductive  reasoning,  with  an  excellent  chapter  on  explana- 
tion. (3)  Knowledge  ;  in  which  are  discussed  the  nature  of  validity, 
the  conception  of  external  reality,  substance,  the  notion  of  self, 
knowledge  and  reality,  etc. 

It  is  impossible  in  a  brief  review  of  so  extended  and  comprehen- 
sive a  work  to  point  out  in  detail  excellencies  or  to  take  exception  to 
what  appear  defects.  I  should  be  inclined  to  find  the  latter  not  so 
much  in  the  properly  logical  parts  of  the  book  as  in  the  psycholog- 
ical and  epistemological  positions  taken  by  the  author;  e.  g.,  in  his 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  531 

view  of  our  direct  perception  of  space  by  sight  and  touch ;  in  his  putting 
the  visual  and  the  tangible  object  in  the  same  place,  with  no  further 
analysis  of  the  significance  of  the  phrase;  in  his  distinction  between 
consciousness  as  a  mental  activity  and  the  content  with  which  this 
activity  concerns  itself ;  in  his  argument  to  prove  phenomena  inde- 
pendent of  perception  and  existent  when  not  perceived — an  argument 
which  does  not  recognize  the  double  sense  of  the  word  'exist' 
touched  upon  by  Berkeley  and  emphasized  by  Mill ;  and  in  his  endeavor 
to  prove,  in  his  discussion  of  the  conception  of  teleology,  that  a  thing 
not  yet  existent  but  which  will  exist  may  be  a  determining  cause  of  an 
action,  whereas  an  action  performed  in  view  of  an  end  which,  for 
some  reason,  will  not  be  attained  cannot  be  regarded  as  determined 
by  that  end. 

One  of  the  chief  excellencies  of  the  book  lies  in  the  fact  that  the 
author  is  careful  and  consistent  in  his  statements,  a  virtue  not  always 
found  in  philosophical  writers.  Evidently  the  work  is  the  result 
of  much  conscientious  labor,  and  its  author  has  that  most  valuable 
possession,  a  clear  mind.  I  feel  well  repaid  for  a  careful  perusal  of 
the  volume,  which  I  shall  read  again  with  equal  pleasure.  In  these 
days  of  much  dogmatism  regarding  the  a  priori  element  in  knowl- 
edge, it  is  a  pleasure  to  meet  with  a  thorough-going  empiricist,  who 
endeavors  to  keep  his  feet  upon  solid  ground  in  all  his  reasonings, 
and  who  yet  has  a  sympathetic  comprehension  of  the  works  of  those 
with  whom  he  disagrees.  Mr.  Hobhouse  refuses  to  accept  the  Neo- 
Kantian  divorce  of  thought  from  sensation,  with  its  subsequent  illog- 
ical reconciliation,  but  finds,  in  the  '  given '  of  apprehension,  both 
form  and  content,  maintaining  that  space,  time  and  relations  of  vari- 
ous sorts  are  not  the  creation  of  thought,  but  are  perceived  by  the 
mind,  in  the  reality  apprehended,  as  among  its  aspects  or  elements. 
Even  the  axioms  of  inference  themselves  he  traces  to  a  source  in  the 
1  given.'  He  finds  them  implicit  in  all  good  reasoning,  and  holds 
that  they  prove  themselves  valid  in  the  only  way  in  which  they  can 
conceivably  be  proved  valid,  i.  e.,  in  satisfactorily  reducing  the  whole 
mass  of  facts  given  to  us  in  apprehension  to  a  consistent  and  orderly 
system.  They  are  proved  valid,  as  all  judgments  are  proved  valid, 
by  their  harmony  with  the  whole  body  of  knowledge.  One  need  not 
agree  with  the  author  in  every  detail,  to  have  a  strong  sympathy  with 
his  general  attitude  upon  this  and  other  topics. 

G.  S.  F. 


53 2  HISTORY  OF  SPECULATIVE   THOUGHT. 

Geschichte  des  Unendlichkeitsproblems  im  abendlandischen  Den- 
ken  bis  Kant.  JONAS  COHN.  Leipzig,  1896.  Pp.  261. 
Dr.  Cohn  has  given  us  a  history  of  the  problem  of  the  infinite 
characterized  by  German  thoroughness.  From  Anaximander  to  the 
Neo-Platonists,  from  Origen  to  the  later  scholastics,  from  Cusanus 
and  Copernicus  to  Kant,  the  deliverances  of  the  greater  and  of  many  of 
the  lesser  lights  in  the  history  of  speculative  thought  are  recorded  and 
examined.  The  author  has  reserved  for  a  later  work  a  theoretic  dis- 
cussion of  the  problem,  clearing  the  way  in  the  present  volume  for 
such  a  discussion.  It  would,  however,  be  impossible  to  make  the  his- 
tory of  any  problem  more  than  a  dry  catalogue  of  opinions,  without 
analyzing  and  criticizing  the  various  positions  which  have  been  taken 
with  regard  to  it;  and  it  is  not  difficult  to  guess  from  Dr.  Cohn's  criti- 
cisms what  will  be  the  general  nature  of  his  own  discussion.  He 
will  stand  as  champion  of  the  notion  of  the  continuous ;  he  will  hold 
to  the  infinite  divisibility  of  finite  spaces  and  times,  sympathizing, 
however,  with  the  Aristotelian  distinction  between  the  infinitely  di- 
visible and  the  infinitely  divided ;  and  he  will  not  believe  that  it  is  im- 
possible for  a  point  to  move  from  one  end  to  the  other  of  a  finite,  in- 
finitely divisible  line,  without  coming  to  the  end  of  an  endless  number 
of  positions.  In  other  words  he  will  think  that  Aristotle  has  answered 
Zeno,  and  that  Newton  has  better  indicated  the  true  nature  of  the  in- 
finitely little  than  has  Leibnitz,  at  least  in  his  popular  utterances. 
What  he  will  present  will  be  in  harmony  with,  I  will  not  say  the 
mathematical  thought  of  our  day,  but  rather  the  thought  of  the  mathe- 
matician of  our  day,  when  he  occupies  himself  with  the  discussion 
of  this  problem.  His  book  will  be  interesting  and  suggestive,  I  am 
sure,  for  his  knowledge  of  what  others  have  written  is  wide,  and  his 
criticisms  are  acute. 

Nevertheless,  I  cannot  think  that  Dr.  Cohn  will  give  a  clear  and 
consistent  solution  of  the  problem  under  discussion  unless  he  has — to 
use  an  American  metaphor  not  wholly  unintelligible  to  Europeans — 
some  card  up  his  sleeve  better  than  those  which  appear  to  be  in  his 
hand.  He  will  not  be  misled  by  mere  verbal  ambiguities  into  irre- 
levant discussions.  He  clearly  recognizes  in  the  present  volume  the 
several  senses  in  which  the  word  infinite  has  been  used,  and,  to  give 
an  example,  he  is  not  captivated  by  the  glitter  of  timeless  eternity. 
He  sees  clearly  the  true  point  at  issue  in  any  discussion  of  the  infinite 
extent  or  of  the  infinite  divisibility  of  space  or  time,  but  it  does  not 
appear  to  me  that  he  is  able  satisfactorily  to  meet  it.  Let  us  consider 
for  a  moment  the  infinitely  little. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  533 

The  Zenonic  argument  to  prove  motion  over  a  given  finite  distance 
impossible,  on  the  supposition  that  the  space  to  be  moved  through  is 
infinitely  divisible,  cannot  be  refuted  by  bringing  in  the  notion  of  the 
continuous.  If  a  line  is  really  infinitely  divisible,  a  point  moving 
along  it  must  assume  a  really  infinite  number  of  positions,  and  must 
assume  them  successively.  If  the  word  'infinite'  really  means  'end- 
less,' the  series  of  positions  can  really  have  no  end.  One  faces  here 
a  flat  contradiction,  one  which  has  been  pointed  out  with  much  clear- 
ness by  a  number  of  thinkers  quoted  by  Dr.  Cohn,  and  one  which  has 
never  yet  been  removed  by  those  who  wish  to  believe  the  line  infin- 
itely divisible. 

It  is  no  solution  of  the  difficulty  to  say  that  the  line  contains  poten- 
tially an  infinite  number  of  positions,  but  in  actu  it  does  not.  The 
point  actually  has  passed  over  the  line,  therefore,  it  actually  has  com- 
pleted an  endless  series.  Nor  can  we  avoid  the  difficulty  by  distin- 
guishing between  what  is  actually  true  of  the  line  itself,  and  what  is 
true  only  of  our  thought  about  it ;  in  other  words,  by  saying  that  we 
may  proceed  in  our  division  of  a  line  as  far  as  we  please,  and  there 
are  always  new  parts  to  distinguish,  new  positions  to  mark.  For 
when  we  call  a  line  infinitely  divisible  we  mean,  not  merely  that  it  is 
practically,  but  rather  that  it  is  theoretically,  impossible  to  exhaust  its 
divisions,  i.  e.,  that  its  divisions  are  really  infinite.  It  will  not  do  to 
introduce  without  a  previous  examination  of  its  content  the  concep- 
tion of  continuous  motion,  or  if  you  assume  all  motion  to  be  con- 
tinuous, simply  the  conception  of  motion.  This  conception  itself 
needs  investigation.  What  is  meant  by  the  continuous?  Have  we 
merely  cloaked  our  unwelcome  contradiction  by  transferring  it  to  this, 
or  have  we  done  away  with  it  ?  Are  we  not  guilty  of  a  petttio  frin- 
cipii  in  assuming  motion  to  be  (theoretically)  possible,  when  this 
possibility  is  the  very  question  at  issue  ? 

However  the  matter  be  viewed,  the  difficulty  remains.  Either 
the  line  is  infinitely  divisible  or  it  is  not.  If  it  is  not,  continued  divi- 
sion results  (theoretically)  in  simple  parts,  and  motion  means  a  pas- 
sage from  part  to  part.  If  the  line  is  infinitely  divisible,  a  point  in 
traversing  it  must  take  successively  an  endless  series  of  positions.  It 
must  completely  exhaust  this  series,  which  is,  by  hypothesis,  inex- 
haustible. The  moving  point  becomes  a  living  contradiction,  an 
intellectual  monster. 

The  real  solution  of  the  problem  lies,  I  think,  in  following  out  the 
suggestion  of  certain  writers,  of  whose  contributions  to  the  literature 
of  the  subject  Dr.  Cohn  speaks  with  some  disparagement—Berkeley 


534  HISTORY  OF  SPECULATIVE   THOUGHT. 

and  Hume.  Far  be  it  from  me  to  defend  all  that  these  philosophers 
have  said  on  the  subject  of  mathematics.  But  the  suggestion  that 
any  finite  line,  though  not  infinitely  divisible  in  itself,  may  be  regarded 
as  such  in  virtue  of  its  proxies,  appears  to  be  fruitful. 

I  see  a  short  line  on  the  paper  before  me.  It  is  a  certain  distance 
from  my  eyes.  Division  of  it,  carried  to  a  certain  point,  results  in 
the  (apparently)  non-extended.  If  the  paper  be  moved  nearer  to  my 
eyes  the  (apparently)  non-extended  element  is  seen  to  be  extended.  In 
other  words,  it  is  replaced  by  something  which  is  evidently  extended 
and  divisible.  A  similar  substitution  may  be  effected  by  the  use  of  a 
microscope,  and  there  appears  to  be  no  theoretical  limit  to  the  possi- 
bility of  such  substitutions.  Common  usage  justifies  me  in  calling 
what  I  now  see  the  same  thing  I  saw  before.  It  is  the  same  in  one 
of  the  numerous  senses  in  which  the  word  is  used.  I  have  substituted 
for  a  given  experience  another  experience  connected  with  it  in  a  cer- 
tain definite  way  in  the  order  of  nature,  and  I  have  abundant  reason  to 
believe  that  any  system  of  mathematical  relations  legitimately  derived 
from  the  latter  may  safely  be  carried  over  to  all  possible  experiences 
connected  with  the  former.  Such  substitutions  one  makes  instinc- 
tively, and  a  man  may  easily  suppose  he  is  still  occupied  with  the 
apparently  non-extended  point  with  which  he  started,  when  he  is  di- 
riding  and  subdividing  its  representative.  Provided  his  mode  of  pro- 
cedure is  good,  it  matters  little  whether  he  is  clearly  conscious  of  all 
the  elements  which  enter  into  the  process  or  not.  Similarly,  it 
matters  little  whether  the  mathematician  can  tell  us  what  he  means 
by  his  infinitesimals  or  not,  provided  he  uses  his  formulae  in  such  a 
way  as  to  give  fruitful  results. 

The  above  solution  of  the  problem  appears  to  me  to  make  possible 
the  acceptance  of  those  things  Dr.  Cohn  seems  most  anxious  to  retain 
— the  notion  of  continuity  and  the  idea  of  a  potential  infinite  divisi- 
bility. And  it  makes  it  possible  to  hold  to  them  without  falling  into 
the  Zenonic  contradiction  of  a  completed  infinite.  It  makes  the 
mathematical  point,  line,  and  surface  rather  formulae  than  individual 
things  sensualistisch  genommen.  I  do  not  think  that,  properly 
worked  out,  it  contains  anything  incompatible  with  a  proper  use  of 
the  infinitesimal  calculus. 

It  is,  of  course,  somewhat  rash  to  guess,  on  the  basis  of  one  book, 
what  the  author  will  incorporate  in  a  second.  Perhaps  I  have 
wrongly  interpreted  Dr.  Cohn's  position.  It  would  be  wise  for  the 
reader  to  peruse  for  himself  the  '  History  of  the  Problem  of  Infinity,' 
and  I  hope  very  much  that  my  review  may  induce  some  to  do  so. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  535 

Most  Americans  are  not  so  situated  that  they  have  access  to  many  of 
the  volumes  from  which  our  author  gives  citations.  He  has  done  us 
service  in  bringing  this  material  together  in  convenient  form. 

G.  S.  F. 

UNIVERSITY  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

The  Logical  Copula  and  Quantification  of  the  Predicate.  ED- 
WARD ADAMSON.  London,  David  Nutt,  1897.  Pp.  51. 
The  author  of  this  brief  essay  draws  attention  to  the  fact  that  the 
Copula  must  be  regarded  in  compliance  with  the  law  of  identity  as  in- 
dicating the  identical  existence  of  subject  and  predicate,  and  that  in 
comprehension,  the  copula  signifies  internal  existence  reflectively,  sub- 
jective existence,  identical  existence  with  all  the  attributes  implied 
in  the  predicate.  In  extension,  on  the  other  hand,  the  copula  signifies 
objective  existence,  distributive  existence  in  several  individuals  united 
together  and  reduced  to  unity  by  the  possession  of  one  or  more  identi- 
cal concepts  or  attributes,  consequently  it  also  signifies  identical  exist- 
ence with  a  fart  only  of  the  attributes  implied  in  the  predicate. 
This  distinction  the  author  makes  as  the  ground  for  the  difference  in 
quantification  according  as  the  view  is  shifted  from  comprehension  to 
that  of  extension.  The  essay  is  suggestive,  but  would  be  more  satis- 
factory were  the  discussion  somewhat  fuller. 

JOHN  GRIER  HIBBKN. 
PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY. 

Proceedings  of  the  Society  for  Psychical  Research,  March,  1897. 
Appendix  to  Part  XXXI. ,  Vol.  XII.  Address  by  the  Presi- 
dent, WILLIAM  CROOKES. 

The  address  of  Mr.  Crookes  contains  much  of  interest.  It  is  an 
attempt  to  disprove  the  a  priori  improbability  of  telepathic  and  kin- 
dred phenomena.  He  shows  by  analogy  the  possibility  of  there 
existing  certain  occult  forces  which  may  account  for  all  such  mysteri- 
ous manifestations ;  for  instance,  he  imagines  a  homunculus  living  in  a 
corner  of  our  world,  indefinitely  small,  and  endowed  with  microscopic 
vision ;  to  such  an  one  the  laws  of  gravitation  and  other  physical  laws 
would  seem  to  be  violated  again  and  again.  So  also,  to  a  person  of 
gigantic  frame  and  organism,  other  laws  and  other  conceptions  of 
matter  would  necessarily  obtain.  And  again,  should  we  be  capable 
of  receiving  sensations  with  increased  or  decreased  rapidity,  then,  too, 
the  time  sense  would  be  altered  and  a  new  world  would  have  to  be 
constructed.  His  conclusion  is  that  we  live  in  a  world,  only  a  part 


536  A    STUDY  IN  APPERCEPTION. 

of  whose  forces  we  know,  and  to  a  part  only  do  our  sense-organs  re- 
spond. And  these  forces,  of  which  we  are  not  at  present  cognizant, 
may  involve  nothing  supernatural  whatsoever,  and  yet  they  may  ac- 
count for  the  alleged  facts  of  the  occult  phenomena  of  psychical  re- 
search. Mr.  Crookes  offers  a  tentative  hypothesis,  as  follows :  That 
ether  waves  of  far  more  rapid  vibrations  than  those  of  the  Roentgen 
rays  may  directly  affect  certain  brain  centers  sensitive  to  them,  without 
the  intervention  of  the  ordinary  channels  of  the  senses,  and  that  such 
rays  moreover  may  be  freed  from  the  limitations  of  space,  as  for  in- 
stance the  law  of  inverse  squares.  Thought  may  therefore  be  com- 
municated at  a  great  distance  and  without  the  physical  connections  and 
sequences  which  we  deem  indispensable  to  all  communication  between 
man  and  man.  Mr.  Crookes's  speculations  can  riot  rank,  however,  as 
an  hypothesis.  At  best  he  establishes  merely  the  possibility  of  his 
speculation,  for  he  presents  no  facts  to  indicate  its  probability  or  to  save 
it  from  being  relegated  to  the  sphere  of  bare  conjecture. 

JOHN  GRIER  HIBBEN. 
PRIXCETON  UNIVERSITY. 


A  Study  in  Apperception.     WALTER  B.  PILLSBURY.     Am.  Jour. 

Psychology,  VIII.,  pp.  315-393.     April,  1897. 

In  this  paper  Dr.  Pillsbury  is  engaged  in  the  praiseworthy  but 
difficult  task  of  throwing  light  upon  the  problem  of  apperception  ver- 
sus association.  He  does  this  in  a  way  that  is  extremely  suggestive ; 
namely,  by  analyzing  the  elements  involved  in  the  reading  of  a  word. 
This,  of  course,  involves  both  subjective  and  objective  factors.  The 
former  may  be  analyzed  into  six  or  seven  factors :  the  association 
between  the  letters  of  the  word ;  the  word  as  a  whole ;  the  preceding 
word ;  the  events  of  the  preceding  day  and  hour,  etc.  The  objective 
factors  came  from  the  letters  themselves.  The  general  scheme  of  the 
investigation  was  ' '  to  determine  the  amount  of  change  which  might 
be  made  in  an  object  ordinarily  perceived  or  assimilated  in  a  cer- 
tain way  without  change  in  the  character  of  the  resultant  perception 
or  assimilation."  The  object  to  be  changed  is  a  type-written  word 
photographed  and  printed  on  a  lantern  slide.  This  was  projected 
upon  a  ground-glass  screen  in  front  of  the  subject.  After  two-tenths 
of  a  second  it  was  cut  off,  and  the  subject  recorded  what  he  '  saw.' 
Comparison  of  this  record  with  the  word  exposed  furnished  means 
of  determining  the  value  of  the  various  objective  and  subjective 
factors  in  the  perception  of  the  word.  The  influence  of  the  ob- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  537 

jective  factors  was  altered  by  omitting  a  letter  or  by  substituting  an- 
other letter  or  by  printing  an  '  x '  over  the  letter  and  so  blurring  it. 
The  subjective  factors  were  varied  largely  by  Professor  Miinsterberg's 
method  of  calling  a  word,  associated  with  the  one  to  be  shown,  im- 
mediately before  this  one  was  given.  The  other  subjective  factors 
were  the  accidental  variations  which  were  noted  in  connection  with 
the  various  experiments.  The  nature  of  all  these  experiments  is  such 
that  the  results  do  not  admit  of  any  complete  tabulation.  The  tables 
given  are  merely  so  many  examples  of  individual  experiments,  and  it 
would  be  impossible  to  draw  any  conclusion  from  them  alone.  They 
do,  however,  show  the  comparative  value  of  the  various  alterations  in 
the  conditions  of  subject  or  object.  The  omitted  letter  is  most  often 
noticed,  the  changed  letter  next  often,  and  the  blurred  letter  is  more 
easily  overlooked.  Any  change  in  the  beginning  of  a  word  is  more 
often  noticed  than  if  the  change  came  later  in  the  word.  The  ex- 
periments made  with  and  without  an  association  show  that  the  percent- 
age of  misprints  overlooked  is  greatly  increased  under  the  influence 
of  the  association. 

The  general  conclusions  of  this  study  should  be  said  to  follow  from 
the  experiments,  not  to  rest  upon  them.  The  author  has  taken 
Wundt's  treatment  of  the  theory  of  apperception  and  its  relation  to 
other  mental  states  as  a  standard,  and  he  begins  his  paper  by  a  very 
good  r6sum£  of  Wundt's  theory.  In  the  statement  of  the  general 
theoretical  results  of  his  experiments,  Dr.  Pillsbury  brings  his  own 
formulation  of  the  process  of  perception  into  sharp  contrast  with 
Wundt's  theory.  "  Wundt  reduces  the  process  to  an  associative  part- 
process  of  identity  between  the  parts  seen  and  letters  of  the  correct 
word,  and  an  associative  part-process  of  contiguity  between  these 
letters  of  the  correct  word  and  those  usually  combined  with  them  to 
form  the  entire  word.  Apperception  is  present  only  in  the  passive 
form  in  which  the  objective  or  mechanical  factors  are  alone  determi- 
nant. We,  on  the  contrary,  have  reduced  association  to  a  very  sub- 
ordinate place,  and  find  active  apperception  to  be  the  truly  controlling 
factor."  The  scheme  of  psychology  here  advanced  is:  (i)  Sensa- 
tion, the  element  of  all  cognative  states.  (2)  The  idea — a  complex 
of  sensation.  (3)  Association  connecting  ideas.  (4)  Appercep- 
tion connecting  this  idea  with  general  experience.  These  processes 
are  all  abstractions.  The  first  concrete  conscious  process  is  (5)  As- 
similation, or  perception.  *'  This  includes  Wundt's  association  syn- 
thesis, assimilation  and  complication,  /.  <?.,  all  of  his  associative 
connections,  as  well  as  the  apperceptive  connections  of  apperceptive 


PSICOLOGIA   PER  LE   SCUOLE. 

synthesis,  the  concept,  the  greater  part  of  which  is  known  as  judg- 
ments, and  probably  agglutinations  also."  (6)  Succession  associations 
and  (7)  the  highest  stage  of  all,  the  true  judgment;  the  general  con- 
clusion of  the  paper  being  "that  conscious  processes  and  their  con- 
nections are  not  so  simple  as  is  usually  supposed,"  and  "  and  that  what 
are  ordinarily  known  as  the  '  higher'  and  '  lower'  processes  are  not 
different  in  psychological  structure  and  mode  of  composition." 

J.  E.  LOUGH. 
HARVARD  UNIVERSITY. 

Comparative    Observations    on    the    Involuntary    Movements   of 

Adults  and  Children.    M.  A.  TUCKER.    Am.  Jour.  Psychology, 

VIII.,  pp.  394-404- 

These  observations  were  made  upon  18—36  adults  and  13-38  chil- 
dren, by  means  of  a  Jastrow's  automatograph.  The  experiments  are 
considered  in  connection  with  the  investigations  of  Strieker,  Lehmann, 
Fere1,  and  Jastrow.  On  the  whole,  the  results  of  Fer6  and  Lehmann 
are  substantiated. 

The  results  of  the  experiments  are  shown  in  a  number  of  tables 
and  cuts.  As  a  final  summary  we  find  : 

"  i.  There  is  physiological  tendency  for  the  hands  and  arms  rest- 
ing in  front  of  the  body  to  move  inward  toward  the  median  plane  of 
the  body. 

"  2.  There  is  no  certainty  that  when  we  see  an  object  we  tend  to 
move  toward  it.  We  may  think  of  it  simply  as  an  object  at  rest,  and 
the  idea  of  motion  is  necessary  to  cause  movement  in  that  direction. 

"3.  Involuntary  muscular  movements  may  be  controlled  by  the  in- 
fluence of  the  sight  or  visual  remembrance  of  moving  objects,  and 
the  imitation  of  the  direction  of  the  moving  stimuli  is  the  result. 

"4.  Children  are  governed  by  and  subject  to  the  same  laws  as 
adults,  but  to  a  less  extent. 

"5.  There  is  no  sex  or  age  difference  in  children,  either  in  invol- 
untary or  controlled  muscular  movements." 

J.  E.  LOUGH. 

HARVARD  UNIVERSITY. 

Psicologia  per  le  Scuole.     GIUSEPPE  SERGI.     2d  edition.     Milan, 

Fratelli  Dumolard,  1895.     Pp.  vii  +  227. 

This  little  book,  designed  for  the  use  of  high  schools,  has,  as  a  text- 
book, the  merit  of  clearness,  directness  and  consistency  of  method. 
The  first  part  is  purely  physiological,  and  the  physiological  point  of 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  539 

view  is  maintained  throughout.  Psychology  is,  for  the  author,  a  part 
of  biology,  namely,  the  study  of  the  functions  of  the  organism  in  so  far 
as  they  are  protective.  Consciousness  is  only  a  quality  which,  for 
some  reason  not  hinted  at,  some  of  these  protective  processes  come  to 
have.  Consciousness  is  not,  he  tells  us,  a  mode  of  being  or  a  separate 
phenomenon.  We  might  at  this  point  like  to  be  informed  what  a 
phenomenon  means,  and  whether  the  utility  for  self-preservation 
which  distinguishes  those  physiological  functions  which  the  author 
calls  '  psychical '  depends  on  their  conscious  quality  or  only  on  their 
physical  complication.  No  theoretical  question,  however,  is  sharply 
faced  or  plainly  dealt  with,  so  that  the  work,  in  spite  of  its  superficial 
clearness  and  dogmatism,  will  be  far  from  leaving  a  clear  impression 
of  its  doctrine  upon  anyone  who  reflects.  It  would  have  been  better, 
perhaps,  to  have  limited  the  subject  to  physiology  proper.  The  au- 
thor would  then  have  remained  upon  ground  congenial  to  himself  and 
the  student  would  not  have  been  deceived  by  the  idea  that  he  had 
traversed  the  subject  of  psychology,  when  he  is  in  fact  left  in  well- 
nigh  total  ignorance  of  its  historical  problems  and  essential  conceptions. 

G.    S ANT AY AN A. 
HARVARD  UNIVERSITY. 


VISION. 

On  Reciprocal  Action  in  the  Retina  as  studied  by  means  of  some 
Rotating  Discs.  C.  S.  SHERRINGTON.  Jour,  of  Physiology, 
XXL,  1897,  33-34. 

Luminosity  and  Photometry.  J.  B.  HAYCRAFT.  Jour,  of  Phys., 
XXL,  1897,  126-146. 

Ueber  den  Einfluss  des  Maculapigments  auf  Farbengleichungen. 

DR.  BREUER.     Ztsch.  f.  Psych.,  XIIL,  464-473,  1897. 

The  object  of  Sherrington's  experiment  is  to  show  that  contrast  is  a 
real  physiological  occurrence,  and  not  simply  an  illusion  of  the  judg- 
ment, by  showing  that  it  produces  an  effect  upon  the  speed  of  alter- 
nation necessary  to  extinguish  flicker,  even  under  circumstances  such 
that  it  is  not  present  at  all  as  a  conscious  phenomenon.  A  circular 
disc  is  divided  up  into  a  number  of  semi-circular  ring-bands,  12  mm.  in 
width,  which  are  painted  blue,  black  and  yellow,  in  such  a  fashion 
that,  upon  rotation,  there  will  be  (i)  an  inner  and  (2)  an  outer  blue 
and  black  half  ring-band,  which  will  fuse  in  each  case  into  a  steely 
grayish  blue,  but  with  this  difference:  in  (i)  the  blue  and  the  black 


54°  VISION. 

ring-bands  are  neither  of  them  accentuated  by  contrast,  because  they 
have  surfaces  of  the  same  brightness  on  either  side  of  them,  while  in 
(2)  the  black  is  blacker  than  it  should  be  on  account  of  being  against 
a 'bright  yellow  background,  and  the  blue  is  brighter  on  account  of 
being  bordered  on  either  side  by  black.  The  difference  in  brightness 
between  the  two  ring-pairs  is  distinctly  visible  before  rotation ;  and 
upon  rotation  the  effect  is  found  to  obtain  which  was  predicted,  viz : 
a  rapidity  of  rotation  which  gave  44  alternations  of  blue  and  black 
per  second  was  sufficient  to  cause  complete  vision  in  the  inner  ring- 
band,  while  the  outer  one  continued  to  flicker  until  the  number  of 
alternations  per  second  was  sixty-eight,  and  this  in  spite  of  the  fact 
that  the  background  during  rotation  was  the  same  for  both  rings — 
the  blackish  yellow  of  the  fused  yellow  and  black  borders.  The 
grayish  blue  rings  were  also  now  indistinguishable  in  appearance.  The 
experiment  is  therefore  conclusive  as  showing  that  a  consciousness  of 
difference  of  background,  far  from  being  the  sole  cause  of  the  con- 
trast effect,  is  not  essential  to  its  production,  and  hence  as  showing 
that  contrast  is  something  which  takes  place  below  the  region  of  con- 
scious judgments ;  if  there  were  any  individuals  who  were  not  con- 
vinced of  this  fact  before,  they  will  doubtless  be  brought  over  by  this 
ingenious  arrangement.  It  will  be  noticed  that  Sherrington's  result 
is  in  contradiction  with  that  of  Baader,  mentioned  in  the  last  number 
of  this  REVIEW.  He  gives,  in  addition,  a  number  of  good  experiments 
to  show  the  effect  of  successive  contrast  on  flickering. 

Haycraft  points  out  that  it  is  a  pity  to  use  the  same  word  photom- 
etry for  two  things  which  are  so  intrinsically  different  as  are  isochro- 
matic  photometry  and  heterochromatic  photometry.  In  the  one  case 
we  are  measuring — by  sensation,  it  is  true,  in  the  last  instance — some- 
thing which  is  at  the  same  time  a  physical  quantity  (viz.,  the  intensity 
of  the  objective  light  which  causes  the  sensation)  ;  in  the  other 
we  are  measuring  a  sensation  which  has  no  counterpart  in  the  objec- 
tive world.  But  this  is,  of  course,  only  a  particular  instance  of  the 
lamentable  fact  that  language  has  not  yet  provided  us  with  any  easy 
means  for  distinguishing,  in  general,  between  objective  light  and  sub- 
jective light- sensation,  and  it  is  another  argument  for  making  the 
latter  compound  word  more  common  than  it  is  now.  He  uses  him- 
self the  word  luminosity,  by  which,  however,  he  proposes  to  mean, 
not  exactly  '  amount  of  visual  sensation, '  because  black  is  a  sensation 
as  much  as  white  is — namely,  the  sensation  which  is  attached  to  the 
resting  state  of  the  visual  apparatus — but  rather  the  '  amount  of  sen- 
sory deviation  from  black.'  This  he  would  take  as  being  measured 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  541 

by  the  number  of  intermediate  steps  which  can  be  perceived  to  be 
such  between  black  and  a  given  gray,  for  instance.  This  measure- 
ment he  has  not  yet  carried  out  for  the  different  spectral  colors,  but  he 
has  determined  once  more  the  relative  objective  intensity  of  the  differ- 
ent parts  of  the  spectrum  at  the  threshold  of  color-perception  both  for 
the  dark-adapted  and  for  the  light-adapted  eye,  his  results  agreeing 
with  those  of  former  observers.  He  also  applied  the  flicker  method 
to  determine  the  relative  luminosity  along  the  spectrum.  No  great 
degree  of  precaution  against  errors  seems  to  have  been  taken;  "  hav- 
ing made  several  such  observations  *  *  *  the  curve  was  drawn." 

Dr.  Breuer  made  a  direct  examination  of  the  amount  of  spectral 
light  of  different  colors  absorbed  by  the  macula,  by  comparing  color- 
equations  at  or  near  the  center  with  those  taken  in  a  field  at  from  three 
to  six  degrees  distant.  His  results  confirm  very  closely  those  of 
Sachs  made  upon  the  extracted  retina.  He  reaches  the  general  con- 
clusion that,  since  the  total  amount  of  absorption  by  the  yellow  pig- 
ment is  so  very  small,  individual  differences  in  this  amount  cannot  be 
of  very  great  consequence.  This  fact  has  an  important  bearing,  of 
course;  it  follows  from  it  that  something  more  is  necessary  to  the  ex- 
planation of  the  difference  between  the  two  types  of  red-green  blind- 

ness'  C.  L.  FRANKLIN. 

BALTIMORE. 

A  Note  on  the   Phenomena   of  Mescal  Intoxication.     HAVELOCK 

ELLIS.     Lancet,  June  5,  1897. 

Mr  Havelock  Ellis  has  re-examined  the  wonderful  vision-produc- 
ing properties  of  mescal,  which  were  first  brought  to  notice  by  Pren- 
tiss,  Morgan  and  Weir  Mitchell.  Mescal  buttons  are  the  fruit  of 
Anhalonium  LeTvinii;  they  are  eaten  by  the  Kiowa  and  other  Indians 
of  New  Mexico  in  connection  with  religious  ceremonial.  Three  of 
the  buttons  were  taken  in  three  doses  at  intervals  of  an  hour ;  an  im- 
mediate effect  was  experienced  in  the  relief  of  a  headache,  which  had 
been  rather  serious  at  the  beginning  of  the  experiment,  and  in  a  con- 
sciousness of  unusual  energy  and  intellectual  power.  After  two  hours 
the  expected  visual  phenomena  began  with  a  pale  violet  shadow  float- 
ing over  the  pages  of  an  open  book.  Objects  seen  peripherally  were 
enlarged  and  heightened  in  color,  and  after-images  were  marked  and 
persistent.  Green  shadows  next  appeared ;  soon  afterwards  vague, 
confused  masses  of  color,  of  kaleidoscopic  character,  were  seen  with 
closed  eyes,  which  presently  became  distinct  and  brilliant,  while  at 
the  same  time  the  air  was  filled  with  perfume.  Later,  when  muscu- 


542  VISION. 

lar  incoordination  had  reached  such  a  stage  that  writing  was  difficult, 
a  golden  tone  lay  over  the  paper,  the  pencil  wrote  in  bright  gold,  and 
the  hand  seen  in  indirect  vision  was  red.  Dr.  Weir  Mitchell's  visions 
were  apparently  much  more  brilliant  than  these,  but  he  could  see 
them  only  with  closed  eyes,  while  Mr.  Ellis  found  it  perfectly  easy  to 
see  them  with  open  eyes  in  a  dark  room,  though  they  were  less  bril- 
liant than  when  the  eyes  were  closed.  Insomnia  persisted  during  the 
greater  part  of  the  following  night,  but  it  seemed  to  be  less  connected 
with  the  constantly  shifting  visions,  which  were  always  beautiful  and 
agreeable,  than  with  the  vague  alarm  which  was  caused  by  a  consid- 
erable degree  of  thoracic  oppression  and  of  auditory  hyperaesthesia. 
The  skin  was  hot  and  dry,  and  the  knee-jerk  was  much  exaggerated. 
A  gas  flame  seemed  to  burn  with  great  brilliancy  and  to  send  out  waves 
of  light  which  extended  and  contracted  rhythmically  in  an  enor- 
mously exaggerated  manner.  What  was  chiefly  impressive,  however, 
was  the  shadows,  which  came  in  all  directions,  heightened  by  flashes 
of  red,  green  and  especially  violet.  "The  violet  shadows  especially 
reminded  me  of  Monet's  paintings,  and  as  I  gazed  at  them  it  occurred 
to  me  that  mescal  doubtless  reproduces  the  same  conditions  of  visual 
hyperaesthesia,  or  rather  exhaustion,  which  is  certainly  produced  in  the 
artist  by  prolonged  visual  attention  (although  this  point  has  as  'yet  re- 
ceived no  attention  from  psychologists)."  These  violet  shadows  may 
be  conditioned  by  the  dilatation  of  the  pupils  which  always  occurs  in 
mescal  intoxication,  for  Dobrowolsky  has  maintained  that  the  erythrop- 
sia  which  is  common  after  eye  operations  is  due  to  the  dilatation  of  the 
pupils  produced  by  the  atropine  previously  administered,  "so  that  the 
color  vision  is  really  of  the  nature  of  an  after-image  due  to  bright  light ; 
Dobrowolsky's  explanation  seems  to  fit  in  accurately  with  my  experi- 
ences under  mescal."  Mr.  Ellis  seems  not  to  have  noticed  an  important 
paper  on  Erythropsia  by  Dr.  Ernst  Fuchs  in  a  late  number  of  the  Ar- 
chiv.fiir  Ophthalmologie (noticed  in  an  earlier  issue  of  this  Journal). 
In  this  it  is  shown,  with  a  great  degree  of  probability,  that  erythropsia 
is  in  reality  entoptic  rod-pigment  vision ;  after  exposure  to  blinding 
snow- light,  or  to  the  excessive  amount  of  light  admitted  by  a  widened 
pupil,  the  rod-pigment,  which  is  usually  overlooked  on  account  of  its 
constant  presence,  becomes  rapidly  reconstructed  and  hence  produces 
for  a  few  moments  its  proper  color  effect.  In  defects  of  nutrition  it 
has  been  often  noticed,  first  by  Parinaud,  that  the  rod-pigment  is  a 
substance  which  is  among  the  earliest  to  suffer ;  hence,  even  without 
the  dilatation  of  the  pupil,  an  erythropsia  due  to  this  cause  might  be 
readily  expected  to  occur  in  this  case. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  543 

The  phenomena  of  mescal  intoxication  are,  according  to  Mr.  Ellis, 
mainly  a  saturation  of  the  specific  senses,  and  chiefly  an  orgy  of  vision. 
He  is  convinced  that  all  the  senses  are  effected ;  there  were  vague  der- 
mal sensations,  and  a  marked  casual  stimulation  of  the  skin  produced 
other  sensory  phenomena  a  heightening  of  the  visions  or  an  impres- 
sion of  sound — a  fact  which  may  throw  an  interesting  light  on  the 
synaesthesiae  or  '  secondary  sensations  .'  The  immediate  cause  of  the 
sensory  phenomena  seems  to  have  been  a  great  and  general  disintegra- 
tion or  exhaustion  of  the  sensory  apparatus ;  in  a  slighter  degree  the 
same  phenomena,  even  the  color  vision,  are  found  in  neurasthenia. 
The  drug,  it  appears,  is  expected  to  have  a  great  future  as  a  specific 
in  cases  of  neurasthenia ;  the  homeopathists  will  therefore  find  their 
account  in  the  fact  that  it  produces,  when  taken  in  large  doses,  the 
very  symptoms  which  it  is  most  powerful  to  cure. 

C.  LADD  FRANKLIN. 

BALTIMORE,   MD. 

Sight,  an  Exposition  of  the  Principles  of  Monocular  and  Binoc- 
ular Vision.  JOSEPH  LE  CONTE.  2d  edition.  New  York,  Apple- 
ton,  1897.  Pp.  318.  $1.50. 

"  In  this  second  edition  I  have  found  little  to  correct  ;  the  changes 
are  mainly  in  the  form  of  additions."  Of  these  additions  probably 
the  most  important  is  that  on  astigmatism ;  the  portions  of  the  book  on 
the  nature  of  space  perception  and  of  the  laws  of  direction  and  on 
color  have  been  amplified. 

The  conspicuous  merits  of  the  first  edition  are  retained — the 
ingenuity  of  the  illustrations,  the  clearness  of  the  statements  and  the 
fascinating  character  of  the  experiments  described.  One  characteristic 
still  remains,  namely,  a  misunderstanding  of  the  psychological  princi- 
ples involved  in  monocular  vision ;  the  view  is  essentially  a  physiolog- 
ical one,  whereas  most  of  the  facts  are  mental  ones. 

At  the  time  the  first  edition  was  written  there  was  no  special 
science  of  psychology  which  was  recognized  by  the  other  sciences. 
Introspective  psychology  was,  for  various  reasons,  regarded  by  the 
scientists  as  one  stage  of  senile  dementia.  Here  is  an  illustrative  quo- 
tation from  Le  Conte  (p.  69)  concerning  the  theories  of  erect  vision  : 
*'  First,  there  have  been  metaphysical  theories  characteristic  of  this 
class  of  thinkers.  According  to  these,  erect  and  inverted  are  purely 
relative  terms.  If  all  things  are  inverted,  then  nothing  is  inverted. 
There  is  no  up  and  down  to  the  soul,  etc.  *  *  *  The  first  we  put 
aside  as  being  non-scientific."  Of  course,  this  caricature  resembles 


544  VISION. 

the  original  about  as  much  as  some  of  the  American  flags  that  float 
over  Swiss  hotels,  with  5^  stripes  and  seven  stars.  The  introspec- 
tive method  of  psychological  investigation  has  received  complete  vindi- 
cation, through  experimental  psychology,  as  being  the  only  possible 
one.  The  very  theory  dismissed  by  Professor  Le  Conte,  t.  <?.,  that 
there  is  no  up  or  down  in  our  visual  field  except  through  association 
with  bodily  space,  is  that  of  Helmholtz  (Physiol.  Optik,  2  ed.,  p.  680) 
and  is  based  on  a  treatment  of  visual  experiences  from  the  standpoint 
of  introspective  psychology.  It  is  impossible  here  to  discuss  fully 
Professor  Le  Conte's  projection  of  impressions  back  along  the  ray  line 
into  space.  The  trouble  arises  from  treating  our  own  mental  experi- 
ences as  located  in  another  person's  brain.  Professor  Le  Conte's  view  of 
erect  vision  is  not  wrong,  but  incomplete.  The  connection  of  the  visual 
field  (which  is  somewhat  improperly  termed  the  retinal  field,  the  two 
being  quite  different  affairs)  with  bodily  space,  together  with  certain 
visual  experiences,  gives  us  our  ideas  of  the  positions  of  objects ;  we 
know  directly  what  up  and  down  mean  and  we  know  nothing  of  our 
retinas  or  of  outward  projection. 

The  same  difference  of  view  characterizes  the  section  on  color- 
perception;  this,  in  connection  with  physical  methods  of  thinking 
about  colors,  leads  to  curious  errors.  '  Unplagued  by  any  phys- 
ical considerations  there  are  seen '  to  be  four  primary  colors :  red, 
yellow,  green  and  blue ;  this  omits  violet,  which  is  to  the  eye  as  dif- 
ferent from  blue  as  yellow  from  red.  '  In  purple  we  see  blue  and 
red,'  which  is  true  only  of  those  persons  who  have  seen  purple  pro- 
duced by  mixtures  of  blue  or  violet  and  red.  The  very  same  persons 
who  '  see'  red  and  yellow  in  orange  also  '  see'  yellow  and  blue  in 
green  (which  contains  neither  when  pure) .  This  whole  '  seeing'  of 
primary  and  secondary  colors  and  their  relations  is  a  matter  of  educa- 
tion ;  it  is  absolutely  lacking  in  children,  to  whom  orange  is  as  much 
a  primary  color  as  red  is.  It  was  at  least  different  in  Newton,  who 
'  saw '  seven  primary  colors. 

Another  error  is  that  concerning  the  fundamental  colors.  The 
psychological  view  of  the  color  system  as  the  resultant  of  the  mixture 
of  three  sensations — so  clearly  stated  by  Helmholtz  and  Konig — finds 
no  mention,  although  it  is  merely  a  statement  of  facts  and  empirical 
laws.  On  the  other  hand,  the  various  hypotheses  concerning  the  func- 
tions of  the  retina  in  regard  to  color  are  extensively  discussed,  although 
they  are  of  no  interest  to  the  psychologist  and  are  mainly  speculations 
of  rather  doubtful  nature. 

These  same  objections  apply,  however,  to  nearly  all  physiologies 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  545 

and  to  most  psychologies;  they  result,  as  I  have  tried  to  indicate,  from 
a  departure  from  the  introspective  standpoint.  Concerning  the  physi- 
ology of  the  retina  we  know  very  little ;  concerning  the  physiology  of 
the  brain  we  know  almost  nothing ;  whereas  our  direct  knowledge  of 
color  and  space  is  highly  developed  and  systematized.  To  attempt 
to  systematize  our  psychological  knowledge  by  deductions  from  the 
physiology  of  the  eye  is  only  one  degree  less  unjustified  than  the  at- 
tempt to  produce  a  science  of  psychology  by  speculation  on  the  actions 
of  brain  molecules. 

When  Professor  Le  Conte  comes  to  binocular  vision  his  physiology 
leaves  him  and  he  becomes  a  psychologist,  experimenting  and  explain- 
ing directly  what  he  sees.  The  clearness  and  completeness  of  his  ex- 
planation leave  nothing  to  be  desired.  The  introduction  of  diagrams 
ready  for  use  with  the  stereoscope  makes  this  section  highly  interesting 
and  practical.  Amid  the  wealth  of  facts  stated  in  the  briefest  and 
clearest  manner,  we  find  a  large  number  of  the  cleverest  illustrations 
probably  ever  introduced  into  a  psychological  book.  In  fact,  the 
whole  book,  in  spite  of  objections  to  its  point  of  view,  is  by  far  the 
best  elementary  exposition  of  the  psychology  and  physiology  of  vision 
with  which  I  am  acquainted,  which  seems  an  odd  thing  to  acknowl- 
edge, when  we  consider  that  the  author  is  a  professor  of  geology  and 
natural  history.  Professor  Le  Conte,  indeed,  is  one  of  those  leaders  of 
science  who  can  at  any  time  step  into  a  new  field  and  get  more  out  of 
it  than  even  its  own  specialist. 

The  biologist  is  evident  not  only  in  rich  chapters  in  the  compara- 
tive physiology  of  vision  and  on  the  evolution  of  the  eye,  but  also  in 
characteristic  explanations  of  various  phenomena  from  the  evolution- 
ary point  of  view.  For  example,  speaking  of  the  indistinctness  of 
vision  outside  of  the  point  of  sharpest  vision,  the  author  says:  "Now, 
what  is  the  use  of  this  arrangement  ?  Why  would  it  not  be  much  bet- 
ter to  see  equally  distinctly  over  all  portions  of  the  field  of  view?  I 
believe  that  the  existence  of  the  central  spot  is  necessary  to  fixed, 
thoughtful  attention,  and  this  again  in  its  turn  is  necessary  for  the 
development  of  the  higher  faculties  of  the  mind.  In  passing  down  the 
animal  scale  the  central  spot  is  quickly  lost.  It  exists  only  in  man 
and  the  higher  monkeys.  In  the  lower  animals  it  is  necessary  for 
safety  that  they  should  see  well  over  a  very  wide  field.  In  man,  on 
the  contrary,  it  is  much  more  necessary  that  he  should  be  able  to  fix 
undivided  attention  on  the  thing  looked  at"  (p.  78). 

E.  W.  SCRIPTURE. 
YALE  UNIVERSITY. 


546  VISION. 

Pseudoptics:  The  Science  of  Optical  Illusions.  A  series  of  psy- 
chological experiments  for  the  classroom  and  home.  Milton 
Bradley  Co.,  Springfield,  Mass.  $5.00. 

This  series  of  charts  and  apparatus  for  experiments  on  visual  illu- 
sions is  especially  intended  to  interest  the  general  public  in  mental 
phenomena.  For  this  purpose  it  is  most  valuable,  and  should  be  sold 
in  many  editions.  The  series  will  also  be  of  much  interest  to  teach- 
ers of  psychology  in  schools,  colleges  and  universities.  We  must  all 
spend — I  might  say  waste — a  great  deal  of  time  in  preparing  illustra- 
tive material  which  it  ought  to  be  possible  to  buy.  Much  time  and 
energy  might  be  saved  if  the  simpler  instruments,  devices  and  illustra- 
tive material  devised  by  each  could  be  used  by  all.  It  would  not  be 
amiss  for  the  American  Psychological  Association  to  appoint  a  com- 
mittee instructed  to  draw  up  a  list  of  such  material  and  the  place 
where  it  could  be  secured.  In  such  a  list  these  Pseudoptics  would 
stand  at  or  near  the  head. 

The  material  is  placed  in  three  boxes,  each  containing  several 
portfolios.  The  first  box  illustrates  illusions  of  length,  direction,  form, 
size  and  movement,  including  25  experiments  in  all.  The  charts  are 
perhaps  on  the  average  20  cm.  square,  sufficiently  large  for  demon- 
stration in  a  lecture,  and  the  illusions  in  most  cases  appear  better  than 
in  the  illustrations  given  in  text-books  and  articles.  In  nearly  all  cases 
the  parts  are  movable,  and  simple  devices  are  given  for  rotation,  etc. 
We  have  thus  not  only  illustrations,  but  a  series  of  experiments  which 
the  student  can  himself  carry  out.  The  second  box  illustrates  after- 
images, color-mixture,  contrast,  indirect  vision  and  the  blind-spot — 
the  term  illusion  being  used  in  a  sense  wide  enough  to  include  all 
cases  where,  through  the  functions  of  the  eye,  nervous  system  or 
mind,  we  see  things  otherwise  than  as  they  '  really  are.'  The  third 
box  illustrates  especially  perspective  and  binocular  vision. 

The  series  is  accompanied  by  an  introduction  explaining  the 
objects  and  advantages  of  the  experiments ;  the  method  for  making 
each  experiment  is  described  in  sufficient  detail,  and  there  are  given 
explanations  of  the  phenomena.  These  latter  are  of  necessity  brief, 
and  in  some  cases  may  prove  misleading,  as  they  may  cause  the  student 
to  imagine  that  the  phenomena  are  more  simple  and  better  understood 
than  is  in  fact  the  case.  The  classification  adopted  may  also  in  several 
cases  prove  misleading.  Thus,  for  example,  under  '  multiple  vision ' 
are  included  phenomena  so  diverse  as  are  binocular  double  vision  and 
the  doubling  of  the  image  in  Schreiner's  experiment.  The  apparent 
similarity  and  real  diversity  in  such  cases  may  easily  confuse  the  stu- 
dent. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  547 

The  author  of  Pseudoptics  wished  originally  that  his  name  might 
not  be  associated  with  it.  But  it  has  been  announced  by  a  firm  of 
instrument  makers,  and  there  is  now  no  reason  why  we  should  not 
give  honor  where  honor  is  due,  and  thank  Professor  Miinsterberg  for 
his  valuable  service  to  education  and  to  psychology. 

J.  McKEEN  CATTELL. 

Uebcr  die  Bedeutung  der   Convergenz-  und  AccomodationsbeTue- 

gungen  fur  die    Tiefemvahrnehmung.     MAXIMILIAN  ARRER. 

Philos.  Studien,  XIII.     i.   116-161.     2.  222-304. 

The  author  investigates  the  problem  of  the  perception  of  depth 
from  the  standpoint  of  the  part  played  in  such  perception  by  the  sen- 
sations of  convergence  and  accommodation.  In  a  dozen  pages  he  re- 
views in  concise  statements  the  experiments  and  discussions  on  the 
subject  in  the  past  in  so  far  as  they  involve  these  sensations.  Chapter 
I.  communicates  the  author's  experiments  on  the  perception  of  differ- 
ences in  depth  by  comparison  of  successive  stimuli.  It  is  believed 
that  this  problem,  which  was  long  ago  investigated  by  Wundt,  will 
bear  a  fresh  investigation  now,  because  of  the  objections  which  have 
been  raised  to  Wundt  on  the  grounds  that  his  experiments  are  not 
numerous  enough  (this  is  admitted  by  Wundt)  ;  that  the  subject  upon 
whom  his  experiments  were  carried  out  did  not  possess  average  ca- 
pacity in  the  perception  of  depth  owing  to  a  defect  in  the  mechanism 
of  the  eye,  and  that  the  theoretic  constructions  which  Wundt  gives  to 
his  results  are  not  warranted.  Chapter  II.  is  an  attempt  at  an  expla- 
nation of  the  monocular  and  binocular  experiments  of  chapter  I. 
Chapter  III.  further  attempts  a  negative  confirmation  of  the  theory  of 
the  former  chapter. 

The  apparatus  used  in  the  first  set  of  experiments,  viz.,  in  those 
on  the  monocular  and  binocular  perception  of  differences  of  depth, 
was  as  follows :  the  subject  looks  through  an  inwardly  blackened  tube, 
which  passes  through  a  screen  of  black  cardboard,  upon  a  gray  field. 
In  the  interval  between  the  tube  and  the  gray  background  two  black 
threads  are  kept  stretched  perpendicularly  by  weights.  The  distances 
between  the  threads  are  varied  by  moving  one  of  them  nearer  to  or 
farther  away  from  the  other,  which  in  turn  remains  unmoved  during 
each  series  of  experiments.  After  showing  one  thread  until  the  sub- 
ject has  a  clear  image  of  its  absolute  distance  from  him,  a  screen  is 
placed  before  the  tube,  the  one  thread  is  lifted  up,  the  other  is 
left  to  hang  in  its  place  in  the  field  of  vision,  and  the  screen  is  re- 


548  VISION. 

moved,  the  problem  being  to  say  whether  the  second  thread  is  at  the 
same  distance,  nearer  or  farther  away  than  the  first  one.  The  au- 
thor's results  agree,  in  the  main,  with  those  of  Wundt.  They  differ  in 
that  they  show  smaller  values  for  the  recognition  of  differences  of 
depth,  but  the  author  writes  that  he  withholds  further  communications 
for  another  place.  The  author's  explanations,  however,  differ  quite 
essentially  from  those  of  Wundt.  According  to  the  latter,  differences 
of  depth  in  the  direction  of  the  eye  of  the  observer  are  recognized 
through  the  sensations  accompanying  the  movements  of  accommoda- 
tion to  the  increased  nearness  of  the  object.  Differences  of  greater 
distance  away  from  the  eye,  on  the  other  hand,  are  recognized  by  dif- 
ferences in  the  thickness  and  clearness  of  the  thread,  the  theory 
being  that  the  accommodations  to  increased  distance  are  brought  about 
by  simple  relaxations  of  the  accommodation-muscles,  corresponding  to 
which  there  are  no  peculiar  movement  sensations.  The  author  finds 
that  the  apparent  differences  in  the  thickness  and  in  the  distinctness  of 
the  thread  are  far  too  slight  to  serve  as  the  grounds  of  the  perceptions 
of  difference  which  the  tables  show,  and  he  accepts  changes  of  sen- 
sation corresponding  to  the  accommodations  to  greater  distances. 
The  results  of  the  discussion  of  the  binocular  and  monocular  experi- 
ments are  gathered  together  as  follows :  "(i)  The  sensible  factors  in 
localization  in  depth,  relative  and  absolute,  are  sensations  of  conver- 
gence and  accommodation.  (2)  The  estimation  of  depth  takes  place, 
neither  through  an  immediate  perception  of  the  degree  of  effort  of 
convergence  nor  through  an  association  between  these  sensations  and 
the  object  to  be  located,  but  simply  through  the  fact  that  these  sensa- 
tions are  the  particular  elements  in  the  space-representation  (Raum- 
Vorstellung),  which  for  our  consciousness  condition  and  bring  to  ex- 
pression the  relation  of  depth."  The  perception  of  depth  is,  accord- 
ing to  the  author,  an  assimilation  process  pure  and  simple.  The 
most  important  moment  in  the  monocular  perception  of  depth  is  the 
sensations  of  accommodation ;  the  most  important  in  the  binocular 
perception  of  depth  is  the  convergence  sensations. 

The  discussion  represents  a  very  large  number  of  experiments 
and  a  careful  study  of  the  literature  of  the  subject.  Occasionally  the 
discussion  seems  to  be  unnecessarily  lengthened,  whereas  the  views 
of  other  writers  are  sometimes  somewhat  too  briefly  given.  From 
the  writings  of  Descartes  and  De  la  Hire  down  to  the  recent  discus- 
sions of  Stumpf,  Lipps,  Dixon  and  others  nothing  seems  to  have 
escaped  the  notice  of  the  author.  Yet  no  mention  is  made  in  the 
entire  thesis  of  the  theory  of  James  and  Ward,  and  the  author  simply 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  549 

assumes  the  sensations  of  accommodation  and  convergence.  In  his 
discussion  of  the  views  of  Wundt  and  Hering,  one  has  the  feeling  that 
all  has  not  been  said  which  might  be  said.  Those  interested  in  the 
subject  will  in  the  future  no  doubt  have  to  take  this  study  into  account. 

G.  A.  TAWNHY. 

BELOIT  COLLEGE,  Wisconsin. 


SLEEP  AND  DREAMS. 

Experience  sur  les  reves.  J.  MOURLY  VOLD.  Edition  prive"e. 
(Repr.  fr.  Rev.  de  PHypnotisme,  January,  1896.)  Christiana, 
Actie-Bogtrykkeriet,  1896.  Pp.  16. 

Einige  Experimente  iiber  Gesichtsbilder  im  Traum.  J.  MOURLY 
VOLD.  Zeitsch.  f.  Psychologic,  1896,  XIII.,  66-74.  (Repr.  sep.) 

Die  physiologischen  Beziehungen  der  Traumvorgange.  CARL 
MAX  GIESSLER.  Halle,  Niemeyer,  1896.  Pp.  45. 

Professor  Void's  two  papers  describe  some  experiments  upon  the 
muscular  and  optical  elements  entering  into  dreams  and  the  conclu- 
sions to  which  they  lead.  The  experiments  were  performed  upon  the 
author  and  some  forty  others,  of  both  sexes  and  for  the  most  part 
adults,  who  volunteered  their  assistance. 

The  first  paper  reports  the  experiments  upon  muscular  stimulation. 
The  author  met  the  subjects  beforehand  and  explained  to  them  in  detail 
the  nature  of  the  experiments,  but  without  a  hint  as  to  the  expected 
outcome.  The  experiments  were  not  to  be  begun  until  the  day  fol- 
lowing the  interview,  in  order  to  avoid  any  direct  influence  of  the  lat- 
ter upon  them,  and  the  subjects  were  requested  to  refrain  from  all  ex- 
ertion on  the  evenings  of  the  tests.  Immediately  on  waking  in  the 
morning  after  each  test  the  subjects  were  to  answer  in  writing  a  num- 
ber of  questions  concerning  the  dreams  of  the  past  night.  With  most 
of  the  subjects  a  considerable  number  of  tests  were  made.  The  con- 
ditions of  the  experiment  consisted  simply  in  confining  certain  sets  of 
muscles  with  a  glove,  ribbon  or  string.  The  two  hands  and  the  tibio- 
tarsal  region  were  the  parts  especially  used.  The  disturbing  influence 
of  the  preparations  for  the  experiment  was  obviated  by  duplicating 
them,  in  one  case  putting  the  glove  on  and  then  removing  it  before 
sleeping,  the  next  evening  keeping  it  on  through  the  night.  To  dis- 
tinguish between  actual  movements  and  sensations  of  movement  due 
to  the  artificial  muscular  stimulation,  the  subject  was  asked  to  note 
carefully  each  time  whether  there  were  signs  of  his  having  moved  just 


550  SLEEP  AND  DREAMS. 

before  waking.  Experiments  were  made  alternately  with  the  right 
and  left  sides,  and  sometimes  with  both  sides  together,  in  order  to  de- 
termine the  relative  influence  of  these  different  conditions. 

Among  the  more  important  results  of  these  experiments,  the 
author  finds  that  we  generally  tend  to  notice  the  position  of  a  flexed 
limb,  whose  sensations  enter  into  our  dreams  and  form  an  integral 
part  of  them ;  we  rarely  dream  of  being  in  a  horizontal  position. 
The  influence  of  the  bodily  position  on  dreams  is  as  follows :  The 
part  which  is  flexed  or  whose  muscles  are  confined  may  be  represented 
statically,  as  being  in  the  position  in  which  it  actually  is.  Or  the 
whole  body  may  be  represented  as  performing  a  movement  of  such  a 
character  that  the  part  in  question  plays  a  prominent  role  in  the  ac- 
tivity. Again,  this  same  movement  may  be  dreamed  of  as  opposed 
or  prevented.  At  other  times  the  dream  represents  another  person  or 
an  animal  as  being  in  the  position  or  performing  the  movement.  Fi- 
nally, in  some  cases  where  the  fingers  are  confined,  a  dream  occurs  in 
which  the  subject  is  occupied  with  a  number  which  corresponds  to  the 
number  of  fingers  affected.  In  this  last  case  the  connection  seems 
rather  forced,  and  the  author  must  give  more  detailed  results  before 
his  position  can  be  accepted. 

Professor  Void  supposes  these  different  effects  to  be  due  to  differ- 
ences in  the  degree  of  fatigue  of  the  interested  centers.  When  fatigue 
is  greatest  the  peripheral  sensation  may  barely  reach  the  threshold  of 
consciousness,  giving  a  general  notion  of  the  number  in  question, 
without  any  distinct  idea  of  its  peripheral  origin  or  of  its  belonging 
to  the  subject  himself.  When  fatigue  is  less  the  notion  of  the  limb 
may  be  more  distinct,  but  still  without  a  tendency  to  associate  it  with 
his  own  person.  In  more  superficial  sleep,  where  fatigue  is  slight, 
the  subject  is  at  length  able  to  associate  the  sensation  with  his  own 
body.  The  author  considers  that  the  active  interpretation  of  these 
sensations  as  movements  is  due  to  a  greater  degree  of  fatigue  than  the 
static,  since  the  latter  involves  a  clearer  consciousness  of  the  actual 
condition  of  the  limb.  We  cannot  but  think  that  he  lays  too  much 
weight  on  one  hypothesis,  which  he  uses  as  counterpoise  for  his  ex- 
periments, viz.,  that  we  never  remember  dreams  in  which  actual 
movements  occur. 

Professor  Void's  second  paper,  read  at  the  Psychological  Congress 
last  year,  deals  with  the  visual  elements  in  dreams.  The  subjects 
were  each  provided  with  a  parcel  containing  a  number  of  small  ob- 
jects or  figures  cut  from  cardboard ;  this  parcel  they  opened  in  bed 
and,  placing  the  objects  upon  a  black  or  white  background,  observed 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  551 

them  fixedly  for  a  certain  length  of  time,  generally  from  2  to  10 
minutes,  but  occasionally,  with  intervals  of  rest,  for  half  an  hour; 
they  then  extinguished  the  light  without  looking  at  the  flame.  The 
same  method  of  reporting  the  results  was  used  as  in  the  muscular  ex- 
periments. The  success  of  the  experiment  seemed  to  depend  upon  a 
number  of  factors :  the  general  disposition  (Anlage)  of  the  subject, 
the  quiet  and  normal  passing  of  the  preceding  evening,  his  health,  the 
absence  of  undue  fatigue,  and  the  exact  and  systematic  carrying  out 
of  the  experimental  conditions. 

The  results  themselves,  as  reported,  seem  somewhat  general  and 
vague  in  character ;  the  author  limits  himself  to  a  few  striking  ex- 
amples, and  does  not  attempt  to  tabulate  the  experiments  at  all.  The 
paper  as  a  whole  is,  therefore,  rather  unsatisfactory  to  the  exact 
scientist.  The  test-object,  says  Professor  Void,  rarely  enters  into  the 
dream  unaltered.  Its  form  and  size  may  reappear  with  change  of 
color,  or  vice  versa,  or  one  or  more  of  these  elements  may  appear 
transformed  or  become  so  in  the  course  of  the  dream.  White  and 
black  in  the  test-objects  had  the  most  marked  influence ;  these  would 
often  appear  in  the  dream  under  the  form  of  simultaneous  or  succes- 
sive contrast-effects.  The  test-object  occasionally  reappeared  in  the 
given  color  or  its  complementary,  or  another  object  would  be  seen  in 
the  color  of  the  given  test-object.  With  colors  other  than  black  and 
white,  the  given  color  was  sometimes  exactly  reproduced,  but  oftener 
appeared  changed  as  to  saturation,  brightness  or  color-tone ;  in  some 
instances  the  complementary  color  appeared.  Unfortunately  nothing 
is  said  as  to  the  relative  frequency  of  these  different  cases,  nor  of  the 
proportion  of  successful  reproductions  to  the  whole  number  of  trials. 

From  these  results  the  author  deduces  the  conclusion  that  the  vis- 
ual apparatus  immediately  before  waking  reproduces  to  a  certain  ex- 
tent the  condition  present  at  the  beginning  of  sleep.  The  brain  cells, 
however,  work  independently  in  sleep,  and  the  syntheses  of  form, 
size,  color  and  abstract  representation  constructed  by  day  or  in  the 
evening  are  broken  up ;  in  place  of  these  new  syntheses  are  built  up 
between  the  outlines  and  abstract  representations  of  daily  life,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  the  outlines  and  more  especially  the  colors  of  objects 
which  affect  the  visual  apparatus  just  before  the  beginning  of  sleep. 

In  contrast  with  these  two  papers,  which  emphasize  the  psycho- 
logical side,  Dr.  Giessler's  is  a  contribution  to  the  physiology  of  the 
dream  processes.  The  author  assumes  at  the  outset  that  the  distribu- 
tion of  nervous  energy,  which  in  waking  life  is  directed  into  certain 
channels  by  the  voluntary  working  of  the  attention,  is  in  dreams, 


55 2  SLEEP  AND  DREAMS. 

through  the  inhibition  of  the  higher  centers,  mainly  passive,  uncoordi- 
nated and  directed  without  effect  to  various  points  of  the  nervous  sys- 
tem. 

Dream  illusions  are  due  to  several  causes:  i.  To  peripheral 
stimuli  which  fail  to  reach  the  threshold;  here  the  stimulus  may 
either  be  transformed  immediately  into  an  illusion,  without  any  sensa- 
tion of  the  stimulated  part  coming  into  consciousness ;  or  it  may  be 
transformed  through  a  mediate  association.  2.  To  stimuli  which 
reach  the  threshold  discontinuously ;  in  this  case  the  vague  sensation 
of  the  part  stimulated  gives  rise  directly  to  an  illusion.  3.  To  re- 
flexes, which  do  not  as  such  come  into  consciousness.  4.  To  sensa- 
tions which  reach  consciousness,  but  are  subjected  either  to  changes  of 
quality  and  localization  or  to  an  increase  of  intensity.  5.  To  feel- 
ings, which  in  connection  with  the  intellectual  elements  bring  about  a 
heightening  of  the  emotional  side.  The  author  proposes  an  explana- 
tion of  the  underlying  physiological  processes  in  each  case.  In  the 
first  case,  i.  e.,  where  the  stimuli  themselves  do  not  reach  conscious- 
ness directly,  he  supposes  that  certain  stimuli  at  some  period  attain  a 
high  degree  of  intensity ;  a  number  of  such  stimuli  are  brought  into 
association  by  a  subcortical  process,  and  the  coordinated  product  is 
transmitted  to  the  appropriate  cortical  center ;  there  it  stimulates  the 
traces  of  former  similar  coordinations ;  between  these  an  association  is 
brought  about,  which  appears  as  the  memory  image  of  a  presentation 
that  has  previously  accompanied  a  similar  bodily  condition.  The 
physiology  of  the  other  cases  is  similarly  explained.  The  author 
illustrates  each  case  with  the  example  of  an  actual  dream.  In  the 
case  cited  he  describes  a  dream  in  which  he  appeared  to  be  standing 
before  a  booth  at  a  fair,  surrounded  by  a  crowd  of  laughing  acquain- 
tances ;  he  ascribes  the  situation  to  a  peculiar  posture  in  sleep  which 
suggested  standing;  the  laughter  was  suggested  by  the  difficulty  of 
breathing  occasioned  by  his  posture  and  by  other  bodily  feelings  which 
he  noted  on  awakening. 

Dr.  Giessler  next  takes  up  dreams  of  hallucinatory  character; 
these  are  due,  as  he  explains,  to  an  idea  of  some  sort,  rather  than  di- 
rect peripheral  stimulation.  Thus  the  strong  notion  of  something  to 
be  avoided  may  give  rise  in  dreams  to  the  experience  of  its  actual  oc- 
currence. The  physiological  process  here  consists,  first,  in  the  con- 
centration of  nervous  energy  along  certain  already  formed  paths, 
whose  mental  products  are  capable  of  giving  a  suitable  turn  to  the 
dream ;  and  second,  in  the  prevention  of  its  outflow  to  other  centers 
which  would  produce  unfavorable  changes  in  the  images ;  the  assist- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  553 

ance  of  the  visual  center  is  usually  needed  in  such  dreams  as  a  support 
for  the  other  centers.  Hallucinatory  dreams  are  divided  into:  (i)  af- 
fective dreams;  (2)  those  involving  the  higher  mental  functions;  (3) 
the  reproduction  of  common  presentation-series. 

The  author  discusses  at  considerable  length  the  processes  involved 
in  three  special  cases  :  visual  space-localization,  speech  and  writing. 
The  space  relations  are  distorted  in  dreams  in  two  ways.  Since  the 
muscles  which  raise  the  eye-ball  offer  greater  resistance  than  those 
which  depress  it,  the  nervous  energy  which  is  transmitted  to  them 
gives  rise  to  a  lesser  movement;  the  dreamer,  therefore,  estimates 
the  upward  movements  as  less  in  proportion  than  the  downward,  since 
they  give  rise  to  the  feeling  of  a  lesser  outcome.  As  regards  depth, 
the  original  position  is  usually  estimated  correctly;  but  when  the  eye 
moves  to  another  point  the  innervation  feeling  of  the  accommodation 
center  remains  practically  unchanged,  and  hence  in  dreams  the  dis- 
tance from  the  eye  of  any  two  points  fixated  in  turn  is  the  same,  or 
the  difference  seems  much  less  than  it  really  is  in  waking  life.  The 
estimate  of  lateral  distances  is  not  subjected  to  any  distortion. 

Dr.  Giessler  formulates  six  laws  governing  the  production  of 
dreams,  two  of  which  apply  to  the  phases  we  have  especially  noticed. 
i  .  There  is  a  tendency  in  dreams  to  refer  conditions  which  are  caused 
by  stimuli  below  the  threshold  of  perception  or  above  the  threshold  of 
apperception  to  a  substratum  outside  of  the  dreamer's  body,  while 
those  conditions  caused  by  stimuli  lying  between  these  two  thresholds 
are  referred  to  the  dreamer's  own  body.  2.  The  nervous  energy  sent 
out  to  a  system  of  organs  (e.  g.,  those  which  regulate  space  percep- 
tion) stimulates  the  different  parts  of  this  system  more  quickly,  more 
intensely  and  more  definitely  in  proportion  as  they  belong  to  an  earlier 
epoch  in  the  historic  development  of  that  system. 

A  very  complete  classification  of  dreams  is  given  at  the  end  of  the 
paper,  based  on  the  nature  of  the  mental  functions  involved. 

HOWARD  C.  WARREN. 
PRINCETON. 


A  Contribution  to  the  Physiology  of  Sleep^  based  upon  Plethysmo- 
graphic  Experiments.  W.  H.  Ho  WELL.  Journal  of  Experi- 
mental Medicine.  Vol.  II.,  No.  3,  1897. 

Some  twenty  experiments  were  performed,  but  of  this  number 
only  four  or  five  gave  entire  satisfaction.  Each  experiment  covered 
about  four  and  a  half  hours  of  normal  sleep.  The  volume  changes  in 
the  hand  and  the  lower  part  of  the  fore-arm  were  measured  by  means 


554  PHYSIOLOGY  OF  SLEEP. 

of  a  water  plethysmograph,  due  precautions  being  taken  to  keep  the 
enclosed  parts  immovable  and  to  secure  a  comfortable  position.  The 
record  was  inscribed  upon  a  drum  revolving  once  in  twelve  hours,  and 
was  supplemented  by  the  notes  of  a  watcher.  Neither  pulse  nor 
respiration  was  registered. 

An  examination  of  two  curves  obtained  in  successful  experiments 
shows  dilatation  of  the  arm  at  the  beginning  of  sleep,  the  maximum 
being  reached  at  one  to  one  and  a  half  hours  and  maintained  for  an 
hour  or  two,  when  constriction  appears,  bringing  the  arm,  first  gradu- 
ally, then  more  rapidly,  to  its  normal  volume  at  awaking.  Within 
this  general  course  of  the  curve  there  are  waves  of  an  hourly  period 
and  sharper  oscillations  that  are  much  briefer.  The  larger  variations 
indicate  a  lowering  of  the  peripheral  resistance  in  the  skin  area  with 
diminution  of  arterial  pressure  and  of  the  blood  flow  through  the  brain. 
The  periodical  wave-like  oscillations  point  to  rhythmic  changes  in  the 
vaso-motor  center,  and  the  shorter  oscillations  are  due  to  external 
stimuli,  deep  respiration  or  bodily  movements. 

A  comparison  of  this  plethysmographic  curve  and  the  intensity 
curves  published  by  other  investigators  or  obtained  by  the  author  him- 
self, shows  a  resemblance  during  the  first  period  only ;  the  deepest 
sleep  seems  to  correspond  with  the  minimal  flow  of  blood  through  the 
brain.  Beyond  this  period,  the  parallelism  ceases,  the  irritability  of 
the  cortex  returning  rapidly  to  the  normal  while  the  anaemic  condition 
of  the  brain  persists  for  some  time. 

Sleep,  according  to  the  theory  advanced  by  Professor  Howell,  re- 
sults from  the  combination  of  three  factors:  "A  diminution  of  irrita- 
bility, caused  by  fatigue,  of  large  portions  of  the  cortical  area ;  volun- 
tary withdrawal  of  sensory  and  mental  stimuli  involved  in  the 
preparations  for  sleep ;  a  diminished  blood  supply  to  the  brain,  owing 
to  a  relaxation  of  tone  in  the  vaso-motor  center  and  the  fall  of  general 
arterial  pressure  thereby  produced.  The  last  factor  is  the  immediate 
cause  of  sleep  and  explains  its  comparatively  sudden  and  nearly 
simultaneous  occurrence  over  the  entire  cortex." 

As  to  the  possible  play  of  psychical  processes  no  distinct  informa- 
tion is  afforded  by  this  paper,  since  the  sleeper  did  not,  in  any  of  the 
experiments,  have  a  conscious  recollection  of  dreaming.  It  is  note- 
worthy, however,  that  in  some  cases  there  was  partial  awakening 
without  permanent  constriction  of  the  arm  and  consequently  without 
permanent  increase  of  the  blood-flow  to  the  brain.  In  explanation, 
the  author  suggests  that  the  metabolic  processes  within  the  cortical 
cells  might  be  increased  by  either  internal  or  external  causes  other 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  555 

than  changes  in  blood  supply,  and  might  thus  rise  above  the  threshold 
of  consciousness.  The  conscious  processes  might  then  outlast  the  cor- 
responding vaso- motor  changes. 

It  may  be  permissible  here  to  observe  that  in  the  much  shorter 
sleep  record  published  by  Shields  (Jour.  Exp.  Med.,  Vol.  I.,  No.  i), 
odor  stimulation  did  not  affect  the  general  direction  of  the  curve 
showing  increase  of  arm  volume  in  the  first  period.  Not  all  the 
odors  employed  were  accompanied  by  the  same  change  in  direction 
or  extent;  nor  was  the  action  of  any  one  odor  uniform.  While  it 
would  be  difficult  to  draw  satisfactory  conclusions  from  these  peculiar- 
ities, and  while,  as  Shields  has  pointed  out,  these  changes  give  no 
clear  evidence  of  sensory  reaction,  it  is  conceivable  that  the  effect  of 
any  stimulation  is  determined  in  some  way  by  the  condition  of  the 
vaso-motor  center  at  the  moment  the  stimulus  is  applied.  As  this 
center,  according  to  Howell,  is  the  seat  of  rhythmic  changes  which 
account  for  the  large  periodical  variations  in  the  plethysmographic 
curve,  it  would  at  least  be  interesting  to  observe  the  effects  produced 
by  stimulation  in  various  phases  of  the  rhythm. 

E.  A.  PACE. 
CATHOLIC  UNIVERSITY,  WASHINGTON. 


GENETIC. 

First  500  Days  of  a   Child's  Life.      MRS.  WINFIELD  S.   HALL. 

Child  Study  Monthly,  November  to  March,  1896-7. 

In  five  papers  appearing  under  the  above  title  Mrs.  Hall  has  out- 
lined the  history  of  the  first  five  hundred  days  of  the  life  of  her  child. 
While  less  critical  and  less  exhaustive  than  Miss  Shinn's,  where 
the  two  writers  whose  work  can  be  so  favorably  compared  have  en- 
tered the  same  field,  Mrs.  Hall's  observations  are  more  completely 
classified,  and  she  has  not  hesitated  to  point  out  a  number  of  conclu- 
sions. Her  observations  have  undoubtedly  been  carefully  carried  out, 
and  this  will  render  her  history  not  only  interesting  in  itself,  but  use- 
ful for  purposes  of  correlation  with  the  results  of  other  observers. 
For  the  introductory  chapter  on  growth  we  are  indebted  to  Dr.  Hall, 
the  father  of  the  child;  but  as  the  results  of  his  measurements  do  not 
appear  again  in  connection  with  the  features  of  development  which 
Mrs.  Hall  describes,  we  may  pass  this  chapter  over  and  go  at  once  to 
the  consideration  of  her  own  papers. 

In  the  introductory  outline  of  the  classification  according  to  which 
the  observations  are  arranged,  we  find  two  main  divisions  of  devel- 


GENETIC. 

opment,  physical  and  psychical.  Under  physical  development  are 
subsumed  muscular  movements  and  coordinations ;  while  included 
with  senses  and  intellect  under  psychical  development  are  emotions. 
If  the  motor  element  is  as  significant  in  consciousness  as  we  are  coming 
to  believe,  and  if  visceral  sensations  and  emotional  expressions  consti- 
tute the  differentiae  of  the  emotions  in  consciousness,  this  division  is 
an  unfortunate  one,  inasmuch  as  it  separates  these  phenomena  by  such 
barriers  as  the  terms  physical  and  psychical  would  tend  to  produce. 

In  the  second  paper  we  regret  to  find  among  muscular  movements 
records  of  so  few  inherent  reactions,  for  without  these  a  history  of  the 
development  of  muscular  movements  must  be  incomplete.  For  ex- 
ample, under  '  grasping '  no  mention  is  made  of  a  reflex,  though  it  is 
recorded  of  the  57th  day  that  "  for  the  first  time  he  seemed  to  know 
that  he  had  something,  and  his  fingers  tightened  upon  it."  The  his- 
tory of  the  development  of  grasping  and  of  sucking  the  thumb  is  given 
on  the  whole  as  a  history  of  voluntary  movements,  i.  e.,  attempted 
conscious  adaptations,  rather  than  as  a  history  of  muscular  movements 
proper.  ^* 

On  page  395  Mrs.  Hall  describes  the  chance  discovery  of  a  useful 
movement,  showing  that  the  child,  in  common  with  young  animals, 
may  develop  through  the  wider  application  of  instinctive  movement. 
There  are  many  observations  which  suggest  questions  of  interest. 
For  example,  the  thumb  was  constantly  enclosed  in  the  fist  till  the  yoth 
day.  In  the  case  of  my  own  child  the  thumb  was  rarely  enclosed  in 
the  fist.  What,  if  any,  is  the  significance  of  such  differences  in  hand 
attitudes,  and  have  they  a  bearing  upon  the  subsequent  development  of 
hand  movements  ?  And  we  are  impressed  by  the  fact  that  many  move- 
ments were  taught  to  the  child.  Was  this  done  in  conformity  to  a  preva- 
lent belief  that  the  various  forms  of  habitual  actions  must  be  learned 
from  another?  Or  was  it  proved  experimentally  in  this  case  that  the 
child  would  not  or  did  not  acquire  these  habits  without  instruction? 
If  the  last  be  true  then  there  is  one  case  to  be  cited  in  support  of  a 
popular  belief.  It  is  of  importance  to  know  whether  these  habitual 
movements  can  be  acquired  altogether  without  instruction  or  by  imi- 
tation, or  whether  these  are  necessary  or  of  assistance.  Nearly  all 
the  movements  described  by  Mrs.  Hall  are  repeated  or  imitated  move- 
ments, either  repetitions  of  copies  set  for  the  child  in  terms  of 
movement,  or  of  those  seen  and  translated  by  him  from  visual  to 
motor  terms.  We  should  like  to  know  whether  he  could  reproduce  a 
movement  from  a  copy  held  in  its  own  terms  more  easily,  or  at  an 
earlier  date,  than  he  could  reproduce  one  from  a  copy  held  first  in  the 
terms  of  another  sense. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  557 

It  is  well  to  indicate  the  value  of  observing  the  development  of 
coordinations,  and  Mrs.  Hall's  remarks  upon  this  are  extremely  sug- 
gestive. But  we  feel  the  need  of  a  more  comprehensive  history  than 
she  gives  us.  Here  again  we  should  know  more  of  the  inherent  coor- 
dinations, and  of  how  far  imitation  was  influential  in  impressing  com- 
binations of  movements  upon  the  organism,  and  of  how  far  experi- 
ment and  the  accidental  results  of  chance  movements  tended,  if  at  all, 
to  modify  a  recognized  order  of  development  of  coordinations. 

The  definition  of  coordination  is  open  to  criticism ;  for  by  the  use 
therein  of  the  word  graceful,  a  number  of  skilled  adjustments  would 
be  excluded  from  the  list  of  coordinations.  Many  highly  dextrous  ar- 
tisans are  not  graceful,  and  many  exquisite  adaptations  required  by 
the  use  of  tools  render  grace  of  movement  impossible.  Later  (p.  406), 
there  is  a  second  definition  of  coordination  which  is  designed  to  fit  a 
conception  rather  than  the  phenomena  as  they  are  seen  to  occur ;  for 
such  movements  as  the  symmetrical  ones  of  the  arms  in  early  infancy 
are  to  be  viewed  as  primitive  coordinations,  yet  not  as  adjustments 
in  time  or  of  force,  but  rather  as  the  preliminary  steps  by  which  data 
for  the  knowledge  necessary  to  such  adjustments  are  acquired. 

The  history  of  psychical  development  opens  with  observations  on 
the  senses.  Among  the  records  of  vision  there  is  little  to  note,  but 
we  cannot  pass  by  the  conclusions  without  pausing  over  the  fourth 
one  (p.  468).  Here  Mrs.  Hall  wi'ites:  "The  time  when  visual  per- 
ception becomes  relatively  clear  precedes  the  following  of  moving 
objects  by  the  eyes  because :  (a)  this  act  is  a  voluntary  one ;  and  (b) 
the  child  cannot  will  to  follow  the  motions  of  an  object  which  it  does 
not  perceive."  There  is  not,  I  believe,  as  yet  enough  evidence  to  es- 
tablish a  claim  of  priority  for  either  fixation  or  following.  Miss  Shinn 
is  of  the  impression  that  following  may  occur  very  early,  and  my  own 
record  shows  that  it  may  precede  fixation.  Nor  can  following  be 
classed  among  voluntary  movements,  the  evidence  at  hand  going  rath- 
er to  show  that  its  place  is  among  the  inherent  ones.  Under  conclu- 
sion 9  the  suggestive  fact  is  noted  that  "attention  is  held  much  more 
closely  when  two  senses  are  affected  than  when  only  one  is  affected." 
Among  sensations  we  miss  observations  upon  touch,  taste  and  smell. 
When  we  come  to  the  emotions  and  the  intellect,  however,  we  find 
fuller  records,  and  this  is  especially  true  of  the  subdivision  of  intellect 
which  treats  of  language.  Over  all  of  these  we  should  like  to  linger, 
for  the  observations  will  well  repay  a  careful  analysis,  and  the  con- 
clusions are  worthy  of  consideration. 

One  impression  grows  within  us  as  we  reach  the  conclusion  of 


558  MENTAL   FATIGUE. 

the  fifth  chapter :  it  is  that  every  advance  is  in  some  sense  a  repetition 
of  experience.  There  is  not  a  case  on  record  in  which  the  child  took 
an  initiative,  or  launched  on  a  wholly  independent  line  of  action. 
When  something  strikingly  unusual  was  performed,  such  as  is  recorded 
on  page  534,  or  of  the  occasion  upon  which  he  alternately  struck  two 
objects  to  produce  different  tones,  he  was  accidentally  led  into  these 
performances  by  the  discovery  of  qualities  in  the  objects.  Such  a 
collection  of  records  gives  a  natural  history  of  the  development  of 
conscious  continuity.  And  we  must  mark  it  as  a  distinct  advance  that 
Mrs.  Hall  has  contributed  a  history  of  mental  development  rather  than 

a  mere  record  of  dates. 

K.  C.  MOORE. 
WAYNE,  PA. 


MENTAL  FATIGUE. 

Ueber  die  Beeinjlussung  einf acker  psychischer  Vorgdnge  durch 
korperliche  und  geistige  Arbeit.  S.  BETTMANN.  Psychol.  Ar- 
beiten  I.  Pp.  152-208. 

Ueber  den  Einfluss  von  Arbeitspausen  auf  die  geistige  Leistungs- 

fdhigkeit.     E.    AMBERG.     Psychol.  Arbeiten  I.     Pp.  300-377. 

Ueber   Ermiidung   und   Erholung.      W.  H.  R.  RIVERS  and   E. 

KRAEPELIN.     Psychol.  Arbeiten  I.     Pp.  627-678. 
On  Mental  Fatigue  and  Recovery.     W.   H.   R.   RIVERS.     Journ. 

Ment.  Sci.  XLII.     Pp.  525-528. 

Studies  of  Fatigue.  J.  M.  MOORE.  Stud.  Yale  Psychol.  Labora- 
tory III.  Pp.  68-95. 

Untersuchungen    iiber   die   Einflusse   der   Arbeitsdauer  und  der 
Arbeitspausen  auf  die  geistige  Leistungsfdhigkeit  der  Schul- 
kinder.     J.  FRIEDRICH.     Ztsch.  f.  Psychol.  XIII.     Pp.  1-53- 
The  influence  of  fatigue  on  mental  performance  is  the  subject  of 
these  six  articles.     Herr  Bettmann  has  investigated  the  effects  of   fa- 
tigue, incident  to  both  mental  and  physical  work,  on  the  time  of  cer- 
tain mental  processes;  Amberg  has  experimented  upon  the  influence  of 
rest  periods  on  mental  ability ;  Dr.  Rivers  and  Professor  Kraepelin  take 
the  general  problem  of  recovery  from  fatigue ;  Dr.  Moore  has  investi- 
gated the  effect  of  fatigue  upon  certain  voluntary  movements,  while 
Herr  Friedrich  has  given  his  work  a  practical  turn,  and  found  the  ef- 
fect of  the  fatigue  of  the  school  day  upon  children's  ability  to  do  some 
ordinary  school  tasks. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  559 

1.  Bettmann's   article    gives  the  results  of  the   influence  of  two 
hours'  rapid  walking  or  of  one  hour's  adding  figures  upon  choice  re- 
actions, word  reactions,  memorizing  figures,  adding,  and  rapid  read- 
ing.    For  the  first  of  these  processes  he  finds  that  the  fatiguing  mental 
work  increased  the  time ;  average  normal  time  293<r,  after  adding  384*. 
The  reactions  taken  after  the  walking  show  a  decrease  in  time,   257*. 
This  is  explained  by  the  number  of  false  reactions  apparently  included 
here,  the  percentage  of   these  under  the  different  conditions  being  as 
follows:  normal  2.6,  after  mental  activity   i,  after  bodily  work,   29. 
The  bodily  work  as  well  as  the  mental  increases  the  time  for  word  re- 
actions.    Memorizing  was  found  more   difficult  after  the  fatigue  of 
adding,  the  decrease  being  slightly  greater  after  the  bodily  work,  al- 
though during  all  the  experiments  there  was  a  '  practice '  advantage 
for  the  latter.     The  average  number  of  figures  learned  in   one-half 
hour  was:  normally,  66 1,  mental  work  influencing,  476,  bodily  work 
influencing,  454.     The  influence  of  the  two  kinds  of  work  shows  itself 
clearly  also  in  the  average   number  of  figures  added  during  one-half 
hour:  normal,  1793;    after  mental  work,    1572;   after  bodily  work, 
1571.     The  average  number  of  syllables  read  normally  in  one-half 
hour  was  8798 ;  after  the  mental  work  only  7660,  and  after  the  bodily 
only  8380  were  read. 

From  these  results  the  author  concludes  that  Turnstunden  and 
Spazieren  should  not  be  used  as  means  of  recreation  before  mental 
work.  One  must  remember,  however,  that  when  we  walk  or  swim 
or  play  tennis  we  do  not  do  them  in  recht  raschem  Tempo,  and  that 
also  in  our  recreations  there  is  a  decided  interest  which  must  have 
been  lacking  in  the  two  hours'  march.  On  the  whole  the  work  is  well 
done,  and  the  results  are  fully  collated,  but  only  one  observer  was 
tested.  In  common  with  the  other  two  Arbeiten  articles,  and  with 
Friedrich's  article  in  the  Zeitschrift,  the  material  would  have  made 
more  interesting  reading  if  it  were  not  spread  over  four  times  the 
space  required. 

2.  In  this  research  the  author  attempted  to  determine  the  effects 
of  different  periods  of  rest,  of  the  difference  in  the  kind  and  duration 
of  work,  and  of  personal  differences.     Adding  and  memorizing  were 
the  mental  processes  used  in  the  investigation.     A  rest  of  five  minutes 
between  two  half  hours  of  adding  showed  a  6  per  cent,  increase  in  the 
amount  done  over  that  when  no  pause  was  made.     When  there  was  a 
continual  change,  five  minutes  work,  five  minutes  rest,  scarcely  any 
increase  was  noted.     For  two  observers,  fifteen  minute  rests  between 
two  half  hours'  work  showed  no  effects ;   when  the  work  was  two 


560  MENTAL   FATIGUE. 

hours  long  and  the  fifteen  minute  rest  was  taken  between  the  hours 
there  was  noted  a  slight  increase  in  the  amount  of  work  done.  For 
the  author  a  fifteen  minute  rest  between  two  half  hours'  memorizing 
gave  a  6j^  per  cent,  decrease  in  amount  accomplished ;  another  ob- 
server, however,  under  like  conditions  showed  an  increase  of  13  per 
cent.  These  rather  conflicting  results  show  the  need  of  further  and 
more  extended  work  in  this  direction. 

3.  Professor  Kraepelin's  and  Dr.  Rivers'  paper  is  a  partial  answer 
to  the  question :  What  period  of  rest  is  necessary  for  the  recovery  of 
mental  freshness  ?     Between  the  different  half  hours'  adding  of  single 
figures  a  rest  of  a  half  or  of  a  full  hour  was  taken.     The  results  show 
that  for  a  normal  man  a  rest  of  the  same  duration  or  of  that  of  double 
the  period  of  work  is  sufficient  to  restore  the  mental  freshness  once, 
after  which  there  is  a  rapid  decrease  in  the  capabilities  which  cannot  be 
balanced  by  a  simple  rest.     During  the  work  many  temporary  personal 
influences  showed  themselves.     How  far  the  results  of  the  latter  two 
researches  can  be  extended  to  daily  life,  to  all  kinds  of  mental  condi- 
tions, it  is  difficult  to  say ;   in  all   probability,  the  question  of  interest 
would  be  one  of  the  great  influences  in  daily  work,  and  to  draw  con- 
clusions from  uninteresting,  not  to  say  wearisome,  experiments  as  to 
what  would  happen  under  ordinary  conditions,  would  be  extremely 
hazardous. 

4.  Dr.  Rivers'  second  paper  only  gives  the  method  and  general  re- 
sults of  the  preceding  research. 

5.  In  Dr.  Moore's  studies,  two  observers  were  tested  as  to  the 
effect  of  fatigue  on  binocular  estimate  of  depth  and  from  the  first  to 
the  last  experiment  there  is  a  gradual  increase  in  error  of  estimate. 
Three  observers  gave  practically  the  same  result  in  monocular  estima- 
tion of  depth.  The  time  of  monocular  accommodation  increased  for  one 
observer  from  .35  s.  to  .87  s.  (296  experiments),  for  another  observer, 
first  series,  .36  s.  to  .46  s.  (391  experiments),  second  series,  .30  s.  to 
6 1  s.    (261    experiments).      Taps  were  made  as  rapidly  as  possible 
with  an  electric  contact  key.     Evidences  of  fatigue  showed  themselves 
at  about  the  7oth  tap.     Fatigue  lengthened  the  time  of  making  each 
tap,  the  average  for  the  first  ten  being  200*7,  and  for  the  last  ten  (47<Dth 
to  48oth)  359<7-     In  most  of  the  experiments  a  rhythm,  similar  to  that 
found  by  Lombard  for  finger  contractions,  was  noted.    In  general  the 
author  finds  that  fatigue  tends  to  make  work  less  rapid,  less  accurate, 
and  highly  irregular. 

6.  Herr  Friedrich  made  his  tests  upon  his  class  of  children,  their 
average  age  being  10  years.     Accuracy  of  adding  and  of  copying  from 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  561 

dictation  was  determined  under  the  following  conditions :  a,  before 
the  first  school  hour;  £,  after  the  first  hour;  c,  after  the  second  hour 
with  a  rest  of  eight  minutes  between  the  two  hours;  </,  after  the 
second  hour,  no  rest ;  e,  after  the  third  hour,  rests  of  fifteen^  minutes 
between  the  hours ;  y,  after  the  third  hour,  one  rest  of  fifteen  min- 
utes between  the  second  and  third ;  g,  after  the  third  hour,  no  rests ; 
h,  before  first  afternoon  hour;  y,  after  first  hour;  £,  after  second 
hour  with  fifteen  minutes  between  first  and  second ;  /,  after  second 
hour,  no  rest.  The  rests  were  filled  with  breathing  exercises,  etc. 
The  results  show  an  increase  of  errors  from  a  \.o  g  and  from  h  to  /; 
for  dictation  experiments  this  amounted  to  370%  and  380%,  respec- 
tively; for  the  adding  series  there  was,  respectively,  103%  and  27$, 
increase.  It  should  be  noted  that  only  one  test  under  each  condition 
was  made ;  conclusions  from  the  work  will  consequently  only  be  valid 
when  confirmed  by  others.  The  article  is  important,  however,  as 
showing  what  elementary  and  secondary  school  teachers  could  do  for 
the  cause  of  scientific  psychology. 

These  five  studies  are  an  advance  beyond  ordinary  observation.  It 
is  slight  to  be  sure,  but  enough  to  show  the  importance,  practical  and 
theoretical,  of  the  problem,  and  to  indicate  what  may  be  done  and 
what  should  be  done. 

SHEPHERD  IVORY  FRANZ. 

COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY. 


CUTANEOUS  SENSATION. 

Localization  of  Cutaneous  Impressions  by  Arm  Movement  with- 
out Pressure  on  the  Skin.  C.  T.  PARRISH.  The  American 
Journal  of  Psychology,  VIII.,  250-267. 

Miss  Parrish's  experiments  had  a  double  purpose :  first,  to  test  the 
accuracy  with  which  an  observer  can  indicate,  by  a  pencil  held  just 
off  the  skin,  a  point  previously  touched  by  the  experimenter;  and, 
second,  to  note  the  effect  of  trying  to  emphasize  or  to  exclude  visual 
images  in  performing  this  act  of  localization.  Her  work  is  thus 
closely  connected  with  experiments  already  reported  by  Dr.  Pillsbury 
and  Miss  Washburn. 

The  results  show  that  in  the  absence  of  sensations  of  contact  from 
the  observer's  pencil  the  error  in  localization  is  greater  than  when  ex- 
ploration of  the  skin  is  permitted.  In  those  series  where  especial 
emphasis  was  laid  on  visualization,  two  of  the  four  observers  made 


562  CUTANEOUS   SENSATION. 

smaller  errors  than  when  left  to  their  own  native  freedom.  The  error 
in  the  case  of  all  four  observers  reached  its  maximum,  on  the  other 
hand,  when  they  were  charged  to  shut  out,  as  far  as  possible,  all  visual 
images.  The  most  accurate  localizations  were  obtained  by  allowing 
the  observers  to  see  the  stimulated  point  whose  position  they  had  sub- 
sequently to  point  out. 

As  to  the  direction  of  the  error  in  localization,  three  of  the  ob- 
servers inclined  to  indicate  points  too  far  to  the  left  on  both  right  and 
left  arms ;  for  which  the  author  tentatively  suggests  the  asymmetry  of 
function  of  the  two  arms  as  the  explanation.  A  more  constant  and 
striking  error  in  direction,  however,  was  that  the  point  indicated  by 
the  observer  usually  lay  nearer  the  wrist  than  the  point  actually  stimu- 
lated ;  and  the  error  kept  this  constant  direction  both  when  the  arm 
with  which  the  localization  was  indicated  moved  from  an  extended 
position  and  when  it  started  from  a  position  of  flexion.  The  author, 
in  substantial  agreement  with  Dr.  Pillsbury,  explains  this  '  peripheral 
displacement*  by  a  tendency  to  overestimate  the  extent  of  the  flexion 
movements  of  the  indicating  arm,  and  to  underestimate  that  of  its  ex- 
tension movements.  This  is  perhaps  the  true  explanation.  And  yet, 
since  the  region  of  skin  experimented  on,  both  here  and  in  Dr.  Pills- 
bury's  work,  was  just  above  the  wrist,  the  constant  direction  of  error 
may  have  been  due  to  the  direction  of  the  nearest  important  basis  of 
longitudinal  orientation  (that  is,  the  wrist,  or,  less  immediately, 
the  fingers)  and  not  primarily  to  a  false  estimate  of  the  movements  of 
the  opposite  arm.  If  it  can  be  shown  that  the  direction  of  error  is 
quite  independent  of  this  matter  of  orientation,  brought  out  so  promi- 
nently in  M.  Henri's  experiments,  the  explanation  given  in  the  paper 
will  seem  much  more  conclusive.  But  a  passing  doubt  like  this  must 
not  be  allowed  to  conceal  in  the  least  the  value  and  interest  of  the  re- 
sults Professor  Parrish  has  given  us. 

Ueber  die  Wahrnehmung  ziueier  Punkte  mittelst  des  Tastsinnes^ 
mit  Riicksicht  auf  die  Frage  der  Uebung  und  die  Entstehung 
der  Vexirfehler.  GUY  A.  TAWNEY.  Philosophische  Studien, 
XIII.,  163-221.  Also  in  Princeton  Contributions  to  Psychology, 
II.,  i,  April,  1897. 

It  has  been  known  that  practice  usually  brings  a  marked  reduction 
in  the  threshold  distance  at  which  two  points  on  the  skin  are  felt  as 
two ;  but  it  has  never  been  quite  clear  whether  repeated  experiment  on 
some  single  selected  spot  of  skin  causes  a  decrease  in  the  threshold  all 
over  the  body,  or  whether  the  decrease  is  only  for  the  selected  spot 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  563 

and  for  the  one  corresponding  to  it  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  body. 
Volkmann,  for  instance,  believed  he  had  experimental  evidence  that 
in  repeated  determinations  of  the  threshold  for  some  one  region  of 
skin  the  threshold  was  reduced  only  over  so  much  of  the  body  as  was 
supplied  from  closely  connected  sensory  fibres,  including  the  corre- 
sponding region  on  the  opposite  side.  Professor  Tawney,  on  the  con- 
trary, has  here  shown  by  extended  experiments  that  practice  in  such 
a  case  not  merely  has  a  local  effect,  but  lowers  the  threshold  irregu- 
larly over  the  whole  body.  The  changes  which  we  designate  as  the 
result  of  '  practice  '  are  therefore  central  and  psychical. 

His  farther  contribution  is  in  making  clearer  the  exact  nature  of 
such  practice  as  is  really  effective.  The  practice  which  causes 
the  threshold  to  decline  is  not  the  mere  repetition  of  the  dis- 
criminative act ;  for,  as  Professor  Tawney  here  shows,  there  may 
be  indefinite  repetition  of  the  act,  without  any  reduction  of  the 
threshold  whatever.  If  the  observer  preserves,  as  far  as  possible, 
a  calmly  receptive  attitude  toward  the  stimulus,  and  allows  his 
judgment  to  be  formed  spontaneously  as  a  ready  characterization  of 
the  external  fact,  then  the  threshold  remains  fairly  constant,  however 
often  the  experiment  be  repeated.  The  threshold  seems  to  be  re- 
duced by  practice  only  when  the  observer  expects  and  strains  for 
greater  and  greater  nicety  of  discrimination  as  the  experiment  pro- 
ceeds. In  other  words,  some  form  of  suggestion  is  the  main  factor 
in  producing  in  this  field  the  results  hitherto  vaguely  ascribed  to  prac- 
tice. Where  suggestion  was  most  carefully  excluded,  practice  had 
little  or  no  influence  on  the  results.  At  the  same  time,  the  author 
warns  us  not  to  suppose  that  suggestion  is  absent  merely  because  the 
observer  has  been  kept  in  the  dark  as  to  the  purpose  or  method  of  the 
experiment.  Autosuggestion  is  at  least  as  pervasive  and  disturbing 
an  influence  as  is  any  other  form  of  suggestion. 

Another  important  feature  of  the  experiments  here  reported  is  the 
intimate  connection  they  seem  to  reveal  between  the  reduction  of  the 
threshold  and  the  puzzling  phenomenon  of  illusory  double  contact 
(  Vexirfehler),  so  exasperating  to  workers  in  this  field.  The  ob- 
servers were  comparatively  free  from  this  illusion  until  practice  had 
considerably  reduced  the  threshold.  And  in  those  series  where  no  re- 
duction normally  took  place,  the  introduction,  at  the  close  of  the  series, 
of  the  suggestion  which  had  been  operative  in  the  other  cases  was  the 
signal  both  for  a  sudden  drop  in  the  threshold- value  and  for  the  ap- 
pearance of  Vexirfehler.  Dr.  Tawney's  explanation  is  that  the  ob- 
server, in  his  effort  to  make  the  finest  discrimination  between  one  and 


564  CUTANEOUS   SENSATION. 

two  points,  changes  the  mode  of  forming  his  judgment.  The  ob- 
server no  longer,  as  at  first,  directs  his  attention  to  that  visual  image 
of  the  stimulating  object  which  arises  in  strongest  association  with  the 
dermal  sensation ;  but  now  gives  his  main  attention  to  the  dermal  sen- 
sation itself.  The  subject's  analytic  examination  of  the  sensation  either 
accentuates  qualitative  differences  in  it,  or  else  produces  them  out- 
right. And  once  having  definitely  before  him  a  distinction  within  the 
sensation,  it  is  easy  to  pass  on  to  the  judgment  and  even  to  the  clear 
perception  of  two  spatially  separate  points  of  contact.  But  if  the  ob- 
server could  rid  himself  of  the  preconception  that  no  more  than  two 
points  were  being  used,  he  could  often  (and  one  of  the  subjects 
actually  did)  have  the  illusion  of  four  or  five  contacts  quite  as  well  as 
of  two.  By  variations  in  the  direction  of  the  suggestion,  its  influence 
was  brought  to  light  in  various  ways.  However,  for  these  and  other 
interesting  details  the  original  paper  must  be  consulted. 

Dr.  Tawney's  account  shows  that  his  experiments  were  carefully 
arranged  and  carried  out,  and  his  paper  is  certainly  a  distinct  and  im- 
portant gain  for  the  special  field  indicated  by  the  title  of  the  article. 
But,  besides  this,  the  principles  he  touches,  in  showing  the  importance 
of  suggestion,  have  their  ramifications  in  all  laboratory  work.  His  ad- 
mirable article,  therefore,  can  hardly  fail  to  be  of  assistance  in  avoid- 
ing pitfalls  in  many  lines  of  psychological  experiment  other  than  that 
to  which  the  author  here  confined  himself. 

GEORGE  M.  STRATTON. 
UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 

Untersuchungen  iiber  die  Sinnesfunctionen  der  menschlichen  Haut, 
Erste  Abhandlung  ;  Druckempfindung  und  Schmerz.  MAX 
VON  FREY.  No.  III.,  xxiii  B.  d.  Abhand.  d.  math.  phys.  Classe 
d.  Konig.  Sachs.  Gesell.  d.  Wissenschaften.  Leipzig,  S.  Hirzel. 
1896. 

In  this  monograph  Frey  gives  an  account  of  experiments  on  the 
relations  of  pressure  sensations  and  their  stimuli.  His  problem  was 
the  physiological  conditions  of  pressure  stimulation,  his  method  the 
determination  of  the  threshold  relations  of  time,  place,  area  and  in- 
tensity. 

The  first  experiments  described  corroborate  the  familiar  fact  that 
pressure  stimuli  of  a  moderate  intensity  are  perceived  only  a  short  time 
after  application.  Frey  concludes  that  only  stimuli  near  the  threshold 
cause  a  temporary  sensory  effect,  but  in  his  experiments  weights  of 
loo  to  200  g.  applied  for  i  min.  on  100  mm.z,  failed  to  cause  continu- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  565 

ous  sensations.  The  removal  of  the  weight  was  at  times  perceived 
as  pressure.  This  is  said  by  Frey  to  be  due  to  pressure  after-images, 
but  heterogeneous  stimuli  of  low  intensity  are  easily  confused.  The 
rapid  fading  away  of  the  pressure  sensation  is  not  necessarily  due,  as 
the  author  assumes,  to  the  fatigue  effect  of  constant  stimuli.  If  the 
stimulus  is  not  pressure,  but  the  work  done  on  the  skin,  the  stimulus 
as  well  as  the  sensation  is  but  momentary.  This  is  practically  ad- 
mitted by  Frey,  for  in  another  place  he  states  that  deformation  of  the 
skin  is  necessary  for  the  production  of  pressure  sensations. 

More  important  are  the  experiments  on  the  relations  of  the  threshold 
to  the  area,  place  and  rate  of  application  of  the  stimulus.  The  ap- 
paratus consisted  essentially  of  a  lever  connected  with  a  balance  to 
which  weights  were  applied  and  clock  work  to  regulate  the  rate  of  in- 
crease of  the  stimulus.  Experiments  on  one  observer  showed  that  for 
him  at  least  the  threshold  increased  at  first  slowly  and  then  rapidly 
from  .2  to  2  g.,  as  the  rate  decreased  from  6.2  to  .7  g.  per  sec.  The 
data  are  very  meagre,  but  the  results  corroborate  those  which  I  myself 
obtained  by  a  less  accurate  method.  It  is  evident  that  they  support 
the  movement  theory  of  pressure  stimulation.  The  experiments  on 
the  area  made  on  two  observers  seem  to  show  that  for  low  rates  of  ap- 
plication, 1.2  to  4.3  g.  per  sec.,  the  threshold  increases  faster  than  the 
area,  but  for  rates  of  6  to  n  g.  per  sec.,  the  relation  seemed  more  a 
direct  proportion.  Here,  also,  the  number  of  experiments  is  inade- 
quate. More  than  two  constants  should  be  used  if  even  an  approxi- 
mately quantitative  relation  is  to  be  obtained,  especially  when  the 
results  vary.  Frey's  conclusion  that  the  intensity  of  stimulation  per 
unit  area  varies  inversely  as  the  entire  area — which  he  calls  the  law  of 
*  hydrostatic  pressure ' — not  only  contradicts  the  results  of  experiments 
by  me,  according  to  which  the  threshold  increases  much  more  slowly 
than  the  area,  but  is  also  based  upon  very  scant  evidence.  Curi- 
ously enough  Frey  misuses  the  term  hydrostatic  pressure,  for  liquid  pres- 
sure increases  with  the  area  of  application.  The  experiments  on  the 
place  of  stimulation  were  made  on  but  one  observer.  The  marked  va- 
riation in  the  results  for  contiguous  areas  is  ascribed  to  the  varying 
distribution  of  pressure  spots. 

The  experiments  on  the  threshold  made  with  hairs  of  known  cross- 
section  are  of  much  interest.  The  law  of  '  hydrostatic  pressure '  was 
found  not  to  hold  for  areas  less  than  \-  mm1.  The  stimuli  seemed 
to  be  equal  when  the  pressure  increased  approximately  in  proportion 
not  to  the  superficial,  but  to  the  linear  magnitude.  This  proves,  ac- 
cording to  the  author,  that  the  organs  of  pressure  sensation  are  not  on 


566  NEW  BOOKS. 

the  surface,  and  that  they  are  in  all  probability  the  corpuscles  of 
Meissner.  This  interpretation  of  the  experiments  was  justified  by  an 
experiment  on  a  physical  model,  which  showed  that  under  conditions 
somewhat  similar  to  those  of  pressure  stimulation  the  pressure  exerted 
on  the  surface  was  not  fully  transmitted  below  the  surface.  With 
these  hairs  Frey  made  maps  of  the  pressure  points  on  the  calf  of  the 
leg  and  the  wrist.  The  threshold  values  run  from  %  to  4  g.  per  mm. 
The  average  values  were  the  same  for  these  places  as  for  the  ball  of 
the  thumb  and  finger  tips. 

Experiments  on  the  pain  threshold  were  also  made  with  hairs  or 
cactus  needles,  one  of  which  was  affixed  to  a  spring,  the  whole  form- 
ing a  delicate  algometer.  The  values  found  for  three  observers  vary 
from  25  to  50  g.  per  mm2.  The  'hydrostatic'  law  of  pressure  and 
area  of  stimulation  was  found  to  hold  for  all  the  areas  investigated, 
less  than  12  mm2.  Hence,  Frey  concludes,  the  organs  of  pain  are 
superficial.  Their  high  threshold  is  explained  by  the  rigidity  of  the 
epidermis.  The  topography  of  the  pain  spots  was  also  studied,  but 
apparently  the  reagent  himself  applied  the  stimulus.  In  these,  as  in 
other  experiments,  especially  those  on  the  topography  of  pressure 
spots,  the  author  seems  to  have  devoted  his  attention  to  physical  and 
physiological  rather  than  to  psychological  sources  of  error. 

HAROLD  GRIPPING. 
NEW  YORK. 


NEW  BOOKS. 

Man's  Place  in  the  Cosmos  and  Other  Essays.  ANDREW  SETH. 
New  York,  Scribners.  1897.  Pp.  viii+3o8.  $2. 

The  Chances  of  Death  and  Other  Studies  in  Evolution.  KARL 
PEARSON.  With  illustrations.  Two  vols.  London  and  New 
York,  Ed.  Arnold.  1897.  Pp.  ix+388  and  460.  $8. 

Entile  Zola :  enquete  medico-psychologique.  I.  Introduction  G£n- 
e"rale.  ED.  TOULOUSE.  Paris,  Societe  d'Editions  Scientifiques. 
1896.  Pp.  xiv+285-  Fr.  3.50. 

Fourteenth  and  Fifteenth  Annual  Reports  of  the  Bureau  of  Eth- 
nology (1892-3,  and  1893-4).  J.  W.  POWELL.  Washington, 
Gov.  Print.  Office.  1896  and  1897.  Two  vols,  pp.  Ixi-f  1136; 
and  one  vol.  pp.  cxxi+366. 

Cong-res  international  d*  Anthropologie  criminelle  :  Comptes 
Rendus  de  la  IV  Session  (Geneve,  1896}.  Geneve,  George  & 
Co.  1897.  Pp.  xxix+396. 


NOTES.  567 

La  Structure  du  Protoplasma  et  les  Theories  sur  PHeredite  et  les 
grands  Problems  de  la  Biologic  generale.  YVES  DELAGE. 
Paris,  Reinwald  &  Cie.  1895.  Pp.  xiv  +  8;8.  Fr.  24. 

L'Annee  Biologique:  Comptes  Rendues  annuels  des  travaux  de 
Biologie  generale  (Premiere  Annee,  1895) .  YVES  DELAGE. 
Paris,  Reinwald  &  Cie.  1897.  ^P-  xlv+732- 

Collezionismo  e  impulsi  collezionistici.  S.  DE  SANCTIS.  Roma, 
Tip.  Innocenzo  Ortero.  1897.  Pp.  30. 

Sulla  dignita  morfologica  dei  segni  detti  4  Degenerativi.'  V. 
GiUFFRiDA-RuGGERi.  Roma,  Loescher  &  Co.  1897.  Pp.  117. 

Appearance  and  Reality.  F.  H.  BRADLEY.  Second  edition  (re- 
vised), with  an  Appendix.  London,  Sonnenschein ;  New  York, 
Macmillans.  1897.  Pp.  xxiv+628.  $2.75. 


NOTES. 

IT  is  with  regret  that  we  record  the  death  of  Professor  W.  Preyer, 
the  distinguished  psychologist  and  physiologist,  at  Wiesbaden,  on  July 
1 5th;  and  also  that  of  Daniel  Greenleaf  Thompson,  author  of  4  A  Sys- 
tem of  Psychology,'  etc.,  in  New  York,  on  June  loth. 

MR.  MUIR,  now  of  Halifax  University,  has  been  appointed  to  the 
chair  of  psychology,  and  Miss  Ethel  Muir,  Ph.  D.  (Cornell),  assist- 
ant in  philosophy  in  Mount  Holyoke  College. 

IT  is  expected  that  the  laboratory  for  Experimental  Psychology  in 
University  College.  London,  will  be  opened  in  October  under  the  di- 
rection of  Dr.  W.  H.  R.  Rivers,  of  Cambridge. 

A  UNIVERSITY  Lectureship  in  Experimental  Psychology  has  now 
been  voted  by  the  Senate  of  Cambridge  University,  England. 

MR.  C.  L.  HERRICK,  lately  professor  of  biology  at  Denison  Uni- 
versity, has  been  elected  President  of  the  Territorial  University  at 
Albuquerque,  New  Mexico. 

MR.  H.  P.  HYLAN  has  been  appointed  instructor  in  psychology  in 
the  University  of  Illinois. 

DR.  A.  R.  HILL  has  been  appointed  professor  of  psychology  and 
ethics  in  the  University  of  Nebraska,  and  Dr.  E.  L.  Hinman  has  been 
promoted  to  an  adjunct  professorship  of  philosophy  in  the  same  Uni- 
versity. 

F.  D.  SHERMAN,  Ph.D.  (Leipzig),  has  been  given  the  position  in 
psychology  and  pedagogy  in  the  Oshkosh  (Wis.)  Normal  School  va- 
cant by^the  removal  of  Dr.  Hill  to  the  University  of  Nebraska. 


568  JVOTES. 

DR.  SIDNEY  E.  MEZES  has  ^een  promoted  from  adjunct  to  asso- 
ciate professor  of  philosophy  at  the  University  of  Texas. 

A  Rivista  quindicinale  di  Psicologia,  Psichiatria,  Neuropa- 
tologia  has  been  inaugurated  under  the  *  Direction '  of  Professor  E. 
Sciamanna  and  Professor  G.  Sergi,  with  a  board  of  editors  of  whom 
Dr.  Santo  De  Sanctis  is  editor-in-chief,  Via  Penitenzieri,  13,  Rome. 

AN  American  Journal  of  Physiology  will  be  published  after  the 
first  of  January  next  under  the  auspices  of  the  American  Physiolog- 
ical Society.  And  a  semi-monthly  organ  of  Zoologie,  Botanique, 
Physiologic  et  Psychologic,  called  L?  Inter  mediaire  des  Biologistes, 
is  to  be  issued  by  Schleicher  Freres,  Paris,  with  M.  Alf.  Binet  as  di- 
rector-in-chief. 

NEW  volumes  in  the  Contemporary  Science  Series,  edited  by  Mr. 
Havelock  Ellis  and  published  in  England  by  Walter  Scott  and  in 
America  by  Charles  Scribner's  Sons,  will  include  '  The  New  Psy- 
chology,' by  Dr.  E.  W.  Scripture ;  *  Psychology  of  the  Emotions,'  by 
Professor  Th.  Ribot;  and  'Hallucinations  and  Illusions,' by  Mr.  E. 
Parrish. 


VOL.  IV.     No.  6.  NOVEMBER,  1897. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  REVIEW. 


STUDIES    FROM   THE    PRINCETON    PSYCHOLOGI- 
CAL   LABORATORY,   VI-VII. 

VI.  THE  REACTION  TIME  OF  COUNTING. 

BY   PROFESSOR   H.    C.   WARREN. 

Princeton    University. 

I.    INTRODUCTION. 

The  problem  underlying  this  study  was  the  question  as  to 
how  we  determine  the  number  of  things  in  a  group.  The  men- 
tal process  concerned  in  this  determination  is  evidently  not  the 
same  as  the  function  technically  known  to  experimental  psychol- 
ogists as  discrimination.  The  latter  consists  in  distinguishing 
between  two  or  more  different  things ;  an  object  is  ascertained, 
by  means  of  certain  marks  or  characteristics,  to  be  the  thing 
sought  for  and  not  something  else ;  or  the  absence  of  these  char- 
acteristics is  noted  and  it  is  thus  known  not  to  be  the  thing 
sought  for.  It  is  also  a  mental  process  distinct  from  recogni- 
tion ;  we  speak  (technically)  of  recognizing  an  object  or  ob- 
jects when  we  recall  their  former  presence  in  consciousness  by 
means  of  certain  marks  and  are  thereby  able  to  class  them  or 
give  them  a  name.  The  knowledge  of  the  number  of  things  in 
a  group,  on  the  other  hand,  is  independent  of  marks  or  differ- 
ences. Number  depends  solely  on  the  distinctness  or  separate- 
ness  of  the  objects  ;  it  has  nothing  to  do  with  their  complexion. 
The  word  discrimination  might  readily  be  applied  to  the  num- 
bering process,  and  so  might  the  word  recognition ;  but  if  this 
were  done  it  could  only  be  through  a  change  from  their  techni- 


H.    C.    WARREN. 

cal  connotation ;  «  numbering '  is  very  different  from  the  pro- 
cesses to  which  these  two  words  are  applied  by  experimenta- 
lists ;  the  mark  of  'five-ness,'  if  we  may  use  such  a  term,  is 
simply  the  spatial  or  temporal  distinctness  of  the  objects  in  the 
group — any  or  all  of  the  objects  can  be  exchanged  for  any 
others,  however  different,  and  the  '  five-ness  'remains  unaltered ; 
this  does  not  hold  true  in  the  case  of  ordinary  recognition  or 
discrimination. 

It  is  not  necessary  here  to  enter  into  any  discussion  of  the 
origin  of  the  concepts  '  one,'  '  two,'  '  three,'  etc.  This  is 
an  entirely  separate  question,  which  has  already  received  con- 
siderable attention  from  psychologists  and  mathematicians.1 
In  the  present  study  we  were  concerned  solely  with  the  proper 
application  of  these  terms  to  given  groups  of  objects.  That  is, 
we  were  to  investigate  the  concrete  process  of  numbering, 
rather  than  the  process  of  acquiring  the  abstract  number 
concepts. 

Whatever  the  nature  of  this  numbering  process,  and  what- 
ever different  kinds  of  numbering  there  may  be,  it  is  proper 
enough  to  denote  the  function  by  the  term  counting,  as  we  shall 
do  throughout  this  paper.  But  we  must  distinguish  at  the  outset 
between  several  varieties  of  counting.  The  most  important  dis- 
tinction is  that  between  counting  proper  and  inferential  counting. 
In  the  former,  objects  are  added  up,  so  to  speak,  by  a  sort  of 
mental  *  one-two-three-ing ;'  in  the  latter,  some  clue  is  given 
by  the  form  of  the  group,  the  amount  of  space  it  occupies,  the 
amount  of  time  required  to  survey  it,  etc. ;  thus,  the  familiar 
quincunx  form  (:•:)  is  taken  in  as  a  whole — the  form  of  the 
figure  is  associated  with  the  number-name,  by  a  mass  of  former 
experiences,  as  firmly  as  is  the  symbol  *  5.'  The  present  study 
was  concerned  primarily  with  the  former  process ;  the  latter  is 
a  species  of  association  or  inference  (as  the  case  may  be), 
whose  investigation  involves  a  different  problem ;  indeed,  its 
chief  role  in  our  study  was  that  of  an  enemy  to  be  thwarted  at 
all  hazards. 

1  On  this  point  see  '  The  Number  Concept,'  by  L.  L.  Conant,  New  York, 
Macmillans,  1896,  and  '  The  Number  System  of  Algebra,'  by  H.  B.  Fine,  Bos- 
ton, Leach,  Shewell  &  Sanborn,  1897. 


PRINCETON  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.          571 

A  further  distinction  is  to  be  noted,  within  the  process  of 
counting  proper,  between  that  which  is  practically  instantane- 
ous and  that  which  involves  the  expenditure  of  time.  If  it  takes 
no  more  time  to  count  Three l  than  to  count  Two  or  One,  it  is 
evident  that  the  apprehension  of  each  separate  object  does  not 
involve  time  ;  if  the  reaction  time  of  these  numbers  be  practically 
the  same,  then  their  counting  proceeds  by  an  apprehension  of 
the  group  as  a  whole,  rather  than  by  successive  apprehension 
of  its  members.  Whereas,  if  the  reaction  time  of  Four  (say) 
is  longer,  the  increment  is  time  consumed  in  apprehending  the 
extra  unit.  We  may  call  these  two  processes  perceptive  and 
progressive  counting,  respectively ;  add  to  this  the  process  al- 
ready noted,  inferential  counting,  and  we  have  three  distinct 
methods  of  counting.  I  give  this  classification  here  without 
discussing  its  practical  bearing  (which  will  appear  later),  in 
order  to  make  clear  the  nature  of  the  problem  and  the  precau- 
tions which  had  to  be  taken  in  the  investigation  to  avoid  con- 
fusion between  the  various  distinct  processes. 

On  the  basis  of  this  division  two  problems  appeared  which 
it  was  the  object  of  this  study  to  investigate.  These  were  :  (i) 
What  is  the  largest  number  that  can  be  counted  by  a  single  act 
of  apprehension — on  the  one  hand,  without  expenditure  of  extra 
time  in  taking  in  each  additional  object ;  on  the  other,  without 
the  assistance  of  association  or  inference?  This  is  the  problem 
of  the  limit  of  perceptive  counting.  (2)  What  is  the  part  played 
by  association  and  inference  in  our  habitual  acts  of  counting? 

A  third  problem  might  have  been  added,  viz.,  as  to  the  law 
by  which  the  time  of  progressive  counting  increases  with  the  in- 
crease of  number — in  other  words,  the  rate  of  progressive  count- 
ing. This  last  inquiry  was  not  followed  up  on  account  of  its 
great  complexity :  it  would  have  required  a  large  amount  of 
time  to  carry  out  the  experiments,  and  the  problem  itself  pre- 
sented difficulties,  on  account  of  certain  disturbing  factors  enter- 
ing in,  e.  £*.,  the  eye  movements  necessary  to  take  in  any  exten- 
sive group  of  objects.  As  between  the  other  two  problems,  the 
present  investigation  was  more  particularly  concerned  with  the 
first. 

1  To  avoid  confusion  the  number-names  will  be  printed  with  a  capital. 


572  H.    C.    WARREN. 

II.    HISTORICAL. 

I  may  point  out,  first  of  all,  the  close  relation  that  exists 
between  this  problem  and  that  of  the  so-called  area  of  con- 
sciousness. The  area  of  consciousness  (Umfang  des  Bewusst- 
seins),  as  understood  by  the  Leipzig  investigators,  is  the  sum 
total  of  impressions  that  can  be  held  in  consciousness  at  one 
time.  The  classic  experiments  of  Dietze1  on  this  topic  aimed 
to  determine  this  sum  for  a  single  case  (the  simplest)  by  means 
of  groups  of  successive  sounds.  The  subject  was  forbidden  to 
count  the  sounds — he  was  to  determine  the  difference  between 
two  groups  after  both  had  been  given,  by  the  mere  fact  of  re- 
taining all  the  members  of  each  group  in  consciousness  at  once. 
The  groups  were  compared  as  equal,  greater  or  smaller,  the 
hypothesis  being  that  as  long  as  this  could  be  done  correctly  the 
subject  must  have  had  a  simultaneous  impression  of  each  entire 
group.  Dietze's  subjects  were  able  to  distinguish  differences 
correctly  up  to  Sixteen  when  the  sounds  were  uniform,  and  up 
to  as  many  as  Forty  when  each  group  was  divided  into  sub- 
groups of  Eight  by  rhythmic  accentuation.  The  highest  num- 
bers in  each  case  were  reached  only  when  the  rate  of  succes- 
sion of  the  sounds  was  most  favorable ;  thus  these  numbers,  if 
the  hypothesis  be  correct,  represent  the  very  maximum  area 
of  consciousness.  The  area  of  consciousness  in  the  case  of 
counting  is  a  somewhat  different  thing.  In  Dietze's  problem 
no  mental  act  was  involved  during  the  experiment  but  the  re- 
tention of  the  sounds  in  consciousness  as  distinct ;  in  counting 
an  active  effort  is  required  to  bring  the  units  together  under  the 
form  of  a  number-concept.  Still,  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  the 
two  problems  really  belong  to  the  same  category,  the  difference 
consisting  chiefly  in  the  presence  of  an  act  of  apperception  in 
counting,  while  Dietze's  experiments  involved  merely  percep- 
tion. My  subjects  were  not  able  to  gather  in  at  once  numbers 
nearly  so  large  as  Dietze's  could  hold  together ;  this  was  to 
be  expected  to  some  extent ;  but  the  wide  difference  between 
the  two  results,  which  will  appear  later,  leads  me  to  question 
whether  Dietze's  subjects  succeeded  altogether  in  avoiding  count- 
ing (i.  e.,  progressive  counting),  and  still  more  whether  they 

.  Stud.,  1885,  II.,  362  ff. 


PRINCETON  PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY.          573 

did  not  rely  somewhat  upon  the  length  of  time,  and  infer  the 
size  of  the  group  from  this — a  tendency  which  (in  another 
form)  I  found  exceedingly  difficult  to  prevent  among  my  own 
subjects.  In  view  of  the  importance  and  fundamental  character 
of  this  problem,  it  seems  strange  that  no  one  has  ever  under- 
taken to  repeat  Dietze's  experiments. 

Another  problem  somewhat  analogous  to  the  present  one  is 
the  number  of  objects,  letters,  etc.,  that  can  be  recognized  at 
the  same  time.  An  investigation  of  this  subject  was  made  by 
Cattell1  at  Leipzig,  in  connection  with  his  reaction  time  experi- 
ments, by  a  method  of  combined  simultaneous  and  successive 
exposure.  The  objects  were  passed  across  a  slit  in  a  screen, 
the  slit  being  varied  in  size  so  that  any  desired  number  of  the 
objects  could  be  seen  simultaneously.  He  found  that  three,  four  or 
five  letters  could  be  recognized  when  passing  at  once — the  maxi- 
mum differing  within  these  limits  for  different  subjects ;  this 
was  apart  from  the  grouping  of  the  letters  into  words,  which, 
of  course,  involves  association  and  is  a  very  different  process 
from  the  one  under  investigation. 

The  problem  of  counting  was  taken  up  by  Cattell  in  a 
later  investigation,2  where  he  places  it  under  the  head  of  area 
of  consciousness.  Cattail's  experiments  consisted  in  exposing 
to  view  simultaneously  and  for  a  very  short  period  (IO<T)  a 
number  of  lines  drawn  on  cardboard  ;  the  subject  was  required 
to  determine  the  number  of  lines  on  the  card ;  the  apparatus 
employed  was  a  falling  screen.  In  these  experiments  the 
method  of  right  and  wrong  cases  was  used.  The  largest  num- 
ber for  which  the  right  answers  exceeded  the  wrong  varied 
between  Five  and  Eleven,  according  to  the  subject.  The 
higher  numbers,  however,  were  only  correctly  counted  by 
those  who  had  made  many  trials ;  this  leads  to  the  suggestion 
that  the  subject  may  have  become  familiar  with  the  number  of 
lines  on  each  card  in  the  course  of  his  practice,  and  that  he 
may  have  afterwards  judged  the  number  from  the  width  of 
space  occupied  by  the  lines  on  the  card — an  inferential  process 
again.  On  this  account  Cattell's  results  seem  open  to  question, 

»Philos.  Stud.,  1885,  II.,  635  ff. 
*Philos.  Stud.,  1886,  III.,  I2i  ff. 


574  H.   C.    WARREN. 

and  it  was  important  that  they  be  repeated  with  such  changes 
in  method  as  would  avoid  this  possible  criticism.  This  was 
one  object  in  the  present  investigation. 

In  connection  with  these  experiments  Cattell  investigated 
the  number  of  figures,  letters  and  words,  recognizable  after  a 
very  brief  exposure.  The  same  apparatus  was  used.  The  re- 
sults are  as  follows  :  Figures,  3  to  6 ;  letters,  2  to  5  ;  words,  i 
to  4  ;  the  subjects  almost  without  exception  recognized  one  fig- 
ure more  than,  they  could  letters,  and  one  letter  more  than  they 
could  words.  This  agrees  with  his  previous  results,  noticed 
above,  by  another  method.  The  problem,  however,  is  differ- 
ent from  that  of  counting,  and  I  need  not  stop  to  discuss  the  re- 
sults in  detail. 

Numerous  other  investigations  have  been  made  on  the  recog- 
nition time  of  colors,  words,  etc.,  which  have  only  an  indirect 
bearing  on  the  present  problem  and  need  not  be  mentioned 
here. 

III.    PRELIMINARY    EXPERIMENTS  ;    HAND    REACTIONS. 

The  problem  of  counting  may  be  investigated,  as  we  have 
seen,  by  the  method  of  right  and  wrong  cases  ;  given  a  short  ex- 
posure (IO<T)  of  a  group  of  things,  how  large  a  group  can  be 
apprehended  in  that  time  so  that  the  number  is  known  ?  This 
treatment  of  the  problem  can  only  be  applied  to  simultaneous, 
or  perceptive  counting.  It  can  give  no  help  in  the  discussion 
of  successive,  or  progressive  counting,  and  but  little  in 
the  investigation  of  inferential  counting.  A  more  effective 
method  is  that  of  reaction  time.  The  subject  reacts  on  the 
number,  and  the  reaction  times  of  the  different  numbers  are 
compared.  This  avoids,  for  one  thing,  the  possibility  of 
counting  from  the  after  image.  The  exposure  need  not  be  so 
short — it  should  be  long  enough  to  ensure  the  taking  in  of 
every  member  of  the  group,  and  is  only  shortened  at  all  in  order 
to  stimulate  attention  to  immediate  activity.  In  the  present 
study  the  reaction  method  was  adopted  as  principal ;  but  the 
method  of  right  and  wrong  cases  served  as  check  upon  the 
results.  The  times  were  thrown  out  whenever  the  count  was 
wrong  ;  and  further,  if  the  wrong  answers  for  a  certain  num- 


PRINCETON  PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY.          575 

her  equalled  the  right,  the  determination  was  set  down  as  a 
guess  rather  than  a  count,  unless  the  right  reactions  were  per- 
ceptibly longer  than  the  wrong. 

Two  separate  investigations  were  made  by  the  writer,  both 
upon  visual  stimuli,  but  with  somewhat  different  apparatus. 
The  first  series,  carried  out  during  the  winter  of  1895-6,  de- 
veloped a  number  of  practical  defects,  which  were  remedied  in 
the  second  series,  made  in  the  winter  of  1896-7. 

In  the  earlier  series,  the  apparatus  consisted  of  a  large 
screen,  with  a  slit  6  cm.  wide  and  16  cm.  high,  behind  which 
swung  a  pendulum  with  a  small  screen  attached ;  when  the 
pendulum  was  up  (and  held  in  place  by  an  electro-magnet)  the 
small  screen  covered  the  slit  in  the  larger  one.  The  slit  was  on 
a  level  with  the  eyes  of  the  subject,  who  was  seated  at  a  dis- 
tance of  3  m.  Behind  the  slit  and  the  pendulum  was  fixed  a 
holder,  in  which  were  placed,  one  at  a  time,  the  cards  used  in 
the  experiment ;  this  holder  was  of  course  concealed  from  view 
by  the  small  screen  when  the  pendulum  was  raised.  The  ob- 
jects to  be  counted  consisted  of  small  white  squares,  of  5  mm.  ; 
these  were  pasted  in  a  vertical  line  at  distances  of  5  mm.  on  the 
cards,  which  were  black.  In  some  cases  the  distances  of  the 
spots  and  their  size  were  varied.  The  experimenter  sat  near 
the  apparatus  and  was  concealed  (as  well  as  the  chronoscope) 
from  the  subject  by  another  screen  ;  he  released  the  pendulum 
by  means  of  a  key.  A  contact  was  made  at  the  point  where  the 
white  spots  first  became  visible  to  the  subject,  and  the  latter 
thereupon  reacted  on  the  number  with  a  Morse  key,  at  the  same 
time  calling  out  the  number.  The  exposure  was  not  limited, 
the  pendulum  being  held  back  by  a  catch  so  that  the  spots  re- 
mained full  in  view  until  after  the  reaction.  By  watching  the 
(Hipp)  chronoscope  hands,  the  experimenter  could  tell  whether 
the  reaction  preceded  the  speech  ;  anticipatory  reactions  on  the 
mere  light  stimulus  were  thus  prevented. 

Four  subjects  took  part  in  these  experiments,  from  only  two 
of  whom,  however  (C  and  G),  were  any  large  series  obtained. 
A  third  (H)  was  unable  to  avoid  anticipations;  many  of  his 
results  had  to  be  discarded  on  this  account,  and  he  finally  aban- 
doned the  work.  The  writer,  who  was  the  fourth  subject  (W), 


576  H.    C.    WARREN. 

acted  as  experimenter  most  of  the  time,  in  order  that  the  other 
subjects  might  not  become  too  familiar  with  the  appearance  of 
the  cards.  The  experiments  were  conducted  in  the  daylight. 
On  ordinarily  bright  days  the  spots  were  easily  distinguishable 
by  the  subjects,  and  were  yet  close  enough  together  to  come 
within  the  range  of  clear  vision,  so  that  no  eye-movements  were 
necessary  to  distinguish  them. 

The  method  was  open  to  the  following  criticisms:  (i)  On 
cloudy  days  the  spots  were  less  easily  discernible  than  on  bright 
days  ;  it  was  impossible  to  measure  the  illumination  or  determine 
the  effect  of  its  variations  upon  the  reaction  time.  (2)  There 
was  found  to  be  a  tendency  on  the  part  of  the  subjects,  after  a 
certain  amount  of  practice,  to  judge  the  number  of  spots  by  the 
amount  of  space  they  covered  on  the  card,  z*.  e.,  the  length  of 
the  broken  white  line  which  they  formed.  (3)  While  it  was 
possible  for  the  experimenter  to  distinguish  anticipatory  light 
reactions,  .in  the  manner  above  mentioned,  slight  anticipations 
could  not  be  detected ;  furthermore,  (4) ,  the  attention  being 
divided  between  the  hand  and  the  voice,  the  reactions  themselves 
might  not  be  reliably  uniform.  While  this  last  objection  did 
not  appear  to  the  writer  to  be  borne  out  by  the  actual  results, 
it  was  obviated  in  the  second  series  by  the  use  of  a  mouth 
key  for  the  reactions ;  the  third  objection  was  met  by  this 
same  change.  The  second  objection  was  partly  met  in  the 
earlier  experiments  by  varying  the  size  of  the  spots  and  their 
distance  apart ;  but  the  conditions  of  the  apparatus  prevented 
this  from  being  available — or  at  least  effective — for  numbers 
greater  than  Five  ;  with  larger  numbers  there  was  no  room  in  the 
slit  for  greater  distances,  and  with  distances  less  than  the 
normal  the  spots  were  difficult  to  distinguish ;  if  larger  or 
smaller  spots  were  used,  the  new  cards  soon  came  to  be  recog- 
nized and  judged  as  well  as  the  original.  In  spite  of  the 
defects  of  this  method,  the  results  obtained  are  of  service  to 
compare  with  the  later  ones.  They  are  also  of  value  in  them- 
selves in  several  particulars. 

There  were  in  all  40  sittings  in  this  series,  of  which  19 
were  made  by  C  and  9  by  G ;  in  each  case  two  sittings  were 
set  apart  for  preliminary  practice  in  simple  reaction ;  the 


PRINCETON  PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY. 


577 


results  of  these  are  not  included  in  the  tables.  At  the  begin- 
ning of  each  regular  sitting,  before  the  counting  reactions  were 
begun,  a  series  of  10  sensory  reactions  was  taken  on  a  card 
with  four  spots ;  a  motor  series  was  sometimes  taken  also. 
The  subject  C  was  of  a  distinctly  sensory  type,  as  these  results 
show  (Table  I.)  and  as  was  proved  by  repeated  tests  elsewhere. 

TABLE  I. — SIMPLE  REACTIONS  ;  VISUAL,  HAND,  IN  LIGHT. 


S 

MV 

No. 

SER. 

M'R 

MV 

No. 

SER. 

c 

291.9 

52-9 

94 

10 

324-3 

58.4 

9i 

9 

G 

351-9 

74-4 

60 

6 

285.9 

69.7 

39 

4 

H 

244-3 

33- 

40 

4 

222.2 

28.3 

3° 

3 

W 

235-6 

58.9 

43 

4 

179-3 

40.4 

21 

2 

C  st. 

192.1 

34-8 

50 

3 

247.8 

58.6 

30 

2 

C  st.  at. 

185.9 

26.9 

10 

i 





— 

— 

S  =  sensory;  M'r  =  motor;  MV  =  mean  variation;  No.  =  number  of  re- 
actions ;  Ser.  =  series  of  reactions ;  st.  =  reaction  on  strip  of  white  paper ;  at. 
=  reaction  with  great  attention.  The  times  are  given  in  a  =  .001  sec. 


G  and  W  were  of  the  ordinary  motor  type ;  H  was  slightly 
motor.  In  Table  I.,  C's  first  few  series  are  omitted,  as  it  was 
found  that  he  frequently  anticipated  on  account  of  a  slight 
sound  made  by  the  pendulum  in  starting ;  this  defect  was 
remedied  in  all  the  later  sittings.  To  determine  the  relation 
between  these  results  and  ordinary  light  reactions,  four  series 
were  taken  with  a  long  white  strip  as  stimulus  in  place  of  the 
spots  ;  the  results  are  given  in  the  last  two  lines  of  the  table ; 
in  one  of  these  series  (st.  at.)  the  subject  concentrated  his 
attention  to  the  utmost. 

The  reaction  times  on  numbers  are  given  in  Table  II.,  the 
sensory  time  for  each  subject  being  given  first  for  the  sake  of 
comparison.  The  counting  time  for  One  is  seen  to  be  in  every 
case  over  IOO<T  longer  than  the  sensory  time.  As  regards  the 
relation  between  the  times  for  the  different  numbers,  I  will 
delay  comment  until  the  later  experiments  have  been  presented. 


578 


H.    C.    WARREN. 


6 
fc 

ro    ON  \O     ON    *o  CO     co    M     N 

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. 

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§ 

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IO      HH        *O      O        *TJ      CO       O 

M      •-  ^      M         M         HH         T^- 

C 

o 

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*-> 

u 

* 

COON1-*      M      »H      cOTt*fOCO 

E 

G 
at 

V 

H 
K 

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fc 

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Tt"      M        CO      M        M 

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B 

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o 

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M          ^~       Tf       -«t-    \O       CO          M 
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"*     1—  1     h-  1              K>     K^     |_| 
^     > 

PRINCETON  PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY.          579 

(Table  III.)  Table  III.  shows  the  number  and  percentage  of 
errors  to  the  entire  number  of  reactions ;  in  no  case  (except 
with  H)  was  the  number  of  errors  so  great  as  to  suggest  that 
any  other  process  but  actual  counting  was  used. 

TABLE  III. — ERRORS  IN  COUNTING  ;  LONG  EXPOSURE. 


C(i9) 

G(9) 

H(6) 

W(6) 

No. 

E 

%E 

No. 

E 

%E 

No. 

E 

%E 

No. 

E 

I 

70 

o 

oo. 

30 

o 

00. 

19 

o 

oo. 

9 

0 

II 

77 

o 

oo. 

38 

o 

oo. 

30 

o 

oo. 

6 

o 

III 

94 

5 

05.3 

33 

o 

oo. 

23 

0 

00. 

9 

o 

IV 

Si 

7 

08.6 

4i 

o 

00. 

22 

6 

27.2 

7 

2 

V 

65 

12 

18.8 

36 

I 

02.8 

7 

2 

28.6 

9 

I 

VI 

49 

2 

04.1 

22 

2 

09. 

7 

3 

42.8 

3 

O 

VII 

29 

3 

10.3 

II 

3 

27.2 

— 

— 



i 

o 

VIII 

7 

2 

28.6 

4 

o 

oo. 

— 

— 



2 

o 

The  numbers  in  brackets  represent  the  series  taken. 
IV.    EXPERIMENTS    IN    COUNTING,    WITH  MOUTH  REACTION. 

In  the  second  series  artificial  illumination  was  used.  A 
lamp  giving  practically  uniform  light  was  placed  in  a  large 
enclosed  space,  within  which  the  pendulum  swung  ;  the  room 
was  darkened.  In  the  front  side  of  the  enclosure  was  an 
opening  12  cm.  square,  but  a  pyramidal  tube  extending 
out  35  cm.  reduced  the  aperture  through  which  the  light 
could  pass  to  6  cm.  square,  and  prevented  its  diffusion. 
Attached  to  the  pendulum  was  a  screen  large  enough  to  cover 
the  aperture  throughout  the  entire  pendulum-swing ;  in  this 
screen  was  a  slit  25  mm.  wide.  The  card  holder  was 
placed  in  front  of  the  opening  at  a  distance  of  1.5  m.,  and  was 
illuminated  during  13 I<T  when  the  pendulum  swung;  as  the 
pendulum  was  held  on  the  farther  side  by  a  catch  there  was 
but  one  illumination  of  the  card  before  each  reaction.  The 
subject  sat  near  the  enclosure,  and  at  a  distance  of  2  m.  from 
the  card  ;  the  latter  was  turned  at  such  an  angle  (ca.  10°)  as 
to  prevent  any  sheen  disturbance. 


580  H.    C.    WARREN. 

The  cards  used  in  these  experiments  were  16.5  cm.  square; 
the  spots  were  (in  every  case)  circles  of  14  mm.  diameter,  and 
were  placed  (in  the  main  series)  at  uniform  distances  along  the 
circumference  of  an  imaginary  circle,  so  that  the  center  of  every 
spot  was  exactly  6  cm.  from  the  center  of  the  card.  As  the 
spots  were  not  in  line,  and  the  distances  between  them  varied 
in  different  cards,  and  as  each  card  could  be  used  in  four  dif- 
ferent positions,  the  tendency  to  use  any  *  inferential '  aid  in  de- 
termining the  number  was  believed  to  be  avoided ;  the  results 
and  the  testimony  of  the  subjects  themselves  confirmed,  this. 
The  spots  were  18,  22  and  26  mm.  apart,  from  edge  to  edge, 
in  different  cards ;  the  same  card  was  rarely  used  twice  in  suc- 
cession, and  every  card  was  turned  a  quarter  or  half  way  around 
before  using  again ;  the  end  spots  in  the  row  were  never  on  the 
vertical  or  horizontal  diameters  of  the  circle ;  these  precautions 
effectually  prevented  inferential  counting.  To  enable  the  sub- 
ject to  fixate  the  card  before  the  experiment,  a  very  dim  gas 
flame  was  usually  placed  near  and  behind  it ;  with  one  subject 
the  slight  illumination  of  the  room  was  sufficient  to  show  the 
outline  of  the  card,  without  giving  any  indications  as  to  the 
spots.  The  Hipp  chronoscope  was  used  in  these  experiments 
also,  but  was  placed  in  another  room,  thus  avoiding  possible 
distraction  from  the  sound.  The  writer,  who  generally  at- 
tended to  the  cards  and  the  pendulum,  gave  a  preliminary  signal, 
by  shouting  :  «  Ready ; '  the  subject  then  fixed  his  eyes  on  the 
card,  and  the  Hipp  was  started  by  the  person  in  charge.  The 
subject  reacted  by  means  of  a  mouth  key ;  l  in  the  counting  re- 
actions he  simply  spoke  the  name  of  the  number  into  the  funnel 
of  the  key.  There  was  thus  no  danger  of  anticipation,  and  no 
division  of  the  attention,  such  as  occurred  when  the  hand  key 
was  used. 

At  the  beginning  of  every  sitting  a  series  of  from  10  to  20 
sensory  reactions  was  taken ;  the  remainder  of  the  hour  was  oc- 
cupied with  the  counting  reactions.  The  principal  subjects 
were  two  in  number,  of  whom  one,  C,  had  taken  part  in  the 

1  The  mouth  key  used  in  these  experiments  will  be  described  and  figured  in 
a  study  by  Professor  Baldwin,  entitled  '  Type  Variations  in  Reaction  Times,' 
which  will  shortly  appear  in  this  REVIEW. 


PRINCETON  PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY. 


58l 


former  series  and  in  many  other  reaction  experiments.  The 
other,  T,  had  never  before  reacted  on  visual  stimuli.  The 
writer  acted  as  subject  in  a  number  of  sittings,  and  his  results 
are  included  in  the  tables  also ;  some  reactions  were  made  by  a 
fourth  subject,  Ta,  who  was  called  away,  however,  before  the 
experiments  had  advanced  far;  his  results  are  not  included.1 
There  were  40  sittings  in  all,  of  which  18  were  given  by  T 
and  12  by  C;  TO  of  each  included  counting  reactions  with  the 
mouth  key.  In  the  first  six  sittings  with  T,  the  hand  key  was 
used ;  the  counting  reactions  made  in  this  way  are  not  included 
in  the  tables,  but  the  sensory  reactions  are  given  in  Table  IV., 


TABLE  IV. — COMPARISON  OF  MOUTH  AND  HAND  REACTIONS. 


S 

MV 

No. 

SER. 

M'R 

MV 

No. 

SER. 

m.  d. 

298.3 

44-7 

130 

10 

476.8 

48-7 

20 

i 

c 

h.  1. 

291.9 

52-9 

94 

10 

324-3 

58-4 

9^ 

9 

st.  h.  1. 

192.1 

34-8 

50 

3 

247.8 

58.6 

3<> 

2 

w 

m.  d. 

378. 

55-4 

81 

5 

288.1 

22.8 

3° 

2 

h.  1. 

235-6 

58.9 

43 

4 

J79-3 

40.4 

21 

2 

T 

m.  d. 

362.8 

48-3 

153 

10 

343-J 

29.7 

18 

I 

h.  d. 

260. 

23.2 

75 

4 

250.2 

31-4 

59 

3 

All  are    simple    visual   reactions ;  m  =  mouth,  h  =  hand  reaction  ;  d  =  in 
dark  ;  1  =  in  light ;  st  =  reaction  on  bright  stimulus ;  cf .  Table  I. 

for  the  sake  of  comparison ;  the  simple  reactions  of  C  and  W 
in  the  earlier  series  are  also  set  down  in  this  table  along  with 
their  speech-key  reactions.  Of  the  reactions  given  in  Table 
IV.,  only  T's  included  mouth  and  hand  reactions  under  uni- 
form conditions  of  illumination ;  here  the  difference  is  close  to 
ioo<r,  for  both  sensory  and  motor,  in  favor  of  the  hand.  In  the 
cases  of  C  and  W,  the  hand  reactions  (as  was  observed  above) 
include  series  in  which  the  light  stimulus  differed  greatly ; 

'The  writer  wishes  to  express  his  thanks  to  all  who  took  part  in  the  experi- 
ments ;  as  well  as  to  Professor  Baldwin,  for  many  valuable  suggestions  on  both 
the  practical  and  the  theoretical  sides  of  this  investigation. 


582 


H.    C.    WARREN. 


hence  the    wide  variation  in   the  results — for   C  a   difference 
of  152.5*7  in  the  motor  and  of  only  6.4(7  in  the  sensory. 

In  Table  V.  the  simple  reactions  with   the  mouth   key  are 
brought  together ;  as  before,  the  first  two  (practice)  series   of 

TABLE  V. — SIMPLE  REACTIONS  ;  VISUAL,  MOUTH,  IN  DARK. 


s 

MV 

No. 

SER. 

M'R 

MV 

No. 

SER. 

T 

362.8 

48-3 

153 

10 

343-1 

29.7 

18 

i 

C 

298.3 

44-7 

130 

10 

476.8 

48.7 

20 

i 

W 

378.0 

55-4 

81 

5 

288.1 

22.8 

30 

2 

Symbols  same  as  in  Table  I. 

each  subject  are  omitted.  T  appears  to  be  of  a  slightly  motor 
type,  while  the  earlier  results  with  C  and  W  are  confirmed — 
they  belong  to  distinctly  sensory  and  motor  types,  respectively. 
The  two  following  tables  give  the  counting  reactions.  In 
Table  VI.  the  mean  reaction  time  (M)  and  mean  variation 

TABLE  VI. — COUNTING  REACTIONS  ;  MOUTH  IN  DARK. 


T 

C 

W 

M 

MV 

No. 

M 

MV 

No. 

M 

MV 

No. 

S 

362.8 

48-3 

153 

298.3 

44-7 

130 

37-8 

55-4 

81 

I 

567-1 

83.8 

23 

553-i 

62.6 

19 

573-3 

75- 

6 

II 

621.1 

93-8 

21 

545-5 

45-9 

23 

597- 

(132.0) 

3 

III 

655. 

86.8 

18 

683.7 

125.4 

19 

572.5 

68.7 

9 

IV 

683.8 

123.1 

42 

740.4 

91.2 

35 

588.8 

(107.4) 

5 

V 

812.3 

155-8 

34 

1090.1 

3l6-3 

27 

655.7 

141.7 

8 

VI 

938.1 

154.6 

17 

1411.2 

3I3-2 

i? 

675- 

53-6 

6 

VII 

1265. 

(26) 

3 

I352-3 

362.3 

6 

786.8 

(168.2) 

5 

VIII 

o 

(2828) 

i 

(689.3) 

3 

Zero 

939- 

(292) 

3 

831-5 

(136-5) 

4 

7I7-3 



3 

Infinity 

1007.7 

434- 

16 

1128. 

i 

671.7 

3 

Symbols  as  in  Table  II. ;  Zero  =  reaction  on  blank  card ;   Infinity  =  reac- 
tion on  number  too  great  to  count. 


PRINCETON  PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY. 


583 


(MV)  are  given  for  numbers  from  One  up  to  Seven.  The 
number  of  (successful)  reactions  for  each  number  (No.)  ap- 
pears in  a  separate  column.  For  the  sake  of  comparison  the 
corresponding  data  of  the  sensory  reactions  (S)  are  added 
also.  As  the  mean  variation  is  considerable,  the  reactions  can 
be  better  compared  by  means  of  the  upper  and  lower  limits  of 
their  variation  ;  these  are  given  in  Table  VII.,  together  with  the 

TABLE  VII. — LIMITS  OF  MEAN  VARIATION. 


T 

C 

W 

Lower. 

Upper. 

Lower. 

Upper. 

Lower. 

Upper. 

S 

3H-5 

411.1 

253-6 

343- 

322.6 

433-4 

I 

483.3 

650.9 

490-5 

6r5-7 

498.3 

648.3 

II 

5*7-3 

714.9 

499-6 

591-4 

465- 

729. 

III 

568.2 

741.8 

558.3 

809.1 

503-8 

641.2 

IV 

560.7 

806.9 

649.2 

831.6 

481.4 

696.2 

V 

656.5 

968.1 

773-8 

1406.4 

5H- 

797-4 

VI 

783-5 

1092.7 

1098. 

1724.4 

621.4 

728.6 

VII 

1239. 

1291. 

990. 

1714.6 

618.2 

955- 

limits  of  the  sensory  reactions.  From  this  table  it  appears  that 
the  counting  reactions,  even  for  One  and  Two,  are  very  much 
longer  than  the  simple  reactions,  while  the  difference  be- 
tween the  times  for  successive  numbers  in  every  case  (except 
T  for  Seven)  falls  within  the  limits  of  mean  variation  of  the 
next.  These  results  may  be  expressed  under  the  two  following 
propositions:  (i)  The  shortest  counting  times  are  longer 
than  the  shortest  sensory  reactions  by  about  2OO<r;  and  (2) 
For  successive  numbers  the  counting  time  is  approximately 
the  same.  Several  remarks  should  be  made  on  each  of  these 
statements. 

As  to  the  first :  the  question  of  the  relation  between  count- 
ing and  recognition  times  comes  up  at  once.  All  the  published 
experiments  on  recognition  time  having  been  made  with  the 
hand  key,  which  gives  decidedly  shorter  times  than  the  mouth 
key  here  used  (cf.  Table  IV.),  it  is  impossible  to  compare  them 


584  H.    C.    WARREN. 

directly  with  these  results.  They  do  admit  of  comparison,  how- 
ever, with  our  earlier  series.  Comparing  the  latter  with  Titch- 
ener's  results  reported  in  the  Philosophische  Studien1,  we  find 
the  following :  Titchener  gives  the  sensory  time  on  light 
stimulus,  for  three  subjects,  as  260,  266  and  2790-;  and  the 
reaction  time  on  the  recognition  of  a  word  as  319. 3,  317  and 
302. 8<r  for  the  same  subjects.  My  hand  reaction  experiments 
give  the  sensory  times  of  C,  G,  H  and  W,  respectively,  as 
291.9,  351.9,  244.3  and  235.6^7  (cf.,  Table  II.);  and  their 
counting  reactions  on  One  as  407.4,  523.6,  429.4  and  497.2*7. 
The  counting  time  is  thus  seen  to  be  somewhat  longer  than  the 
recognition  time,  if  different  subjects  can  be  compared ;  as  it 
happens,  the  writer  (W)  was  the  first-named  subject  in  Titch- 
ener's  experiments,  which  furnishes  one  case  of  direct  com- 
parison. 

Returning  to  our  second  proposition,  the  following  inter- 
pretation may  be  given :  taking  the  mean  time  of  counting 
One  for  standard,  the  subject  is  usually  able  to  count  Two,  often 
Three,  and  occasionally  Four  and  Five  in  the  same  time,  i.  e., 
by  the  same  kind  of  simple  mental  act.  With  Four  or  more 
this  seems  to  be  due  to  a  special  effort  of  the  attention,  or  (occa- 
sionally) to  an  expectation  of  that  particular  number ;  in  the 
earlier  series  there  was  some  assistance  from  the  judgment  (in- 
ference), but  this  was  carefully  guarded  against  in  the  present 
series.  In  general,  then,  it  seems  to  require  a  longer  time,  and 
hence  a  more  complex  mental  act^  to  count  numbers  greater  than 
Three.  For  Six  and  Seven  the  difference  is  so  marked  as  nearly 
to  double  the  length  of  the  reaction  time.  With  these  higher 
numbers,  too,  other  elements  come  in,  as  will  be  seen  when  we 
examine  Tables  VIII.  and  X.,  so  that  the  results  represent 
something  very  different  from  simple  perceptive  counting. 

In  Table  VIII.  are  shown  the  errors  (E)  committed  in  counting 
each  number,  and  the  percentage  of  errors  ( %  E)  to  total  reac- 
tions.2 In  the  two  last  columns  for  each  subject  the  errors  are  clas- 

'VIIL,  138-144. 

2  A  few  reactions  are  included  in  this  table,  from  which,  through  the  fault 
of  the  apparatus  or  its  operators,  no  reaction  times  were  obtained,  but  which 
are  available  for  the  present  purpose ;  this  will  explain  the  discrepancy  between 
the  figures  given  in  Tables  VI.  and  VIII. 


PRINCETON  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.          585 

TABLE  VIII. — ERRORS  IN  COUNTING.  EXPOSURE  OF  131*. 


T 

C 

W 

No. 

E 

%E 

+(«>) 

*— 

No 

E 

%E 

+  (») 

— 

No. 

E 

%E 

+(») 

I 

3* 

0 

00. 

__ 



30 

o 

oo. 

__ 

^_ 

8 

o 

oo 

_  ,  _ 



II 

34 

o 

oo. 

— 

— 

3° 

i 

°3-4 

i 

O 

8 

o 

oo 

— 

— 

HI 

35 

2 

05-7 

I 

i 

30 

S 

16.7 

5 

o 

12 

i 

08.3 

o 

i 

IV 

53 

7 

12.  1 

6 

i 

50 

4 

08. 

4 

o 

9 

0 

00 

o 

o 

V 

S3 

12 

22.6 

S(i) 

6 

50 

»7 

34- 

8 

9 

19 

4 

21. 

1(0 

2 

VI 

Si 

33 

64.7 

17(9) 

7 

5° 

3° 

60. 

10(1) 

»9 

16 

6 

37-5 

o 

6 

VII 

21 

15 

71.4 

3(") 

i 

10 

4 

40. 

2 

2 

«4 

4 

28.5 

3 

i 

VIII 

IO 

10 

100 

i(9) 

o 

5 

4 

80. 

0 

4 

24 

18 

75- 

(6) 

13 

sified  according  as  the  answers  given  were  too  great  (+)  or  too 
small  (  — )  ;  in  some  cases,  it  will  be  noticed,  the  subject  re- 
acted on  discovering  that  the  number  was  too  great  to  count 
(  oo)  ;  these  are  given  in  brackets  in  the  -plus  column.  It  will 
be  seen  that  the  percentage  of  errors  increased  steadily  (with 
slight  exceptions)  in  the  two  principal  subjects  from  Three  up- 
wards, until  at  Eight  it  reached  practically  100.  This  explains  why 
no  reaction  times  are  given  for  Eight  in  Table  VI.1  No  cards 
with  more  than  eight  spots  were  used,  owing  to  this  fact,  but  the 
subjects  did  not  know  of  this  till  near  the  end  of  the  series ;  it 
will  be  noticed  that  T  gave  one  Nine-reaction  and  nine  '  In- 
finity '-reactions  on  Eight. 

The  conclusion  to  be  drawn  at  once  from  a  comparison  of 
these  tables  is  that  the  upper  limit  of  counting  without  infer- 
ence and  without  eye-movements  is  Seven  or  less.  In  T's  case 
the  number  of  wrong  answers  begins  to  exceed  the  right  at  Six  : 
In  C's  case  it  exceeds  it  at  Six  but  not  at  Seven  (where  only 
ten  trials  were  made).  Moreover,  if  we  take  into  account  the 
'doubtful  cases,'  'guesses'  and  'judgments  or  inferences' 
(cf.  Table  X.),  the  limit  for  progressive  counting  -without  eye- 
movement  falls  in  both  cases  to  Five. 

The  two  subjects  differed  somewhat  in  their  method  of  pro- 
cedure, as  shown  by  the  differences  in  the  number  of  errors, 

1  The  bracketed  numbers  given  there  were  of  '  doubtful '  reactions ;  cf . 
Table  X. 


586  H.    C.    WARREN. 

guesses,  inferences  and  '  Infinity  '-reactions,1  but  their  results 
agree  substantially  in  the  limits  for  the  various  kinds  of  count- 
ing. Although  these  results  cannot  be  generalized  without 
corroboration  from  other  subjects,  they  are  of  great  value  as 
coming  from  subjects  of  two  distinct  mental  types,  the  sen- 
sory and  the  motor.  The  distinctions  which  the  subjects  made 
between  the  different  counting  processes,  simple  perception 
of  number,  inference  or  judgment,  guessing  and  progres- 
sive counting  agreed  substantially  also ;  these  distinctions  will 
be  explained  and  discussed  later,  in  connection  with  the  final 
series  of  experiments  on  inferential  counting.  The  reactions 
of  W  are  too  few  in  number  to  be  of  much  service ;  they  pre- 
sent a  substantial  agreement  with  the  others  for  the  lower  num- 
bers ;  for  the  higher  numbers  the  times  are  shorter  and  the  pro- 
portion of  errors  far  smaller ;  this  is  probably  due  to  the  writer 
being  familiar  with  the  individual  cards  from  having  made  them 
and  handled  them  in  most  of  the  experiments. 

Before  leaving  the  present  question  we  may  compare  briefly 
the  results  of  the  mouth-key  experiments  with  the  hand-key 
experiments  of  the  former  series.  It  appears  that  the  hand  re- 
actions are  generally  shorter ;  in  the  case  of  C,  who  acted  as 
subject  in  both  series,  the  difference  is  very  uniform  except  for 
the  higher  numbers.  In  the  hand  reactions,  it  will  be  remem- 
bered, the  number  remained  in  view  until  after  the  subject  had 
reacted ;  there  was  thus  an  opportunity  for  '  progressive  count- 
ing,' which  was  taken  advantage  of ;  so  that  instead  of  guess- 
ing or  inferring  the  number  (as  was  sometimes  necessary  in  the 
mouth  reactions),  the  subject  would  take  more  time  and  '  count 
up  '  the  spots.  The  smaller  percentage  of  errors  and  the  longer 
time  required  to  count  larger  numbers,  are  indications  of  this 
tendency. 

V.    EXPERIMENTS    ON    INFERENTIAL    COUNTING. 

When  the  main  series  with  the  mouth  key  were  practically 
completed,  the  subjects  T  and  C  were  tested  with  a  set  of  geo- 
metrical figures ;  for  example,  three  spots  in  the  form  of  a 
triangle,  four  in  the  form  of  a  square,  five  in  a  quincunx,  etc. 

1  See  Table  X. ;  cf.  also  Table  IX.,  especially  the  results  for  Eight. 


PRINCETON  PS  YC/IOLOGICA  L  LABOR  A  TOR  Y. 


587 


Of  the  forms  used,  some  were  regular  and  others  irregular. 
The  apparatus  and  general  procedure  were  the  same  as  in  the 
main  series.  As  the  figures  had  to  be  frequently  changed  to 
avoid  mere  recognition  reaction,  there  were  a  great  many  dif- 
ferent ones  used,  and  it  is  impracticable  to  tabulate  them  all. 
A  number  of  typical  examples  are  given,  however,  in  Table 
IX.,  showing  the  effects  of  various  arrangements.  The  num- 

TABLE  IX. — COUNTING  BY  INFERENCE. 


1 

r 

C 

FIGURES. 

N 

M 

N' 

E 

N 

M 

N' 

E 

Ill    .'. 

2 

784. 

2 

0 

3 

595-3 

4 

o 

v   :• 

4 

836.2 

8 

0 

4 

810. 

4 

o 

vi    :: 

6 

1181.8 

I 

6 

1546.6 

7 

i 

VII       •: 

8 

1051.1 

9 

0 

9 

1452.2 

9 

0 

VIII        ;  : 

0 



4 

4 

3 

3234-3 

3 

o 

IX    :   : 

2 

1108.5 

2 

o 

3 

1603. 

3 

o 

xii    :•  \  •: 

•  • 

2 

1631-5 

2 

0 

i 

2108. 

i 

0 

ber  of  successful  reactions  and  mean  reaction  times  are  given 
in  the  columns  headed  N  and  M.  The  columns  headed  N'  and 
E  represent  the  whole  number  of  attempted  reactions  and  errors, 
respectively,  as  in  Table  VIII.  It  was  found  that  for  the  higher 
numbers  a  regular  arrangement  facilitated  the  count,  especially 
where  the  figure  was  compact ;  in  the  case  of  a  straight  line 
and  a  polygon  of  six  sides  or  more  the  regularity  rather  impeded 
it ;  the  count  was  still  more  impeded  where  the  arrangement 
was  irregular. 

The  fact  that  numbers  as  high  as  Twelve  were  correctly 
counted  after  so  short  an  exposure  shows  at  once  that  the  pro- 
cess employed  was  different  from  that  employed  in  the  regular 
experiments.  This  is  confirmed  by  the  after-judgments  of  the 
subjects,  who  described  the  procedure  as  *  inference,'  *  count- 
ing,' and  '  guessing.'  When  these  terms  were  explained  they 
were  found  to  indicate  radically  different  processes.  Inference 
was  the  term  used  when  the  number  was  judged  from  the  shape, 


588 


H.    C.    WARREN. 


etc.,  or  inferred  from  the  memory  of  the  same  figure  as  seen 
before.  Counting  was  applied  to  the  progressive  or  '  one,  two, 
three,'  counting.  Guessing  was  a  combination  of  progressive 
counting  for  part  of  a  group,  with  a  guess  or  judgment  of  the 
remainder ;  it  is  really  a  species  of  inferential  counting.  The 
counting  of  some  numbers,  such  as  Nine  and  Twelve  in  the 
table,  was  performed  by  a  kind  of  multiplication ;  the  subject 
called  this  process  inference  (or  judgment),  explaining  at  the 
end  of  the  test  that  he  included  multiplication  under  this  head. 

TABLE  X. — CHARACTER  OF  REACTION  AND  COUNT. 


II 

III 

IV 

V 

VI 

VII 

VIII 

\Vhole  number  of  reactions  .        .        .    . 

•14 

tf 

CQ 

C7 

cc 

27 

12 

o 

2 

7 

II 

24 

4 

I 

Reactions  on  light  ...        

o 

I 

i 

o 

2 

2 

O 

o 

O 

o 

o 

2 

4 

2 

Too  large;  reaction  (  oo)  

o 

O 

o 

I 

q 

II 

Q 

T 

Inferences  

o 

o 

o 

o 

3 

I 

O 

Guesses  

o 

o 

o 

6 

8 

2 

O 

Counts  

o 

o 

o 

o 

3 

I 

O 

Unspecified                 

34 

•ZT 

CT 

?c 

4 

2 

o 

Doubtful  

O 

I 

I 

4 

I 

•} 

o 

Whole  number  of  reactions  

•JO 

•JO 

CO 

en 

CT 

IO 

C 

I 

C 

17 

2Q 

4 

Reactions  on  light  

o 

o 

o 

o 

I 

o 

O 

Too  large  ;  no  reaction  

o 

o 

o 

o 

O 

o 

O 

Too  large  reaction  (oo  )  

o 

o 

o 

o 

I 

o 

o 

C 

o 

o 

o 

I 

2 

o 

I 

Guesses  

o 

o 

2 

8 

4 

o 

Counts  

o 

o 

o 

8 

o 

o 

Unspecified  

2Q 

2C. 

Ad. 

20 

6 

•3 

o 

Doubtful  

o 

o 

I 

7 

2 

I 

Whole  number  of  reactions  

8 

12 

IO 

20 

T6 

2C 

Errors  

o 

I 

o 

i 

6 

12 

Reactions  on  light   

o 

o 

I 

i 

o 

o 

o 

Too  large  ;  no  reaction  ,    . 

o 

o 

o 

o 

o 

o 

I 

Too  large  ;  reaction  (  oo)  ;  

o 

o 

o 

I 

o 

o 

6 

W 

Inferences  

o 

o 

o 

o 

o 

I 

o 

Guesses   . 

o 

o 

o 

o 

o 

I 

o 

Counts  

o 

o 

o 

o 

o 

o 

o 

Unspecified  

8 

II 

1C 

IO 

8 

6 

Doubtful  

o 

o 

I 

2 

i 

PRINCETON  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.          589 

In  Table  X.  are  shown  the  processes  used  in  the  main  series 
of  counting  experiments  (cf.  Tables  VI.  and  VIII.),  as  de- 
scribed after  each  reaction  by  the  subject ;  inferences  and  guesses 
were  always  reported ;  a  large  proportion  of  the  successful  re- 
actions on  numbers  higher  than  Four,  which  are  not  expressly 
ascribed  to  one  or  other  of  these  processes  (those  in  the  row 
labeled  'unspecified'),  are  undoubtedly  cases  of  progressive 
counting  ('counts').1  No  attempt  was  made  in  the  present 
study  to  distinguish  between  inference  and  association  ;  in  the 
table  both  processes  are  included  under  the  term  inference. 
The  word  judgment,  which  was  sometimes  used  by  the  subjects 
in  place  of  inference,  has  been  generally  avoided  in  the  discus- 
sion as  being  too  broad  and  indefinite.  Since  '  guessing,'  as 
here  used,  is  a  complex  process  whose  chief  characteristic  is  an 
inference,  this  leaves  but  three  distinct  processes  by  which  the 
subjects  gained  their  knowledge  of  the  numbers,  according  to 
their  own  statements,  viz.,  the  processes  which  we  have  called 
perceptive,  progressive  and  inferential  counting. 

VI.    CONCLUSIONS. 

Referring  back  to  the  questions  proposed  at  the  outset,  we 
find  that  definite,  if  not  complete,  answers  can  be  given  to  both 
as  a  result  of  the  present  investigation. 

i.  The  Limit  of  Perceptive  Counting — The  limit  of  percep- 
tive counting,  with  two  adult  subjects  (T  and  C)  one  of  motor 
and  one  of  sensory  type,  both  intellectually  bright,  but  with  no 
special  talent  for  numbers,  was  found  to  lie  at  Four  ;  this  number 
was  occasionally  grasped  and  reacted  on  in  the  same  time  as 
One,  but  only  of  Three  and  Two  could  this  be  said  generally. 
Investigations  of  other  subjects  (G,  H  and  W,  as  well  as  C 
again)  with  hand  reactions  served  to  confirm  this  view.  We 
conclude,  therefore,  that,  except  under  special  stress  of  attention, 
or  with  subjects  especially  apt  in  this  direction,  the  function  of 
perceptive  counting  is  limited  to  the  numbers  One,  Two  and 
Three. 

1In  Table  X.  the  rows  are  mutually  exclusive,  except  the  first  and  last;  the 
'  whole  number  of  reactions'  equals  the  sum  of  the  other  rows,  leaving  out  the 
row  of  '  doubtful '  answers. 


59°  H.    C.    WARREN. 

2.  The  Role  of  Inference. — To  apprehend  numbers  greater 
than  Four,  then,  some  other  function  must  come  into  play.  The 
process  by  which  this  knowledge  is  first  attained  is  what  we 
have  termed  *  progressive  counting.'  It  consists  in  establishing 
what  mathematicians  call  a  '  one-to-one '  relation  between  the 
objects  in  the  given  group  and  the  series  of  natural  numbers ; 
when  the  group  is  exhausted  the  last  number  reached  in  the 
count  is  known  to  be  the  number  of  objects  in  the  group.  But 
this  process  is  comparatively  slow,  and  in  practice  it  is  often 
shortened  by  one  or  another  device.  Thus  we  know  by  fre- 
quent experience  (e.  g.,  with  playing-cards  or  dominos)  that 
the  figure  called  a  quincunx  is  a  group  of  five  things ;  when, 
therefore,  we  see  such  a  figure,  instead  of  counting  the  spots  pro- 
gressively, we  associate  the  number-name  (Five)  with  the  group  ; 
and  so  of  other  figures  which  have  become  known  by  repeated 
experience.  Or,  again  :  given  three  rows  of  three  spots  each, 
although  this  particular  figure  may  not  be  familiar  to  us,  still  we 
know  from  the  multiplication  table  (which  is  familiar  enough) 
that  4  three  times  three  is  nine,'  and  upon  perceiving  the  three 
spots  on  each  side  we  immediately  associate  the  number  Nine 
with  the  group.  A  third  case,  not  touched  on  in  any  of  our  ex- 
periments, is  where  the  group  is  divided  into  sub-groups  of 
various  sizes  ;  here  we  may  count  the  sub-groups  separately — 
by  the  perceptive  or  progressive  processes — and  reach  the  sum 
total  at  once  through  our  knowledge  of  the  addition  table ;  this 
is  another  instance  of  inference  based  on  association.  Now  it 
appears  from  our  final  series  of  experiments  (Table  IX.)  that 
for  the  higher  numbers  the  use  of  this  inferential  process  short- 
ens the  reaction  time,  but  that  for  the  lower  ones  it  does  not — in 
fact,  it  tends  rather  to  lengthen  it.  In  other  words,  inference 
tends  to  shorten  -progressive  counting  and  to  lengthen  perceptive 
counting,  when  it  takes  their  place  wholly  or  in  part. 

It  would  be  useless  to  attempt  to  measure  the  amount  of 
shortening  produced  by  influence,  since  the  time  of  the  latter 
process  itself  varies  within  wide  limits.  In  cases  where  we  are 
very  familiar  with  a  certain  grouping  it  may  reduce  the  time 
enormously ;  in  others,  the  inferential  process  is  so  complex 
that  it  is  of  little  use  in  expediting  the  count.  The  chief  result 


PRINCETON  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.          591 

of  the  present  experiments,  as  regards  the  higher  numbers,  is  to 
show  that  progressive  counting  is  a  comparatively  long  process, 
and  that  we  must  resort  habitually  to  some  kind  of  inference  in 
counting  large  groups.  Familiar  figures  are  rare,  and  are 
practically  confined  to  groups  of  less  than  a  dozen ;  but  addi- 
tion and  multiplication,  combined  with  perceptive  or  progres- 
sive counting  are  common  resources.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  we 
do  not  often  have  occasion  to  count  very  large  groups ;  when 
we  do,  we  usually  fall  back  upon  one  or  other  of  these  infer- 
ential processes. 


VII.  SOME  EXPERIMENTS  ON  THE  SUCCESSIVE  DOUBLE- 
POINT  THRESHOLD. 

BY  PROFESSOR  G.  A.  TAWNEY,  AND  PROFESSOR  C.  W.  HODGE. 

Beloit  College.  Lafayette  College. 

Nearly  all  of  the  experiments  on  the  tactual  double-point 
threshold  have  been  carried  on  by  the  method  of  least  changes, 
the  original  of  which  was  first  conceived  and  applied  by  that 
father  of  experimental  methods,  E.  H.  Weber.  Of  the  very  large 
number  of  discussions  in  this  field,  which  have  appeared  since 
the  original  discussion  of  Weber,  only  one1  investigates  the 
double-point  threshold  with  successive  stimuli.  At  the  same 
time,  it  has  been  well  known  by  every  experimentor  in  this 
field  that  the  threshold  for  the  perception  of  successive  points 
must  be  much  shorter  than  that  for  the  perception  of  simultaneous 
stimuli  on  the  same  spot ;  for  the  effect  of  any  slight  failure  to 
set  the  two  points  upon  the  skin  simultaneously  is  always  the 
perception  of  the  two  points  before  the  ordinary  threshold  has 
been  reached.  The  following  is  the  report  of  some  experiments 
which,  if  not  sufficiently  numerous  to  entitle  them  to  the  claim 
of  completeness,  may  nevertheless  be  helpful  as  preparatory  to 
a  more  protracted  study. 

The  object  of  the  experiments  was  to  determine  the  thresh- 

>Judd,  Ueber  Raumwahrnehmung  im  Gebiete  des  Tastsinnes,  Phil.  Stud., 
Bd.  XII. ,  409-463. 


592  G.  A.   TAWNEY  AND    C.    W.  HODGE. 

old  for  the  perception  of  spatial  difference,  and  that  for  the  di- 
rection of  the  difference  (in  eight  different  directions  from  the 
same  spot  of  skin)  with  different  intervals  of  time  between  the 
stimulations.  Among  the  problems  which  were  expected  to  ap- 
pear in  the  course  of  the  experiments  were  the  following  :  (i) 
is  the  threshold  for  the  perception  of  spatial  difference,  with 
successive  stimuli,  the  same  as  that  for  direction,  or  is  it  differ- 
ent? (2)  are  they  the  same  for  all  directions  from  the  same 
spot  of  skin?  (3)  do  they  vary  for  different  lengths  of  time- 
interval  between  the  stimuli,  and  if  so,  according  to  what  law? 
(4)  is  any  light  to  be  gained  from  these  results  upon  simulta- 
neous stimuli,  and  upon  the  general  question  as  to  the  nature  of 
tactual  space-perception  ? 

The  subjects  of  these  experiments  were  four,  Professor  H. 
C.  Warren  (W),  Mr.  J.  F.  Crawford  (C),  Dr.  C.  W.  Hodge 
(H),  Dr.  G.  A.  Tawney  (T).  Excepting  the  latter  none  of 
these  had  .any  practice  in  the  performance  of  such  experiments. 
(T.  had  taken  part  in  an  extended  series  of  experiments  on  the 
tactual  double-point  threshold  for  simultaneous  stimuli.) 

The  arm  of  the  subject  rested  upon  the  table,  a  screen  con- 
cealing it  and  the  apparatus  from  him.  A  piece  of  wood  was 
so  placed  that  the  subject  could  grasp  it,  and  thus  preserve  the 
same  position  of  the  arm  during  each  hour.  The  spot  investi- 
gated was  also  secured  by  marking  the  point  on  the  skin  which 
was  first  touched  in  each  experiment.  The  temperature  of  the 
room  was  kept  approximately  constant,  and  the  general  condi- 
tions of  the  experiments,  such  as  mental  preoccupation,  the 
mood  and  the  health  of  the  subject,  the  time  of  day,  etc.,  were 
carefully  noted  before  each  hour. 

The  instrument  used  was  a  Verdin  aesthesiometer.  In 
order  to  facilitate  the  experiments,  the  instrument  was  sus- 
pended by  a  cord  which  passed  over  a  pulley  to  a  swinging 
weight.  A  difficulty  arose  in  the  determination  of  the  distance 
on  the  arm  of  the  second  point  stimulated  from  the  first.  We 
wished  to  use  both  points  of  the  instrument  in  order  to  take 
advantage  of  the  millimeter  scale  of  the  sesthesiometer,  but  the 
points  could  not  rest  upon  the  arm  at  the  same  time.  One  of  the 
points  was  accordingly  elevated  by  inserting  a  piece  of  wood 


PRINCETON  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.          593 

beneath  the  indicator,  the  other  point  remaining  extended  to 
the  full  length  of  the  spring.  A  card  containing  a  small  hole 
and  fastened  to  a  piece  of  wood  was  so  placed  that  by  passing 
the  points  of  the  sesthesiometer  through  the  hole  successively,  the 
same  spot  on  the  skin  could  be  touched  by  the  extended  point 
and  then  pointed  to  by  the  elevated  point.  In  this  way  the  dis- 
tance of  the  second  stimulation  from  the  first  could  be  read  from 
the  aesthesiometer  scale  without  touching  the  arm  with  both 
points.  The  hole  in  the  card  was  suspended  over  the  same 
spot  on  the  skin  from  day  to  day.  The  experiments  were 
conducted  in  the  following  manner  :  The  extended  point  was 
first  passed  through  the  hole  in  the  card  with  a  pressure 
against  the  skin  of  about  50  g.  The  assthesiomeler  was  then 
raised  and  the  elevated  or  shortened  point  was  made  to  pass 
through  the  hole  and  point  to  the  spot  just  touched  by  the  other 
point,  while  the  other  point  pressed  the  skin  at  a  distance 
measured  by  the  horizontal  graduated  bar  of  the  instrument. 
This  second  pressure  was  also  about  50  g.  The  points  were 
of  bone  suitably  rounded  off  so  as  not  to  cause  pain. 

To  regulate  the  duration  of  the  stimulations,  a  metronome 
was  made  to  vibrate  at  the  desired  rate  in  an  instrument  case 
across  the  room.  The  duration  of  the  stimulation,  as  well  as 
that  of  the  interval  between  the  stimulations,  was  regulated  by 
counting  the  beats  of  the  metronome.  Another  precaution  was 
found  necessary  with  reference  to  the  pressure  of  the  points. 
By  the  conditions  of  the  experiments  the  first  of  each  pair  of 
stimulations  occurred  at  the  same  spot  on  the  arm  throughout 
the  series.  But  the  repeated  stimulation  of  this  spot  gave  rise, 
in  some  cases,  to  a  qualitative  difference  between  the  sensations, 
which  soon  came  to  be  recognized  by  the  subject  as  pain.  Thus 
the  second  point  might  be  recognized  as  different  from  the  first 
without  any  perception  of  spatial  difference.  This,  it  is  true,  is 
an  inference  wherever  it  occurs,  whereas  the  answers  of  the 
subject  ought  to  be  direct  perceptions  ;  but  he  very  easily,  as  ex- 
perience proved,  mistakes  his  inference  in  this  case  for  an  act 
of  perception,  and  even  though  he  should  not  do  so,  it  is  very 
probable  that  the  inferred  knowledge  that  the  points  are  in  fact 
not  the  same  would  have  a  pronounced  effect  upon  his  answers. 


594  G.  A.   TAWNEY  AND    C.    W.  HODGE. 

To  avoid  this  result,  we  simply  lessened  the  pressure  upon  the 
first  point  as  the  hour  proceeded,  asking  the  reagent  to  inform 
us  whenever  any  qualitative  or  quantitative  differences  appeared 
between  the  two  sensations.  It  has  been  asserted  that  one  of 
the  conditions  of  these  and  similar  experiments  is  that  the  two 
sensations  be  subjectively  the  same  in  intensity,  and  it  is  usually 
assumed  that  this  is  to  be  secured  by  the  same  objective  pres- 
sure. But  one  finds  in  fact  that  two  points  on  the  skin  are  very 
seldom  equally  sensitive  to  the  same  objective  pressure.  The 
only  adequate  method  of  securing  like  subjective  intensities  is 
the  empirical  one  of  testing  the  two  spots  until  we  have  ascer- 
tained their  relative  sensibility. 

The  object  of  the  first  series  of  experiments  was  to  deter- 
mine the  threshold  for  the  perception  of  spatial  difference  in 
two  successive  stimulations,  and  also  that  for  the  perception  of 
the  direction  of  the  second  stimulation  from  the  first.  The  in- 
terval between  the  two  stimulations  was  a  constant  one  of  three 
seconds  in  this  series  of  experiments.  Eight  directions  were 
chosen  in  all,  viz.  up  (toward  the  shoulder),  down  (toward  the 
hand),  in  (toward  the  little  finger  side  of  the  arm),  out  (toward 
the  thumb  side  of  the  arm),  up-.out  (half  way  between  up  and 
out),  and  similarly  down-out,  down-in,  up-in.  According  to 
the  method  of  least  changes,  the  series  in  any  one  direction 
should  be  reversed  and  the  average  drawn  from  the  two  thresh- 
olds thus  obtained.  As  the  direction  of  the  second  point  from 
the  first  is  known  in  the  reverse  series  of  these  experiments,  it 
seemed  best  to  separate  the  two  series  and  not  to  follow  the 
usual  custom  of  taking  the  average  between  the  two.  The 
question  also  arose  whether  the  thresholds  for  the  diagonals 
might  not  be  different  from  those  for  the  axes,  owing  to  the 
direction,  and  it  was  decided  to  take  the  thresholds  for  the  four 
axes  first,  then  proceed  to  the  thresholds  for  the  diagonals,  and 
lastly  to  take  the  eight  directions  together.  In  the  latter  case, 
the  eight  directions  could  not  be  taken  without  readjusting  the 
apparatus  and,  rather  than  do  this  (which  would  notify  the 
subject  of  the  direction),  one  of  the  directions,  viz.  up,  was 
omitted.  The  experiments  on  H  were  performed  by  T,  and  those 
on  T  by  H.  Tables  I.  II.  and  III.  show  the  results  of  the  di- 


PRINCETON  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY. 


595 


TABLE  I. 

Showing  thresholds  of  difference  and  thresholds  of  direction  on  the 
axes  from  the  originally  stimulated  point ;  also  middle  thresh- 
old and  middle  variation. 

HODGE. 


IN. 

DOWN. 

OUT. 

UP. 

Differ- 

Direc- 

Differ- 

Direc- 

Differ- 

Direc- 

Differ- 

Direc- 

tacn 
Day. 

Aver. 
Thresh. 

ence. 

tion. 

ence. 

tion. 

ence. 

tion. 

ence. 

tion. 

o 

6 

2 

2 

o 

6 

2 

4 

I.O 

4-5 

i 

H 

I 

6 

2 

2 

2 

2 

i  -5 

6.0 

i 

9 

2 

3 

0 

2 

I 

8 

I.O 

5-7 

3 

3 

4 

4 

I 

7 

2 

6 

2-5 

S-o 

3 

2O+ 

i 

20+ 

3 

4 

3 

3 

2-5 

3-5 

2 

32 

3 

5 

3 

5 

5 

5 

3-3 

ii. 

2O+ 

5 

3 

7 

3 

S 

4 

4 

3-3 

5-o 

4-3 

12.7 

2-3 

6.7 

'•7 

4.4 

2.7 

4-5 

M.  Thresh. 

4-5 

8.1 

•9 

4.1 

1.2 

i-5 

i.i 

x.6 

M.  Var. 

TAWNEY. 


2 

6 

2 

4 

0 

6 

2 

3 

i.S 

4-7 

I 

2 

I 

3 

2 

4 

I 

I 

1.2 

2-5 

I 

2 

I 

2 

2 

2 

3 

3 

'•7 

2.2 

I 

8 

3 

3 

2 

5 

2 

2 

2.O 

4-5 

0 

5 

3 

S 

2 

3 

I 

3 

*-5 

4.0 

2 

2 

i 

3 

4 

4 

3 

3 

2-5 

3-o 

1.2 

4.1 

1.8 

3 

2 

6 

2 

3-7 

M.  Thresh. 

2.1 

.6 

2 

1.2 

M.  Var. 

WARREN. 


I 

H 

I 

12 

i 

12 

20+ 

20+ 

I.O 

12.5 

3 

10 

2 

9 

2 

II 

I 

20+ 

20 

10.0 

S 

12 

2 

8 

I 

8 

2 

4 

3-5 

8.0 

3 

12 

1.6 

9.6 

i-3 

io-3 

7.6 

14.6 

M.  Thresh. 

i-3 

1-3 

0.4 

i-5 

0.4 

'•S 

8.2 

7-i 

M.  Var. 

596 


G.  A.   TAWNEY  AND    C.    W.  HODGE. 


TABLE    II. 

Showing'  thresholds  of  difference  and  thresholds  of  direction  on 
the  four  diagonals  from  the  point  originally  stimulated,  the 
middle  variation  and  the  middle  threshold. 

HODGE. 


DOWN-IN. 

DOWN-OUT. 

UP-IN. 

UP-OUT. 

Differ- 

Direc- 

Differ- 

Direc- 

Differ- 

Direc- 

Differ- 

Direc- 

Day. 

Thresh. 

ence. 

tion. 

ence. 

tion. 

ence. 

tion. 

ence. 

tion. 

5 

6 

i 

5 

i 

ii 

4 

4 

2.7 

6-5 

3 

6 

4 

4 

2 

5 

2 

3 

2.7 

4-5 

2 

7 

3 

5 

3 

3 

3 

3 

2.7 

4-5 

I 

5 

4 

5 

2 

5 

5 

5 

3-o 

S-o 

4 

5 

3 

3 

2 

6 

4 

4 

3-2 

4-5 

3 

5 

i 

2 

4 

12 

i 

i 

2.2 

5-o 

4 

6 

3 

3 

3 

6 

i 

6 

2-7 

4.2 

3 

5-7 

3 

3-8 

2-5 

6.8 

3 

3-7 

M.  Thresh. 

•9 

.6 

•9 

1.2 

.8 

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M.  Var. 

TAWNEY. 


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WARREN. 


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PRINCETON  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY. 


597 


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HODGE. 

TAWNEY. 

WARREN. 

598  G.  A.   TAWNEY  AND    C.    W.  HODGE. 

rect  series  of  experiments  on  the  axis,  on  the  diagonals,  and  on 
the  axis  and  diagonals  combined,  the  thresholds  for  difference 
and  direction  being  given  side  by  side.  The  number  20  indi- 
cates cases  where  a  wrong  suggestion  prevailed  to  such  an  ex- 
tent that  a  correct  answer  was  never  reached. 

What  impresses  us  first  on  looking  over  the  tables  is  the  dif- 
ference between  the  two  thresholds,  i.  e.,  between  that  for  spatial 
difference  between  the  two  stimulated  points  on  the  arm,  and 
that  for  the  direction  of  the  second  point  from  the  first.  This 
difference  has  lead  the  writer  already  referred  to  to  the  conclu- 
sion that  the  threshold  for  the  tactual  perception  of  spatial  dif- 
ference is  shorter  than  that  for  the  tactual  perception  of  spatial 
direction  under  the  conditions  of  these  experiments.  But  when 
we  consider  that  the  idea  of  direction  is  inseparable  in  thought 
from  the  idea  of  spatial  difference,  it  seems  improbable  that  there 
should  be  a  perception  of  spatial  difference  without  a  perception 
of  the  direction  of  one  point  from  the  other.  In  other  words  it 
seems  difficult  to  sense  spatial  difference  without  direction.  And 
yet  we  are  told  that  this  is  the  real  nature  of  all  those  cases 
where  the  threshold  for  the  perception  of  difference  is  shorter 
than  that  for  the  perception  of  direction.  This  means  that 
space  is  after  all  not  the  form  of  tactual  perception ;  at  least, 
that  space  in  three  dimensions  is  not. 

But  again,  the  most  of  the  cases,  upon  which  this  inference 
rests,  do  not  pretend  to  be  perceptions  of  spatial  difference 
without  any  direction.  A  direction  is  usually  given  by  the  sub- 
ject, but  it  happens  to  be  false,  and  the  inference  is  drawn  by 
the  operator  that  a  difference  is  perceptible,  but  not  the  direc- 
tion of  the  difference.  Is  it  not  possible  that  a  difference  is 
perceived  which  is  not  spatial  at  all,  and  that  the  subject  comes 
to  give  it  the  worth  of  real  space-perception  by  illusion?  It 
should  be  remembered  that  we  possess  an  objective  standard 
for  determining  the  direction- threshold,  such  as  we  do  not 
possess  for  the  difference-threshold.  In  the  case  of  difference 
alone,  the  answer  is  usually  correct,  because  a  difference  is,  as 
a  rule,  actually  present ;  but  in  the  matter  of  direction  we  take 
the  correctness  of  the  answer  as  a  criterion  of  a  real  perception 
of  direction.  Is  it  not  possible  that  there  may  exist  an  illusion 


PRINCETON  PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY.          599 

as  to  difference  as  well  as  to  direction?  After  the  discovery 
which  has  recently  been  made  of  the  enormous  part  played  by 
suggestion  in  the  perception  of  two  simultaneous  points,1  it  is  at 
least  possible,  not  to  say  probable,  that  the  same  law  works 
here  also.  Of  this  we  can  speak  more  advantageously  later. 
What  we  are  concerned  here  with  is,  first,  that  we  have  no 
right  to  apply  an  objective  criterion  of  true  perception  in  the 
case  of  direction  unless  we  can  apply  the  same  standard  in  the 
case  of  difference  ;  we  should  refrain  from  generalizing  until 
the  facts  of  the  case  have  been  more  thoroughly  looked  into  ; 
secondly,  this  generalization,  that  the  difference  threshold  is  the 
smaller,  would  in  no  case  be  acceptible  if  it  were  possible  to  ac- 
count for  the  observed  facts  by  such  a  well  established  law  as 
one  which  has  been  included  under  the  general  term,  the  asso- 
ciation of  ideas,  but  which  we  prefer  to  call  suggestion.  The 
direction  given  by  the  subject  may  be  wrong,  as  it  often  is  ;  but 
this  merely  constitutes  a  mistake  of  perception  which,  where 
persistent  in  any  one  direction,  we  call  illusion. 

Assuming  that  the  apparent  perceptions  of  difference  with- 
out direction  are  not  bona  fide  instances  of  perception  in  all 
respects,  what  explanation  can  be  given  for  the  errors  in  the 
judgments  of  direction  ?  It  seems  as  though  a  very  natural 
explanation  is  to  be  found  in  experiences  with  which  we  are 
made  familiar  every  day  and  hour.  The  perception-act  in  these 
experiments  differs  from  that  of  ordinary  experience  in  the  fact 
that  the  subject  is  not  allowed  to  see  the  spot  stimulated  and  the 
instrument  stimulating,  at  the  same  time  he  feels  the  touch.  That 
constant  practice  of  testing  our  tactual  sensations  by  the  sensa- 
tions of  a  much  more  highly  developed  organ  is  therefore  not 
possible  here  ;  and,  consequently,  the  assimilation  of  the  present 
impressions  goes  on  by  means  of  visual  and  motor  images,  as 
every  one  can  easily  persuade  himself  by  trying  the  experiments 
on  himself.  Just  as  in  reading  we  pass  over  typographical  errors 
without  being  in  the  least  conscious  of  their  presence,  because 
the  actual  visual  images  are  assimilated  to  a  correct  visual  image 
of  the  arrangement  of  the  words  and  letters  ;  so  in  these  experi- 


,  Ueber  die  Wahrnehmung  zweier  Punkte,  etc.,  Phil.  Stud.,  Bd. 
XIII.,  S.  163  ff. 


600  G.  A.   TAWNEY  AND    C.    W.  HODGE. 

ments,  one  assimilates  the  actual  tactual  impressions  to  a  revival 
copy  of  similar  experiences  in  the  past,  but  to  a  copy  which  is 
actually  not  in  accordance  with  the  facts  because  the  association 
bond  between  the  tactual  stimulus  and  the  visual  or  motor  image 
is  not  sufficiently  close  to  be  accurate.  The  local  sign  of  the 
tactual  sensation  is,  as  has  been  said  before,  no  simple  quality 
of  the  sensation  itself,  but  just  this  associational  bond  between 
the  sensation  and  the  visual  or  motor  image  to  which  it  is  assim- 
ilated. The  question  of  most  interest  is,  what  determines  the 
visual  or  motor  image  to  be  of  this  or  that  sort.  One  finds  that 
both  difference  and  direction  are  sometimes  given  when  the 
same  point  has  been  stimulated  twice  in  succession,  that  the  di- 
rection given,  even  when  the  points  are  actually  different,  is 
often  wrong,  and  that  the  error  in  the  direction  judgment  seems 
to  lie  persistently  in  the  direction  of  the  judgments  in  the  last 
series  of  experiments,  in  a  direction  suggested  by  the  operator 
himself,  or  in  a  direction  which  the  subject  gets  by  autosugges- 
tion. In  some  cases  it  is  probable  that  more  than  one  of  these 
causes  are  present  to  determine  the  subject's  answer. 

Taking  up  the  answers  in  which  an  actual  difference  is 
present  between  the  two  stimulations,  but  in  which  the  direction 
given  is  wrong,  they  may  be  divided  into  three  groups.  Some 
follow  some  external  suggestion,  i.  e.,  they  are  influenced  either 
by  a  previous  judgment,  or  by  the  combined  influence  of  the  pre- 
vious judgment  and  the  stimulus.  An  illustration  of  the  former 
sort  would  be  as  follows :  Supposing  that  an  up  series  has  just 
been  taken,  and  that  the  present  series  is  one  in  which  the  dis- 
tance increases  downward,  the  subject  gives  the  answer  '  up.' 
The  following  would  be  an  illustration  of  the  latter  :  Supposing 
that  an  in  series  has  just  been  taken,  and  that  the  present  series 
is  progressing  downward,  the  subject  answers  '  down-in.'  Out 
of  ii  such  wrong  answers  made  by  H  during  these  experi- 
ments, 3  fell  under  the  first  head  and  8  under  the  second.  In 
the  case  of  W,  out  of  13  wrong  answers  of  this  kind  9  belong 
to  the  first  class  and  4  to  the  second.  T  made  only  one  wrong 
answer  of  this  sort,  belonging  to  the  first  class. 

A  second  group  of  cases  in  which  wrong  answers  were 
given  admit  of  explanation  as  instances  of  autosuggestion. 


PRINCETON  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.          601 

From  an  objective  point  of  view  they  seem  to  be  accidental. 
The  subjective  process  involved  seems  to  be  somewhat  as  fol- 
lows :  The  subject  feels  the  first  and  then  the  second  stimulus, 
different  in  time,  and  at  once  strives  to  assimilate  the  two  im- 
pressions to  his  past  experiences.  He  represents  the  second 
impression  in  this  or  that  direction  from  the  first,  in  order  to  see 
whether  the  actual  impression  seems  any  different  from  the 
mental  image  of  past  experience.  The  tactual  impression  being 
very  vague  in  space  quality,  he  receives  no  correction,  /.  £.,the 
image  and  the  impression  seem  the  same  and  at  once  fuse  into 
one  perception.  All  perception  seems  to  involve  some  such 
process  as  this.  Every  presentation  is  composed  partly  of  ele- 
ments of  the  present  stimulation  and  partly  of  elements  of  past 
experience.  The  present  sensation  gives  to  the  whole  the  vivid 
character  which  it  itself  possesses.  Illusion  always  arises  when- 
ever the  representation  elements  of  the  experience  dominate 
over  the  whole  so  as  to  give  it  a  meaning  which  the  actual  sen- 
sation elements  do  not  possess.  Of  course  this  does  not  explain 
the  cases  at  hand ;  it  merely  suggests  a  possible  way  in  which 
the  erroneous  judgments  of  direction  come  to  be  given  below 
the  threshold  for  the  perception  of  two  points. 

Another  group  of  answers  seem  to  be  due,  in  one  case,  to 
autosuggestion  combined  with  a  stimulus  element,  and,  in  an- 
other case,  to  autosuggestion  combined  with  the  influence  of  the 
previous  judgment.  Of  the  former  sort  one  finds  in  the  answers 
of  H  25  instances,  and  of  the  latter,  i  ;  in  the  case  of  T,  37  of 
the  former,  and  3  of  the  latter ;  in  the  answers  of  W,  46  of 
the  former  kind  and  16  of  the  latter. 

Granting  the  hypothesis  of  suggestion  to  start  with,  it  seems 
that  all  of  these  instances  of  wrong  answers  as  to  direction 
illustrate  one  form  or  another  of  the  same  process. 

This  conclusion  seems  the  more  probable  when  we  consider 
the  group  of  answers  in  which  difference  and  direction  are 
both  given,  while  the  same  point  on  the  skin  is  stimulated 
twice.  This  occurs  much  oftener  in  descending  series  than  in 
ascending  series,  because  in  the  former  the  actual  direction  of 
the  second  point  from  the  first  is  distinctly  felt  in  the  first  ex- 
periment of  the  series,  and  this  knowledge  operates  as  a  sug- 


602  G.  A.    TAWNEY  AND    C.    W.  HODGE. 

gestion  after  the  difference  between  the  points  has  disappeared. 
In  the  similar  experiments  of  Dr.  C.  H.  Judd,1  the  smallest 
threshold  for  the  perception  of  spatial  difference  in  descending 
series  is  o,  as  given  in  his  table.  All  such  instances  are  ob- 
viously due  to  some  sort  of  suggestion.  They  correspond  to 
the  Vexirfehler  in  experiments  with  two  simultaneous  stimuli. 
In  the  case  of  ascending  series  the  suggestion  may  be  auto- 
matic, in  descending,  external,  /.  e.,  from  a  previous  judgment. 
In  the  ascending  series,  however,  it  may  also  be  due,  as  above,  to 
the  influence  of  a  previous  series  of  judgments  or  of  experiments. 
A  test  of  this  hypothesis,  which  seemed  to  be  crucial,  occurred 
in  the  often  repeated  answer  of  H,  '  spatial  difference  with- 
out direction ;'  but  upon  reflecting  upon  the  subjective  process 
involved,  he  believes  these  judgments  to  be  at  bottom  infer- 
ences, based  upon  slight  qualitative  differences  in  the  two  stimu- 
lations. No  direction  can  be  given,  simply  because  they  are 
inferences  ;  were  they  perceptions  they  would  be  perceptions 
of  direction,  though  erroneous.  In  the  answers  of  W,  two  in- 
stances of  this  phenomenon  are  to  be  found.  When  questioned 
as  to  the  subjective  process  involved,  he  replied,  in  the  first 
instance,  that  he  had  not  paid  close  attention  to  the  first 
stimulus,  and  felt,  when  the  second  came,  that  it  must  be 
different  because  of  the  previous  answers  which  he  had  made 
in  the  series,  but  that  he  had  no  idea  whether  the  direction  was 
the  same  as  in  previous  instances  or  not.  In  the  second  in- 
stance he  observed  that  a  certain  direction  was  present  in  his 
visual  image  of  the  point  stimulated,  but  that  he  simply  was  not 
sure  as  to  the  correctness  of  the  representation.  Such  cases  did 
not  occur  with  T. 

A  modification  of  this  class  of  cases  is  seen  in  answers 
which  indicate  partial  location,  as,  e.  g.,  where  the  answer  is 
*  up  or  up-in,'  '  out,  up-out,  or  up.'  Here  the  uncertainty  as 
to  the  correctness  of  the  mental  representation  is  limited  to  a 
few  alternatives.  Where  this  occurs  with  H,  who  is  a  poor 
visualizer,  the  answer  seems  to  be  the  result  of  self-questioning 
as  to  the  probable  direction  in  which  the  series  is  progressing. 
In  the  case  of  W,  who  is  a  good  visualizer,  it  seems  to  express 

1Loc.  cit.,  pp.  420,  421. 


PRINCETON  PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY. 


603 


uncertainty  as  to  the  correctness  of  the  visual  image,  which,  as 
he  says,  is  usually  present  in  these  experiments.  These  cases 
also  never  occur  with  T. 


TABLE  IV. — SUGGESTIVE  PROGRESSIONS. 

Showing  the  number  of  series  in  which  the  influence  of  sugges- 
tion is  obvious ;  the  total  number  of  series',  the  lower  and  up- 
per limits  of  thresholds  found,  together  with  their  mean;  the 
number  of  single  wrong  answers;  and  the  ratio  of  wrong  an- 
swers which  seemed  due  to  suggestion  to  the  total  number  of 
wrong  answers. 


H. 

w. 

T. 

<J7 

21 

6c 

Q2 

21 

OX) 

1-12 

I—  1C 

I-Q 

Threshold  {  Mean  

16  c 

8 

Number  of  wrong  answers  

4.4.2 

lid. 

IQQ 

Ratio  of  suggestions  to  wrong  answers    .    .    . 

66:442 

87:134 

61  -.199 

A  comprehensive  view  of  the  results  of  these  experiments  is 
offered  in  Table  IV.  In  the  upper  line  the  total  number  of 
series  of  experiments  in  which  suggestive  influences  are 
apparent,  is  given  for  each  of  the  three  subjects,  H,  W  and  T. 
Suggestions  of  different  kinds  sometimes  appear  within  the 
same  series,  as  (e.  g.}  when,  after  an  up-series,  the  subject 
answers,  when  the  same  point  is  stimulated  twice,  *  up,'  and 
continues  this  answer  until  the  second  stimulation  has  reached 
a  distance  of  5  mm,  in  the  direction  downward  from  the  first ; 
here  he  answers  *  up-in,'  and,  as  the  series  progresses  and 
the  distance  becomes  greater,  '  in,'  *  down-in,'  and  finally 
*  down.'  Here  we  have  the  influence  of  a  previous  series  of  ex- 
periments and  judgments  at  first  dominating,  then  a  combination 
of  the  influence  of  the  actual  stimulus  with  that  of  the  previous 
judgments,  and  finally  the  influence  of  the  stimulus  alone ; 
illustrating  what  is  called  in  the  table  a  suggestive  progression. 

In  the  second  line  the  total  number  of  series  of  experiments 
is  given  for  comparison  with  the  number  in  which  suggestive 


604  G.  A.   TAWNEY  AND    C.    W.  HODGE. 

influences  appear.  This  line  shows,  in  the  case  of  H,  W  and 
T,  respectively,  that  ||,  all,  and  If  of  all  the  series  were  influ- 
enced in  this  way. 

In  the  third  line  the  lower  and  upper  limits  of  threshold- 
variations,  together  with  the  mean  of  those  two,  are  given  to  show 
the  result  of  varying  suggestive  influences  under  similar  exter- 
nal conditions.  It  must  be  remembered,  however,  that  differ- 
ences of  direction  are  not  taken  into  consideration  in  this  line, 
and  it  is  true  that  the  threshold  for  some  directions  is  lower  than 
for  others ;  other  factors  than  suggestion,  such  as  direction,  thus 
come  in  to  vary  the  threshold,  but  all  other  factors  combined  are 
not  sufficient  to  account  for  the  wide  divergence  apparent  in 
these  figures. 

In  the  fourth  and  fifth  lines  are  reported  (i)  the  total  num- 
ber of  single  wrong  answers  occurring  throughout  the  experi- 
ments, and  (2)  the  ratio  of  those  answers  in  which  suggestive 
influences  are  apparent  to  the  total  number  of  wrong  answers. 
A  word  should  be  said  with  reference  to  the  wrong  answers 
which  are  not  referrable  to  the  influence  of  suggestion.  These 
were  mostly  the  answer  *  same,'  meaning  that  the  two  stimula- 
tions seem  to  be  on  the  same  spot.  This  is  the  answer  which 
one  expects  in  response  to  all  distances  which  lie  below  the 
threshold.  Such  answers  sometimes  occur,  however,  when  the 
distance  is  above  the  threshold,  and  it  is  possible  that  suggestion 
has  played  some  part  in  these.  We  are  not  in  a  position  to  say, 
however,  that  it  does  so,  or  to  what  extent  it  enters  in,  owing  to 
the  absence  of  objective  criteria.  Another  group  of  answers 
were  simple  expressions  of  uncertainty  and  suspense,  and  are 
not  to  be  counted  among  the  wrong  answers  at  all.  The  answer, 
'  same,'  is  often  given  at  the  beginning  of  series,  i.  <?.,  when  the 
two  stimulations  are  really  the  same,  and  the  answer  is  then 
right.  The  difference  between  the  wrong  answers  due  to  sug- 
gestion and  those  in  which  suggestive  influences  are  not  appar- 
ent seems  to  be  chiefly  this,  that  in  the  former  class  some 
element  of  mental  content  suddenly  makes  its  appearance  in  con- 
sciousness and  influences  the  judgment,  while  in  the  latter  class 
nothing  arises  to  modify  the  usual  reaction  of  the  attention  to 
the  stimulus  ;  and  this  difference  is  what  is  meant  by  suggestion. 


PRINCETON  PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY.          605 

II. 

Another  group  of  experiments  was  begun  in  which  the  series 
were  all  descending.  In  the  experiments  the  direction  was  nec- 
essarily known  to  the  subject,  the  object  of  the  experiments 
being  to  determine  where  difference  and  direction  cease  to  be 
perceived.  Table  V.  shows  the  results.  Wherever  no  threshold 
is  given,  the  subject  continued  to  give  a  difference  and  a  direc- 
tion at  the  end  of  the  series  when  the  same  point  was  stimulated 
twice. 

The  influence  of  suggestion  is  obvious  throughout  this  table 
in  the  fact  that  the  thresholds,  where  they  appear  at  all,  are 
much  lower  than  those  of  the  ascending  series.  All  of  the  sub- 
jects continued  to  give  a  difference  and  a  direction  when  the 
same  point  was  stimulated  twice.  In  the  answers  of  T,  n  are 
of  this  kind  ;  in  those  of  H,  23  ;  and  in  those  of  W,  22.  These 
answers  are  due,  we  take  it,  to  the  same  influence  which  pro- 
duces the  low  thresholds. 

III. 

The  following  experiments  were  carried  out  by  Dr.  Hodge 
in  the  Princeton  Laboratory  for  the  purpose  of  determining  what 
influence,  if  any,  the  length  of  the  interval  between  the  two 
stimulations  has  upon  the  threshold  for  the  perception  of  spatial 
difference  between  the  two  stimulations.  But  before  going  on 
to  describe  the  experiments,  we  will  notice  a  few  facts  as  to  the 
subjective  processes  involved,  which  are  closely  connected  with 
the  foregoing.  Professor  W.  is  a  good  visualizer ;  he  always 
closed  his  eyes  during  the  experiments,  and  gave  close  attention 
to  the  arm  and  the  spots  stimulated  as  they  appeared  in  the  vis- 
ual copy.  Both  subjects  were  given  to  making  a  judgment  of 
difference  or  of  direction,  or  of  both,  at  the  beginning  of  series 
where  the  same  point  was  stimulated  twice  in  succession.  Such 
errors  (corresponding  to  the  Vexirfehler  in  experiments  with 
simultaneous  stimuli)  could,  in  some  cases,  as  above,  in  the  ex- 
periments already  reported,  be  accounted  for  by  the  influence  of 
the  preceding  series,  or  that  of  a  previous  judgment,  but  the  two 
subjects  differ  very  decidedly  in  this  respect.  In  the  case  of  C 
such  judgments  could,  as  a  rule,  be  traced  to  such  influences, 


6o6 


G.  A.   TAWNEY  AND    C.    W.  HODGE. 


TABLE  V.  REVERSED  SERIES  ON  AXES,  ON  DIAGONALS,  AND  ON  AXES  AND  DIAGONALS,  WITH 

H,  W  AND  T. 

D-OUT. 

-, 

C4      *-* 

p«     ro 

W 

G 

1  " 

-, 

fc 

M 

& 

M 

-I 

M       PO 

O 

t> 

-i 

1  - 

«  \o 

H 
0 

M 

I- 

N     ro 

DOWN. 

-I 

I- 

fe 

M 

-I 

ro    w 

ffi 

H 
O 

« 

1     M 

^ 

1  1 

H 

w     ro 

UP-OUT. 

1      1 

,- 

ro   ** 

M 
& 

M     1 

'- 

"  1 

M 

ft 

"     1 

1  " 

H 
O 

1     ~     1 

-  1 

IO    1O    N 

& 

-  1 

C,        M          | 

M 

«        M          | 

1     N 

DOWN. 

M       „        | 

-1 

PRINCETON  PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY.          607 

whereas,  in  the  case  of  W  they  seemed,  as  a  rule,  to  follow  no 
law  ;  they  seemed  to  be  purely  accidental,  so  far  as  the  outward 
conditions  of  the  judgments  were  concerned.  This  difference 
corresponds  to  another  which  appears  in  the  observations  of  W, 
that  to  him  it  seemed  unnatural  to  pay  attention  to  sensations  of 
touch  alone.  He  finds  that  it  requires  an  especial  effort  to  keep 
the  tactual  stimulus  before  the  attention,  while  distraction  from 
slight  causes  is  easy  and  frequent.  W  finds  it  difficult  to  keep 
the  first  stimulus  before  the  attention  for  the  entire  period  be- 
tween the  first  and  the  second,  when  this  is  15  seconds. 

All  of  these  facts  would  seem  to  indicate  that  the  perception  of 
two  points  with  W  depends  chiefly  upon  the  presence  of  visual 
associations.  It  agrees  with  this  that  in  some  series  his  replies 
seem  at  the  start  to  be  determined  partly  by  the  stimulus  and 
partly  by  autosuggestion,  but  as  the  series  progresses  it  is  not 
the  stimulus  which  triumphs,  as  we  expect,  but  the  suggestion, 
and  no  continuance  of  the  series  will  suffice  to  correct  the  per- 
sistent operation  of  the  suggestion.  Again,  in  some  series,  the 
presence  of  more  than  one  suggestion  is  apparent,  neither  of 
which  seems  to  be  in  any  way  connected  with  the  stimulus. 
The  visual  image  of  the  first  point  stimulated  in  each  of  the  ex- 
periments of  a  given  series  seems  to  grow  more  and  more  dis- 
tinct as  the  series  progresses,  showing  that  the  difficulty  in 
judging  correctly  lies,  not  in  the  absence  of  definite  visual  rep- 
resentations, but  in  the  absence  of  the  proper  association  links 
between  the  tactual  excitations  and  the  corresponding  visual 
images.  W  seems  to  rely,  as  a  matter  of  habit,  far  more  on 
visual  than  upon  tactual  images  for  his  knowledge  of  the  ob- 
jects with  which  he  comes  into  contact.  The  series  in  which 
he  knew  nothing  as  to  the  nature  of  the  series,  whether  it  was 
along  the  axes  or  along  the  diagonals,  were  much  longer  than 
those  in  which  he  had  some  knowledge  as  to  their  nature  from 
the  start ;  showing  the  comparatively  weak  significance  of  the 
stimuli  when  experienced  alone,  it  requiring  much  longer  to  rec- 
ognize the  direction. 

With  C  tactual  and  motor  images  predominate  ;  but  the  asso- 
ciation between  these  images  and  the  sensations  is  much  closer 
than  is  the  case  with  W. 


608  G.  A.    TAWNEY  AND    C.    W.  HODGE. 

C  quite  frequently  remembers  the  first  stimulus  by  the  aid 
of  a  motor  image  of  himself  stimulating  the  point  with  his  left 
hand.  One  notices  in  C  also  a  greater  tendency  to  use  what- 
ever data  he  may  be  able  to  acquire  for  inferring  what  the  na- 
ture of  the  stimulus  may  be.  He  has  a  habit  of  assigning  first 
one  direction  to  the  second  stimulus  from  the  first,  and  then  an- 
other until  he  finds  one  which  brings  the  series  to  an  end ;  and 
no  amount  of  instruction  as  to  how  the  answers  should  be  made 
suffices  to  divert  this  tendency.  He  as  a  rule  infers  that  his  an- 
swer is  not  correct  whenever  the  series  is  continued  for  more 
than  two  or  three  experiments  further.  This  is  for  him  a  con- 
stant suggestion,  wherever  it  occurs.  It  was  for  W  also  in 
some  cases,  although  not  so  habitually  as  with  C.  The  latter 
also  gets  information  as  to  the  direction  which  probably  is  being 
taken  in  the  experiments  by  remembering  the  directions  which 
have  already  been  tried.  Sometimes  he  has  the  suggestion 
that  the -direction  pursued  is  one  of  two  or  three,  and  proceeds 
by  a  method  of  elimination  to  go  from  one  to  another  until  he 
reaches  one  which  brings  the  series  to  an  end.  Occasionally 
he  forms  an  hypothesis  as  to  the  direction  and  answers  accord- 
ingly until  the  sensations  either  confirm  or  contradict  it,  the  pro- 
cess by  which  he  forms  the  hypothesis  being  in  some  cases  a 
purely  inferential  one  and  in  other  cases  an  associative  one.  In 
some  cases,  as  he  observes,  he  has  no  notion,  prior  to  the  stimu- 
lus, as  to  the  direction  in  question,  and  answers  according  to  the 
tactual  or  motor  images  suggested  by  the  second  stimulus.  For 
C  the  tactual  perception  for  spatial  difference  is  always  a  re- 
sult based  upon  certain  qualitative  differences  between  the  sen- 
sations involved.  When  asked  to  describe  the  qualitative  dif- 
ferences referred  to,  he  speaks  in  terms  which  to  us  seem  most 
vague  and  indefinite,  and  which  characterize  nothing,  so  far  as 
we  can  determine,  which  enters  into  our  own  experience.  To 
him,  however,  they  have  a  clear  and  definite  character.  It  is, 
moreover,  significant  that  he  observes  the  presence  of  certain 
tactual  and  motor  images  as  an  assimilating  factor  in  every  per- 
ception ;  how  the  assimilation  takes  place  he  would  not  under- 
take to  say,  although  this  is  probably  the  same  process  for  tac- 
tual and  motor  images  as  W  describes  for  visual.  No  doubt 


PRINCETON  PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY.          609 

C's  answers  were  quite  often  inferences  as  much  as  assimila- 
tions ;  but  it  seems  clear  that  his  usual  method  of  answering 
is  one  of  assimilating  his  present  sensations  to  tactual  or  motor 
images  of  previous  experiences  in  the  perception  of  two  points. 
Going  on  to  the  experiments  conducted  by  Dr.  Hodge  to  de- 
termine the  relation  between  the  length  of  interval  between  the 
two  stimuli  and  the  threshold  for  the  perception  of  two  points, 
the  following  were  the  results :  The  interval  was  deter- 
mined as  before  by  a  metronome  which  was  placed  across  the 
room  in  an  instrument  case.  The  intervals  chosen  were  2  sec., 
5  sec.,  10  sec.,  and  15  sec.  It  was  impossible  to  make  the  in- 
terval shorter  than  two  seconds  and  preserve  the  conditions  con- 
stant, owing  to  the  nature  of  the  apparatus.  A  longer  interval 
than  15  sec.  could  not  be  chosen  because  of  the  difficulty  in- 
volved in  retaining  the  first  sensation  in  memory  until  the  sec- 
ond should  follow.  The  experiments  were  made  in  three 
groups  as  follows :  first,  those  in  which  the  directions  were 
straight  up,  down,  in,  or  out  (the  axes)  ;  those  in  which  the  di- 
agonal directions  were  chosen,  and  those  in  which  the  eight 
directions  were  all  taken  within  the  same  hour.  One  determin- 
ation was  made  for  each  of  the  four  intervals  within  each  hour 
in  order  to  have  the  conditions  as  near  the  same  as  possible  for 
experiments  which  were  to  be  compared.  The  number  20+  in 
the  following  tables  indicate  the  series  in  which,  because  of  some 
false  suggestion,  the  subject  never  succeeded  in  making  correct 
answers.  The  o's  indicate  the  series  in  which,  as  a  result  of 
chance  coincidence,  the  direction  hit  upon  by  the  subject  when, 
at  the  beginning  of  the  series,  the  same  point  was  stimulated 
twice,  happened  to  be  the  correct  one  for  that  series.  In  such 
series  it  is  of  course  impossible  to  determine  what  the  real 
threshold  is.  The  direction  thresholds  for  the  perception  of  two 
simultaneous  points  applied  in  the  same  regions  as  the  following 
experiments  were  as  follows:  For  C,  across,  10  mm.,  up  and 
down,  15  mm.,  diagonal  toward  the  thumb,  14  mm.,  and  diago- 
nal toward  the  little  finger,  14  mm.  For  W  the  same  thresh- 
olds were:  across,  8  mm.,  up  and  down,  13  mm.,  diagonal  to- 
ward the  thumb,  8  mm.,  and  diagonal  toward  the  little  finger, 
7  mm.  None  but  the  direction  thresholds  are  given  in  the 


6io 


G.  A.   TAWNEY  AND    C.    W.  HODGE. 


tables  which  follow,  along  with  the  average  thresholds  for  each 
day  in  all  the  directions.  Table  IV.  gives  the  experiments 
with  C. 

TABLE  VI. 

Showing  the  thresholds  for  the  perception  of  two  successive  points 
at  intervals  of  2  sec.,  5  sec.,  10  sees.,  and  ij  sec.  on  left  fore- 
arm, volar  side  of  C. 


2  SECONDS. 


AXES. 

DIAGONALS. 

EIGHT  DIRECTIONS. 

in. 
8 

up. 

d. 

out. 

u-i. 

d-i. 

u-o. 

d-o. 

in. 

up. 

d. 

out. 

u-i. 

d-i. 

u-o. 

d-o. 

6 

0 

10 

3 

9 

3 

7 

3 

3 

o 

9 

8 

2 

6 

6 

4 

4 

9 

I 

4 

2 

7 

2 

5 

i 

3 

13 

3 

5 

5 

5 

4 

2 

2 

4 

2 

3 

4 
3 

5 

i 

5 
7 

i 
3 

I 
0 

5 
4 

7 
4 

4 
3 

7 
8 

3 

5 

4 
6 

3 
3 

15 
3 

4-5 

4 

4.2 

4-5 

3-3 

5-7 

3-5 

3-3 

4.2 

3-7 

3-3 

9.2 

4-7 

4.2 

4.2 

7-2 

M.T. 

5  SECONDS. 


8 

3 

7 

6 

4 

6 

3 

5 

4 

6 

0 

3 

2 

8 

2 

8 

9 

3 

5 

3 

5 

6 

4 

i 

6 

10 

3 

9 

J3 

10 

13 

3 

5 

i 

i 

3 

2 

3 

0 

i 

4 

6 

8 

3 

3 

3 

4 

i 

2 

i 

5 

i 

3 

4 

3 

4 

5 

10 

3 

2 

3 

6 

6 

i 

6 

2 

4-5 

3-2 

3-5 

4-7 

3-3 

3-6 

4-7 

8 

3-5 

4.2 

5-2 

7 

6.2 

3-2 

M.T. 

IO  SECONDS. 


4 

i 

5 

7 

i 

4 

4 

5 

7 

6 

16 

i 

10 

7 

ii 

3 

4 

5 

ii 

4 

6 

3 

6 

3 

IO 

2 

5 

3 

4 

3 

i 

i 

4 

5 

i 

3 

6 

3 

6 

0 

4 

3 

8 

i5 

10 

3 

9 

5 

6 

i 

3 

5 

4 

3 

5 

i 

5 

2 

5 

6 

4 

4 

13 

5 

4-5 

3 

5 

4-7 

4.2 

3-3 

5-2 

3 

6-5 

3-2 

8-5 

6.2 

7 

4.2 

8-5 

3-5 

M.T. 

15  SECONDS. 


0 

3 

i 

2 

3 

3 

2 

5 

2 

i 

4 

4 

o 

5 

5 

2 

6 

5 

i 

I 

5 

4 

5 

0 

IO 

6 

3 

2 

8 

3 

12 

2 

i 

o 

3 

2 

3 

3 

7 

6 

16 

5 

7 

3 

7 

10 

4 

3 

4 

2 

4 

I 

5 

3 

5 

i 

5 

o 

3 

7 

4 

4 

4 

4 

3-6 

3-3 

2.2 

i-5 

4 

3-2 

4-5 

4 

8.2 

4 

4.2 

4 

4-7 

5-5 

6.2 

2-7 

M.T. 

PRINCETON  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.          6ll 

In  the  column  headings  d  stands  for  down ;  u-i  for  up  and 
in  ;  d-i  for  down  and  in ;  u-o  for  up  and  out ;  d-o  for  down  and 
out.  What  one  first  notices  in  the  table  of  C's  experiments  is 
the  difference  between  the  thresholds  for  successive  stimuli  2 
seconds  apart  and  the  corresponding  simultaneous  thresholds. 
For  'across'  the  latter  was  10  mm.,  while  the  succession 
threshold  for  'in'  is  4.5  mm.,  and  that  for  'out'  4.5  mm. ;  the 
simultaneous  threshold  for  '  up  and  down'  is  15  mm.,  while  that 
for  'up'  in  successive  stimuli  is  4  mm.,  and  that  for  'down' 
4.2  mm.  ;  the  diagonal  simultaneous  threshold  toward  the  little 
finger  is  14  mm.,  while  the  two  corresponding  succession 
thresholds  are  5.7  mm.  and  3.5  mm. ;  the  simultaneous  diagonal 
toward  the  thumb  also  is  14  mm.,  while  the  two  corresponding 
succession  thresholds  are  3.3  mm.  and  3.3  mm.  In  other  words, 
the  succession  thresholds  are  much  lower  than  the  simultaneous 
ones  nearest  corresponding  to  them.  But  if  we  expect  that  the 
succession  thresholds  will  shorten  in  proportion  to  the  inverse 
length  of  the  interval  between  the  stimuli,  we  shall  find  little  to 
confirm  the  suspicion.  The  average  of  all  the  thresholds  for  the 
interval  2  seconds  with  C  is  about  4.6  mm.  ;  that  for  5  seconds 
about  4.55  mm. ;  that  for  10  seconds  about  5.03  mm.,  and  that 
for  15  seconds  about  4.1  mm.,  showing  a  slight  decrease  of  0.5 
mm.  between  the  thresholds  for  2  seconds  and  those  for  15  sec- 
onds, while  that  for  10  seconds  is  considerably  longer  than  that 
for  either  2  seconds  or  5  seconds.  This  is  not  a  sufficiently  defi- 
nite indication  to  generalize  upon. 

Going  on  to  Table  VII.,  showing  the  results  of  the  experi- 
ments with  W,  similar  conclusions  are  to  be  drawn.  That  the 
succession  thresholds  are  shorter  by  a  very  appreciable  amount 
(/^  to  K)  tnan  tne  corresponding  simultaneous  is  obvious.  As 
to  the  question  whether  the  threshold  decreases  as  the  interval 
increases,  however,  these  experiments  unite  in  indicating  an  op- 
posite effect  of  lengthening  the  time-interval.  The  difficulty  of 
retaining  the  first  stimulus  clearly  in  mind  during  the  longer  in- 
tervals, so  marked  in  the  case  of  W,  may  have  had  something 
to  do  with  this  result ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  tendency  of 
C  to  infer  was  no  doubt  assisted  by  the  increase  in  the  length  of 
the  interval,  as  it  gave  him  somewhat  more  time. 


6l2 


G.  A.   TAWNEY  AND    C.    W.  HODGE. 


TABLE  VII. 

Thresholds  on   the  left  forearm,  volar  side,  of  W.,  at  intervals  of 
2  sec.,  5  sec.,  10  sec.,  and  15  sec. 


2  SECONDS. 


AXES. 

DIAGONALS. 

EIGHT  DIRECTIONS. 

in. 

up. 

d. 

out. 

u-i. 

u-o. 

d-i. 

d-o. 

in. 

up. 

d. 

out. 

u-i. 

u-o. 

d-i. 

d-o. 

20+ 

12 

3 

5 

6 

3 

4 

i 

6 

5 

i3 

6 

9 

o 

10 

H 

17 

6 

6 

o 

3 

8 

3 

4 

5 

o 

3 

8 

i 

8 

8 

2 

5 

2 

2 

6 

20+ 

4 

3 

20+ 

7 

2 

0 

7 

7 

3 

7 

4 

3 

10 

3 

3 

'4 

6 

7 

2 

H 

5 

3 

ii 

3 

3 

ii 

10 

1.2 

7-5 

3-5 

4-5 

S.2 

5-2 

4.2 

6.7 

8 

3 

4-7 

8 

5 

4-5 

9 

7-5 

5  SECONDS. 


20+ 

5 

4 

ii 

8 

i 

7 

2 

8 

2 

IO 

4 

4 

8 

9 

5 

8 

5 

5 

5 

20+ 

3 

5 

2 

3 

12 

4 

7 

6 

6 

5 

7 

7 

3 

8 

8 

O 

7 

2 

1O 

10 

4 

2 

20+ 

5 

3 

3 

5 

4 

i 

2 

6 

6 

5 

5 

3 

4 

7 

2 

II 

2 

4 

o 

IO 

9-7 

3-5 

4-7 

7-5 

8-5 

4 

4-7 

4.2 

6.2 

6.2 

4-5 

10-5 

4.2 

5-2 

5-6 

7 

IO  SECONDS. 


2O+ 

J3 

0 

15 

4 

3 

4 

3 

15 

18 

2 

8 

3 

4 

5 

20+ 

5 

6 

2 

6 

10 

6 

3 

5 

18 

o 

5 

7 

3 

i 

2 

7 

8 

6 

3 

5 

8 

3 

2 

4 

6 

2O-J- 

i 

9 

4 

8 

4 

3 

20+ 

3 

4 

6 

20+ 

3 

2 

8 

6 

4 

10 

4 

9 

o 

6 

6 

13.2 

7 

3 

8 

10.5 

3-7 

2-7 

5 

ii 

10.5 

4-5 

7 

4-7 

4-3 

4.2 

9 

15  SECONDS. 


3 

9 

0 

5 

6 

4 

9 

5 

8 

o 

7 

8 

6 

8 

7 

18 

5 

4 

IO 

13 

7 

4 

9 

16 

2 

20+ 

7 

20+ 

7 

ii 

IO 

6 

9 

8 

4 

ii 

IO 

4 

2 

8 

10 

6 

6 

*3 

8 

3 

7 

20+ 

3 

3 

9 

4 

7 

12 

I 

3 

8 

4 

5 

3 

13 

6 

10 

I 

5 

6 

5-7 

8.2 

7-5 

6 

5-2 

8 

7 

7-5 

6.2 

ii 

8-5 

7 

8-5 

II.  2 

So  far  as  these  two  sets  of  experiments  go,  therefore,  we 
may  conclude  that  the  threshold  for  successive  stimuli  is  much 
shorter  than  that  for  simultaneous,  but  that  increasing  the  length 
of  the  interval  between  the  successive  stimuli  does  not  further 
shorten  it.  This  may  have  the  contrary  effect.  Throughout 


PRINCETON  PSYCHOLOGICAL   LABORATORY. 


613 


these  experiments  it  was  observed  that  the  same  questions  as  to 
the  relation  of  the  difference  to  the  direction  threshold  arose,  as 
in  the  former  series  of  experiments.  The  answer  *  different 
without  direction '  was,  however,  somewhat  more  frequent  in 
the  experiments  with  successive  stimuli,  than  in  those  with  sim- 
ultaneous stimuli ;  a  result  due,  no  doubt,  to  the  suggestive  effect 
of  the  succession. 

Table  VIII.,  corresponding  to  Table  IV.,  offers  a  summary 
view  of  the  part  played  by  suggestion  in  this  entire  group  of 
experiments.  It  will  not  be  necessary  to  add  to  what  has  been 
said  concerning  the  previous  table  of  the  same  kind. 

TABLE  VIII.  SUGGESTIVE  PROGRESSIONS. 

Showing  the  number  of  series  in  which  the  influence  of  suggestion 
is  obvious  ;  the  total  number  of  series  ;  the  lower  and  upper 
limits  of  thresholds  found,  together  with  their  mean  ;  the  num- 
ber of  single  wrong  answers  ;  and  the  ratio  of  wrong  answers 
which  seemed  due  to  suggestion  to  the  total  number  of  wrong 
answers. 


W 

C 

Numbers  of  Progressions,     

2CI 

226 

Numbers  of  Series,  

25? 

2C5 

1-18 

1-16 

Mean,      

9-5 

8-5 

Number  of  Wrong  Answers,     

KJOQ 

952 

Ratio  of  Suggestions  to  Wrong  Answers,    .    . 

1380:  1509* 

783  :  953 

There  seem  to  be  no  facts  in  connection  with  these  experi- 
ments with  successive  stimuli  which  do  not  readily  harmonize 
with  the  conclusion  as  to  the  nature  of  our  tactual  perception  of 
two  points  arrived  at  two  years  ago  as  a  result  of  a  series  of  ex- 
periments1 with  simultaneous  stimuli  in  Wundt's  institute,  viz., 
that  the  tactual  perception  of  two  points  is  an  assimilation  pro- 
cess, based  on  association,  in  which  visual  or  motor  images  are 
the  assimilating,  and  tactual  sensations  the  assimilated  factors. 
We  may  repeat  again  what  has  been  already  said,  that  the  local 
sign  is  no  simple  quality  of  tactual  sensations,  but  rather  a  rela- 
tion of  association  between  the  different  factors,  visual,  motor 

1  See  article  in  Phil.  Stud,  referred  to  above. 


614  G.  A.   TAWNEY  AND    C.    W.  HODGE. 

and  tactual,  which  enter  into  the  perception  image.  It  is  grati- 
fying to  find  that  Solomons1  has  recently  come  to  similar  con- 
clusions in  regard  to  the  nature  of  the  process  involved.  Aside 
from  his  statement  that  the  process  of  reducing  the  threshold  by 
practice,  "  as  well  as  its  general  bearing  on  the  origin  of  cuta- 
neous perceptions,  has  been  considered  only  speculatively " 
(which  is  not  literally  true),  his  results,  so  far  as  they  go,  ac- 
cord for  the  most  part  with  our  own. 

The  phenomenon  which,  more  than  any  other,  argues 
against  this  view  seems  to  be  the  answer  which  is  sometimes 
given  by  the  subject,  '  different  without  direction.'  But  we 
have  found  reason  for  believing  that  this  answer  is  either  an  in- 
ference from  data  other  than  tactual  or  a  sort  of  illusion  which 
arises  in  one  or  other  of  the  following  ways  :  either  some  non- 
spatial  qualitative  difference  between  the  sensations  calls  up 
visual  or  motor  images  in  which  this  difference  appears  as 
spatial,  or  some  suggestion  foreign  to  the  immediate  experience 
brings  into  consciousness  such  images,  and  the  tactual  sensa- 
tions are  wrongly  assimilated  to  them. 

1  Solomons  '  Discrimination  in  Cutaneous  Sensations,'  PSYCHOLOGICAL 
REVIEW,  Vol.  IV.,  pp.  246-250,  especially  p.  248. 


STUDIES  FROM  THE  HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL 
LABORATORY,  IX. 

COMMUNICATED   BY   PROFESSOR  E.  B.  DELABARRE. 

THE  FORCE  AND  RAPIDITY  OF  REACTION  MOVEMENTS. 

BY  E.  B.  DELABARRE,  ROBERT  R.  LOGAN  AND  ALFRED  Z.  REED. 
INTRODUCTORY   NOTE. 

It  has  long  seemed  desirable  to  measure,  in  the  taking  of  re- 
actions, not  only  the  reaction-time  itself,  but  also  the  degree  of 
pressure  used  by  the  subject  in  reacting  and  the  rapidity  with 
which  he  contracts  his  reacting  muscles.  Reflection  on  the 
possible  bearing  of  such  measurements  upon  the  matter  of 
individual  temperament,  and  the  opportunity  afforded  by  my 
recent  connection  with  the  Harvard  Laboratory,  led  me  to  de- 
vise the  apparatus  and  initiate  the  experiments  herein  described. 
The  number  of  persons  on  whom  measurements  were  taken  is 
not  large,  and  the  number  of  records  taken  in  the  case  of  each 
is  much  smaller  than  would  have  been  desirable.  Yet  the 
time  at  our  disposal  has  not  admitted  of  greater  accomplish- 
ment. I  publish  our  results  as  a  beginning  of  research  into 
this  problem,  and  because  they  establish  the  value  and  sug- 
gestiveness  of  this  inquiry,  and  the  facts  that  a  particular 
average  and  a  particular  range  of  force  and  of  rapidity  in  re- 
acting are  peculiar  to  each  individual.  They  may  possibly 
prove  so  typical  as  to  furnish  an  index  to  the  individual's  fun- 
damental characteristics  as  a  whole — a  possibility  which  I  plan 
to  discuss  in  a  separate  paper  on  the  Study  of  Temperament. 

I  cannot  refrain  from  expressing  my  deep  obligation  to  my 
two  collaborators  in  this  research,  who  have  conducted  the  ex- 
periments with  great  care  and  accuracy,  and  have  devoted  to  the 
research  an  amount  of  time  and  patience  far  in  excess  of  what 
was  demanded  by  their  duty  to  the  laboratory.  They  have 
jointly  contributed  the  following  account  of  the  details  of  the 
experiments.  E.  B.  D. 

615 


616  E.   DELABARRE,  R.  LOGAN  AND   A.  REED. 

I.    APPARATUS    AND    METHOD    OF    RESEARCH. 

The  apparatus  used  in  these  experiments  consisted  of  a 
revolving  drum,  on  which  were  recorded  a  time  line  indicating 
hundredths  of  a  second,  and  parallel  to  it  a  signal  line,  whose 
deviations  indicated  the  time  of  reaction  and  the  duration  of  the 
reacting  movement ;  a  signal  key,  arranged  to  break  a  circuit 
on  giving  the  signal  for  reaction  ;  and  a  special  apparatus  de- 
signed to  record  the  pressure  exerted  by  the  subject  in  reacting, 
and  to  close  an  electric  circuit  throughout  the  period  during 
which  his  muscles  are  contracting. 

The  latter  piece  of  apparatus  is  constructed  as  follows  :  A 
pair  of  metal  jaws  project  horizontally  from  a  vertical  wooden 
support.  They  are  of  such  size,  and  at  such  a  distance  apart, 
as  to  be  conveniently  grasped  in  the  hand,  or  between  the 
thumb  and  forefinger.  The  lower  one  is  hinged  to  its  support, 
so  that  it  can  be  moved  upward  by  the  force  of  the  grasp.  The 
upper  one  furnishes  a  firm  support  for  the  hand.  It  is  attached, 
not  directly  to  the  wooden  support,  but  to  a  heavy  metal  rim, 
which  latter  is  bolted  to  the  wood.  This  rim  surrounds  and  sup- 
ports the  upper  part  of  a  mercury  well,  whose  flexible  leather 
bottom  rests  on  the  lower  jaw,  and  is  raised  and  lowered  by  its 
movement.  A  glass  tube  projects  vertically  above  the  well,  and 
the  column  of  mercury  within  it  stands  at  a  fixed  zero  point 
when  the  lower  jaw  is  in  its  normal  resting  position,  to  which 
it  can  be  adjusted  by  a  screw.  When  the  hand  contracts  and 
the  movable  jaw  is  raised,  the  mercury  column  is  forced  up- 
ward in  the  tube  to  a  height  varying  with  the  amount  of  pressure 
exerted,  and  with  the  particular  point  on  the  jaw  to  which  the 
pressure  is  applied.  This  point  of  application  of  force  is  dif- 
ferent when  the  jaws  are  grasped  by  the  whole  hand  from  what 
it  is  when  their  ends  are  held  between  thumb  and  forefinger. 
Two  scales  are  therefore  provided  alongside  the  tube,  indicat- 
ing in  kilograms  the  pressure  exerted  in  either  case.  An  indi- 
cator, made  of  felt,  rises  with  the  mercury  column,  but  fits  too 
tightly  in  the  tube  to  fall  back  with  it.  It  is  pushed  back  to 
the  zero  point,  after  each  experiment,  by  the  weight  of  a  thin 
rod  which,  when  not  in  use  for  this  purpose,  hangs  suspended 
with  its  end  just  within  the  top  of  the  tube. 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  617 

This  arrangement  works  with  great  ease,  responding  deli- 
cately to  the  slightest  movement  of  reaction.  The  kilogram 
divisions  are  so  far  apart  (for  the  most  part  about  an  inch)  that 
tenths  can  be  easily  estimated.  Various  conditions  introduce  an 
error  by  affecting  the  normal  mercury  level,  but  this  error  prob- 
ably does  not  exceed  one  or  two  tenths  of  a  kilogram. 

The  duration  of  the  reacting  movement  is  recorded  on  the 
drum  by  means  of  an  electric  contact  made  at  the  instant  the 
movable  jaw  begins  to  rise  and  maintained  throughout  its  up- 
ward movement.  For  this  purpose  a  thin  steel  lever  is  pro- 
vided, turning  upon  a  pivot  tight  enough  to  prevent  it  from  fall- 
ing by  its  own  weight.  By  means  of  a  screw,  its  height  can  be 
so  adjusted,  that  when  at  rest  its  movable  end  will  almost,  but 
not  quite,  be  in  contact  with  the  movable  end  of  the  lower  jaw. 
The  moment  the  latter  begins  to  move  upward,  contact  is  made  ; 
the  moment  it  begins  to  drop  back  again,  contact  is  broken.  In 
practice  it  was  found  that  the  adjusting  screw  was  unnecessary ; 
for  when  the  lever  was  pressed  directly  down  upon  the  jaw  its 
slight  recoil  due  to  the  friction  at  its  pivot,  was  sufficient  to  just 
raise  it  from  actual  contact. 

Electrical  connections  were  made  as  follows  :  From  the  bat- 
teries to  the  recording  pen,  thence  to  a  brake  for  starting  and 
stopping  the  drum ;  from  the  metal  frame  of  the  latter  to  the 
signal  key  and  from  the  signal  key  to  the  batteries ;  thus  com- 
pleting the  circuit,  closed  when  the  signal  key  is  in  normal  posi- 
tion, open  when  the  signal  is  given.  The  attachment  to  the 
brake  of  the  drum  is  merely  a  switch  to  keep  the  circuit  open 
when  the  drum  is  not  being  used ;  when  the  brake  is  taken  off 
the  governor,  it  is  pushed  over  toward  the  metal  framework ; 
thus  closing  the  circuit  at  the  same  time  that  the  drum  is  made 
to  revolve.  Another  circuit  is  made  by  connections  from  the 
signal  key  to  the  contact  lever  of  the  reaction  apparatus,  and 
from  the  batteries  to  its  movable  jaw,  in  such  a  way  that  the 
circuit,  which  is  interrupted  by  the  giving  of  the  signal,  is  closed 
again  by  the  reaction. 

The  experiments  were  conducted  as  follows  : 

The  subject  is  seated  in  a  chair  beside  the  table  upon  which 
the  reaction  apparatus  is  placed,  with  his  right  elbow  resting 


618  E.  DELABARRE,  R.  LOGAN  AND  A.  REED. 

upon  a  cushion  ;  it  is  important  that  the  subject's  position  should 
be  as  comfortable  as  possible,  in  order  to  avoid  fatigue.  The 
subject  is  then  directed  to  take  hold  of  the  jaws  with  the  thumb 
and  forefinger  of  the  right  hand,  the  thumb  resting  upon  the 
upper  one  about  an  inch  from  the  end  and  the  forefinger 
lightly  touching  the  under  part  of  the  lower  one  at  a  like 
distance  from  the  end.  It  is  well,  in  fact  almost  necessary, 
to  have  two  experimenters  or  operators,  one  to  start  and 
stop  the  drum  and  give  the  signal,  the  other  to  record  the 
pressure  as  indicated  by  the  mercury  column,  to  push  the 
indicator  back  to  zero,  to  adjust  the  connection  between  lever 
and  jaw  and  to  see  that  the  subject  keeps  his  fingers  in 
the  same  position  upon  the  jaws.  The  subject  being  told  to 
what  signal  he  is  to  react  (the  sound  made  by  the  striking  of 
the  signal  key)  and  instructed  to  think  only  of  making  a  quick  re- 
action, allowing  the  force  of  the  reaction  to  take  care  of  itself,  the 
first  operator  starts  the  drum,  thus  closing  the  circuit  and  bring- 
ing the  recording  pen  slightly  over  to  the  right.  When  the 
drum  has  reacted  its  normal  speed  the  operator  strikes  down 
the  signal  key,  and  keeps  it  pressed  down,  thus  breaking  the 
circuit  and  throwing  the  recording  pen  back  to  its  original  po- 
sition. The  subject,  upon  hearing  the  signal,  reacts  by  bring- 
ing together  his  thumb  and  finger,  thus  forcing  the  mercury  up 
into  the  tube  and  making  the  circuit  by  the  connection  between 
lever  and  jaw,  which  brings  the  recording  pen  once  more  to  the 
right  and  marks  the  time  required  for  the  reaction.  So  long  as 
the  subject  continues  his  pressure  the  circuit  remains  closed,  but 
the  moment  he  ceases,  the  jaw  drops  away  from  the  lever,  the  cir- 
cuit is  broken  and  the  recording  pen  goes  back  to  the  left,  thus 
marking  the  duration  of  the  reactioning  movement.  The  first 
operator  then  stops  the  drum  and  releases  the  key,  while  the 
second  records  the  pressure  and  readjusts  the  contact  lever  and 
the  pressure  indicator.  It  is  better  that  the  subject  keep  his 
eyes  closed  during  each  experiment,  that  his  next  reaction  may 
not  be  influenced  by  seeing  what  pressure  he  has  exerted.  He 
should  also  be  warned  not  to  grasp  the  jaws  tightly  while  wait- 
ing for  the  signal,  for  the  slightest  raising  of  the  lower  jaw 
brings  it  into  contact  with  the  lever.  At  the  end  of  the  experi- 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  619 

ment  the  first  operator  moves  the  drum  along  horizontally,  so 
that  the  pens  will  have  fresh  surface  to  mark  on,  and  is  then 
ready  for  the  next  experiment.  It  was  found  that  space  on  the 
cylinder  was  saved  by  moving  the  drum  along  after  each  ex- 
periment rather  than  arranging  it  to  move  automatically  to  one 
side  at  the  same  time  that  it  revolves.  From  thirteen  to  sixteen 
records  could  be  taken  on  a  single  roll  of  smoked  paper. 

The  object  of  these  experiments  being  to  determine  the  in- 
dividual peculiarities  of  the  subject's  manner  of  reacting,  it  was 
desirable  to  turn  away  his  attention  as  much  as  possible  from 
the  reacting  movement  itself,  in  order  that  attention  to  it  might 
not  interfere  with  its  being  carried  out  unconsciously  and 
naturally.  In  the  above  described  simple  reaction  experiments 
this  aim  was  largely  secured,  since  the  subject  was  fully  occu- 
pied with  the  endeavor  to  react  as  quickly  as  he  could.  Besides 
the  simple  reactions,  however,  another  series  was  taken  of  as- 
sociative reactions,  in  the  hope  that  the  greater  degree  of  con- 
centration required  in  the  search  for  an  association  would  with- 
draw the  attention  still  more  fully  from  the  reaction  movement. 
The  time  of  association  itself  was  recorded.  But  since  its  dura- 
tion was  not  the  prime  object  of  investigation,  the  operators  con- 
tented themselves  with  the  accuracy  obtainable  by  the  endeavor 
on  the  part  of  signal  giver  and  reactor  to  speak  their  words  as 
simultaneously  as  they  could  with  the  pressing  of  their  keys ; 
and  used  no  special  apparatus  to  make  this  simultaneity  absolute. 

II.    EXPLANATION    OF   TABLES. 

The  subjects  were  fifteen  in  number.  They  are  designated  at 
the  head  of  the  tables  by  letters  of  the  alphabet.  On  each  subject 
two  series  of  experiments  were  performed.  Series  I.  deals  with 
simple  reactions,  Series  II.  with  association  reactions.  In  each 
series  the  results  are  set  down,  in  the  order  in  which  the  ex- 
periments were  performed,  in  three  columns.  Column  7?  gives 
the  reaction  time  (simple  or  associated)  expressed  in  thousandths 
of  a  second  (a).  Column  D  gives  the  *  duration  time ;'  the 
period,  that  is  to  say,  during  which  the  pressure  of  the  reacting 
muscles  increases  in  intensity,  and  is  expressed  also  in  thous- 
andths of  a  second.  Column  P  gives  the  maximum  pressure 


620  E.  DELABARRE,  R.  LOGAN  AND  A.  REED. 

expressed  in  tenths  of  a  kilogram.  In  all  three  columns  alike, 
the  last  digit  of  the  tabulated  quantity  was  estimated  by  the  eye, 
the  remaining  digits  being  recorded  by  mechanical  means. 

In  addition  to  these  three  columns  of  figures,  which  repre- 
sent the  direct  results  of  experimentation,  the  pressure  index  of 
each  experiment  has  been  divided  by  the  corresponding  dura- 
tion time,  and  the  quotient  expressed  accurately  to  two  places  of 
decimals.  Since  P  is  expressed  in  tenths  of  a  kilogram  and  D 
in  thousandths  of  a  second,  this  quotient  shows  the  average  num- 
ber of  hectograms  (or,  considered  not  as  a  fraction  but  as  a 
whole  number,  the  average  number  of  grams)  of  pressure 
exerted  by  the  contracting  muscles  during  each  a  of  their  con- 
traction.. It  is  therefore  an  index  to  the  rapidity  with  which  the 
movement  of  contraction  is  executed. 

Finally  the  average  and  the  average  variation  of  columns 

p 
7?,  P  and  -^-,  have  been  worked  out. 

An  asterisk  (*)  in  the  first  three  columns  indicates  that  ow- 
ing to  imperfections  in  the  mechanical  records  the  numerical  re- 
sult is  missing ;  or,  when  figures  are  given,  that  they  are  not 
absolutely  trustworthy.  The  asterisk  has  been  inserted  when- 
ever there  was  the  slightest  question  as  to  the  exact  figures.  In 
every  other  case  the  operators  feel  confident  of  the  entire  accu- 
racy of  their  results,  except  in  so  far  as  the  final  digits  are  sub- 
ject to  errors  in  assessment. 

The  letter  A  placed  before  any  quantity  signifies  that  that 
quantity  has  not  been  reckoned  in  making  up  the  average  and 
average  variation  of  the  column ;  and  the  letter  A  placed  out- 
side, on  the  left  of  the  columns  of  figures,  signifies  that  none  of 
the  quantities,  on  the  line  on  which  it  stands,  have  been  reck- 
oned in  making  up  these  averages.  The  A  is  usually  added  in 
case  of  possible  inaccuracy  marked  by  the  asterisk ;  and  is  also 
employed  when  one  quantity  or  set  of  quantities  shows  a  strik- 
ing and  unexplained  divergence  from  the  other  quantities  in  that 
series. 

It  will  also  be  observed  that  when  the  asterisk  shows  pos- 
sible inaccuracy  in  a  duration  time  or  pressure  index,  the  corre- 

p 
spending  -jj  relation  has  not,  as  a  rule,  been  worked  out. 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY. 

A. 


621 


SERIES  I. 

SERIES  II. 

R 

D 

P 

P 
0 

R 

D 

P 

P 
T5 

A33i 

332 

63 

0.19 

534 

792 

37 

0.05 

260 

35° 

69 

0.19 

769 

419 

68 

0.16 

275 

490 

79 

0.16 

761 

453 

62 

0.14 

234 

302 

So 

0.17 

73<> 

524 

57 

O.II 

173 

482 

97 

O.2O 

886 

505 

70 

0.14 

231 

331 

61 

0.18 

690 

554 

75 

0.14 

225 

339 

68 

0.20 

940 

519 

63 

0.12 

1  80 

373 

43 

O.  II 

827 

45o 

59 

0.13 

221 

404 

59 

0.15 

900 

572 

7i 

0.12 

A37I 

340 

67 

O.2O 

753 

590 

70 

0.12 

224 

312 

64 

0.21 

636 

671 

77 

O.II 

220 

345 

63 

0.18 

614 

543 

88 

0.16 

264 

336 

64 

0.19 

726 

484 

82 

0.17 

A 

187 

*37' 

68 

Average  .  .  . 

228 

65 

0.18 

751 

544 

68 

0.13 

Av.  Var.  .  .  . 

22 

8 

O.O2 

89 

78 

9 

O.O2 

B. 


SERIES  I. 

SERIES  II. 

R 

D 

P 

P 
D 

R 

D 

P 

P 
TJ 

225 

276 

54 

0.2O 

802 

321 

66 

O.2I 

251 

*287 

63 

O.22 

* 

* 

66 

226 

258 

55 

O.2I 

* 

• 

59 

219 

337 

74 

O.22 

726 

250 

52 

O.2I 

209 

346 

85 

0.25 

675 

285 

54 

O.I9 

175 

238 

Si 

O.2I 

775 

294 

58 

O.2O 

207 

165 

37 

0.23 

669 

297 

54 

0.18 

202 

229 

47 

O.2I 

683 

218 

48 

O.22 

290 

200 

46 

0.23 

1086 

274 

45 

0.16 

A393 

232 

52 

O.22 

840 

399 

70 

0.18 

181 

247 

53 

O.2I 

998 

325 

52 

0.16 

185 

196 

45 

0.23 

740 

292 

58 

O.2O 

216 

196 

42 

O.2I 

5o8 

222 

51 

0.23 

236 

2OI 

47 

0.23 

225 

*i89 

44 

0.23 

Average  .  .  . 

218 

53 

O.22 

773 

56 

0.19 

Av.  Var.  .  .  . 

21 

9 

0.01 

116 

6 

0.02 

622  E.  DELABARRE,  R.  LOGAN  AND  A.  REED. 

C. 


SERIES  I. 

SERIES  II. 

R 

D 

P 

P 
D 

R 

D 

P 

P 
D 

146 

263 

105 

Ao.40 

Sio 

525 

A+IIO* 

220 

366 

88 

0.22 

43° 

667 

"3 

O.I? 

152 

474 

A+I20* 

280 

448 

in 

0.25 

207 

37° 

"5 

0.31 

360 

440 

no 

0.25 

2OI 

307 

83 

O.27 

437 

445 

105 

0.24 

268 

294 

86 

0.29 

335 

445 

91 

0.2O 

154 

320 

88 

0.27 

285 

455 

84 

0.18 

146 

298 

87 

0.29 

Ai45 

670 

107 

0.16 

225 

312 

86 

0.28 

500 

575 

100 

0.18 

134 

273 

75 

0.27 

410 

7i5 

95 

0.13 

170 

500 

*I20 

0.24 

70S 

440 

98 

O.22 

97 

486 

101 

O.2I 

457 

35° 

70 

0.20 

390 

410 

85 

O.2I 

Average  . 

.   177 

94 

O.27 

425 

95 

0.2O 

Av.  Var.  . 

37 

12 

O.O2 

Si 

ii 

0.03 

D. 


SERIES  I. 

SERIES  II. 

R 

D 

P 

P 
D" 

R 

D 

P 

p 

D 

"5 

124 

# 

1062 

395 

79 

O.2O 

A39o 

248 

3° 

0.  12 

I524 

410 

67 

0.16 

1  80 

170 

39 

0.23 

1167 

412 

73 

0.18 

160 

145 

35 

O.24 

1435 

360 

62 

0.17 

145 

223 

47 

0.21 

1760 

340 

65 

0.19 

161 

235 

49 

O.2I 

"74 

35° 

60 

0.17 

A  2  2O* 

A240* 

32 

1080 

320 

64 

0.2O 

154 

235 

So 

0.21 

1376 

327 

69 

0.21 

ISO 

175 

35 

O.2O 

1610 

308 

67 

0.21 

162 

278 

43 

0.15 

1090 

35° 

74 

O.2I 

148 

263 

54 

O.2I 

1667 

324 

68 

O.2I 

1  68 

267 

44 

0.16 

990 

345 

77 

O.22 

166 

300 

58 

0.19 

167 

315 

60 

0.19 

145 

298 

52 

0.17 

Average  . 

155 

45 

0.19 

1328 

69 

0.19 

Av.  Var.  . 

12 

8 

0.03 

234 

5 

O.O2 

HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY. 

E. 


623 


SERIES  I. 

SERIES  II. 

R 

D 

P 

P 
D" 

R 

D 

P 

P 

iy 

185 

358 

54 

0.15 

871 

380 

5» 

0.13 

143 

327 

60 

0.18 

A987* 

A456* 

52 

159 

278 

49 

0.18 

AJ588 

371 

55 

0.15 

155 

287 

So 

0.17 

915 

279 

36 

0.13 

ISO 

224 

46 

0.21 

737 

350 

So 

0.14 

178 

178 

40 

O.22 

955 

409 

42 

O.IO 

140 

175 

A35* 

694 

A870 

47 

147 

219 

42 

0.19 

706 

'297 

54 

0.18 

190 

215 

40 

0.19 

570 

282 

50 

0.18 

191 

191 

4i 

0.21 

664 

283 

52 

0.18 

167 

194 

4i 

0.21 

654 

253 

46 

0.18 

190 

191 

37 

O.ig 

* 

• 

45 

157 

15° 

33 

O.22 

* 

* 

51 

624 

312 

48 

0.15 

Ai293 

484 

66 

0.14 

Average  . 

166 

44 

O.ig 

739 

50 

0.15 

Av.  Var.  . 

17 

6 

O.O2 

104 

4 

O.O2 

F. 


SERIES  I. 

SERIES  II. 

R 

D 

P 

P 

D~ 

R 

D 

P 

p 

D 

220 

200 

59 

0.29 

710 

630 

67 

O.I  I 

200 

170 

53 

0.31 

IIIO 

340 

54 

0.16 

2OO 

295 

58 

O.2O 

1035 

375 

68 

0.18 

195 

222 

So 

0.23 

970 

500 

75 

0.15 

1  86 

366 

56 

0.15 

900 

335 

70 

0.21 

125 

315 

52 

0.17 

1150 

337 

67 

0.20 

180 

320 

70 

0.22 

830 

361 

69 

0.19 

140 

320 

6l 

0.19 

981 

328 

63 

0.20 

"5 

260 

69 

O.27 

1760 

400 

58 

0.14 

"5 

315 

54 

0.17 

1712 

340 

61 

0.18 

165 

280 

56 

O.2O 

880 

365 

76 

0.21 

1  60 

265 

54 

0.2O 

Average  . 

167 

58 

O.22 

1094 

66 

0.18 

Av.  Var.  . 

30 

5 

O.O4 

246 

5 

0.02 

624  E.  DELABARRE,  R.  LOGAN  AND  A.  REED. 

G. 


SERIES  I. 

SERIES  II. 

R 

D 

P 

p 

D 

R 

D 

P 

P 

D 

328 

412 

56 

0.14 

1460 

481 

83 

0.17 

252 

473 

54 

O.II 

1098 

469 

73 

0.16 

3H 

223 

34 

0.15 

A  I  105* 

A40O* 

5° 

231 

463 

63 

0.14 

Ai7io* 

A42O* 

50 

2IO 

290 

37 

0.13 

862 

383 

55 

0.14 

243 

270 

37 

0.14 

800 

317 

35 

O.II 

222 

263 

37 

0.14 

822 

332 

37 

O.II 

230 

256 

36 

O.I4 

1073 

328 

37 

O.II 

207 

467 

63 

O.I3 

780 

549 

34 

0.06 

216 

367 

57 

0.16 

599 

834 

32 

0.04 

264 

350 

5i 

0.15 

828 

489 

35 

0.07 

22O 

202 

34 

0.17 

848 

547 

36 

0.07 

360 

234 

33 

0.14 

193 

352 

41 

0.12 

Average  . 

249 

45 

0.14 

917 

46.5 

O.IO 

Av.  Var.  . 

39 

10 

O.OI 

176 

13 

0.04 

H. 


SERIES  I. 

SERIES  II. 

R 

D 

P 

P 
TT 

R 

D 

P 

p 
D 

ASOO 

435 

70 

o.  16 

* 

* 

62 

160 

350 

70 

O.2O 

IIOO 

556 

98 

0.18 

126 

300 

61 

0.20 

1304 

438 

95 

O.22 

155 

360 

80 

O.22 

895 

480 

84 

0.17 

165 

310 

65 

O.2I 

700 

494 

60 

O.I2 

162 

292 

So 

0.17 

855 

343 

70 

O.2O 

218 

305 

49 

0.16 

590 

400 

77 

0.19 

130 

360 

75 

O.2I 

897 

408 

61 

0.15 

142 

34° 

70 

O.2I 

1333 

355 

45 

0.13 

122 

400 

82 

O.2O 

790 

618 

90 

0.15 

144 

493 

88 

0.18 

1875 

607 

58 

O.IO 

165 

463 

99 

0.21 

I70 

400 

84 

O.2I 

. 

155 

413 

88 

0.21 

Average  . 

155 

74 

0.2O 

1034 

73 

0.16 

Av.  Var.  . 

17 

ii 

O.O2 

275 

15 

0.03 

HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY. 


625 


J- 


SERIES  I. 

SERIES  II. 

R 

D 

P 

p 

D" 

R 

D 

P 

P 
"5 

A 

350 

294 

43 

1203 

621 

88 

0.14 

293 

401 

53 

0.13 

2271 

577 

67 

0.12 

183 

300 

43 

0.14 

1300 

542 

67 

0.12 

249 

347 

47 

0.14 

1423 

573 

68 

0.12 

173 

4°3 

56 

0.14 

A556 

A975 

74 

190 

430 

60 

0.14 

1222 

724 

77 

O.II 

147 

418 

49 

0.12 

II9O 

561 

83 

0.15 

1  88 

457 

53 

O.I2 

1594 

586 

62 

O.II 

299 

432 

63 

0.15 

1490 

5H 

59 

O.II 

200 

475 

60 

O.I3 

I097 

A386* 

67 

180 

487 

57 

0.  12 

IOO9 

486 

69 

0.14 

172 

470 

54 

0.12 

194 

481 

61 

0.13 

Average  . 

206 

55 

0.13 

1380 

71 

0.12 

Av.  Var.  . 

37 

5 

0.01 

252 

7 

0.01 

K. 


SERIES  I. 

SERIES  II. 

R 

D 

P 

P 

D 

R 

D 

P 

P 
D 

227 

321 

A38 

AO.I2 

I39i 

331 

7i 

0.21 

229 

403 

69 

0.17 

995 

359 

73 

O.2O 

158 

355 

69 

0.19 

984 

372 

72 

O.I9 

181 

340 

66 

0.19 

I73i 

320 

64 

0.20 

181 

288 

54 

0.19 

1818 

348 

73 

0.21 

204 

256 

59 

0.23 

1131 

354 

61 

0.17 

291 

341 

69 

O.2O 

1217 

408 

75 

0.18 

167 

232 

53 

0.23 

1152 

326 

69 

O.2I 

173 

301 

58 

O.lg 

1337 

363 

77 

0.21 

169 

320 

57 

o.iS 

1494 

291 

63 

0.22 

175 

302 

60 

O.2O 

* 

ASIO 

65 

165 

266 

53 

O.2O 

1037 

355 

67 

0.19 

180 

267 

58 

O.22 

1113 

353 

73 

0.21 

174 

207 

46 

0.22 

Average  . 

191 

59 

O.2O 

1283 

69 

0.2O 

Av.  Var.  . 

27 

6 

O.OI 

226 

4 

O.OI 

626  E.  DELABARRE,  R.  LOGAN  AND  A.  REED. 

L. 


SERIES  I. 

SERIES  II. 

R 

D 

P 

P 

D 

R 

D 

P 

P 
D 

143 

464 

42 

0.09 

629 

293 

49 

0.17 

127 

238 

.  32 

0.14 

384 

219 

38 

0.17 

iS3 

264 

41 

0.16 

481 

378 

54 

0.14 

1  88 

134 

20 

0.15 

415 

292 

40 

0.14 

1  66 

236 

37 

0.16 

402 

411 

47 

0.  II 

153 

244 

40 

o.  16 

602 

336 

47 

0.14 

164 

230 

47 

O.2O 

473 

401 

43 

O.II 

173 

156 

35 

O.22 

540 

290 

4i 

0.14 

i5i 

205 

43 

O.2I 

455 

379 

57 

0.15 

no 

177 

37 

O.2I 

703 

307 

42 

0.14 

150 

180 

35 

O.I9 

575 

373 

5i 

0.14 

163 

217 

4i 

0.19 

952 

260 

44 

0.17 

# 

* 

24 

73i 

266 

46 

0.17 

Average  . 

153 

37 

O.I7 

565 

46 

0.15 

Av.  Var.  . 

*4 

6 

0.03 

124 

4 

O.O2 

M. 


SERIES  I. 

SERIES  II. 

R 

D 

P 

P 
D 

R 

D 

P 

p 

D 

176 

437 

87 

O.20 

1107 

307 

66 

0.21  (I) 

1  80 

294 

60 

O.2O 

1058 

321 

57 

0.18  (I) 

250 

205 

40 

O.2O 

881 

944 

59 

0.06  (2) 

165 

170 

39 

0.23 

IIIO 

755 

57 

0.08  (2) 

180 

174 

41 

O.24 

1  200 

795 

52 

0.07  (2) 

163 

295 

60 

O.2O 

700 

250 

5o 

0.20  (l) 

190 

162 

43 

O.27 

# 

* 

54 

175 

123 

33 

O.27 

1310 

520 

58 

O.II  (2) 

215 

226 

47 

O.2I 

* 

* 

45 

170 

154 

40 

0.26 

1345 

1007 

63 

O.06  (2) 

195 

277 

60 

O.22 

803 

1165 

45 

0.04  (2) 

I5o 

251 

57 

0.23 

1  120 

420 

56 

O.I3  (2) 

165 

225 

49 

O.22 

1  80 

272 

60 

0.22 

Average  . 

182 

5i 

0.23 

1063 

55 

O.II 

Av.  Var.  . 

17 

ii 

O.O2 

l62 

5 

O.O5 

(0   (2) 

Average  . 

O.2O  O.O8 

Av.  Var.  . 

0.01  0.02 

HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY. 

N. 


627 


SERIES  I. 

SERIES  II. 

R 

D 

P 

P 
D" 

R 

D 

P 

P 
TJ 

205 

320 

47 

0.15 

907 

830 

7» 

0.09 

280 

355 

51 

0.14 

* 

* 

70 

1  80 

247 

66 

0.27 

905 

550 

61 

O.I  I 

280 

216 

65 

0.30 

805 

530 

75 

0.14 

185 

255 

56 

O.22 

800 

520 

59 

O.II 

A 

336 

274 

58 

O.2I 

575 

58o 

69 

0.12 

222 

232 

63 

O.27 

565 

545 

66 

O.I2 

219 

261 

74 

0.28 

460 

615 

77 

0.13 

2OS 

141 

56 

0-39 

535 

617 

65 

O.II 

263 

186 

62 

0-33 

505 

485 

7» 

O.IS 

256 

202 

61 

0.30 

700 

660 

80 

O.I2 

204 

182 

64 

0-35 

662 

612 

76 

0.12 

209 

170 

57 

o-34 

625 

675 

70 

0.10 

620 

399 

65 

0.16 

690 

360 

52 

O.I4 

Average  . 

226 

60 

0.28 

668 

68 

0.12 

Av.  Var.  . 

3° 

6 

0.06 

114 

6 

O.OI 

o. 


SERIES  I. 

SERIES  II. 

R 

D 

P 

P 
D 

R 

D 

P 

P 
D" 

270 

433 

103 

0.24 

614 

563 

80 

0.14 

380 

338 

61 

0.18 

700 

360 

69 

0.19 

395 

386 

7i 

o.iS 

800 

517 

78 

0.15 

170 

360 

74 

O.2I 

685 

* 

81 

175 

370 

83 

O.22 

817 

466 

78 

0.17 

225 

392 

79 

O.2O 

937 

570 

83 

0.15 

179 

440 

85 

O.I9 

760 

430 

62 

0.14 

290 

400 

78 

O.I9 

400 

360 

61 

0.17 

2IO 

335 

7i 

O.2I 

265 

521 

79 

0.15 

204 

255 

58 

0.23 

AI795 

* 

73 

190 

215 

5° 

0.23 

820 

360 

68 

0.19 

230 

165 

50 

0.30 

205 

200 

58 

O.29 

Average  . 

240 

7i 

O.22 

680 

74 

0.16 

Av.  Var.  . 

57 

12 

0.03 

152 

7 

0.02 

628  E.  DELABARRE,  R.  LOGAN  AND  A.  REED. 

P. 


SERIES  I. 

SERIES  II. 

R 

D 

P 

P 

D 

R 

D 

P 

P 
D 

A 

320 

225 

45 

O.2O 

1240 

506 

40 

Ao.oS 

237 

180 

3i 

0.17 

1176 

317 

43 

0.14 

207 

270 

34 

0.13 

1057 

242 

39 

o.  16 

200 

187 

32 

0.17 

1026 

Aio8o 

32 

215 

152 

32 

O.2I 

"95 

234 

33 

0.14 

215 

165 

30 

0.18 

1491 

255 

* 

275 

333 

36 

O.II 

1380 

212 

31 

0.15 

265 

175 

*20  + 

0.14 

990 

196 

35 

0.18 

2IO 

195 

33 

0.17 

1796 

35° 

43 

O.I2 

222 

166 

3i 

0.19 

A2320 

270 

43 

o.  16 

A 

199 

385 

32 

Ao.oS 

1730 

265 

37 

0.14 

213 

206 

32 

0.16 

870 

345 

45 

0.13 

270 

287 

47 

0.16 

23I 

276 

44 

0.16 

Average  . 

230 

216 

34 

0.16 

1268 

38 

0.15 

Av.  Var.  . 

21 

50 

4 

O.O2 

241 

4 

O.OI 

III.    RESULTS. 

The  present  operators  have  had  but  little  time  to  devote  to  the 
interpretation  of  their  results.  But  even  so,  several  facts  can 
be  pointed  out,  which  certainly  do  not  prove  laws,  but  which  as 
certainly  are  suggestive  and  point  the  way  to  development  by 
future  workers  in  this  fascinating  research. 

i.  First,  what  perhaps  we  should  have  been  led  a  priori  to 
expect,  is  corroborated.  Divide  -Pby  D,  the  pressure  index  by 
the  duration  time,  and  the  resultant  quotient,  representing  the 
rapidity  of  contraction  of  the  reacting  muscles,  tends,  for  the 
same  individual  and  the  same  series,  to  be  constant.  Look,  for 
instance,  examining  the  tables  almost  at  random,  at  B  I ;  where 
the  pressure  varies  from  37.5  up  to  85,  the  duration  varies  so 

P 
uniformly  in   proportion,  that   the  quotients  -jj  are   all    found 

within  a  range  of  0.05 — from  0.20  to  0.25  ;  where  there  was  an 
average  variation  in  the  case  of  P.  of  9,  there  is  an  average 


HAR  YARD  PS  YCHOLOGICAL  LABOR  A  TOR  Y. 

TABULAR  SUMMARY. 


SUBJECT  AND 
SERIES. 

PRESSURE. 

RAPIDITY. 

Max. 

Min. 

Av 

Av. 
Var. 

Med.* 

Max. 

Min. 

Av 

Av. 
Var. 

Med.» 

A  I 

97 

43 

65 

8 

64 

.21 

.11 

.18 

.02 

.19 

II 

88 

37 

68 

9 

70 

•17 

•05 

•13 

.02 

•13 

B  I 

85 

37 

53 

9 

Si 

•25 

.20 

.22 

.01 

.22 

II 

70 

45 

56 

6 

54 

•23 

.16 

.19 

•02 

.20 

C  I 

"5 

75 

94 

12 

88 

•31 

.21 

.27 

.02 

.27 

II 

"3 

70 

95 

II 

100 

•25 

•13 

.20 

•03 

.20 

D  I 

60 

30 

45 

8 

45 

.24 

.12 

.19 

•03 

.20 

II 

79 

62 

69 

5 

68 

.22 

.16 

.19 

.02 

.20 

E  I 

60 

33 

44 

6 

42 

.22 

•15 

•19 

.02 

.I9 

II 

66 

36 

50 

4 

5i 

•  l8 

.10 

•15 

.02 

•15 

F  I 

70 

50 

58 

5 

55 

•31 

•15 

.22 

.04 

.20 

II 

76 

54 

66 

5 

67 

.21 

.11 

.18 

.02 

.18 

G  I 

63 

33 

45 

10 

39 

•'7 

.11 

.14 

.01 

.14 

II 

83 

32 

46 

13 

37 

•17 

.04 

.10 

.04 

.11 

H  I 

99 

49 

74 

ii 

70 

.22 

.16 

.20 

.02 

.21 

II 

98 

45 

73 

15 

70 

.22 

.10 

.16 

•03 

.16 

J  I 

63 

43 

55 

5 

54 

•15 

.12 

•13 

.01 

•13 

II 

88 

59 

71 

7 

68 

•15 

.11 

.12 

.01 

.12 

K  I 

69 

46 

59 

6 

58 

•23 

•17 

.20 

.01 

.20 

II 

75 

61 

69 

4 

7i 

.22 

•17 

.20 

.01 

.20 

L  I 

47 

20 

37 

6 

37 

.22 

.09 

•17 

•03 

•17 

II 

57 

38 

46 

4 

46 

•17 

.11 

.15 

.02 

.14 

M  I 

87 

33 

5i 

ii 

48 

•27 

.20 

•23 

.02 

.22 

II 

66 

45 

55 

5 

55 

.21 

.04 

.11 

•05 

.09 

N  I 

74 

47 

60 

6 

61 

•39 

.14 

.28 

.06 

.28 

II 

80 

52 

68 

6 

70 

.16 

.09 

.12 

.01 

.12 

0  I 

103 

5° 

7' 

12 

7i 

•30 

.18 

.22 

•03 

.21 

II 

83 

61 

74 

7 

78 

.19 

.14 

.16 

.02 

•»5 

P  I 

47 

30 

34 

4 

32 

.21 

.11 

.16 

.02 

.16 

II 

45 

31 

38 

4 

39 

.18 

.12 

•IS 

.01 

.14 

variation  in  the  case  of  y^-  of  only  o.oi. 

2.  Secondly,  there  are  well  marked  differences  in  rapidity 

between  the  different  individuals,  and  between  the  two  series  of 

the   same   individual.      These  differences   are  of  two  kinds : 

*In  column  '  Med.'  is  given  the  '  Median'  as  distinguished  from  the  average. 


630  E.  DELABARRE,  R.  LOGAN  AND  A.  REED. 

P 

First,  absolute.  The  average  value  of  -j=r  in  Series  I.  for  sub- 
ject J  is  0.13  ;  for  N  it  is  0.28.  J's  maximum  is  0.15  ;  N's 
minimum  is  0.14.  They  then  just  overlap  ;  but  J's  minimum 
is  o.i 2,  and  N's  maximum  0.39.  The  second  way  in  which 

P 

individuals  differ  is  in  this  range  of   variation  in  value  of  -^. 

Compare  the  comparative  constancy  of  subjects  J,  H,  B  and  M 
in  Series  I.,  with  the  extraordinary  freedom  from  law  and  the 
trammels  of  consistency,  which  C,  F  and  N  display. 

3.  Thirdly,  it  is    observable  that  although   the  two  series 
overlap  each  other  a  great  deal,  yet  in  no  case  is  the  maximum 

P 

value  of  -win  Series  II.  greater  than  in  Series  I. ;  and  in  no 

case  is  the  average  value  in  Series  II.  the  greater.  How  far 
this  uniform  lessening  in  rapidity  in  Series  II.  is  due  to  untraced 
workings  of  consciousness,  and  in  how  far  to  the  frequently 
observed  tendency  of  the  reagent  in  Series  II.  to  increase  his 
duration  time  by  starting  to  react  before  he  had  really  found  his 
associated  idea,  is  a  question  for  subsequent  investigation  to  de- 
termine. 

4.  Although  the  range  of  variation  in  pressure  is  larger  than 
in  rapidity,  yet  similar  observations  can  be  made  for  it  also. 
The  degree  of  pressure  exerted  and  the  range  of  its  variation 
are  characteristic  of  the  individual.     Each  has  his  own  special 
tendencies  and  his  own  limits  of  variation,  differing  from  those 
of   the  others.     Some  exert  little  pressure  in  reacting,  some 
much.       Some   are  fairly    constant,   while  others  range    over 
varying  pressures  whose  extremes   are  widely  apart.     In  the 
majority  of  cases  a  comparison  of  the  two  series  shows  for 
each  individual  a  manner  of  reacting  similar  in  both  series,  even 
though  the  absolute  values  of  average  and  limits  may  differ  in 
the  two.     This  correspondence  of  the  two  series,  in  spite  of  the 
small    number   of    experiments    entering  into    each,   furnishes 
strong  evidence  that  we  here  gain  insight  into  fundamental 
characteristics  of  the  individual. 

5.  If  we  compare  Series  I.  with  Series  II.,  it  will  be  noted 
that  in  every  case  but  one  the  average  pressure  is  greater  in 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  631 

Series  II. ;  whereas  it  has  been  seen  that  the  rapidity  is  greater 
in  Series  I.  Both  facts  might  easily  be  due  to  the  above  men- 
tioned increase  in  duration  of  the  reacting  movement. 

Many  further  questions  readily  present  themselves.     What 

p 
relations,  if  any,  has  R  in  either  series  to  P  or  to  D  or  to  -v>  ? 

So  far  as  this  investigation  can  show,  there  would  seem  to  be  no 
fixed  relation  between  them.  Will  further  research  confirm  the 
hypothesis  so  strongly  supported  by  the  experiments  here  re- 
ported, namely,  that  everyone  has  his  own  personal  and  com- 
paratively constant  manner  of  reacting,  his  own  usual  degree 
of  rapidity  and  of  force  in  making  movements  when  his  atten- 
tion is  not  occupied  with  the  way  in  which  he  carries  them  out, 
and  his  own  limits  of  possible  variation  from  their  average  ? 
Under  what  circumstances  does  he  vary  in  particular  ways  with- 
in these  limits  ?  What  is  the  cause  of  these  individual  tenden- 
cies and  differences  ?  Are  they  affair  of  mood,  or  of  tempera- 
ment, or  of  other  causes  ?  Are  the  values  found  in  simple 
reactions,  or  in  associative  reactions,  or  in  both  together,  or  even 
in  some  other  yet  uninvestigated  form,  more  characteristic  of  the 
individual  ?  These  questions,  and  many  more  which  easily 
arise,  can  be  answered  only  by  spending  much  time  and  labor 
in  collecting  more  data  along  these  lines ;  and  still  more  time 
and  labor  in  digesting  and  interpreting  the  data  so  obtained. 


AFTER-SENSATIONS  OF  TOUCH. 

BY  FRANK  N.  SPINDLBR. 

The  subject  of  investigation  for  this  series  of  experiments 
has  been  what  are  generally  called  After-images  of  Touch, 
but  which  should  more  properly  be  called  After-Sensations  of 
Touch.  The  word  Image  applies  well  to  the  case  of  after- 
effects of  sight,  but  would  seem  to  have  no  particular  applica- 
tion to  the  after-feeling  of  a  sensation  of  touch. 

We  are  all  more  or  less  familiar  with  after-sensations  of  all 
sorts,  but  the  very  fact  that  these  after-sensations  are  so  com- 


632  FRANK  H.   SPINDLER. 

mon  and  often  undifferentiated,  makes  them  very  difficult  to 
study  with  any  accuracy.  Most  of  us  have  never  attended  to 
an  after-sensation  of  touch  or  pressure  long  enough  to  be  cer- 
tain of  its  quality  or  duration.  These  sensations  are  all  merged 
into  the  general  and  common  muscular  and  organic  feelings 
and  hence  pass  unnoticed. 

An  after-sensation  of  touch  or  pressure  by  no  means  im- 
plies any  illusion  as  to  the  pressure  still  continuing.  The  ex- 
periment is  often  tried  of  blindfolding  a  person  and  then  pressing 
a  coin  upon  the  forehead ;  on  removing  it  the  subject  will  not 
for  some  time  notice  that  it  is  gone.  We  often  feel  a  pen  be- 
hind the  ear  even  after  it  is  no  longer  there,  or  think  our  hat  is 
on  when  it  is  off.  But  in  all  these  cases  a  little  analysis  would 
enable  the  subject  to  distinguish  between  the  actual  touch  or 
pressure  and  the  after-sensation.  The  latter  is  qualitatively,  as 
well  as  quantitatively,  distinct  from  the  actual  feeling  of  the 
stimulation. 

The  literature  on  the  subject  of  after-sensations  of  touch  is 
meagre.  Many  psychologists  make  no  mention  whatever  of 
the  subject,  while  others  refer  to  it  but  briefly. 

James,  speaking  in  general  of  after-sensations  of  all  kinds, 
says  that  the  nervous  matter  has  an  inertia  and  elasticity,  a  cer- 
tain time  of  stimulation  is  necessary  to  excite  any  kind  of  a 
sensation,  a  certain  time  then  conversely  might  be  expected  to 
be  necessary  for  the  sensation  to  fade  away.  Sensations  then 
outlast,  for  a  little  time,  the  objective  stimuli  which  occasion 
them.  They  show  that  profound  rearrangements  and  slow  set- 
tlings into  a  new  equilibrium  are  going  on  in  the  neural  sub- 
stance. 

Baldwin,  speaking  of  after-sensations  in  a  general  way,  says 
likewise :  "  There  is  a  vibratory  persistence,  in  the  nervous  or- 
ganism, of  peripheral  shocks,  which  tends  to  continue  the  central 
process  and  its  accompanying  mental  state.  And  the  same  resi- 
dum  or  after-effect  is  also  probably  a  mental  necessity,  since  time 
is  needed  for  the  shifting  movements  of  attention  in  its  transi- 
tion to  new  experiences ;  during  this  period  there  is  nothing  to 
drive  the  former  experience  from  consciousness  and  it  persists  a 
noticeable  time." 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY.  633 

If  we  turn  to  Kiilpe  we  find  an  attempt  to  give  a  more  par- 
ticular description  of  the  actual  mechanism  of  after-sensation. 
He  fails,  however,  to  distinguish  between  two  completely  dis- 
tinct types  of  after-effect  in  the  field  of  contact  and  pressure. 
A  light,  quick  touch  on  some  portions  of  the  skin  occasions  not 
only  an  ordinary  sensation  of  contact,  but  also,  after  a  brief  in- 
terval— a  second  or  less — a  second  quick  pulse  of  sensation. 
To  observe  this,  the  stimulating  object  must  be  immediately 
removed,  else  the  secondary  sensation  will  be  drowned  in  the 
continuing  primary  sensation.  This  effect,  however,  is  not  at 
all  analogous  to  the  after-images,  positive  and  negative,  which 
occur  in  vision  and  in  other  senses,  due  to  continuance  of  the 
excitation  in  the  peripheral  organ,  or  to  a  restoration  of  its 
equilibrium,  after  the  stimulation  has  ceased.  Yet  the  sense  of 
touch  presents  after-sensations  of  this  kind  also,  and  these 
Kiilpe  does  not  mention.  His  theoretical  discussion  as  to 
whether  the  after-sensation  is  due  to  a  double  path  of  conduc- 
tion through  the  spinal  cord,  or  to  the  existence  and  cooperation 
of  centrifugal  with  centripetal  sensory  fibers,  applies  only  to  the 
brief  secondary  sensation  after  brief  stimulation — the  first  type  of 
after-effect  mentioned  above.  The  present  study,  however,  has 
been  only  of  the  after-sensations  of  the  other  type — the  varying 
sensations  which  follow  the  cessation  of  a  more  or  less  pro- 
longed stimulation  of  the  skin  by  means  of  pressure. 

To  investigate  these  weights  were  used  of  from  25  up  to 
i  ,000  grams.  These  were  placed  upon  a  brass  holder  with  a 
round  base  seven-eighths  of  an  inch  in  diameter,  covered  on  the 
bottom  with  paper,  so  as  to  prevent  differences  of  temperature 
between  the  metal  and  the  skin. 

The  weights  were  applied  to  the  backs  of  the  hands,  these 
being  the  most  convenient  parts  of  the  body  to  practice  on  and 
also  the  parts  especially  susceptible  to  pressure  sensations. 
They  were  left  in  contact  during  lengths  of  time  varying  from 
five  seconds  to  ten  minutes.  Record  was  then  made  of  the  dif- 
ferent sensations  following  their  removal. 

These  experiments,  however,  labor  under  the  disadvantage 
of  being  entirely  dependent  upon  introspection  for  results,  and 
also  of  dealing  with  very  vague,  indefinite  and  irregular  phe- 


634  FRANK  H.   SPINDLER. 

nomena.  It  is  difficult  to  judge  accurately  the  presence  and 
nature  of  these  after-sensations ;  to  distinguish  them  from  the 
subjective  sensations  easily  discoverable  whenever  attention  is 
directed  to  the  skin ;  to  analyze  them  out  from  among  the  mass 
of  organic  feelings  with  which  they  so  easily  fuse ;  to  deter- 
mine the  moment  of  their  appearance  or  disappearance. 

There  is  a  marked  difference  in  subjects  as  to  their  power 
to  discriminate  these  after-sensations.  Some  are  very  sensitive 
to  them  and  get  all  sorts  of  after-sensations,  while  others  can- 
not get  any  whatever,  although  their  failure  is  probably  due  to 
lack  of  practice  in  introspection. 

The  physical  and  mental  condition  of  the  subject  has  a 
marked  effect.  If  the  subject  is  tired  or  sick,  or  gloomy,  the 
after-sensations  are  dull  and  shorter  continued  than  when  the 
subject  is  well  and  cheerful.  In  the  writer's  own  introspection 
he  found  that  when  he  was  melancholy  and  in  a  state  of  general 
depression  or  exhaustion,  with  languid  circulation  and  slow 
pulse  beat,  there  would  be  hardly  any  after-sensations  experi- 
enced at  all,  even  after  long  stimulation,  while  in  a  more  cheer- 
ful and  active  state  of  mind  and  body  the  after-sensations 
would  be  vivid  and  long  continued  even  after  brief  stimulation. 
This  difference  is  doubtless  due,  in  part,  to  the  fact  that,  when 
depressed,  one  is  skeptical  of  any  feeling  or  sensation  of  any 
kind.  In  view  of  these  difficulties  it  is  not  surprising  that  the 
most  striking  characteristic  of  the  results  we  have  gained  consists 
in  their  extreme  irregularity  and  apparent  inconsistency.  It  seems 
impossible  to  establish  any  definite  and  consistent  relation  be-, 
tween  the  time  of  stimulation  and  the  duration  of  the  after-sensa- 
tion, or  between  the  degree  of  pressure  and  the  duration  or 
vividness  of  the  after-effect.  Such  indefinite  formulation  as  is 
possible,  however,  will  be  attempted  in  the  following  account  of 
our  results. 

I.  SHORTEST  DURATION  OF  STIMULATION  NECESSARY  FOR  THE 
APPEARANCE  OF  AN  AFTER-SENSATION. 

It  was  found  that  100  gms.  for  5  seconds  gave  no  percep- 
tible after-sensation,  but  only  a  feeling  of  relief  on  removal  of 
the  weight ;  25  gms.  for  i  minute,  gave  a  strong  after-sensation 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY. 


635 


lasting  3  minutes  ;  150  gms.  for  5  seconds,  however,  gave  a  weak 
after-sensation  in  the  shape  of  a  feeling  of  warmth  and  contrac- 
tion, lasting  about  ten  seconds  ;  150  gms.  for  5  seconds  then  was 
about  the  lowest  threshold  as  to  time  of  stimulation. 


2.    INTERVAL    BETWEEN     END    OF     STIMULATION    AND    APPEAR- 
ANCE   OF    AFTER-SENSATION. 

There  occurs  always  a  certain  interval  between  the  removal 
of  the  stimulus  and  the  conscious  beginning  of  the  after-sensa- 
tions. The  average  duration  of  all  these  intervals,  in  this 
series  of  experiments,  was  about  36^  seconds.  Their  length 
varies  with  the  time  of  stimulation,  as  will  be  seen  from  the  fol- 
lowing table  for  different  stimulations  of  from  10  seconds  up  to 
10  minutes.  Each  interval  here  given  is  an  average  from  sev- 
eral trials : 


TIME  OF  STIMULATION. 

INTERVAL. 

DURATION  OF  AFTER- 
SENSATION. 

10  seconds. 

5  seconds. 

30  seconds. 

30      « 

10          " 

4^  minutes. 

I  minute. 

39 

5 

2  minutes. 

47  #    " 

4#       " 

3       " 

i  minute,  21%  seconds. 

5          "  and  18  seconds. 

5       " 

44  seconds. 

9 

10          " 

44K    " 

10 

There  appears  to  be  but  little  relation  here,  either  between 
the  duration  of  the  stimulation  and  the  length  of  the  interval 
between  end  of  stimulation  and  after-sensation,  or  between  the 
length  of  the  stimulation  and  the  duration  of  the  after-sensation 
itself.  The  intervals,  however,  seem  to  increase  up  to  stimula- 
tions of  3  minutes'  duration  and  then  to  drop  again,  being  about 
the  same  for  a  5  or  a  10  minute  stimulation  as  for  a  2  or  a  3 
minute  one. 

3.    DURATION    OF    THE    AFTER-SENSATION. 

The  absence  of  any  fixed  dependence  of  the  duration  of  the 
after-sensation  upon  the  time  of  stimulation  is  also  apparent 


636  FRANK  H.  SPINDLER. 

from  the  above  table.  For  any  time  of  stimulation  from  I  to  3 
minutes  the  after-sensation  seems  to  be  about  the  same  in 
duration,  that  is  about  5  minutes ;  while  for  a  5  to  10  minute 
stimulation  the  average  after-sensation  lasts  10  minutes. 

It  is  absolutely  impossible  to  have  these  results  exactly  accu- 
rate, for  the  after-sensations  of  touch  fade  away  so  gradually, 
and  it  is  so  easy  to  call  them  back  even  an  hour  after  first  ceas- 
ing to  notice  them,  that  to  say  absolutely  when  they  stop  is  not 
possible.  Under  the  most  careful  attention,  however,  they  seem 
not  to  last  more  than  10  minutes  at  most.  Their  later  recur- 
rence is  apparently  not  actually  a  matter  of  direct  after-effect, 
but  rather  a  result  of  turning  attention  to  the  skin,  which 
always  easily  arouses  subjective  sensations,  without  previous 
special  stimulation. 

The  most  that  we  can  say  is  that  there  seems  to  be  a  ten- 
dency for  a  longer  stimulation  to  produce  a  longer  after-sensa- 
tion, but  not  a  relatively  longer  one.  For  example,  stimula- 
tions of  i  minute  produce  after-sensations  averaging  5  minutes 
in  duration,  while  stimulations  of  10  minutes  average  10  min- 
utes ;  those  of  5  minutes  produce  after-sensations  averaging  9 
minutes,  and  those  of  2  or  3  minutes  produce  after-sensations 
averaging  5  minutes. 

There  seems  then  to  be  a  limit  to  the  time  the  after-sensa- 
tion can  naturally  continue,  and  a  longer  stimulation  cannot 
produce  a  proportionately  longer  after-sensation.  Indeed,  there 
may  be  a  tendency  in  a  long  continued  touch  or  pressure  to 
deaden  the  nervous  sensibility,  as  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose 
nerve  substance  to  be  capable  of  indefinite  reaction  without  ex- 
haustion and  lethargy. 

It  might  be  supposed  that  there  would  be  a  more  definite 
relation  between  the  heaviness  of  the  weights  used  and  the  dura- 
tion and  strength  of  the  after-sensations.  We  might  expect 
perhaps  that  the  heavier  the  weight,  the  longer  and  more  vivid 
the  after-sensation  would  be.  But  here  also  the  results  are 
very  irregular,  as  the  following  tables  will  show. 

The  weights  of  from  150  to  500  grams  seem  to  produce  the 
longest  after-sensations,  but  even  this  is  contradicted  in  the 
cases  of  stimulation  of  5  minutes'  duration,  where  100  grams 


HARVARD  PSYCHOLOGICAL  LABORATORY. 


637 


WEIGHT. 

TIME  OF  PRESSURE. 

AVERAGE  DURATION  OF 
AFTER-SENSATION. 

loo  gms. 

minute. 

4 

minutes  and  48  seconds. 

ISO        " 

" 

3 

ii 

200       " 

ii 

8 

"         "    30        " 

500     " 

ii 

7 

«            «     12           " 

IOOO       " 

6 

II 

100  gms. 

2  minutes. 

4 

minutes. 

150     " 

2           " 

5 

"        and   6  seconds. 

200     " 

2           « 

4 

•  «         ««    jg       « 

500     " 

2          " 

7 

ii 

IOOO       " 

2 

5 

M 

100  gms. 

3  minutes. 

5 

minutes  and  18  seconds. 

500     " 

3        " 

10 

(i 

IOOO       " 

3        " 

7 

«          «i    ^o        " 

loo  gms. 

5  minutes. 

10 

minutes. 

150     " 

5        " 

8 

« 

200       " 

5        " 

8 

"        and  18  seconds. 

500     " 

5        " 

8 

ii 

IOOO       " 

5        " 

7 

"    3° 

100  gms. 

10  minutes. 

7* 

i  minutes. 

150     " 

10        " 

10 

<i 

200     " 

10        " 

IO 

M 

1000       " 

10          " 

7* 

II 

for  5  minutes  gives  a  10  minute  after-sensation.  These  results 
may  seem  erratic,  but,  as  has  been  said,  the  introspection 
necessary  to  distinguish  the  cessation  of  an  after-sensation  of 
touch  is  extremely  difficult.  The  effect  is  one  that  fades  gradu- 
ally away  and  the  exact  moment  when  the  sensation  is  dropped 
from  consciousness  is  hard  to  decide. 

It  is  noticeable,  however,  that  1,000  grams  in  every  case  pro- 
duced a  shorter  after-sensation  than  did  500  grams,  or  even  150 
or  200  grams,  for  the  same  time  of  pressure.  This  would  agree 
with  Bain's  assertion  that  the  papillae  touched  lightly  give 
a  greater  reaction  than  when  a  heavy  weight  is  applied,  for  the 
latter  seems  to  deaden  the  conductibility  of  the  nerves  and  gives 
comparatively  little  sensation. 


638  FRANK  H.   SPINDLER. 

4.    QUALITY  AND    VARIETY    OF    THE    AFTER-SENSATIONS. 

To  the  writer's  own  introspection  an  after-sensation  of 
touch  assumes  simply  a  feeling  of  contraction  as  if  the  spot 
were  painted  with  collodion  or  mucilage.  This  contracted  feel- 
ing was  generally  strongest  at  from  2  to  3  minutes  after  the 
removal  of  the  stimulus  and  then  faded  gradually  away.  But 
other  subjects  got  more  of  a  richness  and  variety  of  feeling  out 
of  their  after-sensations  than  this.  They  got  the  feeling  of  con- 
traction of  the  skin,  but  also  temperature  sensations,  both  warm 
and  cold,  external  smarting  sensations,  and  also  a  deeper  dull 
ache.  Let  me  give  a  subject's  account  of  an  after-sensation.  100 
grams  were  applied  for  5  minutes.  After  a  negative  interval  of 
40  seconds  after  removal  of  weight  a  touch  sensation  was  felt. 
At  i  minute,  warmth ;  i  minute  20  seconds,  very  warm  with 
touch  sensations ;  2  minutes,  pain  with  heat ;  3  minutes,  touch 
again  more  prominent,  and  also  a  feeling  of  contraction  in  the 
spot,  the-pain  and  touch  alternate ;  5  minutes,  principally  pain  ; 
7  minutes,  pain,  unpleasant;  8  minutes,  pain  in  whole  hand, 
contracted  feeling  in  the  spot  brought  out  on  bending  the  hand ; 
9  minutes,  pain  fades ;  10  minutes,  no  sensation. 

Here  we  have  a  fairly  constant  touch  sensation  together  with 
alternating  pain  and  temperature,  and  finally  the  pain  alone 
persisting  and  then  fading.  This  subject  sometimes  had  sensa- 
tions of  cold  as  well  as  of  heat. 

Another  experiment,  on  another  subject,  gave  the  following 
results  :  One  hundred  grams  were  applied  to  back  of  right  hand 
for  i  minute ;  negative  interval  of  i  minute.  After  one  minute,  a 
slight  cold  feeling  felt  in  spot;  after  2  minutes,  colder;  after 
2.y2  minutes,  warmth;  after  4  minutes,  pain  deep  seated  in 
hand ;  after  seven  minutes,  vague  discomfort ;  after  9  minutes, 
cold ;  after  9  minutes  20  seconds,  no  sensation. 

In  this  subject  then  we  see  temperature  sensation  in  waves, 
also  a  touch  sensation  as  of  contraction  of  the  skin  and  also  a 
deeper  seated  pain. 

Another  subject  got  even  a  more  remarkable  lot  of  feelings 
out  of  the  after-sensations. 

In  one  experiment,  for  example,  100  grams  were  applied  for 
5  minutes,  negative  interval  of  50  seconds.  After  i  minute,  a 


HAR  YARD  PS  VCHOL  O  GICAL  LABOR  A  TOR  Y.  639 

drawing  sensation ;  after  i  minute  and  20  seconds,  itching ; 
after  i  minute  and  50  seconds,  deep,  dull  ache  ;  after  2  minutes, 
warm,  feverish  sensation;  after  2^  minutes,  sharp  pain,  with 
waves  of  heat;  after  3^  minutes,  dull  ache;  after  4  minutes, 
sharp  toothache  pain ;  after  5  minutes,  decided  dull  ache ;  after 
6  minutes,  decided  dull  ache ;  after  7  minutes,  decided  dull 
ache;  after  8  minutes,  intervals  of  no  sensation;  after  8y£  min- 
utes, heat ;  after  9  minutes,  slight  heat ;  after  10  minutes,  no 
sensation.  There  are  here  two  surface  sensations — one  of  touch, 
the  other  of  smarting  ;  and  also  a  deeper  dull  ache — besides  the 
temperature  sensations,  which  were  pronounced  sometimes  cold 
and  sometimes  hot. 

This  subject  had  indeed  a  remarkable  faculty  of  getting  sen- 
sations. In  several  instances  with  him  the  weight  was  placed 
on  one  hand  and  then  the  attention  was  fixed  upon  a  symme- 
trical spot  on  the  other  hand.  The  spot  on  the  hand  actually 
pressed  would  force  itself  upon  the  attention  after  an  interval 
and  give  sensations  of  touch,  heat,  etc.,  but  the  hand  where  the 
spot  was  attended  to  without  previous  pressure  would,  after  a  few 
minutes,  go  through  the  same  series  of  sensations  as  the  actually 
stimulated  spot,  although  not  at  first  so  intensely.  But  if  this 
subject  kept  his  attention  turned  to  a  spot  on  the  hand  its  sen- 
sations become  in  time  exceedingly  disagreeable. 

As  for  the  writer's  own  introspection  in  regard  to  an  actually 
stimulated  spot  on  one  hand  and  a  symmetrical  spot  on  the 
other  hand  simply  attended  to,  the  actually  stimulated  spot 
seemed  to  yield  a  stronger  after-sensation  than  the  sensation 
which  arose  in  the  spot  merely  attended  to,  and  of  a  different 
quality  of  sensation,  yet  so  similar  that  some  might  call  it 
merely  a  difference  of  degree. 

The  very  fact,  however,  that  by  turning  our  attention  to  a 
spot  we  can  cause  lasting  and,  indeed,  even  painful  sensations, 
seemingly  as  strong  as  those  given  by  actually  stimulated  spots, 
and  to  some  subjects  qualitatively  the  same,  increases  enor- 
mously the  difficulty  of  investigating  the  actual  after-effects  of 
stimulation  themselves.  This  difficulty  we  have  kept  in  mind, 
and  have  eliminated,  so  far  as  possible,  its  influence  in  the 
records  whose  results  are  above  tabulated. 


640  FRANK  H.   SPINDLER. 

We  may  sum  up  the  results  of  this  study  very  briefly,  as 
follows : 

The  minimal  time  of  stimulation  which  will  yield  an  after- 
sensation  of  the  kind  under  investigation  is  about  5  seconds, 
with  a  pressure  of  150  grams. 

The  relation  between  the  duration  of  stimulation  and  the 
length  of  the  interval  which  elapses  before  the  appearance  of 
the  after-sensation  is  very  irregular.  The  intervals  increase  up 
to  stimulations  of  about  3  minutes,  and  then  again  decrease. 

The  duration  of  the  after-sensation  increases  with  the  dura- 
tion of  stimulation,  though  without  any  discoverable  regularity. 
It  is  possible  that  there  is  a  limit  to  this  increase — a  possibility 
which  we  have  not  subjected  to  full  investigation. 

The  longest  duration  of  after-sensations  is  given  by  pres- 
sures of  from  150  to  500  grams.  Above  and  below  these  limits 
of  pressure  the  duration  decreases. 

In  quality  the  after-sensations  are  very  variable. 

The  writer  could  discover  no  waves  in  his  own  after-sensa- 
tions, but  only  a  steady  persistent  feeling  of  contraction.  Other 
subjects,  however,  experienced  waves  of  heat,  of  pain,  etc. ; 
but  they  also  in  most  cases  felt  a  steady  persistent  underlying 
touch  or  contraction  sensation,  lasting  through  the  dull  aches, 
the  smarts,  and  the  heat  or  cold. 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS. 

THE   COLOR-VISION   OF  APPROACHING   SLEEP. 

The  experiment  of  Mr.  Havelock  Ellis  on  the  color  producing 
properties  of  mescal  (noticed  in  the  September  number  of  this  RE- 
VIEW), gives  me  occasion  for  describing  an  experience  of  my  own 
which  I  have  not  seen  referred  to  by  others.  It  sometimes  happens  to 
me  to  fall  asleep  over  a  book,  and  upon  such  occasions  I  sometimes 
catch  a  play  of  various  colors  upon  the  printed  page.  The  first  time 
that  this  occurred  I  was  very  nearly  sound  asleep,  although  my  eyes 
were  still  open.  The  colors  were  very  brilliant,  and  they  presented  a 
rather  regular  wavy  pattern  in  red  and  green,  something  like  this : 


I  should  mention  that  I  am  rather  more  apt  than  most  people  to 
go  to  sleep  piecemeal,  if  I  may  express  it  so.  I  have  more  than  once  con- 
tinued reading  aloud,  so  as  to  be  understood,  for  a  full  sentence  or  two 
after  I  had  absolutely  lost  consciousness  of  what  I  was  doing.  Upon 
the  occasion  I  refer  to  I  was  certainly  waked  up  suddenly  from  distinct 
slumber  by  the  startlingly  brilliant  colors  on  the  page  before  me.  They 
were  so  interesting,  as  soon  as  I  caught  sight  of  them,  that  they  caused 
me  to  become  at  once  wide  awake,  and  then  they  immediately  disap- 
peared. This  experience  of  seeing  very  pure  and  brilliant  colors  I 
have  had  only  half  a  dozen  times  in  all, — the  first  case  occurring 
about  a  year  ago.  But  since  I  have  become  familiar  with  the  phe- 
nomenon, I  can  see  any  evening,  as  soon  as  I  begin  to  get  sleepy, 
that  the  page  before  me  is  broken  up  into  largish  patches  of  violet  and 
a  complementary  yellowish  green,  neither  brilliant  nor  saturated.  If 
the  page  is  a  newspaper,  or  other  irregular  surface,  it  is  evident  that 
the  violet  color  covers  its  shadier  portions. 
641 


642          THE  COLOR-VISION  OF  APPROACHING  SLEEP. 

The  occasions  when  the  phenomenon  was  distinctly  different  from 
this,  of  which  I  have  notes  made  at  the  time,  are  the  following : 

The  page  had  rather  even,  smaller  patches  of  brilliant  green  and 
blue ;  each  letter,  of  a  rather  coarse  print,  had  a  brilliant  border  of 
green ;  no  other  color  was  seen  at  this  time ;  the  white  spaces  between 
the  print-lines  of  a  page  of  the  Archiv  fur  Ophthalmologie  were  of 
a  bright  green,  not  at  all  yellowish. 

Once  only  there  were  three  colors  present,  all  very  brilliant  and  of 
fundamental  tone.  The  usual  patches  of  red  and  green  were  separ- 
ated from  each  other  by  a  band  of  even  width  of  intense  blue. 

As  some  irregularity  of  accommodation  has  seemed  to  me  to  be 
among  the  possible  causes  of  the  phenomenon,  I  have  frequently  pre- 
pared for  a  nap  by  arranging  in  my  field  of  view  a  white  surface  with 
darker  objects  raised  two  millimetres  above  it,  and  by  the  side  of  it 
a  dark  surface  with  white  elevations.  But,  upon  all  such  occasions, 
if  I  have  fallen  asleep  at  all,  it  has  been  without  catching  the  phe- 
nomenon. It  is  possible  that  mere  fatigue — general  fatigue,  of 
course,  not  visual  fatigue — is  the  sufficient  explanation,  as  suggested 
by  Mr.  Havelock  Ellis  in  cases  of  neurasthenia  and  of  mescal  in- 
toxication. It  is  also  possible  that,  in  the  colors  which  are  of  normal 
occurrence,  the  violet  is  due  to  some  reconstruction  of  the  visual  pur- 
ple, and  that  the  green  is  the  green  of  contrast.  I  am  familiar  with 
the  color  of  the  visual  purple  when  seen  subjectively,  for  I  have  no 
trouble  in  getting  at  any  time  the  normal  erythropsia  described  lately 
by  Dr.  Ernst  Fuchs.  (See  this  REVIEW,  Vol.  IV.,  p.  221.)  Some 
years  ago,  after  walking  over  a  bright  pavement  in  a  glaring  sunlight, 
with  one  eye  covered,  in  preparation  for  an  experiment,  I  found  that  I 
could  get  this  effect  very  brilliantly,  and  that  it  lasted  for  a  long  time 
— much  longer  than  four  minutes.  The  fact  that  it  was  only  in  one 
eye,  and  that  the  sensation  of  the  other  eye  served  to  prevent  the 
rapid  fading  out  which  occurs  when  any  sensation  is  widespread  and 
continuous,  made  the  circumstances  peculiarly  favorable. 

I  confirm  Fuchs'  observation  that  the  color  does  not  extend  quite  so 
far  as  the  field  of  vision,  and  that  it  is  wanting  at  the  centre.  The 
color-tone  of  this  normal  erythropsia  is  quite  the  same  as  that  of  the 
violet  on  going  to  sleep.  The  other  colors  have,  of  course,  no  con- 
nection with  this,  but  they  belong,  I  believe,  to  a  much  deeper  degree 
of  sleep.  I  have  frequently  experienced  the  green  vision  (as  well  as  the 
erythropsia)  upon  the  first  instant  of  waking  up  in  the  morning.  This 
was  explained  by  its  discoverer  as  being  due  to  the  green  fibres 
awakening  a  little  sooner  than  the  other  two  kinds — those  both  awak- 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS. 


643 


ening  together,  apparently !  A  recent  writer  in  the  Wissenschaft- 
liche  Rundschau  believes  it  to  be  the  contrast  effect  of  the  red  caused 
by  the  blood  vessels  of  the  eye,  to  which  a  sensitiveness  persists  for  a 
few  moments ;  but  if  this  were  the  correct  explanation  it  would  seem 
that  the  red  ought  also  to  be  perceived,  which  is  not  the  case. 

I  should  be  interested  to  know  if  any  one  else  gets  these  colors 
upon  the  on-coming  of  sleep. 

C.  L.  FRANKLIN. 

BALTIMORE. 


PROFESSOR   WUNDT'S   *  UEBER    NAIVEN    UND    KRIT- 
ISCHEN    REALISMUS.'1 

In  this  article  Professor  Wundt  handles  with  marked  critical  in- 
sight and  thoroughness,  some  of  the  crucial  problems  which  arise  in 
the  so  called  Immanental  Philosophy  of  such  men  as  Schuppe, 
Schubert-Soldern  and  Rhemke. 

The  burden  of  his  criticism  is  that  the  logic  of  the  system  brings 
it  into  immediate  conflict  with  the  basal  principles  of  Natural  and 
Psychological  Science  as  well  as  with  their  accredited  results. 

I.  In  denying  any  transcendence  of  the  object  the  Immanental 
Philosophy  runs  counter  to  the  naive  consciousness  as  well  as  the 
scientific  critical  reconstruction  of  the  same.  Believing  with  all  other 
theories  of  knowledge  in  touch  with  the  realistic  tone  of  the  time, 
that  we  must  retrace  the  steps  of  original  naive  knowledge  undisturbed 
by  reflection,  except  in  so  far  as  needed  to  correct  errors,  the  Imma- 
nental Philosophy  sets  about  the  task  of  correction.  This  is,  how- 
ever, nothing  less  than  an  attempt  to  sweep  away  the  whole  '  absurd  ' 
notion  of  a  transcendental  object.  It  is  concluded  that  if  a  transcen- 
dence of  all  experience  is  inconceivable,  it  is  likewise  impossible  to 
conceive  of  a  transcendence  of  consciousness,  and  so  all  reality  is  re- 
duced to  conscious  content,  as  immanent  in  the  subject.  This  recon- 
struction of  naive  thought,  since  it  takes  away  its  fundamental  concept, 
is  impossible  either  for  it  or  for  the  scientific  reconstruction  of  the 
same.  Natural  Science  recognizes  all  elements  as  objective  reality 
which,  without  contradictions  among  themselves,  remain  after  all  ab- 
straction of  subjective  perception.  She  rests  her  whole  claim  to  ob- 
jectivity upon  the  possibility  of  abstracting  from  the  subject,  and  goes 
out  from  the  principles  :  "Jeden  Inhalt  der  nai'ven  Erfahrungsa 

1  An  abstract  of  Professor  Wundt's  article  in  Philosophische  Studien,  XII., 
XIII.,  1896,  1897. 


644  NAIVE  AND    CRITICAL  REALISM. 

lange  als  gegeben  anzuerkennen  als  er  nicht,  durch  nachivetsbare 
Widerspriiche,  zu  denen  dies  fuhrt,  als  ein  blosser  Schein  nach- 
ge-wiesen  set"  Now  the  point  that  Prof  essor  Wundt  makes,  and  very 
properly  too,  is  that  this  criterion  of  objectivity  is  part  of  the  logic 
of  Natural  Science,  and,  since  scientific  processes  are  but  a  refinement 
of  common  naive  knowledge  (with  this  advantage :  that,  by  a  long 
development  through  experience  and  reflection  subjective  elements 
have  been  eliminated,  and  a  settled  logic  of  scientific  thought  at- 
tained) scientific  criteria  of  objectivity  are  final  for  any  theory  of 
knowledge.  The  Immanental  Philosophy,  in  denying  the  concept  of 
transcendent  objectivity,  in  reducing  all  reality  to  conscious  con- 
tent, runs  up  against  the  logic  of  the  sciences. 

II.  But  the  believer  in  the  idea  that  esse=percipi  has  found  in  more 
recent  times  a  new  criterion  which  may  be  substituted  for  the  scien- 
tific.    He  argues  that  the  latter,  demanding  merely  a  contradictionless 
whole  of  experience,  is  in  reality  no  criterion  of  the  content  of  truth, 
but  is  purely  formal  and  negative,  and  leaves  the  problem  of  truth 
unsettled  except  in  so  far  as,  by  an  endless  series  of  experiments  and 
abstractions,    a   relatively   contradictionless   whole  of    experience  is 
attained.     Therefore  an  a  priori  criterion  is  substituted — it  is  the  test 
of  the  '  gattungsmassige '  of  the  social  consciousness,  of  social  catego- 
ries.    What  is  socially  experienced  is  true  as  over  against  the  subjective 
opinions  and  errors  of  the  individual.     The  problem  is  accordingly  re- 
solved into  a  conflict  of  criteria ;   and  for  the  social  criterion  Wundt  has 
nothing  but  ridicule.     How,  he  asks,  is  the  logical   argument  that 
the  individual  ego  presupposes  social  consciousness  a  possibility  with- 
out the  very  assumption  of  the  existence  of  external  objects  in  which 
the  other  consciousness  belongs  ?    Otherwise  it  is  a  mere  abstraction. 
As  for   the    empirical  worth  of   the  criteria    of  the  common  social 
consciousness,  the  simplest  optical  illusion  suffices  to  show  its  useless- 
ness,  and  the  entire  history  of  scientific  method,  splendidly  illustrated 
in  the  Copernican  System,  shows  that  the  real  criterion  of  knowledge 
is  the  perception  of  the  individual  object,  corrected  by  experiment. 

III.  The  real  difficulty  comes,  however,  in  the  application  of  this 
criterion  to  the  actual  content  of  consciousness.     What  are  the  '  gat- 
tungsmassige,'the  common  elements  of  the  social  consciousness,  when 
the  individual  ego  is  abstracted.     First  of  all,  sensations  in  space  and 
time.     Since  they  are  given  immediately  in  the  naive  consciousness, 
and  are  common  property  of  the  Socius,  they  must  be   accepted   as 
objectively  real,  and  the  question  of  their  origin  is  not  a  proper  prob- 
lem for  a  theory  of  knowledge.     Whether  all  sensations,  or  simply 


DISCUSSION  AND  REPORTS.  645 

those  of  the  higher  sense  of  sight,  are  to  be  taken  as  objective,  the 
Immanentalists  have  not  yet  settled  among  themselves.  But  this  is 
immaterial  for  the  principle  and  the  suggestion  of  Schubert-Soldern, 
that  all  sensations  may  be  reduced  to  one  ground  sensation,  the  differ- 
ences being  merely  qualitative  expressions  of  relations  which  Natural 
Science  seeks  to  express  by  means  of  its  transcendental  atoms,  is  a 
thoroughly  logical  solution  of  this  uncertainty. 

To  Professor  Wundt's  thinking  such  a  doctrine  means  nothing  less 
than  a  denial  of  centuries  of  accredited  work  on  the  part  of  science, 
and,  secondly,  an  utter  confusion  of  the  boundaries  between  Natural 
Science  and  Psychology. 

Since  Galileo,  the  great  presupposition  of  modern  science  has 
been  the  subjectivity  of  sensations — and  on  the  ability  to  abstract 
from  the  same,  and  upon  their  reference  to  external  moving  bodies, 
as  their  source,  rests  modern  mechanics  and  molecular  physics. 
The  doctrine  which  maintains  the  objectivity  of  sensation  runs  counter 
to  all  this  and  the  suggestion  that  all  sensations  might  be  reducible  to 
a  fundamental  one  would  have  as  its  logical  outcome  a  rejuvenation 
of  the  Aristotelian  color  theory,  which  reduced  all  light  phenomena  to 
two  ground  sensations,  light  and  dark.  With  modern  optics  Wundt 
holds  it  is  entirely  incompatible. 

But  the  difficulties  to  which  it  gives  rise  in  the  determination  of  the 
boundaries  between  Natural  Science  and  Psychology  are  alone  suffi- 
cient to  show  the  untenability  of  the  doctrine  of  the  objectivity  of 
sensation.  If  sensations  are  objective,  then  they  are  the  data  of 
objective  Natural  Science.  On  the  other  hand,  Psychology  can  have 
to  do  only  with  the  '  non-gattungsmassige,'  or  individual  elements  of 
consciousness,  which  leaves  no  basis  for  general  laws.  The  phi- 
losophers of  this  school,  accordingly  find  in  the  reproductive  processes 
of  memory  and  imagination  the  sphere  of  Psychology,  or  otherwise 
distinguish  it  as  the  object  of  individual  introspection,  while  the 
objects  of  Natural  Science  are  the  primary  sensations  of  the  many. 
But  the  simple  facts  of  Psychology  make  impossible  such  a  distinc- 
tion. Between  sense  perceptions  and  the  reproductive  processes  there 
is  no  distinct  line,  as  Hume  conceived  in  his  impossible  theory  of 
strong  and  weak  impressions.  A  pure  sensation  is  an  abstraction, 
sensation  is  not  known  apart  from  the  reproductive  processes. 
Thus,  if  sensations  be  the  data  of  Natural  Science,  the  latter  must 
logically  be  subsumed  under  Psychology.  This  is  however  equally 
distasteful  to  both  sciences.  Natural  Science  cannot  allow  of  such 
a  subjectification  of  its  problem,  nor  can  Psychology  admit  tins  forma- 


646  NAIVE  AND    CRITICAL   REALISM. 

listic  metaphysical  determination  of  her  field  of  work.  The  abstract 
concept  of  the  individual  is  powerless  to  give  her  material  and,  with- 
out the  investigation  of  the  rise  of  sensations,  it  is  impossible  for  her 
to  understand  the  reproductive  processes  based  upon  them.  The  whole 
difficulty  lies  in  the  false  presupposition  that  the  two  sciences  deal 
with  different  kinds  of  content,  a  deplorable  modern  putting  of  the 
Kantian  distinction  of  '  inner '  and  '  outer  '  sense.  In  fact,  both  deal 
with  the  same  content,  for  there  is  only  one  object,  but  each  ap- 
proaches it  from  a  different  standpoint.  Natural  Science  has  found 
it  necessary  to  abstract  from  all  subjective  elements,  including  sensa- 
tion; it  is  just  this  subjective  side,  however,  that  is  the  peculiar 
sphere  of  Psychology,  the  whole  immediate,  subjective  side  of  reality. 
If  the  ideals  and  methods  of  the  sciences  are  understood  there  is  per- 
fect harmony.  It  is  only  where  these  are  ignored,  and  a  priori  theo- 
ries of  knowledge,  developed  by  uncontrolable  reflection  upon  nai've 
thought,  are  substituted,  that  conflict  arises. 

WILBUR  M.  URBAN. 
PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE. 

Philosophy  of  Knowledge:  An  Inquiry  Into  the  Nature,  Limits 
and  Validity  of  Human  Cognitive  Faculty.  GEORGE  TRUM- 
BULL  LADD.  New  York,  Charles  Scribner's  Sons,  1897.  Pp.  xv 
+  609. 

The  stately  succession  of  Professor  Ladd's  treatises  in  philosoph- 
ical science,  consisting  of  '  The  Elements  of  Physiological  Psychology,' 
'Psychology,  Descriptive  and  Explanatory,'  'The  Philosophy  of 
Mind,'  is  now  carried  forward  by  'The  Philosophy  of  Knowledge,' 
upon  which  at  least  one  further  installment,  A  Philosophy  of  Being, 
is,  we  are  told,  to  follow.  The  present  volume  contains  an  elaborate 
treatment  of  the  chief  problems  of  the  theory  of  knowledge.  Not  at 
first  sight  nor  in  its  arrangement,  but  after  some  slight  scrutiny,  the  in- 
terdependent structure  and  fine  convergence  of  the  argument  appear. 
It  is  independent,  if  not  original ;  and  it  is  presented  in  a  style  which, 
if  diffuse,  elusive  and  sometimes  pedantic,  is  of  a  remarkable  con- 
tinuity, an  almost  consistent  academic  elegance  and  at  times  an  out- 
spoken vigor. 

Dr.  Ladd's  philosophy  of  knowledge  centres,  one  may  say,  in 
the  thought  of  the  self-conscious  self.  In  the  immediately  revealed 
nature  and  the  express  deliverance  of  the  self  we  have  the  key  to  the 
problems  of  perception,  of  judgment,  of  memory,  of  reasoning,  of  the 
nature  of  the  cause,  of  the  nature  of  the  object,  of  the  nature  of  the 
universe.  The  ontological  doctrines  are  in  the  present  work,  of 
course,  only  adumbrated. 

The  theory  of  the  self,  which  had  previously  been  set  forth  in 
« The  Philosophy  of  Mind,'  is  of  marked  interest.  There  had  been 
those  who  held  to  a  '  thinking  substance,'  a  substratum  of  mind,  or  an 
indefinable  'subject.'  Transcendenta lists  (most  of  them)  and  cruder 
spiritualists  agreed  in  maintaining  that  there  is  a  single  agent  or  prin- 
ciple (neither  party  would  accept  the  terms  of  the  other)  which  knows 
in  all  knowledge,  feels  in  all  feeling,  and  wills  in  all  volition,  but 
which  is  not  itself  of  the  content  of  consciousness  nor  appears  in  an 
act  of  objective  cognition  amongst  the  beings  known.  Consciousness 
'  inheres  in  it,'  or  '  implies  it,' or  '  involves  it  as  a  condition; '  it  is  the 
eye  which,  well  as  it  may  be  aware  that  its  own  existence  is  necessary 
647 


648  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

to  seeing,  is  not  amongst  the  objects  of  its  own  vision.  On  the  other 
hand  was  the  proposed  psychological  analysis  of  the  self  into  elements 
of  the  conscious  content,  the  doctrine  that  it  is  no  undecomposable 
entity  or  ultimate  '  principle,'  but  in  one  sense  the  total  group  of  pre- 
sentations, in  another  a  distinguished  part  of  that  group.  The  former 
of  these  doctrines  Dr.  Ladd  rejects  with  energy  as  adding  to  con- 
sciousness an  unmeaning  encumbrance,  the  latter  he  apparently  passes 
by  as  withholding  from  consciousness  its  most  essential  feature.  It  is 
a  striking  circumstance  that  his  own  theory  takes  elements  in  some 
sense  from  both.  The  self  is,  indeed,  a  fact  known  by  and  in  con- 
sciousness, it  is  the  fact  so  known,  being  the  fact  and  entity  of  con- 
sciousness itself.  It  is  not  a  thinking  substance  '  beneath,'  and  hence 
outside  of  consciousness,  nor  is  it  a  complex  group  of  the  particular 
facts  of  consciousness.  Rather  is  it  a  thinking  substance  within  con- 
sciousness, known  for  what  it  is,  a  single  and  active  being  which  exists 
only  in  being  conscious.  The  view  is  not  (or  not  merely)  that  onto- 
logical  principles  oblige  us  to  assume  a  substance  or  unit-being  Jor 
mind,  but  that  the  mind  directly  announces  itself  such  a  unit-being. 
We  have  here,  in  modern  form  and  the  explicitness  that  a  sense  of  past 
controversy  gives,  a  view  notably  like  that  of  Descartes.  The  soul  is 
one  substance,  but  its  whole  nature  is  cogitatio.  And,  Dr.  Ladd 
further  asserts,  '  states  of  consciousness,'  psychoses,  are  not  existences, 
but  phases  or  acts  of  an  existence.  Lastly,  the  continuity  or  personal 
identity  of  a  self  in  time  consists  in  nothing  else  than  its  ability  to 
refer  to  its  own  past  by  the  act  of  recognitive  memory  and  to  build  up 
in  its  successive  states  an  orderly  life. 

The  self-knowledge  of  the  self  in  a  single  moment  is  the  perfect 
type  of  complete  knowledge ;  and  the  part  the  self  plays  in  knowledge 
of  whatever  kind  is  all -important.  Knowledge  professes  by  its  very 
nature  to  be  an  affirmation  of  existence  transcending  itself.  The  as- 
sertion that  we  only  know  phenomena  is  absurdly  false  to  the  facts  of 
cognition.  The  object  in  order  to  be  object  is  inevitably  recognized 
as  '  not  me,'  as  '  out  of  me,'  as  *  not  my  state  of  consciousness  nor  any 
man's  state  of  consciousness,' as  'extra-mental,'  as  'transcendent;' 
iteration  could  hardly  go  further  as  to  the  '  realistic  '  import  of  cog- 
nitive states.  But  this  is  to  say  that  the  object  is  explicitly  recognized 
as  not  self,  that  it  is  set  over  against  a  recognized  self ;  that  self-con- 
sciousness is  thus  an  indispensable  condition  of  objective  conscious- 
ness. And  there  are  also  in  every  cognitive  state  ingredients  of  will 
and  feeling  which  involve  further  references  to  self.  The  object  is 
felt  as  an  alien  other  contrasted  with  me,  and  it  opposes  me  as  '  that- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  649 

which-will-not  always  as  I  'will.''  More  than  this,  when  we  come  to 
ask  what  manner  of  existence  the  '  transcendent '  thing  is,  we  can,  in 
the  last  resort,  draw  our  predicates  from  but  one  source ;  from  the 
only  being  we  immediately  know,  from  ourselves.  The  continuous 
identity  of  an  object  is  somehow  conceived  in  terms  of  the  iden- 
tity of  the  subject.  The  '  causality '  or  action  of  an  object  is 
conceived  in  terms  of  our  own  conscious  action.  Our  ordinary  ex- 
planations have  their  origin  and  their  justification  in  u  the  primal  and 
universal  experience  of  man  with  the  self,  as  consciously  acting 
and  having  its  activity  resisted,  'while  at  the  same  time  observing 
the  simultaneous  and  succeeding  changes  'which  go  on  in  the  ap- 
pearance of  things"  And  u  if  the  cognized  facts  are  deeds  done 
by  a  self,  with  a  consciously  recognized  end  in  view,  then  it  is  pos- 
sible to  explain  to  its  very  centre  the  '  reason '  for  the  facts" 
Again:  u  The  grounds  on  which  all  acts  of  reasoning  repose,  so 
far  as  they  can  possibly  be  explored  by  an  analysis  of  knowledge 
itself,  are  laid  bare  when  we  behold  the  nature  of  the  self  re- 
warding itself  in  the  pursuit  of  some  conscious  good.  This  is  the 
final  answer  to  the  question  :  '  Why  ?' " 

When  at  last  we  set  ourselves  to  realize  the  nature  of  the  entire 
universe,  our  means  of  conception  bear  the  same  stamp.  Our  postu- 
lates imply  (i)  some  sort  of  unitary  Being  for  this  really  existent, 
(2)  that  this  Being  is  Will,  (3)  that  the  differentiation  of  the  activity 
of  this  Will,  and  the  connection  of  the  differentiated  '  momenta ' — the 
separate  beings  of  the  world — is  teleological  and  rational.  That  is, 
it  must  be  thought  of  '  after  the  analogy  of  the  life  of  a  self.'  And 
in  the  concluding  words  of  the  book,  knowledge  is  described  as  "  the 
establishment  of  a  relation  between  the  Revealer,  the  Absolute  Self, 
and  the  Self  to  whom  the  revelation  comes." 

In  sketching  thus  in  scantiest  outline  some  noteworthy  aspects  of 
Dr.  Ladd's  work  one  is  obliged  to  neglect  many  important  discussions ; 
such  as  his  argument  as  to  '  The  Teleology  of  Knowledge,'  his 
trenchant  treatment  of  the  '  antinomies,'  his  comments  on  the  concep- 
tion of  invariable  law,  and  his  special  form  of  the  argument  for  a  cos- 
mic mind. 

The  species  of  '  Ideal- Real  ism '  before  us  has  a  height  and 
breadth  of  build  and  a  harmony  of  form  that  places  it  amongst  the 
more  imposing  styles  of  speculative  architecture.  This  world  of  wills 
is  interesting.  Meanwhile  its  conception  and  proof  contain,  of  course, 
save  in  slight  details,  nothing  novel.  There  is,  by  the  bye,  a  curious 
passage  in  the  preface  in  which  the  author  says  of  his  volume :  "  It 


650  PHILOSOPHY   OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

asks  and  should  receive  the  treatment  due  to  a  pioneer  work."  And 
again,  remarking  that  his  task  would  have  been  easier  if  he  had  had 
u  more  predecessors  among  modern  writers  on  philosophy  in  English  :" 
"  So  far  as  I  am  aware  there  are  none  from  whom  any  help  is  to  be 
derived."  One  does  not  know  to  just  what  species  or  degree  of  in- 
dulgence a  pioneer-work  in  the  nineteenth  century  upon  some  of 
the  hoariest  problems  of  philosophy  lays  claim ;  but  one  is,  indeed, 
moved  to  make  allowance  for  an  author  who  has  been  unable  to  find 
stimulus  or  suggestion  in  the  epistemological  writing  (for  almost  ran- 
dom example)  of  J.  S.  Mill,  Mr.  Bradley  (a  juxtaposition  that  only 
the  former  would  have  tolerated),  Mr.  Hodgson,  Mr.  Balfour  (in  his 
'  Philosophic  Doubt,'  for  instance),  or  from  any  of  twenty  years'  con- 
tributions to  the  periodical  '  Mind.'  The  passage  is  mystifying,  and 
one  has  a  guilty  sense  of  its  being  perhaps  a  needless  touch  of 
critical  acerbity  to  refer  to  its  existence.  But  whatever  its  exact 
meaning  may  be,  the  tendency  is  significant.  The  prime  need 
of  the  day  in  our  somewhat  distracted  science  is  to  make  discussion 
effective  by  bringing  the  opposing  forces  really  to  bear.  As  it  is,  two 
hostile  theories  will  keep  up  their  ceremonial  duel  for  generations  by 
simply  firing  into  the  air,  which  is  thus  filled  with  smoke  and  lurid 
flashes  while  their  own  vitals  remain  unharmed.  A  little  marksman- 
ship and  economy  of  powder,  and  something  may  come  out  of  the 
day;  loud  reports  and  beclouded  fulgurations,  pistol-  or  artil- 
lery-practice on  whatever  scale,  are  in  themselves  a  dubious  end. 
We  shall  do  ill  to  forget  that  scientific  labor  will  advance  by  growing 
genuinely  social ;  that  it  demands  a  keen  sense  of  what  is  already  done 
and  what  needed.  The  spirit  of  lucid  controversy  is  a  fine  effluence 
of  civilization,  and  its  effort  to  grasp  extant  ideas  with  delicate  justice, 
and  with  precision  of  strength  to  break  apart  or  rivet  them  closer,  is 
almost  the  worthiest  discipline  of  the  intelligence.  We  can  hardly 
look  for  a  signal  exhibition  of  it  from  one  who  stands  in  the  thick- 
trodden  market-place  with  the  unshaken  conviction  that  he  is  a  pioneer. 
And,  in  fact,  on  certain  long-controverted  topics,  Dr.  Ladd  shows 
no  such  fine  sense  of  his  own  or  his  adversaries'  position  as  would 
enable  him  to  carry  us  an  inch  nearer  to  '  a  consensus  of  the  compe- 
tent.' This  is  markedly  true  of  his  theory  of  the  realistic  import  of 
cognitive  consciousness.  The  phenomenist  might  simply  deny  the 
alleged  trans-subjective  intention,  the  implication  of  the  '  transcen- 
dent '  in  knowledge — as  the  present  writer  at  all  events  does  deny  it — 
might  declare  that  there  is  no  such  psychological  fact ;  and  Dr.  Ladd 
could  have  nothing  for  it  but  asseverations.  But  not  by  the  'assertory 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  651 

method'  on  either  side  is  inquiry  furthered.  Rather  by  something 
more  analytic.  And  upon  analysis  it  turns  out  that  no  such  *  extra- 
mental  reference'  is  psychologically  possible.  In  order  that  our  con- 
sciousness should  affirm  that  something  does  not  belong  to  it,  it  must 
have  a  generic  conception  of  itself,  an  accurate  universal  idea  of  what 
4  belonging  to  consciousness '  means.  Now  it  is  obvious  that  those 
familiar  authorities,  the  child  and  the  rustic,  not  to  come  nearer  home, 
have  no  such  idea.  Such  an  accurate  idea — and  a  testimony  of  con- 
sciousness based  on  inaccurate  ideas  of  the  situation  would  hardly  be 
cited  as  evidence — is  a  complex  product  of  philosophic  analysis. 
Epistemological  realists  (notably  Mr.  Spencer  and  Professor  A.  Seth) 
have  sometimes  spoken  as  if  idealists  supposed  that  what  we  first 
know  in  perception  is  that  we  have  a  sensation,  a  mental  phe- 
nomenon ;  a  view  which  they  very  easily  refute  by  showing  that  '  sen- 
sation '  or  '  mental  phenomenon '  is  a  later  conception  than  object. 
But  if  they  add  (what  they  mean)  '  extra-mental  object,'  if  they  de- 
clare that  what  we  are  first  conscious  of  is  that  here  is  an  object 
external  to  consciousness,  they  have  confuted  themselves  in  advance. 
To  judge  '  Extra-mental ! '  is  to  have  a  conception  of  the  mental, 
which  they  have  just  pronounced  at  this  stage  impossible.  The  in- 
ference is  that  the  first  stage  is  to  have  a  sense  of  the  presence  of  an 
object — to  have  an  object — without  classifying  it  either  as  mental  or 
as  extra-mental.  It  is  to  the  subsequent  reflection  of  the  metaphysi- 
cian that  grounds  appear  for  terming  it  mental. 

To  this  Dr.  Ladd  might,  perchance,  reply  that  no  complex  con- 
ception is  needed  but  only  the  perception  or  immediate  consciousness 
of  self.  To  judge  a  thing  in  cognition  as  '  not-self '  is  to  contrast  it 
not  with  an  abstractly  conceived  but  a  directly  felt  self.  The  answer 
is  (even  granting  our  author's  theory  of  the  ego  and  our  knowledge  of 
it)  that  such  a  concrete  perception  of  self  is  not  sufficient  to  yield  the 
clear  deliverance  of  consciousness  on  which  he  relies.  It  is  not  enough 
to  deny  that  the  object  is  the  self ;  of  course  it  is  not  the  self.  The 
question  is  whether  it  is  not  a  content-fragment  of  the  self's  conscious- 
ness. And  it  is  not  enough  to  deny  that  it  is  this  content-fragment  or 
that  content-fragment ;  of  course  there  are  content-fragments  which 
it  is  not.  The  question  is  whether  it  is  a  content-fragment  at  all.  To 
deny  that  is  to  employ  the  generic  conception. 

But,  perhaps,  Dr.  Ladd  means  simply  to  reaffirm  the  old  doctrine 
that  a  certain  psychosis,  namely,  a  cognition,  concretely  distinguishes 
its  object  from  itself,  pronouncing  the  former  external  to  itself.  In 
that  case,  forbearing  remark  on  the  logical  atrocity  here  perpetrated, 


652  PHILOSOPHY  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

one  might  rest  content  with  the  old  appeal  to  introspection.  Perception 
is  not  thus  double ;  we  do  not  have  in  view  an  object  plus  a  professed 
percept;  we  have  in  view  only  an  object;  and  the  whole  psycholog- 
ical phenomenon  is  what  we  subsequently  class  as  a  percept.  It  may, 
however,  further  be  said  that  distinction  is  a  mental  process  involving 
two  mental  terms  and  that  to  say  that  one  mental  term  is  not  another 
is  true,  but  does  not  assert  the  existence  of  anything  extra-mental.  Is 
it  suggested  that  the  discrimination  is  between  one  term  and  the  thing 
expressed  by  the  other  ?  The  suggestion  assumes  all  over  again  and 
without  analysis  the  possibility  of  that  '  expression  of  the  transcen- 
dent,' that  'trans-subjective  reference,'  which  is  the  very  matter  of  dis- 
pute. 

Lastly,  if  our  author  should  maintain  that  the  '  trans-subjective 
reference'  is  precisely  an  unanalyzable  and  ultimate  fact,  a  mysterious 
'  meaning  of  the  mind '  or  '  cognitive  property  of  thoughts  '  which 
may  be  felt  but  not  understood,  one  may  reply  in  Mr.  Meredith's 
words:  "  Many  people  are  mystics  until  they  have  written  out  a  fair 
copy  of  their  meaning." 

For  not  only  does  psychology  find  no  terms  in  which  such  a  '  ref- 
erence '  could  be  consummated,  but  logic  exposes  it  as  a  self-contra- 
diction. One  existence,  a  thought  (or  if  our  author  will,  a  thinking 
self)  is  to  designate  another  existence,  an  extra-mental  object.  How 
is  it  to  do  so  ?  It  may  resemble  such  an  object  (if  the  object  be  of  a 
psychic  nature  the  idealist  need  not  deny  that  it  may  exist)  or  contain 
something  resembling  it.  But  no,  it  must  also  contain  indications  of 
.the  numerical  identity  of  the  object  as  different  from  its  own.  Now 
this  is  in  the  end  unmeaning.  One  existence  may  resemble  in  quality 
another  and  thus  to  a  person  informed  (as  consistently  with  phenome- 
nism one  in  some  cases  may  be)  that  the  former  is  to  serve  as  a  sign 
or  representative  of  the  latter,  convey  its  character.  But  it  cannot  (so 
to  speak)  resemble  another  in  its  numerical  identity  and  thus  by  its 
own  being  convey  the  existence  of  something  else.  One  is  familiar, 
of  course,  with  the  common  mode  of  speech  as  to  the  manner  of  this 
conveyance ;  about  a  cognition  containing  the  object  ideally  without 
containing  its  reality.  It  must  be  remembered,  however,  that  ideas 
and  cognitions  are  realities  too  and  what  we  are  discussing  is  the 
relation  between  two  realities.  An  idea  may  actually  operate  so  as  to 
guide  our  conduct  towards  something  not  itself.  But  it  cannot,  with- 
out sharp  self-contradiction,  be  said  to  contain  what  is  non-identical 
with  any  or  all  of  its  parts.  Until  something  is  done  to  relieve  this 
difficulty  the  theory  of  a  trans-subjective  reference  stands  discredited. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  653 

In  the  other  great  problem  of  epistemology,  the  ground  of  induc- 
tive generalization,  and  in  further  points  of  theory  that  cannot  here  be 
touched  on,  Dr.  Ladd  tries  to  improve  the  situation  rather  by  firmer 
exposition  than  by  deeper  analysis.  I  cannot  think  that  one  who  had 
fully  mastered  Hume's  arguments  as  to  cause  and  effect  could  imagine 
their  force  to  be  dissipated  by  interpreting  the  relation  through  '  the 
self's  experience  of  its  own  action  and  suffering.'  This  is  a  door  of 
escape  that  Hume  expressly  guarded.  That  form  of  sequence  which 
we  know  as  our  own  mental  activity  reveals  virtue  going  out  of  the 
cause  into  the  effect  as  little  as  any  other  sequence  in  experience ;  and 
it  reveals  the  cause  as  sufficient  condition  of  the  effect  no  whit  more 
than  any  other.  To  conceive  material  bodies  acting  as  we  feel  our- 
selves to  act — to  conceive  their  action  as  a  series  of  conscious  states 
external  to  our  own — is  not  to  conceive  them  as  extended  masses  at 
all.  As  such  a  philosophy  is  talking  about  something  else  than  the 
plain  man's  matter,  it  cannot  hope  to  have  epitomized  the  plain  man's 
notion  of  material  cause.  Cause  cannot  have  meant  to  the  multitude 
of  men  what  such  a  philosophy  means  by  it. 

As  already  said,  the  root  of  Dr.  Ladd's  theory  of  knowledge  lies 
in  his  theory  of  the  nature  of  mind;  and  of  that  there  is  small  room 
to  speak  here.  If  the  unit-self  is  a  fact  of  consciousness  and  exists 
only  in  consciousness  and  comprises  the  whole  being  of  consciousness ; 
then  it  simply  is  consciousness,  called  a  unit-being:  and  whether 
justly  so  called  depends  upon  the  meaning  of  unit.  Consciousness,  as 
Dr.  Ladd  amply  testifies,  has  multiplicity;  it  has  unity,  or  rather  (for 
that  term,  through  varied  usage,  has  lost  the  edge  of  its  meaning)  it 
has  conjunction  of  elements  into  a  group  or  whole,  in  that  there  is  an 
ultimate  relation  of  jointness  between  (for  instance)  my  taste  and  my 
hearing  at  this  moment,  which  does  not  subsist  between  my  taste  and 
your  hearing ;  and  in  that  there  is  a  relation  of  continuous  change 
(not  ultimate,  but  analyzable  in  a  complex  formula)  between  the  total 
present  consciousness  called  mine,  and  any  total  past  consciousness 
called  mine.  When,  however,  Dr.  Ladd  incidentally  drops  that  a 
so-called  '  state  of  consciousness ' — the  total  consciousness  of  a  moment 
— is  not  an  existence,  but  the  mere  state  or  the  mere  act  of  an  exist- 
ence, he  is  led  away  by  the  scholastic  terms  he  has  used  in  render- 
ing the  deliverance  of  consciousness  about  itself  into  an  ontological 
inference  that  flatly  gives  the  lie  to  that  deliverance.  Consciousness 
in  its  totality  at  this  moment — what  is  called  in  the  old  loose  terms 
'  my  present  state  of  consciousness* — is  identical  with  the  unit-self  at 
this  moment  in  what  ought  in  consistency  to  be  Dr.  Ladd's  sense  of 
the  word. 


654  PSYCHICAL   RESEARCH  AND   PATHOLOGY. 

In  this  fragmentary  comment,  which  can  pretend  to  no  kind  of 
complete  justice  to  a  work  so  comprehensive  and  mature,  there  has 
been  much  mere  assertion.  So  far  as  this  has  failed  to  suggest  the 
analyses  which  could  not  in  full  be  here  performed,  it  has  been  of 
course  quite  futile. 

D.  S.  MILLER. 

BRYN  MAWR  COLLEGE. 


PSYCHICAL   RESEARCH  AND  PATHOLOGY. 

Involuntary    Whispering     Considered   in  Relation    to     Thought- 

Transference.      HENRY  SIDGWICK.     Proceedings    of  S.  P.   R., 

XII.,   298-318.     December,  1896. 

Messrs.  Lehmann  and  Hansen,  it  will  be  remembered  (Psvcn. 
REV.  Vol.  III.,  p.  98),  sought  to  prove  that  a  certain  series  of  experi- 
ments in  thought-transference,  by  Professor  and  Mrs.  Sidgwick,  were 
explicable  because  the  agent's  inward  articulation  of  the  numbers 
guessed  was  probably  heard  hyperassthetically  by  the  hynotized  per- 
cipients. Repeating  the  experiments  so  that  the  percipient  could  actu- 
ally hear  the  agent's  suppressed  whispering,  they  found  that  not  only 
the  successes,  but  also  the  mistakes  resembled  those  in  the  Sidgwick 
series,  and  from  such  like  effects  they  think  that  we  ought  to  infer  like 
causes. 

Their  paper,  the  carefulness  of  which  is  a  refreshing  exception  to 
most  criticism  of  the  Psychical  Research  Work,  is  reviewed  by  Pro- 
fessor Sidgwick,  who  concludes  that  their  experiments  do  not  show 
positive  evidence  for  whispering  as  the  source  of  the  English  results. 
Much  of  his  reply  is  too  minute  for  reproduction.  The  most  telling 
point  he  makes  is  an  empirical  one.  Happening  to  have  the  record 
of  an  old  series  of  pure  chance-guesses  at  numbers,  made  with  the 
agent  and  percipient  in  separate  closed  rooms,  he  compares  this  with 
the  guesses  of  the  Danish  series.  Of  course,  the  number  of  successes 
differ  widely  in  the  two  series,  but  the  errors  run  even  more  closely 
parallel  than  they  do  when  the  Danish  whispering  series  and  the  Eng- 
lish '  thought-transference  '  series  are  compared.  As  such  an  amount  of 
similarity  in  error  with  the  whispered  series  is  obviously  fortuitous 
in  this  case,  so  it  may  be  fortuitous  in  the  thought-tranference 
case.  Professor  Sidgwick  would  partly  explain  the  degree  of  simi- 
larity found  (which  is  but  slight1)  by  an  unconscious  preference  for 

1  The  Danish  authors  made  only  500  experiments,  obviously  too  small 
a  number  for  safe  conclusions.  The  better  to  frame  critical  opinion,  I 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  655 

certain  numbers  in  the  guesses  of  both  sets  of  percipients.  If,  for  ex- 
ample, both  tended  frequently  to  guess  '  five,'  five  as  a  frequent  error 
would  occur  in  both  series,  and  make  them  in  so  far  forth  agree.1 

Sidgwick,  although  admitting  that  whispering  may  possibly  have 
been  a  cause  of  successful  guessing  when  agent  and  percipient  were 
in  the  same  room,  thus  denies  that  Professor  Lehmann  has  proved  the 
point.  And  he  absolutely  denies  Lehmann's  explanation  where  the 
agent  and  successful  percipient  were  separated  by  closed  doors. 
Passing  to  a  general  discussion  of  the  subject,  especially  so  far  as 
drawings  were  the  things  guessed,  he  gives  a  resumt,  in  brief,  of  the 
whole  body  of  evidence  which  many  readers  will  find  a  convenient 
summary  to  refer  to. 

I  Fenomeni  Telepatice  e  le  Allucinazione  Veridiche;   Osservazione 
Critiche    Sul    Neomisticismo  Psicologico.     ENRICO  MORSELLI. 
Firenze,  Landi,  1897.     Pp.  58. 
A  courteously  written  plea  against  accepting  the  recently  published 

evidence  for   thought-transference  and  veridical  hallucination.     The 

have  myself  collected  a  series  of  upwards  of  1,000  guesses  at  bi-digital 
numbers  whispered  with  closed  lips  by  the  agent.  Following  Lehmann's 
method,  and  comparing  the  four  most  frequent  erroneous  guesses  at  each  digit  of 
the  numbers  whispered  with  the  four  most  frequent  errors  made  in  dirining  the 
same  digits  in  the  English  thought-transference  series,  I  find  (taking  the  digits 
from  I  to  9)  that  20  of  the  erroneous  digits  are  common  to  the  two  series.  But 
I  find  that  if  one  compares  the  four  least  frequent  erroneous  guesses  in  my  whis- 
pered series  with  the  most  frequent  corresponding  ones  in  the  thought-transference 
series,  one  gets  15,  no  great  difference.  Taking  the  one  most  frequent  error 
of  substitution  for  each  digit  in  my  series,  I  find  but  2  agreements  with 
the  thought-transference  series,  and  2  with  the  Sidgwick  series  of  pure 
guesses.  Plotting  the  frequency  of  the  various  errors  in  the  several  series 
as  curves  shows  so  great  a  discrepancy  between  my  whispered  series  and  the 
Danish  one  that  it  becomes  obvious  that  the  series  are  too  short  to  serve  as 
proper  terms  of  comparison  with  the  thought-transference  series.  Moreover, 
the  curves  of  my  series  and  those  of  the  thought-transference  series  show  at 
special  points  variations  from  each  other  so  great,  when  compared  with  the 
absolute  figures  which  they  represent,  that  the  same  conclusion  is  again  obvi- 
ous. Both  the  agreements  and  the  disagreements  are  thus  probably  acci- 
dental. I,  myself,  agree  then  entirely  with  Professor  Sidgwick  that  Professor 
Lehmann  has  failed  to  prove  his  particular  hypothesis  of  whispering  as  the 
cause  of  the  '  thought-transference'  results ;  and  I  am  pleased  to  notice  that  Mr. 
Parish,  in  the  work  noticed  below  (Hallucinations  and  Illusions,  p.  320,  note), 
also  considers  Professor  Sidgwick  '  perfectly  justified  in  his  contention  ' 

1  In  my  own  series,  the  tendency  to  run  on  favorite  numbers  in  guessing  was 
a  well  marked  phenomenon,  to  eliminate  the  effects  of  which  many  thousands 
of  guesses  would  be  required. 


656  PSYCHICAL  RESEARCH  AND  PATHOLOGY. 

familiar  methodological  generalities  about  what  should  constitute  satis- 
factory scientific  evidence  for  such  phenomena  are  laid  down  at  ex- 
cessive length,  but  the  author  gets  in  some  short-range  work  in  criti- 
cizing the  evidential  defects  of  several  narratives  published  as  good 
ones  by  the  French,  Italian  and  English  psychical  researchers.  A  curi- 
ous prejudice  runs  through  his  pages  that  no  evidence  for  supernormal 
cognition  can  be  drawn  from  cases  of  persons  of  neuropathic  consti- 
tutions, or  from  those  in  whom  there  have  been  multiple  experiences 
of  the  sort.  He  even  thinks  that  he  discredits  veridical  apparitions  by 
saying  that  the  majority  of  them  seem  to  have  occurred  in  '  English 
misses '  at  the  change  of  life.  Can  he  be  so  sure  in  advance  that 
neuropathic  constitution,  or  even  the  '  menopause,'  might  not  be  pre- 
disposing conditions  for  telepathic  susceptibility,  if  such  a  thing 
should,  in  point  of  fact,  exist?  And,  as  for  persons  with  multiple  ex- 
periences, they  would  seem  a  priori  to  be  just  those  from  whom  eri- 
dence  might  be  best  obtained.  In  point  of  fact  they  are  so — one  subject 
of  '  psychic  temperament'  being  worth  many  with  single  experiences. 
Professor  Morselli,  at  the  close  of  his  pamphlet,  gives  a  list  of  conditions 
which  he-seems  to  regard  as  alternatives  to  telepathy — no  case  should 
be  counted  as  telepathic  if  it  be  possible  to  conceive  it  "  under  one  or 
another  of  the  following  psycho-physical  explanations ;  simple  sug- 
gestion, auto-suggestion,  individual  and  collective  credulity,  psycho- 
physical  automatism,  hypnoid  or  sub-conscious  conditions,  sensorial 
illusion,  psychical  illusion,  e.  g.,  from  accidental  coincidence,  pro- 
voked hallucination,  especially  with  point  de  repere,  unconscious  per- 
ception, emotion  or  movement,  involuntary  expression  of  one's  own 
thought,  doubling  of  personality,  dream  or  hypnagogic  hallucina- 
tions, illusions  of  memory,  after-images  or  retarded  sensations,  sensa- 
tions induced  by  imperceptible  or  unappreciated  physical  agents  (heat, 
electricity,  magnetism,  light),  conditions  of  ecstacy  (monoideism), 
hysteria,  epilepsy  and  epileptoid,  cataleptic,  or  somnambulic  states,  with 
lessor  obscuration  of  consciousness,  lucid  forms  of  insanity,  especially 
with  hallucinatory  fixed  ideas,  psychic  mimicry  and  imitative  of  psy- 
chosis, or  collective  hallucination,  intense  emotional  conditions  with 
their  effects,  transient  states  of  cerebral  intoxication,  whether  endog- 
enous or  exogenous  *  *  *  ."  Once  more,  one  is  tempted  to  ask 
why  must  all  these  things  be  alternatives  to  supernormal  cognition  ? 
Why,  if  it  exist  at  all,  may  it  not  co-exist  with  some  of  them  ?  Why, 
indeed,  may  not  some  of  them  be  its  most  predisposing  conditions  ? 
Again,  in  point  of  fact,  if  there  be  supernormal  cognition,  it  looks 
as  if  this  were  the  case  with  it. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  657 

It  is  a  pleasure  to  turn  from  the  generalities  and  abstractions  of  the 
learned  Genoese  professor  to  the  criticism  at  closer  quarters  of  the  next 
author  on  our  list. 

Zur  Kritik  des  telepathischen  Betvcismaterials.     EDMUND  PAR- 
ISH.    Leipzig,  Barth,  1897.     8°.     Pp.  48. 

Hallucinations  and  Illusions,  a  Study  of  the  Fallacies  of  Percep- 
tion. EDMUND  PARISH.  London,  Walter  Scott;  New  York, 
Charles  Scribner's  Sons.  1897.  12°.  Pp.  390. 
The  English  version  of  Mr.  Parish's  book,  already  reviewed  in  its 
German  shape  in  Vol.  II.,  p.  65  of  this  REVIEW,  is  greatly  improved 
and  brought  up  to  date.  The  author  incorporates  in  it  much  of  the 
criticism  contained  in  the  lecture  l  Zur  KritikJ  etc.  He  was  collector 
for  Germany  of  the  Census  of  Hallucinations  reviewed  there  and  in  the 
present  lecture  he  criticizes  the  Sidgwick  report.  Although  he  gives 
the  authors  credit  in  the  handsomest  terms  for  the  quality  of  their  work, 
he  nevertheless  thinks  that  their  conclusion — that  apparitions  on  the 
day  of  death  are  far  too  frequent  to  be  ascribed  to  chance — will  not  hold 
good.  His  chief  reasons  are  as  follows :  First,  they  have  believed  the 
reported  amount  of  coincidence  between  the  apparition  and  the  event 
to  be  greater  than  facts  warrant.  He  gives  cases  to  show  how  a  figure, 
not  recognized  when  seen,  may  be  described,  when  news  of  a  death  is 
later  received,  as  the  figure  of  the  person  dead.  This  error,  which 
he  calls  Erinnerungs-adaptation,  he  believes  to  be  very  frequent  in 
the  narratives.  Secondly,  he  doubts  whether  most  of  the  hallucina- 
tions which  figure  as  veridical  are  'waking  hallucinations  at  all,  be- 
lieving them  to  be  more  probably  dreams  or  hypnagogic  visions.  But 
if  dreams  are  to  slip  in  and  get  counted,  the  numerical  statistical  argu- 
ment, he  says,  is  entirely  upset ;  for  dreams  are  such  frequent  occurrences 
that  coincidences  between  them  and  distant  events  must  be  frequent  in 
proportion.  And  that  the  so-called  waking  hallucinations  -were  mostly 
dreams,  he  proves  in  detail  by  analyzing  the  26  cases  which  the  Eng- 
lish report  prints  as  'best  accredited.'  Most  of  them  actually  oc- 
curred at  night,  when  the  percipient  was  in  bed  or  sitting  up  watch- 
ing, or  else  in  some  other  situation  where  a  nap  might  naturally  have 
occurred  unawares. 

This  latter  seems  to  me  by  far  the  strongest  objection  yet   made  to 

the  Sidgwick    report.     In   my  own  review   of  the  Sidgwick  report 

(supra,  Vol.  II.,  p.  74,  note),  I  admitted  this  to  be  its  weakest  point. 

But  another  objection  of  Herr  Parish's,  and  the  one   which   he 

himself   considers   his   weightiest,   seems  to   me  to   have  very  little 


658  PSYCHICAL   RESEARCH  AND  PATHOLOGY. 

weight  indeed.  He  shows,  by  three  examples,  through  what  sub- 
conscious links  of  association,  granting  the  hallucinatory  tendency  to 
be  there,  the  ensuing  hallucination  may  have  its  subject-matter  deter- 
mined, and  then  says :  Not  till  the  possibility  of  all  such  associative 
links  is  excluded,  are  we  entitled  to  invoke  an  hypothetic  agency 
like  '  telepathic  impact '  as  the  cause  of  the  hallucinatory  content. 
But  one  does  not  see  how  this  should  effect  the  statistical  argument, 
unless  associative  links  are  in  themselves  more  likely  than  unassigned 
organic  or  other  causes  to  produce  visions  coincidental  'with  deaths. 
If  the  mental  associations  of  the  percipient  belong  to  a  cycle  of 
events  disconnected  with  the  cycle  concerned  in  the  distant  person's 
death,  it  remains  as  improbable  as  ever  that  the  several  outcomes  of 
the  two  cycles  coincident  in  content  should  also  coincide  so  often  in 
date.  That  they  actually  do  so  shows,  according  to  Mr.  Parish,  a 
methodical  flaw  in  the  Sidgwick  report.  Its  authors  accept  as  an  em- 
pirical fact  (with  a  slight  correction  for  oblivion)  the  measure  of  fre- 
quency given  by  the  Census  for  visions  of  recognized  persons,  and 
then  proceed  to  cipher  out  the  improbability  that  any  one  such  vision 
will  occur  by  accident  on  the  day  when  its  object  dies.  But  they 
ought  rather,  says  their  German  critic,  to  have  ciphered  out,  from 
the  number  of  such  coincidences  as  an  empirical  fact  what  the  real 
frequency,  as  distinguished  from  the  recollected  and  reported  fre- 
quency, of  the  visions  must  actually  have  been.  This  would  give  (as 
I  apply  his  reasoning)  the  figure  of  35  hallucinations  at  least,  of  the 
species  immediately  discussed,  to  each  adult  in  the  community,  and 
60  times  that  number,  or  over  2,000  miscellaneous  hallucinations 
of  all  kinds  to  each  head  of  population,1  most  of  which  we  must  sup- 
pose to  be  forgotten  immediately,  if  the  reasoning  is  to  be  seriously 
applied  to  facts.  Mr.  Parish,  of  course,  would  not  so  apply  it,  for 
the  result  is  absurd  and  incredible.  He  only  makes  a  logical  nut  of 
it  for  the  other  side  to  crack,  disbelieving  himself  that  the  returns  of 
the  Census  have  any  definite  numerical  value  at  all.  In  this  contemp- 
tuous estimate  I  cannot  possibly  agree.  W.  J. 

1FThe  computation  is  this  :  By  the  English  figures  17,000  persons  yielded  32 
death-visions,  each  of  which  had  only  i  pure  chance  in  19,000  of  occurring 
when  it  did.  To  produce  the  32  happy  chances  there  must,  therefore,  have 
been  19,000  X  32  such  visions  in  the  whole  17,000  persons,  or  19,000  X  32  -*- 
17,000  =  35.7  such  visions  in  each  one  of  the  17,000.  But,  since  the  32  death- 
visions  were  extracted  from  1,942  hallucinations  of  all  kinds  experienced  by  the 
17,000  answers  of  the  Census  question,  each  answer  must  have  had  a  number  of 
hallucinations  of  all  kinds  as  much  greater  than  35  as  1,942  is  greater  than  32, 
which  would  give  him  approximately  2,000  hallucinations,  not  one  of  which  in 
9  cases  out  of  10  he  would  have  remembered,  for  roughly  g-tenths  of  those 
questioned  in  the  Census  replied  'No.' 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  659 

Lo    Studio    Del?   Attenzione    Conativa,  Ricerche    Spcrimcntali. 

SANCTEDE  SANCTIS.    Atti  della  Societa  Romana  di  Antropologia- 

Vol.  IV.,  Fascicolo  II.     Pp.  19. 

Experiments  on  the  changes  in  the  extent  of  the  field  of  vision 
when  the  attention  was  distracted,  first,  by  auditory  appeals,  or  painful 
stimuli  to  the  skin;  second,  by  the  task  of  counting  the  number  of  de- 
tails in  a  circular  diagram  presented  at  the  centre  of  the  field.  Two 
normal  subjects  (one  more  cultivated  and  intelligent  than  the  other), 
one  melancholic,  and  one  '  hallucinated  '  (paranoiac?)  subject  were 
tested  by  the  perimeter.  The  results  showed  contraction  of  the  field 
in  all  cases.  The  contraction  was  only  moderate  under  the  first  kind 
of  distraction.  Under  the  second  kind  it  was  considerable ;  the  para- 
noiac suffering  in  both  cases  the  greater  loss.  -^  •, 

Collezionismo  e  Impulsi    Collezionistici.      SANCTE    DE    SANCTIS. 

Bulletino  Della  Societa  Lancisiana  Degli  Ospedali  di  Roma,  Anno 

XVII.,  fasc.  I.     Roma,  Tipografia  Innocenzo  Artero,  1897. 

A  careful  discussion  of  the  definition  of  '  Collectomania '  or  '  morbid 
collectionism,'  on  the  basis  of  the  case  of  a  woman  of  63,  in  poor  health, 
with  depression  of  spirits,  who  took  to  collecting  and  secreting  pieces  of 
bread,  hair,  bones,  and  refuse  of  all  sorts.  Wherever  she  saw  any  such 
object  lying  she  was  compelled  to  pick  it  up  and  add  it  to  the  collec- 
tion. She  complained  of  the  symptoms  as  a  sort  of  insanity,  and 
said  they  were  relieved  when  she  drank  wine ;  and  this  induced  the 
doctors,  suspecting  alcoholism,  to  proscribe  wine  altogether,  when  the 
symptoms  disappeared.  When  pressed  for  her  motives,  she  at  last 
reluctantly  said  that  she  thought  the  neighbors  might  use  the  objects 
in  question  for  casting  spells  upon  her. 

De  Sanctis  finds  the  absence  of  consciousness  of  morbidness,  and 
of  reason  for  the  acts,  not  essential  to  the  definition  of  morbid  collecting 
mania.  The  coercive  impulse,  he  thinks,  is  primary,  explanation 
secondary ;  and  the  sense  of  foolishness  which  may  in  any  case  exist 
on  reflection  between  active  fits,  may  be  more  or  less  actively  or  con- 
stantly present,  according  to  the  freshness  of  the  case,  or  the  intelli- 
gence of  the  subject.  •ty  T 

Suite  Cosidette  Alluclnazioni  Antagonistiche.     SANCTE  DE  SANC- 
TIS e  MARIA  MONTESSORI.     Roma,  Societa  Editrice  Dante  Al- 
ghieri,  1897.     ^P-  X7- 
This  article  contains  a  detailed  description  of  a  number  of  clinical 

cases  in  the  University  of  Rome  which  presented  the  phenomena  of 


66o  SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

antagonistic  hallucination.  The  various  symptoms  observed  seemed 
to  admit  of  a  classification  somewhat  as  follows:  i.  As  to  whether 
the  opposed  hallucinations  appeared  as  simultaneous  or  successive. 
2.  As  to  the  manner  in  which  the  hallucination  is  received  by  the 
sense  organ,  as  in  hearing  whether  the  one  hallucination  is  heard  in 
one  ear  and  the  opposed  in  the  other,  or  whether  the  two  are  heard 
promiscuously  in  both  ears.  3.  As  to  whether  the  hallucinations  are 
homonymous  or  heteronymous ;  that  is,  whether  pei'ceived  in  one  and 
the  same  sphere  of  sensation  or  in  different;  for  instance,  the  two  hal- 
lucinations may  both  be  auditory,  or  one  auditory  and  the  other  visual. 
4.  As  to  whether  the  antagonism  observed  manifests  a  logical  contra- 
diction and  is  therefore  absolute,  or  whether  the  antagonism  is  one  which 
is  rather  personal  and  relative.  5.  As  to  whether  the  hallucinations 
are  of  a  physical  or  psychical  nature.  6.  As  to  whether  the  hallucina- 
tions are  episodical  or  accidental  on  the  one  hand,  or  on  the  other  en- 
during and  systematic. 

The  explanation  of  the  antagonistic  hallucinations  as  given  by  the 
authors  of  the  pamphlet  is  that  of  a  tendency  to  association  by  con- 
trast which  tendency  in  pathological  cases  is  abnormally  exaggerated, 
giving  rise  to  the  opposed  hallucinations  as  observed. 

JOHN  GRIER  HIBBEN. 
PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY. 


SOCIAL   PSYCHOLOGY. 

The    Principles   of    Sociology.     FRANKLIN  H.   GIDDINGS.      New 
York,  The  Macmillan  Company.      1896.     Pp.  xvi+476.      3d  Edi- 
tion.     1897. 
The  Theory  of  Socialization.     Same  author  and  publishers.      1897. 

Pp.  xiv+47- 

The  Genesis  of  Social  Interests.     J.  MARK  BALDWIN.     The  Monist, 
April,  1897. 

The  psychologist  can  scarcely  read  Professor  Giddings' '  Sociology  ' 
and  its  accompanying  syllabus  which  puts  into  connected  form  the 
theoretical  principles  and  psychological  presuppositions  of  the  larger 
work,  without  feeling  convinced  that  the  day  of  psychology  has  only 
begun  to  dawn.  Unless  all  signs  fail,  the  study  of  sociology  is  to  take 
its  place  not  merely  in  the  graduate  schools  of  universities,  but  in  the 
under-graduate  work  of  the  colleges,  side  by  side  with  economics  and 
politics.  Professor  Giddings  book,  by  its  more  rigorous  effort  to  define 
the  province  of  the  science,  and  to  determine  the  fundamental  unit  of 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  66 1 

explanation,  will  be  the  most  potent  instrument  which  has  yet  ap- 
peared in  making  possible  such  a  recognition  in  educational  curricula 
of  the  investigations  which  reflect  the  actual  interests  of  our  day. 
But  if  sociology,  as  in  these  works,  is  defined  as  a  psychological 
science,  or  even  as  a  branch  of  psychology,  it  is  evident  that  this  must 
mean  a  highly  increased  interest  in  psychology  and  a  new  demand 
upon  the  psychologist.  Just  as  the  eighteenth  century's  interest  in  the 
individual's  moral  life  called  out  the  psychology  of  its  time,  just  as 
the  nineteenth  century's  interest  in  natural  science  has  created  the  ex- 
perimental psychology  of  to-day,  so  the  growing  social  interest  prom- 
ises to  evoke  a  social  psychology,  which  in  my  judgment  has  a  broader 
field  than  any  of  its  predecessors. 

The  delimination  of  sociology  from  psychology  is  to  be  effected, 
according  to  the  author,  "by  restricting  psychology  to  a  study  of  the 
phenomena  of  the  individual  mind  and  by  assigning  to  sociology  the 
investigation  of  the  more  special  and  complex  phenomena  of  minds 
in  association  with  one  another."  "  Psychology  is  the  science  of  the 
association  of  ideas.  Sociology  is  the  science  of  the  association  of 
minds"  (Princ.  Soc.,  pp.  241).  The  impossibility  of  such  a  delimi- 
tation has  been  pointed  out  in  previous  notices  of  '  Social  Psychology ' 
in  this  REVIEW.  Just  as  there  are  no  individual  *  ideas '  which  can  be 
studied,  in  isolation,  so  there  is  no  individual  mind  which  can  be 
studied  and  comprehended  apart  from  its  relations  to  others;  and 
just  as  psychology  has  learned  that  no  '  association '  of  such  ideas 
could  make  up  a  mind,  so  sociology  must  learn  that  no  association 
of  individual  minds — if  they  were  really  individuals  which  could  be 
dealt  with  as  such — can  make  a  society.  A  true  analysis  of  the  social 
condition  will  not  give  an  '  individual'  as  its  unit  for  synthesis. 

In  the  syllabus  the  formulation  is  somewhat  different.  The  '  four 
great  processes  which  make  up  the  practical  activities  of  life '  are  there 
stated  to  be :  (i)  '  Getting  used  to  the  world  by  attempting  to  obtain 
the  utmost  knowledge  and  feeling  from  external  things,'  which  is  the 
process  of  '  appreciation.'  (2)  '  Adapting  the  external  world  to  our- 
selves,' '  utilization.'  (3)  '  Adapting  ourselves  to  the  external 
world,'  '  characterization.'  (4)  '  Adapting  ourselves  to  one  an- 
other,' '  socialization.'  These  four  processes  are  studied  respectively, 
by  psychology,  economics,  ethics  and  sociology.  It  is  somewhat 
startling  to  be  told  that  ethics  deals  rather  with  our  relations  to  the  ex- 
ternal world  than  with  our  relations  to  each  other,  and  the  author  him- 
self states  that  psychology  deals  with  more  than  the  process  of 
appreciation,  so  that  it  is  to  be  feared  that  the  fascinating  symmetry  of 


662  SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY. 

this  latter  scheme  will  not  avail  to  make  it  practically  workable. 
Moreover,  to  the  psychologist  the  definition  of  his  own  subject  as  the 
'  science  of  the  association  of  ideas '  has  an  anachronistic  sound, 
which  prepares  him  to  be  suspicious  of  the  presuppositions  involved  in 
a  '  science  of  the  association  of  minds.' 

What  these  presuppositions  are  appears  in  the  author's  funda- 
mental principle  of  '  consciousness  of  kind.'  This  is  attained  as  fol- 
lows :  Socialization  requires  some  degree  of  similarity,  of  which  the 
important  modes  are  three:  (i)  Kinship.  (2)  Mental  and  moral 
similarity.  (3)  Potential  likeness  or  capacity  for  assimilation.  "Con- 
sciousness of  kind  is  a  state  of  consciousness  in  which  any  being, 
whether  low  or  high  in  the  scale  of  life,  recognizes  another  conscious 
being  as  of  like  kind  with  itself  "  (Pr.  Soc.,  p.  17).  This  is  analyzed 
in  the  syllabus  into  a  combination  of  (a)  perception  of  resemblance, 
(b)  sympathy  and  liking,  and  (c)  a  desire  for  recognition.  It  is  de- 
clared to  be  the  simplest  or  elementary  social  state  of  mind,  and  the 
chief  socializing  force.  It  modifies  appetites  and  desire,  '  impression ' 
(the  mental  power  of  one  over  another)  and  imitation  so  that  the  in- 
dividual motives  become  socializing  forces. 

The  first  query  which  suggests  itself  is  as  to  whether  we  are  not 
liable  to  assume  an  altogether  too  highly  developed  consciousness  if 
we  make  a  consciousness  of  kind  co-extensive  with  society.  It  is,  of 
course,  true  that  a  bee  or  dog  or  horse  reacts  in  a  peculiar  way  to- 
ward what  we  call  his  kind,  but  this  is  far  from  implying  that  there  is 
any  trace  of  such  a  process  in  the  animal  consciousness  as  a  recogni- 
tion of  likeness.  It  is  well  known  that  smell  is  the  organ  mainly 
depended  on  by  many  of  the  sociable  animals,  and  it  seems  far  more 
likely  that  there  is  no  comparison  of  the  odor  from  the  other,  with 
that  from  the  animal's  own  body,  but  merely  a  direct  reaction  upon  a 
grateful  stimulus.  Nor  does  the  attachment  of  kinship  seem  to  me  to 
be  the  result  of  any  such  comparative  process.  So  far  as  it  is  found 
in  higher  animals,  or  even  in  simpler  human  conditions,  it  seems  to 
be  in  the  case  of  parent  for  offspring,  a  direct  instinct,  selected  in  the 
struggle  for  existence ;  in  the  case  of  offspring  for  parent,  it  doesn't 
exist,  i.  e.,  any  source  of  nourishment  and  entertainment  is  equally 
liked  by  the  little  animal  or  human  infant,  unless  other  circum- 
stances, familiarity,  etc.,  enter;  in  the  case  of  brothers  and  sisters,  it 
doesn't  exist  as  the  result  of  a  perception  of  kinship  or  resemblance — 
any  group  of  children  brought  up  together  from  infancy  develop  as 
much  affection  as  the  average  family  of  the  same  blood.  In  a  word, 
the  attachment  is  either  a  direct,  not  an  indirect  instinct  in  which  there 


PSYCHOLOGICAL.  LITERATURE.  663 

is  no  comparison  prior  to  attachment,  or  it  is  the  result  of  processes 
much  more  intricate  than  the  perception  of  resemblance,  which  appear 
clearly  in  the  case  of  clan  feeling.  The  theory,  as  applied  in  such 
simpler  cases,  implies  that  there  is  a  consciousness  of  self  as  a  definite, 
distinct  individual  and  that  others  are  compared  and  found  to  agree  or 
disagree.  This  is  an  assumption  which  the  psychologist  will  be  slow 
to  admit. 

Is  the  difficulty  met  by  the  point  of  view  of  the  syllabus,  which 
regards  '  consciousness  of  kind '  not  as  a  simple  recognition  that  an- 
other is  of  like  kind  with  the  self,  but  as  a  complex  state,  involving 
the  three  elements  named  above,  with  the  chief  emphasis  upon  sym- 
pathy which  is,  indeed,  often  used  as  epitomizing  the  phrase?  This 
will  depend  on  what  is  understood  by  sympathy  (Syllabus,  1 26) .  If 
it  is  conceived  merely  as  '  imitation  of  emotions,'  then,  as  Spinoza 
saw,  it  may  mean  emulation  or  conflict  as  well  as  compassion  or  socia- 
bility. If  it  is  individualistic  in  its  elements  the  combination  will  not 
be  social.  Sympathy,  as  a  social  force,  must  mean  not  a  state  in 
which  A  and  B  merely  have  like  feelings,  not  merely  a  state  in  which 
B's  feeling  is  caused  by  associations  evoked  by  perceiving  A's  actions 
when  under  said  feeling,  but  a  state  in  which  A  and  his  feelings  have 
really  become  a  part  of  B's  own  interests,  i.  e.,  of  B's  self,  so  that  B 
is  no  longer  a  particular,  exclusive  self,  who  is  B  and  B  only,  but  is 
rather  a  self  that  includes  A  within  it,  in  fact,  a  truly  social  self.  Pro- 
fessor Giddings  speaks  of  the  case  of  two  persons  mentally  giving  and 
taking  and  thereby  becoming  alike.  This  is  to  stop  just  this  side  of  in- 
sight into  the  essential  factor  in  the  social.  The  point  is  that  they  not 
merely  become  alike,  but  that  the  content  of  each  personality  is  made 
to  include  something  of  the  other;  the  self,  while  still  individual,  is 
not  particular,  but  social. 

This  is,  in  fact,  the  fundamental  inadequacy  in  Professor  Gidding*s 
psychology  of  the  social  self,  that  he  treats  it  as  the  older  psychology 
treated  ideas,  as  ready-made,  irreducible  units,  which  could  be  asso- 
ciated, but  not  analyzed.  If  he  had  read  and  taken  to  heart  James' 
chapter  on  the  self,  it  could  hardly  have  failed  to  suggest  a  different 
treatment,  but  Mr.  Spencer  seems  to  be  the  author's  chief  and  almost 
sole  authority  in  psychology. 

It  seems  ungracious,  however,  to  find  fault  with^a  sociologist  for 
his  psychology  when  one  reflects  how  little  psychologists  have  done  in 
this  field  of  the  analysis  of  the  social  self  since  Adam  Smith  sketched 
the  origin  and  growth  of  the  moral  sentiments.  In  fact,  in  view  es- 
pecially of  recent  French  investigations,  it  might  fairly  be  said  that 


664  VISION. 

sociology  is  at  present  doing  more  for  psychology  than  psychology  is 
doing  for  sociology.  A  work  like  this  of  Professor  Giddings,  which 
brings  together  such  a  mass  of  material,  and  makes  so  strenuous  an 
effort  toward  its  explanation  on  psychological  principles,  comes  to  the 
psychologist  as  a  distinct  challenge  to  a  more  adequate  analysis  of  the 
social  consciousness. 

Professor  Baldwin's  article  is  a  successful  attempt  to  meet  the  chal- 
lenge, not  necessarily  of  this  special  work,  but  of  current  social  and 
political  theories.  The  concept  of  person  is  shown  to  be  a  complex 
content,  in  which  the  '  myself '  is  always  merely  one  pole  of  a  shifting 
field  of  other  selves,  and  so  is  always  defined  in  terms  of  others,  just  as 
others  are  defined  in  terms  of  it.  In  the  case  of  a  child  in  a  family, 
the  other  pole  is  sometimes  the  parent,  in  which  case  the  '  me '  of  the 
child  is  imitative,  feeling  itself  to  be  the  inferior  pole;  or,  again,  the 
other  pole  is  the  younger  brother  or  sister  when  the  '  me '  becomes 
aggressive  and  exploits  its  superior  power.  The  point  is  that  it  is 
absurd  to  call  the  child  altruistic  in  the  one  case  and  selfish  in  the 
other,  since  its  attitude  is  in  both  cases  alike,  the  result  of  the  other 
pole.  The  other  pole,  the  socius  or  alter,  is  then  fundamentally 
essential  to  the  content  of  the  developing  consciousness  of  self,  for  the 
child  not  only  thinks  of  the  other,  the  alter,  as  his  socius,  but  he 
thinks  of  himself  as  the  other's  socius.  '  In  short,  the  real  self  is 
the  social  self,  the  socius.'  A  child's  'self  will  then  normally  in- 
clude as  part  of  its  content,  the  family  or  group,  his  '  interests'  reflect 
the  interest  of  the  group,  and  this  identity  of  personal  and  family  in- 
terests '  is  responsible  for  the  rise  of  the  family,  considered  from  an 
evolution  point  of  view.'  j  H  TuFTS> 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO. 


VISION. 

I.  Weitere  Beitrdge  zum  Sehenlernen  blindgeborenen  und  spater 
mit  Erfolg  operierten    Menschen,  soivie  zu  dem  gelegentlich 
vorkommenden    Verlernen  des  Sehens   bei  jungeren    kindern, 
nebst  psychologischen   Bemerkungen   bie  totalen  kongenitalen 
Amaurose.     W.  UBTHOFF.     Zeitschr.  f.  psych,   u.   physiol.    d. 
Sinn.     XIV.,  3,  197-241. 

II.  Demonstration  des   Scheinerschen     Versuches   nebst   Betrach- 
tungen    iiber   das    Z,ustandekommen   von  Raumvorstellungen. 
HEINE.     Zeitschr.    f.    psych,   u.    physiol.    d.    Sinn.       XIV.,    4, 
274-281. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  '     ' 

Professor  Ubthoff  reports  upon  the  development  of  visual  ideas  in 
three  subjects.  The  first  is  an  intelligent  boy  operated  upon  for 
congenital  double  cataract  at  the  age  of  five.  His  mother  declared 
that  he  had  always  been  totally  blind,  but  some  tests  seemed  to  indi- 
cate that  he  received  vague  sight  impressions  from  large  or  moving 
objects,  and  that  he  could  probably  distinguish  between  large  surfaces 
of  red  and  green.  The  second  (previously  reported)  is  a  feeble  boy, 
operated  upon  at  the  age  of  seven  for  total,  double  congenital  blind- 
ness, examined  for  some  time  then  and  again  after  a  lapse  of  two  and 
a  half  years.  The  third  is  a  girl  who  became  totally  blind  when  four 
months  old  and  received  sight  by  operation  at  the  age  of  three  and  a 
half  years.  The  genetic  theory  of  sight  is  upheld.  The  rate  of 
development  in  vision  differed  surprisingly  with  the  difference  in  the 
general  intelligence  of  the  subjects.  The  experience  of  the  first  sub- 
ject in  learning  to  recognize  his  own  image  in  a  mirror  is  specially 
valuable  as  a  description  of  the  struggle  and  fluctuation  in  the  develop- 
ment of  the  consciousness  of  self.  Colors  were  taught  with  difficulty. 
Color  surfaces  were  at  first  only  '  objects.'  Indirect  vision  was  much 
slower  to  develop  than  direct  vision.  In  counting  by  sight  the  sub- 
jects moved  their  heads  along  the  series  instead  of  turning  the  eyes. 
The  perception  of  form,  size  and  distance  was  at  first  impossible  and 
was  learned  through  association  with  touch,  as  the  author  thinks. 

The  last  section  of  the  article  is  a  report  of  interviews  with  a  con- 
genitally  blind  (microphthalmic)  woman  aged  32,  with  good  power 
of  introspection.  She  has  no  conception  of  light  or  darkness,  but 
has  marked  preferences  for  colors.  These  are  due  entirely  to  associa- 
tions, e.  g.,  she  dislikes  red  because  it  is  gaudy,  something  unbecom- 
ing to  an  unfortunate,  and  perhaps  more  so  because  as  a  child  she 
was  told  that  the  flames  of  a  certain  fatal  fire  in  the  vicinity  were  in- 
tensely red.  Her  aesthetic  conceptions  are  based  rather  upon  intel- 
lectual and  emotional  grounds  than  upon  sensory  images.  In 
remembering  adults  she  constructs  images  on  a  large  scale  after  the 
fashion  of  a  child  she  has  handled.  She  can  form  no  conception  of 
a  picture.  She  commits  to  memory  better  when  listening  than  when 
reading  from  the  blind  alphabet.  She  perceives  the  approach  of 
large  objects  mainly  by  differences  in  *  air  pressure.'  She  has  medium 
power  of  estimating  the  distance  of  objects  by  sound  and  tactual  space 
by  movement.  Tests  with  the  aesthesiometer  reveal  no  finer  skin  sensi- 
tiveness than  the  normal.  This  suggestive  report  upon  observations 
reveals  the  need  and  possibility,  and  perhaps  some  method  of  experi- 
mental investigation  on  the  subject. 


666  PEDAGOGICAL. 

Heine  explains  an  excellent  method  of  demonstrating  Schemer's 
experiment  on  a  large  scale.  It  is  done  by  imitating  the  mechanism 
of  the  eye  by  arranging  screens  and  refracting  media  so  that  all  the 
conditions  of  the  image  are  plainly  set  forth.  By  this  means  he 
demonstrates  the  condition  of  the  emmetropic  eye  and  reproduces  the 
effects  of  myopia  and  hypermetropia.  Using  the  same  apparatus  with 
two  slits  covered  by  differently  colored  glasses,  he  explains  the  physical 
and  physiological  conditions  of  the  single  image  in  binocular  vision. 

C.  E.  SEASHORE. 
UNIVERSITY  OF  IOWA. 


PEDAGOGICAL. 

Der  Stundenplan.     Ein  Kapitel  aus  der  Padagogischen  Psychologic 

und  Physiologic.      H.   SCHILLER.     Heft.  I.,  Abh.  d.  Paed.  etc. 

Berlin,  Reuther  u.  Reichard,  1897.     Pp.  65. 

Although  no  psycho-physiological  topic  has  received  so  much  atten- 
tion of  recent  years  as  that  of  fatigue,  yet  there  are  a  number  of 
reasons  why  the  results  of  the  experiments  usually  employed  in  these 
investigations  are  of  a  doubtful  pedagogical  value  :  (i)  The  tests  are 
of  an  unusual  nature,  such  as  memorizing  meaningless  syllables,  etc. 
(2)  They  are  to  the  last  degree  monotonous,  and,  therefore,  awaken 
no  interest  in  the  persons  experimented  upon.  (3)  They  are  pro- 
tracted over  unusually  long  periods  of  time,  with  no  intermission  or 
change.  In  a  word,  the  conditions  of  the  experiments  do  not  corre- 
spond to  the  actual  conditions  of  the  school-room.  Professor  Ebbing- 
haus,  of  Breslau,  has  attempted  to  avoid  this  difficulty  by  testing  the  fac- 
ulty with  which  children  solve  simple  mathematical  problems  during  the 
first  ten  minutes  of  each  recitation,  and  he  has  tried  similar  experi- 
ments for  the  special  purpose  of  testing  the  pupil's  memory  during 
different  hours  of  the  day.  Dr.  Griesbach,  of  Miihlhaus,  has  sug- 
gested that  there  exists  a  close  connection  between  fatigue  and  the  sen- 
sitiveness of  the  skin  as  tested  by  one's  ability  to  distinguish  two 
slightly  removed  points  of  a  compass.  This  method  of  determining 
the  amount  of  fatigue  has  proved  to  be  the  most  satisfactory  of  all. 
The  question  of  fatigue  lies  at  the  basis  of  an  intelligent  school  pro- 
gramme. 

The  only  complete  restorative  from  fatigue  is  sleep.  According  to 
Axel  Key,  children  between  six  and  eleven,  may,  without  hesitation, 
be  allowed  from  ten  to  twelve  hours  daily,  and  even  more ;  while 
youths  of  seventeen  or  eighteen  should  be  allowed  not  less  than  nine 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  667 

or  ten  hours.  These  figures  should  be  borne  in  mind  in  fixing  the  hour 
for  opening  the  school.  The  children  should  not  be  deprived  of  their 
sleep,  nor,  on  the  other  hand,  should  the  hour  be  fixed  so  late  that 
they  lose  their  freshness  before  school  begins.  No  hour  is  suitable  for 
all  localities  and  under  all  circumstances,  since  the  habits  of  the  people 
vary.  One  can  only  say  that  in  general  residents  of  the  large  cities, 
except  those  of  the  manufacturing  quarters,  keep  later  hours  than  those 
of  smaller  towns  and  the  country.  With  due  allowance  for  local  usages, 
Professor  Schiller  thinks  the  three  lower  classes  should  not  assem- 
ble before  nine  o'clock,  and  he  thinks  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  seven 
o'clock,  the  usual  hour  in  Germany  during  the  summer  semester,  is  too 
early. 

More  difficult  is  the  question  of  a  suitable  closing  hour  and  the 
distribution  of  pauses  for  recreation.  The  usual  morning  session  in 
Germany  lasts  five  hours,  with  a  short  recess  after  each  hour.  The 
object  of  the  recess  is  complete  recovery,  if  possible,  from  the  fatigue 
of  the  preceding  exercise,  so  that  the  amounts  accomplished  during 
the  various  periods  may  be  nearly  equal.  In  spite  of  numerous  ex- 
periments, it  is  still  impossible  to  determine  exactly  the  length  of  the 
recesses  necessary  to  this  purpose.  In  the  gymnasium  at  Giessen 
there  is  a  ten  minutes'  recess  after  each  hour  except  the  second,  when 
there  is  fifteen  minutes,  and  each  successive  hour  is  shortened  by 
about  five  minutes,  the  figures  varying  somewhat  for  the  upper  and 
lower  classes.  This  system  gives  far  better  results  than  the  old  prac- 
tice of  allowing  only  one  recess  of  fifteen  or  twenty  minutes  in  the 
middle  of  the  forenoon. 

Dr.  Wagner,  of  Darmstadt,  has  employed  the  method  of  deter- 
mining fatigue  suggested  by  Dr.  Giesbach,  with  the  following  results : 
Fatigue  increases  with  the  greatest  rapidity  during  the  first  hour,  after 
which  it  increases  but  slowly.  Mathematics,  Latin  and  written  exer- 
cises are  specially  fatiguing.  Exercise  in  the  gymnasium  brings  no 
recuperation,  but  often,  and  in  proportion  to  its  intensity,  increases 
the  fatigue.  In  accordance  with  these  results,  Professor  Schiller  pro- 
poses that  the  first  hour  be  devoted  to  the  most  difficult  subject, 
either  Latin,  mathematics  or  those  subjects  which  require  written 
exercises,  preferably  the  last.  These  are  difficult  because  they  are 
more  or  less  abstract  and  awaken  little  interest  in  the  mind  of  the 
average  child.  They  should  be  followed  by  subjects  of  more  general 
interest,  such  as  History,  Geography,  Religion  or  Drawing.  The 
second  hour  is  followed  by  a  somewhat  longer  recess,  after  which  the 
child  is  prepared  for  another  difficult  subject,  preferably  mathematics 


668  AESTHETICS. 

and  the  foreign  languages.  The  last  hour  should  be  devoted  to  the 
natural  sciences,  writing,  singing,  gymnastic  drill,  etc.  When  only 
two  hours  a  week  are  devoted  to  a  subject,  it  gives  much  better  re- 
sults if  the  exercises  come  on  consecutive  days,  or  even  on  consecutive 
hours. 

GUERNSEY  JONES. 
UNIVERSITY  OF  NEBRASKA. 


ESTHETICS. 

1.  Gedanken  zu  einer  ^3£sthetik  auf  entuvickelungsgeschichtlicher 
Grundlage.     KONRAD  LANGE.     Zeitschrift  fur  Psychologic   und 
Physiologie  der  Sinnesorgane,  XIV.,  3.     May,  1897. 

2.  Kritische  Studien  zur  ^Esthetik  der  Gegenivart.     HUGO  SPIT- 
ZER.     Leipzig  and  Wien.      1897. 

I.  With  Groos'  book,  '  Die  Spiele  der  Thiere,'  Lange  conceives  a 
new  epoch  of  aesthetic  study  begun,  because  finally  it  is  to  be  based 
securely  upon  the  evolutionary  hypothesis.  The  play  instinct  has  been 
shown  to  have  an  important  place  in  Natural  Selection,  and  by  that 
means  the  aesthetic  consciousness  has  been  brought  directly  into  rela- 
tion with  the  development  of  the  species. 

But,  that  the  important  relation  of  the  play  instinct  to  the  aesthetic 
consciousness  be  properly  understood,  it  is  necessary  that  the  dis- 
tinction of  play  phenomena  from  other  activities  be  carefully  drawn ; 
and,  secondly,  that  the  psychological  nature  of  the  play  conscious- 
ness be  clearly  defined.  Otherwise  the  theory  of  the  importance  of 
play  in  development  may  rest  upon  a  too  inclusive  concept  of  play 
and  our  connection  of  the  play  consciousness  with  aesthetic  upon  in- 
sufficient psychological  data. 

As  to  the  first,  Lange  criticizes  the  tendency  of  Groos  to  include  too 
much  under  the  concept  of  play.  For  instance,  in  the  consideration 
of  the  plays  of  illusion,  which  is  the  kernel  of  the  problem,  the  line 
between  'play'  and  'earnest'  is  not  clearly  enough  drawn,1  although 
the  importance  of  its  distinction  is  recognized.  Accordingly  the 
plays  (so  called  by  Groos)  which  are  a  direct  and  purposeful  bringing 
into  activity  of  the  parental  and  love  instinct  and  all  that  leads  to  the 
gratification  of  the  same,  are,  according  to  Lange,  really  not  plays. 
Neither  the  acts  of  winning  the  other  sex,  nor  the  building  acts  that 
prepare  for  the  reception  of  offspring  can  be  classed  as  play.  Nor 
can  we  call  the  torture  of  one  animal  by  another,  nor  the  fight  for  life 

1  Cf.  Prof.  Baldwin's  criticism  of  Groos  in  Science,  Feb.  26,  1897. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  669 

and  death,  illustrated  in  one  case,  by  the  play  of  a  cat  with  the 
mouse,  or,  in  the  other,  by  the  fight  of  two  steers  for  a  mate,  play 
phenomena,  as  does  Groos.  All  these  phenomena  can  only  be  classed 
as  play  so  long  as  they  are  of  the  nature  of  an  imitation  of  the  real, 
when  the  sense  of  simulation  and  illusion  is  present.  As  soon  as  illu- 
sion vanishes,  earnest  reality  takes  its  place. 

The  temptation  to  confuse  play  and  earnest  has  arisen  out  of  the 
desire  of  bringing  the  concept  of  play  under  the  rubric  of  the  '  use- 
ful,' thus  making  it  amenable  to  the  operation  of  Natural  Selection, 
entirely  unnecessarily,  as  Lange  thinks,  if  the  real  notion  of  illusion 
be  kept  in  mind.  For  it  is  just  in  the  fact  that  through  conscious  illu- 
sion instincts  are  played  with,  without  leading  to  the  practical  results 
of  the  exercise  of  the  instincts  themselves,  that  the  great  value  of  play 
in  the  individual  and  the  species  may  be  seen.  By  means  of  play  the 
instincts  are  brought  into  activity  without  going  to  the  lengths  of 
reality.  Such  instincts  as  are  important  for  the  promotion  of  the 
species  are  thus  kept  constantly  in  exercise,  while,  if  used  in  reality,  the 
exercise  would  be  infrequent,  owing  to  the  weakness  of  the  young  and 
the  dangers  and  natural  opposition  of  the  environment.  "  Die  Thiere 
spielen  nicht,  weil  sie  Jung  sind,  aber  sie  haben  eine  Jugend,  weil  sie 
spielen  miissen  " — in  the  words  of  Groos. 

In  this  way  Lange  sees  the  doctrine  of  be-wusste  Selbsttauschung 
brought  under  the  concept  of  Natural  Selection,  and  finds  in  it  (agree- 
ing with  Gross?)  ground  for  a  modification  of  our  idea  of  the  struggle 
for  existence.  Through  this  illusion,  play  becomes  the  means  of 
raising  the  simple  reflex  instinct  to  the  first  steps  of  intelligence,  in 
that  play  is  the  first  sense  of  new  modifications  of  the  instincts. 

And  now  the  problem  of  aesthetics.  Can  the  same  argument 
that  gives  to  play  such  weight  in  the  development  of  the  animal,  be 
equally  cogent  in  giving  the  esthetic  consciousness  a  ruling  place  in 
the  development  of  the  human  species.  On  the  basis  of  the  similarity 
of  the  play  instincts  with  the  aesthetic  consciousness,  which  must  be 
here  assumed,  though  fully  treated  elsewhere  by  both  authors,  the 
conclusion  of  Lange,  that  aesthetic  feelings  play  a  large  role  in  the  de- 
velopment of  the  race,  seems  justified.  As  there  are  certain  instincts 
whose  exercise  is  necessary  to  the  maintenance  of  an  animal  species, 
and  for  which  the  proper  exercise  can  be  obtained  only  through  simu- 
lation in  play,  so  there  are  social  instincts,  courage,  patriotism,  ambi- 
tion, etc.,  necessary  for  the  maintenance  of  society,  whose  strength 
and  exercise  is  constantly  kept  up  by  outside  simulations  and  repre- 
sentations of  the  same.  Man  needs  art  just  as  animals  and  children 


670  AESTHETICS. 

need  play,  to  preserve  alive  the  feelings  which  tend  to  the  maintenance 
of  the  social  organism. 

II.  Spitzer's  collection  of  short  critical  essays  upon  books  that  have 
recently  appeared  in  the  aesthetic  literature  of  Germany  serves  equally 
well  the  purposes  of  introduction  to,  or  criticism  upon  the  authors  with 
whom  they  deal.  The  first,  '  Vom  characteristisch  Schonen  '  and  the 
fourth  '  Die  Entivickelung  von  Schiller's  ^EsthetikJ  are  of  interest 
for  the  historical  problems  of  aesthetics.  The  second  essay  deals  with 
a  recent  book  of  A.  Biese,  '  Die  Philosophic  des  Metaphorischen,' 
written  in  the  spirit  of  Feuerbach's  '  TheogonieJ  and  attempting  to 
give  an  account  of  the  metaphor  in  art,  religion  and  philosophy.  The 
criticism  points  out  a  failure  common  to  most  psychological  attempts 
of  this  nature,  and  one  which  Feuerbach  himself  did  not  escape,  a 
failure  of  definition,  in  which  the  boundaries  of  the  metaphorical 
are  drawn  too  widely  and  include  much  which,  through  the  abstrac- 
tion and  criticism  of  centuries,  has  taken  on  an  intellectual  and  technical 
cast.  The  criticism,  in  the  third  essay,  of  the  aesthetical  portion  of 
Dessoir's  '  Geschichte  der  neueren  deutschen  Psychologic,'  deals 
with  that  radicalism  of  historical  interpretation  which  many  of  its 
readers  feel  to  be  characteristic  of  the  entire  work.  The  last  essay 
has  for  its  subject  a  work  of  immediate  interest  in  K.  Lange's  '  Die 
be'wusste  Selbsttaiischung  als  Kern  des  aesthetischen  Genusses' 
Spitzer  considers  the  theory  in  no  wise  equal  to  the  Hutcheson- 
Zimmermann  doctrine  of  the  characteristic  as  an  explanatory  aesthet- 
ical  principle,  and  finds  it  subject  to  numerous  psychological  doubts. 

The  test  case  of  the  illusion  theory  is,  however,  its  application  to 
the  non-imitative  arts,  architecture,  lyric  and  music.  Here,  of  course, 
there  can  be  no  illusion  in  the  sense  of  comparison  of  image  with  the 
real  object,  and  to  fill  up  the  break  the  idea  of  '  Schein-Gefuhle'  is 
introduced.  Lange  points  out,  especially  for  architecture,  that  there 
are  certain  static  and  dynamic  feelings  of  pressure,  strain,  etc.,  which 
we  put  into  the  art  object,  but  which  in  reality  are  not  there.  This 
idea  of  an  illusion  existing  between  the  feelings  and  the  object, 
Spitzer,  as  well  as  others,  finds  untenable.  All  feelings,  then,  are 
elements  of  reality,  and  the  expression,  '  Schein-  Gefiihle,'  is  a  con- 
tradictio  in  adjecto.  The  objection  is  justified  to  this  extent :  that 
it  is  a  fault  of  expression  to  say  that  feelings  are  an  appearance,  and 
therefore,  can  be  the  source  of  illusion.  All  feeling  is  immediately 
given  as  real.  The  illusion  arises  when  from  these  feelings  there  de- 
velop vague  ideas  of  forces  which  we  read  into  the  art  object,  but 
which  in  reality  are  not  there.  The  apparent  difficulty  is  solved  when 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  671 

we  consider  that  the  feelings  are  part  of  the  whole  reality  of  the  art 
object,  the  illusion  is  between  this  reality  and  the  vague  ideas  we 
apply  to  it,  between  the  ideas  of  external  forces  and  our  feelings. 

The  second  difficulty  which  Spitzer  finds  in  the  idea  of  oscillation 
between  semblance  and  reality,  is  the  same  which  presents  itself  to 
Groos  in  'Die  Spiele  der  Thiere,'  /.  e.,  that  in  many  artistic  intuitions 
the  subject  is  entirely  sunk  in  contemplation  and  no  question  of  ap- 
pearance and  reality  arises.  From  this  fact  Spitzer  draws  the  con- 
clusion that  the  illusion  theory  is  itself  faulty,  while  Groos  simply 
directs  the  attention  from  the  oscillating  nature  of  the  process.  The 
truth  seems  to  be  that  the  degree  of  illusion,  as  well  as  the  question 
whether  it  is  continuous  or  an  oscillation  between  appearance  and 
reality,  depends  very  much  upon  the  nature  of  the  arts  under  consid- 
eration— that  is  upon  the  relative  freedom  of  the  imagination  and 
upon  the  number  and  character  of  the  moments  which  tend  to  dis- 
turb the  illusion.  Music,  with  very  few  disturbing  moments  and  a 
maximum  of  freedom,  allows  of  long  sinking  of  oneself  in  the  illu- 
sion. On  the  other  hand  Painting,  in  which  the  critical  faculty  finds 
many  moments  to  disturb,  shows  more  of  the  process  of  passing  to  and 
fro  between  reality  and  illusion. 

In  conclusion  it  should  be  said  that  Spitzer  finds  in  the  illusion 
theory,  as  Lange  also  suggests,  only  one  of  several  principles  of  ex- 
planation of  aesthetic  phenomena,  and  calls  attention  to  the  necessity 
of  more  accurate  psychological  research — especially  in  the  spheres  of 
natural  beauty  and  the  minor  arts,  to  which  the  champions  of  the 
theory  have  not  found  it  necessary  to  turn  their  attention. 

WILBUR  M.  URBAN. 
PRINCETON. 


LOGICAL. 

Uber  die  Scheidung  von  grammatischem,  logischem  und  psycholo- 

gischem     Subject    resp.     Prddicat.     A.    MARTY.     Archiv   fur 

systematische  Philosophe,  1897.     174-190  and  294-333. 

The  writer's  purpose  is  to  refute  the  generally  received  doctrine 

that  there  may  be  a  fundamental  discrepancy  between  the  logical  (or 

psychological)  and  grammatical  elements  of  a  judgment.     By  logical 

subject  or  predicate  he  means  the  elements  of  the  thought  itself,  and 

by  grammatical  he  means  the  expression  of  these  in  words.      Two 

kinds  of   discrepancy,  indeed,  he  admits  at  once:     first,  where  the 

thought  is  not  completely  expressed,  but  where  an  element  is  indi- 


672  LOGICAL. 

cated  by  a  gesture  or  left  to  be  understood  by  the  hearer ;  and,  sec- 
ond, where  there  is  in  the  proposition  a  seeming  (scheinbares)  sub- 
ject or  predicate,  without  any  element  in  the  thought  corresponding 
to  it.  Under  the  latter  class  he  includes  existentials  (put  in  the  form 
but  not  having  the  value  of  categoricals) ,  and  categoroids  (negatives 
like  '  green  is  not  red  '  which  have  the  value  of  negative  existentials, 
there  is  no  red  that  is  green) . 

The  writer  denies,  however,  that  there  are  cases  where  the  logical 
and  grammatical  elements  are  all  present,  but  do  not  correspond  to 
each  other,  the  logical  subject  (or  predicate)  being  expressed  by  a 
word  which  fulfills  in  the  sentence  quite  a  different  function.  In  de- 
fense of  this  position  he  introduces  a  searching  criticism  of  several 
writers,  chief  of  whom  is  Benno  Erdmann.  Erdmann  holds  that  the 
logical  subject  and  predicate  have  no  reference  to  their  syntactical  ex- 
pression, but  are  determined  solely  by  the  objective  relation  of  the 
ideas  in  the  judgment,  a  relation  he  calls  one  of  logical  immanence. 
This  relation  is  that  of  substance  and  accident,  or  an  extension  of  it 
by  analogy ;  it  provides  a  rule  for  the  distinction  of  logical  subject 
and  predicate  in  the  content  of  the  judgment.  ('  To  the  brave  be- 
longs the  world ;'  logical  subject,  '  the  brave.')  If  this  is  true,  of 
course  any  judgment  may  have  many  forms  of  expression. 

The  writer,  however,  denies  that  Erdmann's  rule  is  fundamental. 
As  the  most  fundamental  distinction  he  makes  the  subject  the  better 
known,  the  predicate,  what  is  new.  But  other  distinctions,  originally 
or  usually  coinciding  with  this  one,  become  established  through  cus- 
tom, and  often  come  finally  to  conflict  with  it.  Among  such  distinc- 
tions are  those  of  whole  and  part,  substance  and  accident,  first  and  last, 
and  many  more;  and  which  one  shall  in  any  case  prevail  depends  on 
custom  and  circumstances.  The  writer's  point  is  that  it  is  just  these 
varying  conditions  which  are  brought  out  in  the  grammatical  structure 
of  the  sentence,  and  that  the  syntactical  functions  of  this  structure  do 
correspond  to  the  logical  functions  of  the  thought. 

To  the  objection  that  the  sentence  actually  chosen  often  fails  to  ex- 
press the  exact  judgment  of  the  speaker,  or  even  awakens  a  judgment 
different  from  itself  in  the  mind  of  the  hearer,  the  writer  replies  that 
the  judgment  expressed  is  responsible  neither  for  other  judgments  in  the 
mind  of  the  speaker  which  he  should  but  does  not  express,  nor  for 
judgments  which  the  hearer  afterwards  reaches  by  association  or  in- 
ference. The  sentence  on  the  whole  is  an  adequate  expression  of  the 
thought  below  it,  and  grammatical  relations  stand  for  logical  ones. 

While   this   conclusion  is  well   made  out,  the  writer  introduces 


BIOLOGICAL.  673 

Brentano's  distinctive  view  of  judgment  without  any  bearing  on  his 
main  theme,  and  it  would  seem  without  adequate  support.  He  has 
an  interesting  section  on  the  origin  of  the  grammatical  consciousness, 
a  subject  which  has  been  passed  over  too  lightly  even  by  the  newer 
logicians.  The  paper,  on  the  whole,  marks  a  forward  step. 

J.  FORSYTH  CRAWFORD. 
CHICAGO. 


BIOLOGICAL. 

La  Structure  du   Protoplasma  et  les    Theories  sur  L'heredite  et 

les  Grands  Problemes  de  la  Biologic   Generale.     Y.  DELAGE. 

Paris:  Reinwald,  1895.     Pp.  xiv  +878. 

Thirty  years  ago  this  title  would  have  suggested  that  the  book  was 
a  hopeless  hodge-podge.  Now  that  we  see  more  deeply  into  the  rela- 
tion of  things  we  recognize  that  the  author  could  hardly  have  dealt 
with  less  and  treated  it  completely.  For,  on  the  one  hand,  it  is  clear 
that  heredity  depends  upon  the  specific  constitution  of  the  protoplasm, 
has  to  do  with  the  causes  of  ontogenesis,  and,  combined  with  varia- 
tion, makes  possible  evolution.  On  the  other  hand,  the  structure  of 
protoplasm  has  no  meaning  apart  from  heredity,  individual  develop- 
ment, and  phylogeny,  so  that  the  modern  text-book  on  the  cell  must 
consider  its  significance  in  development  and  inheritance.  The  cell, 
the  individual,  and  the  race  are  merely  units  of  different  order  in  the 
world  of  living  substance. 

In  the  book  before  us  Professor  Delage  has  preserved  a  very  satis- 
factory balance  between  the  facts  concerning  the  cell,  the  individual, 
and  the  race  (300  pages)  and  the  theories  which  have  been  offered  to 
group  and  explain  them  (500  pages) .  He  has  put  himself  into  every 
page,  so  that  the  book  is  nowhere  a  mere  compilation ;  but,  more  than 
that,  his  extensive  review  has  enabled  him  to  render  valuable  judg- 
ment upon  theories  and  to  offer  a  highly  satisfactory  explanation  of  the 
cause  of  phylogenetic  differentiation. 

A  glance  at  the  table  of  contents  will  best  reveal  the  broad  scope 
of  the  book.  The  cell :  Its  constitution ;  its  physiology ;  its  reproduc- 
tion, including  the  relation  of  nucleus  to  cytoplasm.  The  individual : 
Regeneration ;  grafts ;  generation  by  fission  and  budding,  sexual  and 
asexual  reproduction;  ontogenesis;  metamorphosis  and  the  alternation 
of  generations ;  sex  and  the  secondary  sexual  characters ;  latent  char- 
acters; teratogenesis ;  correlation;  death,  immortality  and  the  germ- 
plasma.  The  race  :  Transmissibility  of  characters  innate  and  acquired 


BIOLOGICAL. 


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imetric  structure  ofprotopla 

ficelles,  Idioplasma  .... 
'uclear  idioplasm  .  . 

itracellular  pangenesis  .  .  . 

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'SXSIHaiMOHOIIM  "III  M 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  675 

and  of  transitory  states  in  the  parent;  concerning  telegony  and  xcny; 
heredity  in  asexual  and  sexual  generation,  in  close  unions,  in  hybridi/u- 
tion,  and  in  grafting;  variation,  its  sorts  and  its  causes;  the  facts  con- 
cerning the  origin  of  species.  In  the  second  part,  a  hundred  pages  are 
devoted  to  theories  relating  to  the  foregoing  phenomena.  In  the  third 
part,  the  general  biological  theories  are  explained  and  criticized. 
These  have  been  classified  by  Delage  as  in  the  accompanying  table. 

The  author's  own  '  theory  of  actual  causes'  is  now  brought  for- 
ward. The  course  of  ontogenesis  depends  not  only  upon  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  germinative  plasma,  but  also  upon  tropisms  and  tactisms, 
functional  excitation  and  the  various  external  conditions  of  develop- 
ment. The  origin  of  adaptation  in  species  is  not  due  to  the  summa- 
tion by  selection  of  favorable  individual  variations  for,  as  G.  Pfeffer  has 
pointed  out,  the  killing  off  in  selection  generally  occurs  during  im- 
maturity so  it  can  hardly  determine  the  adaptation  of  the  adult.  De- 
lage believes  that  sports  only  exceptionally  form  species,  at  least  they 
cannot  account  for  the  adaptation  so  characteristic  of  species.  The 
adaptive  specific  qualities  which  any  theory  of  the  origin  of  species 
must  recognize  and  explain  are  produced  as  follows:  Species  are 
variations  become  fixed.  Adaptive  variations  are  brought  about  by 
self  adaptation  (or  accommodation)  of  the  individual  under  the  influ- 
ence of  functional  excitation.  When  the  conditions  under  which  de- 
velopment occurs  change,  the  individual  adapts  itself  to  the  new 
excitations  it  encounters.  But  how  does  this  adaptation  in  the  indi- 
vidual bring  about  an  adaptation  in  the  species?  There  is,  strictly,  no 
species  adaptation  but  only  individual  adaptation.  Let  us  assume  a 
change  from  any  cause  in  the  germ  plasm.  This  change  is  adaptive 
or  non-adaptive.  If  adaptive  so  much  the  better  for  the  individuals ; 
if  unadaptive  the  individuals  will  not  all  die  off,  but  "the  individual 
efforts  will  be  more  energetic  and  more  sustained,  the  somatic  adapta- 
tion will  be  perfected  by  a  more  energetic  functional  excitation,  a  cer- 
tain number  of  individuals  will,  without  doubt,  succumb  among  the 
less  plastic  or  the  more  delicate,  and  thus  the  auto-regulation  of  the 
mean  number  of  individuals  of  the  species  will  be  effected,  but  the 
species  will  continue  none  the  less  to  live.  It  is  only  when  the  varia- 
tion is  radically  pernicious  that  it  will  succumb.  Usually  the  variation 
which  (through  correlation)  affects  necessarily,  although  to  very 
diverse  degrees,  all  parts  and  all  functions,  will  be  injurious  for  some, 
advantageous  for  others,  indifferent  for  most,  and  an  (individual)  com- 
pensation will  be  established  which  will  make  the  injurious  pass  under 
the  protection  of  the  advantageous." 


676  BIOLOGICAL. 

A  word  concerning  the  place  of  Delage's  theory.  It  is  confess- 
edly a  descendant  of  Roux's.  It  is  also  closely  related  to  George 
Pfeffer's  theory,1  differing  chiefly  in  that  it  lays  less  stress  upon  the 
selection  of  plasticity  in  the  organism. 

Enough  has  been  said  to  indicate  that  Delage's  book  is  valuable, 
not  merely  as  an  indispensible  encyclopedia  of  facts  and  bibliography, 
but  as  a  substantial  contribution  to  theoretical  biology. 

C.  B.  DAVENPORT. 
HARVARD  UNIVERSITY. 

The  Average  Contribution  of  Each  Several  Ancestor  to  the  Total 
Heritage  of  the  Offspring.     FRANCIS  GALTON.     Proceedings  of 
the  Royal  Society.     Vol.  61,  401-413.      (Read  June  3,  1897.) 
In  his  work  on  'Natural  Inheritance'  (1889)   Dr.  Galton  stated 
tentatively,  that  the  influence  of  each  parent  on  its  offspring  would  be 
one-fourth,  of  each  grandparent  one-sixteenth,  etc.     This  result  was 
deduced  from   a  discussion  of  his  data  on  human  stature,  and  he  an- 
nounced at  the  time  that  for  the  purpose  of  testing  it  he  had  in  prog- 
ress experiments  on  moths.     In  the  paper  before  us  Dr.  Galton  states 
that  the  experiments  on  moths  failed,  but  that  he  has  found  excellent 

1  Pfeffer's  theory  has  such  points  of  similarity  to  that  recently  proposed  by 
Baldwin,  that  it  may  be  worth  while  to  translate  here  Pfeffer's  own  summary  of 
his  theory,  which  is  to  be  found  in  the  '  Verhandlungen  des  Naturwissenschaft- 
lichen  Vereins  in  Hamburg,'  1893,  pages  44  to  87. 

"The  struggle  for  existence  rejects  all  pernicious  individuals  and  lets  sur- 
vive some  individuals  belonging  to  the  average  of  their  race ;  changes  in  the 
external  conditions  of  life  change  the  species,  since  they  change  the  average  of 
the  surviving  individuals,  impress  thus  upon  the  mass  of  the  species  a  different 
facies,  and  permit  them  to  appear,  alongside  of  their  relatives,  as  a  different 
race,  variety  or  species.  The  remaining  part  of  the  Darwinian  theory,  namely, 
the  gradual  production  of  new  races  and  species,  seems,  consequently,  unneces- 
sary; the  pristine  characteristic  Darwinian  principle  of  the  survival  of  fitness 
suffices  for  the  comprehension  of  the  form-changes  with  which  we  are  con- 
cerned." 

I  have  translated  by  '  survival  of  fitness,'  the  phrase,  '  Uberleben  des  Pas- 
senden.'  It  is  possible  that  '  fittingness '  or  capacity  for  accommodation  would 
have  given  the  idea  better.  This  conclusion  would  seem  to  be  justified  by  the 
following  words  of  Pfeffer  on  page  71  :  "Von  alien  jungen  Tieren  gehen  un- 
bedingt  diejenigen  zu  Grunde,  deren  korperliche  Verhaltnisse  nicht  zu  einer 
praktischen  Handhabung  der  erforderlichen  Eigenschaften  fur  das  jeweilige 
Leben  f  uhren ;  der  Kampf  urns  Dasein  merzt  die  mangelnde  Geschicklichkeit 
und  damit  die  mangelhafte  korperliche  Grundlage  und  deren  Besitzer  aus.  Also 
fiihrt  die  Veranderung  der  ausseren  Lebensbedingungen  zu  einer  immer  weiter 
fortschreitenden  Ausbildung  korperlicher  Verhaltnisse,  welche  einegeschicktere 
Bewegung  des  betreffenden  Tieres  unter  den  neuen  Bedingungen  ermdglichen." 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  677 

material  in  the  records  of  a  pedigree  stock  of  Basset  hounds.  These 
hounds  have  two,  and  only  two,  recognized  varieties  of  color — tran- 
sitional cases  being  very  rare — which  may  be  called  T  (tricolor)  and  N 
(non-tricolor).  With 817  cases  at  his  disposal,  Dr.  Gallon  could  trace 
the  ancestry  of  the  hounds  and  determine  the  influence  of  the  parents,  of 
the  grandparents,  and  (in  187  cases)  of  the  great-grandparents,  on  the 
offspring.  The  results  confirm  his  principle  with  surprising  accuracy. 
Thus,  for  example,  in  the  simplest  case,  where  one  parent  and  two 
grandparents  were  T,  one-half  the  offspring  (subject  to  a  slight  cor- 
rection for  an  excess  of  T  in  the  great-grandparents)  should  be  T, 
and  of  60  cases  36  were  T.  When  all  the  parents  and  grandparents 
were  T,  of  the  119  cases  108  should  be  T,  and  106  were  in  fact  T. 
The  grand  totals  give  in  the  cases  where  the  grandparents  were 
known  387  T,  as  compared  with  a  theoretical  391,  and  in  those  cases 
where  the  great-grandparents  were  known,  181  T,  as  compared  with  a 
theoretical  180.  In  this  special  case  the  hypothesis  is  fully  confirmed, 
and  it  may  fairly  be  called  a  law  of  heredity.  The  law  is  stated : 
"  The  two  parents  contribute  between  them,  on  the  average,  one-half 
or  (0.5)  of  the  total  heritage  of  the  offspring;  the  four  grandparents, 
one-quarter,  or  (0.5)*;  the  eight  great-grandparents  one-eight,  or 
(0.5)*,  and  so  on." 

It  should,  however,  be  noted  that  in  Dr.  Gallon's  material  we 
have  a  Irait  that  must  be  present  or  absent,  and  is  normally  pres- 
ent in  about  one-half  of  all  the  cases.  I  am  nol  sure  lhal  he  is 
justified  in  extending  Ihe  law  generally  lo  human,  animal  and  planl 
heredity.  If  the  Basset  hounds  were  crossed  with  mongrels  one-half 
of  the  offspring  would  not  be  T  or  N.  Dr.  Galton  has  himself  argued 
lhat  variations  obtained  by  artificial  selection  tend  lo  revert  to  the  racial 
mean,  even  when  maintained  for  a  long  series  of  generations,  and  in- 
dividuals having  such  variations  cannot  influence  Ihe  offspring  as 
much  as  is  required  by  Ihis  law.  I  should  suppose  lhat  the  greater 
the  departure  of  the  parent  from  the  mean  of  the  race,  or  Ihe  more 
rare  Ihe  varialion,  the  less,  as  a  rule,  would  be  its  potency  in  hered- 
ity. It  seems  to  me  that  the  stability  of  variation  must,  in  each  case, 
be  determined  by  observalion  or  experimenl,  Dr.  Gallon's  law  being 
too  simple  lo  fil  the  complexity  of  nalure. 

J.  McKEKN  CATTBLL. 
COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY. 


678  VOLITION  AND    GENERAL. 


VOLITION  AND   GENERAL. 

Voluntary  Action.     G.  F.  STOUT.      Mind,  July,    1896.     Pp.   354- 

366.    ' 
Types  of  Will.     ALEXANDER  F.   SHAND.     Mind,   July,  1897.     Pp. 

289-325. 

In  an  article  in  Mind,  October,  1895,  Mr.  Shand  maintained  that 
will,  though  analyzable  up  to  a  certain  point,  had,  in  the  last  resort,  a 
distinctive  quality,  incapable  of  further  analysis  or  description.  Mr. 
Stout  here  offers  as  an  alternative  the  theory  that  will  is  desire  quali- 
fied and  defined  by  a  certain  sort  of  judgment,  the  judgment,  namely, 
"  that,  so  far  as  in  us  lies,  we  shall  bring  about  the  attainment  of  the 
desired  end."  The  characteristic  difference  between  indecision  and 
decision  is  that  in  the  former  we  do  not  yet  know  what  we  are  go- 
ing to  do,  while  in  the  latter  we  do.  Mr.  Stout  explains  by  means  of 
this  conception  the  distinction  between  voluntary  and  involuntary  action 
which  Mr.  Shand  made  so  much  of.  Thus,  e.  g.,  the  sneeze  of  a 
soldier  marching  to  surprise  a  fortress  is  involuntary,  because,  although 
foreseen,  it  is  not  foreseen  as  something  he  desires  to  bring  about ;  the 
indulgence  of  a  morbid  appetite  may  express  the  volition  of  the  moment, 
but  may  be  regarded  as  involuntary  with  reference  to  the  man's  gen- 
eral volition,  etc. 

In  what  is  virtually  a  reply,  but  has  the  form  of  an  independent 
essay,  Mr.  Shand  endeavors  to  show  that  Stout's  theory  like  all  other 
general  theories  of  the  will,  fails  to  take  proper  account  of  different 
types  of  volition.  Urging  the  necessity  of  studying  these  before  rest- 
ing in  any  one  general  formula,  he  distinguishes  and  analyzes  a  num- 
ber of  volitional  types  and  arrives,  substantially,  at  the  following  con- 
clusions:  (I)  Simple  volition.  We  first  seem  to  have  will,  as 
distinguished  from  inferior  conations,  when,  along  with  the  idea  of  a 
desired  action,  we  have  the  judgment  that,  as  far  as  in  us  lies,  we  are 
going  to  realize  it.  This  agrees  with  Mr.  Stout's  formula.  Simple 
volition  is  the  state  described  without  doubt  or  conflict  of  motives ; 
complex  volition  is  the  state  described  preceded  by  such  doubt  or  con- 
flict. (II)  Will  as  negation.  The  above  definition  includes  only 
positive  judgments.  But  there  are  volitions  with  the  negative  judg- 
ment, I  am  not  going  to  do  this.  And  this  is  a  distinct  type ;  for 
though  logically  the  negative  judgment  implies  the  positive,  this  is  not 
true  psychologically.  The  psychological  accompaniment  of  negative 
volition  is  not  necessarily  a  contrary  positive  judgment,  but  a  contrary 
positive  conation.  We  must  accordingly  modify  our  definition  and 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  679 

say  that  the  distinguishing  character  of  will  is  either  a  judgment  that 
we  are,  or  a  judgment  that  we  are  not,  going  to  do  something,  or  it  is 
a  mixture  of  both  judgments.  (Ill)  Hypothetical  and  Disjunctive 
Will.  But  beside  volitions  of  the  categorical  type,  there  are  hypo- 
thetical and  disjunctive  volitions;  and  the  peculiarity  of  the  former  is 
that  they  do  not  affirm  that  we  are  going  to  do  anything,  while  the 
latter  affirm  that  we  are  going  to  do  one  thing  or  another.  Thus 
volitional  judgment  may  assume  a  variety  of  forms,  categorical,  hypo- 
thetical, disjunctive,  positive  and  negative.  But  the  characteristic  of 
will  is  not  in  the  form  of  the  judgment,  but  in  the  content,  namely,  in 
the  emphasis  on  the  agency  of  the  self  (which  is,  however,  not  pecu- 
liar to  will),  and  in  the  belief  that,  conditionally,  or  unconditionally, 
we  shall  try  to  do  (or  not  do)  something.  (IV)  Fictitious  Choice. 
Complex  volition,  or  choice,  is  so  defined  that  the  following  types 
must  be  taken  to  represent  not  real,  but  fictitious  choice,  (i)  A 
traveler  already  decided  to  take  the  shortest  road,  on  learning  that  this 
is  the  shortest,  decides  to  take  this.  Here  the  antecedent  conflict  is 
purely  intellectual.  (2)  He  had  not  previously  decided  on  the  short- 
est, but  on  learning  which  is  the  shortest,  at  once  decides  to  take  that. 
Here  blind  conation  develops  into  will  without  any  conflict  of  desire. 
(3)  A  youth  in  easy  circumstances  determines  to  choose  the  profession 
for  which  his  inclination  is  strongest,  but  is  in  doubt  as  to  which  is  his 
strongest  inclination.  Until  the  final  decision,  there  is  conflict  of  de- 
sires, but  no  conflict  of  motives ;  as  in  (i )  the  volition  becomes  definite, 
but  is  essentially  unchanged.  (4)  A  child  is  set  to  choose  between  two 
playthings.  If  we  assume  a  blind  conation,  at  the  start,  to  choose  *  the 
nicer,'  then,  here  too,  in  spite  of  the  conflict  of  desires  and  apparent 
motives,  the  final  volition  is  only  the  development  of  the  original 
conation.  In  all  four  types,  there  is  no  real  conflict  of  motives,  con- 
sequently no  real  choice.  The  judgment  is  made  up  and  defines  the 
conation ;  but  volition  may  run  counter  to  the  judgment,  choose  the 
worse,  etc.  (V)  Involuntary  Action.  The  most  interesting  cases 
are  ideo-motor  actions,  (i)  Actions  produced  suddenly  through  fear. 
If  we  maintain  Mr.  Stout's  definition  of  an  involuntary  action  and  re- 
quire the  simultaneous  existence  of  a  voluntary  resolution,  such  actions 
will  have  to  be  regarded,  not  as  involuntary,  but  only  as  non-volun- 
tary. (2)  Actions  produced  by  fear,  but  preceded  by  a  determination 
not  to  do  them.  (3)  Types  in  which  conflict  of  desire  is  present,  e.  g., 
the  soldier  endangering  his  own  life  and  the  army's  by  coughing. 
This  case  shows  plainly  that  the  distinctive  constituent  of  will  cannot 
be  the  judgment  that  we  are  going  to  do  something.  (4)  Possibly  types 


680  VOLITION  AND  GENERAL. 

involving  choice ;  but  an  unambiguous  case  is  hard  to  find.  (VI)  Will 
as  Imperative.  So  far  from  it  being  true  that  volition  is  essentially 
determined  by  the  judgment,  I  am  going  to  do  something,  some  volitions 
are  expressed,  not  by  a  judgment  at  all,  but  by  an  imperative.  Such 
imperative  volitions  always  have  for  their  object  the  control  of  another's 
conduct,  and  though  usually  simple,  they  may,  by  sympathy,  be  com- 
plex and  involve  choice.  This  type  cannot  be  eliminated  by  assuming 
that  imperatives  are  merely  means  for  getting  preformed  volitions  ac- 
complished, for  in  some  cases  the  conation  issues  in  the  imperative  too 
suddenly.  Nor  can  it  be  resolved  into  any  of  the  judgment  types ;  it 
is  a  unique  differentiation.  The  judgment  is  either  true  or  false,  the 
imperative  is  neither  true  nor  false.  Finally  (VII)  Desire  and  Will 
do  not  always  have  the  relation  ascribed  to  them  by  Mr.  Stout.  Will  is 
sometimes  determined,  not  by  desire,  but  by  the  less  strong  aversion. 
Thus  the  condemned  man  allowed  to  choose  the  form  of  his  execu- 
tion, actually  wills  to  do  what  he  desires  not  to  do,  since  he  desires  to 
escape  death  in  every  form.  There  are  in  fact  three  types  :  ( i )  desire 
is  the  motive;  (2)  desire  is  effaced  from  the  motive  (e. g.,  '  duty  for 
duty's  sak«.')  ;  (3)  desire  is  replaced  by  aversion. 

Issue  may  fairly  be  taken  with  some  of  these  contentions.  If, 
e.  g. ,  the  condemned  man  choose  to  be  shot  rather  than  hung,  it  seems 
incorrect  to  say  that  his  will  is  contrary  to  his  desire  because  he  does 
not  desire  to  be  shot.  He  does  not  will  to  be  shot  simply,  but  to  be 
shot  rather  than  hung.  He  is  averse  to  being  hung,  he  is  also  averse 
to  being  shot ;  but  he  has,  among  other  stronger  desires,  this  desire 
also,  to  get  through  with  the  disagreeable  necessity  in  the  least  ob- 
noxious way  possible  under  the  circumstances,  and  he  resolves  accord- 
ingly. In  regard  to  '  imperative  volition,'  it  maybe  doubted  whether, 
e.  g. ,  the  command  '  Do  this '  expresses  more  than  a  mere  wish  or  de- 
sire apart  from  the  implied  consciousness,  "I  am  determined  that,  as 
far  as  I  can  control  your  conduct,  you  shall."  Finally,  as  regards  the 
interpretation  of  the  soldier's  involuntary  cough  or  sneeze,  it  seems 
beside  the  mark  to  say  that  it  proves  that  the  fore-knowledge,  I  am 
about  to  do  this,  is  not  the  essential  character  in  will ;  for  nobody,  cer- 
tainly not  Mr.  Stout,  said  that  it  was.  TT  -^  GARDINER 
SMITH  COLLEGE. 

Genesis   of  Number   Forms.     D.  E.  PHILLIPS.     Amer.    Jour,    of 

Psychol.     VIII.,  4,  p.  506.     July,  1897. 

This  study  is  noticeable  for  the  fulness  of  its  material,  comprising 
returns  from  about  two  thousand  persons.     Half  of  these  (974)  were 


PYSCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  68l 

from  children  of  ten  to  sixteen  years  in  the  Worcester  grammar 
schools,  and  one-sixth  (332)  were  from  students  in  a  normal  school. 
Most  of  the  children  were  privately  questioned  and  precautions  were 
taken  against  their  *  imagining  forms  for  the  occasion.'  The  writer 
of  this  notice,  from  her  own  experience,  cordially  endorses  the  con- 
clusions of  Mr.  Phillips,  from  this  verification,  agreeing  with  him 
that  "after  giving  the  slightest  explanation,  a  close  observer  will 
hardly  fail  to  distinguish  every  one  having  distinct  number  forms. 
Those  who  have  no  form,"  the  author  adds,  "have  no  idea  of  what 
you  are  speaking.  *  *  *  Those  having  a  form  show  an  entirely  dif- 
ferent attitude." 

The  most  significant  result  of  the  paper  is  the  conclusion  of  Mr. 
Phillips  that  the  possession  of  mental  forms  is  no  sporadic  aberration 
of  a  few  individuals,  but  merely  the  pronounced  manifestation  of  a 
very  general  characteristic.  "There  is  no  more  reason,"  he  says,  "for 
isolating  these  mental  activities  from  a  much  larger  field,  than  there  is 
for  isolating  exceptional  cases  of  memory  or  imagination  from  these 
general  powers  of  the  mind."  The  statistics  of  the  study  do  not  at 
first  sight  lead  to  this  result,  for  only  sixteen  per  cent,  of  the  sub- 
jects claimed  a  number  form,  when  originally  questioned.  But  the 
attention  of  Mr.  Phillips  was  attracted  by  the  experience  of  Dr. 
Story  who  "  denied  that  he  had  a  number  form,  but  remarked  that 
large  numbers  appeared  far  off."  This  led  to  a  re-examination  of 
250  of  the  adults  of  the  former  investigation  who  had  denied  having 
a  form,  and  to  the  discovery  that  210  of  these  "have  a  feeling  that 
numbers  in  some  way  recede  from  them." 

This  result,  as  Mr.  Phillips  suggests,  not  only  shows  that  "  nearly 
all  persons  possess  some  idea  of  extension  of  numbers,  more  or  less 
indefinite,"  but  it  throws  some  light  on  the  baffling  subject  of  the 
psychology  of  numbers.  The  fact  that  the  most  primitive  number- 
form  seems  to  be  a  '  sensation  of  following  in  some  particular  direc- 
tion '  allies  the  numerical  series  with  the  tendency  of  motion.  The 
number-form  is  thus  an  indication  of  the  close  connection  between  the 
motor  and  the  spatial  image,  and  between  the  arithmetical  and  the 
geometrical  unit. 

The  universality  and  the  thoroughly  '  normal '  nature  of  the  num- 
ber-form is  indirectly  suggested  by  other  results  of  the  study  with 
which,  in  general,  the  statistics  of  similar  investigations  by  the  writer 
of  this  notice  very  definitely  agree.  In  the  first  place,  all  those  who 
remember  the  origin  of  these  forms  refer  them  to  ordinary  experiences 
in  learning  to  count  and  to  read  (p.  514).  Furthermore,  inquiry 


682  VOLITION  AND    GENERAL. 

fails  to  reveal  a  greater  proportion  of  forms  among  the  '  intellectually 
active,'  or  the  '  imaginative,'  which  suggests  that  the  form  is  not  the 
adjunct  of  the  riotous  fancy  merely.  The  permanence  of  forms  is 
shown  by  the  discovery  of  14  per  cent,  among  adults,  as  over  against 
only  1 8  per  cent,  among  children.  Finally,  the  utility  of  forms 
points  to  their  general  occurrence,  and  97  of  the  212  who  answered 
the  questions  of  Mr.  Phillips  are  sure  that  forms  are  helpful  in  the  men- 
tal life,  while  only  one  counts  them  '  troublesome.' 

The  study  of  Mr.  Phillips  is  valuable,  therefore,  because  it  tends 
to  lure  the  number-form  from  the  terra  more  or  less  incognita  of  the 
abnormal,  into  the  familiar  domain  of  the  normal  psychic  life. 

MARY  WHITON  CALKINS. 
WELLESLEY  COLLEGE. 

Sull  'Importanza    delle  Ricerche  Relative    alia   Storia  delle  Sci- 

enze.      GIOVANNI    VAILATI.      Torino,    Roux     Frassati    e    Co. 

1897.     Pp.  22. 

This  is  a  lecture  introductory  to  a  special  course  upon  the  history 
of  mechanics.  The  author  insists  that  an  intimate  knowledge  of  the 
historical  development  of  a  science  is  absolutely  necessary  to  a 
thorough  understanding  and  right  appreciation  of  its  present  day 
methods  and  results.  By  many  historical  instances  he  shows  how  the 
men  of  one  generation  have  been  indebted  to  the  labors  of  those  of 
preceding  generations,  for  methods  of  observation  and  experiment,  for 
proved  and  established  principles  and  laws,  for  working  formula?,  and 
for  a  vast  and  ever  increasing  accumulation  of  classified  facts,  and 
arranged  material.  He  illustrates  this  dependence  upon  the  past  by 
references  especially  to  the  history  of  mathematics  naturally  leading 
to  a  special  disquisition  upon  the  development  of  the  science  of  me- 
chanics, the  latter  being  the  author's  objective  end  in  view  throughout 
this  introductory  lecture.  He  draws  attention  to  the  fact  that  in  the 
European  universities  there  is  an  increased  number  of  courses  offered 
this  year  in  the  history  of  the  various  sciences.  This  signifies  the  im- 
portance which  is  now  attached  to  historical  research  as  an  aid  in  the 
present  development  of  science.  JOHN  GRIER  HIBBEN. 

PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY. 

Die  Assoziationsfestigkeit  in   ihrer  Abhangigkeit  von   der  Ver- 
teilung   der    Wiederholungen.      ADOLF  JOST.      Zeitschrift  fur 
Psychologic  u.   Physiologic   der    Sinnesorgane,    XIV.,    6.     pp. 
436-472. 
This  paper  gives  an  account  of  experiments  carried  on  in  the  Got- 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  683 

tingen  Psychological  Institute  with  the  view  of  investigating  the  rela- 
tive value  of  distribution  and  summation  of  repetitions  in  the  proccs* 
of  memorizing  series  of  nonsense  syllables.  The  experiments  were 
made  with  series  of  12  syllables  constructed  according  to  the  method 
employed  by  Miiller  and  Schumann  in  their  research  on  memory. 

The  first  experiments  were  directed  to  the  more  exact  investigation 
of  a  point  on  which  some  experiments  of  Ebbinghaus  had  already 
thrown  light,  viz.,  the  advantage  of  distributing  over  several  days  the 
total  number  of  repetitions  employed  in  learning.  In  one  group  of 
experiments  the  series  (  Cumulationsreiheri)  were  repeated  30  times 
on  one  day,  and  learned  by  heart  next  day ;  in  the  other  group  the  series 
(  Vertheilungsreiheri)  were  repeated  10  times  on  each  of  3  successive 
days  and  then  learned  by  heart  on  the  fourth.  The  result  was  that 
with  both  the  subjects  on  whom  the  experiments  were  made  the  num- 
ber of  repetitions  required  for  learning  the  series  by  heart  was  about 
15%  less  in  the  second  group  than  in  the  first.  The  next  set  of  ex- 
periments was  designed  to  show  whether  the  lesser  effectiveness  of 
the  accumulated  repetitions  was  due  to  fatigue  or  to  some  specific  new 
factor.  The  repetitions  in  this  group  (24  in  number)  were  so 
arranged  that  the  fatigue  incident  to  persistent  repetition  was  dis- 
tributed equally  over  the  Cumulations  and  Vertheilungsreihen 
which  were  read  in  the  same  hour.  Here  the  advantage  on  the  side 
of  distribution  was  not  so  great,  but  was  still  quite  marked. 

The  next  step  consisted  in  testing  the  value  of  various  forms  of 
distribution,  three  different  forms  being  tried,  viz.,  2  repetitions  on  12 
days,  4  on  6  days  and  8  on  3  days.  Here  the  strength  of  association 
was  tested  by  a  new  method  (Treflermethode}.  Six  syllables  from 
each  of  the  series  which  had  been  already  memorized  were  presented 
in  succession  to  the  subject,  who  was  required  to  name  the  sylla- 
bles which  had  followed  these  in  the  original  series;  the  reaction  time 
for  each  reproduction  was,  at  the  same  time,  determined  by  means  of 
Hipp  chronoscope  and  lip-key.  It  was  found  that  the  number  of  sylla- 
bles rightly  named  increased  progressively  with  the  extent  of  the  dis- 
tribution, being  greatest  where  the  24  repetitions  were  spread  over  1 2 
days.  The  reaction  time  was  longest  for  the  series  spread  over  3 
days;  the  effect  of  distribution,  however,  seemed  to  be  partly  obscured 
by  the  fact,  which  has  been  established  in  the  Gottingen  laboratory,  that 
older  associations,  though  more  correctly  reproduced,  have  longer  re- 
action times  than  those  more  recently  formed.  The  attempt  to  meas- 
ure the  value  of  varying  extent  of  repetitions  by  any  known  method 
is  declared  by  Jost  to  be  impossible.  In  regard  to  the  method  em- 


684  VOLITION  AND    GENERAL. 

ployed  by  me  in  the  research  on  '  The  Place  of  Repetition  in  Mem- 
ory,'1 he  remarks  that  any  given  number  of  repetitions  has  its  effect  not 
only  in  the  reproduction  of  certain  syllables,  but  in  a  certain  '  Hebung 
der  BereitschaftJ  of  others  which  are  not  reproduced;  this  latter 
factor,  however,  we  can  '  im  einzelnen  Falle  garnicht  beurtheilen.' 
It  is  true  that  we  cannot  in  any  particular  case  measure  this  supposed 
Hebung;  we  cannot  well  do  it  in  general,  for  it  is  something  which 
remains  below  the  threshold  of  consciousness.  But  this  does  not  de- 
stroy the  importance  of  the  fact  which  the  Miinsterberg  method  has 
established,  viz.,  that  the  number  of  syllables  which  are  actually  re- 
produced bears  a  definite  relation  to  the  number  of  prior  repetitions. 

The  next  experiments  were  devoted  to  proof  of  the  proposition  that 
if  two  associations  are  of  equal  strength,  but  of  different  ages,  a  new 
repetition  has  a  greater  effect  on  the  older  of  the  two  associations.  A 
number  of  series  (alte  Reihen)  repeated  30  times  on  one  day  were 
compared  next  day  by  the  Trejfermethode  with  other  series  (junge 
Reihen)  repeated  four  times  during  the  hour  in  which  the  first  series 
were  being  tested;  the  first  series,  it  was  found,  gave  fewer  right 
syllables"  and  took  longer  reaction  times  than  the  latter  series.  But  it 
was  found  at  the  same  time  that  with  other  series  arranged  in  the 
same  way,  but  tested  by  the  number  of  repetitions  required  for  learn- 
ing by  heart,  the  'old'  series  required  nearly  40%  fewer  repetitions 
than  the  '  young '  series.  The  last  question  which  was  experimentally 
investigated  was  more  practical :  what  is  the  most  economical  way  of 
learning  a  series  ?  In  one  set  of  experiments  the  series  were  repeated 
4  times  each  day,  while  in  another  set  they  were  repeated  twice,  and 
this  was  continued  with  the  series  until  each  was  learned.  The  result 
was  not  very  decided,  but,  so  far  as  it  went,  tended  to  show  that  the 
advantage  lay  with  the  wider  distribution. 

As  may  be  seen  from  the  foregoing  report,  the  experiments  furnish 
a  valuable  addition  to  the  scientific  knowledge  of  the  laws  of  memory. 
Their  value  for  educational  science  not  merely  in  direct  result,  but  in 
the  promise  of  further  development,  is  no  less  evident. 

SMITH  COLLEGE.  W.   G.   SMITH. 

Beitrdge  zur  speciellen  Dispositionstheorie.     STEPHAN  WITASEK. 

Archiv  fur  Systematische  Philosophic,  III.,  pp.  273-293. 
Beitrdge  zur  Psychologic  der  Komplexionen.     STEPHAN  WITASEK. 

Zeitschrift  fur  Psychologic  u.  Physiologic  der  Sinnesorgane,  XIV., 

6,  pp.  401-435. 

JThis  REVIEW,  III.,  p.  21. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   LITERATURE.  685 

In  these  two  articles  we  have  contributions  to  the  development  of 
various  elements  in  the  psychological  theory  of  the  school  which  hag 
Meinong  for  its  leading  representative.  In  the  first  article  Witasck 
discusses  the  classification  of  dispositions ;  in  the  second  the  chief 
subject  is  the  formation  of  Komplexionen  hohcrer  Ordnung,  of  more 
complex  synthetic  ideas. 

"The  modern  concept  of  disposition,"  says  Witasek,  "has  for  its 
content  *  *  *  the  causal  relation  between  a  relatively  persistent  prop- 
erty of  the  active  subject  (Dispositionsgrundlage)  as  cause  and 
its  product  (Disposttionscorrelat)  as  effect."  It  is  not  the  disposition, 
but  its  basis,  the  property  of  the  subject,  which  has  reality.  Modern 
physiology  and  psychology  are  recognizing  the  existence  of  disposi- 
tions ;  it  is  of  great  importance  to  attain  to  exact  notions  regarding 
the  dispositions  whose  interplay  is  evident  in  our  mental  life.  Psy- 
chology has  long  recognized  that  perceptions  are  the  correlate  of  an 
Empfindungsdisposition,  and  that  ideas  or  memory  images  are  the 
correlate  of  a  Reproductionsdisposition.  There  is  also  to  be  assumed 
a  disposition  corresponding  to  the  new  form  of  psychical  content  present 
in  the  Komplexionen,  or  complex  ideas.  But  these  complex  ideas  may 
arise  in  the  mind  either  by  way  of  direct  construction — first,  the  constit- 
uent elements,  then  the  new  connecting  element — or  indirectly,  in 
which  case  the  relation  is  the  primary  object, the  content  which  is  related 
arising  at  the  same  time.  Common  examples  of  the  latter  fact  are 
found  in  our  recollection  of  complex  related  content.  It  can  be  seen 
in  this  case  that,  when  once  the  relating  synthetic  activity  has  been 
operating,  a  disposition  to  the  renewal  of  that  activity  will  be  formed. 
But  analysis  becomes  more  difficult  when  we  consider  the  complex 
forms  of  combination  involved  in  imaginative  construction.  It  is  not 
sufficient  to  adduce  here  as  explanatory  factors  reproduction  of  un- 
related content  and  subsequent  relating  activity ;  for,  in  that  case,  the 
characteristic  feature  would  be  neglected — the  presence  as  a  primary 
object  of  the  form  or  ideal  outline  which  becomes  filled  up  by  further 
activity.  We  must  assume  that  in  imagination  or  phantasy  we  find  the 
operation  of  a  new  specific  disposition. 

Having  thus  given  his  grounds  for  assuming  three  dispositions  in 
the  domain  of  Komplexionen,  viz.,  the  dispositions  implied  in  the 
relating  activity  itself,  in  the  reproduction  of  complex  ideas  and  in 
imaginative  construction,  Witasek  proceeds  to  the  further  questions, 
whether  the  relating  activity  can  be  intensified  and  whether  it  can  lose 
its  effectiveness.  The  proof  for  an  affirmative  answer  to  the  first  ques- 
tion is  taken  chiefly  from  the  sphere  of  music ;  the  beginner  may  easily 


686  VOLITION  AND    GENERAL. 

fail  to  understand  a  musical  work  in  its  connection  and  complete  form, 
but  with  practice  his  power  of  understanding  and  appreciating  may  be 
greatly  increased.  In  many  lines  of  mental  activity  our  perception  of 
relations  is  already  so  thoroughly  trained,  when  we  begin  to  attend  to 
it,  that  an  improvement  can  with  difficulty  be  traced.  When  a  pre- 
viously attained  facility  is  lost  we  have  to  do  in  reality  not  with  a  loss 
of  faculty  but  a  loss  of  practice.  The  operation  of  such  factors  as  ex- 
haustion and  recovery  cannot  be  easily  demonstrated  ;  their  presence 
is,  however,  highly  probable. 

In  the  introduction  to  the  second  paper  Witasek  takes  up  the  ques- 
tion of  perception  of  change  in  connection  with  the  discussion  on  this 
subject  at  the  Psychological  Congress  in  Munich.  In  addition  to  in- 
direct or  ratiocinative  perception  of  change  Dr.  Stern  had  seemed  to 
distinguish  two  other  forms,  that  in  which  all  the  factors  of  change 
are  immediate  contents  of  consciousness — direct  or  specific  perception 
of  change — and  that  which  is  completed  in  momentary  perception. 
According  to  Witasek  the  last  two  forms  are  fundamentally  similar, 
the  essential  fact  in  both  being  the  presence,  in  addition  to  the  chang- 
ing sensational  content  and  in  inseparable  union  with  it,  of  a  new 
synthetic  content  which  has  no  correlate  in  the  series  of  physical 
stimuli,  and  which  is  in  reality  of  the  same  character  as  \kzfundierte 
Inhalte  for  which  Meinong  and  others  contend. 

The  proper  object  of  the  paper  is  the  investigation  of  two  problems 
in  regard  to  the  Komplexionen.  The  first  problem  is  this  :  how  are 
we  to  explain  the  fact  that  out  of  the  unconnected  manifold  of  sensa- 
tions which  we  receive  in  experience  certain  elements  are  singled  out 
and  combined  with  others  in  quite  definite  complex  ideas?  Take  a 
complex  musical  work  for  example :  the  manifold  of  tones  which  is 
heard  will  be  grouped  and  interpreted  in  various  ways  by  different 
individuals.  The  perceived  content  does  not  give  the  complete  reason 
for  the  different  groupings.  But  if,  on  the  other  hand,  we  appeal  to 
the  activity  of  the  subject  for  an  explanation,  we  seem  to  be  left  in 
danger  of  subjective  caprice.  Often,  indeed,  the  forms  and  connec- 
tions of  what  is  perceived  seem  fixed  apart  from  choice ;  on  the  other 
hand,  in  such  processes  as  comparing,  relating  and  imaginative  con- 
struction the  subject  is  evidently  an  active  participant.  Where  the 
subject  apparently  has  no  choice  there  are  in  the  perceived  content 
determining  factors  such  as  '  weight '  of  an  idea  and  likeness  among 
elements,  which  influence  the  attention  and  the  relating  activity. 
Where  such  moments  in  the  complex  of  tones  are  weaker  a  certain 
effort  is  required  to  appreciate  the  music ;  here  it  is  the  function  of  a 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  LITERATURE.  687 

subjective  synthetic  activity  to  bring  to  completion  the  connections 
which  are  obscurely  indicated.  It  is  in  this  activity  that  Witasck 
finds  the  true  ground  for  the  more  complex  ideal  formations.  Anal- 
ysis plays  its  part  in  preparing  the  material  for  the  relating  activity. 
But  where,  as  in  music,  we  have  to  resist  the  wrong  combinations 
which  press  themselves  on  our  attention  and  expend  effort  in  realizing 
the  true  interpretation,  there  it  is  evident  that  a  specific  synthetic 
activity  of  the  subject  is  in  operation. 

The  second  discussion  is  devoted  to  a  comparison  of  discrimina- 
tion, as  it  affects  on  the  one  hand  the  constituent  elements  of  a 
complex  idea  and  on  the  other  the  form,  shape  or  relation  in  the  idea 
itself.  From  a  consideration  of  further  examples  in  the  domain  of 
music  Witasek  concludes  that  in  the  comparison  of  two  complex 
objects  the  difference  between  the  parts  may  be  evident,  and  yet  the 
difference  between  the  forms  and  total  relations  of  the  two  objects 
may  be  below  the  threshold.  In  some  cases  we  seem  to  be  able  to 
manipulate  and  determine  the  complex  forms  more  readily  and 
securely  than  the  parts,  yet  if  we  examine  more  closely  we  shall  see 
that  in  no  case  do  we  really  have  perceptible  difference  of  forms 
where  the  parts  cannot  be  discriminated ;  what  is  lacking  to  the  parts 
is  only  attentive  analysis.  In  cases  where,  while  noticing  the  differ- 
ence of  the  parts,  we  wrongly  assert  an  identity  of  the  forms,  there 
we  are  again  misled  by  lack  of  analysis  and  by  too  great  attention  to 
common  elements.  Language  often  fails  to  give  needed  help  to  an- 
alysis. 

This  brief  account  of  Witasek's  argument  will  show  in  what  direc- 
tion the  'new  way  of  ideas'  is  tending.  The  main  characteristic 
seems  to  be  a  tendency  to  assume  a  new  psychical  content  or  activity 
where  there  appears  a  well  marked  feature  or  grouping  of  content 
which  does  not  include  in  its  immediate  context  all  the  conditions  of 
its  realization.  But  whatever  their  ultimate  worth  may  be,  such  de- 
velopments are  valuable  in  calling  attention  to  that  neglected  chapter, 
the  psychological  analysis  of  the  more  complex  processes  of  thought 
and  ideal  activity. 

W.  G.  SMITH. 

SMITH  COLLEGE. 


688  NEW  BOOKS. 

NEW  BOOKS. 

Hypnotism  and  Its  Application  to  Practical  Medicine.  O.  G. 
WETTERSTRAND.  Translated  by  H.  G.  Peterson.  With  letters 
on  Hypno-Suggestion,  by  the  translator.  New  York  and  London, 
Putnams.  1897.  Pp.  xvii+i66.  $2. 

The  Psychology  of  the  Emotions.  TH.  RIBOT.  English  translation 
in  Contemp.  Science  Series.  London,  W.  Scott;  New  York, 
Scribners.  1897.  Pp.  xix+455.  $1.25. 

Hallucinations  and  Illusions.  E.  PARISH.  London.  English 
translation  in  Contemp.  Science  Series.  London,  W.  Scott ;  New 
York,  Scribners.  1897.  Pp.  xiv+39O.  $1.25. 

Magic,  Stage  Illusions  and  Scientific  Diversions,  Including  Trick 
Photography.  Compiled  by  A.  A.  HOPKINS.  With  Introduc- 
tion by  H.  R.  Evans,  and  four  hundred  illustrations.  New  York, 
Munn  &  Co.  1897.  Pp.  xii+556.  $2.50. 

The  New  Psychology.  E.  W.  SCRIPTURE.  Contemp.  Science 
Series.  London,  W.  Scott;  New  York,  Scribners.  1897.  Pp. 
xxiv+5oo.  $1.25. 

Ethische  Principienlehre.  H.  HOFFDING.  Bonn,  Siebert.  1897. 
Pp.  64.  M.  .60. 

L'Annee  Philosophique ;  Septieme  Annee.  1896.  F.  PILLON. 
Paris,  Alcan.  1897.  Pp.  316.  Fr.  5. 

L?  Evolution  des  Idees  Generales.  TH.  RIBOT.  Paris,  Alcan. 
1897.  Pp.  260.  Fr.  5. 

I  Riflesse  vascolari  nelle  Membra  e  nel  Cervello  dell'uomo.  M. 
L.  PATRIZI.  Reggio  Emilia,  Calderini.  1897.  Rep.  from  Riv. 
Sper.  di  Freniat.  Pp.  85. 

Zur  Psychologie  der  logischen  Grundthatsachen.  H.  GOMPERZ. 
Leipzig,  Deuticke.  1897.  Pp.  103.  M.  2. 

Introduction  to  Philosophy.  O.  KULPE.  Trans,  by  W.  B.  PILLS- 
BURY  and  E.  B.  TITCHENER.  London,  Sonnenschein ;  New  York, 
Macmillans.  1897.  Pp.  x-f-245.  $1.60. 

The  Conception  of  God.  J.  ROYCE,  J.  LE  CONTE,  G.  H.  Howi- 
SON,  S.  E.  MEGES.  Publications  Phi losoph.  Union  Univ.  of  Cali- 
fornia. Vol.  I.  New  York  and  London,  Macmillans.  1897. 
Pp.  xxxviii+354.  $1.75. 

Darwin  and  after  Darwin.  III.  Isolation  and  Physiological 
Selection.  G.  J.  ROMANES.  Chicago,  Open  Court  Co.  1897. 
Pp.  vi-fi8i.  $i. 


NOTES.  689 

Raumcesthetik  und  geometrisch-optische  Tduschungen.  Til. 
LIPPS.  Schriften  der  gesell.  f.  psych.  Forschung,  heft  9-10  (II 
Sammlung).  Leipzig,  Earth.  1897.  Pp.  viii-f  424.  M.  12. 

The  Subconscious  Self  and  its  Relation  to  Education  and  Health. 
L.  WALDSTEIN.  New  York,  Scribners.  1897.  Pp.  171.  $1.25. 

Richerche  psicofisiologiche  sulVAttenzione.  S.  DE  SANCTIS.  Roma, 
Tip,  Innocenzo  artero.  1897.  Pp.  48. 

II  Tempo  di  Reagione  Semplice.  M.  L.  PATRIZI.  Reggio-Emilia, 
Calderini.  1897.  Pp.  15. 

A  Study  of  Puzzles.  E.  H.  LINDLEY.  Diss.  for  Doctorate,  Clark 
Univ.  (Rep.  from  Amer.  Journ.  of  Psych.),  VIII,  4.  1897. 

The  Impersonal  Judgment.  S.  F.  MACL.ENNAN.  Diss.  for  Docto- 
rate, Chicago  Univ.,  Chicago  Univ.  Press.  1897.  Pp.  49. 

The  Psychic  Development  of  Young  Animals.  Cortical  Cerebral 
Localization.  The  Functional  Development  of  the  Cerebral 
Cortex.  WESLEY  MILLS.  Three  papers  reprinted  from  Trans. 
Roy.  Soc.,  Canada.  Vol.  II. ,  Sec.  IV.  1896. 

Sixteenth  Annual  Report  of  the  Bureau  of  Ethnology,  1894- 
I^95-  J-  N.  POWELL  Director,  Washington,  Gov.  Print.  Office. 
1897.  Pp.  cxix+326. 

Sleep:  its  Physiology,  Pathology,  Hygiene  and  Psychology. 
MARIE  DE  MADACEINB.  Contemp.  Science  Series.  London, 
W.Scott;  New  York,  Scribners.  1897.  Pp.  vii+34i.  $1.25. 

Social  and  Ethical  Interpretations  in  Mental  Development.  A 
Study  in  Social  Psychology.  J.  MARK  BALDWIN.  New  York 
and  London,  Macmillans.  1897.  Pp.  xiv+574«  $2.60. 


NOTES. 

A  LABORATORY  for  experimental  psychology  has  been  opened  in 
the  Illinois  Eastern  Hospital  for  the  Insane,  at  Hospital,  111.,  under 
the  direction  of  Dr.  W.  O.  Krohn,  who  has  given  up  his  position  in 
the  University  of  Illinois. 

THE  Zeitschrift  f.  Psychologic u.  Phys.  der  Sinnesorganc\*  now 
published  by  Earth,  Leipzig.  The  same  firm  will  also  publish  Helm- 
holtz'  Vorlesungen  iiber  theoretische  Physik,  and  the  series  of 
Abhandlungen  zur  Physiologic  der  Gesichtsempfindungen,  edited 
by  v.  Kries,  of  which  the  first  number  has  already  appeared  (M.  5). 


690  NOTES. 

FRANCIS  KENNEDY,  PH.D.,  Leipzig,  has  been  appointed  demon- 
strator in  experimental  psychology  in  Princeton  University. 

IN  the  current  number  (Bd.  III.,  Heft.  4)  of  the  Arch.  f.  Syst. 
Philosophic,  there  is  issued  a  Bibliographic  der  gesamten  philoso- 
phischen  Literatur  for  the  year  1896,  comprising  1831  titles. 

All  communications  for  the  editors  of  THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  RE- 
VIEW, together  with  books,  reprints,  etc.,  intended  for  review,  should 
be  sent,  during  the  year  beginning  November  i,  1897,  to  Professor  J. 
McK.  Cattell,  Garrison-on-Hudson,  New  York. 


INDEX  OF   NAMES. 


The  number*  are  in  italics  for  contributors  ;  in  heavy  Roman  type  for  the  author*  reviewed,  mad 
in  thin  Roman  type  for  names  mentioned  in  the  notes. 


Abelsdorff,  93 

Adamson,  E.,  535 

Amberg,  558 

Armstrong,  Jr.,  A.  C.,  121,  198,  452, 

529 

Arrer,  547 
Aschaffenburg,  329 
Avenarius,  229 

Baker,  S. ,  272 

Baldwin,  H.  G.,  88 

Baldwin,  J.  M.,  76,  220,  299,  340,  401, 

482,  660 
Bettmann,  558 

Binet,  54,  88,  88,  99,  322,  568 
Boas,  213 

Bosanquet,  B. ,  317 
Bouneville,  224 
Breuer,  539 
Bryan,  27 
Burch,  430 
Bussell,  79 

Calkins,  331,  439,  443,  682 

Cameron,  392 

Carstenjen,  229 

Cattell,  U4,  2/8, 299,  307,  339,  547,  677 

Chrisman,  213 

Chrysostom,  119 

Claviere,  230 

Cohn,  532 

Conklin,  322 

Cope,  340 

Couetoux,  223 

Crawford,  J.  F.,  339,  673 

Creighton,  124. 

Crookes,  535 

Curtis,  106 

Davenport,  E.  B.,  676 

Dearborn,  391,  454 

Delabarre,  96,  326,  327,  455,  615 

Delage,  106,  673 

Dewey,  437 

Dodge,  326 

Drew,  209 

Dugas,  443 

Dumas,  G.,  97 

Ebbinghaus,  426 
Egger,  101 


Ellis,  447,  541,  568 
Erdmann,  J.  E.,  336 

Falckenberg,  310 

Farrand,  fo8,  2/2,  298,  324 

Ferrero,  212 

Fick,  93 

Fischer,  339 

Flournoy,  106,  205 

Foucault,  332 

de  Fougeray,  223 

Franklin,  C.  L.,  96,  121,  223,325,  435, 

S4',  543,  <>43 
Franz,  452,  561 
Frazer,  A.  C.,  307 
v.  Frey,  564 
Friedrich,  558 
Fuchs,  221 
Fullerton,  /,  fjo,  405,  JJ/,  535 

Galton,  F.,  676 

Gardiner,  90,  97,  102,  418,  438,  680 

Giddings,  660 

Giessler,  549 

Griffin   76 

Griffing,  S32,  S66 

Guillery,  94 

Griinbaum,  430 

Halevy,  203 

Hall,  J.  S.,428 

Hall,  W.  S.,  555 

Halleck,  85,  105 

Harmon,  7/7 

Hart,  88 

Harter,  27 

Hawkins,  294 

Haycroft,  539 

Keine,  664 

Herrick,  C.  L.,  296,  567 

Heymans,  44» 

Hibben,  87, 126, 336,  339, 536,  Jj6, 660 

682 

Hill,  A.  R.,  567 
Hobhouse,  519 
Hodder,  541 
Hodge,  C.  W-.45a.J9' 
Hoffding,  197 
Howell,  216,  553 
Hvlan,  567 
Hyslop,  77,  14* 


692 


INDEX  OF  NAMES. 


James,  W.,  227,  246,  316,  527,  637,  638 

Jastrow,  445 

Jodl,  300 

Johnson,  R.  B.,  79,  229 

Jones,  G.,  668 

Jost,  682 

Jovanovich,  201 

Judd,  200,  374 

Kennedy,  F.,  689 
Kirkpatrick,  105 
Kirschmann,  340 
Klein,  106 
Kohn,  87 
Kottgen,  93 
Kraepelin,  558 
v.  Kries,  324 
Krebs,  229 
Krohn,  689 
Kurella,  102 

Ladd,  182,  340,  647 
Lange,  C.,  102 
Lange,  K.,  668 
Lasswitz,  310 
Learning,  322 
LeBon,  313 
LeConte,  J.,  543 
Leuba,  103"" 
Lewis,  77j>,  316 
Lloyd,  A.  H.,  164 
Logan,  R.  R.,  615 
Lombroso,  C.,  212 
Lombroso,  P.,  24 
Lough,  in,  338 
Lukens,  214,  216,  430 

Mach,  229,  419 
MacLennan,  203 
MacTaggart,  193 
McWhood,  100 
Marbe,  435 
Marshall,  H.  R.,  420 
Marty,  671 
Mason,  448 
Matsumato,  452 
Metscher,  go 
Merz,  309 
Mezes,  568 
Michaelis,  go 
Miller,  D.  S.,  122,654 
Mills,  W.,  92,  775,  779 
Minot,  313 
Moore,  K.  C.,^8 
Moore,  M.,  558 
Morgan,  Lloyd,  312 
Morselli,  E.,  655 
Mosso,  230 
Muir,  567 
Miinsterberg,  339 

Nagel,  W.  A.,  325 
Newbold,  90,  449 


Nichols,  82 
Noyes,  447 

Ormond,  81, 129,  231,  424 

Pace,  209,  409,  jj-/ 
Parish,  E.,  657 
Parrish,  561,  568 
Parsons,  W.  E.,  82 
Patrick,  305 
Patton,  G.  S.,  426 
Peabody,  F.  G.,  309 
Pergens,  93 
Peterson,  225 
Phillips,  P.  E.,  680 
Pillsbury,  340,  451,  536 
Poulton,  218 
Preyer,  W.,  567 

Quantz,  446 

Reed,  A.  Z. ,  613 
Rehmke,  200 
Reichard,  g6 
Richet,  87 
Riehl,  229 
Rivers,  558,  567 
Robertson,  G.  C.,  306 
Robinsohn,  211 
Royce,  451 

de  Sanctis,  568,  659 

Sanford,  7/9,  ^77,  420 

Santayana,  43g,  539 

Saunders,  86 

Schenck,  430 

Schiller,  F.  C.  S.,  125,  796,  452 

Schiller,  H.,  230,  666 

Schopenhauer,  86 

Schrenk-Notzing,  447 

Schurman,  192 

Scripture,  545,  568 

Seashore,  452,  525,  666 

Sergi,  452,  538,  568 

Seth,  J.,  82,  125,  230 

Shand,  678 

Sherman,  567 

Sherrington,  53g 

Shields,  208 

Sickenberger,  335 

Sidgwick,  H.,  654 

Simmara,  230 

Simmons,  201 

Singer,  770,  250 

Sloane,  422 

Smith,  W.  G.,  684,  687 

Solomons,  246 

Spindler,  454 

Spitzer,  H.,  668 

Stanley,  77,  93,  421 

Starr,  M.  A.,  322 

Sterrett,  J.  D.,  76,  229 


INDEX  OF  NAMES. 


693 


Stetson,  289 

StttrHng,  100 

Stout,  410,  678 

Stratton,  187,  331,  341,  463, 564 

Strong,  C.  A.,  133 

Strong,  O.  S.,  322 

Stumpf,  106 

Symonds,  J.  A.,  447 

Tawney,  86,   106,  112,  312,   436,  549, 

562,  j-?/ 
ThieVy,  96 

Thompson,  D.  G.,  567 
Thompson,  H.  B.,  207 
Titchener,  105 
Trout,  205,  235,  445 
v.  Tschisch,  327 
Tucker,  538 
Tufts,  318,  664 

Ubthoff,  664 

Ueberhorst,  220 

Urban,  361,  452,  646,  677 

Vailati,  682 


Vaschide,  J4,  230 
Void,  549 

Walker,  W.  H.,  81 
Wallace,  229 
Ward,  229 

Warren,  105,  329, 353*  369 
Washburn,  8j 
Watson,  J.,  422 
Weber,  A.,  74 
Welton,  335 
Wenley,  j/o,  337,  424 
Wentscher,  198 
Wernicke,  225 
Weyer,  452 
Wilde,  191 
Wilson,  E.  B.,  318 
Witasek,  438,  684 
Witmer,  116 
Wolfe,  452 
Woodworth,  526 
Wundt,  643 

Ziehen,  230 


INDEX  OF  SUBJECTS. 


Accommodation,  Optical,  547 
Esthetics,  189,  439,  445,  668 
Agnosticism  and  Religion,  192 
Alterations  of  Personality,  88,  447 
Analytic  Psychology,  410 
Analysis  of  Sensations,  419 
Animal  Psychology,  92,  115 
Apperception,  536 
Art,  668 

Association,  329,  682 
Attention,  87,  209,  659 

Beauty,  439 

Biology,  673 

Biological  Determination,  516 

Blind,  391 

Blots  of  Ink,  390 

Blood-pressure,  55  ;  flow,  208 

Causality,  198 

Cell,  318",  322 

Central  Nervous  System,  85 

Cerebral  Circulation,  119 

Children,  Abnormal,  223 

Child  Psychology,  213,  555 

Christianity  and  Idealism,  422 

Clearness,  332 

Color  Sense,  94,  430 ;    ^Esthetics   of, 

445.  539,  641 
Color-blindness,  93,  121 
Columbia  University  Researches,  114 
Comic,  442 

Consciousness  and  Evolution,  420 
Convergence,  547 
Counting,  Reaction  Time  of,  569 
Criminals,  212 
Cutaneous  Sensibility,  247,  561,  564 

Darwin,  218 
Depression,  102 
Determinate  Evolution,  393 
Discrimination,  247 
Double  Point  Threshold,  591 
Dreams,  524,  549 

Education  of  Nervous  System,  85 

Effort,  439 

Emotion,  439 

Epilepsy,  224 

Erythropsia,  221 

Ether,  Experiences  under,  119 

Ethics,  125 

Evolution,  393,  420 


Eye-movements,  325 
Eye-phethysmograph,  119 

Fatigue,  558 

Fechner,  311 

Feeling,  97,  100,  189 

Force  and  Rapidity  of  Movement,  615 

Genetic,  555 

Hallucination,  655,  657,  659 

Hearing,  Tests  of,  134 

Hedonism 

Hegelian  Dialectic,  193 

Heredity,  673,  676 

History  of    Philosophy  of    Thought, 

74,  200,  309 
Hypnotism,  88 
Hysteria,  224 

Idealism,  422 

Identification  of  the  Self,  272 

Image,  Language  and,  67;  retinal,  342  ; 

of  Blind,  391 

Immediate  Inference,  126 
Impersonals,  200 
Inference,  126 
Infinity,  532 
Instinct,  214 
Intellectual  Work,  55 
Intensity  of  Sensation,  in,  258 
Involuntary  Whispering,  654 
Irreversibility  of  Psychic  Phenomena, 

203 

Judgment,  250,  260,  335 

Kierkegaard,  197 
Knowledge,  Stages  of,  164 
Knower  in  Psychology,  I 

Laboratory  Studies,  Harvard,  246,  453, 

615 ;  Princeton,  569 
Language,  telegraphic,    27 ;     L.     and 

Image,  67 
Logical,  231,  335,  535,  671 

McCosh's  Life,  422 
Measurements,  tests  and,  133 
Memory,  119,  285,  294,  327 
Mescal  Intoxication,  541 
Mind  and  Body,  90,  121,  123 
Motor  Reaction,  453 


INDEX  OF  SUBJECTS. 


695 


Movement,  113,  538,  Force  and  Ra- 
pidity of,  615 

Natural  Selection,  218 

Neurology,  318 

Nervous  System,  85 

New  Books,  103,  227,  338,  449,  566,  688 

Negative,  the,  129,  231 

Notes,  105,  220,  339,  449,  451,  567,  689 

Number  and  Space,  82 

Number  Forms,  680 

Optical  Illusions,  96 
Organic  Selection,  393 

Pain,  250,  405,  564 

Parallelism,  198 

Pathology,  101,  223 

Pedagogical,  426,  666 

Perception  of  depth,  547 

Personality,  81 ;  Alterations  of,  88, 
447.  5i6- 

Pessimism,  125 

Philosophy,  History  of,  74,  200;  in 
American  Colleges,  121 ;  recent,  422  ; 
Phil,  of  knowledge  (Ladd's),  647 

Photometry,  539 

Physiology,  Dictionary  of,  87 ;  text- 
book of,  216,  318 

Power  of  thought,  76 

Practice,  112,  562 

Preperception,  262 

President's  Address,  r,  130;  discussed, 
187,  402 

Pressure  sensation,  331,  564 

Pseudoptics,  547 

Psychiatrics,  225 

Psychical  Research,  445,  535,  654 

Psychological  Association,  101 

Psychology,  animal,  92,  115;  practical 
work  in,  116;  Lehrbuch  by  Jodl, 
301;  elements  by  Robertson,  306; 
social,  313  ;  of  sufficient  reason,  361 ; 
Stout's,  410;  of  effort,  437;  of  so- 
cial organization,  482 ;  for  schools 
(Sergi),  538 

Psychophysical  tests,  117;  of  races, 
211 

Race  psychology,  211 
Reaction  time,  113,  205,  297 ;  of  count- 
ing. 569 
Realism,  643 


Religion,  192 
Repetition,  682 
Retina,  93 

School  of  Plato,  79 

Science,  682 

Self,  272 

Sensation,  no,  in,  250,  419 

Sexual  feeling,  447 

Sight  (LeConte),  543;  see  Vision 

Sleep,  549,  553,  641 

Social  Heredity,  393 ;  s.  progress,  309 ; 

6.  organization,  482 
Social  Psychology,  313,  6£o 
Space,  Number  and,  82 
Stages  of  Knowledge,  164 
Stimulation  of  Retina,  430 
Subliminal  Self,  448 
Sufficient  Reason,  361 
Synthesis,  684 

Telepathy,  448,  535,  654 
Temperament,  684 
Temperature  Sensation,  256,  285 
Tests,  117,  132,  285 
Telegraphic  Language,  27 
Theology  and  Theism,  424 
Threshold,  112,  591 
Thought,  Power  of,  76 
Thought-Tranference,  654 
Theism,  307,  424 

Theory  of  Knowledge  (Hobhouse),528 
Timidity,  443 

Touch,  tests  of,  134,  250,  562 
Transcendental  Ego,  124 
Types,  in  reaction,  205,  291 ;  of  mem- 
ory, 385 

Upright  Vision,  71,  143,  182,  342,463 

Vexirfehler,  112,  562 

Vision,  71,  93,  96,  182,  220,  324,  430, 

539.  543.  664.  tests  of.  '33.  M35 
without  inversion,  342,  463;  binocu- 
lar, 375 

Visceral  disease,  405 

Volition,  437,  438,  678 

Weber's  Law,  522 

Will,  freedom  of,  90;  w.  to  believe 
(James)  527 

Word-memories,  326 

Work,  mental,  55,  208,  558 


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